Richard Johns
September 18, 2004
The Good and the Gods
In this paper I will explain how Socrates refutes Euthyphro’s definition of holiness,
namely that “holiness is what all the gods love” (p. 539). I will argue that Socrates’
refutation is valid.
In Plato’s Euthyphro, Socrates challenges Euthyphro to give a definition of
holiness. Euthyphro’s best answer is straightforward enough: Holiness is that which all
the gods love. Socrates then attacks Euthyphro’s position by asking him an unusual
question, forcing him to choose between the following two options:
(1) The gods love a holy action because it is holy.
(2) A holy action is holy because the gods love it.
Euthyphro picks (1), which Socrates shows is inconsistent with his stated position. For
Euthyphro’s position is that, to be holy, an action must be in a state of being god-loved.
But an action is god-loved because the gods love it, and not vice-versa. It is illogical to
say that the gods love an action because it is in a state of being loved by them!
Socrates clarifies his point by saying that being god-loved is a mere attribute of
holiness, and not the essential, defining characteristic of it. A mere attribute of a kind is a
property of that it might well have lacked, while remaining the same kind. For example,
it’s a mere attribute of water that it’s the stuff that the oceans are made of. The defining
characteristic of water is that it has the molecular structure H-O-H.
Richard Johns
September 18, 2004
Has Socrates thereby refuted Euthyphro’s account of holiness? One may worry
that the proof relies of a mere blunder on Euthyphro’s part, in selecting option (1) rather
than (2), since (2) is actually Euthyphro’s original claim. Let us see how Socrates lures
Euthyphro into asserting (1). Socrates asks Euthyphro why the gods love a particular
holy action, such as an act of generosity (p. 540). What causes them to do it? Euthyphro
accepts the answer that they love the action because it is holy, and thus asserts (1).
So the question that faces us is this: What else could Euthyphro (or we) give as
the reason why the gods love a particular holy act? Let us say that the gods love a holy
act because it has the property F. (There must be some such property, or the gods’ love is
completely arbitrary.) It is clear that all holy things necessarily have the property F, and
all F things must be holy. Then, surely, we should simplify our definition by saying that
holiness is F is itself, which leaves us asserting (1).
It will help to give an example here. If we are asked why the gods love (say)
generosity, we might reply that generosity corresponds to the gods’ own nature (i.e. the
gods themselves are generous). In that case, we should simplify our definition to the
claim that holiness is that which corresponds to the gods’ nature, and drop the part about
the gods’ love.
In conclusion, there seems to be no escape from the argument used by Socrates to
refute Euthyphro’s definition of holiness.