European Environment Agency Contract Number 3403/B2009/EEA.53788 GENERAL SUPPORT TO THE FORWARDLOOKING ASSESSMENT COMPONENT OF THE EUROPEAN STATE OF THE ENVIRONMENT AND OUTLOOK REPORT (SOER 2010 PART A) Background Paper on Demographics and Migration Final Version June 2010 Contact BIO Intelligence Service Shailendra Mudgal Leonardo Mazza + 33 1 53 90 11 80 shailendra.mudgal@biois.com leonardo.mazza@biois.com Project Team Bio Intelligence Service Mr. Shailendra Mudgal Ms. Tanja Münchmeyer Mr. Leonardo Mazza Ms. Louise Slater Disclaimer This report contains the research conducted by the authors and is not to be perceived as the opinion of the European Environment Agency. 2 European Environment Agency General support to framing the forward-looking assessment component of the SOER 2010 Part A June 2010 Contents 0. Summary: Mega-trends Demographics and migration................................................... 5 1. Introduction ................................................................................................................ 9 1.1. What is this report about? .................................................................................................................. 9 1.2. Why is this report relevant? ................................................................................................................ 9 1.3. What is the starting point for this report ? the situation in Europe .................................................. 11 1.4. How is the report structured? ........................................................................................................... 12 2. Conceptual note on mega-trends and their analysis .................................................... 13 3. Trends, drivers and uncertainties ............................................................................... 15 3.1. Megatrend I: Population growth, decline, and international migration ........................................... 16 3.1.1. Summary ..........................................................................................................................................................16 3.1.2. Drivers ..............................................................................................................................................................28 3.1.3. Key uncertainties ..............................................................................................................................................32 3.2. Megatrend II: Population ageing and youth bulges .......................................................................... 36 3.2.1. Summary ..........................................................................................................................................................36 3.2.2. Drivers ..............................................................................................................................................................41 3.2.3. Key uncertainties ..............................................................................................................................................43 4. 4.1. Impacts ..................................................................................................................... 47 Potential environmental impacts in Europe ...................................................................................... 47 4.1.1. Natural resources .............................................................................................................................................47 4.1.2. Land use ...........................................................................................................................................................48 4.1.3. Environmental change ......................................................................................................................................48 4.2. Other potential indirect impacts in Europe ....................................................................................... 48 4.2.1. Impacts on peace, conflict and security ...........................................................................................................48 4.2.2. Economic impacts.............................................................................................................................................50 4.2.3. Political and geopolitical consequences ...........................................................................................................51 4.2.4. Changing consumption patters ........................................................................................................................52 4.2.5. Social vulnerability and integration ..................................................................................................................53 4.2.6. Health ...............................................................................................................................................................53 5. 5.1. Policy implications ..................................................................................................... 55 Possible implications for European environmental policy ................................................................ 55 5.1.1. Adapting environmental targets to demographic trends .................................................................................55 5.1.2. Helping developing countries tackle environmentally-induced migration .......................................................55 5.1.3. Influencing sustainable consumption patterns in less developed countries ....................................................56 5.2. Possible implications for other European policy areas ..................................................................... 56 5.2.1. Setting demographic targets ............................................................................................................................56 5.2.2. Immigration policy............................................................................................................................................57 5.2.3. Aid to developing countries..............................................................................................................................57 June 2010 European Environment Agency General support to framing the forward-looking assessment component of the SOER 2010 Part A 3 6. 4 References................................................................................................................. 58 European Environment Agency General support to framing the forward-looking assessment component of the SOER 2010 Part A June 2010 0. SUMMARY: MEGA-TRENDS DEMOGRAPHICS AND MIGRATION The European Environment Agency is conducting an analysis of long-term global megatrends and their environmental implications for Europe up to 2050 as part of the forthcoming European State of the Environment Outlook Report 2010. This analysis focuses on a sample of xx mega-trends across the social, technological, economic, environmental and political dimensions of global change. This background report presents the analysis for two of the xx megatrends, namely rapid global urbanisation and consumption changes. (note: we have not defined the final title for the latter megatrend yet). Mega-trends Population growth, decline, and international migration. The current world population is approximately 6.8 billion people, and the medium variant projects an increase to 9.1 billion by 2050. This development differs considerably across different regions as the population of developed countries is globally declining while in most developing countries it is increasing significantly. The phenomenon of declining populations is however expected to affect the developed world in the future, due to the reducing fertility rates. International migration will further influence this demographic change considerably over the next 50 years, as migration leads to the diversification of populations and has an impact on overall growth rates. International migration remains an important driver of population growth in developed countries, and is the most important driver in Europe. Today, relatively new factors like environmental change and environmental degradation are playing an increasing role in the migration choices made by populations. Population ageing and youth bulges. The world population is getting older at an unprecedented rate. In 2000, about 7% of the world’s population was aged over 65, and this is expected to increase to 16% by 2050. The median age of the world’s population is projected to increase from 29 to 38 years by 2050. Population ageing is expected to affect both developed and developing countries in a similar manner. Youth bulges, on the other hand, exist mostly in developing countries. Global migration may be a partial solution to both population ageing and youth bulges, since migration of younger workers could help to offset the retirement of older workers in countries with ageing populations and provide employment for the youth from developing countries. June 2010 European Environment Agency General support to framing the forward-looking assessment component of the SOER 2010 Part A 5 Key drivers Population growth, decline, and international migration. Fertility rate is one of the main drivers of a population’s growth or decline. The average “replacement level of fertility” is 2.33 children per woman. Increases or decreases in life expectancy influence both population growth or decline and population ageing. Other drivers include increasing living standards, increased use of contraceptives, education, and other social factors. International migration is one of the major factors influencing population growth and decline. For declining populations, such as in the EU, immigration is seen as one of the ways to influence demographic trends. On the contrary, massive emigration of the working population can contribute to population decline. The drivers of migration include poverty, income disparity, population growth, costs of transportation, and the legal and administrative barriers, namely immigration policies. A new type of international migration is currently emerging in the context of global warming, driven by environmental change. Environmentally-induced migration is due to the increasingly frequent and violent hazard events and the vulnerability of many developing countries that are among the most severely impacted by environmental change Population ageing and youth bulges. Population ageing is the result of two demographic forces: rising longevity and falling fertility levels. Rising longevity increases the relative number of the old, and has been especially significant in the developed world, although the trend is a global one and is still ongoing. Falling fertility levels on the other hand reduce the number of the young, and have been the main factor for ageing in the most developed countries in the past fifty years. Youth bulges are, on the contrary, dependent on high fertility levels coupled with declining mortality rates. The high prevalence of HIV/AIDS in many sub-Saharan countries is one of the reasons for the development of youth bulges, due to the mortality of the older population. Other factors such as significant emigration are potential drivers of youth bulges. Major uncertainties Population growth, decline, and international migration. The evolution of world fertility rates are one of the major uncertainties influencing population growth and decline, as small changes in fertility rates can lead to significant changes in population sizes. The changes in immigration policies also influence the growth or decline of a country’s population; however, the immigration needed to balance population decline in developed countries is substantial. Economic growth is one of the main uncertainties influencing international migration flows. The economic situation of a country affects the tendency of its people to emigrate. Conversely, the economic situation of the host country can affect the attractiveness of the country to immigrants, to such an extent that a country may transform from a net emigration to a net immigration country. Environmental change and youth bulges are two 6 European Environment Agency General support to framing the forward-looking assessment component of the SOER 2010 Part A June 2010 other uncertainties that can have a multiplicative effect on the other drivers and thus can affect international migration significantly. Population ageing and youth bulges. Population ageing is less affected by uncertainties as it is a continuation of current demographic estimates. However, ageing may be influenced by factors such as migration and the economic context, and is significantly different in developed and developing countries. Youth bulges are dependent on fertility levels and pandemics. Migration policies from both the countries of emigration and immigration may also influence youth bulges by encouraging or discouraging migration. June 2010 European Environment Agency General support to framing the forward-looking assessment component of the SOER 2010 Part A 7 This page is left intentionally blank 8 European Environment Agency General support to framing the forward-looking assessment component of the SOER 2010 Part A June 2010 1. INTRODUCTION 1.1. WHAT IS THIS REPORT ABOUT? This report presents two interrelated megatrends in the field of demographic change: (i) Population growth, decline, and international migration; (ii) Population ageing and youth bulges. By 2050, it is projected that the world population will reach over 9 billion people. Many developed nations have already stopped growing demographically, and several are expected to experience significant population declines by 2050. The trends of population growth and decline tend to show global opposing patterns, decline in developed countries and growth in developing countries. This divide is expected to become increasingly uncertain in the future as a number of developing countries begin to experience population decline. The increase in international migration, from the most fragile countries to the most stable, is expected by many to play a significant role in this demographic change. Two types of migration can be distinguished, voluntary migration for social and/or economic reasons, and involuntary or forced migration due to environmental catastrophes or global change. Migration represents one of the main factors that may contribute to lessen the disparity of these demographic trends between developed and developing countries. Population ageing and youth bulges are two contrasting trends that have become increasingly important in recent years, opposing the ageing of countries throughout the world, and in particular of developed countries, and youth bulges in developing countries. Population ageing represents an unprecedented demographic shift and one of the main factors of the declining growth rates. Youth bulges are disproportionate concentrations of people in the 15-to-29 year-old age group. Both of these trends affect growth rates, since ageing is one of the main factors of population decline and youth bulges can create significant population and thus socio-economic imbalances within a country. These two trends highlight the difficulties that are linked to the lack or excess of workers in old and young states. All these trends are already visible today and are projected to increase in significance and impacts over the next 50 years. 