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Social Transmission of Cultural Practices and Implicit Attitudes
Yoshihisa Kashima
Simon M. Laham
Jennifer Dix
Bianca Levis
Darlene Wong
Melissa Wheeler
Melbourne School of Psychological Sciences
The University of Melbourne
Running Head: Cultural transmission of practice and attitudes
Keywords: culture, cultural dynamics, laboratory microculture, cultural transmission, cultural
practice, implicit attitudes
Correspondence:
Yoshihisa Kashima
Melbourne School of Psychological Sciences
The University of Melbourne
Parkville, Victoria 3010
Australia
Email: ykashima@unimelb.edu.au
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Abstract
Cultural dynamics were examined in an experimental setting to investigate the mechanisms
of transmission of cultural practices (what people typically do) and implicit attitudes at the
micro-level, and the maintenance of transmitted cultural traits at the macro-level. A cover
story of a fictitious group was used to establish “microcultures” within the laboratory and to
gauge the effect of culture on practices and attitudes across two generations of experimental
participants (cultural oldtimers and newcomers). The results suggested that cultural practices
and implicit attitudes are transmitted through two distinct mechanisms: cultural practices
through explicit instructions and imitation; implicit attitudes through newcomers’
observations of oldtimers’ performance and, presumably, automatic attitude inference.
Furthermore, cultural practices were maintained across generations by explicit instructions,
but implicit attitudes were better maintained by institutionalizing “the way of life” as a
cultural given. Implications of the findings for organizational behavior and the limitations
and advantages of experimental investigations of cultural dynamics are discussed.
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The interface between culture and psychology has been a significant research topic in
recent times. Following a steady, decades-long development in cross-cultural psychology
(e.g., Segall, Lonner, & Berry, 1998), kicked off by Hofstede’s (1980) empirical work and
Shweder’s (1991) meta-theoretical argument, cross-cultural research has flourished into a
major field of inquiry (e.g., Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan,
2001; Triandis, 1989; see Kashima & Gelfand, 2012, on the history of culture research).
Although cross-cultural research tends to highlight stable aspects of culture (Kashima, 2000a),
culture – both within organizations and in society more broadly – obviously changes over
time (e.g., Twenge, Campbell, & Freeman, 2012; Uhls & Greenfield, 2011; Wolff, Medin, &
Pankratz, 1999). Particularly in light of ongoing globalization (e.g., Chiu, Gries, Torelli, &
Cheng, 2011; Hermans & Kempen, 1998), cultural dynamics – stability and change of culture
over time – has become a significant research question (e.g., Kashima, 2000a; Leung, Qui,
Ong, & Tam, 2011).
A prominent meta-theoretical approach to cultural dynamics (e.g., Boyd & Richerson,
1986; Campbell, 1975; Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, 1981; Dawkins, 1976; Sperber, 1996; for
an overview, see Kashima, 2008; Mesoudi, 2009) takes the view that culture is primarily
formed, maintained, and transformed through the generation, transmission, and retention of
non-genetically transmissible information within a human population. According to this view,
social transmission of information is the engine of cultural dynamics. Nonetheless, a number
of questions remain about the mechanisms of cultural transmission. Although some
perspectives such as Dawkins’s meme theory have left them unanswered, others (e.g.,
Sperber, 1996; Tomasello, 1999) have taken them very seriously indeed. In considering
human cultural dynamics, what is critical is an examination of a unique set of cultural
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transmission mechanisms that humans possess at their disposal, and that is the focus of the
present research.
To answer the questions of mechanism of cultural transmission, an experimental
approach is beneficial. Although experimental investigation of cultural dynamics began more
than half a century ago (e.g., Gerard, Kluckhohn, & Rapoport, 1956; Rose & Felton, 1955), it
had a long period of dormancy only to find its renaissance in the past decade (e.g., Bangarter,
2000; Kashima, 2000a; see Kashima, 2008, for a review). Extending this research tradition,
we investigate micro-level cognitive and macro-level institutional mechanisms of the
transmission of implicit attitudes. Attitudes are explicit or implicit predispositions to think,
feel, or behave favourably or unfavourably towards an object or a class of objects; widely
held attitudes have always been regarded as an important aspect of culture (e.g., Triandis,
1971). Implicit attitudes – introspectively unidentified (or inaccurately identified) traces of
past experience that mediate favorable or unfavorable feeling, thought, or action toward
social objects (e.g., Greenwald, Banaji, Pratkanis, & Breckler, 1981) – pose a particularly
intriguing question about cultural transmission. Although they are widely distributed within a
population, thus forming part of a culture (e.g., gender-based implicit attitudes to maths and
science, e.g., Nosek, Smyth, Sriram, Lindner, Devos, et al., 2009; implicit prejudice towards
minorities, e.g., Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald, 2002; see Dasgupta, 2004, for a review), they
are presumably neither directly observable nor (necessarily) verbalized. Individuals in a
society, then, cannot acquire their implicit attitudes by simply observing others’ implicit
attitudes or by explicit communication. How, then, are implicit attitudes transmitted?
Micro-Mechanisms of Implicit Attitude Transmission
A potential mechanism is the observation of others’ behavioral enactment of cultural
practices. Cultural practices include all forms of behaviors that are culturally meaningful;
examples include conventionalized nonverbal behaviors (e.g., greetings such as handshaking,
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bowing, nose touching) through to typical styles of language use (e.g., use of adjectives vs.
verbs; Kashima, Kashima, Kim, & Gelfand, 2006) and more complex sequences of
coordinated actions supported by social institutions (e.g., buying and selling, going to a
restaurant, visiting a dentist, and other types of actions typically called scripts; e.g., Bower,
Black, & Turner, 1979; Schanck & Abelson, 1977; Triandis, Marin, Lisansky, & Betancourt,
1984). Importantly, some cultural practices imply favourable or unfavourable responses
towards objects, thus people may acquire implicit attitudes by observing others’ enactment of
such attitude-implying cultural practices (see Weisbuch & Ambady, 2008, for a similar
argument).
Consistent with this, Weisbuch, Ambady, and their colleagues showed that people’s
implicit attitudes are significantly influenced by the observation of others’ nonverbal
behavior. In particular, Weisbuch, Pauker, and Ambady (2009) found that popular US TV
series exhibited different degrees of pro-white (vs. pro-black) nonverbal bias – nonverbal
behaviours directed to whites were more positive relative to those directed to blacks; and that
TV viewers’ exposure to pro-white nonverbal bias correlated with their pro-white implicit
attitudes. Furthermore, when people were experimentally exposed to pro-white, pro-black, or
no clips (control), those who were exposed to pro-black clips showed less pro-white implicit
attitudes than those in the other conditions, providing evidence for a causal effect of observed
nonverbal race bias on implicit attitudes. Weisbuch and Ambady (2009) replicated these
findings for nonverbal and implicit attitudinal biases for slim vs. overweight women as well,
by showing that exposure to pro-overweight TV clips resulted in a lower pro-slim implicit
attitudinal bias. Interestingly, the effect of observed nonverbal bias on attitudinal bias was
mediated by people’s beliefs about the cultural ideal (i.e., the body size they thought was
most highly culturally valued).
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These findings suggest that implicit attitudes may be transmitted by observing others’
cultural practices – evaluatively-laden nonverbal behaviors in this instance. This points to
intriguing possibilities regarding the mechanisms of cultural transmission for cultural
practices and implicit attitudes more broadly (see Figure 1).
Transmission of Cultural Practices. First of all, cultural practices may be
transmitted by imitation. That is, those who are new to a cultural group (i.e., newcomers)
imitate the cultural practices enacted by those who have been in the group for some time (i.e.,
oldtimers); in so doing, the newcomers learn to perform the oldtimers’ cultural practices. A
number of theorists, past and present, have suggested that imitation is one of the central
mechanisms of cultural transmission (e.g., Smith, 1759; Tarde, 1903; Tomasello, Kruger, &
Ratner, 1993; see Allport, 1935, for a review).
