Evaluating the Impacts and Effectiveness of Targeted Sanctions
QUALITATIVE DATA BASE
This template is the basis of the qualitative data base on UN targeted sanctions. Please
complete all fields and analytical categories identified in the template in a concise manner,
but with sufficient background and documentation for controversial points. The core units of
analysis are sanctions episodes.
COUNTRY
Sierra Leone
AUTHOR(S)
Chioma Daisy Ebeniro and John Osayere Agbonifo
1. BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW
-
The United Nations Sanctions against Sierra Leone began in 1997, following years of
unsuccessful, rebellious, and undemocratic governance in the country. The Revolutionary
United Front (RUF), a rebel army led by Foday Sankoh launched a rebellion in 1991 until
2002. The rebellion in 1991 was followed by the coup d’etat of 29th April, 1992 which saw the
removal of President Momoh by a group of soldiers from the Sierra Leone military, under the
command of Capt. Strasser of the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC). Despite the
change in government, the RUF continued its attacks in Sierra Leone. Right from the start of
the insurrection, Liberian rebel leader and later president, Charles Taylor, acted as banker,
trainer, and mentor to the RUF (www.cryfreedom.org/history.html). Taylor and Sankoh were
friends and fellow guerrillas trained in Libya. When Taylor became President of Liberia in
1997, he saw his role as part of the beginning of a new political order in the Mano River States
of Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. Accordingly, he increased his support for the RUF and
provided support in all aspects of guerrilla war. A UN panel report cites “unequivocal and
overwhelming evidence that Liberia has been actively supporting the RUF at all levels and
providing training, weapons, and related materials, logistical support, a staging ground for
attacks, and a stage haven for retreat and recuperation, and for public relations activities
(Mutwol, 2009).
-
The NPRC group attacked and caused major losses among the Revolutionary United Front
(RUF) combatants. A ceasefire was declared and general amnesty was extended to RUF
soldiers.
-
By the end of 1992, the RUF engaged in attacking economic targets in the diamond rich area
of Kono district, and also the capital, Freetown.
-
By mid 1995 with the assistance from foreign aid, the NPRC were able to push the RUF rebels
away from the capital, Freetown and also from the diamond mining areas.
-
In January 1996 Capt. Strasser is accused of corruption and is subsequently overthrown by his
deputy, Brigadier Bio. Due to International and Local pressure on the NPRC, a general
election was conducted in 1996. Despite the terror unleashed by the RUF on the civilian
populace to mar the general elections, Ahmed Tejan Kabbah is elected President and he signs a
peace agreement in Abidjan between his government and the RUF. The Abidjan meeting
which took place on the 25th of February 1996, had in attendance, the representatives of the
NPRC, representatives of the RUF, UN Special Envoy Berhanu Dinka and representatives of
the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the Commonwealth, and the International Alert (IA)
(Muthol, 2009). The peace agreement fails as the leader of the RUF, Foday Sanko is arrested
for arms trafficking. Hostilities between the RUF and the Sierra Leone government continue.
-
In May 25, 1997, the Kabbah’s government is overthrown in a coup organised by Major
Johnny Paul Koromah. The reason for the coup was alleged to the failure of Kabbah’s
government to implement the peace agreement with the RUF, and also the neglect of the army.
Major Koromah’s Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and RUF join as partners in
the government. During this regime, the worst state-sponsored atrocities are committed in
Sierra Leone. (www.theadvocatesforhumanrights.org).
-
The West (primarily the UK and USA), after the debacle of Somalia and the developing crisis
in the Balkans and the Middle East, were not willing to become involved with Sierra Leone.
The West, through the United Nations, persuaded the regional economic organisation,
ECOWAS, to field a military intervention force to re-instate the democratically elected
government of Tejan Kabbah. The force mainly consisted of Nigerian soldiers and also
included Ghanaian and Guinean troops. As ECOMOG, it had originally been formed to
intervene in the Liberian civil war, a conflict which ended in its withdrawal and the rebels'
backer, Charles Taylor, taking power in Monrovia (www.cryfreedom.org/history.html).
2. BEGINNING INCIDENT OR EVENT (of what prompted UNSC action in the first place)
Violence remains unabated after the military coup of 25 May 1997. There had been intense armed
confrontations between the AFRC and ECOMOG forces and Civil Defence Units or the Kamajors,
resulting in increased human suffering among civilians and provoking further population
displacement. On 22 December 1997, the UN Security Council in its informal consultations requested
a technical analysis of the humanitarian situation in Sierra Leone since the coup. Besides,
humanitarian agencies encountered difficulties delivering assistance to vulnerable groups in the
country under ECOWAS sanctions regime, prompting the Emergency Relief Coordinator to send an
expert mission to the region to assess the humanitarian situation in the country. The intense fighting
prevented the expert mission from entering Sierra Leone and heightened the need for supply of needed
humanitarian assistance to humanitarian agencies in the country. On 8 October 1997, the UN Security
Council expressed in its resolution 1132 "its strong support for the efforts of ECOWAS to resolve the
crisis in Sierra Leone", imposing limited sanctions on the Importation of fuel and other petroleum
products, weapons and related military materials and travel ban on members of the ruling military
junta and their families. The Council further authorised ECOWAS and the Kabbah Government to
ensure full implementation of the UN sanctions. The essence of the sanction was to show that the
international community has refused to recognise the AFRC’s leadership in Sierra Leone.
3. GENERAL OBJECTIVE OF SANCTIONS (i.e., counter-terrorism (CT), non-proliferation
(NP), conflict prevention (CP), human rights (HR), democracy promotion (DP))
The general objectives of the UN sanctions in Sierra Leone were clearly for conflict prevention (CP),
human rights (HR) and democracy promotion (DP). This can be seen in Episode 1 below where the
UN Security Council (1997) in its resolution demanded that the military junta immediately
relinquishes power to the restoration of the democratically elected Government; as well as demanded
that the junta end all acts of violence and to cease all interference with the delivery of humanitarian
assistance to the people of Sierra Leone.
4. IDENTIFICATION OF EPISODES
Episode 1: October 1997 – March 1998; UNSCR 1132
Episode 2: March 1998 – April 2000; UNSCRs 1156 and 1171
Episode 3: July 2000 – September 2010; UNSCR 1306
Episode 1 – October 1997 – March 1998
We begin this episode when despite all the mediation efforts made by the ECOWAS committee and
the OAU, there was still continuous violence and loss of life in Sierra Leone, following the military
coup of May 25, 1997. We consider this an episode because it was the beginning of a major sanction
by the UN on Sierra Leone. UNSCR 1132 was imposed pending a democratically elected
government in place in Sierra Leone. We end this episode on March 1998 when ECOMOG ousted
the AFRC junta and reinstated President Kabbah’s government.
Episode 2 – March 1998 – April 2000
This episode begins with UNSCR 1156 and includes 1171, where the UNSCR welcomes Sierra
Leone’s return to democracy in March 10, 1998, and decides to terminate most of the sanctions
earlier imposed in 1132. However, UNSCR 1171 applies them to leading members of the military
junta and the members of RUF. We consider this an episode because within this period even with the
UN decisions concerning the sanctions on Sierra Leone, the UN established the United Nations
Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) to monitor and advice on efforts to disarm
combatants and restructure the country’s security forces, so as to bring about to the country. We end
this episode in April 2000 when ECOMOG left Sierra Leone.
Episode 3 – July 2000 – September 2010
In this 3rd episode we see that despite the sanctions imposed on the military junta on the RUF, the
conflict situation in Sierra Leone had not abated. When it was found out that illicit trade in diamonds
with neighbouring countries like Liberia was fuelling the conflict in Sierra Leone, a new episode
begins eith UNSCR 1306 of July 2000. Here, a ban on direct import of rough diamonds from Sierra
Leone was imposed. The ban on direct import of rough diamonds from Sierra Leone is still on going.
We end this episode in September 2010 when the UN Security Council lifts the remaining sanctions
against Sierra Leone, including termination of the arms embargo and travel ban for the rebels.
5. SANCTIONS TERMINATION?
UNSC Resolution 1156 (16th March 1998): The SC terminates prohibitions on sale or supply of
petroleum and petroleum products to Sierra Leone and decides to review the other prohibitions
referred to in resolution 1123 (1997).
UNSC Resolution 1171 (5th June 1998): The SC terminates the remaining prohibitions imposed by
paragraph 5 and 6 of resolution 1132 (1997).
Resolution 1171 (1998) was terminated in September 29, 2010 by Resolution 1940. UNSCR 1171
was terminated because it was believed that the Sierra Leone Government had re-established control
over its entire territory and non-government forces had been demobilised and disarmed.
6. REFLECTIONS (i.e. distinctive or unique aspects of the sanctions, potential lessons)
One interesting characteristic of the sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council against
Sierra Leone from 1997 is the application of the 1343 Liberia sanctions regime which was adopted on
March 7th, 2001. The essence of that sanction was to stop Liberia from supporting the armed rebel
groups, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone, through the flow of illicit arms and
illegal diamond trades. This sanction was taken after Resolution 1306 of 2000 was imposed on Sierra
Leone, where the Security Council expressed grave concern for the role played by the illicit trade in
diamonds which was fuelling the conflict in Sierra Leone. In spite of several other sanctions imposed
on Sierra Leone, the 1343 Liberia sanction showed that there is weak border control between
neighbouring countries in West Africa, thereby making it almost impossible for targeted sanctions on
trafficking of arms or diamonds, and regional travels to be effective in the region. In a paper prepared
by the United Nations sanctions Secretariat on November 1999, about the experience of the UN in
administering arms embargos and travel sanctions, it states that it should be recognized, however, that
geographical conditions along the border between Sierra Leone and its neighbours are such that
full governmental control or monitoring of the border is virtually impossible given the resources
available in the region, unless an appropriate mechanism is put in place with the aid of the
international community. Here we see the UN Security Councils attempt at addressing the issue of
cross border co-operation between neighbouring countries engaged in aiding and abetting in the
conflicts and illegalities of regional countries. Consideration for civilians and/or neighbouring
countries collaborating with the opposition, as was later found out, were not thought of.
When it was found that the diamonds were the major supply of income for the RUF thereby fuelling
the crisis in Sierra Leone, the UNSC decided that not only was placing sanctions on both Sierra Leone
and Liberia needed, but that a certificate-of-origin regime for the export of diamonds should be put in
place, so that the origin of the diamonds could be verified by countries before they were traded and
exported. The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) was put in place to make sure that any
diamond coming from a country does not finance a rebel group or other groups planning on
overthrowing a UN-recognized government, and that every diamond export should be accompanied
by a Kimberley Process certificate, and also, that no diamond is imported from, or exported to, a nonmember of the scheme.
