Hon. Conchita Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals
[G.R. Nos. 217126-27]
FLORIN T. HILBAY
ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL
This case presents pure questions of constitutional and statutory law that are
susceptible of standard, correct, reasonable, and objective answers.
The core question in this case relates to the nexus between R.A. No. 6770,1
§14 and judicial power, that is, the relationship between R.A. No. 6770, §14, on the
one hand, and the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and all other courts, on the
other.
The government submits that the resolution of this core question involves
nothing more than a standard analysis of R.A. No. 6770, §14 as it relates to Art. VIII,
§5(1) in the case of the Supreme Court, and Art. VIII, §2 in the case of all other
courts, the respondent Court of Appeals included.
The following regime of rules is the sufficient, necessary, and appropriate
constitutional and statutory bases to decide the questions in this case and provide the
appropriate reliefs prayed for in the present petition.
CONST., Art. VIII, §5
The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(1) Exercise original jurisdiction…over petitions for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
…
…
…
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE FUNCTIONAL AND STRUCTURAL
OF THE OMBUDSMAN, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
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ORGANIZATION OF THE OFFICE
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CONST., Art VIII, §2
The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the
jurisdiction of the various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its
jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof.
… … …
R.A. No. 6770, §14
Restrictions. No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay an
investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is
a prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside the
jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.
No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the
decision or findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure
questions of law.
The law is clear, reducible to the following sets of propositions.
A. On the Constitutional Authority of the Supreme Court
to Issue Ancillary Writs or Provisional Remedies
1. The power of the Supreme Court to issue ancillary writs or provisional
remedies is of a constitutional character, derived from its original jurisdiction [under
Art. VIII, §5(1)], over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and
habeas corpus.
2. Under Art. VIII, §2, Congress “may not deprive the Supreme Court of its
jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5.” Necessarily, this constitutional
limitation on congressional authority extends to the Supreme Court’s authority to
issue ancillary writs or provisional remedies.2
3. Therefore, the positive grant to the Supreme Court of the constitutional
authority to issue ancillary writs or provisional remedies is coupled with an express
Rule 135, Section 6 of the Rules of Court provides that “[w]hen by law jurisdiction is conferred on
a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into
effect may be employed by such court or officer…”
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constitutional denial to the Congress of the power to limit the Supreme Court’s
authority to issue ancillary writs or provisional remedies in relation to its original
jurisdiction under Art. VIII, §5(1).
B. On the Constitutional Authority of the Congress
To Determine the Jurisdiction of Courts other than the Supreme Court
1. Under Art. VIII, §2, the Congress has full constitutional authority “to
define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts.” This power to
create courts and define their jurisdiction includes the power to abolish them and the
lesser power to limit the scope of their jurisdiction.
2. It follows that the limits and the contours of the jurisdiction of the various
courts other than the Supreme Court are purely statutory in character, derived only
from the plenary powers of Congress.
3. Therefore, in the same manner that the Congress can wholly define the
jurisdiction of lower courts to issue such principal reliefs as certiorari or prohibition,
Congress can likewise temper and even entirely deny such courts’ ability to issue
ancillary writs and provisional remedies, whether in the form of a TRO or a writ of
preliminary injunction.
C. On the Authority of the Court of Appeals to Issue Injunctive Writs
1. The jurisdiction or statutory authority of the Court of Appeals to issue
injunctive writs is found in B.P. Blg. 129 (as amended).3
THE JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980, as amended. Section 9. Jurisdiction.—The Court
of Appeals shall exercise:
1. Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto,
and auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction; …
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2. The jurisdiction or statutory authority of the Court of Appeals to issue
injunctive writs, however, has been expressly limited by Congress with the passage of
R.A. No. 6770, §14.
3. Thus, regardless of the general statutory authority of the Court of Appeals
to issue injunctive writs under B.P. Blg. 129 (as amended), R.A. No. 6770, §14
operates as the express limitation on that jurisdiction.
4. Both the general authority of the Court of Appeals to issue injunctive writs
and the specific limitation to that authority derive from the same constitutional,
plenary authority of Congress to “define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of
the various courts.”
