AN INFORMATION REPORT
A FRAMEWORK FOR STUDYING
THE CONTROVERSY CONCERNING
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND FEDERALISM
This report was authorized for publication as a Commission
Information Report on December 4, 1985.
Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations
Washington, DC
April 1986
TABLE OF CONTENTS
.......................................................... vi
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................v i i
C h a p t e r 1 INTRODUCTION .................................................. 1
H i s t o r i c a l C o n t e x t .................................................. 2
Contemporary C r i t i c a l P e r s p e c t i v e s ..................................
4
The P u b l i c Law L i t i g a t i o n Model ...................................
7
S t a t e m e n t of t h e Problem ...........................................
9
S t a t e m e n t of R e s e a r c h O b j e c t i v e s .................................... 1 0
C h a p t e r 2 FEDEMLISM ..................................................... 13
I n t r o d u c t i o n ........................................................ 13
F e d e r a l i s m and t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n ..................................... 1 4
The T e n t h Amendment ............................................ 15
From McCulloch t o G a r c i a ....................................... 15
F a i l e d A t t e m p t s t o Use t h e T e n t h Amendment ..................... 18
A d d i t i o n a l I m p l i c a t i o n s of McCulloch ........................... 19
F e d e r a l i s m and P o l i t i c a l Values ..................................... 20
S u m a r y ............................................................. 21
C h a p t e r 3 DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENTS ..................................... 25
I n t r o d u c t i o n ........................................................ 25
C r e a t i o n of R i g h t s .................................................. 2 5
E q u a l P r o t e c t i o n ............................................... 2 7
Due P r o c e s s .................................................... 29
I n c o r p o r a t i o n of t h e B i l l of R i g h t s ............................ 30
Expansion of t h e Meaning of R i g h t s ............................. 32
o q u i t a b l e R e l i e f .................................................... 35
S t a t u t o r y P o l i c i e s and I n t e r p r e t a t i o n s .............................. 37
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
"
Summary
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C h a p t e r 4 CONSEQUENCES OF FEDERAL J U D I C I A L DECISIONS
Introduction
L i t e r a t u r e Review
G e n e r a l E x p l a n a t i o n s of L i m i t e d C o u r t C a p a c i t y
A C a t a l o g u e of H y p o t h e s i z e d Consequences
A s s e s s i n g What Is Known C o n c e r n i n g t h e Consequences of
Federal Court Decisions
4 P l a n f o r F u t u r e P o l l c y Research
S e l e c t i o n of S u b s t a n t i v e I s s u e A r e a s
Organizing Questions
Methodology
Management P l a n
Proposed P r o j e c t T i m e t a b l e and Work P r o d u c t s
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39
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63
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63
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TABLE OF CASES ........................................................... 67
REFERENCES ............................................................... 69
Chapter 5 SUMMARY
Project Overview
Polciy Significance and Relationship t o Other Projects
PREFACE
A primary m i s s i o n of t h e Advisory Commission on I n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l Relat i o n s i s t o gauge t h e s t a t e of f e d e r a l i s m i n America. According t o many obs e r v e r s , t h e s t a t e s ' p o s i t i o n i n t h e f e d e r a l system h a s been a l t e r e d s u b s t a n t i a l l y d u r i n g t h e p a s t 50 y e a r s through f e d e r a l c o u r t d e c i s i o n s .
Simply
s t a t e d , f e d e r a l c o u r t d e c i s i o n s a r e a l l e g e d t o have d i s r u p t e d t h e way s t a t e
and l o c a l governments f u l f i l l e s s e n t i a l f u n c t i o n s i n many and v a r i e d p o l i c y
a r e a s . I n a r e a s such a s s t a t e c o r r e c t i o n a l systems, mental h e a l t h c a r e , publ i c s c h o o l p u p i l placement, l e g i s l a t i v e apportionment, c r i m i n a l p r o s e c u t i o n
and d e f e n s e p r o c e d u r e s , f e d e r a l c o u r t involvement has been prolonged and
intensive.
Some judges have been c h a r a c t e r i z e d a s having t a k e n on t h e r o l e s
of l e g i s l a t o r s and managers i n d e s i g n i n g and monitoring large-s c a l e changes
i n s t a t e and l o c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s and p o l i c i e s .
The ACIR s e e k s t o undertake a comprehensive s t u d y of t h e m e r i t s and lim i t a t i o n s of f e d e r a l c o u r t involvement i n s t a t e a f f a i r s .
Systematic policy
s t u d i e s a r e proposed t o e v a l u a t e t h e consequences of t h e involvement f o r
federalism--both p o s i t i v e and negative--by examining a core s e t of q u e s t i o n s
concerning t h e e f f e c t s of j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n s on s t a t e p u b l i c p o l i c y and t h e
v a l u e s of s t a t e autonomy.
T h i s I n f o r m a t i o n Report p r o v i d e s an a n a l y t i c a l
framework f o r t h e d i r e c t i o n and scope of t h e s t u d i e s .
Robert B. Hawkins, Jr.
Chairman
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The a u t h o r s of t h i s framework paper a r e Roger A. Hanson and Joy A.
Chapper of J u s t i c e Resources, a n o n p r o f i t r e s e a r c h o r g a n i z a t i o n , l o c a t e d i n
Washington, DC. Hanson and Chapper worked c l o s e l y w i t h Lawrence A. Hunter,
Research D i r e c t o r of A C I R , throughout a l l phases of p r e p a r i n g t h i s r e p o r t .
T h i s c o l l a b o r a t i v e e f f o r t between J u s t i c e Resources and t h e A C I R s t a f f benef i t e d g r e a t l y from t h e e x p e r t and u s e f u l a d v i c e of an a d v i s o r y board of
d i s t i n g u i s h e d l e g a l p o l i c y s c h o l a r s . The Board i n c l u d e s Abram Chayes, George
Cole, Malcolm F e e l e y , Donald Horowitz, David K i r p , Samuel K r i s l o v , Gary
McDowell, Robert Nagel, Susan Olson, Vincent Ostrom, Harry S c h e i b e r , S t u a r t
Scheingold, J e f f r e y Straussman, and R u s s e l l Wheeler. F u l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r
t h e c o n t e n t and a c c u r a c y of t h i s r e p o r t r e s t s , of c o u r s e , w i t h t h e Commission
and i t s s t a f f .
Many t h a n k s a r e a l s o due t o Mary Dominquez, A n i t a McPhaul, and L o r i
O ' B i e r f o r t h e i r s k i l l f u l t y p i n g a s s i s t a n c e i n t h e p r e p a r a t i o n of t h i s r e p o r t .
John Shannon
Executive Director
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
BACKGROUND
The i n s t i t u t i o n a l r o l e of t h e f e d e r a l j u d i c i a r y i n t h e American p o l i t y
h a s been a t o p i c of d e b a t e s i n c e t h e n a t i o n ' s c r e a t i o n . During t h e f o r m a t i o n
and r a t i f i c a t i o n of t h e United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n , t h e opposing forces--the
F e d e r a l i s t s and A n t i - F e d e r a l i s t s - - s t r u g g l e d
over t h i s i s s u e i n t h e i r attempts
t o s h a p e t h e fundamental s t r u c t u r e of t h e government of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . A
c e n t r a l theme of t h e e n s u i n g exchanges between t h e two groups focused on how
f e d e r a l c o u r t d e c i s i o n s would a f f e c t t h e autonomy of i n d i v i d u a l s t a t e s .
The F e d e r a l i s t s argued t h a t a n independent j u d i c i a r y w i t h l i f e t i m e t e n u r e
was e s s e n t i a l t o d e t e r m i n e whether n a t i o n a l and s t a t e laws were c o n s i s t e n t
with constitutional principles.
I n c o n t r a s t , t h e A n t i - F e d e r a l i s t s contended
t h a t t h e f e d e r a l j u d i c i a r y would c o n t r i b u t e t o t h e d i s s o l u t i o n of t h e s t a t e s .
Unless s t a t e c o u r t s were t h e f i n a l a r b i t e r s of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of s t a t e
p o l i c i e s , s t a t e governments would e x i s t " u l t i m a t e l y f o r no purpose. "
Although a sound and workable compromise emerged from t h i s c l a s s i c b a t t l e
of competing v i e w p o i n t s , many of t h e i s s u e s remained open and s u b j e c t t o fut u r e d e l i b e r a t i o n . I n f a c t , t h e f e d e r a l c h a r a c t e r of t h e American system w i t h
i t s d u a l l i n e s of a u t h o r i t y has been a primary reason f o r t h e c r i t i c a l import a n c e of t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t s ; t h e c o u r t s a d j u d i c a t e t h e r e c u r r i n g c l a s h e s between t h e two s p h e r e s of a u t h o r i t y ( F e e l e y and K r i s l o v , 1985). A b r i e f review
of key t r e n d s i n C o n s t i t u t i o n a l h i s t o r y i n d i c a t e s how t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t s have
p e r e n n i a l l y made d e c i s i o n s a f f e c t i n g t h e b a s i c c o n t o u r s of f e d e r a l i s m .
The
t r e n d s include t h e following:
*
Under t h e l e a d e r s h i p of Chief J u s t i c e M a r s h a l l i n t h e e a r l y
18008, t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court put i n t o p l a c e t h e
F e d e r a l i s t s ' n a t i o n a l agenda i n c l u d i n g t h e p r i n c i p l e s of
j u d i c i a 1 review of C o n g r e s s i o n a l and s t a t e l e g i s l a t i o n , t h e
supremacy of t h e n a t i o n a l government i n i t s s p h e r e of aut h o r i t y , and t h e power of t h e Congress t o r e g u l a t e commerce
h a v i n g a n i n t e r s t a t e impact, however, i n d i r e c t .
*
Beginning i n 1835, t h e Supreme Court a p p l i e d t h e F i f t h
Amendment's Due P r o c e s s Clause t o r e s t r i c t t h e f e d e r a l gove r n m e n t ' s r e g u l a t i o n of p r o p e r t y . This r o l l b a c k i n f e d e r a l
a u t h o r i t y was c a r r i e d t o i t s u l t i m a t e end i n t h e Dred S c o t t
d e c i s i o n j u s t p r i o r t o t h e C i v i l War.
*
A f t e r t h e C i v i l War, t h e Supreme Court i n t e r p r e t e d t h e Due
P r o c e s s Clause of t h e 14th Amendment a s a p r o h i b i t i o n
a g a i n s t s t a t e r e g u l a t i o n of p r o p e r t y . The concept of subs t a n t i v e due p r o c e s s p r o p e r t y r i g h t s was l a t e r extended t o
v o i d C o n g r e s s i o n a l r e g u l a t i o n of commerce, t a x a t i o n , and
spending.
*
I n r e s p o n s e t o p u b l i c d e b a t e and d i s c u s s i o n , t h e Supreme
C o u r t m o d i f i e d i t s p o s i t i o n on n a t i o n a l economic p o l i c y
making i n 1937. I t s d e c i s i o n t o minimize j u d i c i a l a u t h o r i t y
o v e r C o n g r e s s i o n a l economic p o l i c i e s c o n t i n u e s t o t h e p r e s e n t time.
These i l l u s t r a t i o n s d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t t h e r e i s a n h i s t o r i c a l c o n t e x t f o r
t h e contemporary d e b a t e c o n c e r n i n g t h e r o l e of t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t s .
The c u r r e n t d e b a t e f o c u s e s on t h e c o u r t s ' i m p o s i t i o n of o b l i g a t i o n s and r e s t r i c t i o n s
on t h e s t a t e s a c r o s s a wide r a n g e of p o l i c y a r e a s .
I n a r e a s s u c h as s t a t e
c o r r e c t i o n a l s y s t e m s , m e n t a l h e a l t h , p u b l i c s c h o o l p l a c e m e n t , l e g i s l a t i v e app o r t i o n m e n t , c r i m i n a l p r o s e c u t i o n and d e f e n s e p r o c e d u r e s , f e d e r a l c o u r t i n volvement h a s been p r o l o n g e d and i n t e n s i v e .
One a l t e r n a t i v e p o s i t i o n i n t h e d e b a t e i s t o a f f i r m c u r r e n t t r e n d s - - t h e
c o n t i n u e d e x p a n s i o n of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s and t h e s i m u l t a n e o u s r e s t r i c t i o n
of s t a t e a u t h o r i t y .
The o t h e r a l t e r n a t i v e i s t o r e c o n s i d e r p r e s e n t t r e n d s
and c h a r t a new c o u r s e of a c t i o n f o r t h e f u t u r e - - t h e o p p o r t u n i t y f o r s t a t e s
t o e x h i b i t g r e a t e r d i v e r s i t y and t o e x e r t g r e a t e r autonomy i n t h e ways t h e y
f u l f i l l e s s e n t i a l functions.
