Mexico at an Impasse
tb (
M. Delal Baer
THE EXPECTATIONS REVOLUTION
THE ]ULY 2000 DEFEAT of Mexico's lnstitutional Revolutionary Party
(PRI) after more than 70 years of rule sparked a revolution in
expectations. There were celebrations in the streets, glowing editorials
in foreign newspapers, and expressions of undiluted optimism in investment and policy circles. Newly elected president Vicente Fox
projected a triumphant image of strength and confidence that inflated
hopes at home and abroad: private investment would flood in, the rule
of law would prevail, the sins of the past would be punished, and the
U.S.-Mexico relationship would flower. More profoundly, Mexico
would elude its existential condition as an underdeveloped nation.
Three years into Mexico's democratic transition, few of these
dreams have been realized. Mexican politics are more democratic but
less governable and are suffering from gridlock between the executive
and legislative branches. The economy is stable, but growth and
competitiveness are lagging as the next generation of reforms-tax,
energy, and labor-falls prey to partisan bickering in Mexico's Congress.
And the friendship between Fox and President George W. Bush has
cooled over differences about immigration and policy toward lraq.
Mexico shows no signs of an imminent crisis, but its triple political,
economic, and diplomatic impasse is taking a tollo The price of
unreasonably high expectations has been premature disillusionment. A
breakthrough in at least one area must come fairly soon-lest Mexico's
grand experiment with economic and politicalliberty fail to fulfill its
potential.
M. DELAL BAER is Director of the Mexico Project at the Center for Strategic
and International Studies and editor of The NAFTA Debate.
[101]
UNGOVERNABLE DEMOCRACY
THE PRINCIPAL CONCERN ofMexico's political elite today is how to build
governing majorities and achieve consensus. After three years of
stalemate in Congress, there is debate over whether Mexico's political
paralysis is the result of a constitutional structure that makes it
inherently ungovernable or of weak leadership on the part
ofPresident Fox. The answer to this question is not insignificant. If the
logjam is due to weak leadership, the presidential elections of 2006
might resolve the problem. If the logjam, however, is structural in
nature, it will be much more difficult to overcome.
Fox's leadership style is unconventional and ideologica11y heterogeneous. Some commentators find him refreshing and authentic,
whereas others complain that he has not established clear priorities or
consistent legislative strategies. But whatever Fox's shortcomings, it
is clear that any leader, no matter how gifted, would have struggled
with the challenge of assuming the presidency at Mexico's singular
moment of regime change. Fox won only 42.5 percent of the vote in
the 2000 e1ections, and his National Action Party (PAN) controls
just 30 percent of seats in the lower house ofCongress (the Cham
ber ofDeputies) and 38 percent in the Senate. In most instances of
regime change, the old regime is defeated and dismantled definitive1y. In Mexico, the PRI was defeated but far from dismantled: it
remains ensconced in Congress as a legitimate opposition party.
Many Mexicans believe that a democratic transition must include
a punitive settling of accounts with the PRI. As a result, Fox has
found himself on the horns of a dilemma: he needs a juicy corruption
case from the PRI era to prosecute, but he also needs the PRI'S
support to form congressional majorities. Fox has failed to reconci1e
these competing demands. His cabinet is divided between
pragmatists who see accommodation with the PRI as inescapable and
confrontationists who think that the president's legitimacy depends
on destroying the PRI, root and branch. Fox has oscillated between
these two approaches, launching vituperative attacks on the PRI one
dayand calling for congressional unity the next. The re
sult has been stalemate: the government launched investigations of
the PRI that were aggressive enough to undermine the chance
oflegislative cooperation but not decisive enough to satisf)r the
appetite for vengeance.
-
""""""
.
",-''',._~-,~-,
CORBIS
Missingpersons: mothers ofthe disappeared protesting in Mexico City, October 2001
Striking a balance between governability and rustorical reckoning
is most difficult during the early years of a democratic transition, as
was the case in Argentina and Chile. Some wi11 inevitably complain
that Mexico's democratic transition did not settle accounts in any
spectacular fashion, despite the fact that a special prosecutor is
investigating former President Luis Echeverría for rus alleged role in
the 1968 Tlatelolco student massacre. Others wi11 argue that the PRI
never committed human rights abuses on the scale of Chile's Augusto
Pinochet or Argentina's Jorge Rafael Videla, making an expurgation of
past sin s less necessary. But what is most important is that the first
three years ofMexico's transitian have not seen a single serious threat
to democracy. This success speaks well ofboth President Fox, who has
emphasized stability, and the PRI, which accepted its defeat with at
least a modicum of grace. To the extent that the stalemate of the past
three years is attributable to the unique dilemma of regime change, it
is a small price to pay for democratic survival. When such one-time
tensions have faded, Mexico's parties may be able to put aside the past
and cooperate on national business.