5. R.A. No. 6770, §14 is the standing authority for the proposition that the
Court of Appeals has been clearly, expressly, and deliberately denied by Congress the
jurisdiction to issue any injunctive writ “unless there is a prima facie evidence that the
subject matter of the investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the
Ombudsman.”
6. Pursuant to the policy of limiting judicial interference in the conduct of the
investigation of the Office of the Ombudsman and the specific language of R.A. No.
6770, §14, the narrowly-defined and limited jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in
the injunctive aspect of the proceedings before it is limited to determining whether
“there is a prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside
the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.”
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D. On the Consequences of the Issuance of a TRO and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
against the Ombudsman’s Investigation.
1. A court that acts without statutory authority—without jurisdiction—acts
with grave abuse of discretion.
2. In a Resolution dated 16 March 2015 (First Resolution) and in another
dated 6 April 2015 (Third Resolution), the respondent Court of Appeals granted
private respondent’s prayer for a temporary restraining order and issued a writ of
preliminary injunction, respectively.
3. These resolutions are patently illegal to the extent that they directly conflict
with Congress’ policy of no injunctive reliefs, expressed as law in R.A. No. 6770, §14.
At the same time, to the extent that R.A. No. 6770, §14 operates as an express
limitation on the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals—denying almost entirely any
jurisdiction to issue injunctive reliefs—the two resolutions have been issued without
jurisdiction and, necessarily, with grave abuse of discretion.
4. The two resolutions subject matter of the present case having been issued
in direct violation of R.A. No. 6770, §14, which constitutes a prohibition against any
injunctive relief and a limitation on the jurisdiction of the respondent Court of
Appeals, they are null and void.
5. The ultimate and plain consequence of the nullity of the two resolutions
subject matter of this case is that the 10 March 2015 Joint Order of petitioner
Ombudsman preventively suspending private respondent should be given full force
and effect.
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We submit that this set of propositions governs the full spectrum of the pure
questions of constitutional and statutory law involved in the present petition for
certiorari and prohibition.
Consistent with the Honorable Court’s instructions in its 7 April 2015
ADVISORY, and for the elaboration of the implications of the foregoing discussion,
petitioner will now proceed with the specific answers to issues A to K of Part II
(Subject Coverage) of the Honorable Court’s ADVISORY.
A.
Whether or not respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it issued the first questioned resolution considering the
constitutionally guaranteed independence of the office of the Ombudsman and Section 14 of
Republic Act No. 6770.
Yes. The Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion correctible by
certiorari and prohibition when it issued the First Questioned Resolution granting the
prayer for a TRO on the preventive suspension ordered by the Ombudsman.
First. The First Questioned Resolution is patently illegal as it directly
contravenes the statutory policy against injunctions under the Ombudsman Act.
Under R.A. No. 6770, §14 the Court of Appeals cannot issue any injunctive writ
“unless there is a prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is
outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.”
In the case at bar, there is no doubt that private respondent, just like any other
mayor, is under the administrative jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman. In
the first place, he is an official subject to the disciplinary authority of the Office of
the Ombudsman pursuant to R.A. No. 6770, §21.4 Under this provision, disciplinary
Section 21. Official Subject to Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions.—The Office of the Ombudsman shall
have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the Government and its
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investigations by the Office of the Ombudsman “over officials who may be removed
only by impeachment, or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary” are the only
ones that are prima facie outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.
In the second place, the respondent mayor is subject to the investigatory
power of the Office of the Ombudsman under R.A. No. 6770, §22. 5 The
Ombudsman’s jurisdiction over private respondent is therefore indisputable.
Second. Respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the First Questioned Resolution because in doing so, it acted without
jurisdiction. R.A. No. 6770, §14 is the standing authority for the proposition that the
Court of Appeals has been clearly, expressly, and deliberately denied by Congress the
jurisdiction to issue any injunctive writ “unless there is a prima facie evidence that the
subject matter of the investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the
Ombudsman.”
Through R.A. No. 6770, §14, the Congress, which has full constitutional
authority under Art. VIII, §2 “to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of
the various courts” has carved out a substantive exception to the jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals under B.P. Blg. 129 (as amended). R.A. No. 6770, §14, therefore, is
the special law governing injunctions involving investigations by the Office of the
subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including Members of the Cabinet, local government,
government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except over officials who may
be removed only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary.
