European Environment Agency
Contract Number 3403/B2009/EEA.53788
GENERAL SUPPORT TO THE FORWARDLOOKING ASSESSMENT COMPONENT
OF THE EUROPEAN STATE OF THE
ENVIRONMENT AND OUTLOOK REPORT
(SOER 2010 PART A)
Background Paper on Demographics and Migration
Final Version
June 2010
Contact BIO Intelligence Service
Shailendra Mudgal
Leonardo Mazza
 + 33 1 53 90 11 80
shailendra.mudgal@biois.com
leonardo.mazza@biois.com
Project Team
Bio Intelligence Service
Mr. Shailendra Mudgal
Ms. Tanja Münchmeyer
Mr. Leonardo Mazza
Ms. Louise Slater
Disclaimer
This report contains the research conducted by the authors and is not to be perceived
as the opinion of the European Environment Agency.
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Contents
0.
Summary: Mega-trends Demographics and migration................................................... 5
1.
Introduction ................................................................................................................ 9
1.1.
What is this report about? .................................................................................................................. 9
1.2.
Why is this report relevant? ................................................................................................................ 9
1.3.
What is the starting point for this report ? the situation in Europe .................................................. 11
1.4.
How is the report structured? ........................................................................................................... 12
2.
Conceptual note on mega-trends and their analysis .................................................... 13
3.
Trends, drivers and uncertainties ............................................................................... 15
3.1.
Megatrend I: Population growth, decline, and international migration ........................................... 16
3.1.1.
Summary ..........................................................................................................................................................16
3.1.2.
Drivers ..............................................................................................................................................................28
3.1.3.
Key uncertainties ..............................................................................................................................................32
3.2.
Megatrend II: Population ageing and youth bulges .......................................................................... 36
3.2.1.
Summary ..........................................................................................................................................................36
3.2.2.
Drivers ..............................................................................................................................................................41
3.2.3.
Key uncertainties ..............................................................................................................................................43
4.
4.1.
Impacts ..................................................................................................................... 47
Potential environmental impacts in Europe ...................................................................................... 47
4.1.1.
Natural resources .............................................................................................................................................47
4.1.2.
Land use ...........................................................................................................................................................48
4.1.3.
Environmental change ......................................................................................................................................48
4.2.
Other potential indirect impacts in Europe ....................................................................................... 48
4.2.1.
Impacts on peace, conflict and security ...........................................................................................................48
4.2.2.
Economic impacts.............................................................................................................................................50
4.2.3.
Political and geopolitical consequences ...........................................................................................................51
4.2.4.
Changing consumption patters ........................................................................................................................52
4.2.5.
Social vulnerability and integration ..................................................................................................................53
4.2.6.
Health ...............................................................................................................................................................53
5.
5.1.
Policy implications ..................................................................................................... 55
Possible implications for European environmental policy ................................................................ 55
5.1.1.
Adapting environmental targets to demographic trends .................................................................................55
5.1.2.
Helping developing countries tackle environmentally-induced migration .......................................................55
5.1.3.
Influencing sustainable consumption patterns in less developed countries ....................................................56
5.2.
Possible implications for other European policy areas ..................................................................... 56
5.2.1.
Setting demographic targets ............................................................................................................................56
5.2.2.
Immigration policy............................................................................................................................................57
5.2.3.
Aid to developing countries..............................................................................................................................57
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6.
4
References................................................................................................................. 58
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0. SUMMARY: MEGA-TRENDS DEMOGRAPHICS
AND MIGRATION
The European Environment Agency is conducting an analysis of long-term global megatrends and their environmental implications for Europe up to 2050 as part of the
forthcoming European State of the Environment Outlook Report 2010. This analysis focuses
on a sample of xx mega-trends across the social, technological, economic, environmental
and political dimensions of global change.
This background report presents the analysis for two of the xx megatrends, namely rapid
global urbanisation and consumption changes. (note: we have not defined the final title for
the latter megatrend yet).
 Mega-trends
Population growth, decline, and international migration.
The current world population is approximately 6.8 billion people, and the medium
variant projects an increase to 9.1 billion by 2050. This development differs considerably
across different regions as the population of developed countries is globally declining while
in most developing countries it is increasing significantly. The phenomenon of declining
populations is however expected to affect the developed world in the future, due to the
reducing fertility rates.
International migration will further influence this demographic change considerably over
the next 50 years, as migration leads to the diversification of populations and has an
impact on overall growth rates. International migration remains an important driver of
population growth in developed countries, and is the most important driver in Europe.
Today, relatively new factors like environmental change and environmental degradation
are playing an increasing role in the migration choices made by populations.
Population ageing and youth bulges.
The world population is getting older at an unprecedented rate. In 2000, about 7% of the
world’s population was aged over 65, and this is expected to increase to 16% by 2050. The
median age of the world’s population is projected to increase from 29 to 38 years by 2050.
Population ageing is expected to affect both developed and developing countries in a
similar manner.
Youth bulges, on the other hand, exist mostly in developing countries. Global migration
may be a partial solution to both population ageing and youth bulges, since migration of
younger workers could help to offset the retirement of older workers in countries with
ageing populations and provide employment for the youth from developing countries.
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 Key drivers
Population growth, decline, and international migration.
Fertility rate is one of the main drivers of a population’s growth or decline. The average
“replacement level of fertility” is 2.33 children per woman. Increases or decreases in life
expectancy influence both population growth or decline and population ageing. Other
drivers include increasing living standards, increased use of contraceptives, education, and
other social factors.
International migration is one of the major factors influencing population growth and
decline. For declining populations, such as in the EU, immigration is seen as one of the
ways to influence demographic trends. On the contrary, massive emigration of the working
population can contribute to population decline. The drivers of migration include poverty,
income disparity, population growth, costs of transportation, and the legal and
administrative barriers, namely immigration policies. A new type of international
migration is currently emerging in the context of global warming, driven by environmental
change. Environmentally-induced migration is due to the increasingly frequent and violent
hazard events and the vulnerability of many developing countries that are among the most
severely impacted by environmental change
Population ageing and youth bulges.
Population ageing is the result of two demographic forces: rising longevity and falling
fertility levels. Rising longevity increases the relative number of the old, and has been
especially significant in the developed world, although the trend is a global one and is still
ongoing. Falling fertility levels on the other hand reduce the number of the young, and
have been the main factor for ageing in the most developed countries in the past fifty
years.
Youth bulges are, on the contrary, dependent on high fertility levels coupled with
declining mortality rates. The high prevalence of HIV/AIDS in many sub-Saharan countries
is one of the reasons for the development of youth bulges, due to the mortality of the
older population. Other factors such as significant emigration are potential drivers of youth
bulges.
 Major uncertainties
Population growth, decline, and international migration.
The evolution of world fertility rates are one of the major uncertainties influencing
population growth and decline, as small changes in fertility rates can lead to significant
changes in population sizes. The changes in immigration policies also influence the growth
or decline of a country’s population; however, the immigration needed to balance
population decline in developed countries is substantial.
Economic growth is one of the main uncertainties influencing international migration
flows. The economic situation of a country affects the tendency of its people to emigrate.
Conversely, the economic situation of the host country can affect the attractiveness of the
country to immigrants, to such an extent that a country may transform from a net
emigration to a net immigration country. Environmental change and youth bulges are two
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other uncertainties that can have a multiplicative effect on the other drivers and thus can
affect international migration significantly.
Population ageing and youth bulges.
Population ageing is less affected by uncertainties as it is a continuation of current
demographic estimates. However, ageing may be influenced by factors such as migration
and the economic context, and is significantly different in developed and developing
countries.
Youth bulges are dependent on fertility levels and pandemics. Migration policies from
both the countries of emigration and immigration may also influence youth bulges by
encouraging or discouraging migration.
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1.
WHAT IS THIS REPORT ABOUT?
This report presents two interrelated megatrends in the field of demographic change: (i)
Population growth, decline, and international migration; (ii) Population ageing and youth
bulges.
By 2050, it is projected that the world population will reach over 9 billion people. Many
developed nations have already stopped growing demographically, and several are
expected to experience significant population declines by 2050.
The trends of population growth and decline tend to show global opposing patterns,
decline in developed countries and growth in developing countries. This divide is expected
to become increasingly uncertain in the future as a number of developing countries begin
to experience population decline. The increase in international migration, from the most
fragile countries to the most stable, is expected by many to play a significant role in this
demographic change. Two types of migration can be distinguished, voluntary migration for
social and/or economic reasons, and involuntary or forced migration due to environmental
catastrophes or global change. Migration represents one of the main factors that may
contribute to lessen the disparity of these demographic trends between developed and
developing countries.
Population ageing and youth bulges are two contrasting trends that have become
increasingly important in recent years, opposing the ageing of countries throughout the
world, and in particular of developed countries, and youth bulges in developing countries.
Population ageing represents an unprecedented demographic shift and one of the main
factors of the declining growth rates. Youth bulges are disproportionate concentrations of
people in the 15-to-29 year-old age group. Both of these trends affect growth rates, since
ageing is one of the main factors of population decline and youth bulges can create
significant population and thus socio-economic imbalances within a country. These two
trends highlight the difficulties that are linked to the lack or excess of workers in old and
young states.
All these trends are already visible today and are projected to increase in significance and
impacts over the next 50 years.
1.2.
WHY IS THIS REPORT RELEVANT?
Significant demographic changes, such as those discussed above, have far-reaching
consequences in many areas. This is highlighted by the changes in population pyramids,
which reveal the size and age composition of each country.
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Figure 1 displays projected populations for various countries until 2030, using the same
scale. Males are shown on the left and females on the right, with each bar representing a
four-year age group, from the youngest at the bottom to the oldest at the top.

Pyramids expanding at the base reveal a rapid rate of population growth and a
youth bulge. This is the case in fast-growing countries such as India or Nigeria.