The common coding model provides a contemporary account of imitation (e.g.,
Hommel, Musseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001; Prinz, 1997). According to this, an action
representation or ‘event code’ contains representations of motor action (B: bodily movement)
and its typical effects (E: anticipated proprioceptive and visual information; Hommel et al.,
2001). First of all, if newcomers and oldtimers develop similar action representations (i.e.,
knowing that a given motor action produces a given effect; B→E), then the newcomers’
viewing the oldtimers’ motor actions (i.e., observation of B→E) is likely to predispose the
newcomers to imitate. Indeed, evidence suggests that people tend to copy one another’s
behaviors (e.g., Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Dijksterhuis & Bargh, 2001; see Chartrand & van
Baaren, 2009, for a review). Therefore, newcomers’ viewing of the oldtimers’ enactment of
cultural practices should predispose them to enact the same cultural practices if they are
supposed to perform the same motor actions as the oldtimers.
(H1a) Newcomers imitate oldtimers’ behaviors.
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It also follows that, when the newcomers’ view of the oldtimers’ motor actions is obstructed
(i.e., newcomers cannot observe oldtimers’ A), they are less likely to imitate (see McShane,
Bradlow, & Berger, 2012).
(H1b) Obstructing newcomers’ perceptions of the oldtimers’ behavior reduces
imitation.
The foregoing discussion has presumed that newcomers are required to perform the
same motor actions as oldtimers. However, in some circumstances, task constraints may
require newcomers to perform somewhat different motor actions to produce the same end
results. For example, if a new tool or machinery is introduced to harvest fruits or to hunt for
animals, newcomers would have to perform somewhat different motor actions, to produce the
same effects (i.e., fruits and animals). The common coding model suggests that even if
newcomers have to perform different motor actions to produce the same effects (i.e., B’→E
when oldtimers perform B→E), their viewing the oldtimers’ producing those effects (i.e.,
observation of E) should predispose the newcomers to perform them (e.g., Bekkering,
Wohlschläger, & Gattis, 2000; Brass, Bekkering, & Prinz, 2001; Brass, Bekkering,
Wohlschläger, & Prinz, 2000; Kilner, Paulignan, & Blakemore, 2003). This is often called
emulation (e.g., Whiten, McGuigan, Marshall-Pescini & Hopper, 2009; we do not follow this
terminology here to avoid complication). Therefore, even if newcomers are to perform motor
actions that are different from oldtimers’, they “imitate” those actions that reproduce the
same effects.
(H1c) Newcomers imitate oldtimers’ cultural practices if they have the same effects
even though their motor actions are different.
Transmission of Implicit Attitudes. Implicit attitudes may be transmitted through
two potential mechanisms. One is embodiment. Newcomers’ own enactment of the
evaluatively-laden cultural practices, which have been acquired from the oldtimers, may
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“embody” or activate attitudes towards the objects (e.g., Cacioppo, Priester, & Berntson,
1993; Niedenthal, Barsalou, Winkielman, Krauth-Gruber, & Ric, 2005). Motor actions
directed towards objects often carry evaluative connotations. For instance, the simple act of
pulling (vs. pushing) a joystick (e.g., Kawakami, Phills, Steele, & Dovidio, 2007) can
produce positive (vs. negative) attitudes towards objects to which the bodily movements are
directed (also see Cacioppo et al., 1993). Although recent research suggests that mere motor
action may be insufficient for the formation of implicit attitudes (e.g., Vandensbosch & De
Houer, 2010), if the motor actions are unambiguously framed as approach or avoidance, they
can be a reliable basis for implicit attitudes (Laham, Kashima, Dix, Wheeler, & Levis, 2013)1.
The other mechanism is inference. Newcomers observe oldtimers’ enactment of
cultural practice and infer the latter’s goals, such as gaining rewards and avoiding costs (e.g.,
Hassin, Aarts, & Ferguson, 2005). If the goal of approaching a desired object (vs. avoiding an
undesired object) is attributed to the oldtimer’s action, newcomers are likely to form a
positive (vs. negative) implicit attitude towards the object to which this behavior is directed.
This hypothesis is in line with a constructivist view of culture (e.g., Hong, Morris, Chiu, &
Benet-Martínez, 2000; Kashima, 2000b), which regards cultural knowledge as constructed by
every generation on the basis of a prior generation’s ideas and practices. It can be contrasted
to the replicator model of cultural transmission well represented by Dawkins’ (1976) meme
theory, which regards cultural transmission as a “replication” of a cultural unit from one
person to another. As criticized by Sperber (1996), a simple replicator model ignores the
mechanisms of cognition and communication. In the constructivist view, on the other hand,
social transmission of implicit attitudes is not so much a replication as a reconstruction – the
view of the mind espoused by researchers of human cognition (Bartlett, 1932; see Kashima,
2000b). Thus, we test the following two hypotheses:
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(H2a) If embodiment mediates transmission, newcomers’ performance of cultural
practices should predict their implicit attitudes, and therefore factors that affect
newcomers’ imitation of cultural practices should also affect their implicit
attitudes.
(H2b) If only inference mediates transmission, oldtimers’ cultural practices should
predict newcomers’ implicit attitudes, and factors that affect newcomers’
imitation should not affect their implicit attitudes.
Macro-level Trends and Mechanisms of Cultural Transmission
These micro-level mechanisms can have macro-level consequences (see Berger,
Bradlow, Braunstein, & Zhang, 2012; Berger & Le Mens, 2009; Salganik, Dodds, & Watts,
2006). That is, the social transmission of information almost always involves an information
loss at both interpersonal and intrapersonal levels (Kashima, 2009). When information about
a cultural practice is transmitted from an oldtimer to a newcomer, the newcomer is unlikely to
learn it exactly the same way as did the oldtimer; after acquiring a cultural practice (albeit
imperfectly), the newcomer is likely to forget some aspects of it and unlikely to reproduce it
completely faithfully (cf. Weick & Gilfillan, 1971). Consequently, when cultural practices
are transmitted in the laboratory, there is an intergenerational dilution as opposed to
intensification. The amount of information that a later generation holds is almost always less
than that which an earlier generation holds in the transmission of laboratory microculture.
A well known example comes from Jacobs and Campbell (1961). These researchers
first installed an arbitrary norm in an experimental group by using Sherif’s (1935) autokinetic effect paradigm. For instance, a first generation, three-person group had two
confederates, who publicly reported consistently large autokinetic movements. The one
naïve participant reported a similarly large autokinesis, replicating Sherif. In the second
generation, one of the confederates was replaced by a naïve newcomer, and then in the third
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generation, the other confederate was replaced, and so on, each generation introducing
another newcomer. Up to about the fifth or sixth generation, newcomers reported somewhat
larger autokinetic movements relative to the control condition. In essence, Jacobs and
Campbell (1961) demonstrated the transmission of a cultural practice of reporting large
autokinetic movements over generations; however, the naïve newcomers reported less and
less extreme autokinesis over generations. Thus, the experimentally created norm eventually
diminished in influence, showing an intergenerational dilution. Similarly, when one
generation of participants transmits information to a second generation, who in turn transmits
to a third generation, and so on, Kashima and his colleagues’ studies (e.g., Clark & Kashima,
2007; Kashima, 2000b; A. Lyons & Kashima, 2003), as well as classic studies that used
similar methods (e.g., Allport & Postman, 1947; Bartlett, 1932), consistently reported a
gradual loss of the original information.
The intergenerational dilution makes what Tomasello (1999) called a ratchet effect
even more intriguing. According to him, one of the most distinctive features of human culture
is its cumulativeness. When a cultural invention occurs, it is often transmitted relatively
faithfully to the next generation and then forms a basis for further elaboration or
improvement (also see Caldwell & Millen, 2009). Even though non-human primates as well
as other animal species transmit cultural practices over generations (for a review, see Whiten
& Mesoudi, 2008), humans appear to be better than other species at the social learning of
what others do (over-imitation; Lyons, Young, & Keil, 2007; see also Whiten, McGuigan,
Marshall-Pescini & Hopper, 2009). Yet, even in adult Homo sapiens, we observe
intergenerational dilutions in the lab.