5 Section 22. Investigatory Power.—The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the power to investigate
any serious misconduct in office allegedly committed by officials removable by impeachment, for the
purpose of filing a verified complaint for impeachment, if warranted.
In all cases of conspiracy between an officer or employee of the government and a private person,
the Ombudsman and his Deputies shall have jurisdiction to include such private person in the
investigation and proceed against such private person as the evidence may warrant. The officer or
employee and the private person shall be tried jointly and shall be subject to the same penalties and
liabilities.
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Ombudsman—it determines the jurisdiction of courts (except the Supreme Court)
over injunctive writs against the Ombudsman.
B.
Whether or not herein petitioner, as an impeachable official, can be subject of contempt
proceedings by respondent Court of Appeals in the discharge of her functions and duties as
the present Ombudsman.
No. Article XI, §2 of the Constitution provides that the Ombudsman may
only be removed from office through impeachment. In Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan,6 the
Honorable Court held that impeachable officers, during their tenure, cannot be
criminally prosecuted because such proceedings may result in their indirect removal
from office.
Similarly, In Re: Gonzalez 7 extends the proscription in Lecaroz to disbarment
cases:
…A public officer who under the Constitution is required to be a Member of
the Philippine Bar as a qualification for the office held by him and who may be
removed from office only by impeachment, cannot be charged with disbarment
during the incumbency of such public officer. Further, such public officer, during his
incumbency, cannot be charged criminally before the Sandiganbayan or any other court
with any offence which carries with it the penalty of removal from office, or any
penalty service of which would amount to removal from office.
In line with Lecaroz and Gonzalez, Jarque v. Desierto 8 emphasizes that the
Ombudsman must first be removed from office through impeachment before being
made to answer for any wrong or misbehavior committed by him or her.
Petitioner respectfully submits that the prohibition on the filing of certain
charges against impeachable officers set forth in Lecaroz, Gonzalez and Jarque
G.R. No. 56384, 22 March 1984.
A.M. No. 88-4-5433, 15 April 1988.
8 A.C. No. 4509, 5 December 1995.
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necessarily includes those for indirect contempt. This is because proceedings for
indirect contempt are criminal in nature. 9 Since indirect contempt proceedings are
criminal in nature, the alleged contemnor is considered an accused in a criminal
proceeding, entitled to the rights available to him or her in regular criminal cases.
Rule 71, Section 7 of the Rules of Court provides that the penalty for indirect
contempt is imprisonment or fine. Hence, an impeachable officer found liable for
indirect contempt and imprisoned as a result thereof is, for all intents and purposes,
effectively removed from his or her office. This possibility collides with Gonzalez
which categorically states that an impeachable officer cannot be made to serve “any
penalty service of which would amount to removal from office.”
Given the foregoing, respondent Court of Appeals should not even have
directed petitioner to comment on private respondent’s petition for contempt. In so
doing, it undermined the independence of petitioner who, as an impeachable officer,
should be able to perform her duties and functions free from the threat of criminal
sanctions.
C.
Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman’s Petition for certiorari under Rule 65 raises
errors of judgment and not errors of jurisdiction contrary to the requirements of the Rules of
Court.
An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its
jurisdiction, and which error is reviewable only by an appeal. On the other hand, an
error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court
without or in excess of jurisdiction and which error is correctible only by the
extraordinary writ of certiorari.10
Soriano v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128938, 4 June 2004.
San Fernando Rural Bank, Inc. v. Pampanga Omnibus Development Corporation and Dominic G. Aquino,
G.R. No. 168088, 3 April 2007.
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The present petition directly puts in question (a) the palpable violation by
respondent Court of Appeals of the clear mandate of R.A. No. 6770, §14, (b) the
absence of statutory authority or jurisdiction of the respondent Court of Appeals to
issue injunctive writs against the Office of the Ombudsman, and (c) the lack of
disciplinary authority of the respondent Court of Appeals over an impeachable public
officer such as the Ombudsman. These questions clearly involve errors of
jurisdiction, not errors of judgment.