Constricting pyramids are more frequent in developed and some emerging
countries such as China or Brazil. They exhibit an ‘inverted’ pattern due to declines
in the numbers of youth relative to the retired, which lead to the phenomenon of
ageing populations.
Figure 1: Population pyramids until 2030 for selected countries around the world
Source: United States Joint Forces Command 2010 Joint Operating Environment Report1
A growing, and richer, world population is expected to influence global demographic
patterns. The growth of middle income groups, mainly in developing countries, will
influence international consumption patterns throughout the world, through increased
pressure on the environment and natural resources.
Changes in the population pyramid also affect the working-age population. Decreases in
the working-age population are expected to bring about stresses on pension and social
insurance systems. Population ageing may also necessitate improved health care systems.
The increase in international migration is expected to have impacts on peace, conflict and
security due to increased competition for resources; geopolitical impacts due to changes in
global power balances; and many more.
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Based on these potential impacts, the paper aims to show that the two demographic
megatrends, namely population growth and decline and changes in the population pyramid
will need to be taken into account in future policy-making processes, in both
environmental and other policy areas.
1.3.
WHAT IS THE STARTING POINT FOR THIS REPORT? THE
SITUATION IN EUROPE
The population of the EU-27 is expected to grow by over 26 million inhabitants, from 495
million in 2008 to 521 million in 2035, before decreasing to reach 506 million in 2060,
representing a loss of 15 million inhabitants over 25 years. Over the entire forecasted
period, between 2008 and 2060, the overall growth of the EU-27 is expected to attain
2.1%, with a significant slowing down at the turn of the century. There are, however
significant differences within Europe, since population decline is expected to occur mostly
in the new Member States.2
Many developed countries are characterised by population decline. In Europe, declining
populations were first experienced in the 1980s, in countries such as Hungary and Bulgaria.
In the 1990s, they were followed by further Eastern-European countries, such as Poland, as
well as Russia, Germany, and Japan.3 The relative decline of the European population is
equally important. Whereas in 1950 Europe and Russia comprised 22% of the global
population, that share is now of 13 percent.4
In the European Union, the fertility rate5 is currently around 1.5 children per woman, with
the difference that it is slightly higher in the EU-10 (1.6) than in the EU-15 (1.3)6. The
highest fertility levels are currently observed in France and Ireland (1.9), while Poland,
Slovakia, Slovenia and Lithuania have the lowest rates (1.3). Migrant groups often have
higher fertility rates than the original population but as they only represent a small
percentage of the overall population their fertility rates do not tend to have a significant
impact.7 As of 2006, of the different world regions, only Russia had a lower fertility rate
(1.34) than the EU (1.5). Africa had the highest fertility rate (5), followed by Latin America
and the Caribbean (2.5), Asia (2.4) and the US and Canada (2).8 However, the wealthiest
countries in Asia, Japan and the Republic of Korea, had lower fertility still, at 1.3 and 1.22
children per woman.
According to the United Nations Ageing Index, eight of the EU Member States are among
the ten most aged countries in the world today.9 Even if fertility rates in the developed
world increase rapidly as of today, they may not reverse the ageing trends for decades. For
example, if the fertility rate increased to replacement level in Western Europe (2.1), the
ratio of seniors to working-age people would continue to rise through the late 2030s.10 The
highest levels of ageing in European societies are expected to be reached in 30-40 years.11
Migration flows tend to diversify the existing population in terms of national minorities and
cultural groups. Since the migrant population is defined as those who are born abroad
and/or the population with foreign citizenship, this does not include the second generation
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of migrants that might well belong to a national minority even though it was not foreignborn. 12
It is estimated that currently at least 175 nationalities are living in the EU. On average 5%
of the population of the EU has foreign (non-EU) citizenship, while some 7% is foreign
born.13 Within the European Union, the picture varies significantly. The new Member
States have relatively few inhabitants with foreign citizenship (less than 3 percent), while
most of the old Member States have above average foreign citizenship, with up to 9% in
Germany and Austria.14
1.4.
HOW IS THE REPORT STRUCTURED?
The report is structured as follows: Chapter 3 provides a conceptual note on megatrends as
well as uncertainties surrounding these trends. This is followed by a discussion about each
megatrend, its trends, drivers and key uncertainties in Chapter 4. The discussion is
introduced by an overview of each megatrend and its drivers in the form of a table
structured according to the STEEP (Social, technological, environmental, economic and
political) framework. Chapter 5 then presents potential impacts of these megatrends,
focusing on environmental impacts and other potential impacts as well. Finally, potential
implications for European environmental and other policy areas are discussed in Chapter 6.
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2. CONCEPTUAL NOTE ON MEGA-TRENDS AND
THEIR ANALYSIS
To be provided by the EEA

Definition and types of uncertainties (example from latest EEA discussion in
Strategic forum)
Strategic Development Forum - Group ”Knowledge”
Knowledge”
Further clarification of Key Terms
Situation
State and dates of
knowledge
Examples of action
Risk
‘Known ’ impacts; ‘known ’
probabilities e.g. asbestos
Prevention: action taken to reduce
known hazards e.g. eliminate
exposure to asbestos dust
U ncertainty
‘Known ’ impacts; ‘unknown ’
probabilities e.g. antibiotics in
animal feed and associated
human resistance to those
antibiotics
‘Unknown’ impacts and
therefore ‘unknown’
probabilities eg the ‘surprises’
of chlorofluorocarbons
(CFCs), pre 1974.
Precautionary prevention: action
taken to reduce exposure to
potential hazards
Ignorance
Precaution: action taken to
anticipate, identify and reduce the
impact of ‘surprises’
Source: ‘Late Lessons’, page 192
.
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3. TRENDS, DRIVERS AND UNCERTAINTIES
Changing demographics are influenced by a large array of driving forces. An overview of
the main and direct driving forces for both megatrends is provided in Table 1 below. To
reflect the types of drivers, the table is structured according to the STEEP (Social,
Technological, Environmental, Economic or Political) framework. Please note that some
driving forces will fall into more than one category, in which case it will be allocated to the
category that is the most important in this context.
The main drivers of each megatrend are discussed in more detail in the respective
megatrend chapter below. Migration policies and demographic trends, namely fertility
rates, appear to be common uncertainties for both of these megatrends.
Table 1: Main factors influencing the two demographic megatrends
Social
Population growth and decline, including
Changes in the demographic pyramid:
international migration
Population ageing & Youth bulges
- Fertility levels
- Fertility levels
- Longevity
- Longevity
- Improved healthcare
- Improved healthcare
- Education (esp. Women)
- Declining infant mortality influence youth
bulges
For migration:
- High HIV prevalence / AIDS is a major cause
- Religious factors
of premature adult deaths
TEEP categories of drivers
- Family links
Technolo
- Availability of effective contraceptives
-gical
- Diffusion of information on contraceptives
- Advances in biotechnology increase
longevity
For migration:
- Better medical supply increases longevity
- Better information about migration
- Better medical supply decreases infant
mortality
possibilities
- Access to more international transport
- Little access and/or information about
contraception
Economic - Increasing living standards and healthcare
- For migration, insufficient economic
opportunities in home country
- Increasing living standards and healthcare
for population ageing
- Low living standards for youth bulges
Environ-
Environmental factors are only indirect drivers of Environmental factors are only indirect drivers
mental
population growth and decline. However, the
of changes in population ageing, and are not
following factors do influence migration:
among the main drivers of youth bulges
- Climate change
- Environmental degradation
- Disproportionate population growth in
vulnerable regions
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Political
Political factors are only indirect drivers of
Political factors are only indirect drivers of this
population growth and decline. However, the
megatrend
instability of the political system of home
country is a factor of migration.
3.1.
MEGATREND I: POPULATION GROWTH, DECLINE, AND
INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION
Today the world population is still growing albeit much slower than in the past. This
development differs significantly according to regions. In large parts of the developed
world populations are already in decline or are expected to begin declining soon. In
contrast, many developing nations are characterised by continuingly increasing
populations. However, population decline is estimated to reach most of the developing
world in the future, although some developing countries are showing increases in growth,
as improvements in health are reducing mortality faster than education or urbanisation are
reducing fertility (e.g. Ethiopia).
3.1.1.
SUMMARY
Various studies, such as the 2007 update of probabilistic world population projections by
the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), highlight the growing
divergence in population trends. On the one hand, in some areas, namely Eastern Europe,
population has started to decline; whereas in other parts of the world, populations are
likely to triple over the course of this century15. The decline of the more developed
countries by approximately one million people per year contrasts with the increase of the
population of the developing countries by 35 million people per year, 22 million of which
would be in the least developed countries16.
3.1.1.1

Population growth and decline
Overview of world population growth and decline
By 1960, the world population had reached 3 billion. Since then it has increased by another
1 billion every 12-14 years, leading to a more-than doubling of the global population over
the past fifty years. Today, the global population is approximately 6.8 billion people
growing by approximately 1.1% annually.17 This means that at the current growth rate, it
takes 61 years for the global population to double in size. One of the most commonly cited
projections of the UN states that by 2025 the world population will have reached 8 billion
people and by 2050 9.1 billion, and that it will still be increasing by 31 million people per
year at that point.18 However, it needs to be noted that this figure is only the medium
variant, since which the UN’s estimates range from 7.8 billion to 11.9 billion people by
2050.19 The medium variant is defined by certain assumptions about future fertility trends
in developed and developing countries, and is not in any way a ‘mean’ growth estimate. In
this medium variant of 9.1 billion people by 2050, it is important to note that although the
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world population would still be growing, the rate of growth will no longer be rapid, and is
estimated to fall by 70%. By 2045-2050, the estimated growth rate of global population will
have fallen to 0.34% per year, less than one-third the current rate of growth, which was
1.18% per year in the 2005-2010 period.20
Development differs significantly throughout the world. While the population of the more
developed countries is estimated to decline by approximately one million people per year
until 2050, that of the developing countries is foreseen to increase by 35 million people per
year, 22 million of which would be absorbed by the least developed countries.21

Population growth of developing countries
It is projected that Asia and Africa will account for most of the population growth while
only 3% of the growth will occur in the most developed countries (i.e. Europe, Japan,
United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand). As a result, it is estimated that by
2025, only 16% of the world population will live in the most developed countries, down
from 18% in 2009 and 24% in 1980.22
During the period 2005-2050, nine countries are expected to account for half of the world’s
population growth, namely India, China, Pakistan, Nigeria, United States, Ethiopia,
Democratic Republic of Congo, United Republic of Tanzania, and Bangladesh, listed
according to the size of their contribution to population growth during that period.23 India
is estimated to represent one-fifth of all growth alone, reaching a population of 1.43 billion
people by 2025. Within the same period, China is foreseen to increase its current
population of 1.35 billion people by another 100 million. The countries of Sub-Saharan
Africa together are projected to see their combined populations increase by 350 million
and those of Latin America and the Caribbean by approximately 100 million.24 This trend is
also underlined by Table 2, and Table 3, below, which show projected demographic
changes per world region by 2050. Following Africa, the second most quickly growing
region until 2050 is estimated to be Latin America and the Caribbean, followed by the US
and Canada and Asia.25
Table 2: Regional demographic changes, 2005-2050
Latin
US and
Europe Russia
America and
Canada
Caribbean
Asia
Africa
Population
2007
591
142
335
569
4010
944
(in millions)
2050*
542
112
438
783
5217
1937
Population
change, in percent
2007
-8.3
-21.1
+30.7
+37.6
+30.1
+105.2
Average age
2005
38.9
37.3
36.3
26
27.6
19
2050*
47.3
43.5
41.5
39.9
39.9
27.4
2006
1.5
1.34
2
2.5
2.4
5
Fertility rate
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Under-15-yearolds, in percent
Over-65-year-olds,
in percent
Life expectancy
Latin
America and
Caribbean
Asia
Africa
Europe
Russia
US and
Canada
2007
16
15
20
30
28
41
2050*
15
17
17
18
18
29
2007
16
14
12
6
6
3
2050*
28
24
22
19
18
7
2006
76
65.5
78.5
73.3
68
53
2050*
82
72.9
82.7
79.5
77.2
65.4
Source: Adapted from Berlin Institute (2008) Europe’s Demographic Future26
Table 3: Population change, 2000-2050 (millions)
Source: Development Research Centre on Migration (2008): Globalisation and Poverty,
Demographics and Climate Change: Future Trends And their Policy Implications for Migration 27