7. TIMELINE (provide a general timeline for each case, identifying the origins, episodes, and
where relevant, the termination of the sanctions)
Background and context
October 1985: Major Geneneral Joseph Momoh is elected President of Sierra Leone.
1 October 1991: Sierra Leone returns to a multi-party system. First attacks of the Revolutionary
United Front (RUF) are launched led by Capt. Foday Sankoh.
March 1992: The RUF crosses the border from Liberia into the South-Eastern part of Sierra Leone,
occupying the border town of Bomaru in Kailahun district. A few months later, the rebels control onefifth of the country in the South-East region. In a counter-offensive, the Republic of Sierra Leone
Military Force (RSLMF) recruits hastily. Its numbers rise from 3,000 to 14,000 men in the first year
of the conflict. The RSLMF joins forces with the United Liberian Movement for Democracy
(ULIMO). Forces from Nigeria and Guinea also join.
April 29, 1992: A group of soldiers under command of Capt. Valentine Strasser overthrow President
Momoh and send him into exile in Guinea. This coup is popular among civilians as Sierra Leone has
suffered rapidly deteriorating social conditions, labor and student unrest, and impending elections,
which the opposition alleges the government was preparing to rig. The Sierra Leone military being
controlled by Strasser’s National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC), re-equips and causes major
losses among RUF combatants. A cease-fire occurs and general amnesty is extended to RUF soldiers
who surrender. The RUF uses this time to regroup.
End of 1992: Having launched a major campaign involving attacks on several locations in the country
with very short intervals, the RUF starts to attack economic targets in the diamond-rich area Kono
district. Attacks also begin to get closer to the capitol of Freetown.
Late 1993: New civilian forces (CDF) enter the war. The Kamajors, drawn mainly from the Mende
ethnic group, the Temne Kapras, Koranko Tamaboros, and the Kono Donsos are among the new
forces.
Mid-1995: With the help of foreign aid (Guinea, Nigeria, Angola), the NPRC pushes RUF rebels
from their positions close to the capitol and repels them from the main diamond mining areas.
January 1996: Amidst allegations of corruption, Capt. Strasser is overthrown by his deputy,
Brigadier Bio. Radio contact between the RUF and RSLMF begins. The nation plans for multi-party
elections. The SLPP wins and its leader, Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, is elected president. He pledges to
continue peace talks.
November 20, 1996: A peace agreement is signed in Abidjan between Kabbah’s government and the
RUF. This agreement is also known as the Abudjan Peace Accord. It provides for the transformation
of the RUF into a political party. The peace process fails as Sankoh is arrested for arms trafficking,
and the RUF struggles to find a new leader. Some dissidents oppose de-mobilization and peace talks
while others support peace. Hostilities continue.
Date
Action
Description
8 October 1997
S/RES/1132 (1997)
Imposes petroleum and arms
embargo and selective travel
ban on non-governmental
forces;
Security
Council
Sanctions
Committee
established
S/RES/1156 (1998)
Lifts petroleum embargo
S/RES/1171 (1998)
Reinforces arms embargo and
selective travel ban on nongovernmental forces
S/RES/1306 (2000)
Direct or indirect import of
rough diamonds from Sierra
Leone, not controlled by the
Government of Sierra Leone
through a Certificate of Origin
regime,
prohibited;
establishment of a Panel of
Experts
(Ep. 1)
16 March 1998
(Ep. 2)
5 June 1998
(Ep. 2)
5 July 2000
(Ep. 3)
19 December 2001
S/RES/1385 (2001)
Extension for 11 months of the
prohibition of all import of
Sierra Leone rough diamonds
except those controlled by the
Government
under
the
Certificate of Origin regime
4 December 2002
S/RES/1446 (2002)
Extends for 6 months the
prohibition of all import of
Sierra Leone rough diamonds
except those controlled by the
Government
under
the
Certificate of Origin regime
31 December 2007
S/RES/1793 (2007)
Exempts from the travel
restrictions
imposed
by
paragraph 5 of resolution 1171
(1998) the travel of any
witnesses whose presence at
trial before the Special Court
for Sierra Leone is required
29 September 2010
S/RES/1940 (2010)
Terminates the measures set
forth in paragraphs 2, 4 and 5
of resolution 1171 (1998) and
dissolves
the
Committee
established
pursuant
to
resolution
1132
(1997)
concerning Sierra Leone
Episode 1
May 25, 1997: The first accused in a previous aborted coup, Major Johnny Paul Koromah, is sprung
from jail and overthrows Kabbah’s government in a coup. Coup plotters claim that Kabbah’s failure to
implement the peace agreement with RUF leaders, his alleged “ethnic favoritism,” and his neglect of
the army are their excuses for overthrowing him. Many judges, attorneys, and police officers flee the
country. Major Koromah’s Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) invites the RUF to join as
partners in their government. Some of the worst state-sponsored atrocities ever in Sierra Leone are
committed during this rule, including sexual violence, physical violence, use of child soldiers,
abductions and forced labor, and looting and burning.
May 1997-April 1998: International refusal to recognize the AFRC is unanimous. Economic
sanctions are imposed by the U.N. An agreement for peace talks is reached in July 1997. On October
23, 1997, a regionally backed agreement to restore constitutional rule in Sierra Leone is reached and
signed in April 1998. This includes an immediate cease-fire and disarmament, the return of refugees
and displaced persons, a program for humanitarian assistance, the return of an expanded Kabbah
government, and immunity for acts carried out during the time the AFRC was in power. RUF
members have shown themselves unwilling to adhere to the agreement, questioning the legitimacy of
ECOMOG forces in Sierra Leone, and viewing the Nigerian force present as too high, and demanding
the release of Sankoh from Nigerian prison, they block a road to Freetown. After large-scale fighting,
ECOMOG secures most of the Freetown Peninsula.
Episode 2
March 10,1998: President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah is returned to power after a military intervention by
the ECOWAS. Despite this, fighting continues in major towns in the provinces, where the retreating
RUF battles the CDF. ECOMOG/CDF forces have gained control over most major cities. RUF forces
destroy cities as they retreat into the bush. Thousands of civilians flee into Guinea and Liberia,
refugee camps overcrowd, RUF’s policy of targeting and hacking of the limbs of innocent civilians
intensifies; mutilations are reported in an increasing proportion of attacks.
October 4, 1998: The rebels call on the government to participate in peace talks mediated by either
the UN or the Commonwealth. AFRC/RUF is in control of important bases at Koindu, Kailahun and
is in virtual control of the diamond rich Kono district.
December 20, 1998: AFRC/RUF forces are in complete control of Kono.
December 22, 1998: Rebels attack Waterloo and by the end of December, Makeni and Lunsar are
firmly under AFRC/RUF control.
December 25, 1998: Nigerian troops begin to send more troops to Freetown (as many as 9,000 to
increase their involvement to 19,000) in response to rebel threat. Kamajor militiamen are airlifted
from South-Eastern Sierra Leone to the capitol. As rebels approach the outskirts of Freetown, citizens
are evacuated. RUF Commander Sam ‘Maskita’ Bockarie claims to have captured Waterloo and
Beneguema, twenty and thirty miles from Freetown.
January 1, 1999: Commander Bockarie claims that, “If Kabbah does not agree to respond to our
request to open dialogue, then in 48 to 72 hours we will enter Freetown.”
January 6, 1999: Rebels enter the capitol, sometimes using civilians as human shields. In less
than twenty-four hours, they capture the entire east and most of the central parts of the city. They raid
the prisons to free junta collaborators. The rebels loot and kill, lining up civilians to execute them.
They mutilate other residents by hacking off hands or legs. Over 6,000 people die. Slowly, ECOMOG
forces recapture the city. Two-thirds of the buildings have been destroyed, 150,000 people are left
homeless, and hundreds of people have lost arms, feet, hands, and ears.
July 1999: Lome Peace Agreement grants amnesty to Sankoh and other members of RUF and
provides a framework for turning the RUF into a political party. Sankoh is made Chairman of
Strategic Mineral Resources Council and given title of VP, a position that controlled most of Sierra
Leone's diamond exports. The RUF violates the agreement holding hundreds of members of
UNAMSIL hostage and capturing their arms and ammunition in the first half of 2000.
Episode 3
April 2000: U.N. peacekeepers begin moving into eastern Sierra Leone, home to several rebel-held
diamond mines, and are promptly attacked. In May, troops of the RUF begin capturing and holding
U.N. peacekeepers hostage. More than 500 U.N. peacekeepers are held at one point. Many are later
freed or escape. Sankoh’s capture has increased speculation about the fate of the remaining hostages.
May 8, 2000: RUF shoots and kills as many as twenty people demonstrating outside Sankoh’s home
against violations of the Lome Agreement. Heavy reinforcement by the UN and British troops and
counter offensive by the government-allied militias repulsed the RUF rebels from the Masiaka area.
The British army were deployed to Sierra Leone to aid the government in quelling violent uprisings by
militia men under the UN resolutions. Sankoh is arrested and stripped of all political positions.
January 2002: The armed conflict is officially declared over. Throughout the nine-year civil war,
fighting concentrated in and around the diamond districts. RUF leaders were keenly aware that
whoever controls the diamond mines controls Sierra Leone, and profits from smuggled diamonds
which funded its attacks (Laura Thompson in www.professionaljeweler.com.)
Source : www.theadvocatesforhumanrights.org
May 2002 - Kabbah wins a landslide victory in elections. His Sierra Leone People's Party secures a
majority in parliament.
2002 July - British troops, which refused to operate under UN command, leave Sierra Leone after
their two-year mission to help end the civil war. British perspective regarding the strategy to be used
to ‘influence the rebels and the use of military force against them, differed from that of UNAMSIL,
which sometimes led to conflicting messages being sent to the Government of Sierra Leone and
detracted from the common, coordinated international approach that was vital to the peace process.’i
- British troops leave Sierra Leone after their two-year mission to help end the civil war.
2003 July - Rebel leader Foday Sankoh dies of natural causes while waiting to be tried for war
crimes.
2004 February - Disarmament and rehabilitation of more than 70,000 civil war combatants officially
completed.
2004 March - UN-backed war crimes tribunal opens courthouse to try senior militia leaders from both
sides of civil war.
2004 September - UN hands control of security in capital over to local forces.
2005 August - UN Security Council authorises opening of a UN assistance mission in Sierra Leone
from 2006, to follow departure of peacekeepers in December.
2005 December - The last UN peacekeeping troops leave Sierra Leone, marking the end of a fiveyear mission to restore order
2006 March - Liberian ex-president Charles Taylor is arrested in Nigeria and handed over to the war
crimes court in Sierra Leone which indicted him.
2007 June - Start of former Liberian president Charles Taylor's war crimes trial in The Hague, where
he stands accused of instigating atrocities in Sierra LeoneSierra Leone's special war crimes court in
Freetown delivers its first verdicts, finding three militia leaders guilty
2008 January - Former Liberian president Charles Taylor's war crimes trial in The Hague resumes
after a six-month delay.