In reality, humans have developed macro-level mechanisms that can reduce
intergenerational dilution by improving the fidelity of cultural transmission and stabilising
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culture over time. Here, we examine two such mechanisms: explicit instruction and
institutionalization.
Explicit Instruction. Explicit instruction occurs in most, if not all, human societies
(e.g., Csibra & Gergely, 2011; Paradise & Rogoff, 2009; Tomasello et al., 1993). Some
instruction takes the form of formal education at school or at work; others may be more
informal, such as subtle feedback about mistakes (see Paradise & Rogoff, 2009). Via both
formal and informal routes, newcomers to a culture acquire its cultural practices and
associated attitudes. Not only cultures of large collectives, but also organizational cultures
are transmitted by a combination of explicit socialization tactics as well as newcomers’
spontaneous learning (e.g., Kunda, 1992; see Chao, 2012, for recent review). However, to the
best of our knowledge, there does not seem to be a direct test of the idea that transmission of
cultural practices and implicit attitudes occurs with higher fidelity when newcomers are
explicitly instructed to learn than when they are not.
Regarding explicit instructions, an analogy may be drawn with intentional (vs.
incidental) learning, in which people are either explicitly instructed (or not) to learn
sequences of behaviors. Recent research has found that some behavioral sequences, which
may be broadly likened to cultural practices, are more easily learned in intentional than
incidental conditions, but other sequences are better learned under incidental than intentional
conditions (e.g., Jones & McLaren, 2009). This suggests that it is not always the case that
cultural practices are likely transmitted better with explicit instructions than without. As well,
the analogy between intentional vs. incidental learning and instructional vs. non-instructional
learning is not perfect. When a cultural practice is instructed to a newcomer, the newcomer’s
learning is likely to be intentional, but when no explicit instruction occurs, it is unclear
whether the learning is intentional or incidental. The newcomer may or may not intentionally
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try to learn the cultural practice or implicit attitude. Furthermore, it is unclear how explicit
instructions of cultural practices affect the transmission of implicit attitudes.
For now, following commonsense notions, we put forward two hypotheses about the
effect of explicit instructions on the transmission of both cultural practices and implicit
attitudes.
(H3a)
Cultural practices are transmitted with higher fidelity with explicit
instructions than without them.
(H3b)
Implicit attitudes are transmitted better with explicit instructions than without
them.
Institutionalization. Institutionalization of a cultural practice can also increase the
fidelity of cultural transmission (Zucker, 1977, 1987; cf. Hughes, 1936). We suggest there are
at least three significant components to the institutionalization of a cultural practice. A
cultural practice is institutionalized to the extent that it is seen to have social fact-like
properties because (a) it is widespread (i.e., most people in a collective have it; descriptive
norm a la Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990), (b) it is embedded in people’s intersubjective
understanding within the collective (not simply an understanding is shared by people, but also
they think that their understanding is shared; see Chiu, Gelfand, Yamagishi, Shteynberg, &
Wan, 2010), and (c) it has a temporal continuity, so that the cultural practice is seen to have
been passed on from one generation to the next in the past, and potentially will be so in the
future. We suggest that these properties make a cultural practice not just what a particular
person does, but what is done as what seems like an objective part of the way of life, or the
way it is, beyond here and now (also see Sani, Bowe, Herrera, Manna, Cossa et al., 2007, for
a related argument).
When institutionalized in this way, a cultural practice is often unquestioned and
alternatives are not considered. Even if it is cognized, questioned, and critically appraised
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personally, it may be taken as a default, routine, and conventional way of doing that cannot
be altered by individual will. Institutionalization may even induce a motivation to acquire and
pass on a practice, so that people who take for granted an institutionalized cultural practice
may learn and transmit it as a matter of course. Arguably, organizations can be construed, at
least in part, as a set of institutionalized cultural practices (e.g., Scott, 2001; Zucker, 1977,
1987).
Zucker (1977) provides evidence for the argument that institutionalization enhances
cultural transmission. She replicated Jacobs and Campbell’s (1961) experiment under several
different conditions. In the personal influence condition, participants were given instructions
to make accurate judgments within a problem solving group. In the organizational context
condition, the instructions emphasized the temporal continuity of the experimental procedure
of the autokinetic movement experiment. Participants were told to regard the experiment as
part of a continuing organization, and that like a real organization, the people who
participated in the procedure changed (and in fact, they replaced oldtimers), but “performance
of any single member may not be important to the organization as long as the job continues to
be done (p. 732).” Zucker found that the arbitrary microcultural practice of reporting large
autokinetic movements persisted in the personal influence condition, but its effect waned
over three generations. When the level of transmission was computed relative to the baseline,
the transmission strength was only .43 out of the maximum of 1.0. In contrast, this index
showed a much greater fidelity of cultural transmission, .88 in the organizational context
condition. Nonetheless, it is unknown whether the same effect occurs for implicit attitudes.
For now, we postulate two hypotheses.
(H4a) Cultural practices are transmitted with higher fidelity with than without
institutionalization.
(H4b) Implicit attitudes are transmitted better with than without institutionalization.
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Overview of the Present Study
We examined the micro- and macro-mechanisms of implicit attitude transmission in a
laboratory setting. In the first phase of the experiment, a participant (oldtimer) was explicitly
instructed and trained to perform a simple learning task called the Individual Push-Pull Task
(IPPT). The cover story instructed participants to imagine being on an alien planet called
Zengor, foraging for four different types of fruits represented by novel visual stimuli
(constructed by Op de Beeck, Torfs, & Wagemans, 2008; see Table 1). They were to collect
two types of fruit, but discard the others. On each trial, an exemplar of a fruit was presented
on a computer screen, and the participant was to either push or pull a joystick to discard or
collect the fruit. Upon pull or push action, the fruit would zoom either towards (collect) or
away from (discard) the participant. The IPPT enculturated oldtimers to form positive and
negative implicit attitudes towards collected and discarded fruits, respectively. After the task,
the oldtimer’s implicit attitudes to the stimuli were measured by an evaluative priming task
(Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986).
In the second phase, a second participant (newcomer) was introduced to the first
participant (oldtimer), and they then performed a two-person version of the same task called
the Joint Push-Pull Task (JPPT), where both the oldtimer and newcomer sat in front of a
computer screen, each with a joystick. As in the first phase, an exemplar of a type of fruit
was presented and one of the participants was to collect or discard it on each trial.
Participants took turns. Importantly, the newcomer received explicit instructions to collect
(or discard) only two types of fruit. For the other two fruits, they were not given any explicit
instruction, and were told that they could either collect or discard as they pleased. This
allowed us to examine the effect of explicit instruction (vs. no instruction) on cultural
transmission. After this joint task, both oldtimers’ and newcomers’ implicit attitudes were
measured using the same evaluative priming task as above.
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Within the experimental paradigm, two different “cultures” were constructed: one that
collected two particular types of fruit (and discarded the other two), and the other with
complementary cultural practices (see Table 1).
Within each culture, there were three different cultural transmission conditions. In the
baseline condition, newcomers sat next to the oldtimers in the joint foraging task, and could
observe (without obstruction) oldtimers’ actions and the effects of those actions while
performing the task. In the low action visibility condition, newcomers’ capacity to imitate
was reduced by placing a screen between the oldtimer and newcomer during the task
(Newcomers could, however, still see the effects of oldtimers’ actions by observing the
direction of stimulus zoom on the screen [see below]). The third, institutionalization,
condition was designed to strengthen cultural transmission by emphasizing the continuity of
the Zengorian culture.
Finally, crossed with culture and transmission conditions, action type was
manipulated. In the match (joystick) condition, newcomers made their collect and discard
responses by performing the same motor actions as the oldtimers, namely, by pulling and
pushing a joystick. In the mismatch (button) condition, newcomers made their responses with
buttons labelled ‘discard’ or ‘collect.’
Method
Participants
Two hundred fifty six students (128 pairs) at the University of Melbourne participated
in this experiment. Two pairs’ data were discarded due to equipment malfunctioning.
Design
The experiment used a three-way, between participants factorial design: 2 (Culture
[what oldtimers were trained to do]: one cultural practice vs. complementary cultural
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practice) x 3 (Cultural transmission condition: baseline vs. low action visibility vs.
institutionalization) x 2 (Action type: match/joystick vs. mismatch/button).