Population decline in Europe and the developed world
In contrast to population growth in developing countries, the developed world will be
increasingly characterised by low birth rates and populations that decline steadily. The fact
that this decline is not due to disease, starvation or violence makes it an unprecedented
megatrend.28/29
Error! Reference source not found. below shows countries whose populations are already
in decline or that are projected to start declining between today and 2050.
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Table 4: Countries projected to have declining populations,
by period of the decline’s onset
Source: Center for Strategic and International Studies (2008)
The Graying of the Great Powers: Demography and Geopolitics in the 21st Century.30
While Europe’s population as a whole still grew in the first decade of this century (even
though many European countries have been in decline since the 1980s and 1990s), it only
did so at a rate of 0.4% per year and is expected to start declining by 2010. By 2050 it is
projected to have declined by 8.3%.31 Russia is currently experiencing significant
population decline (Box 1), since the population size is estimated to fall by 21.1% within
the same period.32 This means that while in 1950 Europe and Russia comprised 22% of the
global population, that share is now at 13% and will decrease to 7.5% by 2050.
Direct impacts of population decline in the EU and countries in the developed world are
diverse. Many industrial economies are based on debt and retirement transfer payments
that rely on a growing population base. A declining population however results in fewer
taxpayers, which could lead to a decline in the standard of living. The younger population
experience an increased pressure to support the older population. On the other hand, the
quality of life may increase with population decline, due to the reduction of pressure on
natural resources, infrastructure, and other services. Other effects of population decline
include shortages in labour. This is also an effect of population ageing, which in Europe is
closely linked to population decline.
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Box 1: Population decline in Russia
Russia’s population decline had already begun in the mid-1990s but the
country’s fertility rate reached its low in 1999 at 1.17 births per woman. This
rate recovered slightly by 2005 when it reached 1.3. However, it remains well
below the replacement level.
According to the UN, this decline could result in a decrease from the current
142 million people to between 136 and 121 million people in 2025 and 100
million people by 2050. Life expectancy in Russia has been decreasing since
the 1960s. In 2007, Russia ranked 164 out of 226 countries in terms of life
expectancy.
Experts explain only part of this trend by the difficult economic conditions
following the country’s transition to capitalism. Other social and medical
factors account for the decrease in life expectancy.
The Russian government has taken action to reverse this population decline
by offering families a one-off payment if they have a second child. This has led
to an increase of 130,000 births from 2006 to 2007.
Sources:
World Affairs (2009) Drunken Nation: Russia’s Depopulation Bomb.
Available at: www.worldaffairsjournal.org/articles/2009-Spring/full-Eberstadt.html
BBC (2009) Halting Russia’s population collapse. Available at:
news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/7971719.stm

Population decline in the developing world
In the future, the phenomenon of declining populations will no longer be restricted to the
developed world. In most developing countries, fertility is falling (see Error! Reference
source not found.). However, only a small number of developing nations will start to show
a decline by 2050, including Azerbaijan, Thailand, and Kazakhstan.33 In 2004, the overall
fertility level in Asia and Latin America was of 2.6 children per woman, which was only half
of the level in 1970. The high fertility levels in these regions in the past led to large
numbers of women remaining in childbearing age now. However, the slowing fertility
levels will now translate into lower numbers of women of childbearing age in the future,
resulting in rapidly declining population growth.
China’s population is expected to grow from 1.31 billion in 2005 to 1.46 billion in 2030, and
is the first developing country estimated to begin a population decline after 2030, reaching
1.41 billion in 205034. It is expected that the population will begin to suffer from its low
growth rates, and from the gender imbalance, with census data from 2000 revealing that
119 boys were born for every 100 girls35.
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The picture is slightly different for Africa, where the fertility levels have also dropped but
nevertheless remain above the average of any other region.36
It should, however, be noted that differences within these regions can be significant. Some
countries in areas with projected population increases, such as Brazil, Costa Rica, South
Korea, Thailand and Kazakhstan also show fertility levels of near or below 2.37 Please see
section 2. on population ageing for further information about future population declines in
the developing world.
3.1.1.2

International migration
Overview of international migration
Migration is expected to play an important role in demographic change over the next 50
years as it leads to more diverse population and has an impact on demographic growth
rates.38 International migration is a global megatrend with approximately 3% of the world’s
population living outside of the country of their birth. This includes both voluntary
migration due to economic reasons and involuntary or forced migration due to political,
religious, or environmentally-induced reasons (see Table 1). Environmentally induced
migration is expected to increase significantly in the future.
Migration in the post-World War II period was characterised by the liberalisation of trade
in goods and movements of capital. Since the 1960s, migration patterns have been marked
by an increase in the share of migrants from developing countries. The divergence in
incomes in different regions of the world contributes significantly to the explanation of
movement patterns. In Europe, this is due to the increase in migration flows from Eastern
European countries that were classed as developing according to their Human
Development Index39. The second half of the 20th century saw a shift in destination places,
since the share in developed countries grew from 5% to more than 12%, and the share of
the Gulf cooperation council countries grew from 5% to 39% of the population.
Global migration has increased significantly in the near past with 75 million people living
outside their own country of birth in 1960 and 191 million in 2005, which corresponds to a
rise from approximately 2.5% of world population to 3%.40
If the percentage of international migrants stays at 2005 levels or continues to increase at
the same rate as in the last decades of the 20th century, the total number of international
migrants is expected to reach between 235 and 415 million by 2050 with a median
estimate of 275. This is an increase of 40% compared to the total number of international
migrants today.41 However, it has to be noted that international migration remains difficult
to monitor.
According to the UN World Population Prospects, 74 countries were net receivers of
migrants over the period 2000-2005. In 64 of these countries, the net migration reinforced
population growth and in seven countries (Austria, Croatia, Germany, Greece, Italy, and
Slovenia) it reversed the trend of population decline. In three countries, migration slowed
down population decline, namely in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Russia.42
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UN predictions estimate that if more was invested today in sustainable development in the
source regions, environmentally induced migration could be significantly reduced.
However, the projections can only partially support such analyses, since many other factors
affect international migration. Illegal migrations are possible causes of social distress and
may equally cause further socio-economical and environmental impacts.

Effects of international migration on Europe
Between 1960 and 2010, the total number of migrants in Europe grew from 14.5% to
49.6% of the total population, with a share of world migrants rising from 19.6% to 26.4%.
Europe only comprises 9.7% of world population in 201043.
The table below gives an overview of the total number of immigrants living in each region
of destination in the world in 2005. It shows that Europe has the largest percentage of
foreigners living within each region. This includes European migrants, e.g. British living in
France, Poles living in Italy, or Germans living in Austria or Greece. Thus one reason that
‘Europe’ has the most immigrants is that it is composed of many small countries. People
who move similar distances within the US, or within India or China, are not counted as
‘migrants’ in Table 5.44
Table 6: Estimated number of migrants living in various regions in 2005
Geographic region
Number of
As a percentage of
migrants (million) total migrants in the
world
As a percentage of
total regional
population
Europe
64
34
9
Asia
53
28
<2
North America
44
23
13
Africa
17
9
<2
Latin America and
Caribbean
7
3.5
<2
Oceania
5
2.5
15
Source: United Nations University - Institute for Environment and Human Security (2007)
Control, Adapt or Flee: How to Face Environmental Migration.
International migration remains the most important driver of European population growth.
More than one million immigrants come to Europe annually, many from North Africa, the
Middle East, and South Asia. The foreign born population in Europe is estimated to account
for 35 million or 14% of the total population.45 However, when looking at the working-age
population in Western Europe, the annual net immigration would have to double or triple
in order to ensure that it does not decrease. The National Intelligence Council Global
Trends report estimates that by 2025, non-European minority populations could reach 15%
in nearly all Western European countries. These migrants will have a substantially younger
age structure than the native population because of youth bulges in the migrants’ home
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countries (see Section 3.2.1.2 for further details on youth bulges).46 Forecasts on migration
flows are much less accurate than those on natural population changes, however. There is
no global estimate for the number of professional, technical and kindred or related (PTK)
i.e. skilled workers. Many developed countries are currently implementing policies aimed
at facilitating the recruitment of highly skilled workers, since they are seen as economic
resources in the context of ageing economies.

Migration flows to developing countries
While Europe has been the prime destination for immigrants from developing countries,
migration flows to other developing countries have grown rapidly in recent years. China,
Southern India as well as possibly Turkey and Iran could attract more labour migrants as
their working-age population slows whereas wages rise. Labour migration into the United
States is projected to decrease as Mexico’s industrial base develops further and its
population ages. Furthermore, Brazil and certain areas of South America are expected to
attract labour migrants who would traditionally have gone to the United States.47 For the
period 2005-2050, the UN estimations project that the major net receivers of international
migrants will be the United States (1.1 million annually), Canada (214,000), the United
Kingdom (174,000), Spain (170,000), Italy (159,000), Germany (110,000), Australia
(100,000) and France (100,000). The major countries of net emigration are projected to be
Mexico (-334,000), China (-309,000), India (-253,000), the Philippines (-175,000), Pakistan (161,000), Indonesia (-156,000) and Bangladesh (-148,000)48. The numbers of international
migrants are however relatively variable and difficult to estimate.

