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DCGS: The path to optimal performance
by
Summer D. Leifer
A Paper Presented in Partial Fulfillment
Of the Requirements of
LEAD500 LEADERSHIP STYLES AND THEORIES
February 2013
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Abstract
In an effort to satisfy national requirements in a resource constrained environment and to
promote seamless operations, the United States Air Force (USAF) developed and implemented
the Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS) thus creating an interconnected and
interoperable intelligence system. However, the DCGS has not yet achieved optimal and
efficient levels of operation. DCGS suffers from a lack of cohesiveness at tactical, operational
and strategic levels and this is largely due to a disjointed vision. Furthermore, many AF
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) leaders are ignorant to the systems full
capabilities and, therefore, rely on small sub-sets of the overall DCGS. As a result of an unclear
vision and a lack of leaders’ understanding, resources are not efficiently utilized or managed and
manpower suffers. To close the performance gap within DCGS, I recommend USAF ISR
leaders articulate and adhere to a unified vision, educate leaders at all levels of command on
DCGS capabilities and assets, and restructure resource management to align capabilities with
needs. A clear vision focused on the DCGS’s strengths and the potential synergy, as was
intended, will close the vision to performance gap and allow the system to operate at its optimal
capacity.
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DCGS: The Path to Optimal Performance
The face of warfare is changing at an increasingly rapid pace. While knowledge has
always been crucial to military leaders, it has become even more critical as the information age
shapes how wars are fought. In his article ISR “Will Lead the Fight” by 2020, retired United
States Air Force (USAF) Lieutenant General (retired) David A. Deptula, the first Deputy Chief
of Staff for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR), Headquarters Air Force, states,
“As with every other aspect of the information age, victory will go to those who create and
exploit knowledge faster than their opponents, and ever increasingly in ambiguous and uncertain
situations (2011). However, Lieutenant General (retired) David A. Deptula also points out
institutions are slow to realize the transformative power of new technologies and often first
utilize new technologies as an adjunct to existing paradigms (2011). This is the case with the
Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS) and how it is currently utilized by the USAF. The
DCGS is intended to fulfill growing information needs through networking and integrating
intelligence from distributed intelligence sites; yet, its full potential has not yet been realized due
to a failure of clear leadership and actualization of the DCGS vision to integrate intelligence
teams through a unified system to capture and provide ISR through multi-intelligence means.
United States Air Force leaders persist in their dependency on stove-piped intelligence sources
rather than utilizing the full array of available resources. Furthermore, they have failed to
enforce and execute the DCGS vision through relying on, promoting and supporting distinct
subsets of the DCGS to the detriment of the entire system. The result is a fractured system that
fails to achieve optimal performance and production. Finally, the inconsistent leadership
messages and unbalanced resource management has been detrimental to large segments of the
DCGS workforce and has resulted in performance and retention problems. To alleviate many of
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DCGS’s current challenges, I recommend AF ISR leaders and commanders at all echelons
adhere to and promote an articulated tactical, operational and strategic DCGS vision, become
familiar with the entire DCGS system and all its resources, and pay careful consideration to
resource management to include human resources. To understand the scope of this undertaking,
one must first understand why DCGS was created, its purpose and how it is intended to be
implemented.
DCGS Background and Vision
DCGS is a complex system integrating global intelligence nodes comprised of
specialized teams and when leveraged to its optimal potential provides outstanding ISR support
to Combatant Commanders (COCOMs) and Component Numbered Air Forces (C-NAFs) (see
figure 1). Deptula and Marrs provide an example of DCGS working to its full capability in a
Joint Forces Quarterly article published in 2009. In their article, “Global Distributed ISR
Operations: The Changing Face of Warfare”, Deptula and Marrs describe an enemy forces attack
on an American base in Northern Iraq where, almost immediately, “Air Force expeditionary
signals intelligence liaison officers embedded with force protection elements at the base alerted
their Fort Gordon [Georgia]-based counterparts and the ISR mission commander (MC) at DGS-1
[Langley Air Force Base, Virginia] to the indirect fire” (Deptula & Marrs, 2009). Once alerted,
the Langley-based ISR MC coordinated with forward-deployed intelligence collection managers
to provide Global Hawk collection of both the indirect fire point of origin and impact points
while also coordinating a joint target tracking system for forensic back-tracking (Deptula &
Marrs, 2009). Through collaborative and integrative intelligence collection, processing,
exploitation and dissemination efforts, US forces were able to identify those responsible for the
attack and their extended network and neutralize the threat (Deptula & Marrs, 2009). From the
DCGS: The Path to Optimal Performance
first notification of indirect fire on the American installation to the apprehension of the attacker,
only three hours and 16 minutes had elapsed (Deptula & Marrs, 2009). This is an example of
how DCGS may be used to its full potential. This success story highlights what DCGS is
intended to do and how intelligence teams, when led and managed effectively, may operate
seamlessly despite distance and system limitations.