1.2. WHY IS THIS REPORT RELEVANT? Significant demographic changes, such as those discussed above, have far-reaching consequences in many areas. This is highlighted by the changes in population pyramids, which reveal the size and age composition of each country. June 2010 European Environment Agency General support to framing the forward-looking assessment component of the SOER 2010 Part A 9 Figure 1 displays projected populations for various countries until 2030, using the same scale. Males are shown on the left and females on the right, with each bar representing a four-year age group, from the youngest at the bottom to the oldest at the top. Pyramids expanding at the base reveal a rapid rate of population growth and a youth bulge. This is the case in fast-growing countries such as India or Nigeria. Constricting pyramids are more frequent in developed and some emerging countries such as China or Brazil. They exhibit an ‘inverted’ pattern due to declines in the numbers of youth relative to the retired, which lead to the phenomenon of ageing populations. Figure 1: Population pyramids until 2030 for selected countries around the world Source: United States Joint Forces Command 2010 Joint Operating Environment Report1 A growing, and richer, world population is expected to influence global demographic patterns. The growth of middle income groups, mainly in developing countries, will influence international consumption patterns throughout the world, through increased pressure on the environment and natural resources. Changes in the population pyramid also affect the working-age population. Decreases in the working-age population are expected to bring about stresses on pension and social insurance systems. Population ageing may also necessitate improved health care systems. The increase in international migration is expected to have impacts on peace, conflict and security due to increased competition for resources; geopolitical impacts due to changes in global power balances; and many more. 10 European Environment Agency General support to framing the forward-looking assessment component of the SOER 2010 Part A June 2010 Based on these potential impacts, the paper aims to show that the two demographic megatrends, namely population growth and decline and changes in the population pyramid will need to be taken into account in future policy-making processes, in both environmental and other policy areas. 1.3. WHAT IS THE STARTING POINT FOR THIS REPORT? THE SITUATION IN EUROPE The population of the EU-27 is expected to grow by over 26 million inhabitants, from 495 million in 2008 to 521 million in 2035, before decreasing to reach 506 million in 2060, representing a loss of 15 million inhabitants over 25 years. Over the entire forecasted period, between 2008 and 2060, the overall growth of the EU-27 is expected to attain 2.1%, with a significant slowing down at the turn of the century. There are, however significant differences within Europe, since population decline is expected to occur mostly in the new Member States.2 Many developed countries are characterised by population decline. In Europe, declining populations were first experienced in the 1980s, in countries such as Hungary and Bulgaria. In the 1990s, they were followed by further Eastern-European countries, such as Poland, as well as Russia, Germany, and Japan.3 The relative decline of the European population is equally important. Whereas in 1950 Europe and Russia comprised 22% of the global population, that share is now of 13 percent.4 In the European Union, the fertility rate5 is currently around 1.5 children per woman, with the difference that it is slightly higher in the EU-10 (1.6) than in the EU-15 (1.3)6. The highest fertility levels are currently observed in France and Ireland (1.9), while Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and Lithuania have the lowest rates (1.3). Migrant groups often have higher fertility rates than the original population but as they only represent a small percentage of the overall population their fertility rates do not tend to have a significant impact.7 As of 2006, of the different world regions, only Russia had a lower fertility rate (1.34) than the EU (1.5). Africa had the highest fertility rate (5), followed by Latin America and the Caribbean (2.5), Asia (2.4) and the US and Canada (2).8 However, the wealthiest countries in Asia, Japan and the Republic of Korea, had lower fertility still, at 1.3 and 1.22 children per woman. According to the United Nations Ageing Index, eight of the EU Member States are among the ten most aged countries in the world today.9 Even if fertility rates in the developed world increase rapidly as of today, they may not reverse the ageing trends for decades. For example, if the fertility rate increased to replacement level in Western Europe (2.1), the ratio of seniors to working-age people would continue to rise through the late 2030s.10 The highest levels of ageing in European societies are expected to be reached in 30-40 years.11 Migration flows tend to diversify the existing population in terms of national minorities and cultural groups. Since the migrant population is defined as those who are born abroad and/or the population with foreign citizenship, this does not include the second generation June 2010 European Environment Agency General support to framing the forward-looking assessment component of the SOER 2010 Part A 11 of migrants that might well belong to a national minority even though it was not foreignborn. 12 It is estimated that currently at least 175 nationalities are living in the EU. On average 5% of the population of the EU has foreign (non-EU) citizenship, while some 7% is foreign born.13 Within the European Union, the picture varies significantly. The new Member States have relatively few inhabitants with foreign citizenship (less than 3 percent), while most of the old Member States have above average foreign citizenship, with up to 9% in Germany and Austria.14 1.4. HOW IS THE REPORT STRUCTURED? The report is structured as follows: Chapter 3 provides a conceptual note on megatrends as well as uncertainties surrounding these trends. This is followed by a discussion about each megatrend, its trends, drivers and key uncertainties in Chapter 4. The discussion is introduced by an overview of each megatrend and its drivers in the form of a table structured according to the STEEP (Social, technological, environmental, economic and political) framework. Chapter 5 then presents potential impacts of these megatrends, focusing on environmental impacts and other potential impacts as well. Finally, potential implications for European environmental and other policy areas are discussed in Chapter 6. 12 European Environment Agency General support to framing the forward-looking assessment component of the SOER 2010 Part A June 2010 2. CONCEPTUAL NOTE ON MEGA-TRENDS AND THEIR ANALYSIS To be provided by the EEA Definition and types of uncertainties (example from latest EEA discussion in Strategic forum) Strategic Development Forum - Group ”Knowledge” Knowledge” Further clarification of Key Terms Situation State and dates of knowledge Examples of action Risk ‘Known ’ impacts; ‘known ’ probabilities e.g. asbestos Prevention: action taken to reduce known hazards e.g. eliminate exposure to asbestos dust U ncertainty ‘Known ’ impacts; ‘unknown ’ probabilities e.g. antibiotics in animal feed and associated human resistance to those antibiotics ‘Unknown’ impacts and therefore ‘unknown’ probabilities eg the ‘surprises’ of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), pre 1974. Precautionary prevention: action taken to reduce exposure to potential hazards Ignorance Precaution: action taken to anticipate, identify and reduce the impact of ‘surprises’ Source: ‘Late Lessons’, page 192 . June 2010 European Environment Agency General support to framing the forward-looking assessment component of the SOER 2010 Part A 13 This page is left intentionally blank 14 European Environment Agency General support to framing the forward-looking assessment component of the SOER 2010 Part A June 2010 3. TRENDS, DRIVERS AND UNCERTAINTIES Changing demographics are influenced by a large array of driving forces. An overview of the main and direct driving forces for both megatrends is provided in Table 1 below. To reflect the types of drivers, the table is structured according to the STEEP (Social, Technological, Environmental, Economic or Political) framework. Please note that some driving forces will fall into more than one category, in which case it will be allocated to the category that is the most important in this context. The main drivers of each megatrend are discussed in more detail in the respective megatrend chapter below. Migration policies and demographic trends, namely fertility rates, appear to be common uncertainties for both of these megatrends. Table 1: Main factors influencing the two demographic megatrends Social Population growth and decline, including Changes in the demographic pyramid: international migration Population ageing & Youth bulges - Fertility levels - Fertility levels - Longevity - Longevity - Improved healthcare - Improved healthcare - Education (esp. Women) - Declining infant mortality influence youth bulges For migration: - High HIV prevalence / AIDS is a major cause - Religious factors of premature adult deaths TEEP categories of drivers - Family links Technolo - Availability of effective contraceptives -gical - Diffusion of information on contraceptives - Advances in biotechnology increase longevity For migration: - Better medical supply increases longevity - Better information about migration - Better medical supply decreases infant mortality possibilities - Access to more international transport - Little access and/or information about contraception Economic - Increasing living standards and healthcare - For migration, insufficient economic opportunities in home country - Increasing living standards and healthcare for population ageing - Low living standards for youth bulges Environ- Environmental factors are only indirect drivers of Environmental factors are only indirect drivers mental population growth and decline. However, the of changes in population ageing, and are not following factors do influence migration: among the main drivers of youth bulges - Climate change - Environmental degradation - Disproportionate population growth in vulnerable regions June 2010 European Environment Agency General support to framing the forward-looking assessment component of the SOER 2010 Part A 15 Political Political factors are only indirect drivers of Political factors are only indirect drivers of this population growth and decline. However, the megatrend instability of the political system of home country is a factor of migration. 3.1. MEGATREND I: POPULATION GROWTH, DECLINE, AND INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION Today the world population is still growing albeit much slower than in the past. This development differs significantly according to regions. In large parts of the developed world populations are already in decline or are expected to begin declining soon. In contrast, many developing nations are characterised by continuingly increasing populations. However, population decline is estimated to reach most of the developing world in the future, although some developing countries are showing increases in growth, as improvements in health are reducing mortality faster than education or urbanisation are reducing fertility (e.g. Ethiopia). 3.1.1. SUMMARY Various studies, such as the 2007 update of probabilistic world population projections by the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), highlight the growing divergence in population trends. On the one hand, in some areas, namely Eastern Europe, population has started to decline; whereas in other parts of the world, populations are likely to triple over the course of this century15. The decline of the more developed countries by approximately one million people per year contrasts with the increase of the population of the developing countries by 35 million people per year, 22 million of which would be in the least developed countries16. 3.1.1.1 Population growth and decline Overview of world population growth and decline By 1960, the world population had reached 3 billion. Since then it has increased by another 1 billion every 12-14 years, leading to a more-than doubling of the global population over the past fifty years. Today, the global population is approximately 6.8 billion people growing by approximately 1.1% annually.17 This means that at the current growth rate, it takes 61 years for the global population to double in size. One of the most commonly cited projections of the UN states that by 2025 the world population will have reached 8 billion people and by 2050 9.1 billion, and that it will still be increasing by 31 million people per year at that point.18 However, it needs to be noted that this figure is only the medium variant, since which the UN’s estimates range from 7.8 billion to 11.9 billion people by 2050.19 The medium variant is defined by certain assumptions about future fertility trends in developed and developing countries, and is not in any way a ‘mean’ growth estimate. In this medium variant of 9.1 billion people by 2050, it is important to note that although the 16 European Environment Agency General support to framing the forward-looking assessment component of the SOER 2010 Part A June 2010 world population would still be growing, the rate of growth will no longer be rapid, and is estimated to fall by 70%. By 2045-2050, the estimated growth rate of global population will have fallen to 0.34% per year, less than one-third the current rate of growth, which was 1.18% per year in the 2005-2010 period.20 Development differs significantly throughout the world. While the population of the more developed countries is estimated to decline by approximately one million people per year until 2050, that of the developing countries is foreseen to increase by 35 million people per year, 22 million of which would be absorbed by the least developed countries.21 Population growth of developing countries It is projected that Asia and Africa will account for most of the population growth while only 3% of the growth will occur in the most developed countries (i.e. Europe, Japan, United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand). As a result, it is estimated that by 2025, only 16% of the world population will live in the most developed countries, down from 18% in 2009 and 24% in 1980.22 During the period 2005-2050, nine countries are expected to account for half of the world’s population growth, namely India, China, Pakistan, Nigeria, United States, Ethiopia, Democratic Republic of Congo, United Republic of Tanzania, and Bangladesh, listed according to the size of their contribution to population growth during that period.23 India is estimated to represent one-fifth of all growth alone, reaching a population of 1.43 billion people by 2025. Within the same period, China is foreseen to increase its current population of 1.35 billion people by another 100 million. The countries of Sub-Saharan Africa together are projected to see their combined populations increase by 350 million and those of Latin America and the Caribbean by approximately 100 million.24 This trend is also underlined by Table 2, and Table 3, below, which show projected demographic changes per world region by 2050. Following Africa, the second most quickly growing region until 2050 is estimated to be Latin America and the Caribbean, followed by the US and Canada and Asia.25 Table 2: Regional demographic changes, 2005-2050 Latin US and Europe Russia America and Canada Caribbean Asia Africa Population 2007 591 142 335 569 4010 944 (in millions) 2050* 542 112 438 783 5217 1937 Population change, in percent 2007 -8.3 -21.1 +30.7 +37.6 +30.1 +105.2 Average age 2005 38.9 37.3 36.3 26 27.6 19 2050* 47.3 43.5 41.5 39.9 39.9 27.4 2006 1.5 1.34 2 2.5 2.4 5 Fertility rate June 2010 2050 European Environment Agency General support to framing the forward-looking assessment component of the SOER 2010 Part A 17 Under-15-yearolds, in percent Over-65-year-olds, in percent Life expectancy Latin America and Caribbean Asia Africa Europe Russia US and Canada 2007 16 15 20 30 28 41 2050* 15 17 17 18 18 29 2007 16 14 12 6 6 3 2050* 28 24 22 19 18 7 2006 76 65.5 78.5 73.3 68 53 2050* 82 72.9 82.7 79.5 77.2 65.4 Source: Adapted from Berlin Institute (2008) Europe’s Demographic Future26 Table 3: Population change, 2000-2050 (millions) Source: Development Research Centre on Migration (2008): Globalisation and Poverty, Demographics and Climate Change: Future Trends And their Policy Implications for Migration 27 Population decline in Europe and the developed world In contrast to population growth in developing countries, the developed world will be increasingly characterised by low birth rates and populations that decline steadily. The fact that this decline is not due to disease, starvation or violence makes it an unprecedented megatrend.28/29 Error! Reference source not found. below shows countries whose populations are already in decline or that are projected to start declining between today and 2050. 