COMPACT POLITICAL REPORT 2007
Compact for Peaceful Elections: Mobilizing Citizens for Peaceful and Credible Elections in 2007 Political Report Active Citizenship Foundation (ACF) July 2007, Philippines COMPACT FOR PEACEFUL ELECTIONS
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COMPACT POLITICAL REPORT 2007
THE 2007 ELECTIONS Political analysts and practitioners often fall into the fallacy of associating democracy with free and competitive elections. In the early literature of democratic transition and consolidation, the introduction of the first competitive elections has always been used as a mark of complete transition from authoritarianism to democracy. After 1986, election has become a key arena of democratic contestation in the Philippines. It harbors the irony of being competitive but at the same time highly exclusionary. This is because election in this country is often routinely interrupted by violence and systematic electoral fraud. The Arroyo administration declared the recently concluded 2007 senatorial and local elections as the most peaceful in Philippine history. Low level of election-­‐related violence was reported even in traditionally notorious areas like Maguindanao and Cotabato areas. Based on the records of the Philippine National Police(PNP), only 125 election-­‐related violent incidents occurred during the 2007 election, a slightly more than 50% decrease from the 2004 election’s 249 and 1998 election’s 269 election-­‐related incidents (See Tables I and II). The decline was partly attributed to the PNP’s “proactive measures” against gun ban violators and private armed groups. But the Arroyo administration’s claim ignores the fact that in many areas in Mindanao elections were not contested and that there is a significantly low voters-­‐ turnout. Save for one town in Maguindanao, all administration candidates for local positions (from governor to councilors) remained uncontested and the Team Unity won by landslide in the entire province. In Cotabato City, NAMFREL reported a very low voters turnout of 38% in the last elections. The COMPACT International Observers Mission (IOM) in the area reported that only close to 50% of barangays actually participated in the elections. In both Cotabato City and Nueva Ecija, fear and possible harassment prevented the voters from going out to cast their votes. In Guagua, Pampanga, the voter turnout also declined from 88% in 2004 elections to 66 % in 2007 elections. The most common complaint in this area and elsewhere in the Philippines is that the COMELEC's list of registered voters is often inconsistent and not updated resulting into delays or disenfranchisement.1 The 2007 mid-­‐term election took place amidst a crisis of governance and legitimacy of the Arroyo administration. If in the 2004 presidential election the main concern was how she can be re-­‐elected as president, the 2007 mid-­‐term elections meant the cut-­‐throat issue of political survival for the troubled presidency of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. The president needs to saturate both the Senate and the Lower House with her own allies in anticipation of another impeachment proposal. Moreover, President Arroyo needed to get the Senate majority as the major issues against her administration (i.e., Hello Garci scandal and extra-­‐
judicial killings) stand a good chance of being re-­‐opened for Senate investigation. Arroyo manipulated the party–list system by forming and funding front party list groups to increase her chances of getting more pro-­‐administration politicians in Congress. Local political competition intensified with the proliferation of private armies and the Arroyo administration’s political strategy of fielding candidates running under two different administration parties; i.e., Lakas and the Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino (KAMPI). When two administration candidates compete not only for the same public office but for the administration’s support and resources, there is more incentive for candidates to use coercion and violence to eliminate their rivals. This was the case in Moises Padilla, Negros Occidental, where KAMPI candidates Elle Garcia of Lakas and LDP candidate Frank Nazareno had a head-­‐on fight for mayoralty position.2 Various Team Reports of COMPACT International Observers Mission in Pampanga, Nueva Ecija and
Cotabato City.
2
Team Report of COMPACT IOM in Negros Occidental.