2008 August - Local elections are marred by violence between the supporters of the two main parties
2009 April - Three former senior leaders of rebel Revolutionary United Front (RUF) sentenced to
long jail terms for civil war atrocities.
2009 October - UN-backed Special Court winds down after seven years investigating civil war
atrocities. Its remaining case, trial of Charles Taylor, continues in The Hague2008 January - Former
Liberian president Charles Taylor's war crimes trial in The Hague resumes after a six-month delay.
2008 August - Local elections are marred by violence between the supporters of the two main parties
2009 April - Three former senior leaders of rebel Revolutionary United Front (RUF) sentenced to
long jail terms for civil war atrocities.
2009 October - UN-backed Special Court winds down after seven years investigating civil war
atrocities. Its remaining case, trial of Charles Taylor, continues in The Hague
2010 September - UN Security Council lifts last remaining sanctions against Sierra Leone - an arms
embargo and a travel ban for rebels.
Source : BBC news. Time Line : Sierra Leone. May 7, 2011.
www.news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1065898.stm
EPISODES
On the following pages we provide a table for each episode you identified. Please complete
all fields and analytical categories identified in the template in a concise manner.
HOW MANY EPISODES DID YOU IDENTIFY?
Three (3)
EPISODE 1
CONTEXT
October 1997 – April 1998 (6 months)
In order to induce the military junta to return control of power to the democratically
elected government of Sierra Leone, the Security Council imposed sanctions against
Sierra Leone on October 8, 1997 through Resolution 1132. The initial sanctions included
targeted travel bans, Arms embargo and Petroleum sanctions. On October 23, 1997, a
regionally backed agreement to restore constitutional rule in Sierra Leone is reached and
signed in April 1998. This includes an immediate cease-fire and disarmament, the return
of refugees and displaced persons, a program for humanitarian assistance, the return of an
expanded Kabbah government, and immunity for acts carried out during the time the
AFRC was in power (www.theadvocatesforhumanrights.org).
UNSC DECISION MAKING
By resolution 1132 (1997) of 8 October 1997, the Security Council, gravely
concerned at the continued violence following the military coup of 25 May 1997,
determining that the situation in Sierra Leone constituted a threat to
international peace and security in the region, and deploring the fact that the
military junta had not taken steps to allow the restoration of the
democratically elected Government and a return to constitutional order, imposed
a regime of mandatory sanctions, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United
Nations, against Sierra Leone. By paragraphs 5 and 6 of this resolution, the
Council prevented the sale or supply to Sierra Leone of petroleum and petroleum
products, arms and related matériel of all types, and imposed restrictions on
the travel of members of the military junta of Sierra Leone and adult members of
their families. By paragraph 10 of resolution 1132 (1997), the Security Council established
a Committee consisting of all members of the Council to undertake the following
tasks and to report on its work to the Council with its observations and
recommendations:
"(a) To seek from all States further information regarding the action
taken by them with a view to implementing effectively the measures imposed
by paragraphs 5 and 6 of that resolution;
"(b) To consider information brought to its attention by States
concerning violations of the measures imposed by paragraphs 5 and 6 of that
resolution, and to recommend appropriate measures in response thereto;
"(c) To make periodic reports to the Security Council on information
submitted to it regarding alleged violations of the measures imposed by
paragraphs 5 and 6 of that resolution, identifying where possible persons
or entities, including vessels, reported to be engaged in such violations;"(d) To promulgate
such guidelines as may be necessary to facilitate
the implementation of the measures imposed by paragraphs 5 and 6 of that
resolution;
"(e) To consider and decide expeditiously requests for the approval of
imports of petroleum and petroleum products in accordance with paragraph 7
of that resolution;
"(f) To designate expeditiously members of the military junta and
adult members of their families whose entry or transit is to be prevented
in accordance with paragraph 5 of that resolution;
"(g) To examine the reports submitted pursuant to paragraphs 9 and 13
of that resolution;
"(h) To establish liaison with the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS) Committee on the implementation of the measures imposed by
paragraphs 5 and 6 of that resolution."
By resolution 1171 (1998) of 5 June 1998, the Council decided that the Committee
established by resolution 1132 (1997) shall continue to undertake the tasks
referred to in paragraph 10 (a), (b), (c), (d), (f) and (h) of resolution
1132 (1997) in relation to paragraphs 2 and 5 of resolution 1171 (1998).
11. The guidelines of the Committee for the conduct of its work were initially
considered at informal meetings of the Committee and subsequently adopted at its
2nd meeting held on 31 October 1997 (SC/6435). These guidelines were
transmitted by the Chairperson to all States and international organizations/
specialized agencies by a note verbale on 3 November 1997.
The new consolidated guidelines of the Committee for the conduct of its
work were adopted on 18 June 1998, and incorporated the relevant provisions
contained in resolution 1171 (1998) adopted by the Council on 5 June 1998
(SC/6532). These guidelines were transmitted by the Chairperson to all States
and international organizations/specialized agencies by a note verbale on
18 June 1998.
2. Designation of members of the military junta of
Sierra Leone and adult members of their families
13. The Committee is mandated under paragraph 10 (f) of resolution 1132 (1997)
to designate members of the military junta of Sierra Leone and adult members of
their families whose entry or transit is to be prevented by all States. In this
connection, the Committee met informally on several occasions with a view to
compiling a list of members of the military junta of Sierra Leone and adult
members of their families. On 8 January 1998, the Committee issued the first
list of members of the military junta of Sierra Leone, which is to be updated on
a regular basis, and was transmitted by the Chairperson to all States and
international organizations/specialized agencies by a note verbale on the same
day (SC/6464). This list was subsequently issued as a press release on
28 January 1998 (SC/6472)
By a note verbale of 5 February 1998, the Permanent Mission of Côte
d’Ivoire informed the Committee that the competent Ivorian authorities had taken
expulsion measures with respect to Paolo Bangoura (Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the Sierra Leonean military junta) and two other persons who were
accompanying him, in implementation of the travel restrictions imposed by the
Council in resolution 1132 (1997). The Committee took note of this
communication.
3. Requests for the supply of petroleum and petroleum products
for humanitarian purposes
By paragraph 7 of resolution 1132 (1997), the Committee was authorized to
approve requests, on a case-by-case basis, for the importation into Sierra Leone
of petroleum and petroleum products for verified humanitarian purposes, by the
democratically elected Government of Sierra Leone, as well as requests from any
other Government or by United Nations agencies or for the needs of ECOMOG. In
this regard, the Committee has received and approved requests from the Deputy
Permanent Representative of Sierra Leone to the United Nations on behalf of the President of
Sierra Leone, as well as the Permanent Mission of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations (on behalf
of the United Kingdom Department of International Development for its emergency
aid programme in Sierra Leone), the International Committee of the Red Cross,
the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator and the United Nations Children’s
Fund in Sierra Leone.
Violations and alleged violations of the sanctions regime
16. With reference to Security Council resolution 1196 (1998) of
16 September 1998, in particular paragraphs 3 and 4, the Committee since its
inception has maintained contact with ECOWAS and ECOMOG on implementation of the
arms embargo and alleged violations. In fact, during the period covered by this
report, the Committee had on various occasions considered a number of alleged
violations of the sanctions regime. In some cases, the Chairperson requested
additional information regarding the alleged violations from the permanent
representatives of the Member States concerned
17. On 7 May 1998, the Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom to the United
Nations informed the Chairperson that its national authorities were
investigating an alleged violation of paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution
1132 (1997) by an international commercial entity. In order not to prejudice
the outcome of the case, the Mission stated that it was unable to provide
further information to the Committee at this time. On 11 May 1998, the
Chairperson, on behalf of the members of the Committee, addressed a response to
the Permanent Representative of the Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom to
the United Nations, thanking him for the information provided so far to the
Committee, and expressing the interest of the members in being kept abreast of
developments in the case. On 12 June 1998, the Permanent Mission of the United
Kingdom to the United Nations informed the Chairperson that its national
authorities had concluded the above-mentioned investigation and had decided that
no criminal proceedings would be instituted. The Committee took note of the
above communications.
In response to reports of the alleged presence of Liberian combatants in
Sierra Leone in violation of the sanctions regime, the Chargé d’affaires of
Liberia addressed a letter dated 4 August 1998 to the Chairperson of the
Committee, stating that the alleged activity was not supported or sanctioned by
the Liberian Government. Moreover, direct talks had been held by the Presidents
of Liberia and Sierra Leone at Abuja, Nigeria, on 2 July 1998, as a means of
strengthening the ties between the two countries. As a further confidencebuilding
measure, the President had paid an official visit to Liberia on
20 July 1998. According to the letter, it was hoped that the enhanced
cooperation between the two Governments would enable them to take measures which
would prevent their respective territories from being used for subversive
activities. The Committee took note of this communication.
5. Other activities of the Chairperson
19. During the reporting period, the Chairperson undertook two visits to the
region. In December 1997, he visited Guinea for discussions at Conakry,
including with the exiled President of Sierra Leone, government authorities,
United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations. The purpose of the
trip was to assess the situation regarding the implementation of resolution
1132 (1997), including to facilitate liaison between the Sanctions Committee and
ECOWAS, and to review mechanisms for humanitarian exemptions. He also met at
Dakar with the Executive Secretary of ECOWAS.ii
The Security Council Resolution 1132. Adopted by the Security Council at its 3822nd
meeting, on 8 October 1997, under chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.
-
Demands that the military junta take immediate steps to relinquish power in Sierra
Leone and make way for the restoration of the democratically elected Government
and a return to constitutional order;
- Reiterates its call upon the junta to end all acts of violence and to cease all
interference with the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the people of Sierra
Leone
POLITICAL WILL
The failure to respond promptly to the crisis in the country indicated a certain lethargy on the
part of the UN. To the contrary, ECOWAS countries took immediate action to deal with the
situation. It took the UN five months after ECOMOG’s intervention before the UN expressed
concern about and support for the intervention. Whereas in the case of Iran the UN acted
expeditiously. The UN lethargy was in coping with international engagement with African
conflicts in the 1990s. The vote on the UNSC 1132 was unanimous with 15 votes from all 15
permanent and non permanent members who were present at the meeting. Kofi Annan was
requested to submit within 15 days of the adoption of the current resolution detailing the
humanitarian situation in Sierra Leone and the compliance from the junta and thereafter,
every 60 days.