Today's gridlock, however, also stems from structural flaws that
make Mexico particularly susceptible to the frustrations of a divided
FOREIGN AFFAIRS .fanuary/FebruarY2oo4
[103]
M Delal Raer
UNGOVERNABLE DEMOCRACY
THE PRINCIPAL CONCERN ofMexico's political elite today is how to
build governing majorities and achieve consensus. Mter three years of
stalemate in Congress, there is debate over whether Mexico's political
paralysis is the result of a constitutional structure that makes it
inherently ungovernable or of weak leadership on the part
ofPresident Fox. The answer to this question is not insignificant. If the
logjam is due to weak leadership, the presidential elections of
2006 might resolve the problem. If the logjam, however, is structural
in nature, it will be much more difficult to overcome.
Fox's leadership style is unconventional and ideologically heterogeneous. Some commentators find him refreshing and authentic,
whereas others complain that he has not established clear priorities or
consistent legislative strategies. But whatever Fox's shortcomings, it is
clear that any leader, no matter how gifted, would have struggled with
the challenge of assuming the presidency at Mexico's singular moment
of regime change. Fox won only 42.5 percent of the vote in the 2000
elections, and his National Action Party (PAN) controls
just 30 percent of seats in the lower house of Congress (the Chamber
ofDeputies) and 38 percent in the Senate. In most instances of regime
change, the old regime is defeated and dismantled definitively. In
Mexico, the PRI was defeated but far from dismantled: it remains
ensconced in Congress as a legitimate opposition party.
Many Mexicans believe that a democratic transition must include a
punitive settling of accounts with the PRI. As a result, Fox has found
himself on the homs of a dilemma: he needs a juicy corruption case
from the PRI era to prosecute, but he also needs the PRI 's support to
forro congres
sional majorities. Fox has failed to reconcile these competing
demands. His cabinet is divided between pragmatists who see
accommodation with the PRI as inescapable and confrontationists
who think that the president's legitimacy depends on destroying the
PRI, root and branch. Fox has oscillated between these two
approaches, launching vituperative attacks on the PRI one day and
calling for congressional unity the next. The result has been
stalemate: the government launched investigations of the PRI that
were aggressive enough to undermine the chance oflegislative
FOREIGN
AFFAIRS'
Volume8] No.
[102]
cooperation
but not
decisive
enough
to 1satisf)r the appetite for
vengeance.
M Delal Baer
government and a limited presidency. Traditionally, governabilitywas
ensured only by the PRI'S ability to deliver overwhelming majorities
in both houses ofCongress, as the politician Manuel Camacho has
noted. There is no constitutional mechanism to guarantee that a
president can successfully govern in the face of an opposition
Congress. Without a majority in either house, therefore, the Fox
presidencywas instantly cut down to size by PRI legislators more
than willing to exercise the constitutional prerogatives accorded to
them in their new role as the opposition (the PRI'S Senate leader
recendy dec1ared that his party would govern from Congress).
It is improbable that any Mexican political party will be able to
reconstruct the electoral majorities formerly enjoyed by the PRI. The
historic 2000 elections did not produce realignment in favor of the
PAN, nor did the 2003 midterm elections result in a PRI majority in
Congress. Instead, three major parties of roughly equal strength vie for
dominance: the PRI, the PAN, and the left-wing Democratic
Revolutionary Party (PRD). Each party, moreover, is riven by
personal
and ideological faults that undermine the negotiating capacity of
party leaders in Congress. The system is further divided by three small
parties that survive thanks mosdy to the use of proportional representation (based on a party's percentage of the national vote talIy) to
elect a portion of Congress.
Looking ahead to the 2006 presidential election, one can envision a
scenario similar to that of the 2000 election: weak parties and strong
candidates who lack electoral coattails. Mexico City Mayor Andrés
Manuel López Obrador, one of the country's most popular potential
presidential candidates, consistendy polls in the neighborhood of 52
percent even though his party, the PRD, has never won more than 25
percent of the vote in a national election. In the event that a ticketsplitting Mexican electorate gives him a victory but only 17 percent of
Congress to his party, forming a governing alliance would be
immensely difficult. Similarly, a PRIor PAN candidate could win a
weak victory in the presidential race while his or her party achieved a
tepid plurality in Congress.
