War as the result of Human Nature: States that war is the outcome of the very nature of human beings. Supported by Confucius to present day behavioral scientists. Implication: to prevent war one must change human nature! Optimists: human nature can be modified to make war less likely Pessimists: Human nature cannot be changed and war is inevitable. Things that could be done to Change Human Nature: Offer alternatives to war i.e.: demanding physical activities. Education: humans to be educated with a love of peace and hatred of war (there are human societies where war is unknown). Cultural exchanges (better understanding between peoples). Screen Potential leaders: ensure that they are not predisposed towards violence. Criticisms: Human nature is infinitely variable…far too general for any practical use. If war is caused by human nature then so is peace. War as the Result of the Internal Structure of States: Argues that wars are caused by ‘bad states´ i.e.: an unpopular government engages in a war against another state in an attempt to promote internal unity. What is a ‘bad state´? In recent past bad = autocratic. More difficult to define what constitutes a ‘good state’. Marxists define it in economic terms. Good state is one in which there is a fair distribution of wealth. USA and allies define it in political terms based on multi-party democracy; sovereignty of people … Fundamentalists Islam defines it in terms of states which base itself upon the word of God. Therefore, this theory has not much practical value when attempting to eliminate war. War as the result of the Structure of the State System: Argues that war is the result of the nature of relations between states, i.e.: Gov. of a state will represent its own interests and in the event of a serious clash in interests there will be war. Implications: Groupings of states in an attempt to promote the wellbeing of all / establishment of an alliance which would deter attack on an individual state / disarmament programs (i.e.: NATO, Non-Proliferation treaty). Transfer of authority from national Gov. to regional or global organizations (i.e.: EC, UN). World Government! Criticisms: Alliances in the past arguably have been as much responsible for the outbreak of war as they have been useful in preventing it. It does not address the most common form of warfare since 1945: civil war. The Origins of the First World War 1. German Responsibility: Fischer’s View: (German Historian) Germany is responsible for the war because of its aggressive pursuit of its weltpolitik. Germany willed the war in order to realize expansionist ambitions and to resole an acute domestic crisis. Fear of ‘encirclement´ after the Triple Entente and Russian army reforms meant that ‘a moment so favorable from a military point of view might never occur again´. Germany put pressure on Austria-Hungary to retaliate against Serbia (even if it meant General war) ß ‘blank cheque´ Criticism of Fischer: German policy before 1914 seems contradictory and lacking in clear aims. No evidence that German leader help expansionist aims before the ‘September Programme´ (which Fischer uses to explain the German desire for war) Places too much importance on the domestic crisis in the decision to launch a war in 1914 Bulow and Hollweg dismissed war as a solution to the socialist problem. More Correct View: Distinguish between Germany’s contribution to the growth in international tensions from 1900-13 with her role during the July crisis itself. All Governments were responsible for tension until 1914 but not equally responsible for the fatal turn of events — for which Germany was culpable. 2. The Responsibility of Other Powers: Austro-Hungary: Contributed to the conflict in the Balkans by lengthy delays in responding to Sarajevo. (i.e.: the ultimatum to Serbia was not delivered until almost a month after Sarajevo.). Declaration of war on Serbia came only 5 days after ultimatum. Refused to halt military operations (as Kaiser suggested) even though talks with Russia were scheduled for July 30. Russia: Clear that Russia was the expansionist force in the Balkans. Unable (unwilling?) to restrain/control Slav nationalism even though it was a force endangering peace and stability in Europe. Balkan Wars might have been a ‘war by proxy´ for Russia. Promise of support to Serbia (influenced decision to reject the ultimatum) France: (not a crucial role) Promised French support to Russia (but this was more the work of French ambassador in Russia rather then official policy from Paris). Hopes of recovering Alsace-Lorraine was worth fighting for but not sufficient for wanting war. Britain: (not a crucial role) Underestimated gravity of crisis in late July. Maybe a clearer statement of British intent to support France would have restrained Berlin. Naval talks with Russia convinced the German Chancellor that the ‘ring of encirclement´ was complete. The Balkans; Tension between Russia and Austria-Hungary. (A-H´s prestige depended on its influence in the Balkans). Pan-Slavism / nationalism Do NOT in themselves explain how an Austro-Serb dispute escalated into a general European war. Alliances, International Anarchy, and Armaments: The system of alliances helps explain why so many powers became involved in the war of 1914. After her isolation at the Algeciras conference, Germany realized that A-H was virtually her only ally and the alliance w/ A-H took on a new importance. (blankcheque of 1914 transformed a defensive alliance into an offensive one). Similarly France gave a ‘blank cheque´ (1912) to Russia turning a defensive alliance into an offensive one. The importance of the alliance systems was not its existence but rather that their defensive nature had been altered. Alliance system reduced flexibility of responses in the event of a crisis (i.e.: German response to Franco-Russian alliance was the Schlieffen Plan, therefore the answer to a Russian threat was to invade France!) However in some respects the alliance system was in some disarray in early 1914 (i.e.: Britain disenchanted w/ agreement w/ Russia over Persia // Britain still did not support France by July 1914). Yet the system of alliances had been successful before at preventing conflicts and maintaining an aspect of a balance of power. Why did war break out in 1914? One answer is that Germany was intent on war in 1914 (and thus rejected most proposals for mediation in 1914). Germany could not tolerate a diplomatic defeat for her ally. The Arms Race can be both a cause and an effect of international tension. Determination of Germany to become a naval power threatened Britain. Russian army reforms (due to be completed by 1917) led to a point of view of the German high command that a preventive war against Russia in 1914 made sense. Maybe the arms race contributed to the feeling that war could not be postponed indefinitely. Gov. in the leading states had warlike attitudes (i.e.: in Germany the General Staff had enormous influence.). However there was a current of antimilitarism in both France and Germany (i.e.: in the socialist movements) …Capitalism, Imperialism and Nationalism Capitalism: Arguments For: Simple belief those industrialists had an interest in provoking war; Capitalist economic pressures were the driving force behind imperialist rivalries. Anglo German Trade Rivalry Arguments Against: Armaments manufacturers had markets overseas which might be lost in wartime. Financiers needed stability. Anglo-German commercial links were growing closed from 1904-1914. Imperialism: Lenin said that the war was an ‘imperialist war´ b/c it sought a re-division of colonial territories. Germany had a prime interest in acquiring the colonies of other states. German Weltpolitik was a challenge to British/French Empires. Yet, agreements were being made on colonial issues prior to the war. Psychological consequences of a generation of imperialism: Exacerbating mutual suspicion and hostility (contributed to the mood of 1914) Contributed to ‘nationalist revival´ Conclusion: There are four central factors: Legacy of Weltpolitik: failed by 1914 / harmed Germany’s relations with other powers / meager achievements contrasted with its high expectations / increased German feeling of insecurity. Growth of Russian power: economic expansion, pop. Growth, army reforms, and strategic railways (close to German borders) alarmed Germany. Disruptive effect of nationalism: threatened A-H in terms of her ability to act as a great power & disintegration. Inadequacy of Germany policy during the July crisis: failure to devise diplomatic alternatives in case the Triple Entente held and France and Britain supported Russia. Four subsidiary factors: The decline of the ‘Concert of Europe´: statesmen unwilling to behave with restraint for the sake of ‘Europe´ as a whole. The Arms Race: increased expectations of war / led Germany to believe she had a better chance of winning in 1914 rather then later. The legacy of imperial rivalries: increased animosities among the great powers (affecting public opinion, press, and Gov.) The influence of domestic tensions: encouraged ruling circles to consider war as a relief from such tensions.