Procedure
Upon arrival, participants were randomly assigned to the roles of oldtimer and
newcomer. Oldtimers and newcomers were both aware of their roles. Oldtimers were told
they would undertake some instructions and training, whereas newcomers were told they
would work on some questionnaires, during the first phase of the session. The oldtimer was
then taken to a nearby testing room to complete the first task, the individual push-pull task
(IPPT) (Laham et al., 2013; Woud et al., 2008), whereas the newcomer remained in the room
and completed a series of questionnaires unrelated to the current study.
Individual Push-Pull Task (IPPT). The task was designed to “enculturate” the
oldtimer, to establish a set of cultural practices, and to condition attitudes towards the novel
stimuli. There were two versions of the IPPT, corresponding to the two ‘culture’ conditions
(see Table 1). In both conditions, the oldtimer was instructed to push (to discard) and pull (to
collect) a joystick with their right hand in response to stimuli shown on a computer monitor
(which particular stimuli were to be pushed/pulled was counterbalanced).
First, the oldtimer read the cover story displayed on the computer monitor asking
them to imagine that they were on a planet called Zengor and that they were to learn aspects
of Zengorian culture, in particular, their foraging traditions. They were told that they were
first to receive training on the “Zengorian way.” They were asked further to imagine that the
stimuli were alien fruits, which they had to learn to collect or discard. Four different
categories of “fruit” were used (Op de Beeck, et al., 2008; see Table 1). These stimuli were
selected as it was assumed that participants would have no clear pre-existing attitudes
towards them. Each category consisted of sixteen exemplars. Following Woud et al. (2008),
two categories of stimuli were tinted blue and the other two categories were tinted red, so that
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participants can learn to collect or discard based on stimulus colour. The oldtimer was
instructed to use the joystick to collect stimuli of one colour, and to discard stimuli of the
other colour. Response-colour and stimulus-colour pairings were counterbalanced across
conditions.
Each trial of the task began with a fixation cross (500 ms), followed by a blank screen
(500 ms), and then a stimulus (a category exemplar) which remained on screen until a
response was made or 3000 ms passed. The participant’s response was recorded when the
joystick moved through 24 degrees from the central position. The next trial was initiated
1500 ms after a lever response was recorded or the preceding stimulus had disappeared from
the screen. Consistent with Woud et al. (2008), a zoom effect was also included to strengthen
the perception of collecting (zoom towards) and discarding (zoom away). When the joystick
was pushed, the onscreen stimulus appeared to zoom away; when pulled, the stimulus
appeared to zoom towards oldtimer. Zoom speed was aligned with response speed.
The IPPT consisted of one practice block of 20 trials (5 trials for each stimulus
category) and five experimental blocks of 64 trials each. Each of the 64 stimuli (16 exemplars
x 4 categories) was presented once in each experimental block in a randomised order.
Therefore, the oldtimer responded 85 times to each stimulus category.
Evaluative Priming Task 1 (EPT1). Following the IPPT, the oldtimer completed an
evaluative priming task (EPT) to measure implicit attitudes. In the EPT, oldtimers
categorized target words as ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ by pressing the Z or M keys, marked
‘POS’ and ‘NEG,’ on a standard computer keyboard (key-valence pairings were
counterbalanced across participants). Six positive and six negative words (e.g., ‘love’, ‘hate’)
were used as targets. Prior to the presentation of a target word, a prime was presented for
300ms. Primes were the 64 stimuli used in the IPPT. In EPT1, stimuli were not coloured.
Participants have come to implicitly associate positive or negative valence with the stimuli. If
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a given stimulus primes a valence then this should facilitate the recognition of the
corresponding word valence. The evaluative priming task consisted of one practice block
containing 10 trials, and one testing block of 128 trials. In the testing block, each of the 64
prime stimuli was presented twice, once with a positive target and once with a negative target.
Apart from this restriction, the order of prime and target word presentation was randomised.
If participants categorised a target word incorrectly or if they did not react at all after 1500ms,
an error message appeared.
Joint Push-Pull Task (JPPT). Following completion of the EPT1, the oldtimer was
moved to an adjoining room which was set-up for the Joint Push-Pull Task (JPPT) – a twoperson extension of the IPPT (see Figure 2). Two seats were positioned in front of a single
computer screen – the oldtimer was seated on the left. Then, the newcomer was brought into
the room and seated on the right. The oldtimer had a joystick identical to that used in the
IPPT. The newcomer, depending on condition, either had a joystick (match/joystick
condition) or two-button button box (mismatch/button condition) at their disposal. In the
match/joystick condition, newcomers were instructed to push/pull the joystick as per
instructions. In the mismatch/button condition, newcomers were instructed to press one of the
two buttons on the button box (left or right), labelled collect and discard. Button-response
pairings were counterbalanced across participants. Although button pushes are more discrete
actions than joystick pulls/pushes, a joystick response was recorded when a small movement
was made (24 degrees); rendering both button and joystick movements similarly discrete
actions based on small movements given the parameters of each device .
In all conditions, the newcomer was given the same cover story as was the oldtimer in
the IPPT. They were told to imagine that they had just landed on the planet Zengor, and were
then presented with the same prototypes of the four categories of Zengorian “fruits” as in the
19
IPPT (Table 1). Both participants were asked to imagine themselves wandering around
Zengor with their partner foraging for fruits.
Unlike in the IPPT, however, stimuli were not coloured in the JPPT. Rather, each
participant received an instruction sheet providing response requirements for different
stimulus categories. These instruction sheets were placed on the oldtimer’s and newcomer’s
desks, each sheet out of sight of the other participant. The instructions for the oldtimer
matched those given during the IPPT, so that they were to collect the same two fruits and
discard the other two. For the newcomer, depending on culture condition, instructions
specified that they were to collect two types of fruit (the two that the oldtimer was instructed
to collect) or discard two types of fruit (the two that the oldtimer was instructed to discard),
but that they could either collect or discard the other two types. Category-response pairings
were partially counterbalanced (see Table 1). Those stimuli for which the oldtimer and
newcomer received the same instructions implemented cultural transmission with explicit
instructions, whereas those stimuli for which the newcomer was free to make either response
afforded an opportunity to examine cultural transmission without explicit instructions.
On each trial, the sequence of events was similar to the IPPT except that the oldtimer
and newcomer took turns to respond. Each trial began with the presentation of an X at the left
or the right of screen to indicate whose turn it was to respond (500 ms), followed by a central
fixation cross (500 ms), a blank screen (500 ms), and then a stimulus , which remained
onscreen until the execution of a response or until 3000 ms had passed. The next trial began
1500 ms after a response was recorded or the stimulus disappeared from the screen. As in the
IPPT, stimuli zoomed toward or away depending on the response made. In the match/joystick
condition, zoom speed tracked joystick movement speed; in the mismatch/button condition, a
button press triggered a fixed duration zoom. Picture size, presentation and zooming of the
stimulus were otherwise the same as in the IPPT.
20
Altogether, the JPPT consisted of one practice block containing 24 trials, and nine
training blocks of 32 trials each. Within the practice block, six exemplars (three each for the
oldtimer and newcomer) were randomly sampled from each fruit category. Within each
training block, eight exemplars were sampled from each category without replacement (four
each for the oldtimer and newcomer); stimulus presentation order was randomized (while of
course maintaining oldtimer-newcomer alternation). Within each trial block, half of the trials
(i.e., 16 trials) were performed by the oldtimer and the other half, by the newcomer, resulting
in the oldtimer and newcomer each responding 35 times to each stimulus category. At the
end of each block, the experimenter pressed the spacebar to progress to the next block.
In the baseline conditions, the oldtimer’s action as well as the stimulus responded to
and action effects (i.e., zoom) were fully visible to the newcomer. However, in the low action
visibility condition, a screen was placed between the oldtimer and newcomer’s seats (see
Figure 2), occluding newcomers’ view of oldtimers’ actions. Note that the newcomer could
see the stimuli and the action effects, but not the executed motor response. In the
institutionalization condition, the physical set up was identical to the baseline condition.