The Advisory Commission on I n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l R e l a t i o n s b e l i e v e s t h a t
Its
t h i s c h o i c e of a l t e r n a t i v e s s h o u l d be i n f o r m e d by s y s t e m a t i c a n a l y s i s .
f a r - r e a c h i n g c o n s e q u e n c e s demand c a r e f u l r e s e a r c h and p a i n s t a k i n g r e v i e w of
a l t e r n a t i v e s t o t h e s t a t u s quo.
F o r t h i s r e a s o n , t h e Commission p r o p o s e s t o
i n v e s t i g a t e t h i s e n d u r i n g problem i n o r d e r t o o f f e r a l l of t h e p a r t n e r s i n t h e
f e d e r a l p a r t n e r s h i p f i r m e r knowledge on t h e consequences of c o u r t d e c i s i o n s
i n t h e modern e r a .
THE CONTEXPORARY DEBATE
The C o u r t s ' C r i t i c s .
On t h e e v e of t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n ' s B i c e n t e n n i a l , b o t h
s c h o l a r l y l i t e r a t u r e and p o l i t i c a l d i s c u s s i o n s i n d i c a t e t h a t many o b s e r v e r s of
t h e contemporary f e d e r a l c o u r t s y s t e m h a v e c o n c e r n s t h a t a r e s t r i k i n g l y simil a r t o t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of t h e A n t i - F e d e r a l i s t s .
Numerous commentaries p o i n t
t o a v a r i e t y of ways i n which j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n s a l l e g e d l y h a v e c o n t r i b u t e d t o
a d i s p l a c e m e n t of s t a t e a u t h o r i t y . The p r i m a r y f o c u s of t h e c r i t i c s i s on t h e
f e d e r a l c o u r t s ' i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of i n d i v i d u a l s ' c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s and t h e
ways t h a t t h o s e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s have a l t e r e d t h e a b i l i t y of t h e s t a t e s t o f u l f i l l key f u n c t i o n s .
(However, r e a c t i o n s t o t h e r e c e n t G a r c i a c a s e i n d i c a t e
t h a t t h e s c o p e of t h e Commerce C l a u s e may once a g a i n be s u b j e c t t o s e r i o u s debate.)
T h r e e i n t e r r e l a t e d r e a s o n s g e n e r a l l y a r e mentioned t o j u s t i f y t h e
c l a i m t h a t j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n s i n t h e a r e a of i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s have dimini s h e d s t a t e power.
F i r s t , t h e number and v a r i e t y of a c t i v i t i e s t h a t a r e s u b j e c t t o c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s t a n d a r d s imposed by t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t s have become l a r g e and a r e growi n g ( G l a z e r , 19 75; H o r o w i t z , 1977; M i s h k i n , 19 78; Morgan, 1984; Nagel, 1978,
1 9 8 4 ) . S t a t e p r i s o n c o n d i t i o n s , mental h e a l t h t r e a t m e n t , l e g i s l a t i v e s e a t
a l l o c a t i o n , w e l f a r e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , p u b l i c s c h o o l p u p i l p l a c e m e n t and d i s c i p l i n e , and p u b l i c employee r e c r u i t m e n t and r e t e n t i o n a r e among t h e a r e a s t h a t
now have j u d i c i a l l y d e t e r m i n e d c r i t e r i a t o which s t a t e o f f i c i a l s must a d h e r e .
A d d i t i o n a l l y , t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t s have l i m i t e d what t h e s t a t e s may do i n a
v a r i e t y of s o c i a l a r e a s i n c l u d i n g a b o r t i o n , p u b l i c a s s i s t a n c e t o r e l i g i o u s l y
s u p p o r t e d s c h o o l s , and c r i m i n a l d e f e n s e procedures.
Second, t h e d e p t h of j u d i c i a l involvement i n d e s i g n i n g r e l i e f f o r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l v i o l a t i o n s is e x t e n s i v e , complex, and d e t a i l e d ( D i v e r , 19 79; Horow i t z , 19 77; Nagel, 19 84). Court o r d e r s f r e q u e n t l y r e q u i r e massive programmatic
changes, a r e s t r u c t u r i n g of s t a t e budgetary a l l o c a t i o n s , and a s h a r p l i m i t a t i o n on s t a t e a d m i n i s t r a t o r s ' d i s c r e t i o n .
T h i r d , j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n s f r e q u e n t l y f a i l t o a c h i e v e t h e i r o s t e n s i b l e obj e c t i v e s and of t e n produce n e g a t i v e s i d e e f f e c t s ( A l p e r t , Crouch, and H u f f ,
1984; G r a g l i a , 1976; W o l t e r s , 1984). These u n d e s i r e d consequences are c i t e d
a s s e r i o u s i n d i c a t i o n s of t h e i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s of s u b s t i t u t i n g j u d i c i a 1 d e c i s i o n making f o r t h e p r o c e s s e s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h s t a t e policy-making bodies. The
n e g a t i v e consequences of j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n s a r e h y p o t h e s i z e d n o t only t o c r e a t e a l o s s i n t h e l e g i t i m a c y of t h e j u d i c i a r y but a l s o t o c o n t r i b u t e t o d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n among c i t i z e n s toward s t a t e and l o c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , p o l i t i c a l
l e a d e r s , and t h e v a l u e of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n .
I n c o n t r a s t t o t h e j u d i c i a l c r i t i c s , many s c h o l The Courts ' Proponents.
a r s , p o l i c y makers, and j u r i s t s g e n e r a l l y b e l i e v e t h a t t h e a c t i v i t i e s undert a k e n - by t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t s a r e - c o r r e c t and e s s e n t i a l g i v e n t h e s i t u a t i o n s
t h a t c o u r t s c o n f r o n t e d . The proponents have a v i s i o n of t h e c o u r t s t h a t emp h a s i z e s t h e p o s i t i v e a s p e c t s of t h e j u d i c i a r y ' s r o l e i n e x t e n d i n g c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s and i n r e s h a p i n g s t a t e p o l i c y .
Judges a r e viewed a s b e i n g
c a p a b l e and n e c e s s a r y i n t h e i r r o l e s a s managers of p u b l i c i n s t i t u t i o n s
(Cavanagh and S a r a t , 1980; Chayes, 1976, 1982; Cox, 1976a; P e r r y , 1'982).
A d d i t i o n a l l y , t h e j u d i c i a r y i s c o n s i d e r e d t o have a u n i q u e a b i l i t y t o
d i s c e r n t h e a p p r o p r i a t e meaning of " p u b l i c v a l u e s , " a t p a r t i c u l a r p o i n t s i n
time and, hence, can d e c l a r e t h e s e v a l u e s i n t h e i r d e c i s i o n s d e t e r m i n i n g conc o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s ( F i s s , 1979).
F i n a l l y , i t i s argued t h a t t h e r e a r e
h i s t o r i c a l p r e c e d e n t s f o r t h e a c t i o n s of t h e contemporary c o u r t s . It i s s a i d
t h a t w h i l e many p r i o r a s s e r t i o n s of j u d i c i a l a c t i v i t y have a l s o been c o n t r o v e r s i a l , t h e c o u r t s have proved themselves capable of g o v e r n i n g complex o r g a n i z a t i o n s i n t h e absence of a c t i o n s by e i t h e r e x e c u t i v e o r l e g i s l a t i v e
i n s t i t u t i o n s (Black, 1985; E i s e n b e r g and Y e a z e l l , 1980).
POLICY RESEARCH AGENDA
The Advisory Commission on I n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l R e l a t i o n s proposes t o o r g a n i z e a r e s e a r c h p r o j e c t t h a t w i l l c o n t r i b u t e t o a contemporary p o l i c y deb a t e of n a t i o n a l s i g n i f i c a n c e . S p e c i f i c a l l y , t h e Commission s e e k s t o p r o v i d e
p o l i c y makers, j u d g e s , s c h o l a r s , and c i t i z e n s w i t h f u l l e r knowledge concerni n g t h e contemporary r o l e of t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t s i n t h e f e d e r a l system. T h i s
w i l l be accomplished through a m u l t i p h a s e d s t u d y of j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n s i n a
v a r i e t y of s u b s t a n t i v e i s s u e a r e a s and a n a l y s e s of t h e bases f o r , and consequences of t h e s e d e c i s i o n s on p u b l i c p o l i c y and i t s e x e c u t i o n , t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p o s i t i o n of t h e s t a t e s i n t h e f e d e r a l system, and t h e v a l u e s of f e d eralism.
E m p i r i c a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n s w i l l be complemented by a n a l y s e s of normative
q u e s t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g fundamental c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and d o c t r i n a l i s s u e s .
Key
t o p i c s i n c l u d e i n t e r p r e t a t i d n s of t h e 1 4 t h Amendment, competing c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n s of t h e l e g i t i m a t e r o l e of t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t s , and a l t e r n a t i v e t h e o r i e s
of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e c i s i o n making. They w i l l be addressed by l e a d i n g s c h o l a r s
from a l t e r n a t i v e p o s i t i o n s . The d e t a i l s of how t h e s e a n a l y s e s w i l l lx organi z e d a r e provided i n a s e p a r a t e r e p o r t .
The f i r s t phase of t h e p r o j e c t is t o p l a n e m p i r i c a l and normative s t u d i e s
of j u d i c i a l involvement i n s t a t e a f f a i r s . T h i s paper p r o v i d e s an a n a l y t i c a l
framework f o r t h e e m p i r i c a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n s . It i d e n t i f i e s t h e c r i t i c a l p r o v i s i o n s of t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n t h a t a l l o c a t e a u t h o r i t y t o t h e n a t i o n a l government
and e s p e c i a l l y f o c u s e s on t h e r e s e r v e d powers of t h e s t a t e s a s s p e c i f i e d i n
t h e Tenth Amendment. P r e v i o u s a n a l y s e s of c o u r t d e c i s i o n s t h a t have i n t e r p r e t e d t h e meaning of t h i s amendment a r e reviewed t o determine how t h e Supreme
Court and t h e lower f e d e r a l c o u r t s have a d j u d i c a t e d d i s p u t e s over t h e d i v i s i o n
of n a t i o n a l and s t a t e governments1 r e s p e c t i v e s p h e r e s of a u t h o r i t y . The v a l u e s of f e d e r a l i s m a r e a l s o i d e n t i f i e d a s an approach t o examining p o t e n t i a l
consequences of j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n s t h a t a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y r e l e v a n t t o f e d e r a l -
ism.
A d d i t i o n a l l y , t h e framework paper d e s c r i b e s t h e methods of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n
t h a t contemporary f e d e r a l c o u r t s have used t o j u s t i f y p l a c i n g r e s t r i c t i o n s on
t h e s t a t e s and i n p r e s c r i b i n g a c t i o n s t h a t t h e s t a t e s must undertake. These
methods i n c l u d e t h e d o c t r i n e s used t o c r e a t e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s , i n c l u d i n g
b o t h contemporary t h e o r i e s and e a r l i e r i d e a s used by t h e c o u r t s when they apa p p l i e d t h e B i l l of R i g h t s t o govern s t a t e p o l i c y , I n a d d i t i o n , t h e p r o c e s s e s
through which c o u r t s have formulated e q u i t a b l e r e l i e f i n i n s t a n c e s of cons t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s 1 v i o l a t i o n s a r e analyzed. This s e c t i o n of t h e framework paper
a l s o d i s c u s s e s t h e r o l e of Congressional s t a t u t e s and e x e c u t i v e d e c i s i o n s t h a t
promote and i n v i t e c o u r t a c t i o n s .
Quasi-experimental r e s e a r c h d e s i g n s a r e proposed t o o r g a n i z e s t u d i e s i n
s u b s t a n t i v e i s s u e a r e a s t h a t a d d r e s s p a r a l l e l q u e s t i o n s concerning t h e consequences of c o u r t d e c i s i o n s on p u b l i c p o l i c y and i t s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , t h e s t r u c t u r e of f e d e r a l i s m , and f e d e r a l i s m ' s values. Based on t h e v a l u e s of f e d e r a l i s m , s e v e r a l a r e a s have been s e l e c t e d f o r a n a l y s i s .
They a r e a s s i s t a n c e t o
r e l i g i o u s l y s u p p o r t e d s c h o o l s , c r i m i n a l defense p r o c e d u r e s , l e g i s l a t i v e apportionment, mental h e a l t h c a r e , p u b l i c s c h o o l p u p i l placement, and s t a t e
c o r r e c t i o n a l systems. The c e n t r a l r e s e a r c h q u e s t i o n s t o be addressed i n c l u d e
t h e following:
1.
What l e g a l and p o l i c y arguments a r e p r e s e n t e d by t h e v a r i o u s p a r t i e s ?
2.
What j u s t i f i c a t i o n s do t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t s o f f e r f o r t h e i r d e c i s i o n s
both i n f i n d i n g c o n s t i t u t i o n a l v i o l a t i o n s and i n promulgating re11 e f ?
3.
What methods do t h e c o u r t s u s e t o g a i n i n f o r m a t i o n i n d e s i g n i n g and
implementing r e l i e f ?