18 European Environment Agency General support to framing the forward-looking assessment component of the SOER 2010 Part A June 2010 Table 4: Countries projected to have declining populations, by period of the decline’s onset Source: Center for Strategic and International Studies (2008) The Graying of the Great Powers: Demography and Geopolitics in the 21st Century.30 While Europe’s population as a whole still grew in the first decade of this century (even though many European countries have been in decline since the 1980s and 1990s), it only did so at a rate of 0.4% per year and is expected to start declining by 2010. By 2050 it is projected to have declined by 8.3%.31 Russia is currently experiencing significant population decline (Box 1), since the population size is estimated to fall by 21.1% within the same period.32 This means that while in 1950 Europe and Russia comprised 22% of the global population, that share is now at 13% and will decrease to 7.5% by 2050. Direct impacts of population decline in the EU and countries in the developed world are diverse. Many industrial economies are based on debt and retirement transfer payments that rely on a growing population base. A declining population however results in fewer taxpayers, which could lead to a decline in the standard of living. The younger population experience an increased pressure to support the older population. On the other hand, the quality of life may increase with population decline, due to the reduction of pressure on natural resources, infrastructure, and other services. Other effects of population decline include shortages in labour. This is also an effect of population ageing, which in Europe is closely linked to population decline. June 2010 European Environment Agency General support to framing the forward-looking assessment component of the SOER 2010 Part A 19 Box 1: Population decline in Russia Russia’s population decline had already begun in the mid-1990s but the country’s fertility rate reached its low in 1999 at 1.17 births per woman. This rate recovered slightly by 2005 when it reached 1.3. However, it remains well below the replacement level. According to the UN, this decline could result in a decrease from the current 142 million people to between 136 and 121 million people in 2025 and 100 million people by 2050. Life expectancy in Russia has been decreasing since the 1960s. In 2007, Russia ranked 164 out of 226 countries in terms of life expectancy. Experts explain only part of this trend by the difficult economic conditions following the country’s transition to capitalism. Other social and medical factors account for the decrease in life expectancy. The Russian government has taken action to reverse this population decline by offering families a one-off payment if they have a second child. This has led to an increase of 130,000 births from 2006 to 2007. Sources: World Affairs (2009) Drunken Nation: Russia’s Depopulation Bomb. Available at: www.worldaffairsjournal.org/articles/2009-Spring/full-Eberstadt.html BBC (2009) Halting Russia’s population collapse. Available at: news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/7971719.stm Population decline in the developing world In the future, the phenomenon of declining populations will no longer be restricted to the developed world. In most developing countries, fertility is falling (see Error! Reference source not found.). However, only a small number of developing nations will start to show a decline by 2050, including Azerbaijan, Thailand, and Kazakhstan.33 In 2004, the overall fertility level in Asia and Latin America was of 2.6 children per woman, which was only half of the level in 1970. The high fertility levels in these regions in the past led to large numbers of women remaining in childbearing age now. However, the slowing fertility levels will now translate into lower numbers of women of childbearing age in the future, resulting in rapidly declining population growth. China’s population is expected to grow from 1.31 billion in 2005 to 1.46 billion in 2030, and is the first developing country estimated to begin a population decline after 2030, reaching 1.41 billion in 205034. It is expected that the population will begin to suffer from its low growth rates, and from the gender imbalance, with census data from 2000 revealing that 119 boys were born for every 100 girls35. 20 European Environment Agency General support to framing the forward-looking assessment component of the SOER 2010 Part A June 2010 The picture is slightly different for Africa, where the fertility levels have also dropped but nevertheless remain above the average of any other region.36 It should, however, be noted that differences within these regions can be significant. Some countries in areas with projected population increases, such as Brazil, Costa Rica, South Korea, Thailand and Kazakhstan also show fertility levels of near or below 2.37 Please see section 2. on population ageing for further information about future population declines in the developing world. 3.1.1.2 International migration Overview of international migration Migration is expected to play an important role in demographic change over the next 50 years as it leads to more diverse population and has an impact on demographic growth rates.38 International migration is a global megatrend with approximately 3% of the world’s population living outside of the country of their birth. This includes both voluntary migration due to economic reasons and involuntary or forced migration due to political, religious, or environmentally-induced reasons (see Table 1). Environmentally induced migration is expected to increase significantly in the future. Migration in the post-World War II period was characterised by the liberalisation of trade in goods and movements of capital. Since the 1960s, migration patterns have been marked by an increase in the share of migrants from developing countries. The divergence in incomes in different regions of the world contributes significantly to the explanation of movement patterns. In Europe, this is due to the increase in migration flows from Eastern European countries that were classed as developing according to their Human Development Index39. The second half of the 20th century saw a shift in destination places, since the share in developed countries grew from 5% to more than 12%, and the share of the Gulf cooperation council countries grew from 5% to 39% of the population. Global migration has increased significantly in the near past with 75 million people living outside their own country of birth in 1960 and 191 million in 2005, which corresponds to a rise from approximately 2.5% of world population to 3%.40 If the percentage of international migrants stays at 2005 levels or continues to increase at the same rate as in the last decades of the 20th century, the total number of international migrants is expected to reach between 235 and 415 million by 2050 with a median estimate of 275. This is an increase of 40% compared to the total number of international migrants today.41 However, it has to be noted that international migration remains difficult to monitor. According to the UN World Population Prospects, 74 countries were net receivers of migrants over the period 2000-2005. In 64 of these countries, the net migration reinforced population growth and in seven countries (Austria, Croatia, Germany, Greece, Italy, and Slovenia) it reversed the trend of population decline. In three countries, migration slowed down population decline, namely in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Russia.42 June 2010 European Environment Agency General support to framing the forward-looking assessment component of the SOER 2010 Part A 21 UN predictions estimate that if more was invested today in sustainable development in the source regions, environmentally induced migration could be significantly reduced. However, the projections can only partially support such analyses, since many other factors affect international migration. Illegal migrations are possible causes of social distress and may equally cause further socio-economical and environmental impacts. Effects of international migration on Europe Between 1960 and 2010, the total number of migrants in Europe grew from 14.5% to 49.6% of the total population, with a share of world migrants rising from 19.6% to 26.4%. Europe only comprises 9.7% of world population in 201043. The table below gives an overview of the total number of immigrants living in each region of destination in the world in 2005. It shows that Europe has the largest percentage of foreigners living within each region. This includes European migrants, e.g. British living in France, Poles living in Italy, or Germans living in Austria or Greece. Thus one reason that ‘Europe’ has the most immigrants is that it is composed of many small countries. People who move similar distances within the US, or within India or China, are not counted as ‘migrants’ in Table 5.44 Table 6: Estimated number of migrants living in various regions in 2005 Geographic region Number of As a percentage of migrants (million) total migrants in the world As a percentage of total regional population Europe 64 34 9 Asia 53 28 <2 North America 44 23 13 Africa 17 9 <2 Latin America and Caribbean 7 3.5 <2 Oceania 5 2.5 15 Source: United Nations University - Institute for Environment and Human Security (2007) Control, Adapt or Flee: How to Face Environmental Migration. International migration remains the most important driver of European population growth. More than one million immigrants come to Europe annually, many from North Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia. The foreign born population in Europe is estimated to account for 35 million or 14% of the total population.45 However, when looking at the working-age population in Western Europe, the annual net immigration would have to double or triple in order to ensure that it does not decrease. The National Intelligence Council Global Trends report estimates that by 2025, non-European minority populations could reach 15% in nearly all Western European countries. These migrants will have a substantially younger age structure than the native population because of youth bulges in the migrants’ home 22 European Environment Agency General support to framing the forward-looking assessment component of the SOER 2010 Part A June 2010 countries (see Section 3.2.1.2 for further details on youth bulges).46 Forecasts on migration flows are much less accurate than those on natural population changes, however. There is no global estimate for the number of professional, technical and kindred or related (PTK) i.e. skilled workers. Many developed countries are currently implementing policies aimed at facilitating the recruitment of highly skilled workers, since they are seen as economic resources in the context of ageing economies. Migration flows to developing countries While Europe has been the prime destination for immigrants from developing countries, migration flows to other developing countries have grown rapidly in recent years. China, Southern India as well as possibly Turkey and Iran could attract more labour migrants as their working-age population slows whereas wages rise. Labour migration into the United States is projected to decrease as Mexico’s industrial base develops further and its population ages. Furthermore, Brazil and certain areas of South America are expected to attract labour migrants who would traditionally have gone to the United States.47 For the period 2005-2050, the UN estimations project that the major net receivers of international migrants will be the United States (1.1 million annually), Canada (214,000), the United Kingdom (174,000), Spain (170,000), Italy (159,000), Germany (110,000), Australia (100,000) and France (100,000). The major countries of net emigration are projected to be Mexico (-334,000), China (-309,000), India (-253,000), the Philippines (-175,000), Pakistan (161,000), Indonesia (-156,000) and Bangladesh (-148,000)48. The numbers of international migrants are however relatively variable and difficult to estimate. Environmentally induced migration Although economic and political factors remain dominant in the decision to migrate, environmental change is becoming increasingly important in the context of climate change and global warming. The concept of environmental refugees was introduced by Lester Brown of the Worldwatch Institute in the 1970s. Following a United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) policy paper published in 1985 and called ‘Environmental Refugees’49, the term entered into common use and is generally defined as people that are displaced because of environmental change in their home. As early as 1990, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) stated that the gravest effects of climate change may be those of human migration.50 Another important step in the discussion about environmental migration was the Stern Review which stated that “Greater resource scarcity, desertification, risk of droughts and floods, and rising sea levels could drive many million people to migrate – a last-resort adaptation for individuals, but one that could be very costly to them and the world.”51 The exact number of environmentally induced migrants is very difficult to estimate (see Error! Reference source not found.). This is due to the difficulty in disentangling the interlinkages between the multiple causes for environmental migration, and because most environmentally induced migration takes place not across international borders but within countries. The numbers of environmentally induced migrants depend on the extent of worldwide environmental change, and on which of the scenarios for the advance of climate June 2010 European Environment Agency General support to framing the forward-looking assessment component of the SOER 2010 Part A 23 change presented by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) will prove to be most accurate.52 Box 2: Environmentally induced migrants The term ‘refugee’ is legally defined by the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. This definition does not include those forced to migrate because of environmental change. The concept of ‘environmental refugee’ remains poorly defined, although It is widely recognised that environmentally induced migration occurs due to slow changes related in part to climate change, including sea level rise and desertification, disasters such as earthquakes and floods, industrial or contaminating events, and related to violent conflict. Environmentally induced migrants can be found throughout the world but are particularly concentrated in the global South. Reaching a commonly agreed definition of an environmental refugee is complicated by the fact that in most cases, economic, political, and social factors all play an important role in a person’s decision to migrate. The current recognised working definition of someone displaced because of environmental change, as defined by the International Organisation of Migration (IOM), is one that does not have the legal definition of ‘climate refugee’ but that reflects the same idea: ‘Environmentally induced migrant’. Further, it is difficult to forecast the number of environmentally induced migrants over any period of time because environmental changes are in themselves difficult to predict. For cases of gradual environmental degradation in