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While KAMPI is supposed to reinforce the existing networks and membership base of Arroyo’s original party, Lakas, in the 14th Congress, competition over House Speakership began. Key KAMPI party leaders are torn between Lakas-­‐CMD’s Jose De Venecia (Pangasinan) and KAMPI’s Pablo Garcia (Cebu). More than forty of the 53 KAMPI politicians elected in the Lower House will support the De Venecia’s candidacy. KAMPI party leader and Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) Secretary Ronald Puno threatened to expel Congressman Pablo Garcia if he pursues his candidacy. President Arroyo failed miserably in the 2007 elections on two counts: (a) the retention of dagdag-­bawas network of local and national COMELEC officials and military officers who were implicated in the Hello Garci scandal spawned qualms and reservations on the credibility of the 2007 election; and, (b) The administration’s political machinery did not deliver the votes for the senatorial candidates. In the so-­‐called ‘cheating capital,’ the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), widespread dagdag-­bawas (padding and shaving of votes) operations and a dubious rise in the voting population in some provinces have been reported. The provinces of North Cotabato, South Cotabato, Zamboanga Sibugay, and Zamboanga del Norte. The National Board of Canvassers rejected the certicates of canvass (COCs) from North Cotabato and South Cotabato because of conspicuous evidence of irregularities in the COCs. The COMELEC dismissed and filed charges of fraud against the Provincial Election Officers of the said provinces. Warrants of arrest were issued against the embattled election officers. A Special Board of Canvassers was formed in each province by the COMELEC to canvass the municipal election results. The dagdag-­‐bawas operations that allegedly took place in the province of Maguindanao was the most blatant of all cases reported during the 2007 elections with the Arroyo administration gaining a 12-­‐0 victory. The Provincial Election Officer, Lintang Bedol, was summoned by the National Board of Canvassers to explain allegations of irregularities in the COCs. He declined to participate by going into hiding. The Special Board of Canvassers formed by the COMELEC for Maguindanao province was not able to proceed with the canvassing because the municipal COCs were nowhere to be found. When Bedol finally faced the public he conveniently declared that the missing COCs were stolen from his office. How the COMELEC will rule over the missing COCs is critical to determination of who will be declared as winner of the 12th spot in the senatorial race. Genuine Opposition candidate Aquilino ‘Koko’ Pimentel III and administration candidate Miguel Zubiri were in a very close fight for the 12th spot. Amidst protests by the political opposition, the COMELEC accepted copies of the COCs reproduced by the municipal Boards of Canvassers (BOCs) and gave a go-­‐signal to proceed with the canvassing. Zubiri was sworn into office on July 13, 2007. Dagdag-­‐bawas practices have also seeped into the party-­‐list election. Votes were padded to raise the chances of administration-­‐supported or –‘friendly’ party-­‐list groups to reach the two percent threshold. In ARMM and other places in the country, cheating is done by rigging the number of registered voters so violators can have more flexibility in fudging on the number of actual votes cast. A twenty percent increase in voting population was noted in Lanao del Sur and around 11-­‐20 % in the provinces of Tawi-­‐Tawi, Basilan, and Sulu.3 Other forms of electoral fraud include arbitrary adjustments registered voters list. In Cotabato City, then reelectionist Vice–Mayor Japal Gulani Jr. alleged that the City Election Officer, Arlan Mangelen transferred names of registered voters on the master list from one barangay to 3
Philippine Daily Inquirer Research Team. http://www.inquirer.net
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another so that on polling day citizens would be unable to find their names when casting their vote.4 The Arroyo administration have gained the majority in the Lower House and won a number of local seats. As purported by a government official close to the president, the Arroyo administration has won 2 out of 3 local seats (congressional and provincial/municipal). This goes to show that the Arroyo administration has laid down its political machinery for the forthcoming 2010 presidential, senatorial, and local elections. But the next questions are: how politically resilient these local alliances are and what is the probability that they would translate into votes for the administration candidates come 2010 election given her status as an outgoing president. Political analyst Joel Rocamora argued that support for national candidates is usually negotiated among local political clans.5 If this is the general pattern, then President Arroyo failed dismally in getting her local allies to deliver the votes for Team Unity’s senatorial candidates. The administration won majority of the congressional, provincial, and municipal seats6 but lost overwhelmingly the senatorial race with only 5 administration candidates getting into the top 12. The phenomenal victory of two independent candidates – Francis ‘Kiko’ Pangilinan and Gregoria ‘Gringo’ Honasan – and the landslide victory of the Genuine Opposition (GO) candidates including an imprisoned coup plotter, Antonio Trillanes IV, only tells us that even relatively solid machinery and enormous resources cannot mollify the public’s distrust of the Arroyo administration. This confirms a widespread perception that the 2007 senatorial race approximates a ‘referendum’7 for the Arroyo presidency, whose legitimacy has been in deep crisis after the Hello Garci expose. With only five administration senators, it would be more difficult for Gloria Arroyo to fight some of her forthcoming major battles: her human rights record, electoral fraud, charter change, and the revival of impeachment proposal. This would spell intensified demand for political accountability. Former military officer, coup plotter and newly-­‐elect Senator Antonio Trillanes IV has recently called for the revival of Senate inquiry on the Hello Garci scandal and the extra-­‐judicial killings. The prospect for charter change via people’s initiative will depend on the extent of cooperation of Arroyo’s allies in the Lower House and in the provinces. THE COMPACT FOR PEACEFUL ELECTIONS The COMPACT for Peaceful Elections was designed by a group of non-­‐ government organizations and civil society groups led by the Active Citizenship Foundation (ACF) to address the perennial problems of electoral fraud and violence. It began during the 2004 national and local elections as a reaction to the growing incidence of election-­‐related violence committed by both state and non-­‐state actors. The number and activities of private armed groups maintained by local warlords were increasing and the New People’s Army was aggressive in imposing its “Permit-­‐to-­‐Campaign” and "Permit-­‐to-­‐Win" (PTC/PTW) policy on local candidates and party-­‐list organizations in their stronghold areas. In the said election, COMPACT organizers were able to get presidential, vice-­‐
presidential, senatorial candidates and major political parties as well to sign a “compact” to keep the 2004 elections peaceful by abandoning the use of coercion and violence during the elections. The same compact-­‐signing was held at the local level especially in areas where there is a high propensity for violence. COMPACT IOM Cotabato Report
Joel Rocamora, “2007 elections – Jueteng, Wives, and Showbiz” A paper prepared for the abscbnNEWS.com, 2007
6
Two out of 3 in favor of the administration as alleged by a government official close to the president.