We are not presented here with questions about multiple valid options
available to the Court of Appeals, in an instance where its jurisdiction is not in issue.
Instead, we face questions involving acts that are patently against the Court of
Appeals’ jurisdiction as defined by Congress and therefore violative of separation of
powers insofar as they constitute a clear and unmistakable disregard by the Court of
Appeals of the jurisdictional limits set by Congress.
D.
Whether or not Section 14 of the Ombudsman Act defeats the power of the Supreme Court
and/or the Court of Appeals to exercise original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari and
prohibition seeking to question acts of the Ombudsman.
As to the Supreme Court. R.A. No. 6770, §14 cannot defeat, modify, or
undermine the authority of the Supreme Court to exercise original jurisdiction over
petitions for certiorari and prohibition. This is because the Supreme Court’s
jurisdiction is constitutional in character, derived from Art. VIII, §5(1). As well, by
specific constitutional fiat, Congress “may not deprive the Supreme Court of its
jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof.” R.A. No. 6770, §14 therefore
has no effect on the Honorable Court’s original jurisdiction.
As to the Court of Appeals. The Congress, pursuant to its constitutional authority
to “define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts” under Art.
VIII, §2 has plenary authority to confer, limit, amend, and even remove from the
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Court of Appeals’ jurisdiction, whether original or appellate, authority to hear
petitions for certiorari and prohibition seeking to question acts of the Ombudsman.
It is a basic principle that jurisdiction is conferred by law, be it the
Constitution or a statute. Considering the full constitutional authority granted to
Congress over the creation of the Court of Appeals and the definition and
apportionment of its jurisdiction, no possible constitutional question may arise out of
a policy decision to grant original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari or
prohibition while strictly limiting the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to issue
injunctive writs to only those cases over which “there is a prima facie evidence that the
subject matter of the investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the
Ombudsman.”
With R.A. No. 6770, §14, what Congress has simply done is to enact a policy,
consistent with the independence of the Ombudsman and the goal of avoiding
unnecessary entanglement of courts into the business of the Office of the
Ombudsman, limiting the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals under B.P. Blg. 129
over petitions for certiorari and prohibition by prohibiting the issuance of injunctive
writs. Considering that Congress can entirely remove the Court of Appeals’
jurisdiction over certiorari and prohibition in the first place, a policy expressed in law
that strictly limits such jurisdiction is undoubtedly within the powers of Congress.
The same no-injunction rule animates the policy behind R.A. No. 8975, 11
which prohibits the issuance of injunctive writs against national government
infrastructure projects and service contracts. Given the policy to promote
infrastructure projects and minimize the danger of judicial intervention in such
AN ACT TO ENSURE THE EXPEDITIOUS IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLETION OF
GOVERNMENT INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS BY PROHIBITING LOWER COURTS FROM ISSUING
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDERS, PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS OR PRELIMINARY MANDATORY
INJUNCTIONS, PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
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important economic activities, it is not surprising that a fair number of judges have
been subjected to administrative proceedings for issuing TROs against national
government infrastructure projects.12 This phenomenon underscores both the judicial
recognition of the power of Congress to impose limits on the jurisdiction of lower
courts and of the need to ensure that judicial power is exercised within the limits set
by law.
In effect, what Congress has done is to limit the Court of Appeals to a residual
jurisdiction over the Ombudsman to issue injunctive writs to only those cases where
“there is a prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside
the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.” This residual jurisdiction to issue
an injunctive writ is similar to Section 3 of R.A. No. 8975. Said section prohibits
courts, except the Supreme Court, from issuing any injunctive writ against national
government infrastructure projects and service contracts. However, the prohibition
“shall not apply when the matter is of extreme urgency involving a constitutional
issue, such that unless a temporary restraining order is issued, grave injustice and
irreparable injury will arise.”
Put otherwise, in the case at bar, the explicit denial by Congress of jurisdiction
on the part of the Court of Appeals to issue injunctive writs “to delay an investigation
being conducted by the Ombudsman” means that, unless its residual jurisdiction can
be invoked, the only remedy against a preventive suspension—an interlocutory
order—is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Supreme Court.