Some analysts have advocated a major constitutional overhaul to
install a parliamentary regime and guarantee majority support for the
executive. But many Mexicans, understandably disconcerted
[104]
FOREIGN AFFAIRS' Volume8J No. 1
Mexico
at
an
Impasse
by the impasse between the president and Congress and fearful for the
viability of democracy, instead look back nostalgically on the days of
a strong president. Accustomed to a pyramidal presidency so powerful
that it was once described as a six-year Aztec monarchy, they are
bewildered by this upside-down world. But the possibility of restoring
an all-powerful presidency is remote, and reengineering the Mexican
constitution to implant a parliamentary system is similarly unlikely.
Disillusionmentwith the political parties may account for
historical1y low voter turnout (42 percent) in the 2°°3 midterm
elections and could cause the electorate to seek out more charismatic
figures. Jorge Castañeda, formerly Fox's foreign minister, launched an
exploratory bid for the presidency on this logic, arguing that Mexican
voters go to the polls only when presented with a
Gridlock could
charismatic individual who offers hope of
change. As one senior Mexican diplomat
restore the authoritarian
has wryly commented, "In Mexico we have
egos, not institutions." This trend toward temptation.
personalism and weak parties may be noth
ing to worry about. Mexico might simply go the way of the United
States: weak but persistent parties that field strong candidates. In a
more ominous scenario, however, the decay of party institutions and
congressional gridlock could restore the authoritarian temptation and
pave the way for wild-card leadership.
Under current conditions, there are only two ways to create
majorities in Mexico: alliance building or modest political reform
aimed at consolidating the party system. Without strong parties that
can achieve electoral majorities across the board, the negotiating skills
of future presidents will be crucia!. Mexican political culture has little
experience with compromise, and the road to democracy has been
paved with insult and calumny. Give-and-take is central to a wellfunctioning democracy, but the spirit of retribution has bogged down
relations between Fox and the PRI-dominated legislature. In time, the
public may blame al1 parties for such gridlock,
thereby creating incentives to compromise. The elimination of
proportional representation, meanwhile, would encourage the gradual
consolidation of the party system. Instituting campaign finance
FOREIGN AFFAIRS ']anuary/FebruarY2oo4
[1°5]
M De/al Baer
reform, congressiona1 reelection, and "second round" provisions in
presidentia1 elections (to guarantee majorityvictories) wou1d further
enhance party 1egitimacy.
If there is hope for ending grid10ck in the remaining three years of
the Fox administration, it stems from the fact that all three major
parties have a shot at winning the presidency in 2006. None wishes to
inherit an ungovernab1e nation, and none wishes to be accused of
obstructionism. The hunger for power, therefore, may encourage a
flurry of congressional activity toward the end of Fox's tenure.
Mexican democracy is not fated to be dysfunctional. But without
some reform, it may end up in a peculiar state ofinstitutionallimbo and
semipermanent grid10ck: a constitutiona1ly mandated presidential
system that operates more like a majority-1ess parliamentary system.
THE COMPETITIVENESS DEFICIT
to take place
unaccompanied by a massive devaluation of the Mexican peso-thanks
to former President Ernesto Zedillo's commitment to fiscal discipline
and a free-floating currency. Three years 1ater, Mexican democracy
has passed an important economic test: both Congress and President
Fox have resisted the temptation to engage in deficit spending and
foreign borrowing in the face of a stubborn, painfu1 recession. In fact,
Fox's economic team has achieved unprecedented price and monetary
stabi1ity-treasury bond rates are below five percent, and inflation is
around four percent. Meanwhi1e, the federal deficit has fallen to 1ess
than one percent of GDP, foreign debt represents 1ess than 20 percent
of GDP, and Mexico's balance of trade is stab1e. Macroeconomic
stability has permitted real wages to rise for three consecutive years,
and, if growth returns in a lowinflation environment, Mexico will
increase its per capita GDP for the first time in nearly 30 years.
In the meantime, however, Mexico is caught in a grinding
stagnation that has 1ed to a net 10ss of 2.1 million jobs, average GDP
growth ofless than one percent in thefirst three years of the Fox
administration,
and a surge in illegal immigration to the United States. The onset of
recession in the United States hit Mexico hard, especially in the
THE 2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION was the first in close to 30 years
[106]
FOREIGN AFFAIRS' Volume83 No. 1
Mexico
al
an
Impasse
manufacturing sector. But there are signs that the Mexican recession is
the result of a growing competitiveness deficit, not simply a matter
ofbad luck to be solved by an uptick in the U.S. economy. Mexico
faces pressures from Chinese expor'ts in the U.S. market and from
foreign assembly plants moving to the Caribbean, China, and other
Latin American nations.