Figure 1, AF DCGS (DOT&E, 2010)
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The current Air Force DCGS concept of an interoperable system is a result of lessons
learned following Operations Desert Storm and Allied Force where there was a clear line
between intelligence and operations. Due to this division, intelligence analysts were unable to
easily provide direct support to troops on the ground and COCOMs. They were also unable to
fuse their products together and, as a result, intelligence products were redundant and/or
incomplete. As Major Valarie A. Long, USAF, noted in her thesis “Operational Design and ISR
and Zombies: How Operational Design Can Help to Re-aggregate Joint ISR at the Theater and
Component Levels”, ISR commanders must coherently manage four areas which tend toward
disaggregation: organizational, structural, constructive and systemic/geographic (Long, 2010).
In order to overcome these limitations, the Air Force established a network of five
interconnected distributed ground station (DGS) units and these DGSs became the groundwork
for the present day DCGS (USAF, 2011). Although, the Air Force and other military services
had made strides to achieve reachback intelligence support, DCGS has distinct differences and
challenges. Lieutenant Colonel Jason M. Brown, USAF, describes these differences between
DCGS and traditional reachback systems and inherent challenges within the DCGS construct in a
2009 Air & Space Power Journal article, “Operating the Distributed Common Ground System: A
Look at the Human Factor in Net-Centric Operations” stating
Because of the high-tech nature of DGS units, outsiders frequently view them as multiINT processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED) nodes for airborne ISR, reachback
organizations, or intelligence fusion and production centers. These labels define part of
their mission, but DGS units and the DCGS enterprise encompass much more. The Air
Force does not treat the DCGS like traditional reachback organizations that provide
support for long-range analysis and planning; rather, it integrates this system into combat
operations in the same manner as any other weapon system. DCGS units conduct combat
operations daily. Personnel take raw information, turn it into relevant intelligence, and
deliver it to operators within minutes (or seconds, depending on the source) of its
collection. These intelligence professionals, or ISR operators, receive training in the
nuances of language, pictures, and video. However, their connectivity to combat
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operations creates a set of challenges familiar to traditional operators but relatively new
to large intelligence organizations and units (Brown, 2009).
The paradigm shift wherein the Air Force DCGS is now considered an integral part of an Air
Force weapons systems has necessitated significant changes in how Air Force ISR is conducted.
Air Force weapons systems require an extensive amount of training and oversight and the rules
for manning, implementation and execution are stringent. While traditional intelligence
activities also require intense scrutiny, training and oversight, there are some basic differences in
the leadership and management of traditional intelligence reachback support organizations and
DCGS as well as the scope and the implementation of governing directives. The governing
document for DCGS is Air Force ISR Agency Instruction (AFISRAI) 14-153, Volume 3, AF
Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS) Operations. AFISRAI 14-153 states the DCGS
mission is as follows:
The AF DCGS, or AN/GSQ-272 SENTINEL, weapon system is the Air Force’s primary
ISR, Processing, Exploiting, and Dissemination (PED) system. AF DCGS provides
actionable, multi-discipline intelligence derived from multiple ISR platforms to
COCOMs [Combatant Commanders], Component Numbered Air Forces (C-NAFs) and
national command authorities across the globe, 24 hours per day, 7 days a week.
Through distributed, (reachback and deployed) and collaborative operations, active duty
(AD), Air National Guard (ANG), Air Force Reserve (AFRC), joint and coalition units
and personnel work as an integrated combat capability, enabling the Air Force to engage
in multiple simultaneous military operations across the globe (AFISRA, 2012).