7
AKBAYAN International Bulletin No. 3. Published by Akbayan Citizens Action Party, June 2007,
Quezon City, Philippines.
4
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The COMPACT program includes the following activities, which are implemented in partnership with local civil society groups, media, and church organizations: • Voters’ education • Capability and machinery-­‐building • Violence documentation • Media campaigns and public events • Response and redress mechanisms • International Observers Mission The COMPACT initiative did not end in the 2004 elections. In between 2004 and 2007 elections, COMPACT expanded its scope of intervention by tackling issues concerning political violence and democratic politics. The campaign was pursued at the national and local levels targeting issues that involved the national government’s rampant violation of civil and political rights and deteriorating peace situation in many localities. The Hello Garci scandal ensued a crisis of legitimacy of the Arroyo administration as well as a crisis of credibility of the electoral process in this country. Certainly electoral fraud is almost an institutionalized feature of post-­‐86 Philippine elections. It is so massive and systematic that it has become empirically intractable; i.e., it is difficult to measure and observe electoral fraud such as vote-­‐buying because it takes place in most conspicuous and yet rampant manner. The Hello Garci scandal is a confirmation to endless allegations of electoral fraud being committed by politicians every election. The 2007 Compact for Peaceful and Credible Election focused on the intertwining issues of fraud and violence in Philippine elections. In the face of weak system to redress the issues of fraud and violence, the COMPACT program seeks to intervene in the political crisis and make an impact on this year’s elections by: • Building a constituency of individuals and civil society organization for peaceful and democratic politics. • Developing a voters education program. • Engaging in local campaigns for peaceful and democratic elections in critical areas. • Organizing a network of stakeholders and key political players at the local level and getting them to agree on peaceful conduct of elections. • Mobilizing citizens in various initiatives to insulate the electoral process from fraud and coercion. Consultation meetings with various stakeholders were organized to carefully formulate an agenda and plan for peaceful and democratic elections. A national conference has been held to provide a forum for sharing analyses insights that came out from the series of consultations. Parallel conferences were held in different provinces and some municipalities to provide a local texture to the generalized condition of electoral fraud and violence as well as to democratize the consensus-­‐building process that was started at the national level. Local candidates fora and education and information campaign were also held. Results of these ongoing, multi-­‐level dialogues were shared with the public through regular media briefings, the publication of a Network Bulletin, and the establishment of a local election campaign monitoring center. To ensure sustainability of these local initiatives, a local peace and democratic politics advocates network has been organized in some municipalities and provinces. A pool of educators was created to make sense of the various issues and analyses being presented or discussed; and translate them into well thought out education modules and campaign materials. The outputs of the educators’ pool have been presented in National Trainers’ Training Seminar. COMPACT FOR PEACEFUL ELECTIONS
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Popular campaign materials such as leaflets, posters, primer on peaceful and democratic elections were produced. Local paralegal teams and a national legal team have been formed to prepare local constituents in responding to any forms of political harassment and in crafting possible courses of legal actions concerning electoral fraud and violence as well. Electoral paralegal trainings have been conducted to familiarize members of the paralegal teams about electoral laws, filing of affidavits, and proper methods of documentation and investigation. COMPACT convenors published paralegal and poll-­watching manual to guide the local teams. Paralegal clinics have been set up in areas where cases have actually been filed and partner organizations had access to legal coaching for emergency cases. On the day of the elections, an election watch (Bantay Eleksyon) has been organized in each pilot areas to coordinate the various local institutions such as the church and the media as well as community groups to monitor and document the voting and canvassing. Roving elections monitors and documentation teams have been deployed and election monitoring centers set up in some municipalities and provinces. A national monitoring and reporting system was set up to compile the local reports into a comprehensive national election day report and follow up responsible agencies. Scholars and practitioners are in agreement that the presence of neutral international observers during the elections deters widespread electoral fraud and violence. The COMPACT International Observers Mission (IOM) was organized precisely for that purpose along with the intention to supply first-­‐hand information about the conduct of the 2007 election to the international community. COMPACT organizers have invited parliamentarians from Australia and Sweden, academics, prominent activists and filmmakers to observe and document the conduct of the 2007 senatorial and local elections in the provinces Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Albay, Camarines Sur, Negros Oriental and Cotabato City (See Profiles of Delegates of the 2007 COMPACT International Observers Mission). International delegates also