YMUN SPECPOL Topic Paper B

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Topic
Paper B
Topic: Situation in Kashmir
Yale Model United Nations XXXIV
SPECPOL
Chris Kaimmer
Shazan Jiwa
YMUN XXXIV: SPECPOL Topic Paper B |2
Letter from the Undersecretary General
Dear Delegates,
A warm welcome to YMUN XXXIV and to General Assembly Committees! My name is
Andrew Dean and I have the pleasure of serving as your Under Secretary General. I am currently
a sophomore in beautiful Silliman College here at Yale. I was born and raised in the distant land
of the Midwest, specifically Milwaukee, WI—and yes, I am most definitely a Packers fan. I
began my Model UN career as a delegate at this same conference five years ago, and have since
developed a passion for international studies. If all goes according to plan, I hope to combine the
International Studies major with either History or Political Science. In my free time I work in the
Silliman College Master’s Office, participate in the Yale branch of the ACLU, and indulge in the
occasional game of Halo.
The challenges and rewards of GA committees lie in their large size, and therefore the
increased importance of compromise. As delegates you’ll be tasked with making convincing
arguments in front of your peers and crafting resolutions that balance your personal goals as
nation-states with the need for international support of your views. Your chairs have chosen
fascinating topics this year, ranging from conflict diamonds in Africa, to the issue of private
military contractors, to the brewing external debt crisis. Furthermore, we’ve decided to
experiment with the format of several committees this year in hopes of making them more
dynamic, varied, and memorable experiences for you as delegates.
The talented and enthusiastic chairs and staff of the GA committees for YMUN XXXIV
will do everything to make your experience here at YMUN a great one. To that end, they have
prepared thorough topic guides for your committees; these should be your first stop in preparing,
though research into your specific country is also necessary to be an effective delegate. If you
have any questions about the committees, background guides, or YMUN in general, don’t
hesitate to contact me or your committee chairs.
I look forward to welcoming you all to General Assembly Committees in January!
Sincerely,
Andrew Dean
Under Secretary General, General Assembly Committees
Yale Model United Nations 2008
andrew.dean@yale.edu
YMUN XXXIV: SPECPOL Topic Paper B |3
Letter from the Chair
Dear Delegates,
It is my pleasure to welcome you to the SPECPOL committee at YMUN XXXIV. I am looking
forward to working with all of you during the conference. The DAIS has worked incredibly hard
to ensure that you all have an exciting experience.
Let me first introduce myself. My name is Shazan Jiwa and I am a Junior, majoring in Political
Science. I am a member of the Model UN Travel Team at Yale and I’ve been fortunate to attend
several conferences in the USA and throughout the world (If any of you want to hear more about
Model UN on the college circuit, feel free to shoot me an email or ask me during conference).
Outside of school, I love traveling (this year I will be going to Kenya, Hong Kong, Turkey, and
Greece) and I am a huge fan of the New England Patriots.
My Co-Chair is Chris Kaimmer, who is also a Junior at Yale, double majoring in History and
Political Science. He brings a wealth of Model UN experience to the committee as he was the
Vice-Chair of the FIFA Committee at this year’s college conference and the International
Olympic Committee at last year’s YMUN. Chris hails from Seattle and is a big soccer fan (in
fact he went to the last World Cup in Germany).
Our goal is to make sure that YMUN is a fun, memorable experience for all of you. We will
hopefully have some guest speakers for our committee and some fun activities planned
throughout the conference. Moreover, we want to be responsive to the committee’s needs.
During the conference, I’d be happy to meet with any of you to discuss your ideas for the
committee, working papers, resolutions, etc. In addition, if any of you have questions about the
committee, please don’t hesitate to contact me beforehand (Shazan.jiwa@yale.edu). That being
said, we also hope that all of you will take time to read this guide and be adequately prepared for
the committee. This guide is really only a starting point: be sure to research your country’s
policy in depth and study some of the resolutions that are mentioned in order to gain a better
understanding of the issues at hand. The bloc positions have been kept short intentionally to
encourage you to learn more about your country’s respective policies. The bibliographies should
also help you all in terms of locating pertinent information.
I am excited to work with all of you and I hope that all of you come out of YMUN with a greater
understanding and appreciation for international diplomacy through our interactions.
Best of luck in your preparation for committee,
Chris and Shaz
Co-Chairs, SPECPOL
YMUN XXXIV: SPECPOL Topic Paper B |4
History of the Committee
Topic: Situation in Kashmir
The Special Political and Decolonization
Committee (SPECPOL), originally the
Special Committee on Decolonization, is the
Fourth Committee of the General Assembly.
