Emotion Work, Feeling Rules, and Social Structure
Author(s): Arlie Russell Hochschild
Source: American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 85, No. 3 (Nov., 1979), pp. 551-575
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
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Emotion Work, Feeling Rules, and Social Structure
ArlieRussellHochschild
of California,Berkeley
University
perspectiveas a lens
This essay proposesan emotion-management
and structure.Emothroughwhichto inspectthe self,interaction,
tion,it is argued,can be and oftenis subjectto acts of management.
The individualoftenworkson inducingor inhibitingfeelingsso as
to renderthem"appropriate"to a situation.The emotion-manageaccountof emotion.It difdrawson an interactive
mentperspective
perspectiveon the one hand and the
fersfromthe dramaturgical
perspectiveon the other.It allows us to inspectat
psychoanalytic
therelationamongemocloserrangethaneitherof thoseperspectives
tive experience,emotionmanagement,feelingrules, and ideology.
Feelingrulesare seenas theside of ideologythatdeals withemotion
is thetypeofworkit takesto cope
and feeling.Emotionmanagement
jobs, morecommonin the midwithfeelingrules.Meaning-making
dle class,put morepremiumon the individual'scapacityto do emoin child rearingsugof class differences
tionwork.A reexamination
gests that middle-classfamiliespreparetheirchildrenfor emotion
familiespreparethemless. In
moreand working-class
management
reproduce
thisway each class preparesits childrento psychologically
theclass structure.
under the tacit assumptionthat emotion,
Social psychologyhas suffered
is not governedby social
because it seemsunbiddenand uncontrollable,
rules. Social rules,for theirpart, are seen as applyingto behaviorand
thought,but rarelyto emotionor feeling.If we reconsiderthe natureof
emotion2and the natureof our capacityto tryshapingit, we are struck
linksemergeamongsocial
by theimperialscope of social rules.Significant
and emotiveexperience-links
feelingrules,emotionmanagement,
structure,
I tryto tracein thisessay.The purposeis to suggestan area forinquiry.
I This paper summarizespart of the argumentpresentedin a forthcoming
book. This
study has been generouslysupportedby a GuggenheimFellowship. Althoughgratitude
in footnoteslike this is (as this paper demonstrates)conventionalized,and although
conventionmakes authenticityhard to decipher,I want anyway to expressappreciation
to Harvey Faberman,Todd Gitlin,Adam Hochschild,Robert Jackson,JerzyMichaelowicz, Caroline Persell, Mike Rogin, Paul Russell, Thomas Scheff,Ann Swidler, Joel
Telles, and the anonymousreviewersfor the AIS.
2 I defineemotionas bodily cooperationwith an image,a thought,a memory-a cooperation of which the individualis aware. I will use the terms"emotion" and "feeling"
interchangeably,
although the term "emotion" denotes a state of being overcome that
"feeling"does not. The term"emotion management"is used synonymously
with "emotion work" and "deep acting."
@) 1979 by The Universityof Chicago. 0002-9602/80/8503-0003$02.00
AJS Volume 85 Number3
551
AmericanJournalof Sociology
Why is the emotiveexperienceof normaladultsin daily lifeas orderly
as it is? Why,generallyspeaking,do people feel gay at parties,sad at
funerals,happyat weddings?This questionleads us to examine,not conbutconventions
offeeling.
ventionsof appearanceor outwardcomportment,
onlywhenwe imagine,by conConventions
of feelingbecomesurprising
emotivelifemightactually
trast,what totallyunpatterned,
unpredictable
and in thefamilyor worklifeof norbe like at parties,funerals,
weddings,
mal adults.
ErvingGoffman(1961) suggestsboth the surpriseto be explainedand
willhold in check
partof theexplanation:". . . We findthatparticipants
certainpsychologicalstates and attitudes,forafterall, the verygeneral
rule that one enterinto the prevailingmoodin the encountercarriesthe
understanding
thatcontradictory
feelingswillbe in abeyance.... So genthatwe need to look at
erally,in fact,does one suppressunsuitableaffect,
offenses
to thisruleto be reminded
of its usual operation"(Goffman1961,
p. 23). If we take thispassage seriously,as I urgewe do, we may be led
back to theclassicquestionofsocialorderfroma particularvantagepointthatof emotionmanagement.
Fromthisvantagepoint,rulesseemto govern
how people tryor trynot to feelin ways "appropriateto the situation."
Such a notionsuggestsbow profoundlythe individualis "social," and
definitions
of situations,with
"socialized"to tryto pay tributeto official
no less thantheirfeelings.
Let me pause to pointout thatthereare twopossibleapproachesto the
social orderingof emotiveexperience.One is to studythe social factors
thatinduceor stimulateprimary(i.e., nonreflective,
thoughby definition
The otheris to study
conscious)emotions-emotions
passivelyundergone.
streamofprimary
secondaryactsperformed
upontheongoingnonreflective
emotiveexperience.
The firstapproachfocuseson howsocial factorsaffect
whatpeoplefeel,thesecondon howsocial factorsaffect
whatpeoplethink
and do about what theyfeel (i.e., acts of assessmentand management).
Those who take thefirstapproachmightregardthosewho take thesecond
as being"overlycognitive."But in factthetwoapproachesare compatible,
and indeedthe second,takenhere,relieson someaccumulationof knowledgegarneredfromthefirst.3
If we takeas our objectof focuswhatit is peoplethinkor do aboutfeelFor comprehensive,
if somewhatdated, reviewsof the theoreticalapproaches to emotion,see Hillman (1964), Carlson et al. (1959), Reymert(1950), and McDougall (1937).
These reviews exclude several more recent theoreticalattemptsby Tomkins (1962),
Arnold (1968), and Plutchik (1962). For a psychoanalyticaccount, see Rapaport
(1953). Also see Rabkin (1968), Sprout (1952), Scheff(1973, 1977a, 1977b), Levy
(1973), and Katz (1977). Various social scientistshave developed their approaches
via inspection of a particular emotion or feeling,as for example, jealousy (Davis
1936; Clanton and Smith 1977), envy (Foster 1972), embarrassment(Goffman1956;
Gross and Stone 1964), and love (Goode 1974; Swanson 1965). For a selectivereview
see Hochschild (1975).
3
552
EmotionWork
aboutemotion
ings,severalquestionsemerge.First,withwhatassumptions
is emotion
and situationdo we begin?In otherwords,(a) how responsive
to deliberateattemptsto suppressor evokeit? (b) What sociologicalapSecond,whatare thelinksamongsocial structure,
proachis mostfruitful?
To beginwith,(c) are
ideology,feelingrules,and emotionmanagement?
therefeelingrules? (d) How do we knowabout them?(e) How are these
rulesused as baselinesin socialexchanges?(f) Whatin thenatureofwork
waysadultsof varyingclasses
and childrearingmightaccountfordifferent
managetheirfeelings?I shall sketchoutlinesof possibleanswerswiththe
thequestions.
aim,in somemeasure,of refining
TWO ACCOUNTS OF EMOTION AND FEELING
In orderto addressthefirstquestion,we mightconsidertwobasic accounts
account
of emotionand feelingfoundin social psychology:the organismic
in whattheyimply
account.The twoapproachesdiffer
and theinteractive
aboutour capacityto manageemotion,and thusin whattheyimplyabout
of rulesabout managingit. I cannotdo fulljusticehereto
theimportance
norcan I offera
the questionof whatemotionis and how it is generated,
on thatquestion.
fullreactionto theampleliterature
view,theparamountquestionsconcernthe
Accordingto the organismic
relationof emotionto biologicallygiven"instinct"or "impulse."In large
part, biologicalfactorsaccountfor the questionsthe organismictheorist
of SigmundFreud (1911, 1915a, 1915b; see Lofposes.The earlywritings
gren 1968), CharlesDarwin ([1872] 1955), and in some thoughnot all
respects,WilliamJames (James and Lange 1922) fit this model.4The
concept"emotion"refersmainlyto stripsof experiencein whichthereis
no conflictbetweenone and anotheraspectof self; the individual"floods
out," is "overcome."The image that comesto mindis that of a sudden,
4 W. McDougall (1948) and, to some extent,S. S. Tomkins (1962) also fitthis classification.Both focuson the relationof emotionto drive or instinct(Tomkins elaborates
a relation between emotion and "drive signals" wherebyemotion is said to amplify
drive signals). The centralissues on which the two theoreticalcamps divide are fixity,
reflexivity,
and origin. (1) The organismictheorists,unlike their interactivecounterparts, assume a basic fixityof emotion,based in biological givens. (2) They assume
that social interactiondoes not basically affectemotions; the social surface remains
what is implied by the term"surface." In the interactiveaccount. this is not the case.