On the applicability of Fabian v. Desierto.13 The respondent Court of Appeals’ apparent
denial of the applicability of R.A. No. 6770, §14 because of this Honorable Court’s
ruling in Fabian is totally misplaced. Fabian involved R.A. No. 6770, §27, which
Sinsuat, et al. v. Judge Hidalgo, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2133, 6 August 2008; Caguioa and Ongkiko v. Laviña,
A.M. No. RTJ-00-1553, 20 November 2000.
13 G.R. No. 129742, 16 September 1998.
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concerns the nullification of appeals to the Supreme Court under Rule 45. The
Supreme Court held therein that the governing rule for appeals from decisions of the
Ombudsman in administrative cases should be Rule 43. Obviously, this has no
bearing whatsoever on the policy of no injunctive reliefs under R.A. No. 6770, §14.
E.
Whether or not Section 14 prohibits the determination by the Supreme Court and/or the
Court of Appeals, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari and
prohibition, of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Office of the Ombudsman relating
to its issuance of a preventive suspension order, including its appreciation of (1) the strength
of the evidence; (2) the length or period of suspension; and (3) the applicability of certain
defenses.
As to the Supreme Court. R.A. No. 6770, §14, being a statute, cannot operate to
prohibit the determination by the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari and prohibition, of grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the Ombudsman relating to its issuance of a preventive suspension
order. As previously stated, the constitutional authority of the Supreme Court over its
Art. VIII, §5(1) jurisdiction cannot be diminished by statute.
Nonetheless, while R.A. No. 6770, §14 cannot limit the Honorable Court’s
authority to inquire, such inquiry must still comply with the requirements of
traditional adjudication. In particular, given the constitutional stature of the Office of
the Ombudsman, such inquiry must be limited to ascertaining the existence of a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, consistent with Art.
VIII, §1.
Thus, while the determination of grave abuse of discretion is still addressed to
the sound discretion of the Honorable Court, it must nonetheless be stressed that the
appreciation of (1) the strength of evidence, (2) the length or period of suspension,
and (3) applicability of certain defenses is a matter addressed in particular to the
judgment of the Ombudsman.
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The general rule, therefore, translates to a policy of non-interference with the
investigatory and prosecutorial functions of the Ombudsman, with resort to Art.VIII,
§1 as an exception.14
As to the Court of Appeals. To be sure, R.A. No. 6770, §14 was deliberately
meant to limit the power of the Court of Appeals, whether in certiorari or prohibition
proceedings, to issue any injunctive writs “to delay an investigation being conducted
by the Ombudsman….”
With particular reference to a preventive suspension order, the legislative
intent to commit full discretionary authority to the Ombudsman’s findings—and thus
immunize it from injunctive writs—is evident in the use of standards, as opposed to
rules. R.A. No. 6770, §24 provides:
Preventive Suspension.—The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively
suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if
in his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge against such
officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or
neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from
the service; or (c) the respondent’s continued stay in office may prejudice the
case filed against him.
This is the language of discretion. The plain text of R.A. No. 6770, §24
consigns to the Ombudsman’s determination compliance with the broad standards
for determining whether preventive suspension may issue. The phrase “in his judgment”
is a testament to an intent expressed clearly in statute. Such broad standards evince a
textual commitment to the Ombudsman of full discretionary authority to
preventively suspend. Matters involving (1) the determination of the strength of the
See Kara-an v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 119990, 21 June 2004, citing Alba v. Nitorreda, G.R. No.
120223, 13 March 1996 and Ocampo v. Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 103446-47, 30 August 1993.
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evidence, (2) the length or period of suspension and (3) applicability of certain
defenses,15 go into the heart of the Ombudsman’s discretion.
On the Applicability of Certain Defenses; in particular, Condonation. It is settled
doctrine that preventive suspension is not a penalty, but a remedial measure meant to
assist the disciplining or investigating authority in securing and/or preserving
documentary evidence and/or testimony and prevent the subject public official from
using his/her position to prejudice an ongoing investigation.
As explained in Ombudsman vs. Peliño, 16 preventive suspension is merely a
“preventive measure,” or a “preliminary step in an administrative investigation.”