Environmentally induced migration
Although economic and political factors remain dominant in the decision to migrate,
environmental change is becoming increasingly important in the context of climate change
and global warming. The concept of environmental refugees was introduced by Lester
Brown of the Worldwatch Institute in the 1970s. Following a United Nations Environment
Programme (UNEP) policy paper published in 1985 and called ‘Environmental Refugees’49,
the term entered into common use and is generally defined as people that are displaced
because of environmental change in their home.
As early as 1990, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) stated that the
gravest effects of climate change may be those of human migration.50 Another important
step in the discussion about environmental migration was the Stern Review which stated
that “Greater resource scarcity, desertification, risk of droughts and floods, and rising sea
levels could drive many million people to migrate – a last-resort adaptation for individuals,
but one that could be very costly to them and the world.”51
The exact number of environmentally induced migrants is very difficult to estimate (see
Error! Reference source not found.). This is due to the difficulty in disentangling the
interlinkages between the multiple causes for environmental migration, and because most
environmentally induced migration takes place not across international borders but within
countries. The numbers of environmentally induced migrants depend on the extent of
worldwide environmental change, and on which of the scenarios for the advance of climate
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change presented by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) will prove to
be most accurate.52
Box 2: Environmentally induced migrants
The term ‘refugee’ is legally defined by the 1951 United Nations
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. This definition does not
include those forced to migrate because of environmental change. The
concept of ‘environmental refugee’ remains poorly defined, although It
is widely recognised that environmentally induced migration occurs due
to slow changes related in part to climate change, including sea level
rise and desertification, disasters such as earthquakes and floods,
industrial or contaminating events, and related to violent conflict.
Environmentally induced migrants can be found throughout the world
but are particularly concentrated in the global South.
Reaching a commonly agreed definition of an environmental refugee is
complicated by the fact that in most cases, economic, political, and
social factors all play an important role in a person’s decision to
migrate. The current recognised working definition of someone
displaced because of environmental change, as defined by the
International Organisation of Migration (IOM), is one that does not have
the legal definition of ‘climate refugee’ but that reflects the same idea:
‘Environmentally induced migrant’.
Further, it is difficult to forecast the number of environmentally induced migrants over any
period of time because environmental changes are in themselves difficult to predict. For
cases of gradual environmental degradation in particular, political, social, and economic
factors play a major role in the choices made by migrants. The number largely depends on
the extent of future environmental degradation as well as on the planning and resources
that are at a government’s disposal to adapt to and mitigate the results of environmental
change. Estimates of the number of environmentally induced migrants and its future
development are therefore divergent.
In 2005, the United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that as of
that date there were 24 million people affected, likely increasing to 50 million by 2010. By
2050, Christian Aid predicts that this number could increase to 647 million people.
Figure 2 below presents the main hotspots of environmental change as well as the
resulting migration trajectories. According to this figure, Europe is to expect its main influx
from environmentally induced migrants from Africa. The UN highlights that out of the 28
countries that are in danger of suffering from climate change, 22 are located in Africa.53
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Figure 2: Environmental change and migration: Hotspots and trajectories
Source: Warner, K. (2008), EFMSV Germanwatch Session
Threatened by a changing environment, people face various options, depending on the
type and speed of environmental change. In cases where certain regions, but not
necessarily the entire country, are affected by the changing environment, the government
might opt for resettlement programmes in unaffected areas. In Mozambique, for example,
periodic flooding increased significantly in its severity as well as frequency, and a
resettlement programme was established to higher areas nearby. However, these areas
are affected by droughts, which mean that people have to commute to their former home
area to sustain their livelihoods. Life has therefore become much more difficult for people,
and although they might have never considered leaving the country before, they might
begin to do so now54.
The type of environmental damage can determine not only the speed of migration
(whether it is sudden or gradual) but also its period (whether it is temporary or
permanent). Table 6 below provides an overview of environmental factors and the type of
migration they trigger. Of the different types of environmental change, gradual
environmental change is expected to be the most important cause of migration. The report
on Environmental Change and Forced Migration Scenarios (EACH-FOR) argues that longer
term or permanent migration, in contrast to seasonal or temporary migration, is becoming
increasingly common, and in particular among younger generations.
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Table 6: Environmental change and resulting migration
Environmental
Factor
Type of migration
Example
Natural disasters
Sudden, large-scale
movements.
Return may never
be feasible.
Hurricane Katrina, which hit the United
States in August 2005, caused the
displacement of about 1.5 million people. It
is estimated that some 300,000 may never
return, although they may be replaced.
Gradual
environmental
degradation
Gradual
movement.
Return may never
be feasible.
Desertification plays a major role in the
migration of 10 million people in Africa over
the last two decades. Other examples are
soil and coastal erosion. Papua New Guinea’s
Carteret Islands have been the first low-lying
islands to evacuate their population due to
environmental change. The Carterets are
among the hardest hit islands in the Pacific
and may be completely submerged by as
early as 2015.
Early and
intermediate
stages of
environmental
degradation
Temporary
migration
By the early 1990s, rural migration had
become a structural phenomenon in
Tambacounda, an area of Senegal affected
by soil erosion: 90% of the region’s men
between the age of 30 and 60 had migrated
at least once in their lifetime. This loss of
working-age men posed challenges for
efforts to rehabilitate degraded lands and
increased the economic burden on the
remaining women and children.
Severe or
irreversible
environmental
degradation
Permanent
migration
The Sertão region in the northeast of Brazil is
repeatedly struck by drought periods that
affect nearly all agricultural activities; in
particular the work of peasants, and small
and medium size producers. Between 1970
and 2005, some 60 million people migrated
from rural to urban areas within Brazil, most
from the Sertão region.
Source: Adapted from International Organisation for Migration Online (2009)
Migration, Climate Change and the Environment 55
Risks are unequally distributed for specific groups of people: the most vulnerable groups to
multiple pressures, including environmental change, are the poor, indigenous populations,
women and children56. The majority of the environmentally induced migrants are the
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extreme poor whose lack of resources means that they often only move within borders and
only short distances from home. This highlights the fact that in many cases
environmentally induced migrants actually migrate nationally and not internationally.
However, a clear distinction will in many cases be difficult as environmentally induced
migrants generally first move within the country, e.g. as part of a resettlement programme,
and only decide to migrate internationally if the national move has not improved their
living conditions. In these cases it is likely to be difficult to trace their migration back to
environmental change.57
However, even as a first measure, internal migration (i.e. within national boundaries) is not
always a possible way to adapt to environmental change. According to the UN, eleven
countries have more than 10% of their land within five metres of mean sea level and a
similar number have all of their territory below five metres. Bangladesh is one of the most
vulnerable countries with 60% of its land less than 5 metres above sea level. At the same
time, Bangladesh’s population is estimated to increase by another 100 million people
within the next 60 years in addition to the 165 million people today.58 Furthermore, a one
metre sea level rise is estimated to threaten the existence of 40 sovereign states globally.
In these cases, the inhabitants of the state in question would have to be resettled to
another country altogether, which brings about important questions of costs,
responsibility, and security (ETH, 2009). An example of this is the government of Tuvalu
that has already begun to negotiate migration rights to New Zealand in the event of serious
climate change-related impacts.59 Countries such as Bangladesh are asking their
development partners to help accommodate environmental migrants. The countries that
are considered responsible for climate change are being asked, for the first time, to take
responsibility for the people that have to migrate as a result of it. An estimated 20 million
Bangladeshis might be displaced by 2050, in a country that is already among the most
densely populated in the world. Developed countries could either provide financial support
to relocate environmental refugees in their own countries or could accept them as
refugees.60 However, although migrating might be the only immediate strategy to cope
with floods, riverbank erosion, cyclones, etc., not everybody is satisfied with this option,
since there is no guarantee of employment or housing in the place of destination, and
many people would rather stay where their ancestors originate from61. Developed
countries therefore need to both support sustainable development in countries affected by
environmental change and act on the causes.
Countries that have a low capacity to adapt to environmental change, as well as countries
with particularly susceptible geographies, such as small island states, are the most
vulnerable to the effect of environmental degradation and climate change. Over 97% of all
casualties due to climate change related disasters occur in developing countries.62 Deltaic
land in the Indian Sundarban region, for example, is regularly flooded due to fast sea level
rise and storms, which threaten the lives of thousands. The Indian government therefore is
considering evacuating 70,000 people in the next five years.63
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3.1.2.
3.1.2.1
DRIVERS
Main drivers of population growth and decline
The principal drivers of population growth and decline are the fertility levels, coupled with
increased longevity. Improved living standards, healthcare, and education are closely
linked to these drivers.

Fertility levels
A country’s total fertility rate is the number of children that women of childbearing age will
have over their lifetime. The global average ‘replacement level of fertility’ at which a
country’s population stabilises is 2.33. This figure is higher than 2.0, at which two parents
would reproduce two children, because mortality before the childbearing years has to be
taken into account. This also explains why the replacement level of fertility depends on the
country: child mortality is higher in poorer countries and the replacement level of fertility
can therefore go up to 3.0 and above, whereas in rich countries it is of 2.1.64
Fertility itself is driven by many factors, among which living standards, education levels, the
availability of contraceptives, increased access to medical treatment, female social
standing and other social factors.
Figure 3 below shows the development of the total fertility rates by regions of the world,
over the period 1950-205065. The graph shows the discrepancy between the fertility rates
of the more developed regions, which are predicted to increase slightly and stabilise in the
next 10-15 years, and those of less developed regions of the world, namely Africa, which
are expected to undergo a sharp decline. Although the current world fertility rate is still
above the global replacement level, this is expected to change by 2020, as the global
fertility rate is foreseen to fall below the global replacement level of fertility.66
Figure 3: Total Fertility Rates by regions of the world, 1950-2050
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Source: UN (2008) World Population Prospects - The 2008 Revision: Highlights.67
The global fall in fertility rates does not, however, mean that the global population will
start shrinking in 2020. Countries in which the earlier generations were characterised by
high fertility rates will have in large numbers of women of childbearing age. More children
will be born even if each mother has fewer children, leading to more but smaller families.
In the developed world, fertility levels were already low in the 1950s, a trend that was only
interrupted by baby booms that remained temporary. By the late 1990s, the overall fertility
level in the developed world was 1.6 births per woman; therefore well below the
replacement level.68 In the EU the fertility rate is even lower and stands currently around
1.5, with the differentiation that it is slightly higher in the old Member States (1.6) than in
the new Member States (1.3). The highest fertility levels are currently observed in France
and Ireland (1.9), while Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and Lithuania have the lowest rates
(1.3).69
In many developing countries, fertility levels have been shrinking rapidly over the past
decades. Between the 1960s and 2000-2005, for example, the overall fertility level of the
developing world decreased by approximately 50%, from 6 births per woman to 2.9 births.
The most significant declines were experienced in Asia, North Africa and Latin America,
which is linked to strong social and economic development at the same time. 70 Differences
have become more significant with some countries, such as China, Hong Kong, Singapore
and South Korea, which reached replacement fertility levels very quickly, while others saw
less significant or much slower change in overall fertility levels.71 In the 1990s, the decline
in fertility levels was less significant and a number of countries, such as Bangladesh and
Egypt, even experienced stalling fertility levels. In Sub-Saharan Africa the decline of fertility
levels slowed significantly after 1990.72 This slowdown in fertility decline explains the
significant increase in population figures that are estimated for Sub-Saharan countries by
2050 as discussed above.
Research shows that there is a strong relation between fertility levels and economic
development. With increasing levels of economic development and improved
infrastructures, fewer children are needed to support parents when they get older. It has
been shown that fertility starts to drop at an annual income of 1000 – 2000 dollars per
person and falls until it hits the replacement level at an income of 4000 – 10 000 dollars
per person per year, which generally corresponds to a middle-income status. After this
point, fertility continues at, or below, the replacement level, and increases again for
some.73 Figure 4 below shows the relation between fertility levels and economic
development as of 2007:
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Figure 4: Fertility level vs. GDP, 2007
Source: The Economist, October 29th, 200974
This applies the other way around also, since fertility rates have an impact on the economic
standing of a family. An example of this is Indonesia’s Family Life Survey that showed that,
on average, each birth reduced by a fifth the likelihood that a woman would have a job—
lowering household income and pushing some families into poverty. Smaller families were
therefore more likely to make it to middle-class status.75

Increased longevity
Increased longevity is brought about by improved health care and slow population growth
due to reductions in fertility levels. This leads to dramatic changes in the population
structure.
The accelerated increase in life expectancy in the 20th century led to a rise in the world
population growth rate, reaching a peak at 2% per year in 1965-70. This speed has
decelerated since then as a result of the decline in fertility levels in the developing world.
In the period 2005-2010 the world population growth rate reached 1.18% per year and is
expected to decrease to 0.34% by 2045-2050. Increases in life expectancy also lead to
population ageing. In developed regions, the population aged 60 or over is estimated to be
increasing at 2% annually and by more than 3% in the developing world.
Increased longevity can also lead to short-term increases in population sizes. Please see
section 3.2.2. for a discussion of increases in life duration.

Other drivers
Other important drivers of growing and declining populations include increased access to
medical treatment, education, female social standing, and other social factors. However,
although important, they all affect either fertility levels or longevity and can therefore be
considered as indirect drivers of growing and declining populations.
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3.1.2.2
Main drivers of international migration
The drivers of international migration can be divided into ‘push’ (repulsive) and ‘pull’
(attractive) factors. The discrepancy in living conditions between two different states is one
of the main drivers of international migration, acting both as a push and as a pull factor.
Population growth rates, policies, legal and administrative barriers, are all factors that
influence international migration. The focus of this report is more specifically on the
influences of climate change on international migration.