Labeling, management,and expressionof feeling (more clearly differentiated
by the
interactionists)are processeswhich can reflexively
"act back" on emotion,and indeed
come to constitutewhat we mean by the term "emotion." (3) Again, the organismic
theoristsare more concernedwith tracingemotionback to its origins.For Freud and
James the originswere energicor somatic, and for Darwin, phylogenetic.The interactive theoristsare less concernedwith origin than with the interfaceof a situation
and experience.The focus on originleads the organismictheoriststo focus on commonalitiesbetween differentpeoples, and between people and animals. The focus on
social interfaceleads the interactioniststo focus on differences.
For recentinnovations
in the interactivetradition,see Kemper (1978) and Averill (1976).
553
AmericanJournalof Sociology
Freud'stenautomaticreflexsyndrome-Darwin'sinstantsnarlexpression,
sion dischargeat a givenbreakingpointof tensionoverload,Jamesand
Lange's notionof an instantaneous
unmediatedvisceralreactionto a perceived stimulus,the perceptionof which is also unmediatedby social
influences.
In thisfirstmodel,social factorscan enterin onlyin regardto howemotionsare stimulatedand expressed(and even here Darwin took the universalistposition) (see Ekman 1972, 1973). Social factorsare notseen as
an influenceon how emotionsare activelysuppressedor evoked.Indeed,
emotionis characterized
by the fixityand universality
of a knee-jerkreactionor a sneeze.In thisview,one could as easilymanagean emotionas
one could managea kneejerk or a sneeze.If theorganismic
theoristwere
to be presentedwiththe conceptof feelingrules,he or she wouldbe hard
put to elucidatewhat theserulesimpingeon, or whatcapacityof the self
couldbe calledon to tryto obeya feelingrule (see Hochschild1977). Recentattemptsto linkan organismic
notionof emotionto social structure,
suchas Randall Collins's(1975) wonderfully
bold attempt,
fromthe
suffer
problemsthat were implicitin the organismicaccountto beginwith.By
Collins,as by Darwinon whomhe draws,emotionsare seen as capacities
(or susceptibilities)
withina person,tobe automatically
triggered,
as Collins
developsit, by one or anothergroupin controlof theritualapparatusthat
does the "triggering"(1975, p. 59). A whollydifferent
avenue of social
control,thatof feelingrules,is bypassed,becausetheindividual'scapacity
to tryto,or trynotto feel-that to whichtheruleapplies-is notsuggested
by theorganismic
modelwithwhichCollinsbegins.
In the interactiveaccount,social influences
permeateemotionmoreinsistently,
moreeffectively,
and at moretheoretically
positediunctures.In
large part,sociopsychological
factorsaccountforthe questionsthe interactive theoristposes. The writingsof Gerthand MIills(1964), Goffman
(1956, 1959, 1961, 1967, 1974), Lazarus (1966), La7arus and Averill
(1972), Schachterand Singer(1962), Schachter(1964), Kemper(1978),
Averill(1976). and aspectsof late Freudianand neo-Freudianthoughtfit
thismodel.To invokethe Freudianvocabulary,theimagehereis not that
of a "runawayid," but of an ego and superego,actingupon,shaping,nagging,howeverineffectively,
temporarily,
or consciously,the id.5 Emotion
is sometimespositedas a psychobiological
meansof adaptation-an ana5 The stresson will (included in the concept of ego, but not all that "earo"refersto)
is not a clean divider of the organismicfrom the interactivetheorist.Schachterand
Gerth and Mills, whom I see as membersof the interactivecamp, lay no particular
stresson volition.Goffmanstressesthe phenomenathat call tacitlyforwill. He stresses
the patternedresultsof it, but provides no theoreticalaccount of will itself.He posits
no actor qua emotionmanagerwho mightaccomplishthe acts that,by inference,must
get accomplishedto pull offthe encountershe describesso well. In my view, we must
reinstitutea self capable of experiencingemotion and of working on it in socially
patternedways. (On the issue of will,see Piaget in Campbell [1976]; Solomon [1973].)
554
EmotionWork
such as shiveringwhencold or perlogue to otheradaptivemechanisms,
fromtheseotheradaptivemechanisms,
spiringwhenhot.But emotiondiffers
subjectto theinand imagining--themselves
perceiving,
in that thinking,
involved.
fluenceof normsand situations-areintrinsically
As in the firstmodel,social factorsaffecthow emotionsare elicitedand
of
expressed.However,in addition,social factorsguide the microactions
labeling (Schachter1964; Schachterand Singer 1962; Katz 1977), in(Gerthand Mills 1964), and managingemotion(Lazarus 1966).
terpreting
in turn,reflectback on that whichis labeled,interThese microactions,
to whatwe call "emotion"
intrinsic
preted,and managed.They are,finally,
of thought,is seen as
in
second
school
this
Emotion,
1976).
(see Schafer
moredeeplysocial. Lazarus's (1966) workin particularlends empirical
weightto the interactivemodel. It suggeststhat normaladults,such as
have a considerable
university
studentson whomhe conductedexperiments,
one
mightexpectfrom
control
than
It
is
more
emotion.
capacityto control
Freudin his
all
of
which
from
or
an
animal,
insane
adult,
a smallchild,an
it
is
the emotive
But
since
earlierwritingsand Darwin drewinspiration.
would
do well to
we
experienceof normaladults we seek to understand,
account.6
beginwiththeinteractive
The InteractiveAccountof Emotionand Social Psychology
If emotionsand feelingscan to somedegreebe managed,howmightwe get
The ina conceptualgraspof themanagingact froma social perspective?
teractiveaccountof emotionleads us into a conceptualarena "between"
designedappearanceson theone hand
the Goffmanian
focuson consciously
eventson the other.
and the Freudianfocuson unconsciousintrapsychic
The focusof Mead (1934) and Blumer(1969) on conscious,active,and
had not theirfocuson
responsivegesturesmighthave been mostfruitful
of feeling.(See
obscuredtheimportance
deeds and thoughtalmostentirely
Shott [1979] foran attemptto consideremotionfroma symbolicinteractionistperspective.)The selfas emotionmanageris an idea thatborrows
withneither.
frombothsides-Goffmanand Freud-but squarescompletely
focusing
and departures,
Here I can onlysketchout a fewbasic borrowings
on thedepartures.
ErvingGoffman
Goffman
guidesour attentionto social patternsin emotiveexperience.He
theindividualis activelynegotiating
catchesan irony:momentto moment,
6 My own account of emotiondraws on that proposed by Katz (1977). For Katz emotion is generatedby a "schematic discrepancy,"that is, a discrepancybetween the
individual's schemata and his currentperception,memory,or imaginingof an event
or object. Also see the interestingwork of Lazarus, Kanner, and Folkman (1979).
555
AmericanJournalof Sociology
a courseof action,but in the long run,all the actionseemslike passive
acquiescenceto social convention.The conserving
of conventionis not a
passivebusiness.Goffman's
approachmightsimplybe extendedand deepenedby showingthatpeoplenot onlytryto conform
outwardly,
but do so
inwardlyas well. "When theyissue uniforms,
theyissue skins" (Goffman
1974) couldbe extended:"and twoinchesof flesh."
Yet, ironically,
to studywhyand underwhatconditions
"participants
...
hold in checkcertainpsychological
states. . ." (Goffman1961,p. 23), we
are forcedpartlyout of the perspective
whichgave birthto the insight.I
shall tryto showwhythisis so, whatthe remediesmightbe, and how the
resultscould be conceptuallyrelated to aspects of the psychoanalytic
tradition.
First,Goffman,
forreasonsnecessaryto his purpose,maintainsforthe
mostparta studieddisregardforthelinksbetweenimmediatesocial situationsand macrostructure
on the one hand,and individualpersonality
on
theother.If oneis interested
in drawinglinksamongsocialstructure,
feeling
rules,and emotionmanagement,
thisstudieddisregardbecomesa problem.