However, to implement Zucker’s (1977) conception of institution, the newcomer was told
that the oldtimer had knowledge about and experience with “the Zengorian ways” as below.
“Your partner has been introduced to the Zengorian culture and has some knowledge
of the Zengorian institution. You can think of yourself as a ‘newcomer’ to the culture and
your partner as an ‘oldtimer’ who has had experience with the Zengorian ways.”
Evaluative Priming Task 2 (EPT2). Following the completion of the JPPT, the
oldtimer returned to room in which they completed the IPPT and the newcomer was taken to
a separate adjoining room. Each then performed an evaluative priming task (EPT2).
Equipment, instructions, targets and primes were the same as those used in EPT1.
21
Questionnaires and Debriefing. After completing EPT2, participants remained in
their rooms in order to complete two questionnaires. One collected demographic information,
while the other contained items not used in the present study. Participants were then given a
funnelled debriefing to determine whether they had any suspicions about the purpose of the
different computer tasks. Finally, they were fully debriefed and thanked for their time.
Results
Oldtimers’ and newcomers’ implicit attitudes were computed, so that positive scores
indicate positive implicit attitudes. The details are reported in the Appendix. We also
examined whether oldtimers performed their cultural practices as instructed, and also to see
whether their implicit attitudes were in line with their cultures. Analyses showed that the
laboratory microcultures were successfully established. The results are reported in the
Appendix.
Micro-Mechanisms of Cultural Transmission: Newcomers’ Action Performance and
Implicit Attitudes
Transmission with Explicit Instruction. We first report newcomers’ actions and
attitudes for the instructed items. Newcomers successfully acquired their cultures with
explicit instructions. They performed their collect and discard actions as instructed in the
JPPT, 95% correct collection (M = 33.27 out of maximum 35) and 89% correct discard (M =
31.16). We examined whether any of the manipulated variables affected their performance by
conducting a general linear model analysis on the number of times the newcomers collected
the instructed items. In this model, we dummy coded cultural transmission condition
(baseline, low visibility, and institutionalization) using two dummy coded variables: action
visibility (0 = baseline; 1 = low visibility; 0 = institutionalization) and institutionalization (0
= baseline; 0 = low visibility; 1 = institutionalization). Thus, predictors were culture
(instructed to collect vs. instructed to discard target stimuli), action type (match/joystick vs.
22
mismatch/button), action visibility, institutionalization as well as all two-way interaction
effects (culture x action type, culture x action visibility, culture x institutionalization, action
type x action visibility, and action type x institutionalization) and three way interaction
effects (culture x action type x action visibility, culture x action type x institutionalization).
As expected, only a culture effect was significant, F(1,113) = 320.61, p < .001, η2p = .74. The
other manipulations did not influence the newcomers’ action performance under these
conditions of explicit instruction (see Appendix for full results).
Newcomers’ implicit attitudes were examined by fitting an analogous general linear
model as that used on actions, this time using EPT2 scores as the dependent variable (see
Appendix). As expected, the effect of culture was significant, F(1,113) = 9.58, p = .002, η2p
= .08. Newcomers developed more positive attitudes towards to-be-collected stimuli (M =
21.22, SE = 6.34) than towards to-be-discarded stimuli (M = -6.28, SE = 6.23). In addition,
the culture x action visibility effect was also significant, F(1,113) = 4.23, p = .042, η2p = .04.
Interestingly, the effect of culture was stronger when the oldtimers’ action was not observable
(M = 33.77 vs. -9.58, t(30) = -2.65, p = .013) than when it was observable (M = 8.67 vs. -2.99,
t(91) = -1.10, ns). Newcomers formed clearer implicit attitudes when they had to focus on the
meaning of the oldtimers’ action (i.e., observable action effects), rather than when they could
simply imitate the oldtimer’s action. No other effects were significant.
Transmission without Explicit Instruction.
Cultural practice. Newcomers’ actions (total number of collections) were subjected
to a general linear model analysis as above. As expected (H1a), cultural practice was
transmitted even in the absence of explicit instruction. A culture effect was significant,
F(1,113) = 54.43, p < .001, η2p = .33. Newcomers collected more when oldtimers collected
(M = 25.50, SE = 1.21) than when they discarded (M = 12.76, SE = 1.23). In addition, as
hypothesized (H1b), action visibility facilitated cultural transmission of practice as indicated
23
by a significant two-way interaction of culture and action visibility, F(1,113) = 4.26, p = .041,
η2p = .04 (Figure 3). The tendency to imitate was stronger when the newcomers could observe
the oldtimers’ actions than when they could not.
Intriguingly, this was further qualified by a three-way interaction involving culture,
action visibility, and action type, F(1, 113) = 4.50, p = .036, η2p = .04. Inspection of the
means suggests that, when the same action was performed (i.e., joystick action), imitation
was greater for visible than invisible actions; however, when newcomers’ response
mismatched oldtimers’ (i.e., button push), visibility of the oldtimer action had a little effect
(see Figure 4). A follow-up analysis confirmed this observation. Consistent with H1b, a
culture main effect and a culture x action visibility interaction was significant for the matched
action type, F(1,58) = 35.27 and 35.27, p < .001 and p = .001, η2p = .38 and .18, ,
respectively; however, consistent with H1c, there was only a main effect of culture for the
mismatched action, F(1,59) = 42.52, p < .001, η2p = .42. In fact, the effect of culture was
present in all conditions except when newcomers performed the same action type with the
oldtimers’ actions being unobservable, t(14) = -1.49, p = .16 (all other |t| > 4.31, p < .001).
Action visibility did not have an effect on imitation when newcomers perform motor actions
that differ from oldtimers’. Also, contrary to H4a, institutionalization did not facilitate the
transmission of cultural practices (see Appendix).
The preceding analyses show that action imitation was a mechanism of the
transmission of cultural practice when there is no explicit instruction. The second generation
learns a cultural practice by observing the first generation’s actions and imitating them. To
further corroborate this, we conducted the same general linear model analysis as above while
replacing manipulated culture with observed oldtimer cultural practice (i.e., oldtimer push
frequency as a covariate). As expected, the main effect of first generation action, first
generation action x action visibility, and first generation action x action visibility x action
24
type interaction effects were all significant, F(1,117) = 99.52, 9.54, and 3.92, p = .000, .003,
and .050, η2p = .46, .08, and .03, respectively.
Implicit attitudes. Newcomers’ implicit attitudes were examined using culture,
cultural transmission condition (baseline, low action visibility, institutionalization; dummy
coded as before), and action type (match vs. mismatch) as predictors in a general linear
model. We hypothesized that if embodiment mediates cultural transmission, the factors that
affected imitation (namely, action visibility) should also affect implicit attitudes (H2a);
however, if inference is the mechanism, they should not (H2b). In line with H2b, only a twoway interaction effect of culture and institutionalization was significant, F(1,113) = 4.60, p
= .034, η2p = .04 (Figure 5). Cultural transmission of attitudes occurred when the foraging
regime was institutionalized: newcomers formed more positive attitudes towards the stimuli
that the oldtimers collected than those stimuli that the oldtimers discarded, t(29) = 2.65, p
= .013. However, cultural transmission did not occur in the absence of institutionalization:
newcomers’ attitudes here were not dependent on oldtimers’ actions, t(92) = -.13, ns.
Contrary to H2a, none of the aforementioned factors that affected newcomers’ cultural
practices had a significant effect on implicit attitudes (see Appendix).
The results suggest that inference mediates implicit attitude transmission (H2b), and
institutionalization facilitates it (H4b). To investigate these possibilities more directly, we
first conducted a general linear model analysis of the newcomers’ implicit attitudes as a
function of the oldtimers’ executed action (i.e., push frequency) and institutionalization.
Recall that there was a culture x institutionalization interaction in the previous analysis.
Again, if inference was a main mechanism for the transmission of implicit attitudes, the
interaction effect of oldtimers’ executed action and institutionalization should obtain. Indeed,
this was the case. The main effect of oldtimer action was significant, F(1,121) = 4.89, p
25
= .029, η2p = .04, and it was qualified by an interaction with institutionalization, F(1,121) =
6.93, p = .010, η2p = .05.