particular, political, social, and economic factors play a major role in the choices made by migrants. The number largely depends on the extent of future environmental degradation as well as on the planning and resources that are at a government’s disposal to adapt to and mitigate the results of environmental change. Estimates of the number of environmentally induced migrants and its future development are therefore divergent. In 2005, the United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that as of that date there were 24 million people affected, likely increasing to 50 million by 2010. By 2050, Christian Aid predicts that this number could increase to 647 million people. Figure 2 below presents the main hotspots of environmental change as well as the resulting migration trajectories. According to this figure, Europe is to expect its main influx from environmentally induced migrants from Africa. The UN highlights that out of the 28 countries that are in danger of suffering from climate change, 22 are located in Africa.53 24 European Environment Agency General support to framing the forward-looking assessment component of the SOER 2010 Part A June 2010 Figure 2: Environmental change and migration: Hotspots and trajectories Source: Warner, K. (2008), EFMSV Germanwatch Session Threatened by a changing environment, people face various options, depending on the type and speed of environmental change. In cases where certain regions, but not necessarily the entire country, are affected by the changing environment, the government might opt for resettlement programmes in unaffected areas. In Mozambique, for example, periodic flooding increased significantly in its severity as well as frequency, and a resettlement programme was established to higher areas nearby. However, these areas are affected by droughts, which mean that people have to commute to their former home area to sustain their livelihoods. Life has therefore become much more difficult for people, and although they might have never considered leaving the country before, they might begin to do so now54. The type of environmental damage can determine not only the speed of migration (whether it is sudden or gradual) but also its period (whether it is temporary or permanent). Table 6 below provides an overview of environmental factors and the type of migration they trigger. Of the different types of environmental change, gradual environmental change is expected to be the most important cause of migration. The report on Environmental Change and Forced Migration Scenarios (EACH-FOR) argues that longer term or permanent migration, in contrast to seasonal or temporary migration, is becoming increasingly common, and in particular among younger generations. June 2010 European Environment Agency General support to framing the forward-looking assessment component of the SOER 2010 Part A 25 Table 6: Environmental change and resulting migration Environmental Factor Type of migration Example Natural disasters Sudden, large-scale movements. Return may never be feasible. Hurricane Katrina, which hit the United States in August 2005, caused the displacement of about 1.5 million people. It is estimated that some 300,000 may never return, although they may be replaced. Gradual environmental degradation Gradual movement. Return may never be feasible. Desertification plays a major role in the migration of 10 million people in Africa over the last two decades. Other examples are soil and coastal erosion. Papua New Guinea’s Carteret Islands have been the first low-lying islands to evacuate their population due to environmental change. The Carterets are among the hardest hit islands in the Pacific and may be completely submerged by as early as 2015. Early and intermediate stages of environmental degradation Temporary migration By the early 1990s, rural migration had become a structural phenomenon in Tambacounda, an area of Senegal affected by soil erosion: 90% of the region’s men between the age of 30 and 60 had migrated at least once in their lifetime. This loss of working-age men posed challenges for efforts to rehabilitate degraded lands and increased the economic burden on the remaining women and children. Severe or irreversible environmental degradation Permanent migration The Sertão region in the northeast of Brazil is repeatedly struck by drought periods that affect nearly all agricultural activities; in particular the work of peasants, and small and medium size producers. Between 1970 and 2005, some 60 million people migrated from rural to urban areas within Brazil, most from the Sertão region. Source: Adapted from International Organisation for Migration Online (2009) Migration, Climate Change and the Environment 55 Risks are unequally distributed for specific groups of people: the most vulnerable groups to multiple pressures, including environmental change, are the poor, indigenous populations, women and children56. The majority of the environmentally induced migrants are the 26 European Environment Agency General support to framing the forward-looking assessment component of the SOER 2010 Part A June 2010 extreme poor whose lack of resources means that they often only move within borders and only short distances from home. This highlights the fact that in many cases environmentally induced migrants actually migrate nationally and not internationally. However, a clear distinction will in many cases be difficult as environmentally induced migrants generally first move within the country, e.g. as part of a resettlement programme, and only decide to migrate internationally if the national move has not improved their living conditions. In these cases it is likely to be difficult to trace their migration back to environmental change.57 However, even as a first measure, internal migration (i.e. within national boundaries) is not always a possible way to adapt to environmental change. According to the UN, eleven countries have more than 10% of their land within five metres of mean sea level and a similar number have all of their territory below five metres. Bangladesh is one of the most vulnerable countries with 60% of its land less than 5 metres above sea level. At the same time, Bangladesh’s population is estimated to increase by another 100 million people within the next 60 years in addition to the 165 million people today.58 Furthermore, a one metre sea level rise is estimated to threaten the existence of 40 sovereign states globally. In these cases, the inhabitants of the state in question would have to be resettled to another country altogether, which brings about important questions of costs, responsibility, and security (ETH, 2009). An example of this is the government of Tuvalu that has already begun to negotiate migration rights to New Zealand in the event of serious climate change-related impacts.59 Countries such as Bangladesh are asking their development partners to help accommodate environmental migrants. The countries that are considered responsible for climate change are being asked, for the first time, to take responsibility for the people that have to migrate as a result of it. An estimated 20 million Bangladeshis might be displaced by 2050, in a country that is already among the most densely populated in the world. Developed countries could either provide financial support to relocate environmental refugees in their own countries or could accept them as refugees.60 However, although migrating might be the only immediate strategy to cope with floods, riverbank erosion, cyclones, etc., not everybody is satisfied with this option, since there is no guarantee of employment or housing in the place of destination, and many people would rather stay where their ancestors originate from61. Developed countries therefore need to both support sustainable development in countries affected by environmental change and act on the causes. Countries that have a low capacity to adapt to environmental change, as well as countries with particularly susceptible geographies, such as small island states, are the most vulnerable to the effect of environmental degradation and climate change. Over 97% of all casualties due to climate change related disasters occur in developing countries.62 Deltaic land in the Indian Sundarban region, for example, is regularly flooded due to fast sea level rise and storms, which threaten the lives of thousands. The Indian government therefore is considering evacuating 70,000 people in the next five years.63 June 2010 European Environment Agency General support to framing the forward-looking assessment component of the SOER 2010 Part A 27 3.1.2. 3.1.2.1 DRIVERS Main drivers of population growth and decline The principal drivers of population growth and decline are the fertility levels, coupled with increased longevity. Improved living standards, healthcare, and education are closely linked to these drivers. Fertility levels A country’s total fertility rate is the number of children that women of childbearing age will have over their lifetime. The global average ‘replacement level of fertility’ at which a country’s population stabilises is 2.33. This figure is higher than 2.0, at which two parents would reproduce two children, because mortality before the childbearing years has to be taken into account. This also explains why the replacement level of fertility depends on the country: child mortality is higher in poorer countries and the replacement level of fertility can therefore go up to 3.0 and above, whereas in rich countries it is of 2.1.64 Fertility itself is driven by many factors, among which living standards, education levels, the availability of contraceptives, increased access to medical treatment, female social standing and other social factors. Figure 3 below shows the development of the total fertility rates by regions of the world, over the period 1950-205065. The graph shows the discrepancy between the fertility rates of the more developed regions, which are predicted to increase slightly and stabilise in the next 10-15 years, and those of less developed regions of the world, namely Africa, which are expected to undergo a sharp decline. Although the current world fertility rate is still above the global replacement level, this is expected to change by 2020, as the global fertility rate is foreseen to fall below the global replacement level of fertility.66 Figure 3: Total Fertility Rates by regions of the world, 1950-2050 28 European Environment Agency General support to framing the forward-looking assessment component of the SOER 2010 Part A June 2010 Source: UN (2008) World Population Prospects - The 2008 Revision: Highlights.67 The global fall in fertility rates does not, however, mean that the global population will start shrinking in 2020. Countries in which the earlier generations were characterised by high fertility rates will have in large numbers of women of childbearing age. More children will be born even if each mother has fewer children, leading to more but smaller families. In the developed world, fertility levels were already low in the 1950s, a trend that was only interrupted by baby booms that remained temporary. By the late 1990s, the overall fertility level in the developed world was 1.6 births per woman; therefore well below the replacement level.68 In the EU the fertility rate is even lower and stands currently around 1.5, with the differentiation that it is slightly higher in the old Member States (1.6) than in the new Member States (1.3). The highest fertility levels are currently observed in France and Ireland (1.9), while Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and Lithuania have the lowest rates (1.3).69 In many developing countries, fertility levels have been shrinking rapidly over the past decades. Between the 1960s and 2000-2005, for example, the overall fertility level of the developing world decreased by approximately 50%, from 6 births per woman to 2.9 births. The most significant declines were experienced in Asia, North Africa and Latin America, which is linked to strong social and economic development at the same time. 70 Differences have become more significant with some countries, such as China, Hong Kong, Singapore and South Korea, which reached replacement fertility levels very quickly, while others saw less significant or much slower change in overall fertility levels.71 In the 1990s, the decline in fertility levels was less significant and a number of countries, such as Bangladesh and Egypt, even experienced stalling fertility levels. In Sub-Saharan Africa the decline of fertility levels slowed significantly after 1990.72 This slowdown in fertility decline explains the significant increase in population figures that are estimated for Sub-Saharan countries by 2050 as discussed above. Research shows that there is a strong relation between fertility levels and economic development. With increasing levels of economic development and improved infrastructures, fewer children are needed to support parents when they get older. It has been shown that fertility starts to drop at an annual income of 1000 – 2000 dollars per person and falls until it hits the replacement level at an income of 4000 – 10 000 dollars per person per year, which generally corresponds to a middle-income status. After this point, fertility continues at, or below, the replacement level, and increases again for some.73 Figure 4 below shows the relation between fertility levels and economic development as of 2007: June 2010 European Environment Agency General support to framing the forward-looking assessment component of the SOER 2010 Part A 29 Figure 4: Fertility level vs. GDP, 2007 Source: The Economist, October 29th, 200974 This applies the other way around also, since fertility rates have an impact on the economic standing of a family. An example of this is Indonesia’s Family Life Survey that showed that, on average, each birth reduced by a fifth the likelihood that a woman would have a job— lowering household income and pushing some families into poverty. Smaller families were therefore more likely to make it to middle-class status.75 Increased longevity Increased longevity is brought about by improved health care and slow population growth due to reductions in fertility levels. This leads to dramatic changes in the population structure. The accelerated increase in life expectancy in the 20th century led to a rise in the world population growth rate, reaching a peak at 2% per year in 1965-70. This speed has decelerated since then as a result of the decline in fertility levels in the developing world. In the period 2005-2010 the world population growth rate reached 1.18% per year and is expected to decrease to 0.34% by 2045-2050. Increases in life expectancy also lead to population ageing. In developed regions, the population aged 60 or over is estimated to be increasing at 2% annually and by more than 3% in the developing world. Increased longevity can also lead to short-term increases in population sizes. Please see section 3.2.2. for a discussion of increases in life duration. Other drivers Other important drivers of growing and declining populations include increased access to medical treatment, education, female social standing, and other social factors. However, although important, they all affect either fertility levels or longevity and can therefore be considered as indirect drivers of growing and declining populations. 