Goffman's
"situationism"is a brilliantachievement,
one that mustbe
understood
as a development
in theintellectual
historyofsocialpsychology.
Earlierin the centurya numberof classicworkslinkedsocial structure
to
or "dominantinstitutions"to "typical identities,"and thus
personality,
also relatedfindings
in sociologyand anthropology
to thosein psychology
or psychoanalytic
in
theory.These studiesappeared a numberof fields-in
Ruth Benedict (1946); in psychoanalysis,
Erich Fromm
anthropology,
(1942), Karen Horney (1937), and Erik Erikson (1950); in sociology,
David Riesman(1952, 1960), Swansonand Miller (1966), and Gerthand
Mills (1964).
Possiblyin responseto thisparadigmGoffman
proposedan intermediate
levelof conceptualelaboration,
"between"social structure
and personality.
His focusis on situations,episodes,encounters.
The situation,the episodically emergent
encounter,
is not onlynearlydivorcedfromsocial structure
and frompersonality;
he evenseemsto intendhissituationism
as an analytic
substitutefor these concepts (see Goffman1976, p. 77). Structure,he
seemsto say,can be notonlytransposed
but reduced"in and down,"while
personality
can be reduced"up and out" to thestudyofhere-now,
gone-then
interactional
moments.
Each interactional
episodetakeson the characterof a minigovernment.
A cardgame,a party,a greeting
on thestreetexactsfromus certain"taxes"
in the formof appearanceswhichwe "pay" forthesake of sustainingthe
encounter.
of safetyfromdisrepute.(Thanks
We are repaidin thecurrency
to HarveyFarbermanfordiscussionon thispoint.)
This modelof the situationqua minigovernment,
whileusefulforGoffman'spurposes,leads us away fromsocial structure
and personality-two
556
EmotionWork
conceptswithwhichany studyof feelingrulesand emotionmanagement
wouldbe wise to deal.7To studywhyand underwhatconditions"participants ... hold in checkcertainpsychological
states. . ." (Goffman1961,
p. 23), we are forcedout of thehere-now,
gone-then
situationism
and back,
in part at least, to thesocial structure
and personality
model.We are led
to appreciatethe importanceof Goffman's
work,as it seemshe does not,
as the criticalset of conceptualconnecting
tissuesby whichstructure
and
personality,
realin theirownright,are moreprecisely
joined.
if we are to understandthe originand causes of changein
Specifically,
"feelingrules"-this undersideof ideology-we are forcedback out of a
studyof theimmediate
situationsin whichtheyshowup, to a studyofsuch
thingsas changingrelationsbetweenclassesor thesexes.
If we are to investigatethe ways people try to manage feeling,we
shall have to posit an actorcapable of feeling,capable of assessingwhen
a feelingis "inappropriate,"
and capable of tryingto managefeeling.The
problemis thatthe actorGoffman
proposesdoes not seemto feelmuch,is
not attunedto, does notmonitorcloselyor assess,does notactivelyevoke,
inhibit,shape-in a word,work on feelingsin a way an actorwouldhave
to do to accomplishwhat Goffman
says is, in fact,accomplishedin one
encounterafteranother.We are leftknowingabout "suppressivework"as
a finalresult,but knowingnothingof the processor techniquesby which
it is achieved.If we are to argue thatsocial factorsinfluencehow we try
to managefeelings,
if we are to carrythe social that far,we shallhave to
carryour analyticfocusbeyondthe "black box" to whichGoffman
ultimatelyrefersus.
Goffman'sactors activelymanage outer impressions,
but theydo not
activelymanageinnerfeelings.For example,a typicalGoffmanian
actor,
Preedyat the beach (Goffman1959), is exquisitelyattunedto outward
appearance,but his glances inward at subjectivefeelingare fleeting
and blurred.The very topic, sociologyof emotion,presupposesa human capacity for,if not the actual habit of, reflecting
on and shaping
innerfeelings,a habit itselfdistributed
variouslyacross time,age, class,
and locale. This variationwoulddrop fromsightwerewe to adopt an ex7Time: to link the momentaryact of emotion work with the concept of personality,
we must alter our perspectiveon time. An emotive episode and the attemptto shape
it is, afterall, a briefstrip of time. Situationssuch as Goffmanstudies are also short.
The focus is on the act, and the act ends, so to speak, when the theatercloses and
starts again when it reopens. If we extend Goffman'sanalysis, by speaking now of
"deep" acting, we, like him, are focusingon short episodes, on "stills" from which
long movies are composed. The notion of personalityimplies a fairlydurable, transsituationalpattern.The Casper Milquetoast personalitymay lead an anxietyavoidant
life of 73 years. Not momentarystills, but many decades are at issue. Again, we
must shift our situationistfocus at the structuralend when we come to speak of
institutions,which live even longer than people do.
557
AmericanJournalof Sociology
clusivefocuson the actor'sattentiveness
to behavioralfacadeand assume
a uniform
passivityvis-a-visfeelings.
This skewin the theoretical
actoris relatedto whatfrommyviewpoint
is anotherproblem:Goffman's
conceptof acting.Goffman
suggeststhatwe
spenda gooddeal of effort
managingimpressions-that
is, acting.He posits
only one sortof acting-the directmanagement
of behavioralexpression.
His illustrations,
though,actuallypointto twotypesof acting-the direct
management
of behavioralexpression(e.g., thegiven-off
sigh,theshoulder
shrug),and the management
of feelingfromwhichexpressioncan follow
(e.g., the thoughtof some hopelessproject). An actor playingthe part
of King Lear mightgo about his task in two ways. One actor,following
the Englishschoolof acting,mightfocuson outwarddemeanor,the constellationof minuteexpressionsthat correspondto Lear's sense of fear
and impotentoutrage.This is the sortof actingGoffman
theorizesabout.
Anotheractor,adheringto theAmericanor Stanislavskyschoolof acting,
mightguide his memoriesand feelingsin such a way as to elicitthe corresponding
expressions.
The firsttechniquewe mightcall "surfaceacting,"
the second"deep acting."Goffman
fails to distinguishthe firstfromthe
second,and he obscuresthe importance
of "deep acting."Obscuringthis,
we are leftwiththeimpression
thatsocial factorspervadeonlythe"social
skin,"the tried-for
outerappearancesof theindividual.We are leftunderestimating
thepowerof the social.
In sum,if we are to accept the interactiveaccountof emotionand to
about the
studythe selfas emotionmanager,we can learnfromGoffman
linkbetweensocial ruleand feeling.But to elaboratethisinsightwe might
well selectivelyrelax the theoreticalstricturesGoffman
has stoicallyimand on personality.
posed againsta focuson social structure
Freud
"black-boxpsychology"withsome theory
The need to replaceGoffman's
of self,in thefullsenseof theterm,mightseemto lead to Freudianor neoFreudian theory.Yet, here,as with Goffman,
only some aspects of the
Freudianmodelseem usefulto my understanding
of conscious,deliberate
efforts
to suppressor evoke feeling.I shall brieflydiscusspsychoanalytic
theoryto showsomepointsof departure.
Freud, of course,dealt with emotions,but forhim theywere always
secondaryto drive.He proposeda generaltheoryof sexualand aggressive
drives.Anxiety,as a derivativeof aggressiveand sexual drives,was of
while a wide rangeof otheremotions,including
paramountimportance,
weregivenrelativelylittleattention.He develjoy, jealousy,depression,
oped,and manyothershave sinceelaborated,the conceptof ego defenses
as generallyunconscious,involuntary
means of avoidingpainfulor un558
EmotionWork
pleasantaffect.Finallythenotionof "inappropriate
affect"is used to point
to aspectsof the individual'sego functioning
and not used to pointto the
social rulesaccordingto whicha feelingis or is notdeemedappropriateto
a situation.
The emotion-management
perspective
is indebtedto Freudforthegeneral
notionof what resourcesindividualsof different
sortspossess foraccomplishingthetaskof emotionwork(as I have definedit) and forthenotion
ofunconscious
involuntary
emotionmanagement.
The emotion-management
perspective
differs
fromtheFreudianmodelin its focuson thefullrangeof
emotionsand feelingsand its focuson consciousand deliberateefforts
to
shape feeling.Fromthisperspective,
we notetoo that"inappropriate
emotion"has a clearlyimportant
socialas wellas intrapsychic
side.