Although there was a lag time of four months between the UN Resolution 1132 of 8 October
1997 and the triggering military coup of 25 May 1997, the SC wasted little time in
establishing the sanctions committee. In deed, paragraph ten of Resolution 1132 established
the sanctions committee. UNSC Resolution 1132 (1997) called for a selective travel ban on
Non Governmental Armed Forces. On 8 January 1998, the Sanctions Committee on Sierra
Leone adopted a list of leading members of the AFRC to be subject to a travel ban.iii
OBSERVATIONS
22. Despite the efforts of the international community to isolate the
non-governmental forces in Sierra Leone through the sanctions imposed, first
under Security Council resolution 1132 (1997) and subsequently under Security
Council resolution 1171 (1998), these forces continue to launch armed attacks,
especially in rural areas. Although most of their supplies of arms and
ammunition seems to derive from looting within Sierra Leone, arms and ammunition
are obviously crossing the Sierra Leone border with neighbouring countries,
including Liberia, in violation of resolution 1171 (1998).
23. It should be recognized that geographical conditions along the border
between Sierra Leone and its neighbours are such that full governmental control
or monitoring of the border are virtually impossible within the resources
available in the region. At the same time, all States are obliged to ensure
that their territories are not used for the purpose of violating mandatory
sanctions imposed by the Security Council. The Sanctions Committee will continue, in
accordance with its mandate and
adopted guidelines, to vigorously follow up on alleged violations of resolution
1171 (1998). In addition, it will continue to explore further measures which
may improve implementation of the arms embargo and travel restrictions, inparticular by
focusing on assistance to neighbouring countries, with a view to
enhancing the monitoring of border crossings and reinforcement of the
prohibitions set out in the above Security Council resolution.
25. Such measures could include:
(a) Support for national or joint monitoring of the border between Sierra
Leone and Liberia;
(b) Identification of focal points within ECOMOG/ECOWAS, and closer
liaison between the Committee and this regional organization;
(c) Continued frequent reporting from the United Nations Observer Mission
in Sierra Leone to the Sanctions Committee;
(d) Renewed distribution, including through the United Nations presence in
the region, of an updated and if possible elaborated list of individuals who are
banned from travelling under the terms of resolution 1171 (1998).iv
PURPOSE(S) (coerce, constrain, signal)
COERCE –To restore democracy
Democracy promotion through the coercion of the military to reinstate the democratically
elected government of Ahmad Tejan Kabbah.
Demands that the military junta take immediate steps to relinquish power in Sierra
Leone and make way for the restoration of the democratically elected Government
and a return to constitutional order ;(para. 1)
CONSTRAIN – Restraining the RUF rebel insurgency and encouraging the peace process.
Expresses its strong support for the efforts of the ECOWAS Committee
to resolve the crisis in Sierra Leone and encourages it to continue to work for the peaceful
restoration of the constitutional order, including through the resumption of negotiations
(para. 3)
AUDIENCE[S] SIGNALLED
Members of the Military Junta, the members of the RUF, and the Arms suppliers
TYPE OF TARGETED SANCTIONS (the design of the measures)
Sectoral: Imposed an oil and arms embargo on Sierra Leone
Individual: Travel ban: travel restrictions on members of the military junta in Sierra Leone.
COORDINATION WITHIN THE UN SYSTEM AND RELATED MULTILATERAL
INITIATIVES (with other UN Agencies, SRSGs, and UN Peacekeeping forces, if applicable
and with IAEA and multi-party talks, if relevant)
UNSCR 1132 was authorized under chapter VIII of the UN chapter, ECOWAS and the
legitimate government of Sierra Leone to co-operate with the implementation of the current
resolution. The case of Sierra Leone shows that regional embargoes supported by the
Security Council were conflicting with UN humanitarian operations. ECOWAS was unable
to clear for five months urgently needed food shipments for UN agencies and NGOs
operating in the country despite an elaboration of the exemption procedures. According to
former UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, "perhaps due to a lack of resources and expertise
in this matter, ECOWAS has not been in a position yet to clear any humanitarian shipment to
Sierra Leone".
UNOMSIL was deployed to demonstrate support for ECOMOG, the return of the
democratically elected Government of Sierra Leone in March 1998, and the peace process in
Sierra Leone, encourage disarmament of combatants. However, “Cooperation between
ECOMOG and UNOMSIL was hampered by the lack of a proper mechanism for liaison and
coordination, which was never put in place. In addition, differences concerning the relative
status of military officers, assignment of specific tasks, ways of conducting military
operations, all gave rise to unhealthy comparisons and were a source of tension. Cooperation
between ECOMOG and UNOMSIL was never optimal. The relationship may also have been
coloured by the past experience of ECOMOG in Liberia with the United Nations Observer
Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL), where a similar tension existed between the two entities.” v
The transition between ECOMOG and UN forces was uncoordinated, ad hoc and adversarial.
The 6,000 strong UNAMSIL force was to be part of a neutral observer force comprising UN
and ECOMOG, as called for by the Lomé accord. While Nigeria announced that it would
withdraw, it indicated that ECOMOG would remain and assist with the disarmament and
demobilization process. When ECOMOG suddenly withdrew completely, it became difficult
to plan an orderly transition. “There were several reasons for this hasty and uncoordinated
transition. Nigeria believed that the UN was not paying sufficient attention to its requests for
logistical and financial support to continue its military operations in Sierra Leone. The UN
Secretariat, on the other hand, encountered reluctance on the part of Security Council
members to provide the needed support. This contributed significantly to the ECOWAS
decision to withdraw earlier than planned. Given the sudden change in ECOMOG
withdrawal deadlines, the entire plan for troop deployments had to be revised quickly. The
rotations of incoming and outgoing units were conducted concurrently, with inherent
coordination problems.Since ECOMOG was supposed to provide security, some UNAMSIL
contingents were faced with serious security threats immediately upon deployment for which
they were not prepared. Their lack of familiarity with the terrain and the causes of the
conflict made them even more vulnerable. A security vacuum was created in several parts of
the country, as withdrawing ECOMOG did not hand over to an incoming UNAMSIL
contingent. With the urgent need for reinforcements, UN forces were deployed without
adequate preparation and training for the conflict environment in Sierra Leone. The
deployment itself was very costly as all troops and equipment had to be airlifted to save
deployment time. Contingents were deployed without information on what their tasks would
be and some contingents had no maps of their areas of responsibility. In some cases, UN
troops were unaware of mission standard operating procedures and rules of engagement.”vi
INTERACTION WITH OTHER SANCTIONS REGIMES (Unilateral measures, Regional
organization measures)
Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) played key
role in enforcing the sanction. The Security Council imposed an oil and arms embargo and
authorized ECOWAS to ensure its implementation using the ECOMOG, who were deployed
to Sierra Leone to protect the government (Giles Yabi). This was in addition to the prior full
embargo imposed by ECOWAS during its 20th session of the authority of Heads of State and
Government, held at Abuja, Nigeria on the 28th to the 29th of August 1997, where decisions
were taken on sanctions against the Junta in Sierra Leone, due to the breakdown of
negotiations between the Monitoring Committee on the situation in Sierra Leone and the
representatives of the Junta in Abidjan on 29-30 July 1997.
RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER POLICY INSTRUMENTS (Use of force, covert actions,
tribunals, referral to ICC)
In addition to Resolution 1132 imposed on Sierra Leone, the UN had mounting evidence to
show the involvement of Liberia in sponsoring the conflict in Sierra Leone. Based on their
findings, in a multifaceted effort to end the conflict in Sierra Leone, the UN imposed
resolution 1343 on Liberia, for Charles Taylor’s involvement in the support of the RUF.
IMPLEMENTATION (assessing monitoring and enforcement)
Under international pressure, from the UN in particular, Kabbah and RUF leader Foday
Sankoh negotiated an agreement in July 1999. A government of national unity was
established, the rebels were given amnesty and the UN was invited to oversee the
agreement’s implementation. The panel found conclusive evidence of supplies of weapons to
the RUF via Burkina Faso through Liberia to Sierra Leone and alleged that Liberian Charles
Taylor was actively involved in fuelling the violence in Sierra Leone (paras. 21-23 of
S/2000/1195 (20 December 2000)vii
The case of sierra leone emphasizes how neighboring states, including Liberia and Burkina
faso, often play crucial role in protraction of conflicts. France was accused of supplying
weapons to the RUF rebels through Liberia and Burkina faso (Africa Confidential 1998-99).
Liberia, Burkina faso and Libya supported RUF and ACRC with arms and other equipments.
Mercenaries from the Ukraine and other eastern European countries fought on the side of the
RUF rebels (Africa Confidential 20 October 1998; January 1999 and 6 February 1998).viii
DIRECT IMPACTS
The economic impacts included a reduction in the movement of weapons and supplies
needed to fuel the materials used by the Military Junta and the RUF in the conflict.
‘Targeted sanctions aimed at sources of revenue appear to have an impact on the ability of
embargoed targets to purchase arms and maintain armed forces as well as on the incentives
for suppliers, sponsors and facilitators or brokers to risk violating a UN arms embargo. UN
panels of experts and sanctions committees have ‘named and shamed’ a
number of individuals, companies and states for their roles in facilitating the transfer of arms,
ammunition and military equipment to embargoed targets. The extent to which such an
approach deters brokers has not been fully explored, but it is known that only a limited
number of the brokers that have played a role in violating UN arms embargoes have been
successfully prosecuted’.ix
Under the power sharing arrangement of the 1999 Lomé Peace Agreement, the RUF leader,
Foday Sankoh, became both the vice-president and chairman of the Commission on the
Management of Strategic Resources. While Sankoh banned all mining activities, he allowed
mining to continue in RUF-controlled areas. “The RUF was finally neutralized through
military intervention by British and Guinean troops in the summer of 2000. The RUF was
also affected by the UN sanctions of 2000 on diamond exports from Sierra Leone but more
importantly by sanctions on Liberian diamonds imposed in 2001, which cut off the
opportunity for diamond trade from RUFcontrolled sites through Liberian ports. In
combination with the arms and timber embargoes on Liberia, the diamond embargo strained
Liberia’s financial support of the RUF.”x
INDIRECT IMPACTS
The impact of importation of fuel and other petroleum products and other related products,
had an impact of reduced food and humanitarian assistance to the innocent civilians of Sierra
Leone. There was also heightened need for the supply of vital humanitarian assistance to the
humanitarian agencies and organizations in Sierra Leone since the delivery of humanitarian
assistance was virtually impossible due to the embargo which prevented the sale and supply
to Sierra Leone of petroleum and petroleum products and arms and related materiel of all
types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary
equipment, etc.
UN ban on the export of Liberian diamonds had largely achieved its purpose -- to end the
movement of smuggled Sierra Leonean diamonds into Liberia in exchange for arms. The
report conceded, however, "The embargo has created a different problem. Since it is
impossible to sell Liberian rough [diamonds] officially, dealers are seeking to camouflage
their Liberian diamonds as those from neighbouring markets" -- including Sierra Leone.