30 European Environment Agency General support to framing the forward-looking assessment component of the SOER 2010 Part A June 2010 3.1.2.2 Main drivers of international migration The drivers of international migration can be divided into ‘push’ (repulsive) and ‘pull’ (attractive) factors. The discrepancy in living conditions between two different states is one of the main drivers of international migration, acting both as a push and as a pull factor. Population growth rates, policies, legal and administrative barriers, are all factors that influence international migration. The focus of this report is more specifically on the influences of climate change on international migration. Global environmental change Global environmental change is a major driver for environmentally induced migration. In the last 100 years, changes have been observed in the global climate, including an increase in global surface temperature by 0.74°C ± 0.18°C between 1906 and 2005. Climate change is also expected to increase the frequency and intensity of natural disasters. This includes considerably increased precipitation and drying, depending on the region; increases in the destructiveness of tropical cyclones, etc.76 These trends are projected to bring about significant environmental change, thus presenting an increased threat to human livelihoods and security. In doing so, they also present a new situation for human mobility. Figure 5 below presents the rapid increase in the number of people reported to have been affected by natural disasters between 1900 and 2008. It must be noted however that it is only in the last decades that the statistics for the number of people affected by natural disasters have been recorded on a systematic basis. The dramatic increase in the number of people reported affected by natural disasters may not therefore reflect the actual numbers of people affected worldwide. Figure 5: Number of people reported affected by natural disasters globally 1900-2008 June 2010 European Environment Agency General support to framing the forward-looking assessment component of the SOER 2010 Part A 31 Source: EM-DAT International Disaster Database (2009)77 Environmental and climate change is expected to affect urban and rural areas alike with increasingly frequent and violent hazard events. Many of the estimated 9 billion of the world population by 2050 will live in megacities that are prone to sea level rise. Flooding, intense storms, and droughts, but also more gradual but significant changes in regional climates place great stress on livelihood systems. Along with numerous other factors, these pressures are projected to contribute to migration.78 Furthermore, over the next two or three decades, the breakdown of ecosystem-dependent livelihoods is estimated to remain the premier driver of long-term migration.79 Global population growth will, in many cases, be concentrated precisely in those regions that have the highest vulnerability to environmental change. For example, Australia, through increasing drought, may not be able to support as many immigrants in the future; while Bangladesh, the horn of Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia, and southern Africa will all face water or drainage problems exacerbated by projected population increase. Other factors Other factors include market differences, costs of labour, the globalisation and reduction in the cost of transport, technological change, food shortages and wars80. 3.1.3. 3.1.3.1 KEY UNCERTAINTIES Uncertainties for population growth and decline As discussed above, it is widely projected that by 2025 the world population will have reached 8 billion people and by 2050, 9.1 billion and that it will still be increasing by 34 million people per year at that point. However, it needs to be noted that this figure is only the medium variant projection and the UN’s estimates reach from 7.8 billion to 11.9 billion people by 2050.81 Uncertainties for population growth and decline are closely linked to the fertility rates and immigration policies. Fertility rates One of the key uncertainties in the estimates of population growth is how the world’s different regional fertility rates will develop. Figure 6 below presents possible developments of world population growth for the period 2010-2050 based on different fertility scenarios. 32 European Environment Agency General support to framing the forward-looking assessment component of the SOER 2010 Part A June 2010 Figure 6: World population 1950-2050 by projected variants Source: UN (2004)82 It is important to note that even small changes in fertility rates can lead to significant changes in population sizes. According to the United Nations Population Division, the world population would more than double to 14 billion people by 2100 if the global fertility rate settled at 2.35, which is just very slightly above the current average global replacement rate. If, however, the global fertility rate declined to 1.85, a level already reached by most developed countries, the global population would be approximately 5.5 billion by 2100. This means that the replacement fertility rate can be regarded as the tipping point for population change; above it, the world population will continue to grow and below it, it will decline.83 The world population will stabilise at approximately 9 to 10 billion people if fertility levels tend towards replacement rate over the coming decades and remain close to it thereafter. 84 Immigration policies Immigration policies are sometimes considered as a remedy to population decline. Countries like Germany and France already have over 12% and 10% of immigrants as a percentage of national population, respectively85. Labour migration is seen by many as a necessary replacement solution to the deficit due to population decline, by encouraging the migration of skilled workers for short periods of time. However, according to the 2004 RAND Europe report, it is believed that replacement migration does not represent a feasible way of reversing population decrease, low fertility and population ageing, because of the numbers of immigrants needed86. Such a policy is June 2010 European Environment Agency General support to framing the forward-looking assessment component of the SOER 2010 Part A 33 not considered feasible or sustainable in the long term, because the numbers of immigrants that would be needed are of substantial magnitudes. Other relevant policies All European MS have begun to address the challenges entailed by demographic change. The main aims were spelled out in the Lisbon Strategy: more education, more innovation, more sustainability, and a higher participation in the labour market, especially among the older workers (55+), are the keys Europe needs to bolster its international competitiveness. If these goals are in fact adopted, if Member States improve their family policies, develop the policies needed to steer immigration, enhance the education of their populations, reshape their social systems with a view to demographic givens, and reorganise their public finances accordingly, Europe could come to terms with its demographic change and ultimately emerge strengthened from the crisis.87 The short and long-term effects of these policies must however be distinguished, as population policies take a long time to pay dividends, making such policies politically unattractive. Thus no single policy initiative is certain to dramatically raise fertility in Europe. Uncertainty here is threefold: What will the supply of migrants from outside the EU be in the coming years? To what extent are the demographic policies going to be implemented? And finally if they are implemented, to what extent are they going to work? 3.1.3.2 Uncertainties for international migration International migration remains the most uncertain demographic process. It also remains the process which is most difficult to monitor. The OECD provides the most comprehensive dataset.88 Both short- and long-term changes in migration patterns are difficult to measure and estimate reliably, since they are highly variable and depend on a multitude of changing socio-economic, political and environmental drivers. Uncertainties in long term patterns are linked to several key factors, as highlighted by the Human Development Report of 2009: differing trends in income, population growth rates, and transport costs tend to increase movements, which simultaneously face the increasingly significant constraint of growing legal and administrative barriers. Numerous other factors such as differences in labour and capital accumulation, technological change, policies and institutions play their part. Short term factors include changes in policy barriers, or other factors such as political instability, environmental catastrophes, food shortages or wars89. Economic growth Over the last half of the 20th century, a number of countries in Southern Europe and East Asia shifted from being net emigration to net immigration countries as a result of dynamic economic growth and ageing, and this trend can be expected to continue into the future, with countries such as Malaysia, Thailand, and Turkey likely also to undergo a migration transition in the coming decades. In turn, countries elsewhere, such as Ghana, have moved 34 European Environment Agency General support to framing the forward-looking assessment component of the SOER 2010 Part A June 2010 in the other direction over the second half of the 20th century, becoming net countries of emigration as economic and political events led to expulsions of foreign populations and a new exodus of nationals. Yet such factors are not built into UN projections: for example, Turkey is projected to have net positive migration until 2015, but negative migration thereafter; whilst Thailand may never attain net negative migration.90 Recovery plans following the economic crisis could be a major factor influencing migration flows in the near future. The crisis affected labour market conditions internationally, restraining labour migration movements. Effects of the crisis revealed decreases in the employment rates of immigrants, both in absolute and relative terms, compared to the native-born population of immigration countries91. Immigration policies Immigration policies either encourage or discourage international migration. Ensuring that policies are adapted to labour needs and favour a long-term integration of immigrants could enable to regulate migration flows. The OECD International Migration Outlook suggests that OECD countries put in place labour migration regimes “which address needs at all skill levels and which are demand-driven”92. If there is a strong demand for low-skilled migration but no adequate policy to favour it, this may result in irregular migration. Environmental change Environmental change is increasingly seen as an important driver of migration, but it remains to be seen to what extent people actually migrate internationally because of environmental change. The EACH FOR report suggests that the answer to this question might be less than expected, since the poorest cannot afford to migrate, and many others do not want to leave the land of their ancestors93. Environmental change is a major uncertainty as it has a multiplier effect on other migration drivers. Land degradation in Niger, for example, has undermined the resilience of farmers to recurring drought. More erratic weather, rising sea levels and other impacts related to environmental change may exacerbate both migration pressures and environmental degradation. Reliable data is lacking for international migration as a whole, so for environmentally induced migration, which is especially difficult to trace, it is no surprise that no reliable data seems to exist. Youth bulges Youth bulges may be a factor of uncertainty for international migration since the migration patterns of the members of these youth bulges cannot be foreseen. Young people from youth bulges may be forced to migrate for various reasons, such as limited opportunities in their home countries, unemployment or poverty. In some countries with large youth bulges, emigration may also be considered as a safety valve against internal conflict94. This could have significant impacts on international migration. June 2010 European Environment Agency General support to framing the forward-looking assessment component of the SOER 2010 Part A 35 3.2. MEGATREND II: POPULATION AGEING AND YOUTH BULGES Population ageing is an unprecedented demographic shift being experienced by large parts of the developed world. Youth bulges can be perceived as an opposite trend, and an element of the developing world. Today however, whereas the former is becoming increasingly frequent in many developing nations, youth bulges remain a persistent factor of many of the most unstable states today. 3.2.1. 3.2.1.1 SUMMARY Population ageing Overview Today nearly seven out of every ten people in the developed world are in the traditional working age (aged 15 to 64). Importantly, not only has this percentage never been this high in the past but it is also expected never to be so high again in the future – it can be perceived as a crucial tipping point. This is because the world is getting older at an unprecedented rate: In 2000, about 420 million people, or about 7% of the world's population, were age 65 or older. By 2050, that number will be nearly 1.5 billion people, or about 16% of the world's population.95 In other words, the median age of the world’s population is projected to increase from 29 years to 38 years by 205096. The countries with the oldest median age are those which have had low fertility rates over a long period of time. These include many developed countries, as well as some developing countries including Hong Kong and Singapore. By 2050, all 45 developed countries are projected to have median ages over 40 years. Europe has the oldest population today, with a mean age of almost 40 years, and is expected to reach 47 years in 205097. The gender gap is visible in population ageing through the mortality declines that benefit older ages and women in particular. In developed countries today, mortality rates continue to decrease among the oldest-old (85+ years), influencing the gender divide98. The decrease in the share of the working population, linked to the increase in the share of the retired population, i.e. the number of over-65-year olds, is set to pose challenges to public institutions, creating pressure on social support systems. This is the case in many developed countries in particular, where a combination of tax increases, borrowing, later retirement ages, cuts in benefits, or adjustments to lower cost-of-living may be necessary to sustain the existing retirement programmes99. Impacts of population ageing in Europe As Table 2 shows (page 17), Europe had the highest percentage of people age 65 or above in 2007, a rate of 16 percent, which is expected to nearly double by 2050.100 The lowest rate of people 65 and above was witnessed in Africa with 3% in 2007. Even by 2050 Europe is estimated to remain the region with the highest percentage of people age 65 or above 36 European Environment Agency General support to framing the forward-looking assessment component of the SOER 2010 Part A June 2010 with 28% of its total population belonging to this group. However, the gap towards other regions is expected to be narrower. 