Let me briefly
illustratethedifferences
betweenthetwoperspectives.
In
Shapiro'swell-known
workon "neuroticstyle,"he givesan example:
An obsessive-compulsive
mindedand active
patient-a sober,technically
man-was usuallyconspicuouisly
in
lackingin enthusiasm
or excitement
circumstances
thatmightseemto warrant
them.On one occasion,as he
talkedabouta certain
thegoodchanceof an imof his,namely,
prospect
successin his work,his soberexpression
was momentarily
portant
interruptedby a smile.Aftera fewmoreminutes
of talking,
duringwhichhe
hissoberness
maintained
onlywithdifficulty,
he beganquitehesitantly
to
speakof certain
hopesthathe had onlyalludedto earlier.Thenhe broke
intoa grin.Almostimmediately,
he regained
however,
hisusualsomewhat
worried
expression.
As he didthis,he said,"Of course,theoutcomeis by
no meanscertain,"
andhe saidthisin a tonethat,if anything,
wouldsuggestthe outcomewas almostcertainto be a failure.Aftertickingoff
severalof the specific
possibilities
fora hitch,he finallyseemedto be
himself
again,so to speak.[Shapiro1965,p. 192,emphasis
mine]
What seemsinteresting
about thisexamplediffers
accordingto whether
one takes the psychiatricperspectiveor the emotion-management
perspective.First,to the psychiatrist
in the case above, what circumstances
warrantwhat degreeand type of feelingseemsrelativelyunproblematic.
A doctor"knows"what inappropriate
affectis; the main problemis not
so much to discernmisfitsof feelingto situationbut to explain them
and to cure the patient of them. From the emotion-management
perspective,on the otherhand, the warrantingfunctionof circumstances
is problematic.
Further,the meansused to assess thiswarranting
function
may well be the same for a psychiatristas for a salesclerkor school
disciplinarian.For, in a sense we all act as lay psychiatrists
using unexaminedmeansof arrivingat a determination
about just "what" circumstanceswarrant"that much"feelingof "that sort."
What the psychiatrist,
the salesclerk,and the schooldisciplinarian
may
shareis a habitof comparing,
situation(e.g., highopportunity,
associated
with an accomplishment
at work) withrole (e.g., hopes,aspirations,ex559
AmericanJournalof Sociology
pectationstypicalof, and expectedfrom,thoseenactingthe role). Social
factorscan enterin, to alterhow we expecta role to be held,or played.
mindedand active"
If, forexample,thepatientwerea "sober,technically
womanand if the observer(rightlyor wrongly)assumedor expectedher
to value familyand personalties overworldlysuccess,less enthusiasmat
"appropriate."Lack of enthe prospectof advance mightseem perfectly
thusiasmwould have a warrantof that social sort.Again,if the patient
fornuclear
was an antinuclearactivistand his discoveryhad implications
energy,thatwould alter the hopes and aspirationshe mightbe expected
to have at workand mightwarrantdismay,not enthusiasm.
of a feelingby makinga comparison
We assess the "appropriateness"
betweenfeelingand situation,not by examiningthe feelingin abstracto.
This comparisonlends the assessor a "normal" yardstick-a socially
normalone-from which to factorouit the personal meaningsystems
whichmay lead a workerto distorthis view of "the" situationand feel
inappropriately
with regard to it. The psychiatristholds constantthe
sociallynormalbenchmark
and focuseson whatwe have just factoredout.
The studentof emotionmanagement
holds constantwhat is factoredout
and studiesthe sociallynormalbenchmark,
especiallyvariationsin it.
in what,fromthe twoperspectives,
seems
There is a seconddifference
perspecinteresting
in the above example.Fromthe emotion-management
tive,whatis interesting
is the characterand directionof volitionand conwhat is of moreinterestis
sciousness.From the psychiatricperspective,
The man above is not doingemotionwork,
pre-willand nonconsciousness.
thatis, makinga conscious,intendedtryat alteringfeeling.Insteadhe is
his enthusiasmby "being himself,"by holding,in Schutz's
controlling
term,a "naturalattitude."He "no longerneeds to strugglenot to grin;
he is not in a grinningmood" (Shapiro 1965, p. 164). In orderto avoid
affective
deviance,someindividualsmayfacea hardertask thando others,
thetaskof consciously
workingon feelingsin orderto makeup for"a natural attitude"-explanablein psychoanalyticterms-that gets themin
social trouble.The hysteric
workingin a bureaucratic
settingmayface the
necessityformoreemotionworkthantheobsessivecompulsivewho fitsin
more naturally.
In sum, the emotion-management
perspectivefostersattentionto how
how people tryto appear to feel.
people tryto feel,not,as forGoffman,
It leads us to attendto howpeopleconsciouslyfeeland not,as forFreud,
The interactiveaccountof emotionpoints
how people feelunconsciously.
to alternatetheoreticaljunctures-betweenconsciousnessof feelingand
consciousnessof feelingrules,betweenfeelingrules and emotionwork,
betweenfeelingrulesand social structure.
In the remainderof thisessay,
it is thesejunctureswe shallexplore.
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EmotionWork
EMOTION WORK
to changein degreeor quality
By "emotionwork"I referto theact oftrying
an emotionor feeling.To "workon" an emotionor feelingis, forour purposes,the same as "to manage"an emotionor to do "deep acting."Note
that"emotionwork"refersto theeffort-theact of trying-and notto the
outcome,whichmay or may not be successful.Failed acts of management
and on thataccount
stillindicatewhatideal formulations
guidethe effort,
are no less interesting
thanemotionmanagement
thatworks.
feeling.
The verynotionof an attemptsuggestsan activestancevis-'a-vis
In my exploratory
characterized
theiremotionworkby
studyrespondents
a varietyof activeverbforms;"I psychedmyselfup.... I squashedmy
angerdown.. . . I triedhardnot to feeldisappointed.. . . I mademyself
have a good time.. . . I triedto feelgrateful.. . . I killedthehope I had
burning."There was also the activelypassive form,as in, "I let myself
finallyfeelsad."
Emotionwork differsfromemotion"control"or "suppression."The
merelyto stifleor preventfeeling."Emolattertwotermssuggestan effort
tionwork"refersmorebroadlyto theact of evokingor shaping,as wellas
suppressing,
feelingin onself.I avoid the term"manipulate"because it
suggestsa shallownessI do notmeanto imply.We can speak,then,of two
broad typesof emotionwork:evocation,in whichthecognitivefocusis on
in whichthe
a desiredfeelingwhichis initiallyabsent,and suppression,
cognitivefocusis on an undesiredfeelingwhichis initiallypresent.One
the
respondent,
goingout with a priest20 years her senior,exemplifies
problemsof evocativeemotionwork: "Anyway,I startedto tryand make
myselflike him.I made myselffocuson theway he talked,certainthings
he'd donein thepast.... WhenI was withhimI did likehimbut I would
go homeand writein my journalhow muchI couldn'tstandhim. I kept
changingmy feelingand actuallythoughtI reallyliked him wlhileI was
withhimbuta coupleofhoursafterhe was gone,I reverted
back to different
exemplifies
the work,not of working
feelings...."8
Anotherrespondent
feelingup, but ofworkingfeelingdown:
Last summerI was goingwitha guyoften,and I beganto feelvery
thathe had just brokenup witha
strongly
abouthim.I knewthough,
8 The illustrationsof emotion work come from a content analysis of 261 protocols
given to students in two classes at the Universityof California, Berkeley,in 1974.
Many of the illustrationscome fromanswers to the question, "Describe as fullya,nd
concretelyas possible a real situation,importantto you, in which you experienced
eitherchanginga real situation to fit your feelingsor changingyour feelingsto fita
situation.What did it mean to you?" Three coders coded the protocols.The findings
will be reportedin a later study. I will only mentionhere that 13% of the men but
32% of the women were coded as "changing feeling"instead of changingsituation,
and of those who changed feelings,far more women reported doing so agentially
rather than passively.
561
AmericanJournalof Sociology
girla yearago becauseshe had gottentoo seriousabouthim,so I was
I alsowasafraidofbeinghurt,so I attempted
afraidto showanyemotion.