Ironically, sanctions intended to prevent Sierra Leonean diamonds from being smuggled into
Liberia were causing legitimately mined Liberian diamonds to be smuggled into Sierra
Leone.xi
EVASION
Illegal diamond traders, such as the RUF, smuggle diamonds out of the country, which they
can do easily because of the size of the diamonds, and sell them in other African states in
exchange for arms. Smugglers are able to use a system of offices and individuals in the
neighboring countries of Liberia and Guinea, for example, as a conduit for getting diamonds
from Sierra Leone to the world market. These nations serve as key routes for transferring
diamonds on their way to Antwerp, Belgium, where nearly 90 percent of the world's rough
diamonds are traded.xii
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
Increased human suffering among civilians and provoking further population displacement
caused by the conflict and violence between the warring parties. This unintended
consequences was due to both the targeted sanctions and the result of the continued conflict.
In February 1997, the UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reported
that medicine had in effect been blockaded during a major health crisis (OCHA, 1997, 8).
INTEGRATING IMPACTS AND CONSEQS
Intended consequences
Unintended consequences
Direct impacts
On Military Junta/RUF
On the Sierra Leone civilians
Indirect impacts
Economic impacts on the Military
Reduced food/humanitarian
and the RUF
assistance to the civilians
EFFECTIVENESS
The embargo had minimal impact as armed confrontation between the AFRC/RUF and
ECOMOG continued. In terms of democracy promotion, we could say that there was some
form of success since ECOMOG was able to ouster out the AFRC junta and reinstate the
democratically elected President, Kabbah. There was obviously failure in terms of conflict
prevention as the fighting between the Rebels and the Peace keeping forces still continued.
EPISODE 2
CONTEXT
April 1998 – July 1999 (16 months)
In February 1998, ECOMOG troops toppled the military regime, and Kabbah was returned to power.
The UN applauded Sierra Leone’s return to democracy in March 10, 1998 and decided to terminate most
of the sanctions imposed in 1132. The sanctions against AFRC members remained in place, as did
measures against the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). In October, the RUF launched a major
offensive, seizing the capital Freetown in January 1999. Much of the country remained under rebel
controls. Graphic images broadcast worldwide finally alerted the West to the seriousness of the
situation, the inadequacy of the ECOMOG operation, and the untenable position of the government.
Although intervening militarily in Kosovo, the United States and the United Kingdom pushed hard for
diplomatic settlement in Sierra Leone. President Clinton sent the Reverend Jesse Jackson to broker
peace, a move sanctioned by the U.N. The resulting Lome Accord, signed in July 1999, offered amnesty
to all combatants and provided for RUF inclusion in a new coalition government in exchange for RUF
disarmament. The UN was invited to oversee the agreement’s implementation. Significantly the U.N.
Secretary-General's Special Representative (SGSR) added a reservation to the amnesty provision by
interpreting the article as not applying to "international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity,
war crimes, and other serious violations of international humanitarian law." The Accord established a
timetable for the formation of a neutral peacekeeping force and requested the assistance of the U.N.,
now prepared to send troops."' In October 1999, the Security Council established the United Nation's
Mission in Sierra Leone ("UNAMSIL") to assist in carrying out provisions of the agreement. Six
thousand peacekeeping troops were initially pledged (Nicole Fritz_ Alison Smith (2001) Current Apathy
for Coming Anarchy: Building the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Fordham International Law Journal
Volume 25, Issue 2).
UNSC DECISION MAKING
Resolution 1156, 1998 adopted by the Security Council at its 3861st meeting, on 16 March 1998, acting
under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, Lifted the petroleum embargo. Resolution 1171
1998 Adopted by the Security Council at its 3889th meeting on 5 June 1998. Lifted all remaining
sanctions against the Government of Sierra Leone and instead applied them on leading members of the
former military junta and of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). The objectives of the sanctions
targeting the former military junta and the RUF were the re-establishment of government control
throughout the territory of Sierra Leone and the disarmament and demobilisation of all non-government
forces.
POLITICAL WILL
The UNSCR 1156 was adopted unanimously by 15 votes from both the 5 permanent members of the
security council and the 10 non-permanent members, all present at the meeting held on March 16, 1998.
The adoption of UNSCR 1171 was unanimously adopted by 15 votes made up of 5 permanent members
and 10 non-permanent members of the security council. The UN asserted political will when, in 1998, it
deployed UN peacekeepers to Sierra Leone. The peacekeepers remained in the country until 2005. The
Security Council by Resolution 1181 (1998) established the UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone
(UNOMSIL). In October 1999, UNOMSIL mandate was taken over by the UN Mission in Sierra Leone
(UNAMSIL), with a mandate to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.
UNAMSIL, however, came under assault by the RUF at various times and efforts by the Secretary
General and SC to strengthen UNAMSIL by raising the troop strength from 6,000 to 11,000 did not
materialise. Alarmed by the grave threat the RUF constituted to the peacekeeping force, following the
departure of ECOMOG troops and inadequate personnel, Britain stepped in to save the faltering
UNAMSIL. Britain deployed more than 1,000 troops, an action that strengthened UNAMSIL and
contributed to security in the country. Britain, however, declined to allow its troops operate under the
command of the UN force in sierra Leone.
(Background Research, Responsibility to Protect online at http://www.iciss.ca/02_Section_Ben.asp#sierra ).
South Africa expelled the former RUF leader in late February 2000 at the request of the UN Security Council's
sanctions committee. The committee complained that Sankoh had violated the travel ban enumerated in UN
Resolution 1171 for former military junta members. The Sierra Leone government is considering conducting an
investigation into Sankoh's trip to South Africa to determine whether he went there to sell illegally-mined
diamonds from Sierra Leone.xiii
PURPOSE(S) (coerce, constrain, signal)
The purpose of the sanction was to coerce as well as to signal to the Military Junta and the RUF by
restricting all travel sanctions to only the members of the Military junta and the RUF. The case of Sierra
Leone was an attempt to apply more focused coercive pressure as part of a "smart sanctions" policy. The
Security Council sought to impose sanctions on specific leadership groups and factions while avoiding
measures that would add to already severe humanitarian problems for vulnerable populations.
AUDIENCE[S] SIGNALLED
Members of the Military Junta, and the members of the RUF, Liberian Government, including Charles
Taylor, Gambia, and Guinea
TYPE OF TARGETED SANCTIONS (the design of the measures)
Resolution 1156 (March 1998) Decided:
-
To terminate, with immediate effect, the prohibitions on the sale or supply to Sierra Leone of
petroleum and petroleum products referred to in paragraph 6 of resolution 1132 (1997)
Resolution 1171(June1998) Decided :
-
To terminate the remaining prohibitions imposed by paragraphs 5 and 6 of resolution 1132
(1997)
5. Decides that all States shall prevent the entry into or transit
through their territories of members of the military junta and adult members of
their families, as designated in accordance with paragraph 10 (f) below,
provided that the entry into or transit through a particular State of any such
person may be authorized by the Committee established by paragraph 10 below for
verified humanitarian purposes or purposes consistent with paragraph 1 above,
and provided that nothing in this paragraph shall oblige a State to refuse entry
into its territory to its own nationals;
6. Decides that all States shall prevent the sale or supply to Sierra
Leone, by their nationals or from their territories, or using their flag vessels
or aircraft, of petroleum and petroleum products and arms and related matériel
of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment,
paramilitary equipment and spare parts for the aforementioned, whether or not
- originating in their territory;
-
Decides, with a view to prohibiting the sale and supply of arms and related matériel to nongovernmental forces in Sierra Leone, that all States shall prevent the sale or supply, by their
nationals or from their territories, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of arms and related
matériel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment,
paramilitary equipment and spare parts for the aforementioned, to Sierra Leone other than to the
Government of Sierra Leone through named points of entry on a list to be supplied by that
Government to the Secretary-General, who shall promptly notify all Member States of the
United Nations of the list.
COORDINATION WITHIN THE UN SYSTEM AND RELATED MULTILATERAL
INITIATIVES (with other UN Agencies, SRSGs, and UN Peacekeeping forces, if applicable and with
IAEA and multi-party talks, if relevant)
ECOWAS, ECOMOG, and UNAMSIL
In March 1998 ECOMOG ousted the AFRC junta and reinstated President Kabbah’s government. The
Security Council lifted prohibitions on the supply of oil but maintained the arms embargo. In June 1998,
it established the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) to monitor and advice
on efforts to disarm combatants and restructure the nation’s security forces (Giles Yabi). The Security
Council by Resolution 1181 (1998) established the UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL).
In October 1999, UNOMSIL mandate was taken over by the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL),
with a mandate to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence. UNAMSIL came under
assault by the RUF at various times. Efforts to strengthen UNAMSIL by raising the troop strength from
6,000 to 11,000 did not materialise. From 1 - 5 May 2000, the RUF captured more than 500 UN
peacekeepers and a large number of weapons, armoured personnel carriers and helicopters. These
blatant episodes occurred at a time when the last four battalions of Nigerian ECOMOG troops were
departing the country. Seriously threatened by the void created by the departure of ECOMOG troops
and inadequate personnel, Britain, refusing to operate under the command of the UN, stepped in to save
the faltering UNAMSIL. Britain deployed more than 1,000 troops, an action that strengthened
UNAMSIL and contributed to security in the country. However, UNAMSIL remained incapacitated
with inadequate troops as at the end of 2000. The force Commander, General Vijay Jetley left following
conflicts with some of his lieutenants (Background Research, Responsibility to Protect online at
http://www.iciss.ca/02_Section_B-en.asp#sierra ).
Thus, Oudraat argued that partial and targeted sanctions in Sierra Leone failed because they were standalone measures, not part of a coercive strategy; and because of poor implementation. An energetic
response to the first signs of defiance may well have led to very different outcomes in both countries.
Half-measures, on the other hand, stood no chance of success (Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, p10).
INTERACTION WITH OTHER SANCTIONS REGIMES (Unilateral measures, Regional
organization measures)
The Security Council saddled ECOMOG with responsibility for enforcing the formers targeted
sanctions. Such responsibility was in addition to enforcing the prior full embargo imposed by
ECOWAS. In response to the 25 August 1997 overthrow of the Kabbah government, ECOWAS
imposed a full embargo on Sierra Leone, including on humanitarian food assistance to the country
unless exempted through an appeal process. The comprehensive nature of the embargo (land and sea
blockade) was at variance with the targeted nature of the Security Council sanctions. The difference,
notwithstanding explanations of inexperience on the part of ECOWAS, partly explains why ECOMOG
found it difficult implementing the exemption clause of the UN sanction.
RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER POLICY INSTRUMENTS (Use of force, covert actions, tribunals,
referral to ICC)
ECOMOG combined military action with sanctions. For instance, in February 1998, ECOMOG troops
toppled the military regime, and reinstated Kabbah to power. The sanctions against AFRC members
remained in place, as did measures against the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). Similarly, in
February 1998, ECOMOG, following provocation from rebel/army junta forces, launched a full military
assault that led to the collapse of the junta, and a few months later the UN established UNOMSIL. At
the same time the Special Representatives of the Secretary General did not relent in performing their
duties, including maintaining close contact with all parties to the conflict and monitoring the situation.
