Case 1 | Bulletin 20 – General
Published January 2014
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Control of a detained person
Arrest of a person suspected of involvement in drugs importation, raising issues about:
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Working with other forces.
Carrying out and documenting risk assessments.
Supervisor roles in relation to risk assessment.
Selecting a location to detain a suspect.
Keeping suspect under constant supervision.
Use of personal protective equipment.
Location of post incident procedures.
Providing identity protection for officers involved in a death following police contact.
Overview of incident
Officers attempted to arrest two men after they left a property late one evening. A vehicle was
pursued and the two men were eventually both detained and arrested. One of the men was
found to have been carrying a bag containing a kilogram of cocaine.
Subsequent mobile phone analysis showed that the men had been in recent contact with a
phone belonging to Mr A. Officers researched the address that the men had been seen leaving,
and later attended the property to arrest Mr A and Ms B in connection with the supply of class A
drugs.
Officers took Mr A into the kitchen, where he was arrested by Detective Constable C. Mr A was
not handcuffed and sat in a chair at the kitchen table for approximately two hours while officers
searched his property.
As a result of his arrest, Mr A was interviewed and conditionally bailed with an electronic tag
and subjected to a curfew. He was later charged with ‘being concerned in the supply of class A
drugs’ and a date was scheduled for him to appear at Crown Court, for trial, together with the
other two males seen leaving his house.
Although he had been charged, the investigation into Mr A’s activities continued.
Intelligence was later received, linking Mr A to a smuggling attempt.
After further work, officers were able to obtain substantial evidence which suggested that Mr A,
together with his daughter, Ms D, and another man, Mr E, were pivotal in a drugs importation
network.
© Independent Police Complaints Commission. All Rights Reserved.
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On viewing this new evidence, the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) advised that all three
suspects would need to be arrested for the importation offence before the trial, as it was clear
there would be an impact on these proceedings and the date may need to be changed.
Detective Constable C began planning the arrests, which were now scheduled to take place a
week before Mr A’s trial. Part of the strategy was for none of the three suspects to be informed
of the other arrests.
The plan was for each arrest team to be in possession of a Section 8, Police and Criminal
Evidence Act (PACE), search warrant to allow them to force entry to properties and recover
items specified on the warrant, if any of the suspects were not at home.
The key evidence outstanding in the investigation was a mobile phone used to contact the
couriers and a computer which had been used to book flights.
Taking into consideration the intelligence concerning Mr A, his conviction history, his age,
physical appearance and their recent contact with him, Detective Constable C assessed the
threat posed by Mr A to officers and himself as low. A similar risk assessment was carried out
for Ms D and Mr E who lived at separate addresses, and again the risk was assessed as low.
Detective Constable C did not conduct a formal documented risk assessment on any of the
suspects or their addresses, and neither he nor Detective Sergeant F considered there to be a
risk connected to the change in offence for which Mr A was to be arrested. Detective Sergeant
F also felt that the risk associated with Mr A had not changed since he was last arrested.
At the conclusion of his research, Detective Constable C produced three briefing packs, one for
each team making the arrests. The packs contained photos, maps and a brief background note
relating to the operation. Although the risk was deemed low, all officers were reminded to wear
their personal protective equipment (PPE).
On the morning of the day the arrests were due to be carried out, a briefing took place for the
teams that were due to be involved in the arrest. Detective Constable C and Detective Sergeant
F ran through the aims and objectives for the day, the low risk associated with each address
and reiterated that none of the suspects were to be informed of the other arrests. Detective
Sergeant F also requested each team establish an arrest incident log before leaving.
Due to their previous dealings with Mr A, Detective Constable C and Detective Sergeant F
decided they would attend his address. Before leaving, Detective Sergeant F asked Detective
Constable G, who was on the telephone setting up her arrest incident log for Ms D, to add the
place where they were going to arrest Mr A.
The operator informed Detective Constable G that the address was located in another force
area. She relayed this information back to Detective Sergeant F who stated he knew that to be
the case and so requested the incident record be sent through to the other force.
Detective Constable G relayed this information to the operator who generated an incident
record number, which was passed to Detective Sergeant F.
At around 7am, Detective Constable G and her team attended the first known address. Ms D
was not at home, but officers were able to obtain a contact number for her. When speaking to
Ms D, on the phone, the officers told her they wished to see her and asked her where she was.
The officers then made their way to her location.
© Independent Police Complaints Commission. All Rights Reserved.
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When officers arrived at her location, they arrested Ms D for conspiracy to import class A drugs.
The arresting officer conducted a dynamic risk assessment and decided not to handcuff her.
She was then taken back to her known address before the property was searched. After this
was completed, she was transported to the local police station.
Around the same time, Detective Constable C, Detective Sergeant F, Detective Constable H
and Detective Constable I arrived at Mr A’s property.
On arrival, Detective Constable H and Detective Constable I put on their stab protection body
armour and ensured they were in possession of personal protective equipment such as CS
spray, batons and handcuffs.
Detective Constable C and Detective Sergeant F did not wear their body armour when they
entered the address. Detective Constable C also took a pair of handcuffs and a radio, while
Detective Sergeant F carried a baton and a pair of handcuffs.
Shortly after knocking on the door, Detective Constable I noticed Mr A looking out of a bedroom