4.
How do c o u r t d e c i s i o n s a f f e c t t h e a u t h o r i t y and c o n t r o l r e l a t i o n s h i p s
between s t a t e o f f i c i a l s and r e c i p i e n t s of s t a t e s e r v i c e s , o t h e r s t a t e
and f e d e r a l o f f i c i a l s , and t a x p a y e r s ?
5.
How do c o u r t o r d e r s a f f e c t t h e p r o c e s s of s t a t e governmental d e c i s i o n
making? I n p a r t i c u l a r , a r e s t a t e s ' budgetary a l l o c a t i o n s t o v a r i o u s
programs af f e c t e d ?
6.
To what e x t e n t a r e t h e o s t e n s i b l e o b j e c t i v e s of c o u r t i n t e r v e n t i o n
a c h i e v e d ? What b e n e f i t s a r e produced? Are t h e r e n e g a t i v e s i d e e f f ects?
7.
Does j u d i c i a l i n t e r v e n t i o n a f f e c t t h e c o n f i d e n c e and i n t e r e s t t h a t
c i t i z e n s have i n s t a t e governments?
8.
Does f e d e r a l c o u r t involvement s u b s e q u e n t l y i n h i b i t o r f o s t e r t h e
w i l l i n g n e s s of s t a t e o f f i c i a l s t o t r y new i d e a s ?
During t h e second phase of t h e p r o j e c t , t h e s e q u e s t i o n s w i l l be a d d r e s s e d
through a comparat i v e a n a l y s i s of j u r i s d i c t i o n s where j u d i c i a l involvement h a s
o c c u r r e d and j u r i s d i c t i o n s where i t h a s n o t . The framework p a p e r , was approved
by t h e Commission a s a n I n f o r m a t i o n Report on December 4 , 1985. The p o l i c y
s t u d i e s a r e s c h e d u l e d t o commence i n e a r l y 1986 w i t h a p r o j e c t e d completion
d a t e of March 1987.
While t h e p o l i c y s t u d i e s a r e under way, t h e p a r a l l e l
normative s t u d i e s w i l l a l s o be undertaken.
The t h i r d and f i n a l phase of t h e p r o j e c t i s t o s y n t h e s i z e t h e p o l i c y
s t u d i e s ' f i n d i n g s w i t h t h e i d e a s s e t f o r t h i n t h e framework paper.
Additiona l l y , t h e competing viewpoints developed i n t h e normative a n a l y s e s w i l l h e l p
t o i n t e g r a t e t h e framework paper and t h e p o l i c y s t u d i e s . A comprehertsive r e view of t h e two p r i o r p h a s e s , t h u s , w i l l p r o v i d e a f o u n d a t i o n f o r c o n s i d e r a t i o n of a l t e r n a t i v e recommendations by t h e Commission.
T h i s phase w i l l be
completed by mid-1987.
D i s s e m i n a t i o n of t h e p r o j e c t ' s i n t e r i m and f i n a l work p r o d u c t s w i l l be
d i r e c t e d toward a broad audience of j u d g e s , s c h o l a r s , p o l i c y makers, and c i t i zens. The Conrmission w i l l p u b l i s h and make a v a i l a b l e monographs on t h e s e p a r a t e p o l i c y s t u d i e s and t h e s y n t h e s i z i n g volume. Conference p r o c e e d i n g s on t h e
p o l i c y s t u d y t o p i c s w i l l a l s o be p r i n t e d and d i s t r i b u t e d t o t h e l a r g e number
of i n d i v i d u a l s and o r g a n i z a t i o n s t h a t r e g u l a r l y r e c e i v e t h e Commission's publ i c a t i o n s . F i n a l l y , c o l l a b o r a t i v e e f f o r t s w i l l be made w i t h groups such a s
t h e American P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e A s s o c i a t i o n and American H i s t o r i c a l Associatior1
t o r e a c h p r e c o l l e g i a t e and c o l l e g e e d u c a t o r s w i t h a p p r o p r i a t e v e r s i o n s of t h e
s t u d y 's b a s i c f i n d i n g s .
SUMMARY
I n t h e American f e d e r a l system, t h e c o u r t s a r e i n a p i v o t a l p o s i t i o n t o
s h a p e t h e n a t u r e and s i g n i f i c a n c e of t h e s t a t e s ' a u t h o r i t y . Concern h a s been
e x p r e s s e d t h a t t h e c o u r t s s y s t e m a t i c a l l y have t i l t e d t h e b a l a n c e between nat i o n a l and s t a t e powers by f a i l i n g t o l i m i t t h e scope of n a t i o n a l government
and by i n c r e a s i n g r e s t r i c t i o n s on t h e s t a t e s .
F u r t h e r , i t i s contended t h a t
t h e growing involvement by t h e f e d e r a l j u d i c i a r y has impaired t h e q u a l i t y of
p u b l i c p o l i c y and t h e v a l u e s of f e d e r a l i s m .
A t e s t of t h e p r o p o s i t i o n s concerning t h e consequences of c o u r t d e c i s i o n s
i s v i t a l t o t h e c u r r e n t d e b a t e o v e r t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l r o l e of t h e c o u r t s and
t h e f u t u r e of f e d e r a l i s m .
S y s t e m a t i c i n f o r m a t i o n can h e l p reduce u n c e r t a i n t y
surrounding the consequences of j u d i c i a l intervention i n s t a t e a f f a i r s and
make a unique contribution by describing the impact of controversial federal
court actions within the context of theories of federalism.
Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
The i n s t i t u t i o n a l r o l e of t h e n a t i o n a l j u d i c i a r y i n t h e American p o l i t y
h a s been a t o p i c of p u b l i c d e b a t e s i n c e t h e beginning of t h e n a t i o n .
During
t h e f o r m a t i o n and r a t i f i c a t i o n of t h e United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n , c o n f l i c t i n g
views on t h i s s u b j e c t were e x p r e s s e d by t h e c o n t e n d i n g f o r c e s s e e k i n g t o shape
t h e b a s i c governmental s t r u c t u r e .
A c e n t r a l theme of
t h e s e d i s c u s s i o n s was
how n a t i o n a l c o u r t d e c i s i o n s would a f f e c t t h e autonomy of i n d i v i d u a l s t a t e s .
The c o a l i t i o n of F e d e r a l i s t s argued t h a t an independent j u d i c i a r y was nec e s s a r y t o d e t e r m i n e whether n a t i o n a l and s t a t e laws were c o n s i s t e n t w i t h cons t i t u t i o n a l principles.
'It was argued t h a t i f t h e l e g i s l a t u r e s were unchecked
by a n o t h e r i n s t i t u t i o n , t h e s e law making b o d i e s would soon abandon t h e p r e s c r i b e d l i m i t s of t h e i r a u t h o r i t y ( R o s s i t e r , 1961: 464-72).
In contrast, the
A n t i - F e d e r a l i s t s e x p e c t e d t h a t a n a t i o n a l j u d i c i a r y would c o n t r i b u t e t o t h e
d i s s o l u t i o n of t h e s t a t e s . They argued t h a t u n l e s s s t a t e c o u r t s were t h e f i n a l
f i n a l a r b i t e r s of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of s t a t e p o l i c i e s , s t a t e governments
would e x i s t " u l t i m a t e l y f o r no purpose" ( S t o r i n g , 1985).
The c o n s t i t u t i o n a l framework t h a t emerged was, t o a c o n s i d e r a b l e e x t e n t ,
a compromise between t h e opposing groups.
i n s t a n c e s but
Federalists.
in
others,
significant
The F e d e r a l i s t s p r e v a i l e d i n most
c o n c e s s i o n s were
made t o t h e Anti-
I n a d d i t i o n , some d i s p u t e s c o n c e r n i n g t h e d e s i r e d scope and a l -
l o c a t i o n of governmental a u t h o r i t y remained open and became i s s u e s f o r f u t u r e
d i s c u s s i o n and a n a l y s i s .
B a s i c c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s s u e s r e v o l v i n g around f e d e r a l i s m have been r a i s e d
throughout American h i s t o r y a l t h o u g h i n d i f f e r e n t forms and i n v a r y i n g contexts.
A t c r i t i c a l j u n c t u r e s , j u d i c i a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of t h e r e s p e c t i v e pow-
e r s of t h e n a t i o n a l and s t a t e governments have provided t h e s t r u c t u r a l foundat i o n s f o r long-term t r e n d s i n s o c i a l and economic p o l i c y making.
even long-standing
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l f o u n d a t i o n s of f e d e r a l i s m have been ques-
t i o n e d and a l t e r n a t i v e
p o l i t i c a l events,
t i o n of
However,
conceptualizations
such a s e l e c t o r a l
the courts,
considered
in
r e s p o n s e t o major
r e a l i g n m e n t s , .changes i n t h e
and i n t e l l e c t u a l d e b a t e .
New directions have t h e n been
t a k e n , a t l e a s t u n t i l t h e d e b a t e was prompted once again.
-1-
composi-
HISTORICAL CONTEXT
A b r i e f review w i l l i l l u s t r a t e how f e d e r a l i s m h a s been a n e s s e n t i a l com-
ponent i n some of t h e most fundamental c o n t r o v e r s i e s i n v o l v i n g a l t e r n a t i v e
models of governance.
One of t h e most i m p o r t a n t c l a s h e s o c c u r r e d s h o r t l y a f -
t e r t h e a d o p t i o n of t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n . The newly emerging n a t i o n was c o n f r o n t e d
w i t h q u e s t i o n s of e x a c t l y how a u t h o r i t y was t o be a l l o c a t e d i n p a r t i c u l a r i n stances.
During t h e e a r l y 1800s, under t h e l e a d e r s h i p of Chief J u s t i c e Mar-
s h a l l , t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court put i n t o p l a c e t h e F e d e r a l i s t s ' agenda
by e s t a b l i s h i n g t h e power of f e d e r a l j u d i c i a l review o v e r C o n g r e s s i o n a l l e g i s l a t i o n (Marbury v. Madison, 1803) and s t a t e l e g i s l a t i o n (Cohens v.
Virginia,
1821); t h e supremacy of t h e n a t i o n a l government w i t h i n i t s s p h e r e of a u t h o r i t y
(McCulloch v. Maryland, 1819); and t h e power of t h e Congress t o r e g u l a t e comm e r c i a l a c t i v i t i e s having a n i n t e r s t a t e impact, however i n d i r e c t (Gibbons v.
Ogden, 1824).
The j u d i c i a l s u c c e s s of t h e F e d e r a l i s t p e r s p e c t i v e , moreover,
o c c u r r e d d e s p i t e a n a p p a r e n t s h i f t toward more A n t i - F e d e r a l i s t
s e n t i m e n t s by
the national electorate, as reflected i n Presidential elections.
Yet, d e s p i t e t h e s e j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n s t h a t extended and expanded t h e pos i t i o n of t h e n a t i o n a l government, w h i l e s i m u l t a n e o u s l y r e d u c i n g t h e a u t h o r i t y
of t h e s t a t e s , t h e f e d e r a l system underwent subsequent m o d i f i c a t i o n s w i t h t h e
c r e a t i o n of new j u d i c i a l d o c t r i n e s .
t i c e Taney, M a r s h a l l ' s s u c c e s s o r .
One t r e n d began i n 1835 under Chief J u s The Supreme Court decided t h a t t h e guaran-
t e e s of t h e F i f t h Amendment's Due P r o c e s s Clause meant s u b s t a n t i v e p r o t e c t i o n
f o r p r o p e r t y r i g h t s ; t h e f e d e r a l government could n o t r e s t r i c t ownership of
property.
The e f f e c t of t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n was t o c u t back t h e a u t h o r i t y of
t h e n a t i o n a l government.
The Court took t h i s d o c t r i n e t o i t s l o g i c a l conclu-
s i o n i n t h e Dred S c o t t c a s e (1857) decided j u s t b e f o r e t h e C i v i l War. Although
t h e r e were many o t h e r i s s u e s i n t h i s c a s e , one of t h e C o u r t ' s p r i n c i p a l conc l u s i o n s was t h a t Congressional
legislation,
i n t h i s i n s t a n c e t h e Missouri
Compromise, could not i n t e r v e n e i n , and r e s t r i c t t h e ownership of s l a v e s , who
were deemed p r o p e r t y .
A f t e r t h e C i v i l War, t h e Supreme Court gave meaning t o t h e concept of
s u b s t a n t i v e due p r o c e s s through i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of t h e 1 4 t h Amendment.
The
1 4 t h Amendment's p r o v i s i o n t h a t t h e s t a t e s a r e not t o v i o l a t e t h e i n d i v i d u a l ' s
r i g h t of due p r o c e s s was i n t e r p r e t e d t o p r o h i b i t s t a t e (e.g., Smyth v. A m e s ,
1898) and f e d e r a l economic r e g u l a t i o n s (e. g. , Adair v. United S t a t e s , 1908).