interviewed key political players from incumbent mayors or governors to warlords, local COMELEC officials, and regional commanders. They shared their observations with the local stakeholders by holding press conferences. DEMOCRACY INTERRUPTED. THE PHILIPPINE CASE There is a spectre haunting the so-­‐called “third wave democracies”: the stability of democratic institutions is perennially challenged by corruption, poverty, military coup, the absence of rule of law and a growing indifference of citizens. The crisis either ends up in an authoritarian reversal or extremely low political equilibrium (incompetent public officials coincides with low level of citizens participation). The cost of democratization increases when extremist challengers (from both left and right) to the democratic system maintain a solid power base (territories, networks) and has command over substantial amount of coercive resources. Democratization is also impeded by the persistence of categorical inequalities preventing a big chunk of the population from participating in politics exacerbated by the state’s lack of capacity to protect the public sphere from the interventions of factional interests such as the military, the national elite or any armed group. By all indication, the current state of Philippine politics is in the brink of de-­‐
democratization. Democratic rule of law never took off and the country witnessed the gradual emergence of new networks of violence as well as the resurgence of collective violence and human rights violations. Philippine politics can be characterized as high level democracy but with a low state capacity.8 It is a high democracy because of the existence of a robust network of social movement organizations and pro-­‐democracy civil society groups, formal channels of 8
This is part of the typology developed by Charles Tilly on various paths of democratization.
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political participation constitutionally protected by civil and political rights. But these democratic features are constantly undermined by weak state. The expansion of democratic space and institutionalization of citizenship rights took place without the other preconditions such as the professionalization of the police and military, the development of an impartial and efficient state bureaucracy, the removal of categorical inequalities, and the dissolution of autonomous power centers (i.e. warlords, political dynasties, and politicized military factions, political dynasties). In the Philippines, democracy has diminished instead of strengthen state capacity resulting from the combination of the following mechanisms: (a) re-­‐concentration of control over legal and illegal resources as a result of the Local Government Code; i.e., the devolution of political and administrative functions to local governments; (b) optimal use of electoral and representative institutions by political clans; and (c) the formation of networks of violent entrepreneurs. Re-­concentration of political and economic control The Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) as mandated by the Local Government Code (LGC) was intended to strengthen local public officials by increasing their autonomy and providing them a guaranteed supply of state money for their projects or patronage activities. It seeks to gradually reduce the dependency of local governments on national government. In real life, however, the IRA has institutionalized an ongoing clientelist relationship between the president and local executives by dangling the speedy release of IRA money as a political incentive. Combining the IRA and pork barrel, the state, through the Office of the President, distributes power to different political actors deepening existing social cleavages and intensifying social conflicts. In addition, the LGC granted local chief executives the authority to appoint their respective local police chief hence increasing the former’s access and control over the state coercive resources. This is a convenient arrangement mayors and governors who derived kickbacks and profits from illicit economic activities such as jueteng, drug trafficking, arms or drugs smuggling, illegal logging and the like. With the combined protection of local police and private army, local warlord politicians become more economically entrenched and politically indispensable, increasing their bargaining leverage with the president. Controlling democratic institutions Political clans took advantage of the re-­‐establishment of electoral and representative institutions. 9 Members of political clans have dominated the Lower House since the 9th congress. It was reported that 80% or 166 of district representatives elected in the 13th congress come from political families – a very significant increase from the 12th congress’ 66 percent.10 More than half of the total number of representatives in the 13th congress was re-­‐elected members of political families. Getting a congressional seat is appealing to political clans because it is where they can haggle with national power brokers through the pork barrel system. Political clans also prevail in the gubernatorial race. The percentage share of governors who come from political dynasties have dramatically increased from 64 percent in 1998 9
Joel Rocamora and Paul Hutchcroft (2003), “ Strong Demands an The original intent of the party list law
is to provide mechanism for the inclusion of “under-represented” and “marginalized” groups into the legislative
arena. As distinguished from the concept of sectoral representation, the party list is a system of proportional
representation where party list groups compete for congressional seats in an open election with the party platform,
rather than personalities, as their major selling point. Weak Institutions. The Origins and Evolution of Democratic
Deficit in the Philippines,” Journal of East Asian Studies (3): 278.