As the Lead Command for AF DCGS, the Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance Agency (AFISRA) is responsible for providing overarching guidance and
oversight while outlining long-term, strategic goals (AFISRA, 2012). The DCGS strategy is
meant to drive the entire system as it is comprised of various sites with specialized capabilities
and missions. The official USAF website DCGS factsheet reports the DCGS is comprised of 45
geographically, networked sites and represents a mix of AD, ANG, and AFR units “working as
an integrated combat capability” (USAF, 2011). Furthermore, the weapon system nodes, or
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sites, are regionally focused yet are also capable of executing missions beyond their area of
responsibility (USAF, 2011). Each site is capable of receiving data from any U-2, RQ-4 Global
Hawk, MQ-9 Reaper or MQ-1 Predator operating “anywhere in the world” and disseminating the
intelligence to supported commanders and customers globally (USAF, 2011). An Air Force
DCGS crew is led by a Mission Operations Commander (MOC) who supervises a crew
consisting of analysis and reporting segments including an all-source intelligence cell, the DCGS
analysis and reporting team (DART), geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) to conduct imagery
intelligence (IMINT) and full-motion video (FMV) intelligence, signals intelligence (SIGINT),
and sensor/mission planning segments (see figure 2). These crews may be comprised of
individuals simultaneously operating at geographically separated units across the world through
an integrated network, the Distributed Ground Interface Facility (DGIF) workstations, allowing
seamless PED of intelligence.
Figure 2, DCGS Crew Construct (AFISRA, 2012)
The DCGS concept is sound and has the potential to produce comprehensive and tailored
intelligence products to support commanders and customers through leveraging teams of
specialized intelligence analysts and their respective intelligence PED systems. However,
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supported commanders and DCGS leaders have failed to exploit the full range of its strengths
largely as a result of the problem Lt. Gen. (retired) Deptula discussed regarding slow institutional
paradigm change.
DCGS Performance Gaps
DCGS is intended to be an integrated, multi-intelligence network providing
comprehensive and tailored intelligence support and products to its customers. Air Force leaders
publically champion the fusing of intelligence sources to support national objectives; yet, they
remain over reliant on antiquated technologies and intelligence training, tactics, and procedures
(TTPs) and, as a result, provide confusing guidance and messages to the Airmen supporting
missions, frustrate DCGS resource management, and fail to optimize performance and
production. In regards to current challenges facing AF-DCGS, current AF ISR Agency
Commander, Major General Robert P. “Bob” Otto, stated during an interview conducted in late
2012 with the journal Tactical ISR Technology,
We have invested in more airmen analysts, but the growth in our force cannot keep up
with the growth of raw data. To meet this challenge we’re shifting from a collectionbased model, where crews are organized based on the collection platform, to a model
where the teams are formed specifically to support a prioritized operation. Our teams will
pull whatever data is necessary to support their assigned operation, then analyze and
report directly to the warfighters working that operation. This model allows us to open
the aperture on what data we’ll be pulling to provide that support. In today’s operational
environment, data collected from any platform may be relevant to support operational
needs at any level. While this model addresses the problem of keeping up with all the
data, by only looking at the data we care about now, it creates other issues. First, ‘Why
collect that other data if we will not look at it?’ We collect and expose it so that others,
such as the Army or national agency analysts, can look at it if it satisfies their needs.
Second, by acknowledging we use all the data out there, we have increased the volume of
data we need to sift through. To deal with this we need to develop more advanced, more
automated search and analysis tools (TISR, 2012).
While top Air Force leadership supports full integration of multi-intelligence sources through
connecting teams of specialized analysts via integration and interface systems, mid-level
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commanders continue to rely on geospatial intelligence (GEOINT), which includes IMINT, as
their prime source of intelligence and increasingly on emerging FMV intelligence while
neglecting the utility of other intelligence such as SIGINT, MASINT and electronic intelligence
(ELINT). According to AFI 14-132, Geospatial Intelligence, “a critical aspect of GEOINT is the
principle of ‘value-adding’ wherein any use of GEOINT automatically changes and transforms
the resulting product or output of a particular service, increasing its potential application to
purposes beyond those served by the original user” (SECAF, 2012). IMINT has a long history
within the Air Force. Indeed, our modern day Air Force has its roots in the Army Air Corps use
of photo reconnaissance to gain military advantage (Department of the Air Force, 2011).