However, a f t e r t h e n a t i o n a l e l e c t i o n s
-2-
of
1936, t h e Court changed i t s
view on Congressional economic r e g u l a t i o n .
Beginning i n 1937, i t took an ex-
p a n s i v e v i e w of Congress' a u t h o r i t y under t h e Commerce C l a u s e and decided t o
minimize j u d i c i a l a u t h o r i t y over economic p o l i c y making.
The r e s u l t of t h i s
j u d i c i a l r e v e r s a l was t o expand t h e power of t h e n a t i o n a l government a t t h e
c o n t i n u e d expense of t h e s t a t e s .
C e r t a i n l y , each of t h e s e p e r i o d s of d o c t r i n a l , development was marked by
s o c i e t a l c o n f l i c t and t h e realignment of p o l i t i c a l f o r c e s .
Yet, the h i s t o r y
of t h e development of a l t e r n a t i v e d o c t r i n e s and t h e i r c o r r e s p o n d i n g watershed
c a s e s a l s o r e v e a l s t h a t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s a r e open t o s o b e r d e b a t e and
and t h a t t h e market p l a c e of i d e a s can i n f l u e n c e p o l i c y .
Existing positions
can be c h a l l e n g e d and, a s j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n s i n d i c a t e , long-standing p a t t e r n s
of d e c i s i o n s are amenable t o change.
This pattern--challenge
of
paradigmatic
a l t e r n a t i v e d o c t r i n e s , a d o p t i o n of
doctrines,
new d o c t r i n e s ,
consideration
of
c r i t i c a l reexamination--
p r o v i d e s an h i s t o r i c a l c o n t e x t f o r t h e modern e r a , where once a g a i n t h e r e a r e
s e r i o u s disagreements o v e r t h e
courts.
issue
of
f e d e r a l i s m and t h e f e d e r a l
S o c i e t y , i n g e n e r a l , and t h e p o l i c y making community, i n p a r t i c u l a r ,
a r e a t a crossroads.
s i o n making:
One p a t h i s t o a f f i r m e x i s t i n g t r e n d s i n j u d i c i a l d e c i -
c o n t i n u e d expansion of c i t i z e n s ' c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s and con-
t i n u e d v o i d i n g of
rights.
vital
s t a t e laws and p o l i c i e s i n l i g h t of t h e s e newly c r e a t e d
Another p a t h begins by q u e s t i o n i n g c u r r e n t t r e n d s and s u g g e s t i n g t h a t
more d e f e r e n c e be g i v e n t o s t a t e autonomy; d i v e r s i t y r a t h e r t h a n u n i f o r m i t y i n
s t a t e laws and p o l i c i e s s h o u l d be p e r m i t t e d and encouraged.
I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e c u r r e n t d e b a t e o v e r t h e r o l e of modern c o u r t s i n c r e a t i n g c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s , an emerging a r e a t h a t may s i g n i f i c a n t l y l i m i t t h e
autonomy of
rights.
t h e s t a t e s is renewed f e d e r a l j u d i c i a l p r o t e c t i o n
of p r o p e r t y
Recent c o u r t d e c i s i o n s i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t s w i t h i n c r e a s -
i n g frequency may s t r i k e down government r e g u l a t i o n s on t h e grounds t h a t t h e y
v i o l a t e p r o p e r t y r i g h t s under t h e d o c t r i n e of s u b s t a n t i v e due p r o c e s s ( e . g . ,
C i t y of Cleburne, TX v.
Cleburne Living C e n t e r , 1985). T h i s form of j u d i c i a l
review, which r e s u r r e c t s a d o c t r i n e t h a t had been dormant f o r s e v e r a l decades,
u n d e r s c o r e s t h e fact t h a t t h e s e s o r t s of c r i t i c a l i s s u e s a r e never f u l l y r e solved.
It may a l s o r e p r e s e n t a n o t h e r h i s t o r i c a l watershed f o r f e d e r a l i s m
i f , as recent
cases i n d i c a t e ,
such a d o c t r i n e i s a p p l i e d asymmetrically--
l i m i t i n g s t a t e but not f e d e r a l regulations.
The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental R e l a t i o n s b e l i e v e s t h a t t h e
-3-
contemporary d e b a t e o v e r t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l r o l e of t h e f e d e r a l j u d i c i a r y des e r v e s c a r e f u l examination.
T h i s t o p i c h a s e n d u r i n g s i g n i f i c a n c e because of
t h e f e d e r a l s t r u c t u r e ; i n e v i t a b l e c o n f l i c t s between d u a l l i n e s of a u t h o r i t y
demand t h a t c o u r t s a d j u d i c a t e c r i t i c a l d i s p u t e s .
These c o u r t d e c i s i o n s , i n
t u r n , a f f e c t t h e p a r t i c u l a r c h a r a c t e r of f e d e r a l i s m a t s p e c i f i c p o i n t s i n time
(Feeley and K r i s l o v , 1985).
Hence, r e s o l u t i o n of t h e contemporary c o n t r o v e r s y
w i l l c o n t r i b u t e t o t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g of f e d e r a l i s m and t o how t h a t understandi n g i s e x p r e s s e d i n t h e y e a r s t o come.
Because of t h e Commission's g o a l t o
f o s t e r a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g of f e d e r a l i s m among s c h o l a r s , p o l i c y makers and c i t iz e n s , t h e t o p i c f i t s s q u a r e l y w i t h i n i t s o r g a n i z a t i o n a l mission.
For t h i s
r e a s o n , t h e Commission s e e k s t o e x p l o r e t h e e m p i r i c a l and normative i s s u e s
t h a t a r e c e n t r a l t o t h e modern d e b a t e and t o u s e t h e i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t i s g a t h e r e d t o c o n t r i b u t e toward knowledge concerning what t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t s can
and s h o u l d do i n t h e f e d e r a l system.
CONTEMPORARY CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES
Numerous c r i t i c a l commentaries on t h e a c t i o n s of t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t s c l a i m
t h a t j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n s have l i m i t e d t h e s t a t e s i n f u n d a a e n t a l ways.
These
d e c i s i o n s have determined what s t a t e p o l i c i e s and p r a c t i c e s a r e u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and, t h e r e f o r e , must be t e r m i n a t e d .
They a l s o have o r d e r e d t h e s t a t e s
t o a c t a f f i r m a t i v e l y t o meet c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c r i t e r i a .
Although t h e r e a r e a v a r i e t y of a r e a s i n which t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t s have
l i m i t e d s t a t e a c t i o n s , a dominant f o c u s of t h e s c h o l a r l y and p o p u l a r l i t e r a t u r e i s on t h e c o u r t s ' i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of i n d i v i d u a l s
'
constitutional rights
i n t h e f a c e of s t a t e government a c t i v i t i e s and t h e ways t h a t t h o s e i n t e r p r e t a -
l / Three
t i o n s have a l t e r e d t h e a b i l i t y of t h e s t a t e s t o f u l f i l l key f u n c t i o n s . i n t e r r e l a t e d r e a s o n s a r e g e n e r a l l y mentioned t o j u s t i f y t h e s t r o n g c l a i m t h a t
j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n s i n t h i s a r e a have diminished s t a t e power.
F i r s t , t h e number and v a r i e t y of s t a t e and l o c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s t h a t have
become s u b j e c t t o c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s t a n d a r d s imposed by t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t s a r e
l a r g e and i n c r e a s i n g ( G l a z e r ,
1984; Nagel,
1978, 1984).
legislative seat
1975; Horowitz,
1977; Mishkin,
1978; Morgan,
S t a t e p r i s o n c o n d i t i o n s , mental h e a l t h t r e a t m e n t ,
allocation,
welfare
administration,
public
school
pupi 1
placement and d i s c i p l i n e , and p u b l i c employee r e c r u i t m e n t and r e t e n t i o n a r e
among t h e many a r e a s t h a t now have j u d i c i a l l y - d e t e r m i n e d
s t a t e o f f i c i a l s must adhere.
c r i t e r i a t o which
When c i t i z e n s b e l i e v e t h a t p o l i c i e s , p r a c t i c e s ,
-4-
and s p e c i f i c a c t i o n s f a l l s h o r t of t h o s e c r i t e r i a , t h e y can s u e s t a t e and l o c a l governments and s e e k r e l i e f i n f e d e r a l c o u r t s .
One consequence of t h i s
new l e g a l remedy i s t h a t t h e r e c e n t e x p l o s i o n i n t h e c i v i l c a s e l o a d of t h e
f e d e r a l c o u r t s l a r g e l y is a t t r i b u t a b l e t o l i t i g a t i o n d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t s t a t e
and l o c a l governments ( P o s n e r , 1985; Schuck, 1983). 2/
I n a d d i t i o n t o e s t a b l i s h i n g s t a n d a r d s t h a t t h e s t a t e s must s a t i s f y , t h e
c o u r t s have r u l e d t h a t t h e r e a r e c e r t a i n a r e a s t h a t t h e s t a t e s may n o t r e -
s t r i c t because
rights.
such
restraints
would
impose
on
citizens'
constitutional
For example, t h e c o u r t s have l i m i t e d what t h e s t a t e s may do t o r e -
s t r i c t r e a d i n g m a t e r i a l s , movies, and p u b l i c e v e n t s , t o r e g u l a t e a b o r t i o n , t o
r e n d e r a s s i s t a n c e t o r e l i g i o u s l y s u p p o r t e d s c h o o l s , and t o p e r m i t t h e o b s e r vance of p r a y e r o r e v e n s i l e n t m e d i t a t i o n i n t h e s c h o o l s .
Finally, the es-
t a b l i s h m e n t of n a t i o n a l c r i m i n a l d e f e n s e p r o c e d u r e s i n v o l v e s b o t h t h e s e t t i n g
of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s t a n d a r d s and t h e l i m i t i n g of
s t a t e and l o c a l p o l i c i e s .
Defendants' r i g h t s a g a i n s t s t a t e a c t i o n s have been c r e a t e d f o r a l l s t a g e s of
the legal process--arrest,
i n t e r r o g a t i o n , t r i a l , and appeal--with
correspond-
i n g r e s t r i c t i o n s and mandates on s t a t e a c t i o n s .
Many of t h e s e f a r - r e a c h i n g d e c i s i o n s o c c u r r e d a t t h e same time t h a t t h e
o t h e r branches of t h e f e d e r a l government expanded t h e i r involvement i n domest i c p o l i c y making.
Both movements flowed from t h e s o c i a l g o a l s of promoting
e q u a l i t y and h e l p i n g t h e d i s a d v a n t a g e d ( S h a p i r o , 1983).
However, t h e c r i t i c s
m a i n t a i n t h a t such a c t i o n s a r e beyond t h e c o u r t s ' i n s t i t u t i o n a l r o l e and have
i n t r u d e d on t h e e s s e n t i a l p o s i t i o n
of
t h e s t a t e s i n t h e f e d e r a l system.
A second r e a s o n g i v e n a s t o how and why t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t s have i m p a i r e d
t h e c a p a c i t y of t h e s t a t e s t o govern i s because of t h e e x t e n s i v e depth of jud i c i a l involvement (Diver,. 19 79 ; Horowitz,
f e d e r a l d i s t r i c t c o u r t judgments
1977; Nagel,
1978, 1984).
Many
f i n d i n g i n d i v i d u a l s t a t e s i n v i o l a t i o n of
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s t a n d a r d s have r e s u l t e d i n sweeping, complex, and d e t a i l e d i m plementing o r d e r s . These c o u r t o r d e r s o f t e n r e q u i r e major changes i n programs,
o p e r a t i o n a l p r a c t i c e s , and t h e d e l i v e r y of s e r v i c e s rendered by t h e s t a t e s .
For example, mental h e a l t h f a c i l i t i e s w i t h thousands of p a t i e n t s have been
o r d e r e d t o d e i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e p a t i e n t s s o t h a t they may be g i v e n t r e a t m e n t i n
what t h e c o u r t s c o n s i d e r e d more a p p r o p r i a t e c e n t e r s and c l i n i c s (D.
and S. Rothman, 1984).
T h i s type of c o u r t - o r d e r e d
Rothman
r e l i e f puts the judiciary
i n t h e p o s i t i o n of making managerial a s s e s s m e n t s t h a t a r e normally t h e prov i n c e of
professional
administrators
and
- 5-
experts
in
specialized
fields.
The r e s o u r c e s r e q u i r e d t o meet t h e s p e c i f i e d c o u r t - o r d e r e d
changes have
f r e q u e n t l y reached upwards of s e v e r a l m i l l i o n s of d o l l a r s . The impact of t h e s e
requirements on a s t a t e ' s o v e r a l l budget is t h a t t h e o f f i c i a l s who normally
c o n t r o l t h e budgetary p r o c e s s - s t a t e
budget o f f i c e r s - m u s t
t h a n o t h e r programs.
give t h e
l e g i s l a t o r s , g o v e r n o r s , agency h e a d s , and
court-mandated
expenditures higher p r i o r i t y
For example, i f c o u r t s d e c i d e t h a t mental h e a l t h expen-
d i t u r e s must i n c r e a s e t o meet t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y r e q u i r e d l e v e l s of c a r e ,
t h e n revenues must be r a i s e d o r e x p e n d i t u r e s may need t o be reduced i n o t h e r
spending a r e a s .