10
Karen Tiongson-Mayrina and Allan Villarta, “13th Congress: 8 in 10 District Reps Hail from Political
Families,” GMA News Research, March 21. 2007. Compiled by 2007 Compact Secretariat.
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synchronized elections to 79% in 2001 elections and steady 80% in 2004 and 2007 elections.11 In all local positions, political clans entrenched themselves by skillfully shirking constitutional term limits by taking a break for one term and field their wives, sons or daughters, or any relative to take their place; or switching local positions with another family member or political ally. A competitive electoral system lacking in strong, platform-­‐based political party system in the Philippines increases the propensity of individual politicians and autonomous power centers to rely on personality and resources as well as undermine rules of political accountability. It is easier to exact political accountability in mature democracies because sanctions are much in place by political parties and state institutions such as the congress, judiciary, police and military. The introduction of the party list elections was seen as a mechanism to foster a platform-­‐based and more inclusionary politics. But the prospect for fulfilling the original intent of the party list law is consistently thwarted by either by legal ambiguities, the incursions of traditional politicians, and the dominance of political machinery at the local level.12 There is an upsurge of interest among state actors and other sectoral, political, and religious groups in party list elections. With the success of some progressive party list groups such as Akbayan and Sanlakas during the first party–list election in 1998 and their high visibility in the media because of their legislative performance such as the “payola” expose, the extreme left followed suit by forming Bayan Muna. Religious groups ranging from Christian fundamentalist groups to Muslim also formed their respective political parties. The military recently joined the foray by supporting Bantay, a political party that listed Jovito Palpalaran as the party’s nominee. Palpalaran earned notoriety for his active involvement in a spate of extra-­‐judicial killings since 2004. Even anti-­‐communist organizations have sought representation through the party list by forming the Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy (ANAD) in 2003 by the National Alliance for Democracy (NAD). The latter is an offshoot of the Alsa Masa, a Marcos backed -­‐anti-­‐communist movement that committed gross human rights violations. There were attempts in the past by the administration and other traditional politicians to circumvent the party list law by slowing down the accreditation process, building their own “front” organizations or issuing “creative” interpretation of the 2 percent threshold.13 Akbayan identified around 12 party-­‐list organizations that were organized and funded allegedly by President Arroyo’s political operators, the National Security Adviser, and some AFP officials.14 One prominent example is Agbiag! Timpuyog Ilocano, which was organized by Assistant Secretary Marcelo Farinas II of the Office of the External Affairs. Most of the nominees of these front party list organizations are incumbent officials or relatives of political allies of President Arroyo. (See Table III) Even the leftist Bayan Muna has devised strategy of dividing its machinery by creating new, like-­‐minded parties like Anakpawis, Gabriela, and Kabataan (formerly AnakBayan) to optimize its chances of getting more seats in the Lower House. This strategy of splitting 11
Gladstone A. Cuarteros, “The Clans Hold of Local Power,” Institute for Popular Democracy. May 22,
2007.
Akbayan International Bulletin No. 3. Akbayan Citizens Action Party, June 2007. Quezon City:
Philippines.
13
Aries A. Arugay, Jay A. Carizo, and Djorina Velasco, “ The Party-list System of Representation: Trojan
Horse for ‘New Politics’?, Political Brief, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Fourth Quarter 2004) and “’Admin’ Fronts in the Partylist,” http://www.akbayan.org.ph
14
Rocamora, “2007 elections—Jueteng, Wives, and Showbiz.”