While not imposed in all administrative cases as a matter of course, preventive
suspensions are resorted to when the prevailing circumstances of a particular case so
warrant, as when there is a need to “prevent the accused from using his position and
the powers and prerogatives of his office to influence potential witnesses or tamper
with records which may be vital in the prosecution of the case against him.”17
Preventive suspension is integral to an investigation, it being a crucial
component of the set of tools available to the Ombudsman so she may secure vital or
relevant information and prevent the subject official from influencing the
investigation. Preventive suspension is an investigative tool, an instrument to make
effective the administrative process, not a punishment.
Given the interlocutory nature of a preventive suspension, the only clearly
imaginable defense against it is jurisdictional, consistent with the residual jurisdiction
of lower courts under R.A. No. 6770, §14.
With the exception of the residual jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals under R.A. No. 6770, §14
to issue injunctive writs where “there is a prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the
investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.”
16 G.R. No. 179261, 18 April 2008.
17 Id.
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With due respect to respondent Court of Appeals, condonation has no
bearing on the question whether the Office of the Ombudsman may preventively
suspend. As we have already argued, the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
under R.A. No. 6770, §14 has a preclusive effect on all defenses, including
condonation, except the residual jurisdiction mentioned herein.
In the first place, condonation is an antidote against a penalty, which
preventive suspension is not.
In the second place, preventive suspension is issued at the beginning of an
investigation for purposes of securing and preserving evidence, and has nothing to do
with imposing a penalty. Preventive suspension is therefore purely remedial, and does
not go into the final finding of guilt of a respondent public official.
In the third place, to hold that condonation can nullify a preventive
suspension order is to assume that there is no more point to an investigation being
conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman the moment it is considered that
condonation may apply. This position is erroneous in light of the reality that an
investigation conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman may produce evidence of
civil and/or criminal liability, both of which are not extinguished by the absence of
administrative liability.
In fact, even when administrative liability can no longer be imposed, an
investigation conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman can produce results that
are crucial in the performance of the Ombudsman’s functions and may substantially
benefit the public or assist other institutions in the performance of their functions.
The Ombudsman, without imposing administrative sanctions, may, at the end
of an investigation, direct the officer concerned to perform and expedite an act
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required by law, or stop, prevent, or correct any abuse or impropriety in the
performance of duties;18 report the irregularity to the Commission on Audit (or even
the Civil Service Commission or the Commission on Elections) for appropriate
action;
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publicize matters covered by its investigation;
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or simply make
recommendations about the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud,
and corruption in the government. 21 The importance of all these other possible
results of an investigation (which may or may not include the need for a preventive
suspension order), attests to the fact that the imposition of administrative liability
(condoned or not) is clearly not coextensive with the multiple objectives of an
investigation conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman.
In any event, granting ex gratia argumenti that respondent Court of Appeals was
correct in considering the condonation doctrine, private respondent’s preventive
suspension still cannot be enjoined. Petitioner, in appreciating the evidence against
him, took note of his payment of PhP449,058.75 under the contract being questioned
without the documentation required by auditing rules and regulations. Such violation
is independently worthy of closer scrutiny in the pending administrative case, and was
committed in July 2013, when private respondent was already re-elected.
Private respondent’s preventive suspension is clearly warranted because, as
alleged in the Complaint of the Special Panel of Investigations, he authorized the
aforementioned payment, drawn from public funds, in violation of Commission on
Audit (COA) Circular No. 2012-001 dated 14 June 2012. Such evident disregard of
existing COA rules in the course of releasing the payment of PhP449,058.75, as
averred by the Panel, is a stand-alone administrative offense, among others,
R.A. No. 6770, §15(2).
R.A. No. 6770, §15(4), (5).
20 R.A. No. 6770, §15(6).
21 R.A. No. 6770, §15(7).
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committed after private respondent’s re-election. Condonation only applies to acts
performed prior to re-election and not to those committed subsequent thereto.
F.
Whether or not Section 14 completely removes from the Supreme Court and/or the Court of
Appeals the power to issue ancillary injunctive writs in relation to the Office of the
Ombudsman’s conduct of an investigation.