Hence, t h e i n t r i c a c i e s of budget ing--balancing
objectives, factoring i n
a v a i l a b l e resources-may
citizens ' preference i n t e n s i t i e s ,
programmatic
and
stretching
be d i s r u p t e d by e x t e r n a l d e c i s i o n s t h a t r e q u i r e sub-
s t a n t i a l e x p e n d i t u r e s (Frug, 19 78; H a l e , 19 79; Harriman and Straussman, 1983 ;
Note, 1977).
Thus, when t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t s o r d e r complex e q u i t a b l e r e l i e f ,
t h e y may e v e n t u a l l y t a k e on t h e s o r t s of r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s - - t h e
f u n d i n g of s t a t e programs--normally
management and
conducted by s t a t e e x e c u t i v e and l e g i s l a -
t i v e i n s t i t u t i o n s . 3-/
A t h i r d r e a s o n g i v e n f o r b e l i e v i n g t h a t c o u r t s have d i s r u p t e d s t a t e p o l i -
cy making i s t h a t j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n s f r e q u e n t l y f a i l t o a c h i e v e o s t e n s i b l e
o b j e c t i v e s , and produce,
The u n a n t i c i p a t e d
standard.
in fact,
consequences,
For example,
it
negative
moreover,
side effects
a r e undesirable
have
19 77).
by v i r t u a l l y any
i s a l l e g e d t h a t s c h o o l d e s e g r e g a t i o n p l a n s have
r e s u l t e d i n l e s s i n t e g r a t i o n ( G r a g l i a , 1976; W o l t e r s ,
son conditions
(Horowitz,
resulted
i n an i n c r e a s e
1984); changes i n p r i -
i n inmate
violence
(Alpert,
Crouch, and Huff, 1984; Marquart and Crouch, 1984); e x p e r i m e n t a t i o n w i t h l e s s
r e s t r i c t i v e mental c a r e has been i n h i b i t e d because of a c o u r t - o r d e r e d emphasis
on upgrading i n s t i t u t i o n s (Note, 1975), and s o f o r t h .
Besides t h e s e s o r t s of
immediate n e g a t i v e consequences, t h e r e i s long-term damage.
P u b l i c support
f o r t h e c o u r t s , and even s u p p o r t f o r t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s t h a t t h e c o u r t s have
t r i e d t o change ( W o l t e r s , l 9 8 4 ) , i s a l l e g e d l y reduced because of t h e n e g a t i v e
consequences of j u d i c i a l p o l i c y making.
Underlying t h i s b a s i c t h r e e - p a r t
criticism is the proposition that the
j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n s a l t e r i n g t h e f e d e r a l arrangement have flowed from developments i n l e g a l d o c t r i n e and p a r t i c u l a r normative t h e o r i e s of how c o u r t s s h o u l d
act.
C e r t a i n l e g a l developments o v e r t h e p a s t
50 y e a r s have p r o v i d e d t h e
c o u r t s w i t h a s e t of g u i d e p o s t s , r a t i o n a l e s , and p r e d i s p o s i t i o n s t h a t have l e d
t o t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of s t a n d a r d s f o r t h e s t a t e s and i n t e n s i v e review of s t a t e
- 6-
regulations in a wide variety of areas of public life. Among these developments are key doctrinal issues, which include the creation of constitutional
rights, the application of the Bill of Rights to state actions, and changes in
theories of equitable relief, as well the passage of certain statutes that
mandate or invite court action.
The combined effect of these and other inter-
related developments (see, Horowitz, 1983) is that they reinforce and justify
specific decisions with which the courts' critics take issue. Critics express
skepticism toward the desirability of these developments and warn against
their implications (Berger, 1977; McDowell, 1982; Morgan, 1984; Nagel, 1978,
1984).
In fact, to avert further extensions of these ideas and to limit them,
recommendations have been made to amend the Constitution, to limit the federal
courts' jurisdiction, and
to
call for a new
constitutional
convention.
The conflict over judicial decisions is more than disagreement on actions
individual courts have taken in specific cases.
trinal disputes.
It also extends beyond doc-
Controversy exists on the legitimate and proper role of the
courts in the federal system.
THE PUBLIC LAW LITIGATION MODEL
The public law model of litigation is an idea around which many proponents of court involvement converge, although there is considerable diversity
among the proponents' views.
In a narrow sense, the public law litigation
model refers to a specific conceptual framework that describes and explains
the actions of federal judges in resolving disputes over the constitutionality
of state policies and practices (Chayes, 1976).
These disputes, which fre-
quently result in complex plans to prevent future occurrences of constitutional violations, are generally called institutional reform or extended impact
litigation.
Yet, this model offers an image of the federal courts that goes
beyond institutional reform and the execution of intricate consent decrees.
It suggests a general model of court decision making that encompasses and
justifies the setting of constitutional standards in a wider range of issues
(see, e.g., Ackerman, 1984).
In this broader sense, the public law litigation
model shares an orientation with other ideas concerning the function and
tradition of the courts. An examination of this larger picture of the federal
courts reveals four themes that are especially pertinent to the topic of the
federal courts and the autonomy of the states.
One theme is that the courts are capable of, and necessary for settling
-7-
o n t r o v e r s i e s t h a t b r i n g judges i n t o t h e r o l e of quasi-managers of p u b l i c i n t i t u t i o n s f o r extensive periods
Perry, 1982).
courts.
of
time (Chayes,
1976, 1982;
Cox,
1976a;
T h i s c a p a b i l i t y i s based i n p a r t on t h e independence of t h e
.
P o l i t i c a l f l e x i b i l i t y a l l o w s t h e c o u r t s t o make n e c e s s a r y d e c i s i o n s
t h a t o t h e r i n s t i t u t i o n s would n o t and c o u l d n o t o t h e r w i s e make (Cavanagh and
S a r a t , 1980; Kalodner,
1978; K i r p ,
1968, 1981a).
Moreover, t h e judges a r e
b e l i e v e d t o be s u f f i c i e n t l y q u a l i f i e d t o make t h e b e d e c i s i o n s s o t h a t t h e i r
performance i s a t l e a s t a s p o s i t i v e a s t h a t of s t a t e o f f i c i a l s .
The c o u r t s '
performance i s a l l e g e d t o be a s good a s t h a t of t r a d i t i o n a l policy-making i n s t i t u t i o n s , because t h e judges adopt a decision-making p r o c e s s of b a r g a i n i n g
and mutual adjustment common t o t h e o t h e r i n s t i t u t i o n s when t h e y d e s i g n and
implement r e l i e f ( K i r p , 1981b).4/
A second theme i s t h a t t h e f u n c t i o n of t h e c o u r t s is t o g i v e meaning t o
" p u b l i c v a l u e s " ( F i s s , 1979).
The j u d i c i a r y h a s t h e a b i l i t y t o d i s c e r n t h e
a p p r o p r i a t e meaning of v a l u e s a t p a r t i c u l a r moments i n time.
Although v a l u e s
a r e s u b j e c t t o e v o l u t i o n a r y change, i t i s contended t h a t judges a r e i n t h e
b e s t p o s i t i o n t o c a p t u r e t h e i r t r u e meaning and t o d e c l a r e them i n d e c i s i o n s
affecting constitutional rights.
For some o b s e r v e r s (e.g.,
Cox, 1976a), t h e
a b i l i t y of t h e c o u r t s t o a r t i c u l a t e v a l u e s t h a t a l r e a d y e x i s t among t h e mass
p u b l i c e x p l a i n s why t h e y m a i n t a i n widespread s u p p o r t and l e g i t i m a c y d e s p i t e
e s t a b l i s m e n t of new and, i n i t i a l l y ,
c o n t r o v e r s i a l p r e c e d e n t s and d o c t r i n e s .
A t h i r d theme i s t h a t much of what t h e c o u r t s a r e c r i t i c i z e d f o r doing
today i s not a t a l l e x t r a o r d i n a r y (Black, 1985; E i s e n b e r g and Y e a z e l l , 1980).
It i s argued t h a t t h e r e a r e numerous h i s t o r i c a l i n s t a n c e s of c o u r t s managing
complex p u b l i c and p r i v a t e i n s t i t u t i o n s .
Although t h e s e p r e v i o u s e x p e r i e n c e s
were e x t r e m e l y c o n t r o v e r s i a l , t h e c o u r t s proved themselves c a p a b l e of governi n g i n t h e absence of
a c t i o n s by e i t h e r e x e c u t i v e o r l e g i s l a t i v e
bodies.
F i n a l l y , many s c h o l a r s , who contend t h a t what t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t s have
been doing t o e x t e n d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s i s j u s t i f i a b l e , l i m i t t h e i r c r i t i cisms t o t h e means t a k e n by t h e j u d i c i a r y t o implement s p e c i f i c d e c i s i o n s .
Law p r o f e s s o r s and r e s e a r c h e r s who have analyzed t h e problems t h a t t h e c o u r t s
have encountered i n accomplishing t h e i r o b j e c t i v e s d i r e c t t h e i r recommendat i o n s toward t h e c o r r e c t i o n of t h e implementation p r o c e s s .
Some s u g g e s t t h a t
t h e c o u r t s pursue more r e f i n e d s t r a t e g i e s s o a s t o a c h i e v e d e s i r e d ends by
u s i n g t h e a v a i l a b l e knowledge of
o r g a n i z a t i o n a l dynamics and s o c i a l change
( F a i r , 1983; H a r r i s and S p i l l e r , 1977; Note, 1977; Note, 1980).
- 8-
O t h e r s propose
t h a t , because of t h e t e n t a t i v e n a t u r e of knowledge concerning t h e g a i n s artd
l o s s e s of a l t e r n a t i v e p o l i c y o p t i o n s , judges should a l l o w f o r more i n p u t and
a d v i c e from t h e communit i e s , o r g a n i z a t i o n s , artd groups of c i t i z e n s who must
c a r r y o u t t h e implementation of j u d i c i a l o r d e r s (Bloomfield, 19 70).
a t rock bottom,
these scholars affirm the basic precepts
However,
behind t h e c o u r t
o r d e r s r e g u l a t i n g a c t i v i t i e s of t h e s t a t e s .
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
The c r i t i c s and t h e competing model of p u b l i c law l i t i g a t i o n p a i n t cont r a s t i n g p o r t r a i t s of what t h e c o u r t s can and s h o u l d do.
However, i t i s d i f -
f i c u l t t o s e t t h e c r i t i c s and proponents of f e d e r a l c o u r t a c t i v i t i e s s i d e by
s i d e and compare them p r e c i s e l y , because t h e two s e t s of arguments a r e voiced
a t d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s of a b s t r a c t i o n .
Yet, i t i s c l e a r t h a t s e v e r a l b a s i c is-
s u e s r e v o l v e around t h i s c o n t r o v e r s y over t h e a c t i v i t i e s of t h e c o u r t s .
Which
p e r s p e c t i v e i s a more a c c u r a t e d e s c r i p t i o n of how t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t s have a f fected s t a t e authority?
What a r e t h e contending views of t h e r o l e of t h e
s t a t e s i n t h e f e d e r a l system?
How does each s i d e i n t e r p r e t key p r o v i s i o n s of
t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n , such a s t h e Tenth and t h e F o u r t e e n t h Amendments, t h a t a f f e c t
t h e p o s i t i o n of t h e s t a t e s ?
What a r e t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s of each p o s i t i o n f o r
t h e f u t u r e scope of n a t i o n a l p o l i c y making?
Undoubtedly, many j u d g e s , p o l i c y makers, and l e g a l s c h o l a r s b e l i e v e f e d e r a l c o u r t involvement i n s t a t e a f f a i r s has been w a r r a n t e d on c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
grounds and h a s produced p o s i t i v e consequences i n terms of i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s .
It seems f a i r t o s a y t h e predominant view of t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t s i n law r e views, s o c i a l s c i e n c e j o u r n a l s ,
and r e l a t e d p u b l i c a t i o n s emphasizes t h e v i r -
t u e s of j u d i c i a l involvement and p l a c e s i t w i t h i n t h e t r a d i t i o n of a d e m o c r a t i c
s o c i e t y , t h e unique f u n c t i o n s of t h e c o u r t s , and t h e i r c a p a c i t y t o govern.
However, t h e c o u r t s
c r i t i c s have r a i s e d i s s u e s of such paramount s i g n i f i c a n c e
t h a t they cannot j u s t i f i a b l y be dismissed by v i r t u e of b e i n g o u t of s t e p w i t h
c o n v e n t i o n a l t h i n k i n g . The e f f e c t s of t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t s 1 a c t i o n s on t h e autonomy of t,he s t a t e s and t h e concept of f e d e r a l i s m a r e c e n t r a l i n d e t e r m i n i n g
how America i s governed.