It has been integral in promoting “social,
economic, political and educational progress
in the Territories, to assist in developing
appropriate forms of self-government and to
take into account the political aspirations
and stages of development and advancement
of each Territory.”1 One cannot
underestimate the role that SPECPOL has
played: since the inception of the UN, more
than 80 former colonies have gained
independence. SPECPOL, through its
numerous resolutions and debate, has
promoted the self-determination of states
and decolonization efforts. Indeed, in 1960,
the Declaration on the Granting of
Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples stated that “all people have a right
to self-determination and proclaimed that
colonialism should be brought to a speedy
and unconditional end.”2
Since the partition of the sub-continent in
1947, India and Pakistan have contested the
territorial rights to the Princely State of
Kashmir and Jammu. Indeed, there has been
tremendously rivalry between these two
states, and while there have been attempts to
pacify conflict through cease fires and
potential plebiscites, these have ended up
failing. In the wake of a potential nuclear
arms race and a looming civil conflict within
Pakistan, SPECPOL needs to find some way
of resolving the situation in Kashmir in
order to prevent further conflict.
History of the Problem
The concept of creating two separate states
out of the Indian subcontinent to account for
religious differences was first conceived by
Chaudhuri Rahmat Ali in 1933; Pakistan
would consist of the northwestern provinces
of India which predominantly consisted of
Muslims and the Princely State of Kashmir
and Jammu. Pakistan is in fact an acronym:
“P for Punjab, A for the Afghanis of the
north-west frontier, K for Kashmir, S for
Sind and Tan denoting Baluchistan. The
word also means land of the pure in Urdu.”3
1
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpi/decolonization/history.h
tm
2
ibid
3
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/in_depth/south
_asia/2002/india_pakistan/timeline/1947.stm
YMUN XXXIV: SPECPOL Topic Paper B |5
In 1947, when Great Britain finally agreed
to the partition of India, over 560 princely
states had the option of joining Pakistan or
India, or becoming Independent States as
long as the decision considered the state's
geographical position and the religion of
their inhabitants. Kashmir was
predominantly populated by Muslims; the
1947 consensus revealed that Kashmir "was
77 per cent Muslim. Hence, it was
anticipated that the Maharaja would accede
to Pakistan, when the British paramountcy
ended on 14-15 August. When he hesitated
to do this, Pakistan launched a guerilla
onslaught meant to frighten its ruler into
submission. Instead the Maharaja appealed
to Mountbatten for assistance, and the
Governor-General agreed on the condition
that the ruler accede to India.”4
The Instrument of Accession was signed on
October 26, 1947 by Maharaja Singh and it
effectively aligned Kashmir with India.
Upon this agreement, Indian soldiers entered
Kashmir and occupied a small territory,
driving all Pakistani troops out of the area. It
is important to note that the Accession
agreement emphasized the importance of
considering the political and religious views
of the inhabitants of Kashmir and that before
the accession became official, this would
need to be verified by popular referendum.
The United Nations Security Council passed
Resolution 38 which “called upon both the
Governments of India and Pakistan to take
immediately all measures within their power
(including public appeals to their people)
calculated to improve the situation, and to
refrain from making any statements and
from doing or causing to be done or
permitting any acts which might aggravate
the situation.”5 The President of the Security
Council proposed mediating immediate
dialogue between both heads of state. In
Resolution 39, passed on January 20, 1948,
the Security Council proposed the creation
of a commission of three representatives,
one selected by India, one by Pakistan, and
the third member a common person chosen
by the two governments. This commission
would engage the two countries to find
common ground, investigate the conflict,
and implement future resolutions passed by
the Security Council.
Resolution 47 passed in April 1948 “noted
with satisfaction that both India and Pakistan
desire that the question of the accession of
Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan
should be decided through the democratic
method of a free and impartial plebiscite.”6
In calling for a plebiscite to be held so that
Kashmir was aligned with the political
orientation of its inhabitants, the resolution
called for the withdrawal of Pakistani
nationals “not normally resident therein who
have entered the State for the purpose of
fighting and to prevent any intrusion into the
State of such elements and any furnishing of
5
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/N
R0/047/63/IMG/NR004763.pdf?OpenElement
6
4
Stein, Burton. 1998. A History of India. Oxford
University Press. Page 368.
