Sample response to the activity ‘On Liberty’
and Freedom of the Press
Although first published 149 years ago, Mill’s libertarian views on freedom of opinion and
publication are still pertinent today. Some of Mill’s critics have suggested that the arguments
expressed in On Liberty are not entirely consistent. Nevertheless, the principles laid out in that
essay have been very influential in Great Britain and elsewhere in the framing of legislation
concerning freedom of speech.
Mill opens Chapter 2 of On Liberty with what he believes to be obvious: that liberty of the press
is one of the securities against corrupt or tyrannical government. Citing several examples, he
then argues vigorously for the fallibility of opinion in practically all matters. Concerning religions,
Mill considers, for example, a Buddhist or a Confucian in Peking who is as certain of the ‘truth’
as the Christian is of the ‘truth’: “It has never troubled the one who is certain that mere accident
has decided which of these numerous worlds is the object of his reliance”. Concerning science,
Mill similarly argues that in every age people have held opinions “which subsequent ages have
deemed not only false but absurd”; Mill gives examples of geocentric and heliocentric theories
(of the motion of the planets); and of the theories of oxygen or phlogiston (as the principal agent
of combustion).
It is Mill’s firm opinion that the proliferation of all opinions (or what might be called conceptual
plurality) is vital in any society: it is through debate and reason that humanity makes progress.
Mill believes that it is but a pleasant falsehood that truth always triumphs over persecution. The
suppression of any opinion is wrong, even if held by only one person, as it may turn out to be
true or useful to humanity. There is no need to suppress pernicious thought because “wrong
opinion and practices gradually yield to fact and argument”.
Mill wonders what humanity may have lost intellectually through the fear of individuals to speak
openly their opinions, which differed from those of the mass of humanity. Mill discusses the
cases of Socrates and Jesus, both put to death for ‘blasphemy’; and also mentions several
Protestant opponents of the Catholic church who were persecuted before the time of Lutherian
Reformation. He notes that people were still being prosecuted for heresy in the mid-nineteenth
century, and that “there is never any fair and thorough discussion of heretical opinions”.
According to Mill, we need to learn as well as we are able the theories and opinions that differ
from our own, as without such knowledge it is impossible to judge the true validity of our own
ideas: “Both teachers and learners go to sleep at their post, as soon as there is no enemy in the
field”. Mill wryly observes that “[people] acknowledge that there should be free discussion on all
subjects which can possibly be doubtful, but think that some particular principle or doctrine
should be forbidden to be questioned because it is so certain, that is because they are certain
that it is certain”.
Mill places the highest value on liberty, as a fundamental human right. The limitations on that
right to liberty are governed by the principle of ‘harm’: that if no one is harmed by one’s actions,
then no authority should have the right to interfere in one’s affairs. Thus, according to Mill’s
criterion, no one’s opinions, theories or views should be suppressed. However, having laid out
his views, Mill then acknowledges (at the end of Chapter 2) that reasoned discussion of
contentious issues does not always transpire in a wholly temperate atmosphere. Then, at the
beginning of Chapter 3, Mill raises a vital, corollary consideration:
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“…even opinions lose their immunity when the circumstances in which they are
expressed are such as to constitute their expression a positive instigation to some
mischievous act. An opinion that corn-dealers are starvers of the poor, or that private
property is robbery, ought to be unmolested when simply circulated through the press,
but may justly incur punishment when delivered to an excited mob assembled before the
house of a corn-dealer, or when handed about among the same mob in the form of a
placard”.
Mill believes that such provocative acts need to be controlled: “The liberty of the individual must
be thus far limited; he must not make himself a nuisance to other people”. Here we reach the
core of the difficulty concerning legislation governing the publication of provocative opinions.
When is publication or the expression of opinions on controversial, historical or political issues to
be considered a nuisance: in any kind of publication? And how can we properly judge, as a
general principle, when publication is likely to cause civil disturbance owing to the offence to
concerned parties’ beliefs, principles or faith? British legislation has long grappled with these
issues; the outlawing of incitement of racial and religious hatred, and the outlawing of incitement
to terrorism are recent examples of restrictions in that regard.
Mill’s libertarian arguments are powerful and important. However, most people would probably
agree that there should be some limitations on the publication of material that may be dangerous
to society. What those limitations should be (and if there should be any at all) are still hotly
debated. I would be surprised if a class debate on this issue did not also evince the general
difficulty of determining exact limits of socially acceptable behaviour, when specific instances of
publication (such as, for example, incitement to violence) may tend to moderate our tendencies
towards a liberal view that texts or any kind of published information can do no real harm in a
mature, educated society.
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