12
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one’s voting machinery defeats the democratizing intent of the party-­‐list law. To be sure, no political group should be thwarted from exercising its fundamental rights of association of expression. But to resort to a strategy that would increase one’s political leverage (by getting more seats) at the risk of narrowing the options and chances of other partly list groups is like replicating the problem of the tyranny of the majority. Party list election has not been spared from political coercion and violence by military or armed rebels. There were cases where Akbayan leaders and organizers were harassed by the CPP-­‐NPA and even extorted them to pay “permit-­‐to-­‐campaign” fees. The NPAs have been actively campaigning for Bayan Muna in their own territories. Bayan Muna leaders were either ambushed or gun down because of their alleged communist connections. In Bodega, Pampanga, Brgy. Captain Romie Manuel was harassed and threatened by a military officer campaigning for the military-­‐backed Bantay party list organization. The formation of new networks of violent entpreneuers There is a general agreement within the democratization literature that political violence tends to decline as democratization reaches a degree of stability and predictability and the channels of political participation and interest articulation were institutionalized.15 The underlying assumption is that there are fewer incentives to use violence as a political leverage since venues for claim-­‐making already exist and protected by a system of democratic rights. Democratization did not reduce the incidence of collective violence. Despite of the restoration of formal democratic institutions and the system of rights, the civil and political rights situation did not improve immediately in the early years of the transition as the Aquino administration struggled survival from the violent attacks by the military, the armed left, and Islamic secessionist groups in Mindanao. The Commission on Human Rights data from 1986-­‐2004 reveal the upsurge of human rights violations in the period 1988-­‐
1989 surpassing the 1986 level (See Table IV) The number went down in 1993 under the Ramos Administration. But as the country move towards consolidation, collective violence rose steadily from 1996 thru 2004. Collective violence after the transition has increasingly become local,16 mostly carried out by new networks of violent entrepreneurs who make a profit out of violence and are indifferent of the distinction between political and criminal violence. What accounts for the endurance of collective violence in the Philippines under a democratic regime? And what explains the increasingly local character of collective violence after 1986? Joel Rocamora rooted the persistence of political violence in the electoral system established after the democratic transition. According to his study, the system of holding a synchronized election for presidential, senatorial and local positions makes the national politicians dependent on local warlords to get votes.17 In addition, in the absence of a well-­‐
functioning political party system where political parties get their own subsidies, national and local politicians are often left on their own to generate campaign funds. National 15
Samuel Huntington (1968). Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Terry Lynn Karl (1990), “Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America, Comparative Politics, Vol.23, No.1,
October 1990; Adam Przeworski (1991) Democracy and the market. Political and economic reforms in Eastern
Europe and Latin America. London: Cambridge University Press.; and Ekkart Zimmerman (1983). Political
Violence, Crises and Revolutions. Theories and Research. Massachusetts. Shenkman Publishing Corporation.
Patrick Patino and Djorina Velasco (2006), “Violence and Voting in the post-1986 Philippines, “ The
Politics of Death. Political Violence in South East Asia. Edited by Aurel Croissant, Beate Martin and Sascha Kneip.
Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2006
17
Joel Rocamora (1995). Boss: 5 Case Studies of Philippine Local Politics. Edited by Jose Lacaba. Quezon
City: Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ) and the Institute for Popular Democracy (IPD).
16
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politicians often rely on “political patrons” and “personal networks” for campaign money, hence removing the incentive for national politicians to use violence. 18 But the juetengate scandal that brought down former President Joseph Estrada showed the real deal between national and local politics: national politicians do not rely on local political warlords only for votes and cheating machinery but also for extracting protection money from growing illegal economy such as jueteng. Personal wealth and contributions from political patrons are not enough to meet the exorbitant costs of running a national campaign or even maintaining a public office. The Pinedas, the alleged jueteng lords of Pampanga, were reportedly one of the major campaign contributors of Gloria Arroyo’s campaign for presidency in 2004. The use of drug trafficking as method to raise campaign funds (also known as “narcopolitics”) has become prominent during the 2007 elections. Violence has increasingly been commodified with the fast expansion of illegal economic activities and the breakdown of law enforcement in the country. Over the years, private security has become a sunrise industry providing short-­‐term intelligence work, private security force, and other military services to any interested party. The industry allegedly recruits former NPA or MNLF rebels as well as former (retired, dismissed or in AWOL status) military personnel and its market ranges from private individuals, political warlords to companies and local governments. In Davao City, there were allegations that Mayor Duterte hired a private armed group to work as the city’s death squad, which was created to go after petty criminals and drug traffickers in the city. A human right activist observed that even middle class citizens and some non-­‐government organizations are silent about the “extra-­‐judicial killings” by Duterte’s death squads – an indication of their tacit approval of this method. This resonates the case of Brazil, where citizens approved of the vigilantes like ROTA and Esquadrao Da Morte who go after criminals because neither the police or the judiciary cannot hold the latter accountable. Some local warlords hire the services of a private armed group to protect their illegal economic activities and use them during campaign period to attract potential “clients.” 19 The breakdown of the rule of law has made violence the currency of political exchange. Philippines embarked on democratization without a fully developed capacity to enforce a democratic rule of law. The restoration of civil and political rights and electoral institutions preceded the development of stable and impartial institutions that will implement laws and civil and political rights. Democratization did not eliminate local authoritarian power structures. In fact, these structures have been strengthened by a culture of impunity cultivated by a weak system of political accountability and wheeling and dealings among national power-­‐holders. By monopolizing local elections, political warlords and prominent human rights violators (military and politicians) were not prosecuted but in fact re-­‐
integrated into democratic system. The absence of a democratic rule of law reinforces the capacity of non-­‐state actors to impose their own rule of law. In some places in the country, there is a parity in terms of access to coercive resources between the military and some rebel groups. The increasing use of ‘death squads” by local public officials is one example. Moreover, armed rebel groups like the NPA and RPA-­‐ABB have used threats or actual violence to exact “revolutionary justice” and extort money and other favors from individual politicians and even some party-­‐list organizations through the Permit-­‐to-­‐Campaign policy. A prominent local politician in Cotabato City told delegates of the COMPACT-­‐IOM about the alleged interventions by the MILF and MNLF during elections in some municipalities in the ARRM by showing force to influence ordinary voters in supporting their favored candidates. 18
19
Patino and Velasco : 12.
