Brenes 1
Victor Brenes
Summary 1
PHI 3100
Word Count: 591
Throughout the whole dialogue of the Euthyphro, Socrates’ goal is to discover what it
means to be “pious”; by learning the definition of “piety” from Euthyphro, who claims to have
“accurate knowledge” of the divine (5a), he can go back to Meletus and claim that he has learned
the meaning of “piety” and will, from now on, act in a pious manner.
At first, Euthyphro explains to Socrates that to be pious is to “prosecute the wrongdoer”
and impiety would be “not to prosecute [the wrongdoer]” (5e). (It is important to note that
Socrates also questions Euthyphro on the nature, or behavior, of the gods among themselves. The
idea of the gods being at odds with one another becomes important later on in the text.) Although
Socrates entertains this idea, he asks Euthyphro what exactly makes a specific action “pious”
over another? In other words, what makes the act of prosecuting a wrongdoer, pious?
Euthyphro argues that “what is dear to the gods is pious, what is not is impious” (7a).
Socrates argues that if the gods are always in a “state of discord” with one another, how could
one really know for certain that the gods truly love or hate a specific action; if a specific action is
loved by a portion of the gods and hated by another, how can piety be determined? (7b-8b).
Euthyphro attempts to revise the original response by saying that “no gods would differ
from one another”, meaning that when it comes to piety, all the gods would be unanimous (8b).
Socrates then demands Euthyphro to show proof or evidence that the gods can indeed agree,
Euthyphro responds by saying that it will not be an easy task.
Socrates questions Euthyphro, “Is the pious being loved by the gods because it is pious,
or is it pious because it is being loved by the gods?” (10). Socrates is careful when he analyzes
this phrase with Euthyphro, and come to the conclusion that the “god-loved is not the same as the
Brenes 2
pious” and vice versa, therefore Euthyphro had given a “quality” of piety, not an exact standard
for measuring is.
Socrates then chooses to focus on whether piety has anything to do with justice.
Euthyphro argues that to be “pious is the part of the just that is concerned with the care of the
gods” (12e). Socrates then tries to narrow down how piety, in fact, can help care for the gods
and proposes that when a pious action is done, the action “betters” the gods; Euthyphro disagrees
completely.
Instead Euthyphro proposes that to care for the gods is to perform the right type of
service to the gods. An individual must know how to pray (to beg) and offer sacrifices (to give a
gift), that are pleasing, to the gods. By doing so a pious person would know how to “give to, and
beg from, the gods” (14d). This is the conclusion Socrates arrives to with Euthyphro towards the
end of the dialogue, yet Socrates continues to question Euthyphro’s premises and asks whether
the gifts that the gods receive benefit the gods in anyway, and if so does man hold an advantage
over the gods? Euthyphro’s response is that the gods receive, honor, glory, and praise. Socrates
then restates the original argument, “So the pious is once again what is dear to the gods”. From
this point Socrates wonders whether they overlooked a fact, or if they were wrong with a specific
premise, but Euthyphro must go since he has no more time.