Global environmental change
Global environmental change is a major driver for environmentally induced migration. In
the last 100 years, changes have been observed in the global climate, including an increase
in global surface temperature by 0.74°C ± 0.18°C between 1906 and 2005. Climate change
is also expected to increase the frequency and intensity of natural disasters. This includes
considerably increased precipitation and drying, depending on the region; increases in the
destructiveness of tropical cyclones, etc.76 These trends are projected to bring about
significant environmental change, thus presenting an increased threat to human
livelihoods and security. In doing so, they also present a new situation for human mobility.
Figure 5 below presents the rapid increase in the number of people reported to have been
affected by natural disasters between 1900 and 2008. It must be noted however that it is
only in the last decades that the statistics for the number of people affected by natural
disasters have been recorded on a systematic basis. The dramatic increase in the number
of people reported affected by natural disasters may not therefore reflect the actual
numbers of people affected worldwide.
Figure 5: Number of people reported affected by natural disasters globally 1900-2008
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Source: EM-DAT International Disaster Database (2009)77
Environmental and climate change is expected to affect urban and rural areas alike with
increasingly frequent and violent hazard events. Many of the estimated 9 billion of the
world population by 2050 will live in megacities that are prone to sea level rise. Flooding,
intense storms, and droughts, but also more gradual but significant changes in regional
climates place great stress on livelihood systems. Along with numerous other factors, these
pressures are projected to contribute to migration.78 Furthermore, over the next two or
three decades, the breakdown of ecosystem-dependent livelihoods is estimated to remain
the premier driver of long-term migration.79
Global population growth will, in many cases, be concentrated precisely in those regions
that have the highest vulnerability to environmental change. For example, Australia,
through increasing drought, may not be able to support as many immigrants in the future;
while Bangladesh, the horn of Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia, and southern Africa will
all face water or drainage problems exacerbated by projected population increase.

Other factors
Other factors include market differences, costs of labour, the globalisation and reduction in
the cost of transport, technological change, food shortages and wars80.
3.1.3.
3.1.3.1
KEY UNCERTAINTIES
Uncertainties for population growth and decline
As discussed above, it is widely projected that by 2025 the world population will have
reached 8 billion people and by 2050, 9.1 billion and that it will still be increasing by 34
million people per year at that point. However, it needs to be noted that this figure is only
the medium variant projection and the UN’s estimates reach from 7.8 billion to 11.9 billion
people by 2050.81 Uncertainties for population growth and decline are closely linked to the
fertility rates and immigration policies.

Fertility rates
One of the key uncertainties in the estimates of population growth is how the world’s
different regional fertility rates will develop. Figure 6 below presents possible
developments of world population growth for the period 2010-2050 based on different
fertility scenarios.
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Figure 6: World population 1950-2050 by projected variants
Source: UN (2004)82
It is important to note that even small changes in fertility rates can lead to significant
changes in population sizes. According to the United Nations Population Division, the world
population would more than double to 14 billion people by 2100 if the global fertility rate
settled at 2.35, which is just very slightly above the current average global replacement
rate. If, however, the global fertility rate declined to 1.85, a level already reached by most
developed countries, the global population would be approximately 5.5 billion by 2100.
This means that the replacement fertility rate can be regarded as the tipping point for
population change; above it, the world population will continue to grow and below it, it will
decline.83 The world population will stabilise at approximately 9 to 10 billion people if
fertility levels tend towards replacement rate over the coming decades and remain close to
it thereafter. 84

Immigration policies
Immigration policies are sometimes considered as a remedy to population decline.
Countries like Germany and France already have over 12% and 10% of immigrants as a
percentage of national population, respectively85. Labour migration is seen by many as a
necessary replacement solution to the deficit due to population decline, by encouraging
the migration of skilled workers for short periods of time.
However, according to the 2004 RAND Europe report, it is believed that replacement
migration does not represent a feasible way of reversing population decrease, low fertility
and population ageing, because of the numbers of immigrants needed86. Such a policy is
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not considered feasible or sustainable in the long term, because the numbers of
immigrants that would be needed are of substantial magnitudes.

Other relevant policies
All European MS have begun to address the challenges entailed by demographic change.
The main aims were spelled out in the Lisbon Strategy: more education, more innovation,
more sustainability, and a higher participation in the labour market, especially among the
older workers (55+), are the keys Europe needs to bolster its international
competitiveness. If these goals are in fact adopted, if Member States improve their family
policies, develop the policies needed to steer immigration, enhance the education of their
populations, reshape their social systems with a view to demographic givens, and
reorganise their public finances accordingly, Europe could come to terms with its
demographic change and ultimately emerge strengthened from the crisis.87
The short and long-term effects of these policies must however be distinguished, as
population policies take a long time to pay dividends, making such policies politically
unattractive. Thus no single policy initiative is certain to dramatically raise fertility in
Europe. Uncertainty here is threefold: What will the supply of migrants from outside the
EU be in the coming years? To what extent are the demographic policies going to be
implemented? And finally if they are implemented, to what extent are they going to work?
3.1.3.2
Uncertainties for international migration
International migration remains the most uncertain demographic process. It also remains
the process which is most difficult to monitor. The OECD provides the most comprehensive
dataset.88
Both short- and long-term changes in migration patterns are difficult to measure and
estimate reliably, since they are highly variable and depend on a multitude of changing
socio-economic, political and environmental drivers.
Uncertainties in long term patterns are linked to several key factors, as highlighted by the
Human Development Report of 2009: differing trends in income, population growth rates,
and transport costs tend to increase movements, which simultaneously face the
increasingly significant constraint of growing legal and administrative barriers. Numerous
other factors such as differences in labour and capital accumulation, technological change,
policies and institutions play their part. Short term factors include changes in policy
barriers, or other factors such as political instability, environmental catastrophes, food
shortages or wars89.

Economic growth
Over the last half of the 20th century, a number of countries in Southern Europe and East
Asia shifted from being net emigration to net immigration countries as a result of dynamic
economic growth and ageing, and this trend can be expected to continue into the future,
with countries such as Malaysia, Thailand, and Turkey likely also to undergo a migration
transition in the coming decades. In turn, countries elsewhere, such as Ghana, have moved
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in the other direction over the second half of the 20th century, becoming net countries of
emigration as economic and political events led to expulsions of foreign populations and a
new exodus of nationals. Yet such factors are not built into UN projections: for example,
Turkey is projected to have net positive migration until 2015, but negative migration
thereafter; whilst Thailand may never attain net negative migration.90
Recovery plans following the economic crisis could be a major factor influencing migration
flows in the near future. The crisis affected labour market conditions internationally,
restraining labour migration movements. Effects of the crisis revealed decreases in the
employment rates of immigrants, both in absolute and relative terms, compared to the
native-born population of immigration countries91.

Immigration policies
Immigration policies either encourage or discourage international migration. Ensuring that
policies are adapted to labour needs and favour a long-term integration of immigrants
could enable to regulate migration flows. The OECD International Migration Outlook
suggests that OECD countries put in place labour migration regimes “which address needs
at all skill levels and which are demand-driven”92. If there is a strong demand for low-skilled
migration but no adequate policy to favour it, this may result in irregular migration.

Environmental change
Environmental change is increasingly seen as an important driver of migration, but it
remains to be seen to what extent people actually migrate internationally because of
environmental change. The EACH FOR report suggests that the answer to this question
might be less than expected, since the poorest cannot afford to migrate, and many others
do not want to leave the land of their ancestors93. Environmental change is a major
uncertainty as it has a multiplier effect on other migration drivers. Land degradation in
Niger, for example, has undermined the resilience of farmers to recurring drought. More
erratic weather, rising sea levels and other impacts related to environmental change may
exacerbate both migration pressures and environmental degradation.
Reliable data is lacking for international migration as a whole, so for environmentally
induced migration, which is especially difficult to trace, it is no surprise that no reliable
data seems to exist.

Youth bulges
Youth bulges may be a factor of uncertainty for international migration since the migration
patterns of the members of these youth bulges cannot be foreseen. Young people from
youth bulges may be forced to migrate for various reasons, such as limited opportunities in
their home countries, unemployment or poverty. In some countries with large youth
bulges, emigration may also be considered as a safety valve against internal conflict94. This
could have significant impacts on international migration.
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3.2.
MEGATREND II: POPULATION AGEING AND YOUTH BULGES
Population ageing is an unprecedented demographic shift being experienced by large parts
of the developed world. Youth bulges can be perceived as an opposite trend, and an
element of the developing world. Today however, whereas the former is becoming
increasingly frequent in many developing nations, youth bulges remain a persistent factor
of many of the most unstable states today.
3.2.1.
3.2.1.1

SUMMARY
Population ageing
Overview
Today nearly seven out of every ten people in the developed world are in the traditional
working age (aged 15 to 64). Importantly, not only has this percentage never been this high
in the past but it is also expected never to be so high again in the future – it can be
perceived as a crucial tipping point. This is because the world is getting older at an
unprecedented rate: In 2000, about 420 million people, or about 7% of the world's
population, were age 65 or older. By 2050, that number will be nearly 1.5 billion people, or
about 16% of the world's population.95 In other words, the median age of the world’s
population is projected to increase from 29 years to 38 years by 205096.
The countries with the oldest median age are those which have had low fertility rates over
a long period of time. These include many developed countries, as well as some developing
countries including Hong Kong and Singapore. By 2050, all 45 developed countries are
projected to have median ages over 40 years. Europe has the oldest population today, with
a mean age of almost 40 years, and is expected to reach 47 years in 205097.
The gender gap is visible in population ageing through the mortality declines that benefit
older ages and women in particular. In developed countries today, mortality rates continue
to decrease among the oldest-old (85+ years), influencing the gender divide98.
The decrease in the share of the working population, linked to the increase in the share of
the retired population, i.e. the number of over-65-year olds, is set to pose challenges to
public institutions, creating pressure on social support systems. This is the case in many
developed countries in particular, where a combination of tax increases, borrowing, later
retirement ages, cuts in benefits, or adjustments to lower cost-of-living may be necessary
to sustain the existing retirement programmes99.

Impacts of population ageing in Europe
As Table 2 shows (page 17), Europe had the highest percentage of people age 65 or above
in 2007, a rate of 16 percent, which is expected to nearly double by 2050.100 The lowest
rate of people 65 and above was witnessed in Africa with 3% in 2007. Even by 2050 Europe
is estimated to remain the region with the highest percentage of people age 65 or above
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with 28% of its total population belonging to this group. However, the gap towards other
regions is expected to be narrower. 101
The main effects of population ageing include direct impacts on economic growth, the
labour force market, productivity, and public finances, among others. A large working age
population provides resources for retirement and investments to the economy. The change
in Europe’s age structure is expected, by the OECD, to slow down overall economic growth
in Europe by 0.4 percentage points every year until 2025 and by 0.9 percentage points
thereafter102. The annual growth is foreseen to decline from 2.2% to 1.8% between 2011
and 2030, and to barely 1.3% in 2031-50. The challenge will directly impact the labour
force market and the rate of productivity growth. The EU Economic Policy Committee
estimates that the shrink in European workforces will tend to make European economies
increasingly reliant on advances in productivity to generate growth103. Pension and health
care commitments of public finances are also foreseen to be affected directly by European
population ageing.
There are, however, significant differences in population ageing throughout Europe.
Although the population is expected to continue to rise between 2005 and 2050 in several
Member States, such as France, Ireland, the UK, or Spain, it is already falling in many of the
new Member States104. These differences are due to a number of socio-economic factors,
such as the choices made in immigration policy sectors.
The impacts of population ageing in Europe remain uncertain however, since they depend
on a variety of factors, including the role played by public policy. The “Impact of ageing
populations on public spending” report of the EU Economic Policy Committee (2006)
highlighted the fact that the reforms that were carried out in several EU countries since
2001 “appear to have curtailed the projected increase in public spending significantly in
half of all EU-15 MS”105. Choices made by public policy, such as raising the retirement age;
introducing greater flexibility to allow people to continue working beyond the age of
retirement if they wish to do so; or introducing selective immigration quotas for skilled
workers; could also greatly influence the impacts of population ageing throughout the EU.