In December 1998, the rebels mounted an assault to recaptured Freetown, and by January 1999
succeeded at capturing most parts of the city. Later the same month, ECOMOG troops retook the capital
and again installed the civilian government. Special Representative Okelo initiated a series of diplomatic
efforts geared at opening up dialogue with the rebels. On 7 July, after a series of negotiations begun in
May 1999, the Lome agreement was signed by all parties to the conflict. When the Lome agreement
failed, ECOMOG did not hesitate to use force as the need arose. On its impact, the Security Council,
while in support of negotiated settlement to the conflict, imposed further sanctions on the rebels and
Liberia.
IMPLEMENTATION (assessing monitoring and enforcement)
The effectiveness of arms embargoes is dependent on the member states monitoring and enforcing them.
However, there are often political and economic incentives for member states to violate arms
embargoes. Economic benefit and solidarity appear to have been the major motivating factors regarding
the blatant violations of the arms embargo against the RUF by the Liberian government. Moreover,
Sierra Leone had vast border areas that were not monitored by government personnel. Furthermore, the
airspace was largely unregulated and was not monitored. These conditions seem to have facilitated
embargo-busting activities, such as transfer of weapons by smugglers to targeted rebels and groups.
(Beyond ‘shadow-boxing’ and ‘lip service’: The enforcement of arms embargoes in Africa by Guy
Lamb ISS Paper 135 • April 2007).
The Panel of Expert on Sierra Leone reported on how Taylor helped violate the arms embargo on Sierra
Leone. The Panel found that most of the weapons shipped into RUF territory passed through at least two
other countries, including Liberia. In its findings on implementation of the arms embargo, the Panel
reported that the region was “awash with arms” (paras. 19-20, S/2000/1195 (20 December, 2000). It had
found “unequivocal and overwhelming evidence” that Liberia had been actively supporting the RUF at
all levels, by providing it with training, weapons and related material, logistic support, a staging ground
for attacks and a safe haven for retreat, recuperation and public relations activitiesxiv
Many small arms were also coming in from Bulgaria or Ukraine through Libya, Liberia and Burkina
Faso. Ukrainian and South African mercenaries were reportedly re-equipping and retraining both AFRC
and RUF fighters prior to the October 1998 attack on Kono
DIRECT IMPACTS
Economic impacts on the signalled targets. Major foreign exchange earners such as the Bong Mines, the
LAMCO iron ore company and the Union Glass factory remain closed with no signs of being revived.
Major rubber concessions like Firestone, LAC and Guthrie are operating at less than half their
capacities.
INDIRECT IMPACTS
Unemployment in Sierra Leone was pegged at an alarming 85 percent in 2000. Economic harship was
rampant for the innocent civilians in Sierra Leone. Pervasive and deepening poverty on the civilians in
the country. The war had curbed agricultural production drastically, cut government revenues from
mining and seen the destruction of hundreds of schools, health clinics, and administrative facilities.
Forced displacement had effected more than half the population estimated at 4.5 million. Between
20,000 and 75,000 people have been killed and thousands mutilated. Dislocation of people, the brain
drain compounded by the war, and destruction of schools have exacerbated the educational crisis in the
country, which has a literacy rate of about 20 per cent. (Source : www.afrol.com)
EVASION
NOT AVAILABLE AT THE MOMENT Following a visit to Sierra Leone and Liberia in December
1998, the chairman of the UN Security Council sanctions committee on Sierra Leone reported that arms
and ammunition were crossing from neighbouring countries, including Liberia, in violation of a June
1998 Security Council Resolution prohibiting the sale and supply of arms to non-governmental forces in
Sierra Leone (Amnesty, 1999).
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
Worsening humanitarian crisis as the ECOMOG could not implement the exemption clause that would
enable delivery of vital supplies. This led to frustration of the efforts of international NGOs and sharp
criticism of the ECOMOG and the practice of delegating sanctions enforcement to regional bodies.
ECOWAS lacked the capacity to administer the embargo exemptions, and in effect, food aid was being blocked.
The economy of Sierra Leone was shattered that the Government of Sierra Leone had to develop a
consultation with civil society in implementing a poverty reduction strategy.
INTEGRATING IMPACTS AND CONSEQS
Intended consequences
Unintended consequences
Direct impacts
On Military Junta/RUF
On the Sierra Leone civilians
Indirect impacts
Economic impacts on the Military
Shattered economy of Sierra
and the RUF
Leone and high unemployment
rate
EFFECTIVENESS
The arms embargo proved ineffective in stopping hostilities which continued even after the Lome
agreement. The UN threat of an arms embargo against the military junta in Sierra Leone in August 1997
was credible, but it failed to force the target to step down from power and allow the restoration of the
democratically elected government. ECOWAS intended for UN sanctions to be one part of a threepronged approach—including dialogue, the introduction of sanctions and the use of force—to restoring
Ahmed Kabbah’s elected government to power and removing the AFRC junta from power. After talks
with the junta broke down in July 1997, ECOWAS asked the UN to consider imposing sanctions,
including an arms embargo. It was only after the UN arms embargo was imposed, in October 1997 that
the junta agreed to a timetable for restoring the democratically elected government. However, the arms
embargo did not compel the junta to step down and it was removed by armed force.xv
At the political level, the UN fully supported the ECOWAS peace efforts in Sierra Leone and assisted in
trying to raise funds for ECOMOG to overcome known logistical constraints. The Secretary-General
convened a high-level conference to mobilize assistance for DDR, urgent humanitarian needs and
logistical support for ECOMOG. However, from the military perspective, no specific mechanism was
put in place for the UN to help ECOMOG in overcoming its logistical problems. The support provided
by the international community was limited and ultimately led to the withdrawal of ECOMOG from
Sierra Leone in late 1999-early 2000. Given the limitations, ECOMOG fell short of carrying out its
responsibilities, including sanctions implementation and monitoring.
Following the overthrow of the civilian government of Kabbah in May 1997, the Security Council
imposed oil and arms embargo against Sierra Leone, along with travel ban on members of the ruling
junta. The Council mandated ECOMOG to monitor and enforce the measures by force where necessary.
Only 15 days after, the junta reached an agreement for the reinstatement of the Kabbah government and
demobilization of rebel groups and Sierra Leones armed forces. However, the junta failed to implement
the agreement. The RUF continued to engage in mass atrocities against civilian populations, including
rape. ECOMOG had little choice but to topple the military regime and return Kabbah to power. Whilst
the sanctions against the AFRC and RUF subsisted remained in place, the RUF managed a spectacular
offensive in 1999 and in the process seized the capital Freetown (Making Economic Sanctions Work by
Chantal de Jonge Oudraat)
Following a visit to Sierra Leone and Liberia in December 1998, the chairman of the UN Security
Council sanctions committee on Sierra Leone reported that arms and ammunition were crossing from
neighbouring countries, including Liberia, in violation of a June 1998 Security Council Resolution
prohibiting the sale and supply of arms to non-governmental forces in Sierra Leone (Amnesty, 1999).
Security Council resolution 1171 June 1998 re-imposed a travel ban and arms embargo on the RUF and
members of the former junta, but it does not seem to have strictly obstructed access to arms. Many small
arms were also coming in from Bulgaria or Ukraine through Libya, Liberia and Burkina Faso. Ukrainian
and South African mercenaries were reportedly re-equipping and retraining both AFRC and RUF
fighters prior to the October 1998 attack on Kono. This strong external support meant the RUF could
take on ECOMOG force in the east.
(SIERRA LEONE’S WAR IN A REGIONAL CONTEXT: LESSONS FROM INTERVENTIONS
David Keen
Online at
http://www.lse.ac.uk/archived/global/Publications/HumanSecurityReport/WestAfricaPaper.pdf).
Thus, Oudraat argued that partial and targeted sanctions in Sierra Leone failed because they were standalone measures, not part of a coercive strategy; and because of poor implementation. An energetic
response to the first signs of defiance may well have led to very different outcomes in both countries.
Half-measures, on the other hand, stood no chance of success (Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, p10).
PLEASE LOOK BACK AT THE TOR FOR A STRUCTURE FOR ASSESSING EFFECTIVENESS.
PLEASE ASSESS FOR EACH OF THE DIFFERENT PURPOSES IDENTIFIED EARLIER IN THE
EPISODE.
EPISODE 3
CONTEXT
July 2000 – September 2010 (GT 10 years)
Due to the continued mayhem in Sierra Leone, the UN Security Council met in July 5, 2000 to
investigate the effectiveness of the 1132 sanctions in Sierra Leone. The panel of experts of the UNSC
expressed concern about the role played by the access of the rebels to the diamond mines, and how these
diamonds were transported to neighbouring countries, especially Liberia. Resolution 1306 was the
product of the findings of the panel. This became imperative when the panel found that Liberia had been
supporting the RUF through provision of weapons, training for RUF members, and providing a place for
the rebels to escape to. It was even discovered by the panel that Sierra was saturated with arms which
had come in through neighbouring countries like Liberia and Burkina Faso. The panel of experts on the
Sierra Leone sanctions regime noted that then Liberian President, Charles Taylor, was actively involved
in fuelling violence in Sierra Leone
Source: Farrall, J.M (2007) United Nations Sanctions and the Rule of Law. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press. Pp 367
UNSC DECISION MAKING
-
Resolution 1306 adopted by the Security Council at its 4168th meeting of July 5, 2000, under
Chapter VII of the United Nations charter.
Imposed a ban on the direct or indirect import of rough diamonds from Sierra Leone not controlled
by the Government of Sierra Leone through a certificate of Origin regime. The resolution also
established a panel of experts to monitor sanctions violations, consider the adequacy of air traffic
control systems in the region, and provide observations and recommendations to the Council. The
final report of the Panel, which was Chaired by Martin Chungong Ayafor (Cameroun), was issued as
S/2000/1195; the four month mandate of the Panel expired at the end of December 2000 and was not
renewed.
POLITICAL WILL
Resolution 1306 was adopted by 14 votes to none against one abstention from Mali which was at that
time also the Chair of the ECOWAS committee.