window.
Detective Constable I identified himself as a police officer and asked Mr A to come down from
the bedroom. Mr A opened the front door completely naked and appeared to recognise
Detective Constable C from their previous dealings.
Detective Constable C informed Mr A that they had a warrant to search his house and Mr A
allowed them in without discussion.
Mr A appeared calm. When the officers asked him to put some clothes on he indicated he had a
dressing gown hanging on a door and was escorted by Detective Constable C to fetch it from an
upstairs bedroom.
Detective Constable H searched the dressing gown before it was handed to Mr A.
Mr A was then taken downstairs and sat in the dining area of the kitchen where the warrant was
explained to him. Detective Constable C then arrested Mr A for conspiracy to import class A
drugs into the UK, and cautioned him. Mr A did not respond.
Detective Constable H sat opposite Mr A at the table and made a note of the arrest in the
search log. Mr A was then asked to sign next to the note of his arrest, but declined to do so,
saying he would like to speak to his barrister first.
Detective Constable C conducted a dynamic risk assessment of the situation taking into
consideration Mr A’s physical build, the fact he was barefoot, naked under his dressing gown
and sat at a table. Mr A was compliant with all requests and had never acted in a violent or
confrontational way. Detective Constable C therefore assessed the likelihood of him becoming
violent as low. As a result, Detective Constable C felt that handcuffing him was an unjustified
use of force in the circumstances.
There were no knives or weapons visible and although they were sat in the dining area of a
large kitchen, Detective Constable C was comfortable as it was the same place Mr A had sat
when they had searched the property previously without incident. He did not believe Mr A was
an escape risk or posed a physical risk to himself or the officers.
Officers asked Mr A whether there were any firearms, drugs or large sums of money in the
house, to which he replied, “No”.
© Independent Police Complaints Commission. All Rights Reserved.
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Detective Constable H had a general conversation with Mr A and he told the officers he initially
thought they were visiting about the recent burglary at his house. They explained this was not
the case and they were there for the drug related matters that he had been arrested for.
Mr A had reported a burglary at his house to local police the previous week. During the burglary,
thieves reportedly stole the keys to three expensive cars parked at the house. These cars were
subject to a restraint order in relation to the supply of drugs offence, which meant they could not
be sold and were to be seized under the Proceeds of Crime Act. Detective Constable C was
unaware of the burglary and found it strange that only the keys to the vehicles had been stolen.
Around this time, Mr A asked to make a telephone call but this was declined by the officers. He
was told he would be taken to the local police station at the end of the search and he could
make a call from there.
Mr A informed the officers that he had a meeting with his barrister later that afternoon. Detective
Constable C recalls telling Mr A that there was lots of time left to get him interviewed and out,
but if they felt he was not going to make it, they would contact his barrister. This did not affect
his demeanour, he was content with the response and remained laid back and calm.
Detective Constable C wanted to build a rapport with Mr A and play-down the significance of the
arrest so chose not to make him aware that the CPS were likely to be charging him with
conspiracy to import class A drugs.
As he had just woken up, Mr A asked Detective Constable C and Detective Constable H if he
could have a cup of herbal tea.
Detective Constable H remained sat at the table but looked up from his paperwork. Detective
Constable C checked the work surfaces to ensure they were safe, before allowing Mr A to make
a cup of tea under his close supervision. After making the tea, Mr A thanked the officers, smiled
and returned to his seat.
During the previous search of Mr A’s home, he had been allowed to make himself cups of tea,
and Detective Constable C did not see why he should not be afforded the same courtesy on this
occasion.
Some time later Detective Constable I came into the kitchen and informed Detective Constable
H that he had started seizing exhibits.
Shortly after Detective Constable C received a phone call confirming that both Ms D and Mr E
had been arrested. Detective Constable C stepped out of earshot into the living room to take
this call, and Mr A remained unaware that the arrests had taken place.
Detective Constable C returned to the kitchen and after being happy with Mr A’s demeanour,
left him with Detective Constable H and went into another room to begin searching.
A few minutes later, Detective Constable I returned to the kitchen area and gave the evidence
he had found to Detective Constable H. While he was in the kitchen, Detective Constable H
asked him to remain with Mr A while he went and drew a sketch plan of the house in the search
log.
Mr A looked at the exhibits on the table and asked Detective Constable I what documents he
had seized. Mr A asked why he had taken these documents and Detective Constable I
explained that in matters of this type they were interested in company and financial documents.
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Detective Constable H returned to the kitchen and Detective Constable I asked him if he wanted
his body armour taken back to the car. The house was very warm and both officers decided Mr
A did not pose a risk warranting them keeping their personal protection equipment on.
Detective Constable H started entering the evidence from Detective Constable I into the search
log. Detective Constable I took their body armour to the car before going back upstairs to
continue searching. Detective Constable C was still in the study and Detective Sergeant F was
searching upstairs.
Detective Constable I found various items of interest in one of the bedrooms, including a laptop
computer, a mobile phone and a quantity of drugs.
Mr A’s daughter, Ms J, arrived just after 8am.
Detective Constable C opened the front door and identified himself as a police officer. He did
not tell Ms J that Mr A was under arrest or let her in the house.
Ms J then spoke to Mr A briefly before leaving the property.
Detective Constable H and Mr A then returned to the kitchen.
Once back in the kitchen, Mr A asked Detective Constable H if he could make another cup of
tea and have some biscuits. Detective Constable H agreed, and watched him make the tea from