Because t h e r e i s t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h e c o u r t s 1
c r i t i c s may have d e t e c t e d a s u b s t a n t i a l l y d i f f e r e n t k i n d of j u d i c i a l i n v o l v e ment t a k i n g p l a c e today o r d i f f e r e n t r e s u l t s stemming from j u d i c i a l i n v o l v e ment s i m i l a r t o t h a t of t h e p a s t , t h e c r i t i c i s m w a r r a n t s s y s t e m a t i c a t t e n t i o n .
T h e r e f o r e , i t i s t h e i n t e n t of t h e Commission t o o r g a n i z e a s t u d y on t h e
-9
-
contemporary f e d e r a l c o u r t s ' involvement i n s t a t e a f f a i r s .
The s c o p e of t h e
w
i
l
l
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
a
n
a
l
y
s
e
s
of
both
e
m
p
i
r
i
c
a
l
p
r
o
p
o
s
i
t
i
o
n
s
of
t h e c o u r t s ' castudy
p a c i t y t o determine s t a t e p o l i c y and normative t h e o r i e s of
should e x e r c i s e t h e i r authority.
how t h e c o u r t s
Although t h e e m p i r i c a l and t h e normative
i s s u e s a r e i n t e r r e l a t e d , t h e y w i l l each be t h e f o c u s of s e p a r a t e i n v e s t i g a -
-
tions. 5/
The purpose of t h i s paper i s t o p r o v i d e t h e framework f o r t h e e m p i r i c a l
component of t h e l a r g e r s t u d y .
Such r e s e a r c h w i l l c o n t r i b u t e t o a n under-
s t a n d i n g of f e d e r a l i s m i n two ways.
On t h e one hand, a s t o c k - t a k i n g e f f o r t t o
determine t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e contemporary f e d e r a l c o u r t system and
t h e s t a t e s w i l l h i g h l i g h t t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l meaning and s i g n i f i c a n c e of fede r a l i s m . Whereas f e d e r a l i s m i s u n q u e s t i o n a b l y a s t r u c t u r a l f e a t u r e of American
Government, i t i s l e s s c e r t a i n how t h e concept of f e d e r a l i s m r e l a t e s t o c o u r t
decisions.
What c o n s i d e r a t i o n i s g i v e n t o f e d e r a l i s m ?
How does f e d e r a l i s m
c o n s t r a i n n a t i o n a l p o l i c y making?
On t h e o t h e r hand, i t is important t o know how j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n s b r i n g i n g t h e c o u r t s i n t o t h e s t a t e p o l i c y a r e n a b e a r on t h e s t r u c t u r e and v a l u e s
of f e d e r a l i s m .
What s o r t of f e d e r a l i s m emerges from t h e s e j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n s
and what a r e t h e i r consequences?
Hence, f e d e r a l i s m i s both a u s e f u l c o n t e x t
f o r a n a l y z i n g t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t s and a n i d e a t o be c l a r i f i e d by such an a n a l ysis.
The normative s t u d i e s w i l l enhance t h e e m p i r i c a l a n a l y s i s by p r o v i d i n g a
c o n t e x t t o t h e s p e c i f i c f i n d i n g s concerning c o u r t c a p a c i t y .
It w i l l place
q u a n t i t a t i v e measures and p o l i c y s t u d i e s w i t h i n t h e broader p e r s p e c t i v e of
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e c i s i o n making and d e m o c r a t i c governance.
When both t h e em-
p i r i c a l and normative a n a l y s e s a r e completed, a r i c h e r u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e
i n s t i t u t i o n a l r o l e of t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t s i n t h e f e d e r a l system s h o u l d emerge.
STATEMENT OF RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
T h i s paper s e t s f o r t h a framework f o r a n e m p i r i c a l s t u d y of t h e consequences of
f e d e r a l c o u r t d e c i s i o n s a s they a f f e c t f e d e r a l i s m .
A s e r i e s of
e m p i r i c a l s t u d i e s w i l l f o l l o w . A s y n t h e s i s of t h i s framework and t h e e m p i r i c a l
s t u d i e s w i t h t h e f o r m u l a t i o n of o v e r a l l c o n c l u s i o n s and recommendations w i l l
b e t h e t h i r d phase.
An i n d i c a t i o n of t h i s s t u d y ' s s u c c e s s w i l l be whether
p o l i c y makers a r e drawn t o t h i s t o p i c and pursue subsequent Commission recommendations and whether s c h o l a r s b u i l d on t h e hypotheses t h a t emerge from t h i s
- 10-
Figure 1
PROPOSED PROJECT SCHEDULE
Work P r o d u c t
Time Schedule
P r o j e c t Phase
March-December
Phase One
P h a s e Two
Phase Three
19 85
Framework P a p e r
September 1985-March 1987
Empirical P o l i c y S t u d i e s ;
Normative a n d
Constitutional Studies
A p r i l 19 87-September
S y n t h e s i s of t h e Framework
Paper, t h e Policy Studies,
and t h e Normative S t u d i e s
19 87
D i s s e m i n a t i o n of
Project Reports
study.
(An o u t l i r l e
of
the project's
t h r e e phases
i s found i n Figure 1.)
T h i s framework p a p e r w i l l be u s e d i n i t i a l l y t o g u i d e p o l i c y s t u d i e s of
federal court
involvement,
erlsurirlg t h a t p a r a l l e l q u e s t i o n s a r e a d d r e s s e d
and a n a l y z e d i n a comparable manner.
Ultimately, it w i l l u n i f y t h e p o l i c y
s t u d y f i n d i n g s and p r o v i d e p o l i c y makers,
s y s t e m a t i c u r l d e r s t a r r d i r ~ g of
the
judges,
relationships
and s c h o l a r s w i t h a more
between f e d e r a l
courts
and
federalism.
The p a p e r c o n s i s t s of f o u r b a s i c p a r t s , which a r e t r e a t e d i n s u b s e q u e n t
chapters.
C h a p t e r 2 examines t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t s i n l i g h t of v a r i o u s t h e o r i e s
of f e d e r a l i s m .
C h a p t e r 3 t r a c e s t h e e x p a n s i o n of f e d e r a l c o u r t irrvolvemerrt
C h a p t e r 4 reviews t h e l i t e r a t u r e on t h e impact of f e d e r a l
i n state affairs.
court decisions
OIL
the states.
C h a p t e r 5 c o r ~ c l u d e s w i t h a n e x a m i n a t i o n of
t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s and a s t a t e m e n t of t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e of t h e proposed e m p i r i c a l
irrves t i g a t i o n s .
NOTES
1/
-
Of f u r t h e r i n t e r e s t i s t h e i s s u e of t h e p r e e m p t i o n of s t a t e and l o c a l
a u t h o r i t y by t h e f e d e r a l government i n c e r t a i n program a r e a s , e.g.,
economic and e n v i r o r l m e n t a l r e g u l a t i o n .
The Supreme C o u r t h a s p l a y e d a
s i g r ~ i f i c a n tr o l e t h r o u g h b o t h i t s c o r l s t i t u t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e
range and d e p t h of n a t i o n a l a u t h o r i t y and by i t s s t a t u t o r y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n
of s p e c i f i c a c t s of Congress r e g a r d i n g Congress ' i n t e n t i o n s t o preempt
t h e f i e l d . An Advisory Commission on I n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l R e l a t i o n s 1 s t u d y
on t h i s t o p i c i s c u r r e n t l y underway, w i t h completion s c h e d u l e d f o r Janu a r y 1987.
21 Most commentators on t h e c o n t r o v e r s y s u r r o u n d i n g t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t s and
f e d e r a l i s m do n o t a t t a c h s p e c i a l s i g n i f i c a n c e t o t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between
s t a t e - l e v e l i n s t i t u t i o n s and a c t i v i t i e s and l o c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s and a c t i v i t i e s (e.g., p r i s o n s , mental h e a l t h h o s p i t a l s , l e g i s l a t i v e apportionment
v e r s u s j a i l s , s c h o o l d i s t r i c t s and p o l i c e departments ).
One r e l e v a n t
f e a t u r e of t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p i s t h a t t h e s t a t e s ' frameworks f o r t h e d e l i very of l o c a l s e r v i c e s d i f f e r s u b s t a n t i a l l y .
For example, some s t a t e s
o p e r a t e and f i n a n c e l o c a l c o u r t s , j a i l s , and s c h o o l s , whereas o t h e r
s t a t e s permit l o c a l u n i t s of government t o c o n t r a c t o u t t h e p r o v i s i o n of
l o c a l s e r v i c e s t o p r i v a t e o r g a n i z a t i o n s (Ostrom, 1969). Analyses of f e d e r a l c o u r t involvement a t t h e l o c a l l e v e l must, t h e r e f o r e , t a k e t h i s d i v e r s i t y i n t o a c c o u n t . However, f o r purposes of e x p o s i t i o n , t h i s r e p o r t
r e f e r s p r i m a r i l y t o t h e s t a t e s a s t h e key u n i t s of a n a l y s i s i n f r a m i n g
research issues.
31 E q u i t a b l e r e l i e f i s t y p i c a l l y i n t h e form of a n i n j u n c t i o n t h a t o r d e r s
t h e defendant (e.g., s t a t e p r i s o n o f f i c i a l , s c h o o l s u p e r i n t e n d e n t , mental
h e a l t h a d m i n i s t r a t o r ) t o perform some s p e c i f i c a c t i o n .
41
-
It i s important t o l a y o u t , a t l e a s t b r i e f l y , t h e r e a s o n i n g behind t h e
b e l i e f t h a t j u d i c i a l involvement is "necessary" o r " e s s e n t i a l " g i v e n t h e
s i t u a t i o n s t h a t judges have c o n f r o n t e d .
I n b a l d t e r m s , t h e argument
c l a i m s t h a t t h e judges r e a l l y have no c h o i c e but t o i n t e r v e n e i n s t a t e
a f f a i r s i n o r d e r t o a m e l i o r a t e i n t o l e r a b l e and u n c i v i l i z e d s o c i a l condit i o n s i n l i g h t of p o l i t i c a l i n a c t i o n by o t h e r u n i t s of government. Indeed, i t presupposes t h a t such i n t o l e r a b l e and u n c i v i l i z e d c o n d i t i o n s
would have p e r s i s t e d i n t h e absence of c o u r t i n t e r v e n t i o n ( s e e , e.g.,
Cooper, 1984; D. Rothman and S . Rothman, 1984).
Although t h i s p e r s p e c t i v e does n o t n e c e s s a r i l y h e r a l d o r e x t o l t h e
v i r t u e s of j u d i c i a l involvement, i t r e s t s on two c r i t i c a l e m p i r i c a l a s sumptions: ( 1 ) t h a t p r i o r t o j u d i c i a l involvement c o n d i t i o n s were s o i n t o l e r a b l e t h a t judges were j u s t i f i e d , indeed compelled, t o o v e r t u r n t h e
r e s u l t s of t h e p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s s and ( 2 ) t h a t t h e c o u r t s had some c a p a c i t y t o improve t h e c o n d i t i o n s a t l e a s t t o some degree.
These e m p i r i c a l
assumptions a r e , of c o u r s e , open t o q u e s t i o n and v e r i f i c a t i o n .
The a n a l y s e s of normative q u e s t i o n s w i l l f o c u s on a l t e r n a t i v e conceptuali z a t i o n s of fundamental c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and d o c t r i n a l p r i n c i p l e s .
Key
t o p i c s i n c l u d e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of t h e Tenth and t h e 1 4 t h Amendments,
c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n s of t h e l e g i t i m a t e r o l e of t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t s , and
t h e o r i e s of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e c i s i o n making. They w i l l be a d d r e s s e d by
l e a d i n g s c h o l a r s who w i l l t a k e a l t e r n a t i v e p o s i t i o n s - - o f f e r a j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r a p a r t i c u l a r p o i n t of view and t r a c e o u t t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s of
t h a t viewpoint. The s p e c i f i c d e t a i l s of how t h e normative a n a l y s e s w i l l
be o r g a n i z e d a r e provided i n a s e p a r a t e r e p o r t .
Chapter 2
FEDERALISM
INTRODUCTION
. n c i p l e f o r t h e a l l o c a t i o n of a u t h o r i t y and a s e t
F e d e r a l i s m i s both a
of p o l i t i c a l v a l u e s t h a t surround t h a t a l l o c a t i o n .
I n t h e American system, a
key p r i n c i p l e i s t h a t t h e n a t i o n a l government and t h e i n d i v i d u a l s t a t e governments each can make a u t h o r i t a t i v e d e c i s i o n s .
P r o v i s i o n s of t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n
s p e c i f y s e p a r a t e s p h e r e s of a u t h o r i t y f o r each u n i t , a l t h o u g h t h e e x a c t s e p a r a t i o n between
them
is
subject
to
perennial
debate
and
interpretation.