Three years after the imposition of an arms embargo on Sierra Leone in 1997, the Security Council
approved an embargo on Sierra Leonean diamonds in 2000. The embargo on diamonds followed the
recommendation of a Panel of Experts, which was set up to examine the link between the war and
diamonds. The Panel reported that Liberian President Charles Taylor was largely responsible for the
continuing war in Sierra Leone, and urged the Security Council to reinforce the arms embargo on
Liberia and impose additional sanctions, including a travel ban, assets freeze, and diamond and timber
embargoes. The Panel also detailed how the rebel RUF used diamonds to fund the war and forced Sierra
Leoneans into diamond mining. The Panel’s report detailed how the RUF exported diamonds, mostly
through Gambia, Guinea, and Liberia, emphasising the growth in Gambian diamond exports, despite the
fact that Gambia has no diamond deposits of its own. The Panel concluded that Liberian authorities
were fully aware of, and benefited from, illegal transit of Sierra Leonean diamonds through their
country. The Panel also reported on how Taylor helped violate the arms embargo on Sierra Leone even
though Taylor denied providing weapons and training to RUF forces. The Panel found that most of
the weapons shipped into RUF territory passed through at least two other countries, and Liberia was
always one of them.
Following these findings, and the Panel’s recommendation to fully investigate Liberia’s role in violating
the sanctions on Sierra Leone, the Security Council disbanded the Panel on Sierra Leone and replaced it
with the Panel of Experts on Liberia. In 2001, the Council began adopting and implementing the Panel’s
recommendations to impose new sanctions on Liberia and directed the Panel to monitor them
effectively.
(Targeting Spoilers The Role of United Nations Panels of Experts Alix J. Boucher and Victoria K. Holt,
Report from the Project on Rule of Law in Post-Conflict Settings Future of Peace Operations January
2009
Stimson Center Report No. 64, online at
http://www.operationspaix.net/IMG/pdf/StimsonBoucherHolt_Targeting_Spoilers_jan09_FINAL.pdf)
The Kimberley Process (KP) began in May 2000 in Kimberley (South Africa) as interested
governments, NGOs and industry groups sought to come up with a practical way to prevent illicit
diamonds from entering the legitimate diamond trade. As a result, the ‘Kimberley Process Certification
Scheme’ (KPCS) was designed and entered into force in 2003, with the support of the UN and the
WTO. The KPCS now represents 75 countries, including Sierra Leone and all major diamond
producing, trading and processing countries. Countries that participate must pass legislation to enforce
the KP. They must also set up control systems for the import and export of rough diamonds. Participants
are only allowed to trade rough diamonds with other participants. No uncertified shipments of rough
diamonds will be permitted to enter or leave a participant's country. The aim is to prevent blood
diamonds from entering the KP system.
However, for two and half years the participants of the Kimberley Process engaged in serious
negotiations. The big breakthrough occurred during the 13th plenary meeting in Gaborone, Botswana
during the last week of November 2001, where the draft of the final agreement was written. On 5
November 2002, the governments signed the Interlaken Declaration, which introduced the long-awaited
Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS). The national legislations to implement the KPCS was
scheduled to be in place by 1 January 2003. On the appointed day, only a handful of
countries, including India, Canada, Switzerland and some countries in Africa, were actually ready to
begin the implementation. The European Union faced some administrative delays and implemented in
February. The United States waited to implement until the question of WTO conformity was fully
resolved in May 2003. Although the UN did not take part in the negotiations, it provided essential
backup with publications and disseminations of expert reports, through its leverage on governments, and
through its formal endorsement of the Kimberley Process in December 2000 with the General Assembly
Resolution 55/56.
PURPOSE(S) (coerce, constrain, signal)
The purpose of the sanction was to coerce and constrain the link between illicit trade in rough
diamonds and armed conflict, through the Kimberley Process. The sanctions on Liberia were meant to
deal with the spoiler role played by Charles Taylor of Liberia and to signal to all actors, including arms
and diamonds smugglers, involved in breaching existing UN sanctions in the region. Sanctions seek to
block all diamond sales by Liberia, restrict international travel of Liberian officials and sustain arms
embargo against Liberia Altogether, the aim of the UN was to cut off factors that fuel and sustain the
war with a view to constrain the rebels and coerce them to tow the path of peace and democratization.
AUDIENCE[S] SIGNALLED
All States (especially the Government of Liberia) engaged in the sales, production, importing and
exporting of diamonds; The RUF, The Military Junta, etc
TYPE OF TARGETED SANCTIONS (the design of the measures)
SECTORAL (diamonds) Ban on trade in diamonds not controlled by the Government of Sierra Leone
through a certificate of origin regime.
In addition to Resolution 1306 of July 2000,which states in paras 1-5 of S/RES/1306 (2000) that:
All States shall take the necessary measures to prohibit the
direct or indirect import of all rough diamonds from Sierra Leone to their territory;
2. Requests the Government of Sierra Leone to ensure, as a matter of
urgency, that an effective Certificate of Origin regime for trade in diamonds is in
operation in Sierra Leone;
3. Also requests States, relevant international organizations and other bodies
in a position to do so to offer assistance to the Government of Sierra Leone to
facilitate the full operation of an effective Certificate of Origin regime for Sierra
Leone rough diamonds;
4. Further requests the Government of Sierra Leone to notify the
Committee established by resolution 1132 (1997) (“the Committee”) of the details of
such a Certificate of Origin regime when it is fully in operation;
5. Decides that rough diamonds controlled by the Government of Sierra
Leone through the Certificate of Origin regime shall be exempt from the measures
imposed in paragraph 1 above when the Committee has reported to the Council,
taking into account expert advice obtained at the request of the Committee through
the Secretary-General, that an effective regime is fully in operation;
Resolution 1343 (May 2001) Decided:
- To sanction the Government of Liberia for supporting armed rebel groups, in particular, its
support of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone, and for its role in the illicit
diamond trade.
- seek to block all diamond sales by Liberia
- restrict international travel by top Liberian officials
sustain the arms embargo against Liberia
INTERACTION WITH OTHER SANCTIONS REGIMES (Unilateral measures, Regional
organization measures)
In December 2000, the Kimberly Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) was established when the
United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution A/RES/55/56, supporting the creation of an
international certification scheme for rough diamonds, and this was followed by support from the United
Nations Security Council in its Resolution 1459 passed in January 2003. The Security Council endorsed
the KPCS whilst its sanctions against blood diamonds were still in force. In other words, the SC
combined sanctions and the KP in an effort to cut off the economic life-wire of the rebel, which had
sustained the deadly conflict in Sierra Leone.
RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER POLICY INSTRUMENTS (Use of force, covert actions, tribunals,
referral to ICC)
The UN Security Council combined sanctions with military pressure to isolate and weaken the rebel
regime. The UN worked with the diamond industry, diamond exporting countries and NGOs, such as
Global Witness, Partnership Africa Canada, Amnesty International, to introduce certificate of origin
systems designed to protect the legitimate diamond trade as opposed to diamond produced by sanctioned
rebel groups. At the same time, the SC maintained travel and diamond sanctions against Liberia, and
had UNAMSIL on ground to monitor the peace process in Sierra Leone.
IMPLEMENTATION (assessing monitoring and enforcement)
In order to improve implementation of diamond sanctions, the panel recommended that diamond
sanctions should be imposed against Liberia, until it could demonstrate that it was no longer involved in
the trafficking of arms to, or diamonds from Sierra Leone. The 1343 Liberian sanctions of March 2001
were put in place to prevent the illicit trade of diamonds and arms. To crack down on the illicit diamond
trade, the government of Sierra Leone tightened security between Kono a large diamond district, and
Freetown the country’s major exporting site. Resolution 1343 marked the Security Councils first attempt
to impose sanctions on one country for deliberately busting sanctions on another. The sanctions on
Liberia achieved its aim of buttressing the peace process in Sierra Leone. Events in Sierra Leone in late
2000 and 2001 also show that the threat and imposition of sanctions on Liberia probably contributed to
the rebel’s decision to sign an unconditional ceasefire in November 2000.
Monitoring UN sanctions in Africa: the role of panels of experts
Alex Vines, Online at
http://www.vertic.org/media/Archived_Publications/Yearbooks/2003/VY03_Vines.pdf
In 2001, the Council began adopting and implementing the Panel’s recommendations to impose new
sanctions on Liberia and directed the Panel to monitor them effectively. Evidence suggests that
monitoring and implementation have been effective (Please see direct and indirect impacts below).
DIRECT IMPACTS
In 2006, the Kimberley Process conducted a review of the direct impact of the KPCS on Sierra Leone:.
“In the case of Sierra Leone, the KP review visit found that that the certification system had facilitated
greater control over the diamond industry and reduced smuggling through the monitoring and control of
diamond exports. The review visit estimated that the official system is now capturing up to 80 percent of
production. According to Sierra Leone’s official export statistics, the total value of exports increased
from US$26 million in 2001, to US$155 million in 2004, and US$142 million in 2005” (KP 2006, 23).
The diamond embargo resulted in an almost complete halt to the traffic in illicit diamonds from Sierra
Leone to Liberia
INDIRECT IMPACTS
Establishment of the link between diamond and conflict inspired the UN embargo on diamond in Sierra
Leone. Concern about the link on the part of the UN and some international NGOs shaped the diamond
industry decision to do something about blood diamond. The rebel RUF was able to protract the bloody
conflict until January 2001 through the smuggling and sale of diamonds, which funded the purchase of
weapons. The Kimberley Process succeeded in halting the ability of rebel groups to fund their activities
through the sale of diamonds. Mineral Resources Minister Mohamed Swarray-Deen remarked that the
Kimberley Process had helped to legitimize the industry in his country. “It has returned the diamond
industry back to the community which is rightly the main beneficiary. It was originally hijacked by a few
greedy and corrupt people.” (quoted in MacJohnson, AFP, 2003)
1. Legitimization of the diamond industry in Sierra Leone
All parties to the KP, including Sierra Leone, must provide every diamond with a governmentbacked certificate of origin. Those who are not party to the KP are not allowed to sell to major
markets such as the US and Europe, or trade with diamond-processing countries such as Belgium,
India and Israel. Parties to the KP are agreed that they will only allow for the import and export of
rough diamonds if those rough diamonds come from or are being exported to another Kimberley
Process participant. The KPCS is an attempt to design a system that will ensure that (1) conflict
diamonds do not enter the legal trading system between the point of mining and first export from a
producing country (2) diamonds are not tampered with between their dispatch from a producing
country and their first arrival in a country where they will be cut, polished or traded (3) countries
that cut, polish and trade in rough diamonds have adequate controls and procedures to ensure that
conflict diamonds cannot enter their trade (ActionAid 2002.) By adhering to the industry standard
the government of Sierra Leone demonstrates that blood diamond cannot enter the market, which
has, in turn, provided legitimacy for the diammond trade in the country.
2. Legitimization of the global diamond market
The World Diamond Council played prominent role in the emergence of the KP. In addition, the
World Diamond Council proposed that the industry create and implement a System of
Warranties for diamonds. Under this system, which has been endorsed by all Kimberley Process
participants, all buyers and sellers of both rough and polished diamonds must make a written
guarantee on all their invoices that their diamonds “have been purchased from legitimate sources
not involved in funding conflict and in compliance with United Nations resolutions.” (World
Diamond Council 2003). The involvement and commitment of the Council and countries that
cut, polish and trade in rough diamonds have adequate controls and procedures to ensure that
conflict diamonds cannot enter their trade have bestowed legitimacy on the global diamond
market.