In addition, to test H2a directly, we conducted an analogous analysis with newcomers’
own executed actions as a predictor together with institutionalization, the former of which
should be a predictor if embodiment is at work here. This analysis found neither a main effect
of newcomers’ actions nor an interaction effect of newcomers’ actions and
institutionalization, although the latter interaction was marginally significant, F(1,117) = 3.50,
p = .064, η2p = .03. We therefore included both oldtimers’ and newcomers’ actions and
institutionalization as predictors. None of the effects involving newcomers’ action were
present, Fs < .12, ps > .73, η2p = .00. In contrast, oldtimers’ action and its interaction with
institutionalization were both marginally significant, F(1,119) = 2.36 and 3.33, p = .13
and .07, with reasonable effect sizes, η2p = .02 and .03, respectively. Put differently,
newcomers' implicit attitudes were more affected by the oldtimer’s actions than by their own
actions, suggesting they are not acquired through embodiment. On balance, there is stronger
evidence for the hypothesis (H2b): that cultural transmission of implicit attitudes occurs
through inference.
Summary of Micro-Mechanisms. Explicit instructions clearly enabled newcomers to
acquire cultural practices and implicit attitudes for the instructed items as expected. However,
in the absence of explicit instructions, cultural practices were transmitted through imitation,
whereas implicit attitudes were transmitted though inference. With regard to practice, results
supported H1a, H1b, and H1c. Consistent with the common coding model, when newcomers
performed the same motor actions as oldtimers, preventing the newcomers from viewing the
oldtimers’ action inhibited imitation; however, when newcomers performed different motor
actions to obtain the same effects, preventing the newcomers from viewing the oldtimers’
action had no effect on imitation. Implicit attitudes were transmitted through inference.
26
Consistent with H2b, oldtimers’ actions predicted newcomers’ implicit attitudes; however,
contrary to H2a, newcomers’ actions did not predict their implicit attitudes.
Consistent with H4b, institutionalization facilitated the transmission of implicit
attitudes; however, contrary to H4a, institutionalization did not affect the transmission of
cultural practices. This is again in line with the results that implicit attitudes and cultural
practices are transmitted through different routes. Furthermore, it suggests that the effect of
institutionalization cannot be attributed to demand characteristics of the situation. Had it been
the case, institutionalization should have had a similar effect on both attitudes and practices.
Macro-Mechanisms of Cultural Transmission
Turning to macro-level trends, we expected an intergenerational dilution for cultural
practices and implicit attitudes. However we expected that fidelity of cultural transmission
should be greater with explicit instructions than without for cultural practices (H3a) and
implicit attitudes (H3b). In order to investigate how macro-level mechanisms such as
instruction and institutionalization affect the retention of cultural practice and attitudes, it is
more instructive to analyze the data from a different perspective.
Cultural Practice. We constructed a transmission index in cultural practices for
instructed and uninstructed items by computing a difference score between first generation
and second generation performances. A negative score indicates that the second generation’s
performance was poorer than the first generation’s, so that a negative (positive) score means
a dilution (intensification) of cultural practice. We conducted a general linear model analysis
with instruction (explicit instruction is present, i.e., instructed items vs. absent, i.e.,
uninstructed items; repeated measures factor), culture, action visibility, institutionalization,
and action type as predictors. First of all, consistent with H3a, the grand mean of transmission
index was -4.52 (SE = .40), and highly significant, F(1,117) = 126.16, p < .001, η2p = .52,
suggesting that there was a weakening of cultural practice from the first to the second
27
generation. However, the dilution was much less when explicit instruction was present (M =
1.18, SE = .511) than when it was not (M = -10.23, SE = .68), F(1,117) = 161.13, p < .001,
η2p = .58. Actually, the second generation’s adoption of cultural practice was even stronger
than the first generation’s under explicit instruction; the transmission index was positive and
different from zero (M = 1.52, SE =.45; t(124) = 3.38, p = .001).
Furthermore, there was an interaction effect of explicit instruction and action visibility,
F(1,117) = 4.12, p = .045, η2p = .03 (see Figure 6). Without explicit instructions, the dilution
in cultural practice was worse when the oldtimers’ actions were unobservable than when they
were observable, t(123) = 3.50, p = .001. This basically replicates our results for the microdynamics reported earlier. However, the effect of low visibility on dilution was largely
reduced by explicit instructions, t(123) = 1.17, p = .246. Explicit instructions can compensate
for the obstacle to cultural transmission posed by the lack of opportunities to observe the
oldtimers’ actions.
Implicit Attitudes. We investigated an intergenerational dilution for implicit attitudes
by conducting an analogous analysis. Again, a negative score meant a dilution of cultural
pattern. Surprisingly, the grand mean was 3.48 (SE = 4.00), not significantly different from
zero, F(1,117) = .76, p = .39, η2p = 01, suggesting that there was no dilution of cultural
pattern when it came to implicit attitudes. Furthermore, contrary to H3b, there was no effect
of explicit instruction, F(1,121) = .01, p = .94, η2p = .00, but a marginal interaction effect of
explicit instruction and institutionalization, F(1,121) = 3.15, p = .079, η2p = .03 (Figure 7).
For instructed items, there was no effect of institutionalization, t(123) = .25, p = .801;
however, for uninstructed items where culture was transmitted without explicit instructions,
institutionalization had a marginal effect, t(123) = 1.86, p = .066.
Summary of Macro-Mechanisms. There was an expected intergenerational dilution
for cultural practices; however, consistent with H3a, explicit instruction prevented it from
28
happening, but contrary to H4a, institutionalization had no effect. In contrast, implicit
attitudes showed no dilution; contrary to H3b, explicit instruction had no effect, but
consistent with H4b, institutionalization facilitated the transmission.
Discussion
Micro-Mechanisms
The results suggest that cultural practices are transmitted by imitation (H1a), but
implicit attitudes are transmitted by inference (H2b) rather than by embodiment (H2a).
According to the inference hypothesis, oldtimers’ actions are observed, their attitudes are
inferred, and newcomers adopt the inferred attitudes as their own.
Cultural Practices. The pattern of newcomers’ cultural practices was consistent the
contemporary common coding model (e.g., Hommel, et al., 2001). According to this, both a
motor action and the effect of the motor action play critical roles in the action representation.
This model suggests that the obstruction of newcomers’ views of the oldtimers’ motor actions
may hinder imitation to some extent, but not completely, as long as the action effect is
observable. Consistent with this, when newcomers performed the same motor actions as
oldtimers, imitation occurred for uninstructed items; however, when newcomers could not
view the oldtimers’ motor actions, imitation was hindered. Further consistent with the model,
newcomers imitated their oldtimers’ cultural practices on the basis of action effects (i.e.,
stimulus zoom) even if they had to perform different motor actions to do so (i.e., button
pushes as opposed to joystick pull or push). We found no effect of action visibility on
imitation when newcomers performed different motor actions for uninstructed items. In
contrast, neither action visibility nor action type had any effect for instructed items.
Implicit Attitudes. As expected (H4b), institutionalization facilitated the
transmission of implicit attitudes for uninstructed items. However, institutionalization had no
effect for instructed items, for which reduced action visibility facilitated attitude transmission.
29
This pattern of results supports the inference hypothesis (H2b), but contradicts the
embodiment hypothesis (H2a). First, the embodiment hypothesis suggests that the factors that
affect imitation should affect attitude transmission because imitation mediates the effect of
cultural practices on implicit attitudes (Figure 1). Therefore, action visibility and
institutionalization should have similar effects on newcomers’ cultural practices and implicit
attitudes; however, they did not. In contrast, the inference hypothesis suggests that the
experimental manipulations may affect the newcomers’ cultural practices and implicit
attitudes differently, as we observed here.
To recapitulate, low action visibility had differential effects on practice and attitudes.
For uninstructed items, low action visibility hampered the transmission of practice, but had
little effect on attitudes. For instructed items, on the other hand, reduced action visibility had
no effect for cultural practice, but facilitated the attitude transmission. In contrast,
institutionalization facilitated the transmission of attitudes, but had no effect on practice.