Pace of ageing in the developed vs. the developing world
Even though the phenomenon will hit both the developed and the developing world, the
difference between the two will remain significant at least in the near future. In most
developed MS, the most rapid growth in the ratio of seniors (age 65 and older) to the
working-age population will occur during the 2010s and 2020s. By 2010, it is expected that
there will be about one senior for every four working-age people in the developed world,
increasing to a ratio of one in three or higher by 2025.106 Japan, whose working-age
population has been shrinking since the mid-1990s, for example, is expected to reach a
higher ratio by 2025 with one senior for every two working-age people. Figure 7 below
presents countries with an estimated median age of over 50 by 2050. By then, it is
expected that the developing world will have reached the same stage in the ageing of its
population as the developed world has reached now.107
Figure 7: Countries with a Median Age over 50 by 2050
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Source: Center for Strategic and International Studies (2008) 108
The highest growth rates between 2007 and 2050 in the senior population are expected to
take place in Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean, which are estimated to triple the
size of this part of the population within this period.109 A significant example of population
ageing in this part of the world is the case of China (Box 4). Still, those countries that are
‘youngest’ today are also estimated to experience the least ageing (e.g. countries in SubSaharan Africa) and those countries that are ‘oldest’ today are expected to experience the
most ageing. This means that the world will see demographic divergence over the
foreseeable future before it might see some sort of convergence.110
Box 3: Population ageing in China
Owing to the One-Child Policy (see box 4), China’s population is expected to
start declining around 2030. Whereas in 2020-2025 the population is still
estimated to increase by 0.34% per year, it is predicted to decrease by 0.32%
per year in 2040-2045.
This decline has significant implications on the age structure of the Chinese
population. Whereas China is considered as a ‘young’ society today, by 2030 it
is estimated to be ‘older’ than the United States measured by its population
percentage of over 65-year olds. Between 2005 and 2030 this age group is
estimated to double in size. This also means that China’s workforce is likely to
peak in 2015 and to continuously decrease thereafter compared to a doubling
in its workforce between 1980 and 2005.
Compared to many developed countries that encounter the same problem,
China is expected to be hit by the problems of an ageing society with only a
developing country’s income.
Sources: AEI (2007) and Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute (2007) and
Center for Strategic and International Studies (2008)
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It is important to note, however, that the speed of population ageing in the developing
world is expected to be higher than in the developed world, which would allow less time
for adaptation. Furthermore, it is expected by many to hit many developing countries at
lower levels of socio-economic development, which means that consequences might be
worse.111
3.2.1.2
Youth bulges
Contrary to the trends in developed economies, many developing countries will experience
substantial youth bulges, which are disproportionate concentrations of people in the 15-to29 year-old age group. The 15-29 age group may actually increase in some countries and
contribute to international migration. Several of the countries with the largest youth
bulges are among the world’s most unstable or potentially unstable countries.
Most youth bulges today are in the developing world, and form a crescent which stretches
from the Andean region of Latin America across Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and
the Caucasus, before finally reaching the northern parts of South Asia. Three quarters of
the countries with youth bulges by 2025 will be located in Sub-Saharan Africa with the rest
located in the Middle East and a few across Asia and among the Pacific Islands.112

Migration as a solution to youth bulges
Global migration, which is very likely to increase over the next 10 to 20 years, could
provide a partial solution to problems associated with large youth populations. Countries in
the Middle East and North Africa are experiencing a youth bulge due to population
explosion after the 1960s. Asian and European countries, on the other hand, face severe
population ageing and a lack of manpower. Migration of younger workers would help to
offset the retirement of older workers in countries with ageing populations and provide
jobs for unemployed youth from developing countries.

Worker bulges
Some youth bulges are expected to mature into ‘worker bulges’, an advantage for fastdeveloping countries that offer a business-friendly environment for investment and an
educated work force and such as Turkey, Lebanon, Iran, or Morocco. In ‘weak’ or ‘failed
states’, where the government and institutions are unable to provide a significant set of
public services, such as legitimate government, physical security and minimal economic
development, the worker bulges are expected to go elsewhere113, and in particular to more
developed countries offering employment opportunities.
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Figure 8: Youth bulges: young adults aged 15-29 as a proportion of adults (aged 15 and older).
Source: Population Action International (2003)114,
Data: United nations population Division (2003)

Effects of youth bulges on Europe
Part of these worker bulges are expected to migrate from the less developed regions to
more developed countries, including Europe. These youth workers will have direct impacts
on the demographic structure and employment in the emigration countries.
Indirect impacts related to the migration of young workers and students are linked to the
diffusion of development and consumption patterns, as the migrants return to their native
countries. The model of guest-worker migration might be a possibility within Europe to
counter-balance the ageing population structure. By encouraging short term circulation
patterns of skilled migrants, either for working or for post-graduate education, Europe
could influence development and consumption patterns in developing countries.
However, the current and future impacts of these flows on the European economy are
highly dependent on the nature of migration policies in immigration countries, and the
attractiveness of EU Member States (i.e. France, Spain, Ireland or Germany) on countries
with youth bulges. It is difficult to predict what the future effects may be, as these depend
on policies at both the national and European scale.

Effects on civil conflicts and political instability
Population Action International’s recent study, “The Shape of Things to Come. Why age
structure matters to a safer, more equitable world”115, reveals that population age
structure strongly influences the stability, governance, economic development and social
well-being of countries. One of the main key findings is that “very young and youthful age
structures are most likely to undermine countries’ development and security”. A young age
structure was found to triple the rate of civil conflict throughout the 1990s. Youth bulges
are therefore an ambivalent demographic trend, as they represent both a possible supply
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of migrant workers to developed countries and a potential source of instability in the
source countries.
3.2.2.
DRIVERS
3.2.2.1
Main drivers of global ageing
Global ageing is the result of two demographic forces: Falling fertility levels and rising
longevity. The first reduces the relative number of the young and the second increases the
relative number of the old. The fastest ageing societies are generally those with the
greatest declines in fertility116, although rising longevity can be an equally important factor.

Falling fertility levels
The fertility rate is considered as the largest driver for population ageing today117, since the
decline in the fertility rate over the past fifty years is the main factor for ageing in the most
developed countries. The increase in the speed of fertility transitions has direct effects on
the speed of population ageing. Please see section 3.1.2. for a discussion on fertility levels.
Fertility rates are influenced by a wide range of factors, such as living standards, education,
and the availability of contraceptives. It is difficult to predict to what extent the policies
designed to help people have the desired number of children will affect fertility levels.
However, there is fair evidence that strong state action to promote the availability and the
use of contraception, as well as increases in income and education, lead to sharp falls in
fertility. This has happened even in countries as otherwise conservative as Malaysia,
Indonesia and Iran. Germany is an example of a country which has implemented several
measures to increase fertility rates without noticeable results so far. The main question is
whether countries will promote family planning and achieve economic growth. The same
question goes for the developing world where it will need to be evaluated whether and
which measures are likely to be implemented and what their results can be expected to be.

Rising longevity
Since the Second World War global life expectancy has risen from approximately 45 to 65
years. This represents a greater gain over the past 50 years than over the previous 5000
years. This rise has been especially significant in the developed world: In the United States,
for example, life expectancy rose from 47 years in 1900 to 66 years in 1950 and 77 years in
2000. Today, Japan is the world’s leader in longevity with a life expectancy of 80 years.
Europe has a life expectancy that is higher than the US although not as high as Japan. 118
Currently, European women on average may expect to live 81.9 years and men 75.8
years.119 The increase in life expectancy in these countries is still ongoing: Compared to
2004 women recently gained half a year of life expectancy and men almost a full year.120
The initial gains in life expectancy were those in the reduction of child mortality, around
mid-1900. These were followed by gains in middle-age mortality, and today any residual
gain is to be made on the longevity of the over-70. This however is much more difficult to
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obtain, and thus the increase in the future in developed countries will probably be much
slower.
Although the trend towards longevity is a global one, Figure 9 below shows that stark
differences in life expectancy remain between regions as of 2008. This becomes especially
clear when looking at the African continent most of whose countries are characterised by a
life expectancy of 55 years or under.121
Figure 9: Global life expectancy at birth, 2008
Source: CIA (2008) World Factbook122

Time squeeze
Another potential social driver producing ageing populations to be considered, especially in
developed countries, is what is sometimes referred to as the “time squeeze”. This refers to
the incompatibility between the various ambitions and the actual available time of women.
The assumption is that college-educated women are often older at the time of birth of
their first child, leaving them less time to have their second child before reaching the
biological limits of fertility.123 Due to the time squeeze, some women try to have their
children at an earlier age, whereas others reach the menopause before having had the
time to have as many children as desired.

Other drivers
Other important drivers of population ageing include increasing living standards, greater
female labour force participation, later age of marriage, availability of contraceptives,
diffusion of information about contraceptives, and increased access to medical treatment.
However, although important, they all affect either fertility levels or longevity and can
therefore be considered as indirect drivers of population ageing.
3.2.2.2
Main drivers of youth bulges
The main drivers of youth bulges are high fertility levels coupled with gradually declining
levels in child mortality as well as HIV/AIDS which causes premature adult deaths.124

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Countries where populations are in the early phase of demographic transition experience
high fertility levels coupled with gradually declining rates of childhood mortality. The
combination of these two factors leads to a significant increase in the younger populations,
creating a youth bulge.