The h i s t o r i c a l c o n t e x t f o r t h e framing of t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n was a confede r a t i o n of newly independent, s o v e r e i g n s t a t e s t h a t sought t o d e f i n e t h e scope
of governmental d e c i s i o n making and t o d e v i s e a n a p p r o p r i a t e d i v i s i o n of authority.
The e x a c t consensus among t h e f r a m e r s i s u n c l e a r a s t o where pre-
c i s e l y t h e d i v i s i o n was t o be made and what s p e c i f i c a l l y t h e f r a m e r s expected
t h e new f e d e r a l system t o a c h i e v e i n t h e s h o r t and l o n g run.
general observations
However, some
can be made concerning f e d e r a l i s m t h a t h i g h l i g h t
the
r o l e t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t s have played.
The autonomy of t h e s t a t e s i s s e e n a s a means t o s e c u r e i m p o r t a n t v a l u e s ,
such a s t h e promotion of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n , self-government, p o l i c y exp e r i m e n t a t i o n ; t h e c l o s e correspondence between t h e s u b s t a n c e of p u b l i c p o l i c i e s and l o c a l views i n a g e o g r a p h i c a l l y l a r g e and d i v e r s e s o c i e t y ; and t h e
avoidance of t h e c o n c e n t r a t i o n of power.
However, t h e e x t e n t t o which t h e s e
v a l u e s a r e r e a l i z e d depends on t h e presence of o t h e r key c o n d i t i o n s , such a s
s o c i a l pluralism,
political
competition,
commitment
t o the
"rules
of
the
game," and, f i n a l l y , t h e a b i l i t y of t h e p r i n c i p l e of f e d e r a l i s m t o be s e l f sustaining.
The i n t e l l e c t u a l h i s t o r y of American f e d e r a l i s m documents how i t s meaning
h a s s h i f t e d i n r e a c t i o n t o c a t a c l y s m i c changes i n s o c i e t y - - t h e
break of t h e
C o l o n i e s from England, t h e C i v i l War, and t h e Great Depression.
These p e r i o d s
of r e t h i n k i n g f o l l o w a p a t t e r n found i n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l democracies throughout
t h e world where major p o l i t i c a l e v e n t s s u c h a s r e v o l u t i o n ,
war, and s o c i a l
upheaval a r e t h e c a u s e s of renewed c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e c i s i o n making and where
modified o r new c o n s t i t u t i o n s r e f l e c t t h e consequences of t h o s e e v e n t s .
-13-
Addi-
t i o n a l l y , f e d e r a l i s m has been r e d e f i n e d , a t l e a s t p a r t i a l l y , by every P r e s i d e n t i a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s i n c e World War I T . There have been s u c c e s s i v e v e r s i o n s
of "Cooperative Federalism" i n c l u d i n g " C r e a t i v e Federalism" and two phases of
"New Federalism.
"
These i n c r e m e n t a l , but meaningful, m o d i f i c a t i o n s have mani-
f e s t e d themselves i n a number of ways, i n c l u d i n g t h e formulas and programs
used t o f i n a n c e t h e i n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l t r a n s f e r and e x p e n d i t u r e of p u b l i c r e sources.
D e s p i t e t h e i n f i n i t e ways t h a t t h e concept has been used t o d e s c r i b e
r e l a t i o n s h i p s between t h e n a t i o n a l and i n d i v i d u a l s t a t e governments ( f o r a
compendium of t h e many d e f i n i t i o n s of f e d e r a l i s m s e e , S t e w a r t , 1984), t h e r e
remains a s e t of i d e a s t h a t p r e s c r i b e how and why t h e s t a t e s s h o u l d be f r e e
from t h e t o t a l domination of t h e n a t i o n a l government.
This c o r e i s d e r i v e d
from t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n and a body of l i t e r a t u r e on t h e developments a s s o c i a t e d
with federalism.
I t i s important t o review t h e s e i d e a s because of t h e i r i m -
p l i c a t i o n s f o r t h e assessment of
contemporary f e d e r a l c o u r t involvement i n
state affairs.
FEDERALISM AND THE CONSTITUTION
A r t i c l e 1,
Section
8 of
the
Constitution
"enumerates"
t h o s e powers
t h e Congress s h a l l have i n c l u d i n g t h e power t o t a x , t o r e g u l a t e f o r e i g n and
i n t e r s t a t e commerce, t o d e c l a r e war, and t o maintain armed f o r c e s .
I n con-
t r a s t , t h e r e a r e only a h a n d f u l of s t a t e m e n t s i n t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n t h a t speak
d i r e c t l y t o how a u t h o r i t y i s t o be d i v i d e d between t h e n a t i o n a l government
and t h e s t a t e governments.
They a r e t h e Tenth Amendment, t h e Necessary and
Proper Clause, and t h e Supremacy Clause.11
- They r e a d a s f o l l o w s :
Tenth Amendment. The powers n o t d e l e g a t e d t o t h e United
S t a t e s by t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n , nor p r o h i b i t e d t o t h e s t a t e s ,
a r e r e s e r v e d t o t h e s t a t e s r e s p e c t i v e l y , o r t o t h e people.
Necessary and Proper Clause--Article 1 , S e c t i o n 8. The
Congress
s h a l l have t h e power....
To make a l l laws which
s h a l l be n e c e s s a r y and p r o p e r f o r c a r r y i n g i n t o e x e c u t i o n
t h e f o r e g o i n g powers, and a l l o t h e r powers v e s t e d by t h i s
C o n s t i t u t i o n i n t h e government of t h e United S t a t e s , o r
any department o r o f f i c e r t h e r e o f .
Supremacy Clause--Article 6 , S e c t i o n 2. This C o n s t i t u t i o n ,
and t h e laws of t h e United S t a t e s which s h a l l be made i n
pursuance t h e r e o f ; and a l l t r e a t i e s made, o r which s h a l l
be made, under t h e a u t h o r i t y of t h e United S t a t e s ; s h a l l
be t h e Supreme Law of t h e Land; and t h e Judges i n every
s t a t e s h a l l be bound t h e r e b y , a n y t h i n g i n t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n
o r laws of any s t a t e t o t h e c o n t r a r y not w i t h s t a n d i n g .
The Tenth Amendment.
The Tenth Amendment is t h e c l e a r e s t a s s e r t i o n t h a t
t h e s t a t e s have independent s t a t u s .
Power remains w i t h t h e s t a t e s i f i t i s
D e s p i t e t h e seeming s i m p l i c i t y of t h i s p r o v i s i o n , i t i s sub-
not delegated.
ject t o c o n s i d e r a b l e disagreement.
Some proponents of s t a t e s o v e r e i g n t y r e a d
t h e Tenth Amendment a s a s h a r p l i m i t a t i o n on what t h e n a t i o n a l government can
do and t h a t t h e s t a t e s a r e o t h e r w i s e f r e e t o a c t e x c e p t where p r o h i b i t e d by
t h e Constitution.
Advocates of a n e x p a n s i v e n a t i o n a l a u t h o r i t y c l a i m t h a t t h e
Tenth Amendment h i s t o r i c a l l y h a s been over-read by i t s proponents and t h a t i t s
f o r c e was, i n any e v e n t , reduced i n s i g n i f i c a n c e by t h e C i v i l War Amendments.
Under t h i s view, t h e 1 3 t h , 1 4 t h , and 15th Amendments gave t h e n a t i o n a l government, s p e c i f i c a l l y t h e Congress, t h e broad power t o e n f o r c e t h o s e same r i g h t s
g u a r a n t e e d t o c i t i z e n s by t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n a g a i n s t i n f r i n g e m e n t
t i o n a l government,
against
i n €ringements
by
by t h e na-
s t a t e l e g i s l a t i o n and p o l i c y .
Another view i s t h a t t h e Tenth Amendment is a d e c l a r a t o r y s t a t e m e n t of
t h e d i v i s i o n of power between t h e n a t i o n a l government and t h e s t a t e s .
Berns, 1966; Mason, 1968).
(see,
The Tenth Amendment s t i p u l a t e s t h a t t h e r e is a d i -
v i s i o n of a u t h o r i t y , b u t adds n o t h i n g t o t h a t which would have been r e s e r v e d
t o s t a t e s without i t .
Because what i s n o t withdrawn from t h e s t a t e s by t h e
C o n s t i t u t i o n i s undoubtedly r e s e r v e d t o them, t h e Tenth Amendment does not
c o n s t r a i n n a t i o n a l government p o l i c y i n any s p e c i f i c way ( s e e , A C I R ,
However, f o r a l l t h r e e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , t h e meaning of
g a t e d " t o t h e n a t i o n a l government i s c r u c i a l .
explicit, i f
general,
a r e "necessary
"enumerated" powers,
and p r o p e r "
for
carrying
1986).
what i s " d e l e -
What i s d e l e g a t e d is a s e t of
t h e power t o make a l l laws t h a t
out
all
o t h e r powers
explicitly
g r a n t e d , and t h e power t o e n f o r c e t h e n a t i o n a l C o n s t i t u t i o n and laws a s supreme
t o any s t a t e c o n s t i t u t i o n o r law t h a t might c o n f l i c t w i t h them.
Hence, t h e
b r e a d t h of t h e enumerated powers and t h e meaning of t h e Necessary and P r o p e r
C l a u s e , i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h t h e Supremacy Clause d e t e r m i n e t h e n a t i o n a l and
s t a t e s p h e r e s of a u t h o r i t y .
From McCulloch t o Garcia.
The meaning of what is n e c e s s a r y and p r o p e r
was shaped very e a r l y i n t h e landmark c a s e of McCulloch v. Maryland, (1819).
I n t h i s c a s e , t h e Supreme Court p r o h i b i t e d t h e S t a t e of Maryland from t a x i n g
o r o t h e r w i s e i n t e r f e r i n g w i t h t h e Bank of
t h e United S t a t e s , a c o r p o r a t i o n
c h a r t e r e d by t h e Congress, by l e v y i n g a stamp t a x on bank n o t e s i s s u e d by t h e
B a l t i m o r e branch of t h e Bank.
Although t h i s c a s e i s u s u a l l y c i t e d a s e s t a b -
l i s h i n g t h e supremacy of t h e n a t i o n a l government w i t h i n i t s d e l e g a t e d s p h e r e
-15-
of a u t h o r i t y , t h e C o u r t ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e meaning of " n e c e s s a r y " i n t h i s
s p e c i f i c d e c i s i o n had l a s t i n g e f f e c t s on how f e d e r a l i s m was i n t e r p r e t e d .
It
d e c i d e d t h a t , i f t h e u l t i m a t e end of a g i v e n n a t i o n a l p o l i c y i s w i t h i n t h e
scope of a s p e c i f i e d power, and i s n o t f o r b i d d e n by t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n , t h e n t h e
Congress i s f r e e t o choose t h e means t o t h e end.
I n o t h e r words, "necessary"
was n o t r e a d by t h e Court t o mean " a b s o l u t e l y n e c e s s a r y " but r a t h e r t o mean
A s a r e s u l t , t h e n a t i o n a l government became a b l e
"convenient" o r " u s e f u l " .
t o expand t h e scope of i t s d e c i s i o n making s o long a s t h e end o r o b j e c t i v e of
the policy
was
useful
or
convenient
in
executing
some
s p e c i f i e d power.
I n p r a c t i c a l t e r m s , t h e Supreme Court had decided t h a t i t was t o d e t e r mine, by v i r t u e of i t s power of j u d i c i a l r e v i e w , whether t h e end of a Congress i o n a l p o l i c y t h a t r e g u l a t e s t h e s t a t e s i s w i t h i n t h e scope of s p e c i f i e d nat i o n a l power.
However,
a l t h o u g h McCulloch
v.
Maryland i n d i c a t e d t h a t
the
Court would a s s e s s t h e p r o p r i e t y of t h e ends of t h e n a t i o n a l government, i t
p r e s c r i b e s no s p e c i f i c l i m i t a t i o n and p r o v i d e s t h e Court no c l e a r b a s i s on
which t o c r a f t d o c t r i n e t o d e l i n e a t e a s e t of s p e c i f i c g u i d e l i n e s by which r e s e r v e d powers might be d e f i n e d .
The Court s a i d t h a t i t would a n a l y z e t h e d i s -
p u t e s o v e r n a t i o n a l r e g u l a t i o n w i t h i n t h e c o n t e x t of t h e enumerated powers and
t h e n e c e s s a r y and p r o p e r c l a u s e and o f f e r i t s judgment whether t h e a c t i o n l i e s
within the
scope
of
those
powers
delegated
t o the
national
government,
Y e t , because t h e b r e a d t h of enumerated powers has expanded o v e r time, t h e
scope of t h e n a t i o n a l government i s extended and t h e p o s s i b l e r o l e f o r t h e
s t a t e s is limited.