Institutionalization had no effect when explicit instructions were given. In a way, explicit
instructions of a cultural practice themselves institutionalize the cultural practice. It is not
surprising that the additional institutionalization manipulation had little to add. This finding
also mitigates against the possibility that the effect of institutionalization on attitudes is an
experimental demand; had it been the case, it should also have affected practice.
Additional findings provide support for the inference hypothesis. First, the inference
hypothesis suggests oldtimers’ actions should predict newcomers’ attitudes, but the
embodiment hypothesis suggests that newcomers’ actions should predict their attitudes,
instead. In fact, it was oldtimers’ actions that predicted newcomers’ attitudes. Furthermore,
the finding that reduced action visibility enhanced the transmission of attitudes for instructed
items may be interpreted in line with the inference hypothesis. Newcomers in the low
visibility condition may have paid closer attention to the meaning of oldtimers’ actions (i.e.,
30
which fruits to collect and which to discard). This may have facilitated inference making,
which in turn may have consolidated their implicit attitudes.
That newcomers acquire cultural practices through imitation but implicit attitudes
through inference suggests that their attitudes and behaviors may be largely independent of
each other. Consistent with this reasoning, partial correlations between newcomers’ attitudes
and actions, controlling for culture, were non-significant, .01 and .10, for uninstructed and
instructed stimuli, respectively.
Macro-Mechanisms
The analysis of intergenerational dilution showed that explicit instructions stabilized
the transmission of cultural practice, but had little effect on the transmission of implicit
attitudes. Instead, it was institutionalization that stabilized the cultural transmission of
implicit attitudes. When newcomers take for granted that what oldtimers do is the way to go
about doing their business (i.e., the cultural way of life), it appears to help them concentrate
on the cultural meaning of oldtimers’ actions, more clearly infer their attitudinal implications
(Rogoff, Paradise, Arauz, Correa-Chávez, & Angelillo, 2003), and acquire culturally
appropriate attitudes. Nonetheless, although institutionalization did not affect the
transmission of cultural practices in this experiment, it seems premature to conclude that
institutionalization plays no role in the learning of cultural practice. Further research is
needed.
It is interesting to note that the transmission index for uninstructed items suggests an
intensification of implicit attitudes over generations under institutionalization. In other words,
newcomers’ implicit attitudes became more extreme than their oldtimer counterparts’. Again
it is premature to conclude that implicit attitudes always become more extreme when
transmitted across generations. However, the present observation may be interpreted as an
instance of a ratchet effect (Tomasello, 1999; also see Caldwell & Millen, 2009, on
31
experimental demonstration) whereby a cultural characteristic “accumulates” over time.
Typically, ratchet effect describes cumulative cultural change in expertise; however, we use
the term purely descriptively in this instance as an extremetization of a cultural characteristic
such as implicit attitudes. Indeed, there are observations of cultural changes of this type.
Inside the laboratory, Thompson, Judd, and Park (2000) showed that when stereotypes were
transmitted from one generation to another, they became more extreme in a later generation.
Outside the laboratory, Twenge and her colleagues’ research have found that attitudes
towards women (e.g., Twenge, 1997) and self-esteem (e.g., Twenge & Campbell, 2008) have
become more positive in the United States over the generations.
Implications for Cultural Dynamics
We investigated the micro- and macro-dynamics of the social transmission of cultural
practice and implicit attitudes in a lab setting. At the micro-level, different psychological
mechanisms seem to be involved in the transmission of cultural practices and implicit
attitudes. Cultural practices are likely transmitted by instruction and imitation, whereas
implicit attitudes are likely transmitted by inference. At the macro-level, explicit instructions
can maintain cultural practices, whereas institutionalization complements this by facilitating
newcomers’ acquisition of appropriate implicit attitudes that are aligned with the cultural
practices. In the present case, explicit instructions came from an experimenter, rather than the
oldtimer, but different types of instructions should be explored in future research. Overall,
pedagogy and institutionalization appear to be complementary mechanisms of cultural
maintenance.
The current results have a number of implications for cultural dynamics. Most
strikingly, implicit attitudes are acquired by inference. Although many theoretical approaches
to cultural transmission take the view that cultural ideas such as attitudes are “replicated” in
newcomers’ minds (notably Dawkins’s, 1976, meme theory which seems to imply some form
32
of imitation), our findings suggest that cultural transmission is more like reconstruction than
replication. Similarly, recent research on intergenerational value transmission (Zentner &
Renaud, 2007) found that adolescent children’s acquisition of parental values was mediated
by their perception and acceptance. In both cases, those who are on the receiving end of
cultural transmission actively reconstruct the cultural ideas held by the previous generation;
when these processes are thwarted, cultural transmission too is hampered. This picture is in
line with a constructivist approach to culture and cognition (e.g., Hong et al., 2000; Kashima,
2000b) and Sperber’s (1996) suggestion that cultural transmission is constrained by cognitive
and communicative mechanisms.
The current results also imply that contagion models of social influence (e.g.,
Christakis & Fowler, 2007, 2008) may be limited in their applicability. They may be
applicable to cultural practices (e.g., cessation of smoking, dietary practice), but not to
cultural ideas such as attitudes. To be sure, newcomers’ imitation of oldtimers’ cultural
practices can be construed as a kind of contagion; however, the analogy seems strained if
attitudes are said to be transmitted by contagion in the current study. Implicit attitudes are
acquired through inference and active reconstruction by the cultural learner – it is not like a
virus or a germ that travels from one person to another by contagion. Recent research
(Kashima, Wilson, Lusher, Pearson, & Pearson, 2013) also failed to find evidence for
contagion in the learning of perceived descriptive norms among residents in a regional
community of Australia.
Implications for Practice
The current results have implications for organizational socialization and
enculturation. Cultural practices within an organization may be transmitted by a combination
of the organization’s explicit instructions and the newcomers’ spontaneous imitation of
oldtimers’ behaviors. Behavioral compliance is a likely outcome of these processes.
33
Nevertheless, whether newcomers also acquire cultural ideas such as attitudes and values that
are meant to be reflected in those cultural practices is a different matter. Some organizational
socialization practices may assume that when newcomers are taught to perform cultural
practices, their attitudes may follow from it. However, as Brehm (1966) noted, psychological
reactance may arise when newcomers are forced to adopt cultural practices (e.g., by explicit
instructions), and may develop attitudes that are contrary to what was intended.
The current results make two suggestions to combat this perennial problem. First, at
the individual level, superordinates are advised to lead by engaging in the cultural practices
themselves – this can facilitate the acquisition of the corresponding implicit attitudes on the
part of their subordinates, reducing any psychological reactance that may arise. Second, at the
organizational level, institutionalization of those cultural practices – members of the
organization taking them for granted as a temporally continuing social reality – may be an
important factor that enables the maintenance and even strengthening of its organizational
culture (i.e., ideas and values) while avoiding unintended negative consequences. For
instance, an organization can portray certain practices as a time-honored “tradition” that is
both foundational in the past and continuing into the future. Such portrayals may help an
organization to inculcate in its members those cultural practices that are central to its
operation.
Limitations and Future Directions
Without doubt, experimental investigations of microcultures have a number of
limitations. They have restricted ecological validity; they are unlikely to be embedded in the
routinized social life of a cultural group; they are unlikely to engage people psychologically –
not to the extent “real” cultures do; and they are likely to be too simple – one type of attitude
and one type of behaviour – unlike the “web of significance” that characterizes culture in
Clifford Geertz’s (1973) influential account. It is critically important to investigate whether
34
the current results are generalizable to other cultural objects, practices, and ideas. It is quite
possible that other patterns obtain for other cases. Still, laboratory microcultures have the
advantage of making the micro-mechanisms of cultural dynamics tractable. When
complemented with other forms of empirical investigation – ethnography, cross-cultural
surveys and experiments – they have an important place in the social psychology of cultural
dynamics.