Presently, commanders continue to rely on GEOINT, particularly IMINT, to portray battle
damage assessments and provide battle space awareness. Unlike some of the more nebulous
intelligence sources such as SIGINT or extremely technical sources such as MASINT, IMINT
literally provides a clear picture a commander may hold in his/her hand and see a visual
intelligence depiction. This is an important aspect to consider as traditional military strategies
focus on the quantitative rather than the qualitative. As Lieutenant Colonel Danny R. Wolf
asserted in his Air War College Master’s thesis,
Assessing performance is a much easier proposition than assessing effects...With the
intent to defeat the enemy, it is easy to count the number of enemy soldiers killed on the
battlefield and infer success in defeating the enemy. It is entirely more difficult to assess
the objective by measuring the enemy’s intent or will to fight, and therefore conclude
mission success (Wolf, 2009).
GEOINT may provide commanders quantitative evidence of performance, while SIGINT may
provide qualitative feedback. Military commanders are still in a quantitative mindset and
therefore overlook the value other intelligence sources may provide in regards to qualitative
intelligence. In addition, Air Force commanders are more easily able to directly control and
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shape GEOINT/IMINT whereas they must coordinate through other agencies, such as the
National Security Agency, to obtain collection tasking authority for other intelligence sources
(AFISRA, 2012). Finally, the communications infrastructure to support multi-intelligence
sources requires a tremendous amount of careful coordination and collaboration. Although
DCGS is designed to integrate multiple intelligence sources, the architecture and TTPs to support
this integration continue to evolve. These issues—preference for IMINT, lack of direct control
over multi-intelligence sources, and system and TTP challenges—have resulted in a DCGS
vision to performance gap.
Repercussions
As a result of this gap, DCGS stakeholders are negatively impacted. First, commanders
are not receiving full and complete intelligence packages and reports. Without full integration
and utilization of all the intelligence assets available, commanders have blind spots. This leaves
friendly forces vulnerable to attack and hinders COCOM’s ability to deny, degrade, disrupt
and/or destroy adversary activities. Moreover, as mid-level commanders fail to leverage DCGS
sites and teams, they fail to support National Command Authority directives and the instruments
of national power: diplomacy, information, military and economics. Furthermore, the impact on
morale and retention of skilled intelligence analysts is negatively affected as the individuals feel
their hard work and contributions are overlooked. Interestingly, this has a significant impact on
the Air Force as Airmen trained in these Air Force Specialty Codes, or skill sets, require highly
specialized, time-intensive, and costly training. Many of the Airmen operating in the DCGS
system experience frustration and burnout when they fail to receive leadership support in the
form of resources, training and appropriate utilization and/or feedback from customers.
Subsequently, they perceive their work is unimportant or disregarded. In his dissertation
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“Occupational Burnout and Retention of Air Force Distributed Common Ground System
(DCGS) Intelligence Personnel” published by the Pardee Rand Graduate School, John K.
Langley addresses negative trends amongst DCGS intelligence personnel affecting their health,
performance, job satisfaction and retention (Langley, 2012). In his dissertation, Langley states a
psychologist providing treatement to DCGS intelligence operators at a stateside DCGS site
noted many of the operators suffered from unmet expectations and low professional efficacy
largely as a result of mixed messages from AF leadership (Langley, 2012). According to
Langley, “on the one hand, personnel in intelligence career fields are constantly reminded they
are on the cutting edge of warfighting—an indispensable piece of the equation. On the other
hand, many ISR personnel feel that they are not always supplied with what they need in order to
accomplish all they are asked to do—particularly, sufficient numbers of personnel…this type of
role conflict can be an organizational risk factor” (Langley, 2012, p.16, para.1). Unfortunately,
this in turn causes a vicious cycle as intelligence trained Airmen leave the Air Force sustaining
and perpetuating a force deficit which, in turn, puts added stress and pressure on those remaining
to fulfill intelligence requirements...which may or not be utilized. This negative trend affecting
AF ISR and DCGS may be ameliorated by significant leadership and management changes.
Recommendations
To facilitate optimal utilization of and synergy within AF DCGS, I recommend AF ISR
leaders and commanders develop, implement and adhere to a unified, system-wide DCGS ISR
vision. Although numerous senior Air Force officers, commanders and leaders have stressed the
importance of all ISR assets and multi-source intelligence collection, there still remains a large
cadre of individuals in position of authority who fail to leverage the vast array of DCGS
resources and, instead, depend on a limited amount of intelligence sources—primarily, IMINT.