Patino and Velasco: 14.
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The persistence and, in fact, increasing incidence of collective violence despite democratization may also indicate deep social cleavages or recurring patterns of domination and resistance. As long as categorical inequalities exist, ordinary people will see the futility of democratic participation. Poverty heightens up the vulnerability of ordinary people to coercion, electoral fraud, and resort to political or criminal violence. For instance, existing land disputes were intensified by the 2007 local elections in Negros Occidental. Around four hundred people were threatened with forced eviction by the Penas in the municipality of Pulupandan. Those who did not support the mayoralty candidate Magdaleno Pena were not allowed to enter some barangays. The political family’s control in the area was so strong that the canvassing was done in the absence of board of canvass and public monitors. The Penas also set up barricades manned by their own private armies in their ancestral lands in Ubay to prevent supporters and poll-­‐
watchers of other candidates from passing through.20 CHALLENGES FOR THE 2010 SYNCHRONIZED ELECTIONS Three years into the next presidential and local elections, the country faces, time and again, the challenge of securing a peaceful, credible, and democratic election. The likelihood of reversing the present trend towards de-­‐democratization depends on to the degree that the Arroyo administration act to restore a democratic rule of law, minimize substantially categorical inequalities, revive public confidence on the electoral institutions, and diminish the influence of violent entrepreneurs in politics. The reform agenda for both state and civil society groups in the next coming years should revolve around these issues. Where the state cannot provide for the necessary conditions and protection for democracy to thrive, organized citizens should step up not only in compelling both state and non-­‐state actors to be politically accountable but in designing alternative institutions and practices. Democratic and effective rule of law is rooted in democratic citizenship and the constitutive norms of which are democratically but efficiently deliberated upon by societal groups. The prospect for pursuing reforms is quite dim under Arroyo’s watch. Structures of violence and inequalities remained intact. Executive-­‐legislative and intra–legislative fights would most likely impede any proposal for reforms with the Senate majority in the hands of the political opposition and the Lower House majority with the administration. What democratic forces need to identify are the potential linkages that need to be forged in preparation for the 2010 elections while demanding more state protection. They should also identify a system of incentives for armed groups to disengage from violence. Forming linkages. The pursuit of political reforms will depend on the strategic interaction between democratic opposition and reform-­‐minded government officials and legislators. Constituency-­‐building around democratic reforms must be scaled up by designing doable citizens legislative agenda and working with Senators, congressmen, and party-­‐list organizations who can commit to push the agenda during his/her term. Parallel efforts must be made at the local level. Constituency-­‐building at the local must be undertaken bringing in reform-­‐minded local public officials such as Pampanga Governor Ed Panlilio, Naga City Mayor Jesse Robredo, Isabela Governor Grace Padaca and the like sharing strategies and best practices in dealing with corruption, warlordism, and illegal economies. The re-­‐election of Isabela Governor Grace Padaca and the victory of Fr. Ed Panlilio who came in late into the gubernatorial race in Pampanga can provide insights on navigating trapo politics and introducing reforms at the local level, the dynamics of which are heavily driven by political machinery and networks of coercion. Both Padaca and Panlilio defeated 2007 COMPACT International Observers Mission (IOM) team reports on Negros Occidental and
Cotabato City.