HIV/AIDS
In many countries of southern and eastern Africa, the prevalence of HIV/AIDS is one of the
reasons for the development of youth bulges, due to the particularly high rates of mortality
in the adult population. AIDS has orphaned millions of children, and the number is
expected to increase with the deaths of increasing numbers of HIV-infected parents in the
coming decade.125

Other drivers
Significant emigration can sometimes be a driver of youth bulges. Some rare cases in
middle-transition populations experience strong emigration rates, thus influencing the
proportion of young adults in the global population. Leftover youth bulges in middle- and
late-transition populations can also linger for a number of years. However, the size of
youth bulges rapidly decreases when the young adults mature126.
3.2.3.
3.2.3.1
KEY UNCERTAINTIES
Uncertainties for population ageing
Population ageing is the megatrend with the least uncertainties, despite some
reservations, in particular those due to pandemics. The reason for the accuracy in
population ageing estimates is that all the people aged over 45 in the year 2050 have
already been born today and can therefore be counted. Even if fertility levels and therefore
the number of young people by 2050 are less certain, demographers generally agree on
the assumption that they will not experience a strong and lasting rebound anytime soon.
Also, past low fertility rates mean that the number of childbearing women has been
reduced significantly, which means that any significant impact of increasing fertility levels
will be delayed. Population growth will therefore take a long time to regain momentum, so
ageing will continue for many decades.127
The impacts of population ageing are different in developed vs. developing countries.
Population ageing is less advanced in developing countries, and the countries with high
fertility rates are expected to experience the slowest population ageing. In the future,
population ageing is expected to be increasingly common in the developing world and to
occur more rapidly than it did previously in the developed world128. Projections for the
developing world tend to show that population ageing may have more varied
consequences, inducing greater prosperity for some and greater instability and security
threats for other countries129.
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
Demographic policies
Demographic policies can reduce the speed of population ageing by slowing down fertility
declines under the right circumstances. The case of China is particularly significant in this
respect (Box 4 and Figure 10).
Box 4: The One-child policy in China
Planning policies can have a significant impact on fertility rates. This has
been the case in China since the one-child policy was introduced in 1979 to
tackle social, economic and environmental problems in the country. The
Chinese family planning policy restricts the number of children that married
urban couples can have to one. The policy is based on the use of fines that
are imposed on the family’s income. It has reduced the fertility rate from
over 3.0 in 1980 to approximately 1.8 in 2008. The impacts of this policy are
expected to show in the following decades as the large cohort of the fertile
population is currently reaching its peak (Figure 10), which is expected to
lead to a large number of births before slowing definitively.
Source of data: CIA World Factorbook, China. Available at :
www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html#People
Figure 10: Size of the Chinese population by age group, 1950-2050
Source: Hellig, G.K. (2004) IIASA130
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Multiple policy interventions, if adapted to specific country social, economic, and political
contexts, can also create some gains in fertility. However, other changes in broader social
and economic conditions, such as income, employment, and female workforce
participation, may also affect fertility levels.

Migration
Migration tends to affect population ageing, as it determines the size, rate of change and
composition of a population. Immigration is known to reduce population ageing in many
parts of the world such as Canada and Europe, since immigrants are frequently younger
and have more children. Within Europe, the effects of migration are double.
Emigration can contribute to population ageing in the source countries; i.e. in Eastern
Europe. It is believed that migration will have an increasing role in population ageing in the
future in low-fertility countries with stable or declining populations131.
Immigration on the other hand is perceived as a factor that contributes to the slowing
down of population ageing in southern and mainly in north-western countries. However,
while immigration can reduce the age of the receiving county, it cannot solve population
ageing as such. Even if the proportion of the population of foreign origin increases from 515% of the total today, to 15-30% by mid-century, it is expected that this will not prevent
population ageing132.

Other impacts
A number of uncertainties such as the impacts of wars can also contribute to the ageing of
demographic structures because it is often the younger generations that are more severely
impacted by the effects of wars.
3.2.3.2
Uncertainties for youth bulges
The concept of youth bulges is relatively new and is inextricably linked to the evolution of
demographic patterns. These demographic patterns can be modified by various factors
that are more or less difficult to predict.

Pandemics
The effect of many ongoing pandemics, such as HIV/AIDS, can be estimated, although this
also depends on the evolution of medical research. The ability to control a pandemic can
prevent the development of youth bulges.

Uncertain factors creating social unrest
Some sociologists such as Gunnar Heinsohn argue that youth bulges result from historical
periods of social unrest lacking external triggers, such as sudden, catastrophic
environmental changes, and genocides. Both of these factors highly uncertain factors
which cannot be predicted, therefore youth bulges remain a highly uncertain demographic
phenomenon.
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
Fertility levels
Finally, the extent of the change in the size of youth bulges is inextricably linked to the
trends in fertility levels (see section 3.1.3. for a discussion of the uncertainty of these).
Based on these demographic factors, the size of youth bulges is expected to decrease over
the next 20 years in many countries, with the exception of Sub-Saharan Africa and the
Middle East. The youth population is however foreseen to remain large.

Migration policies
Migration policies, either within the country of emigration or the country of immigration,
are a secondary factor which may influence youth bulges, by either encouraging or
discouraging immigration, whether for work or for educational purposes.
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4. IMPACTS
At a global level, a growing population and economic growth are the major driving forces
for the future use of natural resources and consumption patterns. The Ecological Footprint,
a measure of humanity’s demand on nature, calculates that humanity currently uses the
equivalent of 1.4 planets to provide the necessary resources and absorb human waste, and
moderate UN scenarios estimate that by 2025 the planet will need the equivalent of two
Earths to support the global demand for energy, food and water133.
Experts currently consider 21 countries with a population of about 600 million to be either
cropland or freshwater scarce. Owing to continuing population growth, 36 countries, with
about 1.4 billion people, are projected to fall into this category by 2025. Among the new
entrants will be Burundi, Colombia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Malawi, Pakistan, and Syria.134
Environmental change is expected to exacerbate resource scarcity. Scarce resources
already have triggered the trend of buying land in developing countries to secure food and
water demand in richer countries.
4.1.
4.1.1.
POTENTIAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS IN EUROPE
NATURAL RESOURCES
Population growth and decline, and international migration, have strong impacts on the
consumption of natural resources. In Europe, the reduced consumption of natural
resources brought about by population decline could both ease the stress on the
environment and improve the global quality of life. The impacts of international migration
however are double, easing the burden on areas of emigration and placing more stress on
natural resources in the receiving countries. A larger population, due to immigration, can
result in greater use of natural resources. Migration patterns for Eastern to Western
Europe may result in a shift of the burden on natural resources within Europe itself, to
countries such as the U.K, France, Spain or Scandinavian countries.
Population ageing is seen as a trend that may ultimately indirectly reduce the burdens of
growth on the environment. However, the reduced budget of Member States, which may
arise from the increased costs due to pensions and health care, may result in reduced
budgets for environmental protection.
The impacts of youth bulges are less clear, and are largely indirect as the youth bulges are
outside of Europe, in developing countries. They result in increased pressure on natural
resources in these, and the nature of the effects on Europe itself remains uncertain. A large
migration of youth bulges to Europe would of course result in increased resource
consumption.
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4.1.2.
LAND USE
A growing population, linked to changes in life styles, can have a strong direct impact on
land use owing to the increased pressure for urbanisation (see SOER Background Paper II:
Urbanisation and Consumption). In Europe however, urban and environmental planning is
actively aiming to reduce the pressures linked to urban sprawl. The conflict between
agriculture and tourism in many European countries is however leading to conflicts
between the different types of land-use, owing to an increase in the value of land because
of high touristic pressure in many attractive areas of Europe, such as the South of France.
Migration can have direct impacts on European land use and urbanisation, by leading to
intensified environmental and economic problems in receiving areas. High immigration
rates can contribute to crowding and environmental/sanitation issues in slums in some
parts of Europe. However, this issue is closely regulated in most parts of Western Europe.
Urbanisation is also considered as a driving force for regional warming because of so-called
heat islands.135 As most migrants will try to go to urban areas to find employment, this can
increase these regional warming issues.
4.1.3.
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE
Population growth and decline, combined with changing consumption patterns, are one of
the main factors influencing environmental change. On its own, Europe cannot influence
environmental change drastically at the global level, since the whole of Europe’s
population only makes up 11% of the total world population.
It is through joined actions at the global level that Europe can influence environmental
change, since the main players of tomorrow’s world are undoubtedly the growing
populations of the developing countries. Europe may be able to play a part by influencing
the consumption patterns of the cultural elites of these countries, through short-term
migration. One indirect impact of the migration of skilled workers or higher-education
students to Europe can be the exchange of ideas, skills, and consumption patterns.
4.2.
OTHER POTENTIAL INDIRECT IMPACTS IN EUROPE
4.2.1.
IMPACTS ON PEACE, CONFLICT AND SECURITY
The four demographic megatrends could have impacts on peace and security. Population
growth and its resulting increase in competition for resources that might be scarce can lead
to violent conflict. Furthermore, this conflict can also be triggered by an increased
vulnerability to disease and support for extremist movements that can be due to rapidly
growing populations. These developments are more likely to occur in developing nations
with weak institutions. The impacts of growing populations that lead to youth bulges are
discussed below.136
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Population decline, on the other hand, will have its own impacts on peace, conflict and
security. Declining populations also mean that these countries experience manpower
shortages for their armed forces. Unless these countries are able to substitute manpower
by capital in their armed forces, this can mean that their defence establishments will shrink
and that their future role in international military missions, such as peace keeping
operations, will be limited. Furthermore, increased migration as a solution to a declining
population may result in cultural and racial tensions.137
Population ageing is likely to have significant economic impacts (please see below), which
can lead to increased internal instability and conflict. 138 China might be a prime example of
this phenomenon as the problem of population ageing, which is currently primarily a
problem of developed countries, will hit China at only a developing country’s income.
Among the four megatrends discussed in this paper, youth bulges are likely to have the
most significant impact on peace, conflict and security. As discussed above, the largest
proportional youth populations will be located in the West Bank/Gaza, Pakistan,
Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Iraq139, several of them being the world’s politically
most unstable or potentially unstable countries. Some of these countries are very poor and
lack the economic resources to support the educational and employment opportunities
necessary to effectively integrate youth into society. Large populations of poorly educated
young people with limited or no employment opportunities can provide fertile grounds for
radical political and religious movements. If the current inability of many states in these
regions to adequately integrate youth populations continues it is likely to perpetuate the
cycle of political instability, ethnic wars, revolutions, and anti-government activities that
already affects many countries.140 In contrast to declining populations that might
experience shrinking military manpower, youth bulges will provide for increasing military
manpower of the above-mentioned countries. This manpower can be used for
international peacekeeping and disaster relief efforts but also for less peaceful operations.
National as well as international migration can have impacts on peace, conflict and security
for different reasons such as increased competition for local resources, increased
vulnerability to disease, increased discrimination, and support for extremist movements. 141
Upon arrival, migrants can be the cause of increased competition for already scarce
resources. According to the Stern Review, there are between 30 to 200 million people at
risk of hunger with temperature rises of 2 to 3°C – rising to 250 to 550 million people with
a 3°C warming. Furthermore, between 0.7 and 4.4 billion people could experience growing
water shortages with a temperature rise of 2°C.142 However, this depends on a number of
factors such as the available technologies, water pricing, etc. Even if resources are
plentiful, conflict might result from a struggle over their control. 143 However, whilst
environmental migration can contribute to the risk of conflict, it is unlikely to be the single
trigger. Other important factors, among others, remain political instability, poor
governance, ethnic tensions, and lack of investment in sustainable development.
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4.2.2.
ECONOMIC IMPACTS
Economic impacts of population growth and decline have been hotly debated by
researchers. According to Bloom et al. (2003) there are three distinct schools of thought in
this field. The so-called ‘pessimists’ view, which goes back to Malthus (1798), is that
population growth has a negative impact on the economy as increasing demand cannot be
met by fixed resources. This view began to be rejected by the so-called ‘population
optimists’ in the early 1980s who argued that prices of these fixed resources would actually
decline due to technological innovation. Increasing demand could therefore be met. This
was followed by the ‘neutralist school’ that states that the link between population change
and economic growth is actually weak. Bloom et al. (2003) concluded that all three schools
of thought can fall back on theoretical models and data to support their views. 144
Population decline might have positive impacts in developing countries where this trend
could translate into higher savings rates, and rising incomes and living standards. 145
However, this will largely depend on other factors such as the political environment, and
not solely on declining populations.
What might have a clearer impact on the economy is population ageing. An increasing ratio
of seniors to the working-age population means that the workforce will actually shrink. This
can have a significant impact on national GDP and be a major burden on national old-age
benefit programmes.146 Furthermore, an older workforce may be less adaptable and
mobile and be less likely to be the source of innovative ideas and actions. Rates of savings
and investments may also fall. 147 The impacts of population ageing on pension and health
care costs are set to increase the burden on public funds, as describe above in section
3.2.1.1.
As discussed above, countries with youth bulges that are least touched by population
ageing are also those that are characterised by political instability, high poverty rates and
chronic civil unrest. They are therefore less likely to benefit economically from their
increasing workforce. 148
Migration to Europe can have a positive effect on the source areas of migration. Migrants
may send transfers of money to their home countries, in some cases contributing higher
prosperity in a poor region, thus enabling access to water, sanitation, healthcare, waste
treatment or whatever. Migration can have a negative as well as a positive economic
impact. Countries might experience a so-called ‘brain drain’ due to the fact that those
people that are most likely to find work elsewhere, i.e. those that are young and well
educated, are the most likely to leave. These are, however, also the people that the
country needs most in order to adapt to the changing environment and to ensure a more
stable future. The results of a brain drain tend to be lower productivity, decreased levels of
technical skills, and a smaller tax-base.149 However, there is also a phenomenon called
‘brain gain’ (or brain circulation) when migrants return to their home country following
their time abroad. In the context of environmental migration though, this can only be the
case if this migration is of a temporary nature, as it generally used to be. Even in cases
where migrants do not return, the brain drain can be offset to a certain degree by the
benefits of remittances that migrant workers send back to their native countries. According
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to the Word Bank, these remittances significantly reduce poverty and equalise incomes.150
Figure 11 below provides an overview of remittance inflows per region for the period 20002010.
Figure 11: Remittance inflows 2000-2010
Source: The Economist (2009)151
In the receiving country, immigration might have a negative impact on the economy as
recently arrived migrants are more likely to be unemployed and have lower levels of
education than other population groups.152 However, this will depend on the immigration
laws in the country in question, on the type of immigration – whether legal or illegal – and
on the effort put into integrating migrant communities – by providing education for them,
in particular.
4.2.3.
POLITICAL AND GEOPOLITICAL CONSEQUENCES
Related to the point above is a global power shift as a result of demographic change. As
discussed above, the demographic weight of regions will change significantly over the next
decades. Whereas by 2050 it is assumed that the population of more developed countries
will decline by approximately one million people per year, that of the developing countries
is estimated to increase by 35 million people per year, 22 million of which would be
absorbed by the least developed countries.153
As a result it is estimated that by 2025, approximately 16% of the world population will live
in the most developed countries, down from 18% in 2009 and 24% in 1980.154 This shift is
paired with the economic decline of ageing populations due to decreasing workforces and
less innovation. The overall result is an economic and political power shift, and a potential
reduction in the consumption of resources, depending on the lifestyle choices made by
senior citizens. Furthermore, countries with ageing populations might become less
culturally attractive and politically relevant for younger people.155 According to Jack A.
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Goldstone, this shift will result in current institutions, such as the G-8 becoming less
powerful while the g-20 will become increasingly important. This trend will reflect the
recognition that countries such as Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico and Turkey are
becoming global economic powers.156
4.2.4.
CHANGING CONSUMPTION PATTERS
Growing population and economic growth is a major driving force for the change in
consumption patterns. Increased migration can also change the patterns. Figure 12 below
illustrates that the steady increase of the share of the world population which belongs to
middle or high income groups means that humanity will increasingly be on an
unsustainable path if consumption patterns and ecological footprint of these income
groups do not change. However, there remains significant uncertainty regarding the way
consumption patterns are changed due to demographic changes.
Figure 12: World population growth 1950-2050
Source: WBCSD (2008) Sustainable Consumption Facts and Trends
Figure 13 below presents an example of the influence of demographic change on
consumption patterns by showing the changing energy consumption per age group.
According to this example, population ageing will have a favourable impact on energy
consumption, especially the consumption of fuels and lubricants for vehicles.157
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Figure 13: Energy consumption per age group
Source: Kronenberg, Tobias (2009) The impact of demographic change on energy use and
greenhouse gas emissions in Germany. Ecological Economics158
If environmentally induced migration results in rural-urban migration, as can be expected
in many cases, this will also have environmental impacts through changes in consumption
patterns and energy use.
4.2.5.
SOCIAL VULNERABILITY AND INTEGRATION
Immigrants can experience increased vulnerability due to potential language and cultural
barriers. Migration flows add to the already existing patchwork of national minorities and
cultural groups in the receiving countries. Also some degree of spatial segregation of
migrant communities exists in most large cities, which has spatial related impacts.
Migration due to natural disasters can lead to people losing their documents, which means
that access to assistance might be particularly difficult. 159
4.2.6.
HEALTH
In the US and other developed countries the average healthcare cost for a person over 65
is estimated to be three to five times higher than for a person aged under 65. A rapid
increase in the number of over-65 year olds together with further advances in medical
technology means that the impact of population ageing on healthcare costs is expected to
be significant.160 However, the proportion of people over 65 does not increase quickly and
the increase in healthcare costs is not linked to absolute age, rather people’s health
becomes more expensive in the last years of their lives, a factor which does not change
with the ageing of population. The extent to which ageing populations have an impact on
the health care system as such will depend on the state’s involvement in that system. In
European countries, for example, where the state is heavily involved in the provision of
healthcare, the impact can be expected to be significant. In the EU-27, for example, the
average healthcare expenditure is estimated to increase from 6.7 to 8.4% of GDP.
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However, the difference between countries is significant, ranging from an estimated
increase 0.4% of GDP in Bulgaria and Latvia to 3.8% in Malta.161
Furthermore, increased migration, travel, and trade are likely to accelerate the transfer of
infectious diseases to the European Union, at a time when the number of infections
resistant to drugs is rising. Increased transport possibilities enable travellers to reach most
of the cities worldwide within 36 hours—this is less time than it is the incubation period of
many infectious diseases.162
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5. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
5.1.
POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS FOR EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY
The trends, drivers and impacts discussed above raise some key questions about the
appropriate European policy response. This section will present some of those key
questions and will reflect on the most likely responses to them.
5.1.1.
ADAPTING ENVIRONMENTAL TARGETS TO DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS
The demographic situation varies across Europe, and the types of pressures on the
environment differ accordingly. The economic implications of an ageing population might
also result in varied environmental pressures. Therefore, there is a need for further
research into the impacts of demographic change on the European environment. This
raises several significant questions:

Should demographic changes and population ageing be taken into account when
setting future environmental targets and objectives?

Can European environmental policy also take into account future migration flows
and their localised impact both on demographic trends and, subsequently, on the
European environment?

Should such policies be enacted, what would the costs to Europe be?
The success of these policies would require a thorough analysis of the impacts of various
demographic groups on environmental pressures. A quantitative and qualitative analysis of
the implications of demographic change on the environment would need to be carried out
at EU-level.
5.1.2.
HELPING DEVELOPING COUNTRIES TACKLE ENVIRONMENTALLY-INDUCED
MIGRATION
Europe’s influence on global environmental and climate change policy and the situation in
developing countries could substantially reduce the pressure to migrate from the most
vulnerable countries.

What efforts would be needed to improve the living conditions in vulnerable
countries with high emigration rates?

To what extent could Europe improve the situation in vulnerable countries, and
would this have a significant impact on reducing the pressure to migrate from
these countries?
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
Would these policy instruments, in turn, have a significant effect on the migratory
pressure at Europe’s boundaries?
To carry out this approach successfully, European policy-makers would need to devise the
solutions conjointly with the most vulnerable countries.
5.1.3.
INFLUENCING SUSTAINABLE CONSUMPTION PATTERNS IN LESS DEVELOPED
COUNTRIES
Europe is not able to reverse the worldwide trends in climate change by itself. The main
challenges lie with the populations in developing countries, who will make up the majority
of the world’s population in the coming decades. The type of consumption patterns and
employment of the social elites of these developing countries will inevitably determine the
future of the planet. Europe could play a role in influencing these elites, by encouraging
sustainable lifestyles, choosing low meat consumption diets, low footprint leisure, energy
efficient products, and limiting the quantities of household waste. Elite migrants could
then return to their home countries and perhaps transmit some of these European lifestyle
patterns.

Should Europe consider the influences that it can have on developing countries as a
way to influence global sustainable development throughout the planet?

Should Europe look into developing a short-term migratory guest worker model
now that emigration countries are more developed and the prospects to return
have improved?
Determining the appropriate policy instrument to facilitate such a migration of social and
cultural elites would require careful evaluation of the existing structures and international
agreements to identify the most effective approach. Given Europe’s advanced R&D
capacities, it could take a leading role in such a framework.
5.2.
POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS FOR OTHER EUROPEAN POLICY
AREAS
5.2.1.
SETTING DEMOGRAPHIC TARGETS
Many European countries already have policies in place that aim at increasing fertility
levels, including the provision of child care, parental leave and financial allowances for
families with children. Prominent examples of this are France and Sweden, where these
policies had some success. However, there is still no general consensus among
policymakers and demographers about which policies work best to encourage fertility
levels.163 European policymakers will have to accept economic and political power shifts
due to demographic change and become part of institutions that reflect such shifts.
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
Can policy instruments be devised to influence fertility levels at the European
level?

Which policy instruments would be the most effective to do so?
The appropriate policy instrument(s) for such an approach would necessarily require
evaluation to ensure their efficacy and legality, in line with the questions outlined above.
5.2.2.
IMMIGRATION POLICY
Institutions and concepts will need to be set up to deal with the increasing numbers of
immigrants coming to Europe. As mentioned above, the encouraged short-term migration
of skilled workers and both social and cultural elites would be necessary to maintain
Europe’s competitiveness at the international level. Countries with significant youth bulges
will need to be supported in their efforts to integrate these youths into society.

Can EU policy instruments be used to encourage the short-term migration of skilled
workers and both social and cultural elites?

What would the framework of such a short-term migratory model be; what length
of time would these highly-skilled workers be encouraged to stay in Europe for?

What would the actual impacts of this type of migratory policy on the emigration
countries be?
The success of this approach would require a careful evaluation of the impacts of this type
of policy on the economies of both the emigration and immigration countries.
5.2.3.
AID TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
The impacts of environmental change in developing and underdeveloped countries are
such that many environmental refugees may be forced to migrate to more developed
countries. Rather than legislating directly on migration, European policy-makers could
focus on increasing the capacity of those affected by environmental changes and hazards
to cope themselves164. Additionally, EU humanitarian or development aid must be brought
to those who suffer from environmental changes and hazards but do not have the means
to migrate.

Can policy instruments be developed to aid the underdeveloped and developing
countries that are suffering directly from the effects of environmental change?

Should such policies be enacted, what would the costs to Europe be?
Defining policy instruments to act on the effects of environmental change within the most
vulnerable countries would require an adequate assessment of the impacts that would
need mitigating and the efficiency of the different possible measures. European policymakers would need to devise the solutions conjointly with the most vulnerable countries.
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