The current congressional impasse over economic reform is
especially damaging in this contexto The stalemate is not simply
partisanship ron amok; it is a symptom of regime change, of
fundamental disagreement over how much to preserve from the old
order. Many ofMexico's market reforms were imposed from above by
the PRI 's ruling technocracy in the 1990S.lronically, opposition to
them now comes not from President Fox and the PAN but from the
PRI itself-the continuation of a long-simmering conflict within the
party that has eropted into an open rebellion since the PRI lost the
presidency. (Many PRI-istas, however, have started to push for early
passage of some reforms to ease the task should the party recapture the
presidency in 2006.) Although there is a cost to delaying reform,
Mexico does need time to build a foundation of democratic support for
its market economy. Competitiveness-enhancing reforms ron headlong
into taboos and have steep political costs.
Energy policy provides a good example of this deadlock. Energy
has long served as a sacred symbol of Mexican sovereignty, and the
constitution explicitly prohibits private ownership in energy sectors,
even though the government does not have sufficient resources to
finance its own oil and natural gas exploration. As a result, cheap
energy does not offer the natural advantage to the Mexican economy
that it should. Electricity costs there are, on average, higher than those
in the United States, and there are frequent energy shortages that,
among other things, keep investment away from many northern
industrial parks. Although Mexico sits on one of the world's largest
natural gas reserves, it has to import natural gas from the United
States. (In fact, federal efforts to develop privately ron, competitively
priced electrical capacity have slowed to a crawl due to scarce gas
supplies.) ''A Mexican businessman can go to Texas and invest in
natural gas production to sen to Mexico, but that businessman is
unable to do the
same at home in Mexico," one economic official has
FOREIGN AFFAIRS .JanuarylFebruarY2oo4
[1°7 ]
scoffed. Still, mustering the
M Delal Baer
two-thirds congressional majority needed to change the constitution
and liberalize the energy sector is a daunting task.
Reform of the judicial system, another crucial step in improving
Mexico's economic situation, will not be easy either. Foreign investors
are wary of wobbly courts (plagued by frivolous litigation and corrupt
judges) and the capriciousness of the rule oflaw. The Dutch financial
services company ING has been sued three times in three separate
criminal courts for alleged underpayment on an insurance policy held
by Fertinal, a nearly bankrupt company hoping to save itself with a
huge reward. Senior ING executives have been
arbitrarily jailed, and ING even saw its assets frozen on the order of a
Mexico City court-a move that sent chills through the foreign financial
community.
Raising taxes, also a necessary reform, is another political bombshell. Mexico's tax collection rate hovers around 11 percent of GDPthe
lowest among the members of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development, which average collection rates of
almost 27 percent. Future competitiveness depends on long-term
investment in physical infrastructure and human capital, and Mexico's
efforts in these areas willlag so long as its tax collection rate remains
so low. Windfall resources from privatization and high oil prices have
made it possible to postpone tax reform over the past two decades, but
the moment of truth is fast approaching. Mexico is running out of
public companies to privatize, oil prices are falling, and revenues
derived from commercial tariffs have declined with the advent of free
trade.
A coming demographic shift wi11 only exacerbate these spending
pressures. Although Mexico is typically considered a young country,
the percentage of the population aged 65 and over is projected to
increase to 13 percent in 2°3° and to almost 25 percent by 2°5° (from a
low of 2.6 percent in 193°). In absolute terms, this means that there
wi11 be 17 million people older than 65 in 2°3° and more than 3° million in 2°5°. The implications of this shift for health and pension costs
are staggering. If Mexico cannot soon achieve economic modernity
and tax efficiency, it wi11 face a social catastrophe. As Richard J
ackson, director of the Global Aging Initiative, puts it, Mexico must
grow rich before it grows old.
[108]
FOREIGN AFFAIRS' Volume83 No. 1
Mexico
al
an
Impasse
Mexico has made enormous strides toward fiscal and monetary
stability, but its economy cannot afford to idle while the rest of the
world speeds ahead. Stalled reforms have dampened investor enthusiasm, costing Mexico $5 billion in direct foreign investment
(which fell from $16 billion in 2000 to $11 billion in 2002). The
failure to generate the more than one million jobs needed for new
entrants into the labor market, meanwhile, could thrust hundreds of
thousands ofMexicans out of their homes and toward the U.S. border.