101 The main effects of population ageing include direct impacts on economic growth, the labour force market, productivity, and public finances, among others. A large working age population provides resources for retirement and investments to the economy. The change in Europe’s age structure is expected, by the OECD, to slow down overall economic growth in Europe by 0.4 percentage points every year until 2025 and by 0.9 percentage points thereafter102. The annual growth is foreseen to decline from 2.2% to 1.8% between 2011 and 2030, and to barely 1.3% in 2031-50. The challenge will directly impact the labour force market and the rate of productivity growth. The EU Economic Policy Committee estimates that the shrink in European workforces will tend to make European economies increasingly reliant on advances in productivity to generate growth103. Pension and health care commitments of public finances are also foreseen to be affected directly by European population ageing. There are, however, significant differences in population ageing throughout Europe. Although the population is expected to continue to rise between 2005 and 2050 in several Member States, such as France, Ireland, the UK, or Spain, it is already falling in many of the new Member States104. These differences are due to a number of socio-economic factors, such as the choices made in immigration policy sectors. The impacts of population ageing in Europe remain uncertain however, since they depend on a variety of factors, including the role played by public policy. The “Impact of ageing populations on public spending” report of the EU Economic Policy Committee (2006) highlighted the fact that the reforms that were carried out in several EU countries since 2001 “appear to have curtailed the projected increase in public spending significantly in half of all EU-15 MS”105. Choices made by public policy, such as raising the retirement age; introducing greater flexibility to allow people to continue working beyond the age of retirement if they wish to do so; or introducing selective immigration quotas for skilled workers; could also greatly influence the impacts of population ageing throughout the EU. Pace of ageing in the developed vs. the developing world Even though the phenomenon will hit both the developed and the developing world, the difference between the two will remain significant at least in the near future. In most developed MS, the most rapid growth in the ratio of seniors (age 65 and older) to the working-age population will occur during the 2010s and 2020s. By 2010, it is expected that there will be about one senior for every four working-age people in the developed world, increasing to a ratio of one in three or higher by 2025.106 Japan, whose working-age population has been shrinking since the mid-1990s, for example, is expected to reach a higher ratio by 2025 with one senior for every two working-age people. Figure 7 below presents countries with an estimated median age of over 50 by 2050. By then, it is expected that the developing world will have reached the same stage in the ageing of its population as the developed world has reached now.107 Figure 7: Countries with a Median Age over 50 by 2050 June 2010 European Environment Agency General support to framing the forward-looking assessment component of the SOER 2010 Part A 37 Source: Center for Strategic and International Studies (2008) 108 The highest growth rates between 2007 and 2050 in the senior population are expected to take place in Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean, which are estimated to triple the size of this part of the population within this period.109 A significant example of population ageing in this part of the world is the case of China (Box 4). Still, those countries that are ‘youngest’ today are also estimated to experience the least ageing (e.g. countries in SubSaharan Africa) and those countries that are ‘oldest’ today are expected to experience the most ageing. This means that the world will see demographic divergence over the foreseeable future before it might see some sort of convergence.110 Box 3: Population ageing in China Owing to the One-Child Policy (see box 4), China’s population is expected to start declining around 2030. Whereas in 2020-2025 the population is still estimated to increase by 0.34% per year, it is predicted to decrease by 0.32% per year in 2040-2045. This decline has significant implications on the age structure of the Chinese population. Whereas China is considered as a ‘young’ society today, by 2030 it is estimated to be ‘older’ than the United States measured by its population percentage of over 65-year olds. Between 2005 and 2030 this age group is estimated to double in size. This also means that China’s workforce is likely to peak in 2015 and to continuously decrease thereafter compared to a doubling in its workforce between 1980 and 2005. Compared to many developed countries that encounter the same problem, China is expected to be hit by the problems of an ageing society with only a developing country’s income. Sources: AEI (2007) and Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute (2007) and Center for Strategic and International Studies (2008) 38 European Environment Agency General support to framing the forward-looking assessment component of the SOER 2010 Part A June 2010 It is important to note, however, that the speed of population ageing in the developing world is expected to be higher than in the developed world, which would allow less time for adaptation. Furthermore, it is expected by many to hit many developing countries at lower levels of socio-economic development, which means that consequences might be worse.111 3.2.1.2 Youth bulges Contrary to the trends in developed economies, many developing countries will experience substantial youth bulges, which are disproportionate concentrations of people in the 15-to29 year-old age group. The 15-29 age group may actually increase in some countries and contribute to international migration. Several of the countries with the largest youth bulges are among the world’s most unstable or potentially unstable countries. Most youth bulges today are in the developing world, and form a crescent which stretches from the Andean region of Latin America across Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and the Caucasus, before finally reaching the northern parts of South Asia. Three quarters of the countries with youth bulges by 2025 will be located in Sub-Saharan Africa with the rest located in the Middle East and a few across Asia and among the Pacific Islands.112 Migration as a solution to youth bulges Global migration, which is very likely to increase over the next 10 to 20 years, could provide a partial solution to problems associated with large youth populations. Countries in the Middle East and North Africa are experiencing a youth bulge due to population explosion after the 1960s. Asian and European countries, on the other hand, face severe population ageing and a lack of manpower. Migration of younger workers would help to offset the retirement of older workers in countries with ageing populations and provide jobs for unemployed youth from developing countries. Worker bulges Some youth bulges are expected to mature into ‘worker bulges’, an advantage for fastdeveloping countries that offer a business-friendly environment for investment and an educated work force and such as Turkey, Lebanon, Iran, or Morocco. In ‘weak’ or ‘failed states’, where the government and institutions are unable to provide a significant set of public services, such as legitimate government, physical security and minimal economic development, the worker bulges are expected to go elsewhere113, and in particular to more developed countries offering employment opportunities. June 2010 European Environment Agency General support to framing the forward-looking assessment component of the SOER 2010 Part A 39 Figure 8: Youth bulges: young adults aged 15-29 as a proportion of adults (aged 15 and older). Source: Population Action International (2003)114, Data: United nations population Division (2003) Effects of youth bulges on Europe Part of these worker bulges are expected to migrate from the less developed regions to more developed countries, including Europe. These youth workers will have direct impacts on the demographic structure and employment in the emigration countries. Indirect impacts related to the migration of young workers and students are linked to the diffusion of development and consumption patterns, as the migrants return to their native countries. The model of guest-worker migration might be a possibility within Europe to counter-balance the ageing population structure. By encouraging short term circulation patterns of skilled migrants, either for working or for post-graduate education, Europe could influence development and consumption patterns in developing countries. However, the current and future impacts of these flows on the European economy are highly dependent on the nature of migration policies in immigration countries, and the attractiveness of EU Member States (i.e. France, Spain, Ireland or Germany) on countries with youth bulges. It is difficult to predict what the future effects may be, as these depend on policies at both the national and European scale. Effects on civil conflicts and political instability Population Action International’s recent study, “The Shape of Things to Come. Why age structure matters to a safer, more equitable world”115, reveals that population age structure strongly influences the stability, governance, economic development and social well-being of countries. One of the main key findings is that “very young and youthful age structures are most likely to undermine countries’ development and security”. A young age structure was found to triple the rate of civil conflict throughout the 1990s. Youth bulges are therefore an ambivalent demographic trend, as they represent both a possible supply 40 European Environment Agency General support to framing the forward-looking assessment component of the SOER 2010 Part A June 2010 of migrant workers to developed countries and a potential source of instability in the source countries. 3.2.2. DRIVERS 3.2.2.1 Main drivers of global ageing Global ageing is the result of two demographic forces: Falling fertility levels and rising longevity. The first reduces the relative number of the young and the second increases the relative number of the old. The fastest ageing societies are generally those with the greatest declines in fertility116, although rising longevity can be an equally important factor. Falling fertility levels The fertility rate is considered as the largest driver for population ageing today117, since the decline in the fertility rate over the past fifty years is the main factor for ageing in the most developed countries. The increase in the speed of fertility transitions has direct effects on the speed of population ageing. Please see section 3.1.2. for a discussion on fertility levels. Fertility rates are influenced by a wide range of factors, such as living standards, education, and the availability of contraceptives. It is difficult to predict to what extent the policies designed to help people have the desired number of children will affect fertility levels. However, there is fair evidence that strong state action to promote the availability and the use of contraception, as well as increases in income and education, lead to sharp falls in fertility. This has happened even in countries as otherwise conservative as Malaysia, Indonesia and Iran. Germany is an example of a country which has implemented several measures to increase fertility rates without noticeable results so far. The main question is whether countries will promote family planning and achieve economic growth. The same question goes for the developing world where it will need to be evaluated whether and which measures are likely to be implemented and what their results can be expected to be. Rising longevity Since the Second World War global life expectancy has risen from approximately 45 to 65 years. This represents a greater gain over the past 50 years than over the previous 5000 years. This rise has been especially significant in the developed world: In the United States, for example, life expectancy rose from 47 years in 1900 to 66 years in 1950 and 77 years in 2000. Today, Japan is the world’s leader in longevity with a life expectancy of 80 years. Europe has a life expectancy that is higher than the US although not as high as Japan. 118 Currently, European women on average may expect to live 81.9 years and men 75.8 years.119 The increase in life expectancy in these countries is still ongoing: Compared to 2004 women recently gained half a year of life expectancy and men almost a full year.120 The initial gains in life expectancy were those in the reduction of child mortality, around mid-1900. These were followed by gains in middle-age mortality, and today any residual gain is to be made on the longevity of the over-70. This however is much more difficult to June 2010 European Environment Agency General support to framing the forward-looking assessment component of the SOER 2010 Part A 41 obtain, and thus the increase in the future in developed countries will probably be much slower. Although the trend towards longevity is a global one, Figure 9 below shows that stark differences in life expectancy remain between regions as of 2008. This becomes especially clear when looking at the African continent most of whose countries are characterised by a life expectancy of 55 years or under.121 Figure 9: Global life expectancy at birth, 2008 Source: CIA (2008) World Factbook122 Time squeeze Another potential social driver producing ageing populations to be considered, especially in developed countries, is what is sometimes referred to as the “time squeeze”. This refers to the incompatibility between the various ambitions and the actual available time of women. The assumption is that college-educated women are often older at the time of birth of their first child, leaving them less time to have their second child before reaching the biological limits of fertility.123 Due to the time squeeze, some women try to have their children at an earlier age, whereas others reach the menopause before having had the time to have as many children as desired. Other drivers Other important drivers of population ageing include increasing living standards, greater female labour force participation, later age of marriage, availability of contraceptives, diffusion of information about contraceptives, and increased access to medical treatment. However, although important, they all affect either fertility levels or longevity and can therefore be considered as indirect drivers of population ageing. 3.2.2.2 Main drivers of youth bulges The main drivers of youth bulges are high fertility levels coupled with gradually declining levels in child mortality as well as HIV/AIDS which causes premature adult deaths.124 42 High fertility levels and declining mortality rates European Environment Agency General support to framing the forward-looking assessment component of the SOER 2010 Part A June 2010 Countries where populations are in the early phase of demographic transition experience high fertility levels coupled with gradually declining rates of childhood mortality. The combination of these two factors leads to a significant increase in the younger populations, creating a youth bulge. HIV/AIDS In many countries of southern and eastern Africa, the prevalence of HIV/AIDS is one of the reasons for the development of youth bulges, due to the particularly high rates of mortality in the adult population. AIDS has orphaned millions of children, and the number is expected to increase with the deaths of increasing numbers of HIV-infected parents in the coming decade.125 Other drivers Significant emigration can sometimes be a driver of youth bulges. Some rare cases in middle-transition populations experience strong emigration rates, thus influencing the proportion of young adults in the global population. Leftover youth bulges in middle- and late-transition populations can also linger for a number of years. However, the size of youth bulges rapidly decreases when the young adults mature126. 3.2.3. 