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President Arroyo’s political allies using a platform of good governance, transparency and accountability. Padaca, a radio broadcaster, rose against the formidable political dynasty, the Dys in two consecutive gubernatorial elections: against the sitting governor Faustino Dy, Jr. in 2004 and against the latter’s brother, Benjamin in the recently concluded elections. The Dys ruled Isabela for over 30 years. Panlilio, a parish priest and director of a social action center, won against then incumbent governor Mark Lapid and Lilia Pineda, the wife of alleged jueteng kingpin and Presidential backer, Bong Pineda. The challenge for the progressive forces is how to sustain the new networks of reform-­‐
minded, anti-­‐trapo citizens generated by the Panlilio and Padaca electoral campaign; and transform these new networks into a solid political base for reforms. A test case will be the fight against jueteng with its deeply entrenched networks of corruption. Both Panlilio and Padaca declared the eradication of jueteng as part of the governance platform. Padaca has already encountered significant resistance from most mayors in Isabela since she introduced her anti-­‐jueteng campaign in 2004.21 The jueteng machinery may not have worked or delivered the votes in favor of Lilia Pineda in the recent gubernatorial race but Panlilio and his supporters, which mainly come from the middle class, must brace themselves for a disgruntled political opposition and getting he support of the ordinary people who depend on jueteng for a living. Increase state protection. State still matters in the practice of democratic citizenship. In theory, it is in the nature of the state to provide security and enabling conditions for individuals to pursue their free will. This is the paradox of democracy: “although society needs protection from the state (i.e the arbitrary action of the state against individuals and groups), it is only within the framework of the state that this is possible.”22 Since the Arroyo administration cannot provide the necessary state protection of fundamental rights, democratic forces should seek more international support to pressure the government. The possible revival of investigations of and eventual prosecution of government and military officials involved in electoral fraud and extra-­‐judicial killings would hopefully restore public trust on state institutions to protect their rights. Incentives to disengage from violence. Most of the armed groups – from armed to private army – are connected to their own communities. In most cases for the armed rebels, the legitimacy of their actions is drawn from the communities they worked with. A community-­‐
based approach to compel armed groups and local warlords to control or outrightly disengage from violence should be developed with the aim to cultivate a strong sense of restraint as well as of political accountability among these actors. The state should increase the risks of using private armed groups and engaging in illicit economic activities by criminalizing such actions. Specific recommendations The following immediate and long-­‐term electoral and political reforms are mostly based on the recommendations made by delegates of the 2007 COMPACT International Observers Mission. 1. Restore public trust on the electoral system and the COMELEC  Translating constituency for peaceful and democratic elections into action groups that will provide community-­‐based watchdogs focus on monitoring and documenting election-­‐related violence and electoral fraud in coordination with PPCRV and NAMFREL “Mutual Inspiration for Padaca and Panlilio,” http://newsinfo.inquirer.net. June 29, 2007.
Teresa Caldeiria and James Holston (1999). “Democracy and Violence in Brazil,” Comparative Study of
Society and History. Additional comment in parenthesis provided.
21
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 Training of election monitors  Implementation of automated counting  Formulate guidelines or legislate laws that will reduce campaign spending and increase transparency and accountability of electoral campaign.  Separate judicial and administrative functions of the COMELEC. Create an independent court to adjudicate disputes over electoral conduct in a timely and independent manner.  Rebuild public trust on election system and the COMELEC by prosecuting corrupt national and local COMELEC officials.  COMELEC should improve its administrative efficiency with the implementation of more effective leadership and management practices including the design of a human resource development program to recruit and develop competent, honest, and professional individuals into the service.23  COMELEC should maintain accurate and complete list of voters at all times. The COMELEC voters ID card should be recognizes as primary means of identification and should entitle citizens to cast their vote.  Additional funds should be provided to civil society organizations by the COMELEC for activities like poll-­‐watching, voter education , capacity-­‐building or training for volunteers.  Insulate public politics from particular power holder by abandoning the first-­‐past-­‐
the post winner-­‐take-­‐all system and establishing a proportional representation or Single Transferable Vote (STV) majoritarian system. 2. Remove enabling conditions as well as informal structures of political violence.  Revive the campaign against the NPA’s “Permit-­‐to-­‐Campaign” policy and support Congressman Etta Rosales’ bill criminalizing of the NPA’s PTC policy.  Political mapping of private armies and paramilitary groups and periodic monitoring of their activities by local citizens watchdog with the support of national and international human rights organizations.  The AFP and the PNP should be non-­‐partisan and implement strict guidelines regarding activities during elections. An army or police personnel caught actively campaigning for a candidate or a party list group should be given appropriate penalty. 3. Reinforce platform-­‐based politics by establishing partnership with non-­‐profit organizations involved in capacity-­‐building for active citizenship and push amendments to the party-­‐list law.  Support reform-­‐minded local candidates with high potential of winning and gradually build a network of this type of public officials. Adopted from Patick Patino’s “Redesigning the COMELEC, Political Brief, Vol. 14, No. 1. Institute for
Popular Democracy.
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4. Renew COMPACT for Peaceful and Democratic Elections for the 2010 elections with the aim to (a) restore public trust on democratic institutions and procedures; (b) lay down the parameters for political inclusion and exclusion; and (c) establish measures for exacting political accountability in the areas of governance, economic development, human rights and the rule of law.  Formation of International Observers Mission  Propose enabling rules, amendments or new legislation clarifying the rules of political inclusion and exclusion (Party–list and Absentee Voting law)  Constituency-­‐building through voters educations, organizing local election monitors, networking with teachers and young professionals, and other civil society groups such as NGOs, church, and media.  Policy Advocacy in the area of: electoral reforms including COMELEC leadership, automated elections, restricting violent entrepreneurs (both state and non-­‐state actors) COMPACT FOR PEACEFUL ELECTIONS
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