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/N
R0/047/72/IMG/NR004772.pdf?OpenElement
YMUN XXXIV: SPECPOL Topic Paper B |6
material aid to those fighting in the state.”7
India was called upon to reduce its military
presence in the area to a minimum and
follow certain provisions in order to allow
for a peaceful plebiscite to occur. In
addition, citizens who had been forced to
leave their homes due to violence in the area
would be invited back to vote in the
plebiscite. In essence, Resolution 47 set the
guidelines for a plebiscite that was supposed
to be supervised by the UN.
The first ever Indo-Pakistani War would
escalate in May 1948, “when the regular
Pakistani army was called upon to protect
Pakistan's borders. Fighting continued
throughout the year between Pakistani
irregular troops and the Indian army.”8
Nehru used this fighting as an excuse to not
have a plebiscite: Pakistani presence in
Kashmir violated the terms of the UN
Security Council Resolution and therefore
there could not be such a vote. On January
1, 1949, the UN finally brokered a deal
between the two countries and a cease-fire
line was drawn where the fighting had
stopped. The resolution passed included the
presence of a peacekeeping force in the area
(United Nations Military Observer Group in
India and Pakistan). However, a referendum
never happened. “In 1954 Jammu and
Kashmir's accession to India was ratified by
the state's constituent assembly and in 1957
it approved its own constitution. To the west
of the ceasefire line, Pakistan controls
roughly one third of the state. A small
region, which the Pakistanis call Azad
(Free) Jammu and Kashmir, and the Indians
call Pakistani-occupied Kashmir, is semiautonomous. The larger area, which includes
the former kingdoms of Hunza and Nagar,
7
ibid
called the northern areas, is directly
administered by Pakistan.”9
The second Indo-Pakistani war saw Pakistan
launch an attack across the cease-fire line
and India responding by invading Lahore.
The UN established another cease-fire and
through the Tashkent agreements, both
countries stressed the importance of having
a peaceful solution to the dispute. Tensions
would escalate again in 1971 when India
assisted Bangladesh or East Pakistan in its
secession from
Pakistan, which
was plagued by
civil war. Again,
the UN Security
Council
intervened and
passed Resolution 307 calling for another
cease fire in the province.
Throughout the late 1980s and 1990s, a
military Islamic movement began in
Kashmir. “In 1989 armed resistance to
Indian rule began in the Kashmir valley.
Muslim political parties complained that the
1987 elections to the state's legislative
assembly were rigged against them, and they
formed militant wings.”10 India claimed that
these groups were sponsored (supplied and
trained) by Pakistan and demanded that it
stop sponsoring cross-border terrorism. That
being said, regardless of whether or not
Pakistan was to blame for this growing
movement, Kashmir has yet to conduct a
legally binding plebiscite to take into
account the views of its inhabitants.
9
ibid
8
10
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/in_depth/south
_asia/2002/india_pakistan/timeline/1947_48.stm
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/in_depth/south
_asia/2002/india_pakistan/timeline/1989.stm
YMUN XXXIV: SPECPOL Topic Paper B |7
Current Situation
Nuclear Arms Race
Although both India and Pakistan made an
agreement in 1988 that they would not
attack each other’s nuclear facilities, there is
reason to believe otherwise as the arms race
between the two countries has escalated. In
May 1998, India conducted underground
nuclear tests in Rajasthan, which Pakistan
responded to by conducting six tests in
Baluchistan. Additionally, Pakistan tested
the Ghauri missile, its longest range missile
which could strike targets 932 miles away.
While many states placed sanctions on these
countries for these tests, these have since
been lifted. Both countries still have
significant nuclear capacities and neither is
partisan to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty, which means that there is no
international verification of these systems by
the International Atomic Energy Agency.
The use of nuclear weapons by either of
these states could have a disastrous impact
on the Southeast Asian region.
Cease-Fire
Cease-fire agreements have consistently
been violated by both Pakistan and India. In
1999, Pakistani troops were caught in the
mountain region of the Indian-administrated
portion of Kashmir and were met with air
strikes from India. “At the height of the
conflict, thousands of shells were fired daily,
and India launched hundreds of air strikes.
The Red Cross reported that at least 30,000
people had been forced to flee their homes
on the Pakistani side of the Line of Control.
Correspondents reported that about 20,000
people became refugees on the Indian
side.”11 Pakistan was told to withdraw its
11
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/in_depth/south
_asia/2002/india_pakistan/timeline/1999.stm
troops from the Indian administered
territory. While a new cease-fire was agreed
upon, this event, along with previous
violations, demonstrates that neither party
consistently follows through with these
agreements. There have been recent terrorist
attacks as of 2001 on the Kashmiri
Assembly as well.