his position sat at the kitchen table. Mr A also took a packet of biscuits from the cupboard
before returning to his seat.
The officer joked with Mr A that he must like his tea as he was drinking from a very large mug,
to which Mr A nodded in agreement as he was eating. He ate several biscuits before returning
the packet to the cupboard.
Detective Sergeant F took the items he had seized from the living room into the kitchen, where
he recalls Mr A was sat in the same position as earlier with a full mug of tea. He then left the
kitchen and went upstairs to search some of the bedrooms.
After making a phone call about the seizure of the cars, Detective Constable C went upstairs
and joined Detective Constable I who had identified several items of interest. Detective
Constable C sealed these items in evidence bags and took them down to the kitchen.
Detective Constable H remained at the kitchen table, entering the seized items into the search
log. The officer asked Mr A if the computer and the phone he had seized were both his, and he
replied that they were.
A short while later, Mr A admitted that the substance officers had found in the bedroom was
drugs, and he was further arrested by Detective Constable C for possession of cannabis.
Detective Constable C then asked Mr A about his car keys that he said had been stolen in the
burglary the week before. Detective Constable C went outside and checked the cars, which he
found to be unlocked. He found it strange the cars were still there as he would have expected
them to have been stolen when the car keys were taken.
Detective Constable C returned to the kitchen and discussed the burglary with Mr A. Detective
Sergeant F also entered the kitchen during this conversation and began searching through
some paperwork.
© Independent Police Complaints Commission. All Rights Reserved.
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During this time, Detective Constable H continued to enter the items into the search log. Mr A
remained polite and calm which was a continuation of the relaxed manner between them.
Detective Constable C stepped outside the house to make a phone call to his office regarding
the burglary. Shortly after, he returned inside, collected the search kit from the hallway and took
it out to his car.
While he was doing this, Detective Sergeant F went into the study opposite the kitchen. At the
same time, Detective Constable I had finished upstairs and came downstairs, where he recalled
Mr A being sat calmly in the same position as before. He then took this moment to step outside
the house to get some fresh air.
Detective Sergeant F had a quick look around the study before going outside to look at the cars
in the garage for himself. As he did so, he remembers glancing into the kitchen and seeing Mr A
leaning back in his chair with his mug of tea in front of him.
Detective Constable H was aware they were coming to the end of the search, as the other
officers had stopped bringing items down to the kitchen.
At this point, Detective Constable H noticed out the corner of his eye that Mr A was standing up
with his back to the fridge.
Detective Constable H recalls that Mr A appeared to bend to his left and then immediately stand
upright, and as he did so, Detective Constable H noticed he had an object in his right hand.
Detective Constable H then looked up properly and was not initially concerned because
throughout their time in the property, Mr A had never presented himself to be a threat.
Mr A was now stood facing Detective Constable H with both his arms open to the side at
shoulder height. Detective Constable H then noticed that Mr A was holding a large knife.
Detective Constable H shouted “knife!” to warn his colleagues. Detective Constable C had reentered the property and was making his way down the hallway to the kitchen when he heard
shouting. He could not initially make out the words but then heard Detective Constable H shout
and knew he needed assistance.
Detective Constable H recalls that Mr A then threatened officers with the knife, and that his
body language had completely changed, he now looked very angry and screamed at the
officers.
As he was screaming, Mr A plunged the knife into his chest.
As he was swinging the blade round, Detective Constable H recalls shouting “Stop! No!” and
stood up from his chair with his arms raised, showing the palms of his hands in a passive
gesture.
He then ran around the table towards Mr A, while at the same time shouting to colleagues to
call an ambulance. Detective Constable C arrived in the kitchen around the same time.
Detective Constable C recalls running into the kitchen and noticing the chair where Mr A had
been sitting was empty. Turning to his left he almost bumped into Mr A who appeared enraged
and was shouting.
© Independent Police Complaints Commission. All Rights Reserved.
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Detective Constable H could see the knife was embedded in Mr A’s chest. Mr A then let go of
the knife and raised his hands out to the front in a grabbing motion, making an angry roaring
noise as he did so. He lunged towards both the officers and they instinctively grabbed one arm
each.
Mr A remained on his feet and was fighting against the officers, moving both his arms and trying
to grab the knife.
Hearing the shouting, Detective Constable I made his way to the kitchen. He saw Detective
Constable C and Detective Constable H struggling with Mr A, who was making a growling type
noise and facing towards the table with both his arms raised.
Detective Constable I recalls Mr A’s right profile was slightly turned towards him and he could
clearly see the dark handle and wide back end of what he believed was a knife protruding from
Mr A’s chest. He was shocked at what he saw and it took a few seconds for him to realise what
was happening.
Realising an ambulance was needed urgently, he turned to get his phone, which was in the
pocket of his jacket by the front door. As he did so, Detective Sergeant F appeared in the
hallway behind him and Detective Constable I said “Get an ambulance, he has stabbed himself
in the chest,” followed by, “Give me some handcuffs”.
Detective Sergeant F recalls running through the front door and hearing the shout, “knife”.
When he fully entered the kitchen, he noticed blood on the floor and Detective Constable C
pulling Mr A to the floor while having difficulty holding his arm. Although he was aware Detective
Constable H was shouting, he had not taken in what he was saying and had not yet seen the
knife.
As Detective Constable C was taking Mr A to the floor, Detective Constable H was shouting at
him, “He’s got a knife in his chest; he’s got a knife in his chest!”. Detective Constable H held
onto Mr A’s right arm, almost holding him up and shouted, “Stop struggling we’re trying to help
you.”