I talked myselfinto not caringabout Mike . . .
to changemyfeelings.
butI mustadmitit didn'tworkforlong.To sustainthisfeelingI had to
almostinventbad thingsabout him and concentrateon themor continue
to tell myselfhe didn't care. It was a hardeningof emotions,I'd say. It
a lot of workand was unpleasant,
on
tookbecauseI had to concentrate
I couldfindthatwas irritating
abouthim.
anything
Oftenemotionworkis aided by settingup an emotion-work
system,for
example,tellingfriendsof all theworstfaultsof thepersonone wantedto
fall out of love with,and thengoingto thosefriendsforreinforcement
of
thisviewof theex-beloved.This suggestsanotherpoint: emotionworkcan
be done by the selfupon the self,by the selfupon others,and by others
upon oneself.
In each case theindividualis consciousof a momentof "pinch,"or discrepancy,betweenwhat one does feeland whatone wantsto feel (which
is, in turn,affected
by whatone thinksoneoughtto feelin sucha situation).
In response,the individualmay tryto eliminatethe pinchby workingon
feeling.Both the sense of discrepancyand the responseto it can varyin
time.The managingact,forexample,can be a five-minute
stopgapmeasure,
orit can be a morelong-range
gradualeffort
suggested
by theterm"working
through."
Thereare varioustechniquesof emotionwork.One is cognitive: the attemptto changeimages,ideas; or thoughtsin the serviceof changingthe
feelingsassociatedwiththem.9A secondis bodily: the attemptto change
somaticorotherphysicalsymptoms
ofemotion(e.g.,trying
to breatheslower, tryingnot to shake). Third,thereis expressive emotionwork: trying
to changeexpressivegesturesin theserviceof changinginnerfeeling(e.g.,
fromsimpledisplayin that it is
tryingto smile,or to cry). This differs
directedtowardchangein feeling.It differs
frombodilyemotionworkin
thattheindividualtriesto alteror shapeone or anotheroftheclassicpublic
channelsforthe expressionof feeling.
Thesethreetechniques
aredistincttheoretically,
buttheyoften,ofcourse,
in practice.For example:
go together
9 There may be various types of cognitive emotion work. All can be described as
attemptsto recodifya situation.By recodificationI mean reclassification
of a situation
into what are previouslyestablishedmental categoriesof situations.As in an initial,
more automaticcodificationof a situation,deliberaterecodification
means asking onself
(a) What categoryin my classificationschema of situationsfits this new situation?
(the schema may include blame-insituations,blame-outsituations,credit-insituations,
credit-outsituations,etc.), and (b) What categoryin my classificationschema of emotions fitsthe emotion I'm feelingrightnow? (i.e., is it anger, general anxiety,disappointment?). In deliberate recodifications,one tries to change the classificationof
outward and inward reality. (To translate this idea into Lazarus's framework,we
might speak of the individual tryingconsciously to alter his or her appraisal of a
situationso as to change the coping process [Lazarus 1966].)
562
EmotionWork
in highschool.BeforegamesI didn'tfeeltheupI was a starhalfback
up." (This was due to
surgeof adrenalin-ina word I wasn't"psyched
and stillexperience-Iwas also
I was experiencing
difficulties
emotional
an A studentwhosegradesweredropping.)
Havingbeen in the past a
intense
by coachesas a
player,a "hitter"recognized
emotional,
fanatical,
I
veryhardworkerand a playerwith"desire,"thiswas veryupsetting.
I could to get myself"uip." I would try to be outwardly
did everything
"rah rah" or get myselfscared of my opponents-anythingto get the
I triedto looknervousand intensebeforegames,so at
adrenalin
flowing.
bored,
catchon.... WhenactuallyI wasmostly
leastthecoacheswouldn't
I was in the
or in anyevent,not"up." I recallbeforeonegamewishing
mycousinplayforhis school,ratherthan"outhere."
standswatching
Emotionworkbecomesan objectof awarenessmostoften,perhaps,when
the individual'sfeelingsdo not fitthe situation,that is, when the latter
feelings
in thesituation.A situation(such
doesnotaccountforor legitimate
of itself("this is a
as a funeral)oftencarrieswithit a properdefinition
framecarrieswithit a senseofwhatit is
timeof facingloss"). This official
amongsituaconsistency
to feel (sadness). It is whenthistripartite
fitting
tion,conventionalframe,and feelingis somehowruptured,as when the
at the thought
desireto laugh delightedly
bereavedfeelsan irrepressible
comeintofocus.It is thenthat
of an inheritance,
thatruleand management
themorenormalflowof deep convention-themorenormalfusionof situation,frame,and feeling-seemslikean accomplishment.
the unsecretary,
The smoothlywarmairlinehostess,the ever-cheerful
the teacherwho
irritatedcomplaintclerk,the undisgustedproctologist,
unflappablepokerplayermay
likes everystudentequally,and Goffman's
all have to engagein deep acting,an actingthatgoeswellbeyondthemere
withsituaorderingof display.Workto makefeelingand frameconsistent
engage.But they
andprivately
tionis workin whichindividualscontinually
do so in obeisanceto rulesnotcompletely
of theirownmaking.
FEELING
RULES
We feel.We tryto feel.We wantto tryto feel.The social guidelinesthat
directhow we want to tryto feelmay be describableas a set of socially
shared,albeitoftenlatent(not thoughtabout unlessprobedat), rules.In
knownand howare they
whatway,we mayask, are theserulesthemselves
developed?10
10 That we can single out such a thing as "feelingrules" is itselfa commentaryon
the ironic posture of the self legitimatedin modern culture. Modern urban cultures
fostermuch more distance (the stance of the observingego) from feelingthan do
traditional cultures. Jerzy Michaelowicz, a graduate student at the University of
California,San Diego, observed that traditionaland tight-knitsubculturesput people
directlyinside the frameworkof feelingrules and remove ironic distance or sense
of choice about them. He reportedon some researchin which one Hassidic rabbi was
asked, "Did you feel happy at the Passover ceremony?" "Of course!" came the incredulous reply.
563
AmericanJournalof Sociology
To beginwith,let us considerseveralcommonformsof evidencefor
or those
feelingrules.In commonparlance,we oftentalkaboutour feelings
For
example,we
of othersas if rightsand dutiesapplieddirectlyto them.
oftenspeak of "havingthe right"to feelangryat someone.Or we say we
"should feel moregrateful"to a benefactor.We chide ourselvesthat a
friend'smisfortune,
a relative'sdeath,"shouldhave hit us harder,"or that
another'sgood luck,or our own,shouldhave inspiredmorejoy. We know
feelingrules,too,fromhowothersreactto whattheyinferfromouremotive
display.Anothermay say to us, "You shouldn'tfeel so guilty;it wasn't
yourfault,"or "You don't have a rightto feeljealous, givenour agreement."Anothermay simplydeclarean opinionas to the fitof feelingto
situation,or may cast a claim upon our managerialstance,presupposing
this opinion.Othersmay questionor call foran accountof a particular
feelingin a situation,whereastheydo not ask foran accountingof some
othersituatedfeeling(Lymanand Scott 1970). Claimsand callingsforan
accountcan be seen as rule reminders.
At othertimes,a personmay,in
addition,chide,tease,cajole, scold,shun-in a word,sanctionus for"misfeeling."Such sanctionsare a clue to the rulestheyare meantto enforce.
as to the extent(one can feel
Rightsand dutiesset out theproprieties
"too" angryor "not angryenough"),thedirection(one can feelsad when
one shouldfeelhappy), and the durationof a feeling,giventhesituation
againstwhichit is set. These rightsand dutiesof feelingare a clue to the
to one finalreachof socialcontrol.
depthof social convention,
in theoryat least,betweena feelingruleas it is
There is a distinction,
knownby our senseof whatwe can expectto feelin a givensituation,and
a ruleas it is knownby oursenseof whatwe shouldfeelin thatsituation.
For example,one mayrealistically
expect(knowingoneselfand one'sneighbor's parties) to feelboredat a large New Year's Eve partyand at the
Howsametimeacknowledge
thatit wouldbe morefitting
to feelexuberant.
ever,"expectto feel"and "shouldideallyfeel"oftencoincide,as below:
in manywaysthanI imagdifferent
Marriage,
chaos,unreal,completely
of our weddingat eight
ined.Unfortunately
we rehearsed
the morning
o'clock.The wedding
was to be at eleveno'clock.It wasn'tlikeI thought
wouldknowwhatto do). Theydidn't.Thatmademe nervous.