Still, some long-term investors are betting that the backlash against
liberalization will fade as the wheels of generational change turno
Youthful Mexican politicians from all parties express positive
convictions about the need for continued economic opening. Mexico
may be closer than it seems to a true consensus on an open economy,
but a breakthrough must occur soon if the competitiveness deficit is to
be eliminated and the hemorrhage of Mexicans into the United States
stanched.
BEYOND NAFTA
in U.S.Mexican relations. But ever since the North American Free Trade
Agreement went into effect in 1994, the two countries have been
searching for the next great advance in bilateral relations. Jorge
Castañeda proposed transforming NAFTA into a European-style
"North American Community," complete with free movement of labor
and social development funds for poorer nations. Fox, enamored of
Europe's success in helping to develop the formerly poor countries of
Spain and Portugal, hoped that the United States might be willing to
do the same for Mexico. He also asked that the Bush administration
provide de jure recognition of the de facto residence of millions of
Mexicans working illegal1y in the United States, the first step toward
a free labor market.
A Mexican foreign policy that demanded sizeable amounts of aid
and the legalization of millions of immigrants, however, was the last
thing the Bush administration had expected. Washington tends to
associate the European model with overregulation and excessive
supranational bureaucracy, and Mexico underestimated U.S.
sensitivity
MEXICO'S DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION raised hopes of a revolution
FOREIGN AFFAIRS .JanuarylPebruarY2oo4
[109]
.
M De/al Baer
to job competition and downward pressure on wages in the face of a
looming recession. The free movement oflabor remains unrealistic as
long as Mexican wages are a fraction of wages in the United States.
Plenty ofU.S. policymakers remember that the last amnesty offered by
Congress-the Simpson- Rodino Immigration Reform and Control Act
of 1986-resulted in ever-larger waves of illegal immigration and
undermined the credibility ofU.S.law enforcement. Ultimately, the
events of September 11 allowed the White House to gracefully
sidestep the inconvenient requests of its southern neighbor.
Such setbacks do not mean that integration cannot continue or that
nothing has been accomplished. Mexico has successfu11y broadened
U.S. focus beyond its prior preoccupation with drug trafficking
(thanks in part to the progress it has made in arresting cartelleaders,
which allowed the U.S. Congress to modify
its controversial certification process). The
U.S.-Mexican relations Partnership for Prosperity, a creative
initiative launched by Bush and Fox in
are tied up in lmots:
September 2001 to foster investment in
each nation expects the Mexico's underdeveloped regions, has
impossible of the other. brought the Overseas Private Investment
Corporation and the Peace
Corps to Mexico for the first time. There is
hope for coordination in developing border infrastructure and North
American standards and certification procedures. Even in immigration
policy, incremental progress is possible if care is taken to protect
certain sensitive service and manufacturing sectors.
Three lessons of enduring importance emerge from the experience
ofBush and Fox thus faro The first is that it does not pay to hinge the
success of the entire relationship on a single issue, as Mexico did
when it defined success exclusively in terms of a comprehensive immigration accord. The second is the need for prior agreement when
one partner seeks a sea change in relations. When the Fox administration announced its desire for changes in U.S. immigration policy
without any prior negotiation, it created expectations that plague the
relationship to this day. The third lesson is that issue linkage can
prove fatal for bilateral harmony. With such a complex bilateral
agenda, linking issues allows a fire in one area to spread to others,
leading to multiple breakdowns in bilateral relations. Mexico tried to
[110 ]
FOREIGN AFFAIRS' Volume 8j No. 1
Mexico al an Impasse
link the entire agenda to immigration; the United States has done the
same with Iraq. As a result, U.S.-Mexican relations are tied up in
knots: each nation expects the impossible of the other.
The next great shift in bilateral relations is within sight, but it
awaits a more propitious momento The United States and Mexico
must first erect a new North American security architecture.
Protection of the North American perimeter is essential to the security
ofboth nations. (Consider the effects on Mexico of a contagious
biological attack on Los Angeles or DalIas, or the economic costs
should a terrorist attack on the United States be launched from
Mexico.) Nonetheless, they have had no formal defense relations
since the end of World War 11, and, given Mexico's recent diplomatic
choices, there is little chance that a strategic alliance will be forged in
the short termo A few days before the first anniversary of September
11, Mexico withdrew from the Rio Pact, the western hemi
< sphere equivalent of the NATO char!er's provisions for collective rcfflfe.fénse..