3. Establishment of a global diamond market governance mechanism
4. The success of the Kimberley Process rests on a combination of national legislation and industry
self-regulation. The collaboration between global NGOs, the global diamond industry and
stakeholder countries with regard to blood diamond has brought about a novel global diamond
market governance mechanism, which very existence confers legitimacy on the diamond trade.
EVASION
However, the success of the Kimberley Process in halting rebel involvement in the diamond trade does
not paint a complete picture. It is suspected that other powerful interests have stepped in to keep both
illegal mining and smuggling alive. In an interview with Agence France-Presse (AFP), Lebanese
diamond merchant Ansa Farouk said that “other individual powerful interests have stepped in to keep
both illicit mining and smuggling alive. They have their contacts in Conakry and Monrovia (the Guinean
and Liberian capitals) and where the diamonds go to after this, I cannot say. There are lots of mafia-like
movements involved.” (MacJohnson, AFP, 2003).
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
The Panel of Experts on Liberia report on the diamond embargo on the latter: "The embargo has created
a different problem. Since it is impossible to sell Liberian rough [diamonds] officially, dealers are
seeking to camouflage their Liberian diamonds as those from neighbouring markets" -- including Sierra
Leone. Ironically, sanctions intended to prevent Sierra Leonean diamonds from being smuggled into
Liberia were causing legitimately mined Liberian diamonds to be smuggled into Sierra Leone
'Conflict diamonds' evade UN sanctions Improvements in Sierra Leone, but continuing violations in
Angola and Liberia, Michael Fleshman, Africa Recovery, Vol.15 #4, December 2001).
Moreover, the rise of powerful movements, which aimed at continuing illicit mining and smuggling of
conflict diamond, is another unintended consequence of the KP, coercion and constraint of the rebels.
Liberian dollar dropped sharply against the greenback from 40 in May to 52 in November 2001, rising at
one point 62 to the dollar. Worse still, the government owed civil servants salary arrears ranging from
four to seven months (AFP 7 November 2001). This could be attributed to the diamond embargo as it
was reported in 1999, Liberia mined $10 million worth of diamonds locally but exported $297 million
worth of diamonds to Belgium, where the rough stones are traded and/ or cut. While Liberia is a transit
point for diamonds as far afield from Russia, Congo and Angola, De Beers estimated that about $70
million of Liberia’s exports in 1999 came from Sierra Leonexvi
INTEGRATING IMPACTS AND CONSEQS
Intended consequences
Unintended consequences
Direct impacts
On Military Junta/RUF
On the Sierra Leone economy
Indirect impacts
Economic impacts on the Military
Economic impacts on the nation
/RUF/States involved in diamond
as well as illegal sales and
Exportation and importation
camouflage of the blood diamonds
EFFECTIVENESS: Please give us your assessment here.
From the Sierra Leone case, it can be seen that the effectiveness of the sanctions were determined by the
implementation procedures as wel as the Institutions already in place as of the time of the conflict in the region,
Sectoral sanctions such as oil and gas embargo have been effective, but the travel bans were not too effective.
This is because of the cross border co-op[erations and lackadisical at[tit[uted of the border control amongst
African neighbouring countries. Reasearch into countries which were aiding and abetting in the conflict in Sierra
Leone should have been done expediately and such countries sanctioned as a deterrant to other countries. For
example secondary sanctions were helpful such as Liberia and its role in Sierra Leone. The panel of experts
established under the Sierra Leone sanctions regime was particularly instrumetal in providing unequivocal
evidence that the Government of Charles Taylor in Liberia was actively supporting the RUF through the provision
of weapons, logistical support as well as a safe haven for retreat and recuperation.151 As recommended by the
sanction reform Process, the Security Council followed through on the panel’s recommendations by imposing a
travel ban on senior members of the Liberian Government, its armed forces and their spouses, as well as
mandating Liberia to freeze the financial assets of the RUF.xvii The decision to impose secondary measures against
Liberia marked an important development in the use of sanctions by the Security Council, as this was the first
time that it sanctioned a UN member because of its refusal to comply with measures imposed against another
(UNSC Res. 1373 (28 September 2001) S/RES/1373 in Kiragu, 2010). In other for the monitring and implementatin to
be effective in Sierra Leone, a permanent bserver mission should be in place, ike the United Nations Observer
Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL). It can be seen that what works best in Sierra Leone is the use of force and
coercion in other to get results.For the sanctions in Sierra Leone to be adjudged totally effective, one must also
put into consideration the humanitarian consequencies of the sanctions that were p[ut in place. Due to the war in
Sierra Leone and the consequent economic and financial embargoes that were put in place, currently according to
UNDP’s human Index, Sierra Leone ranks last on the UNDP’s Human Development Index, with the lowest life
expectancy of 35 years in the world. In future, sanctions should be only targeted at Individuals to minimise the
humanitarian consequences on innocent civilians. Finally, for the sanctions to be totally effective for cases like
Sierra Leone, the root causes of the problem [should be [tackled and erring individuals be brought to ook
immediately. The root cause of the conflict in Sierra Leone was corruption and bad governance, which had no
transperancy, thereby leading to unequal income distribution of the national wealth among thepeople and citizens
of Sierra Leone.
ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND MATERIAL
In the following box you may add background or reference material that is too generic for inclusion
elsewhere in the template.
Acronyms and References (Being collated)
Abbreviations and acronym
AFRC Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Sierra Leone)
AU African Union
DDR Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea)
DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo
EC European Community
ECOMOG Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
EEC European Economic Community
IA International Alert
KPCS Kimberley Process Certification Scheme
NPRC National Provisional Ruling Council
OAU Organization of African Unity
RUF Revolutionary United Front (Sierra Leone)
UN United Nations
UNOMSIL United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone
UNMIL United Nations Mission in Liberia
i
Peacekeeping Best Practices, 2003, Lessons Learned from United Nations Peace Keeping Experiences in Sierra
LeonePp33/83. Online at http://www.iss.co.za/af/profiles/SieraLeone/sleonelessons.pdf
ii
UNSC, 1998, LETTER DATED 31 DECEMBER 1998 FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SECURITY
COUNCIL COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO RESOLUTION 1132 (1997)
CONCERNING SIERRA LEONE ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE
SECURITY COUNCIL, S/1998/1236 http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1132/pdf/1236e.pdf
iii
UN, ‘Security Council Committee on Sierra Leone issues list of junta members affected by sanctions’, Press
release SC/6464, 8 Jan. 1998, online at http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1132/pdf/6464e.html.
iv
UNSC, 1998, LETTER DATED 31 DECEMBER 1998 FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SECURITY
COUNCIL COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO RESOLUTION 1132 (1997)
CONCERNING SIERRA LEONE ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE
SECURITY COUNCIL, S/1998/1236 http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1132/pdf/1236e.pdf
v
, Peacekeeping Best Practices, 2003, Lessons Learned from United Nations Peace Keeping Experiences in
Sierra LeonePp33/83. Online at http://www.iss.co.za/af/profiles/SieraLeone/sleonelessons.pdf
vi
Peacekeeping Best Practices, 2003, Lessons Learned from United Nations Peace Keeping Experiences in Sierra
Leone Pp34/83-35/83
viivii
Farrall, Jeremy Matam, United Nations Sanctions and the Rule of Law. (Cambridge : Cambridge University
Press, 2007). PP 357-368
viii
Sierra Lenone (nd), online at http://www.conflicttransform.net/Sierra%20Leone.pdf
ix
Daniel Strandow and Peter Wallensteen, 2007, United Nations Arms Embargoes: their Impact on Arms Flow
and Target Behaviour. A report by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and the Special
Program on the Implementation of Targeted Sanctions at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research,
Uppsala University. Online at http://books.sipri.org/files/misc/UNAE/SIPRI07UNAE.pdf
x
Ruben De Koning, 2008, Resource-Conflict Links in Sierra Leone and Democratic Republic of Congo, SIPRI, No
2008/2 online at http://books.sipri.org/files/insight/SIPRIInsight0802.pdf
xi
Michael Fleshman, 2001, “Conflict diamonds' evade UN sanctions: Improvements in Sierra Leone, but
continuing violations in Angola and Liberia”, Africa Recovery, Vol.15(4): 15.
xii
Sheryl Dickey (nd) ‘Sierra Leone : Diamonds for Arms’ online at
http://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/v7i3/sierraleone.htm
xiii
Sheryl Dickey (nd) ‘Sierra Leone : Diamonds for Arms’ online at
http://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/v7i3/sierraleone.htm
xiii
United Nations Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts Appointed Pursuant to Security Council
Resolution 1306 (2000), Paragraph 19, in Relation to Sierra Leone, S/2000/1195, para. 2
xiv xiv
[ Farrall, Jeremy Matam, United Nations Sanctions and the Rule of Law. (Cambridge : Cambridge University
Press, 2007). PP 357-368
xv
Daniel Strandow and Peter Wallensteen, 2007, United Nations Arms Embargoes: their Impact on Arms Flow
and Target Behaviour. A report by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and the Special
Program on the Implementation of Targeted Sanctions at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research,
Uppsala University. Online at http://books.sipri.org/files/misc/UNAE/SIPRI07UNAE.pdf
xvixvi
Partnership Africa and Canada report on Sierra Leone conflict diamonds in « The Heart of the matter »,
January 2000
S/RES/1132 (1997)
8 October 1997
S/RES/1156 (1998)
16 March 1998
S/RES/1171 (1998)
5 June 1998
S/RES/1306 (2000)
5 July 2000
S/RES/1385 (2001) [
S/RES/1446 (2002)
S/RES/1793 (2007)
S/RES/1940 (2010)
19 December 2001
4 December 2002
31 December 2007
29 September 2010
Works cited
United Nations Arms EmbargoesTheir Impact on Arms Flows andTarget Behaviourd A report by
Damien Fruchart, Paul Holtom and Siemon T. Wezeman SIPRI Arms Transfers Project Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute and Daniel Strandow and Peter Wallensteen. Special Program on the Implementation
of Targeted Sanctions Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University (2007).
Farrall, Jeremy M. United Nations Sanctions and the Rule of Law. Cambridge, NY:
Cambridge UP, 2007.
Kiragu,Ruth (2010) ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF UN TARGETED
SANCTIONS (A SEMINAR PAPER ON LEGAL CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND
CONFLICT SETTLEMENT) UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA[
Vines, Alex. "Can UN Arms Embargoes in Africa be Effective?" International Affairs. 83.6
(2007): 1107-1122.