As to the Supreme Court. No. The original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
under Art. VIII, §5(1) carries with it the necessary authority to issue ancillary
injunctive writs to aid it in the exercise of its jurisdiction. In addition, the
constitutional prohibition against the Congress depriving the Supreme Court of its
Art. VIII, §5(1) jurisdiction carries a concomitant prohibition against the limitation of
the Supreme Court’s power to issue ancillary injunctive writs in aid of the exercise of
such original jurisdiction.
As to the Court of Appeals. Yes. The Congress has the full constitutional
authority to “define, prescribe, and apportion” the jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals. Consistent with the authority of Congress to grant or remove the power to
issue injunctive reliefs in actions for certiorari and prohibition, Congress—necessarily
and with even greater force—can remove, as it did in R.A. No. 6770, §14, the
authority to issue ancillary injunctive writs in relation to the Ombudsman’s
investigation.
G.
Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman’s determination that the preventive suspension
of a respondent in an administrative disciplinary case is “timely, proper and necessary” a
finding of fact, or of law, or a mixture of both.
R.A. No. 6770, §24 states that the “Ombudsman or his Deputy may
preventively suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an
investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge
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against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct
or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from
the service; or (c) the respondent’s continued stay in office may prejudice the case
filed against him.”
The language of the law indicates that the timeliness, propriety, and necessity
of a decision to preventively suspend are largely factual in character. Assessing the
weight of evidence and determining the need to temporarily remove the officer
concerned so a full and credible investigation may be had are matters that depend on
the appreciation of facts by the Office of the Ombudsman.
H.
Whether or not a determination by the Ombudsman, under issue G, is conclusive on the
courts, such that a contrary view from the courts will only “delay and interfere” with the
ongoing investigation.
The determination by the Ombudsman, under Issue G, is conclusive on the
courts. The phrase “in his judgment” indicates a textual commitment by the Congress
of the power to preventively suspend a public official within her jurisdiction. With
respect to the Court of Appeals, this is a legislative mandate to respect such textual
commitment, effectively creating a high bar against the exercise of any jurisdiction to
judicially scrutinize the propriety, necessity, and timeliness of a preventive suspension
order by the Ombudsman.
The Honorable Court has also consistently respected and given due deference
to the legislative policy consigning to the Office of the Ombudsman the parameters
for the exercise of the discretion to preventively suspend. 22 Nonetheless, given the
Court’s authority to determine grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of the
Garcia v. Mojica, et al., G.R. No. 139043, 10 September 1999; Office of the Ombudsman v. Evangelista,
G.R. No. 177211, 13 March 2009.
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discretion to preventively suspend, there is no doubt that the Supreme Court can
assess the validity of the exercise of such power to preventively suspend.
I.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals should be allowed to first address, in a Rule 65
proceeding, all questions raised over the Office of the Ombudsman’s issuance of a preventive
suspension order.
No, the Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction in the first place to issue any
TRO under R.A. No. 6770, §14.
J.
Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman’s petition for certiorari and prohibition is the
plain, speedy and adequate remedy to assail the Court of Appeal’s Resolution in the Petition
for Contempt.
Yes, because the Court of Appeals lacks contempt jurisdiction over the
Ombudsman, who is an impeachable public officer.
K.
Whether or not this Court should issue a temporary restraining order (TRO) to prohibit the
Court of Appeals from conducting further proceedings in the consolidated cases and to stop
the implementation of the two assailed resolutions.
Yes. Without a doubt, petitioner Ombudsman has the unmistakable right
grounded in the Constitution and expressly granted under R.A. No. 6770, to enforce
her preventive suspension so that she may proceed with the investigation she intends
to conduct without further delay. The Congress has specifically prohibited
respondent Court of Appeals from acquiring jurisdiction to issue injunctive reliefs, in
a Rule 65 proceeding, questioning the propriety of the issuance of a preventive
suspension order issued by the Office of the Ombudsman.
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Unless a TRO is issued by the Honorable Court, the investigation being
conducted by the Ombudsman will be rendered futile. The danger that documents
will not be accessed and secured, or even destroyed, and testimonies of potential
witnesses will not be obtained will impair the core functions of the Ombudsman, to
the grave detriment of her office and of the public.
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