1'1f¡s move was a stunnmg BlDw ffom a neigl1Dor pre
led to be a fiiend~ Mexico nad- taKen to lám15asting tne pact as a
itaristic relic of the Cold War, and the United States never
actualIy ected that Mexican troops would participate in a Rio
Pact-sponsored an. Nonetheless, Washington interpreted Mexico's
withdrawal
sign that the United States, in its darkest hour, could not expect n
symbolic solidarity. So crippled was Mexico by its historic in
lrity that, when confronted with the diplomatic challenges of
¡tember 11, it could not see the genuine vulnerability of its
northern ghbor, let alone respond compassionately, without
equating 1passion with subordination.
\1exico's position in the run-up to the war on Iraq was also troub
Its decision not to support the U.S. position can be attributed to
nestic opposition and pressure from other allies, but it also had a
dency to indulge in what one senior U.S. official described as
lomatic "dancing in the end zone." Mexico may feel the need to
nish its anti-American credentials to play to a home audience et
by the lack of a new immigration accord. The result, however,
been a setback in bilateral relations.
Portunately, U.S.-Mexican security cooperation is in better shape
n such symbolic actions indicate. Mexico has pursued what one
~.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS .JanuarylFebruarY2oo4
[111]
..
M Delal Raer
Mexican diplomat calls a "Janus-faced" policy: privately working to
secure borders while publicly declaring diplomatic distance and
issuing stern demands for immigration reformo In reality, a quiet
revolution has begun. Both countries have stepped up efforts to
secure the N orth American perimeter, sharing sensi tive in telligence
and jointly monitoring shared airspace. If there is anything to
criticize, it is that the United States has not been quick enough to give
Mexico the resources and technology it needs to upgrade its security
infrastructure. Washington should grant Mexico observer status in the
N orth American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD, currently
run with Canada's help) and create a joint bioterrorism task force to
coordinate the epidemiological efforts and border health resources
ofboth countries. Ultimately, the goal should be to build the
institutional architecture necessary to turn bilateral relations into a
strategic partnership, complementing the economic partnership
established by NAFTA.
STOPPING THE DRIFT
THERE IS FRUSTRATINGLY LITTLE that the United States can do to
enhance Mexico's economic competitiveness or to consolidate
Mexican democracy; these are issues that Mexico must resolve on its
own. But Washington can and should stop the drift in bilateral
relations. The Bush administration must put Mexico back on its
priority list, despite its recent disappointment with Mexican foreign
policy.
President Bush should renew his commitment to the Partnership
for Prosperity by naming a special envoy to marshal private investors
and philanthropic interest to the high-migration regions ofMexico.
Currently, less than one percent of foreign investment goes to rural
Mexico; even a modest increase would make a meaningful difference
for the almost 25 million Mexicans who live in these areas. The part
nership is a bright spot in bilateral relations, but even it runs the risk
of getting lost in the shuffie.
Washington should also take action on immigration policy, even
though the interests ofMexico and the United States are not always
perfectly aligned. Policymakers should begin with the agricultural
sector, in which Mexican and U.S. workers do not compete. Mexican
[112 ]
FOREIGN AFFAIRS' Volume8] No. 1
Mexico at an Impasse
farm laborers should not have to face death in the desert to perform a
vital function for the U.S. economy. Rather than wait for Congress to
act on the politically thorny issue of immigration, Bush could increase
the number of visas issued through the already existing agricultural
worker programo The United States should also improve the consular
services offered by its embassy in Mexico City. Consular
and customs officers are the face of the United States to millions of
Mexicans; too often, those faces are scowling and unfriendly, and
demand for consular services far outstrips capacity. An infusion of
money is necessary to increase the number and quality of officers.
As for Mexico, there is no better way to win the affection of the
United States than to make it feel that it has a true partner in matters
of mutual defense. Mexico should engage the security issue head-on
as an equal partner, without hiding behind multilateral distractions
and anachronistic shibboleths about losing national sovereignty.
Such steps, modest but not insigniticant, will benetit both nations.
The next three years wi11 determine the outcome ofMexico's historic
transition. Mexico and the United States, out of se1f-interest and
mutual concern, must work to make the most of them.e
FOREIGN AFFAIRS .]anuary/FebruarY2oo4
[113]