Mr A went down in a controlled fall onto his left side with his head very close to the corner point
of the kitchen units. He continued trying to grab the knife and Detective Constable C shouted for
handcuffs. Detective Constable H recalls it being only a matter of seconds from the moment
they took hold of him to the moment he was laying on the floor.
As Mr A went to the floor, Detective Sergeant F took out his mobile phone and dialled 999.
An ambulance was called and officers attempted to administer first aid.
Shortly after the ambulance crew entered the house, Police Constable K from the local force
arrived and was met outside by Detective Constable I and Detective Sergeant F.
Detective Sergeant F stated that he wanted to speak to the duty inspector from the local force
and Police Constable K put them in touch. He also started a scene log, recording everyone who
went in and out of the address.
The local force duty inspector that day was Inspector L. After speaking to Detective Sergeant F,
he made his way to the scene.
© Independent Police Complaints Commission. All Rights Reserved.
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Shortly after, Ms J arrived back at the property. On arrival, she was met by Police Constable K
who informed her that she could not go in, so after asking what was going on and being told
nothing, she sat back in her car and awaited information.
Mr A died later of his injuries.
More officers from the local force arrived at the house and arrangements were made for
Detective Constable C, Detective Sergeant F, Detective Constable H and Detective Constable I
to be taken to a local police station for a post incident procedure.
During this process each of the four officers gave an initial written account of the events. These
were thorough and in line with the guidance. They were also examined for injuries by a forensic
medical examiner. None of the officers had any fresh injuries. They were also photographed
and blood staining on their bodies and clothing was recorded. The clothing from each of the
officers was forensically taken and subsequently retained by the IPCC.
Approximately two weeks after the incident, the four officers provided further detailed accounts
via their solicitors. Although asked to be interviewed as a significant witness to Mr A’s death,
Detective Constable H declined.
In the early afternoon, scenes of crime officers from the local force began the forensic
examination.
A Home Office forensic pathologist attended the scene and examined Mr A’s body in situ,
before his body was then moved to the mortuary at the local hospital for a post mortem
examination.
Officers from the local force provided a cordon to secure the scene throughout the night.
Type of investigation
IPCC independent investigation.
Findings and recommendations
Pre-operation
Finding 1 – Passing of information
1.
The operator in the control room was told by Detective Constable G that Mr A’s home
was within another force area.
2.
Detective Constable G requested the operator inform the local force of their intention to
conduct a cross-border operation. The local force had no record of receiving this
information.
3.
The processes and systems are already in place for cross-border liaison and there are
no recommendations to change them. It is likely that on this occasion, the failure to pass
on information was due to a breakdown individually or locally within the control room.
© Independent Police Complaints Commission. All Rights Reserved.
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Local recommendation 1
4.
Checks should be made with the control room to see where the liaison between the two
forces broke down.
Local recommendation 2
5.
Officers in charge of cross-border operations should ensure they are in possession of the
incident log reference raised by the host force before deploying officers.
Finding 2 - Obtaining information for the risk assessment
6.
When planning the arrest and search of Mr A’s home, Detective Constable C did not
conduct any checks with the local force’s Intelligence Bureau.
7.
He was therefore unaware that Mr A had reported a burglary at his home the week
before the search, during which he stated the keys to three expensive cars (which
Detective Constable C was hoping to seize) had been stolen.
8.
As a result of the burglary, an officer from the local force visited Mr A’s home and would
have been in an ideal position to provide current details that would have been pertinent
to the risk assessment and planning of the operation.
Local recommendation 3
9.
Detective Constable C and Detective Sergeant F should be reminded of the importance
of contacting the host force’s Intelligence Bureau as part of the risk assessment process.
Supervisors overseeing cross-border operations should ensure this has been done.
Local recommendation 4
6.
It is recognised that on some occasions, the host force’s Intelligence Bureau will not be
contacted for operational reasons, however, if this is not carried out, the reason should
be documented.
Local recommendation 5
7.
Contact with the host force Intelligence Bureau (for cross-border operations) should form
part of the check list in the Risk Assessment Aide Memoire contained within the force’s
Search Log. This document should also contain a supervisor’s approval section which
would ensure a supervisor had seen and agreed the risk assessment.
Finding 3 - The application of Section 8 PACE search warrants
8.
Detective Constable C applied for three Section 8 Police and Criminal Evidence Act
(PACE) warrants, one of which was for the search of Mr A’s home address. The warrant
obtained was not an all-premises search warrant and did not include the three vehicles
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that Detective Constable C stated he wanted to search before seizing them under the
Proceeds of Crime Act.
9.
Section 32, PACE, allows for the search of premises where a person is at the time of, or
immediately prior to, arrest. As the officers stated they believed he had just got out of
bed, they could not have relied on this power to search these vehicles.
10.
Under PACE, vehicles are premises in their own right and therefore must be individually
listed for the purposes of a Section 8, PACE warrant application.
Local recommendation 6
11.
Detective Constable C and the supervisor responsible for approving search warrants,
should be reminded of the law in relation to Section 8 PACE.
Local recommendation 7
8.
In addition, to ensure this is not a wider problem within this police unit, it is recommended
that a dip sample of Section 8 PACE warrants covering the past 12 months is conducted.
The results of the dip sampling may identify that wider learning is required.
Assessing risk
Finding 4 - Documenting the risk assessment
9.