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The tendency to place more emphasis on a sub-organization within the system has led to
inequities in resource allocation, has weakened the entire enterprise, and has resulted in suboptimal performance. According to an article, “Who Gets Power—And How They Hold On to
It”, written by Gerald R. Salancik, University of Illinois, and Jeffrey Pfeffer, University of
California at Berkeley,
The critical contingencies facing most organizations derive from the environmental
context within which they operate. This determines the available needed resources and
thus determines the problems to be dealt with…subunits that contribute to the critical
resources of the organization will gain influence in the organization. Their influence
presumably is then used to bend the organization’s activities to the contingencies that
determines it resources (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1977).
Thus far, the preponderance of AF ISR resources has been focused on GEOINT, primarily
IMINT, while SIGINT has been under-resourced and under-utilized despite its immense
intelligence value. As an integral part of a more unified DCGS vision, I also recommend Air
Force ISR leaders, across the chain of command, are better educated on the full DCGS multiintelligence spectrum and its inherent capabilities. This sentiment was echoed by Lieutenant
General (retired) David Deptula in an Air Force Magazine article when he stated, “The bottom
line is, this is no time for ‘old think. We have got to take some new approaches to the way we
move into the future. It is not just an option. Given the increased demand and fewer resources we
have available, it is an imperative” (Sirak, 2010). As AF ISR is currently faced with the
difficulty of maintaining increasingly complex ISR demands with diminishing budgetary
support. During a Senate Select Committee on Intelligence hearing on January 31, 2012, the
Director of National Intelligence, James R. Clapper, Jr., a retired Air Force Lieutenant General,
told the committee, “never before has the intelligence community been called upon to master
such complexity on so many issues in such a resource-constrained environment” (Garamone,
2012, para.3). This makes my final recommendation even more important as it related to
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retaining trained intelligence professionals while also assisting them to sustain high performance
in a demanding environment. I encourage DCGS leaders to invest more resources towards
manpower management and to put processes in place to provide timely feedback to DCGS
operators regarding their contributions. Through recognizing each of the intelligence specialty
careers and their requisite skill sets are distinct and require individualized planning and
management while also creating and supporting a cohesive environment where these skill sets
may complement one another, DCGS, as a whole, will be strengthened. Given the operational
design of and possible applications within DCGS, the above recommendations will allow DCGS
leaders, teams and operators to maximize the latent strengths and nascent opportunities for ISR
synergy.
Conclusion
Given today’s current fiscal restraints and global security concerns, the
Department of Defense and the United States Air Force are committed to achieving efficient and
effective intelligence systems. As technology continues to evolve at an exponential rate, the AF
has leveraged new opportunities to streamline intelligence processing, exploitation and
dissemination. For the last two decades, our country has been engaged in ongoing military
operations against nation-states and non-state entities and the last decade has witnessed a new
type of warfare combining attacks, intelligence and cyberspace: cyber-warfare. Former Air
Force Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Agency (AFISRA) Commander, Major
General Bradley Heithold, described the imperative to maintain and develop Air Force
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance assets stating:
I told my folks that we have to move at the speed of war. This became even more
apparent to me when I was over in Afghanistan and Iraq recently. On the war front,
every day, every encounter matters. There’s not an infinite amount of time to have
victory, and so in everything we do, including these acquisition programs, we must move
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at the speed of war—and I know everyone in the agency gets that message (Rosenberg,
2012, p.5, para. 4).
The AF DCGS was put in place to leverage the entire spectrum of national, tactical and joint
intelligence. Its designation as a weapons system has been a two-edged sword as it allowed
more funding yet levied further restrictions on top of the already substantial intelligence
oversight TTPs. Furthermore, the paradigm shift integrating operational weapons systems and
intelligence collection has not been fully realized in large part due to some leaders’ ignorance
regarding the full capabilities of the DCGS. The lack of in-depth knowledge has led to many
DCGS leaders over reliance on only one aspect of DCGS—GEOINT—to the detriment of the
entire system. Furthermore, DCGS intelligence professionals, in particular those working the
neglected intelligence systems, suffer from a coherent, consistent leadership vision and message
and a lack of resources and feedback. Through sustaining a unified operational and strategic
vision across the enterprise, educating leaders at all levels, and carefully managing and
sustaining human resources, the DCGS will be postured to perform as it was designed to do.