3.2.3.1 KEY UNCERTAINTIES Uncertainties for population ageing Population ageing is the megatrend with the least uncertainties, despite some reservations, in particular those due to pandemics. The reason for the accuracy in population ageing estimates is that all the people aged over 45 in the year 2050 have already been born today and can therefore be counted. Even if fertility levels and therefore the number of young people by 2050 are less certain, demographers generally agree on the assumption that they will not experience a strong and lasting rebound anytime soon. Also, past low fertility rates mean that the number of childbearing women has been reduced significantly, which means that any significant impact of increasing fertility levels will be delayed. Population growth will therefore take a long time to regain momentum, so ageing will continue for many decades.127 The impacts of population ageing are different in developed vs. developing countries. Population ageing is less advanced in developing countries, and the countries with high fertility rates are expected to experience the slowest population ageing. In the future, population ageing is expected to be increasingly common in the developing world and to occur more rapidly than it did previously in the developed world128. Projections for the developing world tend to show that population ageing may have more varied consequences, inducing greater prosperity for some and greater instability and security threats for other countries129. June 2010 European Environment Agency General support to framing the forward-looking assessment component of the SOER 2010 Part A 43 Demographic policies Demographic policies can reduce the speed of population ageing by slowing down fertility declines under the right circumstances. The case of China is particularly significant in this respect (Box 4 and Figure 10). Box 4: The One-child policy in China Planning policies can have a significant impact on fertility rates. This has been the case in China since the one-child policy was introduced in 1979 to tackle social, economic and environmental problems in the country. The Chinese family planning policy restricts the number of children that married urban couples can have to one. The policy is based on the use of fines that are imposed on the family’s income. It has reduced the fertility rate from over 3.0 in 1980 to approximately 1.8 in 2008. The impacts of this policy are expected to show in the following decades as the large cohort of the fertile population is currently reaching its peak (Figure 10), which is expected to lead to a large number of births before slowing definitively. Source of data: CIA World Factorbook, China. Available at : www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html#People Figure 10: Size of the Chinese population by age group, 1950-2050 Source: Hellig, G.K. (2004) IIASA130 44 European Environment Agency General support to framing the forward-looking assessment component of the SOER 2010 Part A June 2010 Multiple policy interventions, if adapted to specific country social, economic, and political contexts, can also create some gains in fertility. However, other changes in broader social and economic conditions, such as income, employment, and female workforce participation, may also affect fertility levels. Migration Migration tends to affect population ageing, as it determines the size, rate of change and composition of a population. Immigration is known to reduce population ageing in many parts of the world such as Canada and Europe, since immigrants are frequently younger and have more children. Within Europe, the effects of migration are double. Emigration can contribute to population ageing in the source countries; i.e. in Eastern Europe. It is believed that migration will have an increasing role in population ageing in the future in low-fertility countries with stable or declining populations131. Immigration on the other hand is perceived as a factor that contributes to the slowing down of population ageing in southern and mainly in north-western countries. However, while immigration can reduce the age of the receiving county, it cannot solve population ageing as such. Even if the proportion of the population of foreign origin increases from 515% of the total today, to 15-30% by mid-century, it is expected that this will not prevent population ageing132. Other impacts A number of uncertainties such as the impacts of wars can also contribute to the ageing of demographic structures because it is often the younger generations that are more severely impacted by the effects of wars. 3.2.3.2 Uncertainties for youth bulges The concept of youth bulges is relatively new and is inextricably linked to the evolution of demographic patterns. These demographic patterns can be modified by various factors that are more or less difficult to predict. Pandemics The effect of many ongoing pandemics, such as HIV/AIDS, can be estimated, although this also depends on the evolution of medical research. The ability to control a pandemic can prevent the development of youth bulges. Uncertain factors creating social unrest Some sociologists such as Gunnar Heinsohn argue that youth bulges result from historical periods of social unrest lacking external triggers, such as sudden, catastrophic environmental changes, and genocides. Both of these factors highly uncertain factors which cannot be predicted, therefore youth bulges remain a highly uncertain demographic phenomenon. June 2010 European Environment Agency General support to framing the forward-looking assessment component of the SOER 2010 Part A 45 Fertility levels Finally, the extent of the change in the size of youth bulges is inextricably linked to the trends in fertility levels (see section 3.1.3. for a discussion of the uncertainty of these). Based on these demographic factors, the size of youth bulges is expected to decrease over the next 20 years in many countries, with the exception of Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East. The youth population is however foreseen to remain large. Migration policies Migration policies, either within the country of emigration or the country of immigration, are a secondary factor which may influence youth bulges, by either encouraging or discouraging immigration, whether for work or for educational purposes. 46 European Environment Agency General support to framing the forward-looking assessment component of the SOER 2010 Part A June 2010 4. IMPACTS At a global level, a growing population and economic growth are the major driving forces for the future use of natural resources and consumption patterns. The Ecological Footprint, a measure of humanity’s demand on nature, calculates that humanity currently uses the equivalent of 1.4 planets to provide the necessary resources and absorb human waste, and moderate UN scenarios estimate that by 2025 the planet will need the equivalent of two Earths to support the global demand for energy, food and water133. Experts currently consider 21 countries with a population of about 600 million to be either cropland or freshwater scarce. Owing to continuing population growth, 36 countries, with about 1.4 billion people, are projected to fall into this category by 2025. Among the new entrants will be Burundi, Colombia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Malawi, Pakistan, and Syria.134 Environmental change is expected to exacerbate resource scarcity. Scarce resources already have triggered the trend of buying land in developing countries to secure food and water demand in richer countries. 4.1. 4.1.1. POTENTIAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS IN EUROPE NATURAL RESOURCES Population growth and decline, and international migration, have strong impacts on the consumption of natural resources. In Europe, the reduced consumption of natural resources brought about by population decline could both ease the stress on the environment and improve the global quality of life. The impacts of international migration however are double, easing the burden on areas of emigration and placing more stress on natural resources in the receiving countries. A larger population, due to immigration, can result in greater use of natural resources. Migration patterns for Eastern to Western Europe may result in a shift of the burden on natural resources within Europe itself, to countries such as the U.K, France, Spain or Scandinavian countries. Population ageing is seen as a trend that may ultimately indirectly reduce the burdens of growth on the environment. However, the reduced budget of Member States, which may arise from the increased costs due to pensions and health care, may result in reduced budgets for environmental protection. The impacts of youth bulges are less clear, and are largely indirect as the youth bulges are outside of Europe, in developing countries. They result in increased pressure on natural resources in these, and the nature of the effects on Europe itself remains uncertain. A large migration of youth bulges to Europe would of course result in increased resource consumption. June 2010 European Environment Agency General support to framing the forward-looking assessment component of the SOER 2010 Part A 47 4.1.2. LAND USE A growing population, linked to changes in life styles, can have a strong direct impact on land use owing to the increased pressure for urbanisation (see SOER Background Paper II: Urbanisation and Consumption). In Europe however, urban and environmental planning is actively aiming to reduce the pressures linked to urban sprawl. The conflict between agriculture and tourism in many European countries is however leading to conflicts between the different types of land-use, owing to an increase in the value of land because of high touristic pressure in many attractive areas of Europe, such as the South of France. Migration can have direct impacts on European land use and urbanisation, by leading to intensified environmental and economic problems in receiving areas. High immigration rates can contribute to crowding and environmental/sanitation issues in slums in some parts of Europe. However, this issue is closely regulated in most parts of Western Europe. Urbanisation is also considered as a driving force for regional warming because of so-called heat islands.135 As most migrants will try to go to urban areas to find employment, this can increase these regional warming issues. 4.1.3. ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE Population growth and decline, combined with changing consumption patterns, are one of the main factors influencing environmental change. On its own, Europe cannot influence environmental change drastically at the global level, since the whole of Europe’s population only makes up 11% of the total world population. It is through joined actions at the global level that Europe can influence environmental change, since the main players of tomorrow’s world are undoubtedly the growing populations of the developing countries. Europe may be able to play a part by influencing the consumption patterns of the cultural elites of these countries, through short-term migration. One indirect impact of the migration of skilled workers or higher-education students to Europe can be the exchange of ideas, skills, and consumption patterns. 4.2. OTHER POTENTIAL INDIRECT IMPACTS IN EUROPE 4.2.1. IMPACTS ON PEACE, CONFLICT AND SECURITY The four demographic megatrends could have impacts on peace and security. Population growth and its resulting increase in competition for resources that might be scarce can lead to violent conflict. Furthermore, this conflict can also be triggered by an increased vulnerability to disease and support for extremist movements that can be due to rapidly growing populations. These developments are more likely to occur in developing nations with weak institutions. The impacts of growing populations that lead to youth bulges are discussed below.136 48 European Environment Agency General support to framing the forward-looking assessment component of the SOER 2010 Part A June 2010 Population decline, on the other hand, will have its own impacts on peace, conflict and security. Declining populations also mean that these countries experience manpower shortages for their armed forces. Unless these countries are able to substitute manpower by capital in their armed forces, this can mean that their defence establishments will shrink and that their future role in international military missions, such as peace keeping operations, will be limited. Furthermore, increased migration as a solution to a declining population may result in cultural and racial tensions.137 Population ageing is likely to have significant economic impacts (please see below), which can lead to increased internal instability and conflict. 138 China might be a prime example of this phenomenon as the problem of population ageing, which is currently primarily a problem of developed countries, will hit China at only a developing country’s income. Among the four megatrends discussed in this paper, youth bulges are likely to have the most significant impact on peace, conflict and security. As discussed above, the largest proportional youth populations will be located in the West Bank/Gaza, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Iraq139, several of them being the world’s politically most unstable or potentially unstable countries. Some of these countries are very poor and lack the economic resources to support the educational and employment opportunities necessary to effectively integrate youth into society. Large populations of poorly educated young people with limited or no employment opportunities can provide fertile grounds for radical political and religious movements. If the current inability of many states in these regions to adequately integrate youth populations continues it is likely to perpetuate the cycle of political instability, ethnic wars, revolutions, and anti-government activities that already affects many countries.140 In contrast to declining populations that might experience shrinking military manpower, youth bulges will provide for increasing military manpower of the above-mentioned countries. This manpower can be used for international peacekeeping and disaster relief efforts but also for less peaceful operations. National as well as international migration can have impacts on peace, conflict and security for different reasons such as increased competition for local resources, increased vulnerability to disease, increased discrimination, and support for extremist movements. 141 Upon arrival, migrants can be the cause of increased competition for already scarce resources. According to the Stern Review, there are between 30 to 200 million people at risk of hunger with temperature rises of 2 to 3°C – rising to 250 to 550 million people with a 3°C warming. Furthermore, between 0.7 and 4.4 billion people could experience growing water shortages with a temperature rise of 2°C.142 However, this depends on a number of factors such as the available technologies, water pricing, etc. Even if resources are plentiful, conflict might result from a struggle over their control. 143 However, whilst environmental migration can contribute to the risk of conflict, it is unlikely to be the single trigger. Other important factors, among others, remain political instability, poor governance, ethnic tensions, and lack of investment in sustainable development. June 2010 European Environment Agency General support to framing the forward-looking assessment component of the SOER 2010 Part A 49 4.2.2. ECONOMIC IMPACTS Economic impacts of population growth and decline have been hotly debated by researchers. According to Bloom et al. (2003) there are three distinct schools of thought in this field. The so-called ‘pessimists’ view, which goes back to Malthus (1798), is that population growth has a negative impact on the economy as increasing demand cannot be met by fixed resources. This view began to be rejected by the so-called ‘population optimists’ in the early 1980s who argued that prices of these fixed resources would actually decline due to technological innovation. Increasing demand could therefore be met. This was followed by the ‘neutralist school’ that states that the link between population change and economic growth is actually weak. Bloom et al. (2003) concluded that all three schools of thought can fall back on theoretical models and data to support their views. 144 Population decline might have positive impacts in developing countries where this trend could translate into higher savings rates, and rising incomes and living standards. 145 However, this will largely depend on other factors such as the political environment, and not solely on declining populations. What might have a clearer impact on the economy is population ageing. An increasing ratio of seniors to the working-age population means that the workforce will actually shrink. This can have a significant impact on national GDP and be a major burden on national old-age benefit programmes.146 Furthermore, an older workforce may be less adaptable and mobile and be less likely to be the source of innovative ideas and actions. Rates of savings and investments may also fall. 147 The impacts of population ageing on pension and health care costs are set to increase the burden on public funds, as describe above in section 3.2.1.1. As discussed above, countries with youth bulges that are least touched by population ageing are also those that are characterised by political instability, high poverty rates and chronic civil unrest. They are therefore less likely to benefit economically from their increasing workforce. 