There is no evidence of a documented risk assessment and the Search Log Risk
Assessment Aide Memoire had been crossed through as ‘N/A’.
10.
According to the force’s standard operating procedures (SOPs) on the Investigation of
Crime (Secondary), the Search Log Aide Memoire must document the risks associated
with the search.
Local recommendation 8
11.
It is understood that in operational policing, there is not always time to document a risk
assessment. However, where time does permit, as in this case, documented risk
assessments must be completed. These do not necessarily need to be lengthy but
should be focused on the activity they relate to and demonstrate that a range of risk
factors have been considered and managed.
Local recommendation 9
12.
Detective Constable C must be reminded that documenting risk assessments before an
operation is essential. If this is not carried out, a conclusion is likely to be drawn that a
risk assessment was not carried out.
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Local recommendation 10
13.
Detective Constable C and Detective Sergeant F should be made aware of the SOPs in
existence for the completion of a documented risk assessment before a search of a
property.
Local recommendation 11
14.
Detective Sergeant F should be reminded of his responsibilities as a supervisor to ensure
the risk assessment is comprehensive and documented before deploying for a search of
property.
Local recommendation 12
15.
Other specialist units within the force record risk assessments against pre-defined
templates held locally on a computer database. A check should be conducted to
establish if such templates exist within this police unit.
Local recommendation 13
16.
If predefined templates for recording risk assessments do exist, clarification must be
sought within the force, as to where officers are expected to record the risk assessment
before searching premises – in the Search Log (as per SOPs) or on the templates.
17.
If the force want risk assessments relating to property searches to remain in the Search
Log, the Search Log Risk Assessment Aide Memoire should be modified to make it more
comprehensive and easier to use. Or, if the force want risk assessments relating to
property searches to be conducted using computer-held templates only, and not be
completed in the Search Log, existing templates must be validated to ensure they meet
the business need they were created for. If they do not exist, a structured template
should be created and held on the local computer system to allow for risks associated
with searching properties to be identified and assessed easily. The Search Log Aide
Memoire and this page should then be removed from the Search Log.
18.
The SOPs contained within the SOP for the Investigation of Crime (secondary) must be
updated to reflect the change in procedure.
Finding 5 - Identifying risk factors and grading risk
19.
The risk assessment conducted by Detective Constable C before this operation was not
adequate in that when assigning the risk, he did not consider anything other than the
physical risks. There was no consideration given to the psychological risk associated with
the arrest of Mr A.
20.
There was no consideration given to any unpredictable behaviour of the suspect.
Detective Constable C and Detective Sergeant F felt they ‘knew’ Mr A because of their
previous dealings with him.
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21.
Detective Sergeant F, the supervisor, did not believe the risk associated with Mr A had
changed since the last time they arrested him the previous year. Detective Sergeant F
was not in a position to make this judgement as he did not have any current knowledge
on Mr A’s lifestyle or the occupants of his home.
22.
The offence that Mr A was arrested (conspiracy to import class A drugs) was more
serious than the previous offence (conspiracy to supply class A drugs). Mr A was also on
bail and being monitored by an electronic tag, therefore he was unlikely to be bailed
following this arrest. Mr A is likely to have known this.
23.
All of these factors increased the psychological risk to Mr A.
24.
Detective Constable C’s grading of the risk was ‘low’, a grading which is not officially
used in the force.
Local recommendation 14
25.
Detective Constable C and Detective Sergeant F should be re-trained on identifying and
managing risks.
Local recommendation 15
26.
The current Risk Assessment Aide Memoire contained in the Search Log is not adequate
for officers to conduct and document concise risk assessments. Currently there is a free
text box for identifying and managing risks, which although is necessary, it is
recommended the use of a risk model is incorporated into the Aide Memoire to assist in
structuring assessments.
Local recommendation 16
27.
An officer should never base their risk assessment of someone solely on the fact they
have arrested someone before. All suspects should be treated as an unknown risk. The
modification to the Aide Memoire must include a section to show the assessor has
considered unpredictable behaviour by a suspect.
Local recommendation 17
28.
It is recommended that an ‘approval’ section is incorporated into the risk assessment to
ensure a supervisor has seen and approved the assessment.
Finding 6 - Officer safety and control of a detained person
29.
When they entered his home, Mr A was taken to the kitchen and arrested. He was not
handcuffed and remained sat in this area at a table opposite Detective Constable H, who
was filling in the Search Log.
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30.
After a short while, Detective Constable H and Detective Constable I removed their
safety equipment to their car.
31.
As the officer left to supervise Mr A, Detective Constable H sat in a position that
prevented him from having a good level of control over Mr A. He was situated in between
the kitchen table and the kitchen French doors, meaning that if Mr A decided to use
violence against this officer, he would be unable to defend himself or get out of the way.
32.
At the start of the search, Mr A made himself a cup of tea under supervision from
Detective Constable C who stated he did not feel this was a risk as they had afforded him
the same courtesy when they arrested him previously.
33.
Towards the end of the search, Mr A asked if he could make another cup of tea. On this
occasion, Detective Constable H observed him from his seated position make a cup of
tea and get some biscuits on the other side of the kitchen.
Local recommendation 18
34.
There is no recommendation made over the fact Mr A was not handcuffed. Exerting
control over a suspect does not always require the use of handcuffs and should be
judged on a case-by-case basis in line with officer safety training and handcuffing SOPs.
35.
All operational officers should be reminded of the following:

Suspects must always be detained in the safest room of the house. This is the part
of the house which negates the risk of harm to the officers and suspect. Kitchens
must therefore (generally) be avoided at all times.

A suspect may have weapons concealed in their homes and therefore, once
detained, they should not be allowed to freely move around and should remain in
one location, e.g. sat on the sofa, which should be searched prior to them sitting
on it.

Suspects must remain under constant supervision.

If a suspect requests refreshments they must never be allowed to make them
themselves.

On every search, one person should take responsibility for the safety of the search
including the suspect(s), officers and the environment.

Only if absolutely necessary, and after the premises and occupants are under
control, should consideration be given to the removal of safety equipment.

The situation should never arise where there is no protective equipment available
to officers who have a detained person who is not handcuffed.

Thought must be given to where officers position themselves to maximise their
safety and the control they can exert over a suspect. This is heightened if the
suspect is not handcuffed.
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36.
All of the above should be factored into officer safety training or the most appropriate
course delivered by the force to operational staff.
37.
Consideration should be given to using this scenario for training purposes.
Local recommendation 19
38.
All the officers involved in the search of Mr A’s home must be debriefed on the learning
from this investigation.
Local recommendation 20
39.
All existing staff in this police unit should be informed of the learning coming from this
case.
Finding 7 – Officer safety equipment
40.
Despite making a note in the briefing packs that all officers involved in the operation
should wear their personal protective equipment, Detective Constable C and Detective
Sergeant F, the team sergeant, approached Mr A’s property without stab proof vests.
41.
Their attitude towards the risk to themselves was partly because they knew Mr A through
their previous dealings with him.
42.
Detective Constable H and Detective Sergeant F wore stab proof vests and had their
personal protective equipment (PPE) as per the briefing.
Local recommendation 21
43.
All officers and staff who attend search operations must deploy with the appropriate
personal protective equipment and adopt the risk mitigation measures identified following
a suitable and sufficient risk assessment of the operation.
Local recommendation 22
44.
Suspects must always be treated as unknown risks no matter how many times they have
been dealt with previously by the police.
Local recommendation 23
45.
Detective Constable C should be reminded that if he outlines a control measure to a risk
during a briefing, he should follow it and set an example.
Local recommendation 24
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46.
Detective Sergeant F should be reminded that as a supervisor he had a duty to ensure
both he and Detective Constable C were wearing their stab proof vests and that each
had adequate personal protective equipment.
Local recommendation 25
47.
Detective Constable C and Detective Sergeant F must be reminded that a suspect
always presents an unknown risk no matter how many times they have been dealt with
previously.
Post incident
Finding 8 – Deciding on a location for the post incident procedure (PIP)
48.
There was confusion created by the force as to where the PIP was going to take place,
which in turn created a delay in IPCC attendance.
Local recommendation 26
49.
Once the location of a post incident procedure is decided this should not be changed as
it can cause significant delay to the start of the PIP and to the attendance of the IPCC.
Finding 9 - Identity protection
50.
At the beginning of the PIP, the officers who attended Mr A’s house demanded
anonymity from the IPCC.
51.
It appeared the officer’s compliance with the PIP was dependent on them obtaining this
status, and therefore a decision was taken by the IPCC to allow the officers to be given
pseudonyms for use at this time.
52.
Detective Constable C, Detective Constable H, Detective Constable I and Detective
Sergeant F did not want photographs taken of their faces.
Local recommendation 27
53.
Please note that this recommendation is not applicable following fatal firearms
incidents.
54.
The following points should be brought to the attention of Detective Constable C,
Detective Sergeant F, Detective Constable H and Detective Constable I and all
operational officers.

The IPCC can offer ‘identity protection’ where necessary to officers if they are
significantly involved in a death following police contact and if the IPCC believes
this a significant reason to do so.
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
Protection of identity during an IPCC investigation simply means the officers
names will not be known to anyone other than the lead IPCC investigator.

Identity protection is not a given right and officers who normally operate in an overt
role using their real names, should not expect their names to be protected within
an investigation.

Officers who are merely trained in a covert role, such as conventional surveillance,
but operate in an overt role are unlikely to have their identity protected on this
basis alone.

Officers should not refuse to have photographs taken during a PIP process for the
purpose of safeguarding evidence and must understand this serves to protect
them as well as to progress the investigation.

Although subject to legal advice, the PIP should be open and transparent to avoid
public speculation of wrongdoing on behalf of the officers involved, especially in
cases of heightened sensitivity.

Officer’s identity is always safeguarded by the IPCC and subject to a harm test
before being disclosed to a third party.