Respect for self-determination
To date, Security Council Resolution 47 has
not been upheld, which is of deep concern to
the international community. SPECPOL
stresses the importance of self-determination
for people of decolonized territories. While
Pakistan strongly supports a plebiscite in
order to garner the opinion of the inhabitants
(which are predominantly Muslim), India
asserts that the Instrument of Accession
legally makes Kashmir part of India. There
have been several disagreements between
the two as to whether or not Indian troops
were in Kashmir before or after the
Instrument of Accession was signed by the
Maharaja. That being said, the Security
Council had intended for a plebiscite to
occur shortly after it passed its resolution in
1948 and this should be respected. Pakistan
and India view Kashmir as important to
nationalist sentiment—Pakistan for Muslim
Unity, and India for the secularist
movement.
Situation in Pakistan
While the
international
community initially
condemned General
Pervez Musharraf’s
military coup in
Pakistan in October
1999 when he deposed elected Prime
Minister Nawaz Sharif, it has become more
receptive to this regime due to the role it has
YMUN XXXIV: SPECPOL Topic Paper B |8
played in the post 9/11 World. Musharaff’s
support in the War on Terror has been
crucial in furthering the United States’
efforts to eliminate terrorist networks.
While Musharraf was re-elected in October
of 2007, this victory has been widely
contested by the Pakistani Supreme Court
due to the fact that he was President and in
command of the armed forces at the same
time. In response he declared the country in
a state of emergency in order to assume
power. While it seems that he will resign as
head of the Pakistani army in order to quell
any challenges to his presidency, the
political climate in Pakistan is still very
unstable. Despite this turmoil, the
international community is also in a weak
position to intervene given Musharraf’s role
in the War on Terror. The international
community must be very careful if it was to
place sanctions or go against the actions of
the current regime as it could undo much of
the progress made against terrorism, and
could lead to a potential backlash in the
Middle East.
Bloc Positions
Americas
The United States should act cautiously
given its cordial ties to both India and
Pakistan. Nonetheless, it has a very unique
relationship with Pakistan due to the War on
Terror and the USA should consider
supporting efforts that aim to have a
plebiscite within Kashmir to determine
whether the territory goes to India, Pakistan,
or becomes independent. Most of the North
and South American countries do not have a
vested interest in this topic but would favor
a plebiscite nonetheless.
Europe
Europe is very aware of the potential danger
of nuclear proliferation by these two states
and should push for agreements to be made
that ensure that neither India nor Pakistan
attacks each other with nuclear weapons.
Europe should push for greater cooperation
between the two and the rest of the
international community with regard to their
nuclear programs especially given the
presence of UN Peacekeepers along the
Cease Fire Line in Kashmir. Many European
countries might also favor a plebiscite The
United Kingdom should be in line with
European Policy but it should be cautious on
the issue of the plebiscite since it supported
the initial Instrument of Accession, although
it does support plans that would stabilize the
area.
Asia and Oceania
Most Asian countries should be worried
about the destabilizing effect that the current
situation between India and Pakistan is
bringing to the area. These countries should
favor solutions that address the nuclear arms
race between the two. Some countries might
even consider the impact of instability
within Pakistan on neighboring areas if the
situation escalates beyond what it currently
is. That being said, there would need to be
sufficient proof that political instability in
Pakistan would affect neighboring areas
(otherwise it would merely be a matter that
could only be dealt with by Pakistan given
territorial sovereignty).
Africa
African Countries would support a plebiscite
and/or be in favor of ways that address the
aspirations of self-determination for the
Kashmiri people.
YMUN XXXIV: SPECPOL Topic Paper B |9
Bibliography
Haider, Masood. Kashmir Dispute: Islamabad demands Proactive UN Role. Accessed online at:
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/ind-pak/001020.htm
Stein, Burton. A History of India. Oxford University Press, England: 1998, pp 368.
India and Pakistan. Accessed online at: http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/indindx.htm
India-Pakistan: Troubled Relations. Accessed online at:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/in_depth/south_asia/2002/india_pakistan/timeline/default.stm
UN Security Council Resolution 38. Accessed online at:
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/047/63/IMG/NR004763.pdf?OpenElement
UN Security Council Resolution 47. Accessed online at:
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/047/72/IMG/NR004772.pdf?OpenElement
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