148 Migration to Europe can have a positive effect on the source areas of migration. Migrants may send transfers of money to their home countries, in some cases contributing higher prosperity in a poor region, thus enabling access to water, sanitation, healthcare, waste treatment or whatever. Migration can have a negative as well as a positive economic impact. Countries might experience a so-called ‘brain drain’ due to the fact that those people that are most likely to find work elsewhere, i.e. those that are young and well educated, are the most likely to leave. These are, however, also the people that the country needs most in order to adapt to the changing environment and to ensure a more stable future. The results of a brain drain tend to be lower productivity, decreased levels of technical skills, and a smaller tax-base.149 However, there is also a phenomenon called ‘brain gain’ (or brain circulation) when migrants return to their home country following their time abroad. In the context of environmental migration though, this can only be the case if this migration is of a temporary nature, as it generally used to be. Even in cases where migrants do not return, the brain drain can be offset to a certain degree by the benefits of remittances that migrant workers send back to their native countries. According 50 European Environment Agency General support to framing the forward-looking assessment component of the SOER 2010 Part A June 2010 to the Word Bank, these remittances significantly reduce poverty and equalise incomes.150 Figure 11 below provides an overview of remittance inflows per region for the period 20002010. Figure 11: Remittance inflows 2000-2010 Source: The Economist (2009)151 In the receiving country, immigration might have a negative impact on the economy as recently arrived migrants are more likely to be unemployed and have lower levels of education than other population groups.152 However, this will depend on the immigration laws in the country in question, on the type of immigration – whether legal or illegal – and on the effort put into integrating migrant communities – by providing education for them, in particular. 4.2.3. POLITICAL AND GEOPOLITICAL CONSEQUENCES Related to the point above is a global power shift as a result of demographic change. As discussed above, the demographic weight of regions will change significantly over the next decades. Whereas by 2050 it is assumed that the population of more developed countries will decline by approximately one million people per year, that of the developing countries is estimated to increase by 35 million people per year, 22 million of which would be absorbed by the least developed countries.153 As a result it is estimated that by 2025, approximately 16% of the world population will live in the most developed countries, down from 18% in 2009 and 24% in 1980.154 This shift is paired with the economic decline of ageing populations due to decreasing workforces and less innovation. The overall result is an economic and political power shift, and a potential reduction in the consumption of resources, depending on the lifestyle choices made by senior citizens. Furthermore, countries with ageing populations might become less culturally attractive and politically relevant for younger people.155 According to Jack A. June 2010 European Environment Agency General support to framing the forward-looking assessment component of the SOER 2010 Part A 51 Goldstone, this shift will result in current institutions, such as the G-8 becoming less powerful while the g-20 will become increasingly important. This trend will reflect the recognition that countries such as Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico and Turkey are becoming global economic powers.156 4.2.4. CHANGING CONSUMPTION PATTERS Growing population and economic growth is a major driving force for the change in consumption patterns. Increased migration can also change the patterns. Figure 12 below illustrates that the steady increase of the share of the world population which belongs to middle or high income groups means that humanity will increasingly be on an unsustainable path if consumption patterns and ecological footprint of these income groups do not change. However, there remains significant uncertainty regarding the way consumption patterns are changed due to demographic changes. Figure 12: World population growth 1950-2050 Source: WBCSD (2008) Sustainable Consumption Facts and Trends Figure 13 below presents an example of the influence of demographic change on consumption patterns by showing the changing energy consumption per age group. According to this example, population ageing will have a favourable impact on energy consumption, especially the consumption of fuels and lubricants for vehicles.157 52 European Environment Agency General support to framing the forward-looking assessment component of the SOER 2010 Part A June 2010 Figure 13: Energy consumption per age group Source: Kronenberg, Tobias (2009) The impact of demographic change on energy use and greenhouse gas emissions in Germany. Ecological Economics158 If environmentally induced migration results in rural-urban migration, as can be expected in many cases, this will also have environmental impacts through changes in consumption patterns and energy use. 4.2.5. SOCIAL VULNERABILITY AND INTEGRATION Immigrants can experience increased vulnerability due to potential language and cultural barriers. Migration flows add to the already existing patchwork of national minorities and cultural groups in the receiving countries. Also some degree of spatial segregation of migrant communities exists in most large cities, which has spatial related impacts. Migration due to natural disasters can lead to people losing their documents, which means that access to assistance might be particularly difficult. 159 4.2.6. HEALTH In the US and other developed countries the average healthcare cost for a person over 65 is estimated to be three to five times higher than for a person aged under 65. A rapid increase in the number of over-65 year olds together with further advances in medical technology means that the impact of population ageing on healthcare costs is expected to be significant.160 However, the proportion of people over 65 does not increase quickly and the increase in healthcare costs is not linked to absolute age, rather people’s health becomes more expensive in the last years of their lives, a factor which does not change with the ageing of population. The extent to which ageing populations have an impact on the health care system as such will depend on the state’s involvement in that system. In European countries, for example, where the state is heavily involved in the provision of healthcare, the impact can be expected to be significant. In the EU-27, for example, the average healthcare expenditure is estimated to increase from 6.7 to 8.4% of GDP. June 2010 European Environment Agency General support to framing the forward-looking assessment component of the SOER 2010 Part A 53 However, the difference between countries is significant, ranging from an estimated increase 0.4% of GDP in Bulgaria and Latvia to 3.8% in Malta.161 Furthermore, increased migration, travel, and trade are likely to accelerate the transfer of infectious diseases to the European Union, at a time when the number of infections resistant to drugs is rising. Increased transport possibilities enable travellers to reach most of the cities worldwide within 36 hours—this is less time than it is the incubation period of many infectious diseases.162 54 European Environment Agency General support to framing the forward-looking assessment component of the SOER 2010 Part A June 2010 5. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 5.1. POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS FOR EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY The trends, drivers and impacts discussed above raise some key questions about the appropriate European policy response. This section will present some of those key questions and will reflect on the most likely responses to them. 5.1.1. ADAPTING ENVIRONMENTAL TARGETS TO DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS The demographic situation varies across Europe, and the types of pressures on the environment differ accordingly. The economic implications of an ageing population might also result in varied environmental pressures. Therefore, there is a need for further research into the impacts of demographic change on the European environment. This raises several significant questions: Should demographic changes and population ageing be taken into account when setting future environmental targets and objectives? Can European environmental policy also take into account future migration flows and their localised impact both on demographic trends and, subsequently, on the European environment? Should such policies be enacted, what would the costs to Europe be? The success of these policies would require a thorough analysis of the impacts of various demographic groups on environmental pressures. A quantitative and qualitative analysis of the implications of demographic change on the environment would need to be carried out at EU-level. 5.1.2. HELPING DEVELOPING COUNTRIES TACKLE ENVIRONMENTALLY-INDUCED MIGRATION Europe’s influence on global environmental and climate change policy and the situation in developing countries could substantially reduce the pressure to migrate from the most vulnerable countries. What efforts would be needed to improve the living conditions in vulnerable countries with high emigration rates? To what extent could Europe improve the situation in vulnerable countries, and would this have a significant impact on reducing the pressure to migrate from these countries? June 2010 European Environment Agency General support to framing the forward-looking assessment component of the SOER 2010 Part A 55 Would these policy instruments, in turn, have a significant effect on the migratory pressure at Europe’s boundaries? To carry out this approach successfully, European policy-makers would need to devise the solutions conjointly with the most vulnerable countries. 5.1.3. INFLUENCING SUSTAINABLE CONSUMPTION PATTERNS IN LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES Europe is not able to reverse the worldwide trends in climate change by itself. The main challenges lie with the populations in developing countries, who will make up the majority of the world’s population in the coming decades. The type of consumption patterns and employment of the social elites of these developing countries will inevitably determine the future of the planet. Europe could play a role in influencing these elites, by encouraging sustainable lifestyles, choosing low meat consumption diets, low footprint leisure, energy efficient products, and limiting the quantities of household waste. Elite migrants could then return to their home countries and perhaps transmit some of these European lifestyle patterns. Should Europe consider the influences that it can have on developing countries as a way to influence global sustainable development throughout the planet? Should Europe look into developing a short-term migratory guest worker model now that emigration countries are more developed and the prospects to return have improved? Determining the appropriate policy instrument to facilitate such a migration of social and cultural elites would require careful evaluation of the existing structures and international agreements to identify the most effective approach. Given Europe’s advanced R&D capacities, it could take a leading role in such a framework. 5.2. POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS FOR OTHER EUROPEAN POLICY AREAS 5.2.1. SETTING DEMOGRAPHIC TARGETS Many European countries already have policies in place that aim at increasing fertility levels, including the provision of child care, parental leave and financial allowances for families with children. Prominent examples of this are France and Sweden, where these policies had some success. However, there is still no general consensus among policymakers and demographers about which policies work best to encourage fertility levels.163 European policymakers will have to accept economic and political power shifts due to demographic change and become part of institutions that reflect such shifts. 56 European Environment Agency General support to framing the forward-looking assessment component of the SOER 2010 Part A June 2010 Can policy instruments be devised to influence fertility levels at the European level? Which policy instruments would be the most effective to do so? The appropriate policy instrument(s) for such an approach would necessarily require evaluation to ensure their efficacy and legality, in line with the questions outlined above. 5.2.2. IMMIGRATION POLICY Institutions and concepts will need to be set up to deal with the increasing numbers of immigrants coming to Europe. As mentioned above, the encouraged short-term migration of skilled workers and both social and cultural elites would be necessary to maintain Europe’s competitiveness at the international level. Countries with significant youth bulges will need to be supported in their efforts to integrate these youths into society. Can EU policy instruments be used to encourage the short-term migration of skilled workers and both social and cultural elites? What would the framework of such a short-term migratory model be; what length of time would these highly-skilled workers be encouraged to stay in Europe for? What would the actual impacts of this type of migratory policy on the emigration countries be? The success of this approach would require a careful evaluation of the impacts of this type of policy on the economies of both the emigration and immigration countries. 5.2.3. AID TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES The impacts of environmental change in developing and underdeveloped countries are such that many environmental refugees may be forced to migrate to more developed countries. Rather than legislating directly on migration, European policy-makers could focus on increasing the capacity of those affected by environmental changes and hazards to cope themselves164. Additionally, EU humanitarian or development aid must be brought to those who suffer from environmental changes and hazards but do not have the means to migrate. Can policy instruments be developed to aid the underdeveloped and developing countries that are suffering directly from the effects of environmental change? Should such policies be enacted, what would the costs to Europe be? Defining policy instruments to act on the effects of environmental change within the most vulnerable countries would require an adequate assessment of the impacts that would need mitigating and the efficiency of the different possible measures. European policymakers would need to devise the solutions conjointly with the most vulnerable countries. June 2010 European Environment Agency General support to framing the forward-looking assessment component of the SOER 2010 Part A 57 6. REFERENCES 1 United States Joint Forces Command 2010 Joint Operating Environment Report. Available at: www.jfcom.mil/newslink/storyarchive/2010/JOE_2010_o.pdf Based on U.S. Census Bureau International Data Base (IDB) www.census.gov/ipc/www/idb/country.php 2 Eurostat press release, Population projections 2008-2060. From 2015, deaths projected to outnumber births in the EU27. Almost three times as many people aged 80 or more in 2060. 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