The IPCC does not grant anonymity, this can only be given by the judge or a
coroner after consideration, and before any criminal or inquest proceedings.
Force response
Local recommendation 1
1.
The force’s final position remains that Detective Constable G contacted the control room
asking for an incident log to be sent relating to the arrest. However the force has been
unable to find any evidence that the message was sent and the local force maintain that
they did not receive it.
Local recommendation 2
2.
The risk assessment in the record of search booklet has been amended to require
incident log or equivalent incident reference numbers from both forces to be included for
any cross-border enquiry, proving that both parties have communicated with each other.
Local recommendation 3
3.
Detective Constable C and Detective Sergeant F were reminded about the importance of
contacting the host force Intelligence Bureau as part of the risk assessment process.
4.
The force notes that the incident arose in the context of a ‘cross-border arrest enquiry’,
not a pre-planned ‘cross-border operation’. As a result, there is a practical distinction
between the two. The term ‘police operation’ normally refers to a co-ordinated policing
activity involving a number of officers from one force, for which plans are necessary in
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order to effectively carry out the operation. These plans may involve a document that
covers a wide range of areas such as briefing material, logistical information, times,
dates, command structure and responsibilities, radio call signs, officer details, contact
details, maps, plans, diagrams, and contingencies for various unforeseen eventualities.
For smaller, less comprehensive deployments, and especially in the case of fast-moving
spontaneous matters, the relevant details may be recorded in an officer’s pocket book or
other relevant document produced and maintained by the officer. The term ‘policing
enquiry’ would normally be associated with a smaller deployment that is conducted
without the need for detailed forward-planning. An enquiry of this nature may cover a
wide range of policing activities, from a search of a location, area or premises, either for
a person or for evidence, to no more than a knock on a door to see if a person is there. In
either case, it is expected that the host force would be informed of the activity and details
registered within the host force’s command and control system.
Local recommendations 4 and 5
5.
Following the incident, a decision was made that existing standard operating procedures
(SOPs) would be reviewed.
6.
Recommendations from the investigation have been incorporated into a new toolkit with
details about risk assessment methodology.
7.
The toolkit, condenses the most important aspects of policy into a handy check list (a
brief flowchart, or collection of bullet points, containing only the key information needed
by the operational officer), supported by more detailed contextual information, specific
forms to be used, and so on, optionally available as needed via hyperlinks from the main
toolkit.
8.
The toolkit also reminds supervisors of their responsibility to review risk assessments and
endorse the record with their signature.
9.
The record of search booklet already includes a section for a supervisor to complete. The
force will ensure that it remains a specific duty for a supervisor to read and approve the
risk assessment page or any document referred to in the record of search booklet. The
supervisor will be required to date and sign the physical risk assessment checklist page,
or otherwise endorse an equivalent document held electronically.
10.
Had officers contacted the local force’s Intelligence Bureau, before they attended the
scene, they would have seen Mr A’s earlier crime report of a burglary at his address.
They may then have noted that the person reporting the offence could not provide his
own telephone number to the reporting officer, a fact commented on by that officer.
Indeed, once officers arrived at the address and were speaking to Mr A, they did ring the
local control room to find out what the crime report stated. The information received as a
result of this enquiry however, had no bearing on their dynamic risk assessment of the
situation.
11.
Ideally, a search of all possible sources which might reasonably be expected to have a
bearing on a pre-planned police activity should have been carried out. This needs to be
balanced against other factors, such as the time a more detailed search for information
and follow-up enquiries might take, and the impact this delay may have on the police
activity.
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12.
Contact with the host force Intelligence Bureau is accepted as best practice. Non-contact
of the host force Intelligence Bureau would need to be accounted for in the new
procedures now in place as a result of the learning in this case.
Local recommendations 6 and 7
11.
The force does not agree with the legal position adopted by the IPCC.
12.
A vehicle may be searched if it is parked within the curtilage of premises covered by the
warrant. In that context it constitutes goods on the premises. As statute makes clear, a
vehicle may also be ‘premises’ in its own right under section 23 of PACE. It is suggested
that the IPCC may have taken an overly narrow view about the limits of the definition of
‘premises’ for the purpose of a search conducted under the authority of the section 8
warrant. This may be through a mistaken assumption that powers of search following
arrest under section 32 of PACE were being exercised, rather than under the authority of
a section 8 warrant. The Police National Legal Database is helpful here: “The lawfulness
of police conduct in the execution of a search warrant will often depend on the precise
wording of the warrant. By virtue of section 23 PACE, the term ‘premises’ includes,
amongst other matters, any vehicle, vessel and any tent or moveable structure. From this
it can well be argued that if the search warrant were to be couched in the terms of
‘authorised to search premises situate at …………. (specify address) ….’ the warrant
would authorise search of vehicles at that address, irrespective of who they might belong
to, as well as the dwelling itself.” (Source: D17273 / Search warrant - extent of power
[FAQ] )”
13.
It follows, that the suggested random ‘dip sampling’ of warrant applications would prove
ineffective unless sufficient resource-intensive ‘background’ was obtained for each case.
This would place the terms of any particular application in its correct perspective. It would
be more appropriate to ensure that there was effective supervisory oversight of all
warrants and warrant applications.
Local recommendation 8
14.
The existing search log already includes a Risk Assessment Aide Memoire. A short
response of ‘n/a’ (not applicable) may not be sufficient for many search activities in a preplanned situation. A brief entry to the effect that ‘no known risks are identified’ however,
may be defensible legally, depending on the circumstances, since this indicates that the
question of risk was considered and then set aside. This point has been addressed in the
unit through the development of an enhanced set of risk assessments.
15.
The risk assessment, which is featured in the new toolkit, includes specific reference to
its use in the search log, and includes further guidance to supervisors as to the kind of
written presentation they should expect to see completed where an authorising signature
is needed for risk assessing a premises search.
16.
A number of organisation-wide training courses on the proper conduct and documenting
of risk assessments for officers and staff in various ranks and roles are already in place.
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17.
The force describes risk assessment as a two-part process, with an initial written stage
during planning, and then, while the policing activity is occurring, the focus shifting to
dynamic risk assessment, supported by the skills and techniques offered through officer
safety training. However, if the officer believed, at the planning stage, that the subject,
the equipment being used, any materials present and the environment did not pose ‘a
significant risk’ there would be no need to record any specific risk assessment.
Local recommendations 9, 10 and 11
18.
The officers listed have been spoken to about the issues identified.
Local recommendation 12
19.
The force has developed an enhanced risk assessment which has been included in a
new risk assessment toolkit as part of the organisation-wide redrafting of standard
operating procedures.
Local recommendation 13
20.
The points raised during this recommendation have been incorporated within the
organisation-wide review of standard operating procedures and in the development of a
new risk assessment toolkit.
21.
Officers have the choice either to make amendments to risk assessments in the search