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References
AFISRA. (2012). Air Force ISR Agency Instruction (AFISRAI) 14-153, Volume 3, AF
Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS) Operations. Lackland: AFISRA.
Brown, J. (2009). Operating the Distributed Common Ground System: A Look at the Human
Factor in Net-Centric Operations. Air & Space Power Journal.
Department of the Air Force. (2011). AFPAM 36-2241: Professional development guide.
Washington D.C.: United States Air Force.
Deptula, D. A. (2011, June 24). ISR "will lead the fight" by 2020. Retrieved from AOLDefense:
http://defense.aol.com/2011/06/24/isr-will-lead-the-fight-by-2020/
Deptula, D., & Marrs, J. R. (2009). Global distributed isr operations: The changing face of
warfare. Joint Forces Quarterly, 110-115.
DOT&E. (2010). AF DCGS. Washington D.C.: DOT&E.
Langley, J. (2012). Occupational Burnout and Retention of Air Force Distributed Common
Ground System (DCGS) Intelligence Personnel. Rand.
Long, V. (2010). Operational Design and ISR and Zombies: How Operational Design Can Help
to Re-aggregate Joint ISR at the Theater and Component Levels. Montgomery: Air
Command and Staff College, Air University.
Rosenberg, B. (2012, April 5). Moving at the speed of war is air force ISR unit's goal. Retrieved
from Defense Systems: http://defensesystems.com/Articles/2010/04/06/Interview-MajGen-Bradley-Heithold-ISR-Agency.aspx?Page=5
Salancik, G. R., & Pfeffer, J. (1977). Who Gets Power—And How They Hold On to It.
Organizational Dynamics, 5(3), 3-21.
SECAF. (2012). AFI 14-132, Geospatial Intelligence. Washington D.C.: USAF.
DCGS: The Path to Optimal Performance
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Sirak, M. (2010). ISR revolution. Air Force Magazine, 3(6), 36-42.
TISR. (2012, November/December). ISR UNIFIER: Connecting the Dots Across an Ever
Evolving Battlespace. Tactical ISR Technology, 2(6), 16-21. Retrieved from Tactical ISR
Technology.
USAF. (2011, December 9). Air Force Distributed Common Ground System. Retrieved from
USAF: http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=15433
Wolf, D. (2009). ISR: The right question to ask. Montgomery: Air War College, Air University.
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Acronyms
AD – Active Duty
AF – Air Force
AF DCGS – Air Force Distributed Common Ground System
AFI – Air Force Instruction
AFISRA – Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Agency
AFRC – Air Force Reserve Command
AFTTP – Air Force Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
ANG – Air National Guard
AOC – Air and Space Operations Center
AOR – Area of Responsibility
ARC – Air Reserve Component
CAN – Correlation Analyst
CIES – Common Imagery Exploitation System
CMS – Correlation Mission Supervisor
C-NAF – Component Numbered Air Forces
CO – Cryptologic Operator
COCOM – Combatant Command
COMINT – Communications Intelligence
DART – DCGS Analysis Reporting Team
DCGS – Distributed Common Ground System
DGIF – Deployable Ground Intercept Facility
DGS – Distributed Ground Station
DCGS: The Path to Optimal Performance
DLO – Data Link Operator
DMS –Distributed Mission Supervisor
DMS – Distributed Mission Site
ELINT – Electronic Intelligence
EMS – ELINT Mission Supervisor
FMV – Full Motion Video
GA – Geospatial Analyst
GCP – Ground Control Processor
GEOINT – Geospatial-Intelligence
GMS – Ground Mission Supervisor
GRE – Geospatial Reports Editor
IMS – Imagery Mission Supervisor
ISE – Imagery Support Element
MASINT – Measures and Signatures Intelligence
MOC – Mission Operations Commander
MPC – Mission Planning Cell
PED – Processing, Exploitation and Dissemination
PR – Product Reporter
S&W – Surveillance and Warning
SA – Signals Analyst
SCAN – Senior Correlation Analyst
SCR – Screener
SDAC – Signals Development & Analysis Cell
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DCGS: The Path to Optimal Performance
SIGINT – Signals Intelligence
SP – Sensor Planner
SSO – Special Signals Operator
STW – SIGINT Threat Warning
S&W – Surveillance & Warning Supervisor
TA – Threat Analyst
TR – Technical Reporter
TTP – Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
TW – Threat Warning
USAF – United States Air Force
WOC – Wing Operations Center
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