35
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Author Note
The research reported in this article was supported by a grant from the Asian Office of
Aerospace R&D (Award No. FA2386-09-4093) and a grant from the Australian Research
Council (DP1095323) to Y. Kashima and S. Laham. We would like to thank the Editor of the
special issue, Michael Morris, and two anonymous reviewers for their extremely useful
comments. Their constructive criticisms were an inspiration that transformed the manuscript.
End Note
1
For instance, Woud, Rinck and Becker (2008) showed that people’s isotonic arm flexion
and extension by joystick movements produced corresponding implicit attitudes; however,
Vandenbosch and de Houwer (2011) were unable to replicate these effects, suggesting that
bodily movements are not sufficient for the formation of attitudes. Laham, Kashima, Dix, and
Wheeler (submitted a) conducted a meta-analysis of past research on such effects and also
conducted an empirical study (Laham et al., 2013) to show that people do form implicit
attitudes if flexion and extension movements are unambiguously framed as approach or
avoidance, implying that referent objects are desirable or undesirable.
42
Table 1. Stimuli, cultural practices, and conceptual implications
Stimuli
Oldtimer
Newcomer
Conceptual
Implication
IPPT
JPPT
Explicit Instruction
Collect/
Collect/
Collect/
Discard
Discard
Discard
Collect/
Discard
Collect/
Discard
Collect/
Discard
Discard/
Collect
Discard/
Collect
Either
No Instruction
Discard/
Discard/
Either
Collect
Collect
Note: Regular font denotes response options for one culture condition; italicized font,
response options for the complementary culture condition.
43
Figure 1
Generation 1: Oldtimers
Generation 2: Newcomers
Implicit
Attitude
Cultural
Practice
Implicit
Attitude
Inference
Embodiment
Imitation
Cultural
Practice
44
Figure 2
sitting 50 apart
80 from monitor
height of
partition is 150
length of
partition is 165
a.
b.
Note. Schematic drawings of the test phase of the JPPT showing (a) the baseline and
institutionalization conditions and (b) the low visibility condition . Measurements in cm.
45
Figure 3. Newcomers’ collection actions for uninstructed (“either”) stimuli as a function of
culture and action visibility
30
25
20
Collect
Discard
15
10
5
Not Observable
Observable
Figure 4. Newcomers’ collection actions for uninstructed (“either”) stimuli as a function of
culture and action visibility for the same vs. different action
Same Action (Joystick)
Different Action (Button)
35
35
30
30
25
25
20
Collect
20
Collect
15
Discard
15
Discard
10
10
5
5
Not Observable
Observable
Not Observable
Observable
46
Figure 5. Newcomers’ implicit attitudes to uninstructed (“either”) stimuli as a function of
culture and institutionalization.
30
20
10
0
No Institutionalization
-10
-20
-30
-40
Institutionalization
Collect
Discard
47
Figure 6. Intergenerational dilution for Cultural Practice as a function of Explicit Instruction
and Action Visibility
4
2
0
Instruction
No Instruction
-2
-4
Unobservable
-6
Observable
-8
-10
-12
-14
48
Figure 7. Intergenerational dilution for Implicit Attitudes as a function of Explicit Instruction
and Institutionalization.
25
20
15
10
5
0
Instruction
No Instruction
No Institution
-5
Institutionalization
-10
-15
-20
49
Appendix
This appendix reports preliminary analyses for the study and a table of F-statistics for
the general linear model analyses for newcomers’ cultural practices and implicit attitudes for
instructed and uninstructed items.
Preliminary Analyses
First, we report the method by which we computed oldtimers’ and newcomers’ implicit
attitudes, and then report the results that provide evidence for the successful manipulation of
culture in the main study.
Computation of Implicit Attitudes. We computed oldtimers’ and newcomers’ implicit
attitudes by following Fazio et al. (1986). Only correct responses were used, and response
latencies shorter than 300 ms, or greater than 2.5 standard deviations above a participant’s
mean latency were removed as outliers. On the average, 3.8 and 3.7 out of 128 RTs were
outliers (3.0 and 2.9%) for oldtimers and newcomers, respectively. ANOVAs conducted on
the number of outliers showed that they were distributed evenly across the conditions. None
of the condition effects were significant. To index participants’ implicit attitudes, mean
response latency for positive targets was subtracted from the mean response latency for
negative targets for each prime type (collect prime vs. discard prime). Higher scores indicated
more positive implicit attitudes. This procedure was followed separately for EPT1 and EPT2
for oldtimers and EPT2 for newcomers.
Establishing Culture in the Lab: Oldtimers’ Acquisition of Cultural Practice and
Implicit Attitudes. We could successfully establish microcultures as intended. Oldtimers
were enculturated to collect or discard stimuli as instructed. They correctly collected 97% of
the time (M = 82.44 times out of maximum 85), and correctly discarded 93% of the time (M
= 79.05 out of 85). We could also condition implicit attitudes in oldtimers. A repeated
measures (Prime: collect vs. discard) ANOVA on EPT1 scores showed that attitudes towards
50
to-be-collected stimuli were more positive (M = 14.44; SE = 3.00) than those towards to-bediscarded stimuli (M = 1.37; SE = 3.31), F(1,124) = 10.92, p < .001, η2p = .08. Oldtimers
developed reliably positive attitudes towards to-be-collected items (t(124)= 4.81, p < .001),
but did not show a conditioning effect for to-be-discarded items (t (124) = .42, ns).
Oldtimers’ cultural practices and attitudes were maintained during the JPPT as well.
Oldtimers correctly collected 97% (M = 34.10 out of maximum 35; note that this is the
average for two to-be-collected types) and correctly discarded 94% (M = 32.99 out of 35; i.e.,
average for two to-be-discarded types) of the time. The oldtimers’ implicit attitudes were
again in accordance with enculturation. Their attitudes to the to-be-collected items were more
positive (M = 13.40; SE = 3.07) than those to the to-be-discarded items (M = -2.75; SE =
3.10), t(124) = 4.73, p < .001. Again, attitudes towards the to-be-collected items were reliably
positive (t(124) = 4.36, p < .001); these attitudes did not change significantly from EPT1 to
EPT2 by a paired-samples t-test, t(124) = 1.04, ns. Implicit attitudes toward the to-bediscarded items did become somewhat more negative, although they did not significantly
differ from zero, t (124)= -.89, ns. Again, there was no change from EPT1 to EPT2, t(124)
= .29, ns.
General Linear Model Analyses for the Micro-Dynamics
Table A1 reports the F-statistics relevant for each of the analyses on newcomers’
cultural practices and implicit attitudes for instructed and uninstructed items. We have also
conducted analogous analyses while treating culture as random effect. This is because
newcomers were yoked to oldtimers, and therefore exposed to somewhat different treatment
of culture (although the culture manipulation was successful as we reported above). These
reanalyses did not affect the results appreciably – all significant effects remained significant,
and nonsignificant effects remained nonsignificant.
51
Table A1. F-values from the general linear model analysis for newcomers’ cultural practices
and implicit attitudes for instructed and uninstructed items.
Predictors
Instructed
Uninstructed
Practice
Attitudes
Practice
Attitudes
Culture (C)
320.61**
9.58*
54.43*
2.09†
Action Type (T)
0.10
0.10
1.50
1.27
Action Visibility (V)
0.00
1.45
0.11
2.62
Institutionalization (I)
0.76
1.15
1.92
0.77
CxT
1.69
1.24
0.74
0.14
CxV
2.34
4.23*
4.26*
0.37
CxI
0.85
2.27
0.09
4.60*
TxV
0.21
0.05
0.05
1.89
TxI
0.04
0.08
3.02
1.81
CxTxV
1.37
0.67
4.50*
0.98
CxTxI
0.02
0.54
0.02
0.01
Note: ** p. < .01, * p. < .05, † p. = .015; The cultural transmission conditions (baseline, low
visibility, and institutionalization) were dummy coded: action visibility (0 = baseline; 1 = low
visibility; 0 = institutionalization) and institutionalization (0 = baseline; 0 = low visibility; 1 =
institutionalization). For this reason, a V x I interaction effect cannot be examined. The
degrees of freedom are all (1, 113).
52