(everyone
me (nordidanyonein the
My sisterdidn'thelpmegetdressedor flatter
I wantedto be so
roomuntilI askedthem).I was depressed.
dressing
day.I neverdreamed
howanyonewouldcryat their
happyonourwedding
A wedding
is "thehappyday" of one'slife.I couldn'tbelieve
wedding.
thatsomeof mybestfriends
couldn'tmakeit to mywedding
and that
addedto a lot oflittlethings.
andall these
So I started
outto thechurch
thatI alwaysthought
wouldnothappenat mywedding
wentthrough
things
mymind.I brokedown-I criedgoingdown."Be happy"I toldmyself.
Thinkof thefriends,
(But I finally
said to
and relatives
thatarepresent.
married,
you are. It's forRich [my
myself,
"Hey peoplearen'tgetting
longaislewe lookedat each
husband]andyou.") Fromdownthepretty
564
EmotionWork
other'seyes. His love for me changedmy whole being. From that point
on we joined arms.I was relievedand the tensionwas gone. In one sense
it meantmisery-but in the truesense of two people in love and wanting
to share life-it meant the world to me. It was beautiful.It was indescribable.
In any given situation,we ofteninvestwhat we expect to feel with
idealization.To a remarkableextenttheseidealizationsvary socially.If
the"old-fashioned
bride"above anticipatesa "right"to feeljealous at any
possiblefutureinfidelity,
the young"flowerchild" below rejectsjust this
right.
. . .when I was livingdown south,I was involvedwitha groupof people,
friends.We used to spend most eveningsafterwork or school together.
We used to do a lot of drugs,acid, coke or just smoke dope and we had
this philosophythat we were very communaland did our best to share
everything-clothes,
money,food,and so on. I was involvedwiththis one
man-and thoughtI was "in love" withhim.He in turnhad told me that
I was very importantto him. Anyway,this one woman who was a very
good friendof mine at one time and this man startedhaving a sexual
relationship,
supposedlywithoutmy knowledge.I knewthoughand had a
lot of mixedfeelingsabout it. I thought,intellectually,
thatI had no claim
to the man,and believedin fact that no one shouldever try to own anotherperson.I believedalso thatit was none of mybusinessand I had no
reasonto worryabout theirrelationship
together,forit had nothingreally
to do withmy friendship
witheitherof them.I also believedin sharing.
But I was horriblyhurt,alone and lonely,depressedand I couldn'tshake
the depressionand on top of those feelingsI feltguiltyforhavingthose
possessivelyjealous feelings.And so I would continuegoingout withthese
people everynight,and tryto suppressmy feelings.My ego was shattered.
I got to the pointwhereI couldn'teven laugh around them.So finallyI
confronted
my friendsand left for the summerand traveledwitha new
friend.I realizedlater what a heavy situationit was, and it took me a
longtimeto get myselftogetherand feel wholeagain.
Whetherthe conventioncalls fortryingjoyfullyto possess, or tryingcasually not to, the individual compares and measures experience against an
expectationoftenidealized. It is leftformotivation ("what I want to feel")
to mediate between feelingrule ("what I should feel") and emotion work
("what I tryto feel"). Some of the time many of us can live with a certain
dissonance between "ought" and "want," or between "want" and "try to."
But the attempts to reduce emotive dissonance are our periodic clues to
rules of feeling.
A feeling rule shares some formal properties with other sorts of rules,
such as rules of etiquette, rules of bodily comportment,and those of social
interaction in general (Goffman 1961). A feeling rule is like these other
kinds of rules in the followingways: It delineates a zone withinwhich one
has permission to be free of worry,guilt, or shame with regard to the situated feeling.Such zoning ordinances describe a metaphoricfloorand ceil-
565
AmericanJournalof Sociology
ing,therebeingroomformotionand play betweenthetwo.Like otherrules,
feelingrulescan be obeyedhalfheartedly
or boldlybroken,the latterat
varyingcosts.A feelingrulecan be in varyingproportions
externalor internal.Feelingrulesdiffer
curiouslyfromothertypesof rulesin thatthey
do not apply to actionbut to whatis oftentakenas a precursorto action.
Therefore
theytendto be latentand resistantto formalcodification.
Feelingrulesreflectpatternsof social membership.
Some rulesmay be
nearlyuniversal,such as therulethatone shouldnot enjoykillingor witnessingthe killingof a humanbeing,includingoneself.1"Otherrulesare
unique to particularsocial groupsand can be used to distinguish
among
themas alternategovernments
or colonizersofindividualinternalevents.
FRAMING RULES AND FEELING RULES: ISSUES IN IDEOLOGY
Rules formanagingfeelingare implicitin any ideologicalstance; theyare
the"bottomside" of ideology.Ideologyhas oftenbeenconstrued
as a flatly
cognitiveframework,
lackingsystematicimplicationsforhow we manage
feelings,
or, indeed,forhowwe feel.Yet, drawingon Durkheim(1961),12
Geertz(1964), and in parton Goffman
(1974), we can thinkof ideologyas
an interpretive
framework
thatcan be describedin termsof framing
rules
and feelingrules.By "framing
rules"I referto therulesaccordingto which
we ascribedefinitions
or meaningsto situations.For example,an individual
can definethesituationofgettingfiredas yetanotherinstanceofcapitalists'
abuse of workersor as yet anotherresultof personalfailure.In each case,
theframemayreflect
a moregeneralruleaboutassigning
blame.By "feeling
rules"I referto guidelinesforthe assessmentof fitsand misfitsbetween
feelingand situation.For example,accordingto one feelingrule,one can
be legitimately
angryat the boss or company;accordingto another,one
cannot.Framingand feelingrulesareback to backand mutuallyimplyeach
other.
11 But this,too. seems to be culturallyvariable. Erving Goffmanpoints out that hangings in the 16th centurywere a social event that the participantwas "supposed to
enjoy," a rule that has since disappeared in civilian society.
12 Durkheim, in The ElementaryForms of Religious Life, conveys just this understandingof the relation of world view to feelingrules: "When the Christian,during
the ceremoniescommemoratingthe Passion, and the Jew, on the anniversaryof the
fall of Jerusalem,fast and mortifythemselves,it is not in giving way to a sadness
which they feel spontaneously.Under these circumstances,the internal state of the
believeris out of all proportionto the severe abstinencesto which theysubmit themselves. If he is sad, it is primarilybecause he consentsto beingsad. And he consentsto
it in order to affirmhis faith" (Durkheim 1961, p. 224). Again, "An individual . . . if
he is stronglyattached to the societyof which he is a member,feels that he is morally
held to participatingin its sorrows and joys; not to be interestedin them would be
equivalent to breakingthe bonds unitinghim to the group; it would be renouncing
all desire for it and contradictinghimself"(1961, p. 446, emphasesmine).
566
EmotionWork
It followsthatwhenan individualchangesan ideologicalstance,he or
she dropsold rulesand assumesnewones forreactingto situations,
cognitivelyand emotively.A sense of rightsand dutiesapplied to feelingsin
and acsituationsis also changed.One uses emotionsanctionsdifferently
fromothers.For example,feelingrulesin Amerisanctioning
ceptsdifferent
can societyhave differed
formen and womenbecause of the assumption
bringswithit a
movement
basically.The feminist
thattheirnaturesdiffer
new set of rulesforframingtheworkand familylifeof menand women:
the same balance of prioritiesin workand familynow ideallyapplies to
men as to women.This carrieswithit implicationsforfeeling.A woman
can nowas legitimately
(as a man) becomeangry(ratherthansimplyupset
or disappointed)over abuses at work,sinceherheartis supposedto be in
thatworkand she has therightto hope,as muchas a manwould,foradvancement.