log or to maintain an electronic version. While the ‘standard’ hard copy search record is
suitable for many routine police search tasks, more specialist documents, perhaps
replaced by, or supported through, computer-held templates may be required for more
specialised or extensive searches undertaken by certain units. The form the
documentation takes is of less consequence than the fact a unique retrievable, auditable
document is completed in every case, and supervised by accountable, competent
individuals in accordance with the principles of nationally-recognised risk assessment
processes and risk assessment training. This issue will be addressed through the current
review.
Local recommendation 14
22.
The force has taken steps to ensure both officers continue to receive refresher training
as operational considerations permit.
Local recommendation 15
24.
The search log contains an aide memoire which addresses the issues raised within this
recommendation. This must be set against the potential further risk of an over-reliance
on rigid risk assessment models. For these reasons, a free-text area will always be
necessary in order to document and respond flexibly to the changing and inherently
unknowable aspects of a risk. This is also supported by the inclusion of an enhanced risk
model, contained within the online risk assessment toolkit. This will assist corporate
adherence to a single, upgradeable, best-practice risk assessment model across the
force.
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Local recommendation 16
25.
Current owners of the search log confirm that the risk assessment guidance within the
toolkit is consistent with force policy. It also provides an enhanced aide memoire within a
redesigned search log.
26.
The force is also reviewing recruitment and in-service training for officers, with a new
emphasis on identifying and responding proportionally to ‘vulnerability’ in a person,
regardless of the source of that vulnerability.
Local recommendation 17
27.
The search log already includes a section for a supervisor to complete. The force will
ensure that a supervisor continues to read through and approve the risk assessment
page or a similar document. The supervisor will then be required to sign, print and date
the risk assessment checklist page, or to confirm the status of any electronic counterpart
that has been authorised.
Local recommendation 18 and 19
28.
All the officers involved in the search of Mr A’s home have been debriefed on the
learning from this case. All staff working within this unit have also been informed of the
recommendations made during the course of the IPCC investigation.
Local recommendation 20
29.
The recommendation has been cascaded to all relevant officers.
30.
Where appropriate, this circulation has also been supported by further direction on
related matters. For example, in one unit, all current in-house training materials will,
when next due for review, be quality-assured against the eight points to ensure
compliance with the principles they set out.
31.
The investigation report has been forwarded to the lead for officer safety training to
consider including in future officer safety training interventions. It has also been
forwarded to the Curriculum Design team to consider including in any other relevant
courses.
Local recommendations 21 and 22
32.
The force believes that the existing principles of health and safety risk assessments and
dynamic risk assessments address these issues at the organisational level.
Local recommendations 23, 24 and 25
33.
The force has confirmed that the relevant issues have been brought to the attention of
the individuals concerned.
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Local recommendation 26
34.
It is accepted that unfortunately in this case, in the immediate friction of events involving
three potential decision-making parties – the force, the local force and the IPCC – the
venue for the post incident procedure was changed. It is beyond question that a single
fixed location for post incident procedures is always to be preferred when possible. There
is therefore learning from this incident for the managers of all three organisations
regarding full communication between all parties at the earliest possible point. It is also
felt that it would be counter-productive to attempt to draw any general rule from this
specific incident, since circumstances will inevitably differ from incident to incident, and
possibly change during the course of an incident as new information is assessed. The
requirements of safety, effective investigation, and victim and witness care clearly must
always take precedence over choosing a venue merely because it was the one first
nominated. The siting and, if necessary, re-location of the most suitable venue for post
incident procedures must always remain a matter for the judgement and agreement of
the investigating parties in each case, while respecting that the immediate investigative,
operational, and safety demands of the incident remain the most important.
Local recommendation 27
35.
The force has brought the relevant points to the attention of the relevant officers.
36.
Regarding the suggestion that ‘all operational officers be made aware of the following.’
The force respectfully submitted that a general circulation outlining this, without the
context of an incident that immediately involves that target audience, may achieve the
opposite effect. By highlighting the possibility of requesting ‘identity protection’ from the
IPCC for all officers where possibility may not have previously occurred to the officers.
37.
Regardless of the internal measures employed by the IPCC in the granting of identity
protection, the officers concerned will also be entitled to seek Police Federation and legal
advice, in addition to taking the wishes of the IPCC into account. It follows that it would
be more effective for the IPCC to make the argument on this issue on a case-by-case
basis, as the appropriateness of a request for identity protection will always depend on
the particular circumstances of the case. For this reason, at present, no general
circulation on this point is envisaged.
Other action taken by this force
38.
This case has also been brought to the attention of the Training Sub Group of the Mental
Health Programme Board Initiative. Though still a work in progress, the Training Sub
Group is keen to ensure that new training inputs will draw on a number of relevant,
recent incidents. Although this work sits under the umbrella of ‘mental health’, it
incorporates a large-scale thematic review of all aspects of police interaction with
‘vulnerable’ people, regardless of the source of their vulnerability. An emerging strand of
the work is that standard officer safety and first aid training, both for recruits and serving
officers, in future needs to incorporate an awareness of how best to recognise and
interact with such ‘vulnerable’ people, whether their vulnerability is due to substance
abuse, mental or physical illness, permanent disability or, as it would appear in the case
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of Mr A, emotional distress exacerbated by the situation. It is anticipated that some of this
training will be video or role play based.
39.
Additionally, a 'fast time' anonymised scenario based on the lessons of this case was
incorporated into the current round of officer safety training. In the next round of officer
safety training, a reminder will be included, which states that during any police encounter
or activity there are only ever two levels of risk: 'High' and 'Unknown'. Unknown means
this could be that the officers know certain things (such as a previous unproblematic
relationship with a subject) but they cannot know everything about a subject, and this
should mean they are thought of as an unknown risk. No subject should ever be seen as
low risk. We teach our officers to project calmness, achieve rapport, and exert effective
control. Regarding the 'Rapport' stage, it is accepted that this has a wider remit for
certain officers and roles and consequently, whilst they may wish to allow a subject more
freedom, for example during the course of a long search at a venue, they should still be
able to control them. We will re-enforce that a subject should never be seen as a low risk
and that if an officer makes a decision to allow a subject a certain amount of freedom,
such as not being handcuffed during a premises search, they would have to look at
controls, such as the guidance we circulated regarding a suitable, safe, and searched
location in which to detain the person, and an appropriate number of officers on hand to
safely manage the situation should the subject suddenly shift from 'unknown' to 'high' risk
for any reason.
Outcomes for officers and staff
1.
There were no criminal, disciplinary or misconduct outcomes for any of the police officers
or police staff involved in this case.
If you need more information about this case, please email learning@ipcc.gsi.gov.uk
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