Or, a manhas therightto feelangryat thelossofcustodyifhe
has shownhimselfthe fitterparent."Old-fashioned"feelingsare now as
perspectives
subjectto new chidingsand cajolingsas are "old-fashioned"
on thesame arrayof situations.
an alternaOne can defyan ideologicalstancenotsimplyby maintaining
an alternativeset of feeling
tive frameon a situationbut by maintaining
rightsand obligations.One can defyan ideologicalstanceby inappropriate
necessaryto feel
affectand by refusing
theemotionmanagement
to perform
to feel.Deep
what,accordingto the officialframe,it would seem fitting
ideologiobeisance
to
a
given
can
be
a
form
of
work,
then,
actingor emotion
cal stance,lax emotionmanagement
a clue to an ideologylapsedor rejected.
sets
As some ideologiesgain acceptanceand othersdwindle,contending
of feelingrulesrise and fall.13Sets of feelingrulescontendfora place in
standardwithwhichto comparethe actual
people'smindsas a governing
lived experienceof, say, the seniorprom,the abortion,the wedding,the
thedivorce.Whatwe call "the changing
birth,thefirstjob, thefirstlayoff,
of the "same" sorts
climateof opinion"partlyinvolvesa changedframing
of events.For example,each of twomothersmay feelguiltyabout leaving
hersmallchildat day care whileworkingall day. One mother,a feminist,
mayfeelthatshe shouldnot feelas guiltyas she does. The second,a traditionalist,may feelthatshe shouldfeelmoreguiltythan,in fact,she does
feel.
Part of what we referto as the psychologicaleffectsof "rapid social
change,"or "unrest,"is a changein the relationof feelingrule to feeling
and
and a lack of clarityaboutwhattheruleactuallyis, owingto conflicts
13 Collins suggeststhat ideologyfunctionsas a weapon in the conflictbetweencontending elites. Groups contend not only for access to the means of economic production
or the means of violence but also for access to the means of "emotion production"
(1975, p. 59). Rituals are seen as useful tools for forgingemotional solidarity (that
can be used against others) and for settingup status hierarchies(that can dominate
those who findthat the new ideals have denigratingeffectson themselves).
567
AmericanJournalof Sociology
sets of rules.Feelingsand framesare
betweencontending
contradictions
We may,like themarbut notyet reconventionalized.
deconventionalized,
ginalman,say, "I don'tknowhowI shouldfeel."
as RandallCollinsrightly
It remainsto notethatideologiescan function,
elitesand social
betweencontending
notes( 1975), as weaponsin theconflict
strata.Collinssuggeststhatelitestryto gain access to the emotivelifeof
adherentsby gaininglegitimate
access to ritual,whichforhimis a formof
emotivetechnology.
Developinghis view,we can add thatelites,and indeed
social groupsin general,struggleto assertthe legitimacyof theirframing
rules and theirfeelingrules. Not simplythe evocationof emotionbut
laws governingit can become,in varyingdegrees,the arena of political
struggle.
FEELING
RULES AND SOCIAL EXCHANGE
The seemingly
staticlinksamongideology,feelingrules,and emotionmanagementcome alive in the processof social exchange.Studentsof social
interaction
have meanttwo thingsby the term"social exchange."Some
to theexchangeof goodsand servicesbetweenpeople (Blau
have referred
1964; Simpson1972; Singelmann1972). Others(G. H. Mead) have reaccountingreferredto an exchangeof gestures,withoutthe cost-benefit
"exferredto in thefirstusage.Yet acts of display,too,maybe considered
changed"in the limitedsense that the individualveryoftenfeelsthat a
gestureis owed to oneselfor another.I refer,then,to exchangeof acts of
of patternedentitlement.
displaybased on a prior,sharedunderstanding
Any gesture-a cool greeting,an appreciativelaugh, the apologyfor an
outburst-is measuredagainsta priorsense of what is reasonablyowed
another,giventhe sortof bond involved.Againstthis backgroundmeasure,somegestureswillseemmorethanample,othersless.
The exchangeof gestureshas, in turn,two aspects; it is an exchangeof
displayacts (Goffman1969,1967)-that is, of surfaceacting-and also an
exchangeof emotionwork-that is, of deep acting.In eithercase, rules
(displayrulesor feelingrules),once agreedupon,establishtheworthof a
gestureand are thusused in socialexchangeas a mediumofexchange.Feeling rulesestablishthebasis of worthto be ascribedto a rangeof gestures,
includingemotionwork.Emotionworkis a gesturein a social exchange;
it has a functionthereand is not to be understoodmerelyas a facetof
personality.
Thereseemto be twowaysin whichfeelingrulescomeintoplay in social
exchange.In the first,the individualtakes the "owed" feelingto heart,
takesit seriously.For example,a youngwomanon the eve of her college
graduationfeltanxiousand depressedbut thoughtthatshe "oughtto feel
happy," and that she "owed this happiness"to her parentsformaking
568
EmotionWork
her graduationpossible.The parentsfeltentitledto a seriesof gestures
indicatingher pleasure.The younggraduatecould "pay" her parentsin
emotivedisplay,a surfaceactingdissociatedfromher "real" definition
of
the situation.Goingone step further,
she could pay themwitha gesture
of deep acting-of tryingto feel.The mostgenerousgestureof all is the
act of successfulself-persuasion,
of genuinefeelingand framechange,a
deep actingthatjells, thatworks,thatin theend is notphony(since it is
whattheemotionis) thoughit is nonetheless nota "natural"gift.
The secondway feelingrulescomeintoplay in exchangeis shownwhen
the individualdoes not take the affective
convention
seriously;he or she
plays withit. For example,an airportobservation:There are two airline
ticketagents,one experienced,
one newon thejob. The newagentis faced
withthetaskof rewriting
a complexticket(involvingchangeofdate,lower
fare,and creditof the difference
betweenthepreviousand presentfareto
be made towardan air travelcard,etc.). The newticketagentlooksforthe
"old hand,"whois gone,whilethecustomers
in lineshiftposturesand stare
intentlyat the new agent.The "old hand" finallyreappearsafter10 minutes,and the following
conversation
takesplace: "I was lookingforyou.
You're supposedto be my instructor."
Old hand: "Gee," withan ironic
smile,"I am reallysorry.I feelso bad I wasn'there to help out" (they
both laugh). The inappropriate
feeling(lack of guilt,or sympathy)can
be playeduponin a way thatsays,"Don't takemynonpayment
in emotion
work,or display workpersonally.I don't want to work here. You can
understand
that."The laughterat an ironicdistancefromtheaffective
conventionsuggestsalso an intimacy;we do notneedtheseconventions
to hold
us together.
Whatwe shareis thedefianceof them.
COMMODITIZATION
OF FEELING
In the beginning
we asked how feelingrulesmightvaryin salienceacross
social classes.One possibleapproachto thisquestionis via theconnections
amongsocial exchange,commoditization
of feeling,and the premium,in
manymiddle-class
jobs,on thecapacityto managemeanings.
Conventionalized
feelingmay come to assumethe propertiesof a commodity.When deep gesturesof exchangeenterthe marketsectorand are
boughtand sold as an aspect of labor power,feelingsare commoditized.
Whenthemanagergivesthecompanyhis enthusiastic
faith,whentheairline stewardessgivesher passengersher psyched-upbut quasi-genuine
rewhatis sold as an aspectoflaborpoweris deep acting.
assuringwarmth,
But commoditization
of feelingmaynothave equal salienceforall social
classes.It mayhave moresalienceforthemiddleclass thanfortheworking
class. The way each class socializesits childrenmay,furthermore,
prepare
themforfuturedemandsfortheskillof emotionmanagement.
569
AmericanJournalof Sociology
WhenI speakofsocialclass,it is not strictly
speakingto income,education,or occupationalstatusthatI refer,
butto something
roughly
correlated
to these-the on-the-jobtaskof creatingand sustainingappropriate
meanings.The bankmanager,theIBM executive,forexample,maybe required,
in part,to sustaina definition
of self,office,
and organization
as "up and
coming,"or "on thego," "caring,"or "reliable,"meaningsmosteffectively
sustainedthroughacts upon feeling.Feelingrulesare of utmostsalience
in jobs such as these; rule remindersand sanctionsare more in play.
It is not,as ErichFrommsuggests,
thatthemodernmiddle-class
man"sells
his personality,"
but that,moreprecisely,manyjobs call foran appreciationof displayrules,feelingrules,and a capacityfordeep acting.
Working-class
jobs more oftencall for the individual'sexternalbehaviorand theproductsof it-a car partassembled,a truckdelivered500
milesaway,a road repaired.The creationand sustaining
of meaningsgoes
on, but it is not such an important
aspectof work.Physicallaboris more
commoditized,
meaning-making
and feeling,less. Surely,too, thereare
or lower-class
workingjobs thatdo requirethecapacityto sustainmeanings
and to do so, whennecessary,
by emotionwork;thejobs of prostitute(ElmerPascua,workin progress)and personalservantrequirefeelingmanagement.But to theextentthatmeaning-making
worktendsto be middle-class
work,feelingrulesare moresalientin themiddleclass.
or airlinestewardess,
Thereare jobs,likethatofsecretary
withrelatively
low financialrewardsand littleauthority,
whichnonetheless
requirea high
degreeof emotionand displaymanagement.
Such jobs are oftenfilledby
women,manyof whomcomefromthemiddleclass. Suchworkersare especially important
as a sourceof insightabout emotionmanagement.
Being
less rewardedfortheirworkthan theirsuperiors,theyare morelikelyto
feeldetchedfrom,and be perceptiveabout,the rulesgoverning
deep acting. Deep actingis less likelyto be experiencedas part of the self and
morelikelyto be experienced
as partof thejob. Justas we can learnmore
about "appropriatesituation-feeling
fits"by studyingmisfits,so too we
can probablyunderstand
commoditized
feelingbetterfromthoseforwhom
it is a salientformof alienation(see Kanter's[1977] excellentchapterson
secretaries).
CLASS, CHILD REARING, AND EMOTION WORK
Middle-and working-class
parentstendto controltheirchildrenin different
ways (Kohn 1963, 1969; Bernstein1971). Given the generalpatternof
each class tendsto prepareits childrenwiththe skills
class inheritance,
and to pass on class-appronecessaryto "its" typeof workenvironment
priateways.
Middle-classparentstendto controlvia appeals to feeling,and thecon570
EmotionWork
trolis moreof feeling.14
The working-class
parent,by contrast,tendsto
controlvia appeals to behavior,and thecontrolis moreof behaviorand its
consequences(Kohn 1963; Bernstein1971). That is, themiddle-class
child
is morelikelyto be punishedfor"feelingthewrongway,or seeingthings
in thewronglight,"or havingthe"wrongintention,"
whereastheworkingclass child is morelikelyto be punishedforwrongbehaviorand its consequences.The class difference
in socializationamountsto different
degrees
of trainingforthecommoditization
of feeling.This is yetanotherway the
class structure
reproduces
itself.(Thanksto CarolinePersellforthispoint.)
It maywell be that,especiallyamongthemiddleclass,a corresponding
value is now placed on "authenticity,"
on thingsas they"trulyare" or
"once were."Authenticity,
whichLionelTrillinghas describedas the"new
moralvirtue,"whenit refersto unworked-over
feeling,may be rendered
scarceforthosein themeaning-making
sector.For thissector,thepattern
may be that of conventionalizing
feeling,puttingit on the market,and
lookingfor"authenticity"
(see Trilling1972).15
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Why,we asked at the beginning,
do we feel in ways appropriateto the
situationas muchof thetimeas we do? One suggestedansweris: because
we activelytryto managewhatwe feelin accordancewithlatentrules.In
orderto elaboratethissuggestion
we consideredfirstthe responsiveness
of
emotionto acts of management
as it is treatedin theorganismic
and interactiveaccountof emotion.Accordingto theinteractive
account,we are not
14 As Kohn comments,". . . middle class mothersare far more likely to punish their
son physicallyfor what they call loss of temper than for behavior definedas wild
play. They appear to findthe child's loss of temper,but not his wild play, particularly
intolerable" (1963, p. 308). Again, ". . . The interviewreportsindicate that the distinctionbetween wild play and loss of temperwas most often made in termsof the
child's presumedintent,as judged by his precedingactions . . . if his actions seemed
to stem fromthe frustrationof not having his own way, theywere judged to indicate
loss of temper" (Kohn 1963).
15 Accordingto Trilling,the place of "sincerity,"as a moral virtue, has been taken
(Trilling'sverb is "usurped") by "authenticity."Sincerityrefersto the relationbetween
innerfeelingand outward display. Trillingoffersmany definitionsof authenticity,
but
one seems to referto the relationbetween the self as emotion managerand the inner
feelingsso managed.He citesWordsworth'spoem "Michael" about a veryold shepherd:
"When Michael, afterhaving lost his son Luke to the corruptionof the city,continues
to build the sheepfold which he and the boy had ceremoniallybegun together,his
neighborsreportof him that sometimeshe sat the whole day, 'and never liftedup a
single stone"' (1972, p. 93). There is no act of self upon feeling; he is not psyching
himself"up" or "down," he is not "lettinghimself"feel grief,or deliberately"getting
into" his grief.It is on thisaccount called "authentic,"and deemed nowadays valuable.
What now ironicallyunderminesauthenticity,as a virtue,is the cultural beliefin the
mutabilityof inner feelingand the individual's capacity, with therapeuticguidance
or otherwise,via "emotion work" or otherwise,to change fundamentallywhat is not
implacablyascribed afterall.
571
AmericanJournalof Sociology
floodof feeling,and thoseoccaalwayspassivevis-a-visan uncontrollable
sionalefforts
to activelyshape our feelingcan sometimes
be effective.
Taking thisaccountI beganto articulatetheemotion-management
perspective
firstby distinguishing
it fromthe dramaturgical
perspectiveon the one
hand and the psychoanalytic
perspectiveon the other.I thensuggested
some links amongemotiveexperience,deep acting,and feelingrules. In
turn,feelingruleswereseen as the bottomside of ideologyand therefore
subjectto thesamepressuresforchangeas are ideologies.
of feeling(i.e., what one is supposedto feel) are used in
Conventions
social exchangebetweenindividuals.Individualsoperatetheirexchanges
accordingto a priorsense of what is owed and owing.Individualssee
themselves
as beingowedand as owinggesturesof emotionwork,and they
exchangesuch gestures.People bond,in the emotivesense,eitherby fulfillingthe emotiverequirements
situationscall forth(e.g., the graduate
to one side
tryingto feel happy) or by holdingjust theserequirements
(the ironicticketagentacknowledging
thesincerefeeling"due" theother
evenwhileplayingwiththatnotionof debt).
Justas gesturesof emotionworkcan be exchangedin private,so they
can be exchangedin the marketplace,as an aspect of what is sold and
boughtas laborpower.In such a case we can speak of the "commoditization" of emotionwork.This prevailsmoreforworkerswhosejob it is to
make and sustainmeanings(e.g., "this is an up-and-coming
company";
"this is a pleasant,safe airplane")-jobs foundmorein the middleclass.
Commoditization
is less salient for those in physicallabor or nonsocial
mentallabor,morecommonin theworkingclass. A reexamination
of class
in childrearingsuggeststhatmiddle-class
familiespreparetheir
differences
childrenforemotionmanagement
familiesless. Each,
more,working-class
in this way, preparesits childrento psychologically
reproducethe class
structure.
The emotion-management
perspectivecan be applied to any numberof
areas. We know littleabout how feelingrules vary in contentfromone
occupationto another.The funeralparlordirector,the doctor,the complaintsclerk,the day-careworkerall apply a sense of "should" to the
situated feelingsthat emergein the course of a week. How do these
"shoulds"differ?Crosscutting
occupationaland class differences,
theyare
likelyto exhibitculturaldifferences
associatedwithgenderand ethnicity.
Indeed,a goodplace to studychangein feelingruleswouldbe thestrataof
is extendedover
personsforwhomtherightof mento cry,or feelfearful,
a greaterrangeof situations,and forwhomthe rightof womento open
zone. How has this set of
angeris extendedover a larger,sanction-free,
offeminist
feelingrules,as theunderside
ideology,alteredtheunderstanding
betweenmen and womenas to what feelingsare latently"owed" and
"owing"? We need to ask how different
sexes, classes, and ethnicand
572
EmotionWork
religiousgroupsdifferin the sense of what one "ought to" or "has the
rightto" feelin a situation.How different
is the burdenof hiddenwork
tryingto obey latent laws? Finally,in whose interestare these feeling
rules?Some managingof feelingpromotesthesocial good. Some does not.
Surelytheflightattendant'ssensethatshe "shouldfeelcheery"does more
to promoteprofitforUnitedthanto enhanceherowninnerwell-being.
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