A c l a s s i c a l i l l u s t r a t i o n i s t h e Commerce Clause.
Despite
whatever may have been t h e Founding F a t h e r s ' i n t e n t i o n s , t h e meaning of
"in-
t e r s t a t e commerce" h a s grown and, w i t h t h i s growth, t h e range of a c t i v i t i e s
s u b j e c t t o Congressional l e g i s l a t i o n has multiplied.
An i m p l i c a t i o n of McCulloch r e l e v a n t t o t h e i s s u e of t h e contemporary
f e d e r a l c o u r t s and t h e s t a t e s ' autonomy i s t h a t t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l f o u n d a t i o n s
of f e d e r a l i s m p l a c e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r p r o t e c t i n g s t a t e a u t h o r i t y , i f only i n d i r e c t l y , with t h e f e d e r a l courts.
T h e i r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of what a c t i v i t i e s
a r e w i t h i n t h e powers d e l e g a t e d t o t h e n a t i o n a l government determines what i s
and i s not l e f t i n t h e hands of t h e s t a t e s .
However, t h e t e s t used by t h e
c o u r t s t o determine what a c t i o n s a r e and a r e not w i t h i n t h e purview oE t h e nat i o n a l government i s a n e g a t i v e one f o r t h e s t a t e s ; t h e emphasis i s on f a s h i o n i n g a t e s t t o a s s e s s p r e c i s e l y what powers have been d e l e g a t e d t o t h e nat i o n a l government
w i t h l i t t l e o r no e x p l i c i t c o n s i d e r a t i o n of
-16-
the states.
Presumably, such a t e s t would c o n s i d e r whether t h e ends of a Congress i o n a l p o l i c y were c o n s i s t e n t w i t h some n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t , o b j e c t i v e , o r purpose; whether t h e ends were a c h i e v a b l e by t h e e x e r c i s e of a power d e l e g a t e d t o
t h e n a t i o n a l government; and whether t h e p a r t i c u l a r a c t i o n was both n e c e s s a r y
and p r o p e r t o a c h i e v e such an o b j e c t i v e . I f t h e p o l i c y was n e c e s s a r y t o e x e c u t e
one of t h e enumerated powers (e.g.,
a n a t i o n a l t a x , w e l f a r e , o r commerce p o l i -
c y ) , t h e n t h e a c t i o n would be w i t h i n t h e d e l e g a t e d powers of t h e Congress.
In
t h e absence of a n a t i o n a l c o n n e c t i o n , t h e Court would presumably c o n s i d e r t h e
a b i l i t y t o a c t i n t h e a r e a beyond t h e d e l e g a t e d powers of t h e n a t i o n a l government and t h e r e b y , u n l e s s t h e s t a t e s were e x p r e s s l y p r o h i b i t e d ,
find that the
s t a t e s have t h e r e s e r v e d power of f o r m u l a t i n g p o l i c y i n t h e a r e a . 2-/
Problems c o n f r o n t i n g t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t s i n s h a p i n g t h e a p p r o p r i a t e limits
of t h e n a t i o n a l government and, t h e r e b y d e f i n i n g t h e scope of s t a t e governments, a r e d r a m a t i c a l l y h i g h l i g h t e d i n t h e Supreme Court 's d e c i s i o n concerning
C o n g r e s s i o n a l a u t h o r i t y over s t a t e and l o c a l p u b l i c employees i n a c a s e decided
i n 1985.
I n Garcia v. San Antonio M e t r o p o l i t a n T r a n s i t A u t h o r i t y , e t a l . , t h e
Court o v e r t u r n e d
an e a r l i e r decision
( N a t i o n a l League of C i t i e s
v.
Usery,
1 9 7 6 ) and h e l d under t h e Commerce Clause t h a t t h e Congress had t h e a u t h o r i t y
t o r e g u l a t e t h e wages of l o c a l t r a n s i t employees (by r e q u i r i n g t h e t r a n s i t aut h o r i t y t o a d h e r e t o n a t i o n a l minimum wage s t a n d a r d s ) d e s p i t e o b j e c t i o n s t h a t
t h e r e g u l a t i o n s would have n e g a t i v e consequences on t h e f i n a n c i n g of a t r a d i t i o n a l l o c a l government f u n c t i o n .
I n r e a c h i n g i t s d e c i s i o n , t h e Court reasoned t h a t t h e e x p l i c i t b a s i s f o r
p r o v i d i n g p r o t e c t i o n t o s t a t e s i n t h e f e d e r a l system i s not normally a respons i b i l i t y of t h e j u d i c i a r y .
Federalism's i n t r i n s i c i n s t i t u t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s -
t i c s - - r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n Congress of t h e s t a t e s ' i n t e r e s t s through t h e views
of S e n a t o r s and Represent a t ives--provide
t h e a p p r o p r i a t e means f o r d e t e r m i n i n g
whether v i a b i l i t y of t h e s t a t e s i s diminished by t h e o t h e r w i s e l e g i t i m a t e nat i o n a l government a c t i o n s .
T h i s means t h a t t h e Court i s s t i l l w i t h o u t working
c r i t e r i a t o d e f i n e t h e l e g i t i m a t e scope of s t a t e independence, i.e.,
by l i m i t -
i n g t h e scope of enumerated powers and i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e Necessary and P r o p e r
C l a u s e , and, t h e r e b y , d i s t i n g u i s h i n g t h e scope of n a t i o n a l and s t a t e governments.
The l o c u s of d e c i s i o n making w i t h r e s p e c t t o whether t h e s t a t e s ' i n t e r -
e s t s a r e enhanced o r i m p a i r e d , i s now i n t h e Congress.
R e l i a n c e on t h i s f e a t u r e of t h e p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s s t o s e t t l e q u e s t i o n s conc e r n i n g s t a t e s ' i n t e r e s t s has s u b s t i t u t e d what may be an e v e n weaker mechanism
-17-
f o r e n s u r i n g s t a f e a u t h o r i t y t h a n t h e a l r e a d y weak j u d i c i a l t e s t of whether
C o n g r e s s i o n a l p o l i c y f a l l s w i t h i n t h e scope of enumerated powers and t h e meani n g of t h e Necessary and Proper Clause.
The C o u r t ' s assumption t h a t s t a t e
i n t e r e s t s are r e p r e s e n t e d i n Congress h a s n o t been confirmed.
Research on
Congressional v o t i n g h a s not demonstrated t h a t t h e s t a t e s ' form v o t i n g b l o c s
t o protect t h e i r interests.
Hence, Garcia may r e p r e s e n t a f u r t h e r weakening
/
of t h e p o s i t i o n of t h e s t a t e s . 3F a i l e d Attempts t o Use t h e Tenth Amendment.
Although G a r c i a may be p a r t
of a t r a d i t i o n e x t e n d i n g back t o McCulloch v. Maryland t h a t d e p r e c i a t e s t h e
s t a t e s ' r e s e r v e d powers,
t h e Supreme Court
did attempt
t o u s e t h e Tenth
Amendment as a working c r i t e r i o n t o d e l i m i t t h e proper s p h e r e of t h e n a t i o n a l
government i n t h e 1920s and 1930s.
The Court made a s e r i e s of r u l i n g s t h a t
found Congressional l e g i s l a t i o n i n t h e a r e a s of economic r e g u l a t i o n , t a x i n g ,
and spending t o be u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l , because they were i n c o n f l i c t w i t h j u d i c i a l d e f i n i t i o n s of i n t e r s t a t e commerce, t a x e s and e x p e n d i t u r e s .
Well-known
examples i n c l u d e t h e C o u r t ' s s t r i k i n g down c h i l d l a b o r s t a n d a r d s i n Hammer v.
Dagenhart, 1918.
powers not
Here t h e Court embellished t h e Tenth Amendment t o read t h a t
" 'expressly
(emphasis added).
'
d e l e g a t e d t o t h e n a t i o n a l government a r e r e s e r v e d "
Other i l l u s t r a t i o n s i n c l u d e t h e Child Labor Tax Case, 1922,
i n which t h e Court h e l d u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a f e d e r a l t a x on n e t annual prof i t s
of b u s i n e s s e s t h a t employed c h i l d l a b o r , h o l d i n g them t o be p e n a l t i e s r a t h e r
than t r u e taxes.
- v.
Another key c a s e was U.S.
A g r i c u l t u r a l Adjustment Act (AAA) of 1936.
B u t l e r , which d e a l t w i t h t h e
That a c t provided f e d e r a l payments
t o f a r m e r s who cooperated i n t h e government's program of p r i c e s t a b i l i z a t i o n
through p r o d u c t i o n c o n t r o l .
The Court found t h a t t h e M A i n f r i n g e d on s t a t e
p r e r o g a t i v e s under t h e Tenth Amendment, d e s p i t e Congressional power t o t a x
and spend f o r t h e g e n e r a l w e l f a r e .
Beginning i n 1937, t h e Supreme Court r e v e r s e d t h e t r e n d of r e s t r i c t i n g
n a t i o n a l government a c t i v i t y i n economic p o l i c y making on t h e b a s i s of t h e
Tenth Amendment.
I n c a s e s t h a t y e a r , such a s N a t i o n a l Labor R e l a t i o n s Board
v. Jones and Laughlin S t e e l Co. and Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, t h e Court
s h i f t e d t o a p o s i t i o n of f i n d i n g t h e Tenth Amendment t o be of l i m i t e d r e l e v a n c e
i n a s s e s s i n g t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of Congressional t a x l n g aed spending p o l i cies.
T h i s s h i f t , of c o u r s e , was t h e product of widespread p u b l i c s u p p o r t f o r
t h e agenda of t h e New Deal and a r e p u d i a t i o n of t h e i n t e l l e c t u a l underpinnings
of t h e C o u r t ' s r e a s o n i n g p r i o r t o 1937. The pre-1937 j u d i c i a l f o r a y t o e n f o r c e
-1 8-
federalism by limiting the scope of enumerated powers under the Tenth Amendment did not enhance the positi0.n of the states in the long run.
In fact, the
refusal of the judiciary after 1937 to limit the national government under the
pre-New Deal interpretation of the Tenth Amendment, combined with its inability to find limits under the McCulloch interpretation of "necessary and proper," may have motivated the Court finally to transfer this responsibility to
Congress in the Garcia case.
Additional Implications of McCulloch.
McCulloch
v.
Maryland and its
progeny have established not only that the national government is supreme within its delegated sphere of authority, but also that its delegated sphere is
virtually unlimited, with the exception of express constitutional prohibitions
placed upon it, of which there are none with respect to the states (see, ACIR,
1986).
In light of this fact, some critics of contemporary court decisions
are willing to concede that federalism plays a minor role in defining the division of governmental authority and in defining what comprises a right protected by the Constitution from abridgement by the states; but they argue that
federalism deserves the highest priority when the courts go about interpreting
Congressional legislation and crafting relief.
If federalism is to endure in the presence of such an unlimited national
government, it is argued that the federal courts must take into account the
states1 ability to per'form their functions in an effective manner despite the
establishment of national supremacy. Hence, the federal courts need to consider the viability
of the states in order to interpret the meaning of national
, ,
legislation and to fashion relief in ways that do not sacrifice the states'
authority (Howard, 1980).
Much of this criticism is directed at the judicial interpretations of
the Civil Rights Act of 1871.
The first section of this act, which is now
Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code, was interpreted in the
1960s to permit citizens to bring suits against state and local officials when
their actions were found to violate constitutional rights.
On the basis of
Section 1983, the federal courts have subsequently designed extensive changes
in state institutions, such as prisons, mental health facilities, and schools
to bring them into conformity with judicially enumerated constitutional standards.
Controversy over Section 1983, as it is commonly labeled, centers on
whether state interests are adequately taken into account in light of the prin-19-
c i p l e of f e d e r a l i s m .
The c o u r t s ' c r i t i c s s u g g e s t t h a t when r i g h t s a r e d e f i n e d ,
s t a t e a u t h o r i t y i s d e p r e c i a t e d and t h e c o n c e p t i o n s of
" c i t i z e n s " and t h e i r
r i g h t s a r e expanded t o i n c l u d e a w i d e r range of i n d i v i d u a l s and a g r e a t e r num-
ber of r i g h t s (Nagel, 1979).
B e l i e v i n g t h a t contemporary c o u r t s a r e t o o i n -
t r u s i v e i n t h i s r e g a r d , c o n c r e t e s u g g e s t i o n s have been advanced r e g a r d i n g how
state interests
can
and
should
be
given
greater
weight
(Nagel,
1978).
Contemporary o b s e r v e r s p o i n t t o s e v e r a l ways i n which t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t s
may have i n t e r p r e t e d C o n g r e s s i o n a l l e g i s l a t i o n and c r a f t e d r e l i e f i n a manner
t h a t i s i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e of federalism--autonomous and v i a b l e s t a t e s - - g i v e n
t h e p r e s e n c e of a n a t i o n a l government w i t h s o
few l i m i t a t i o n s p l a c e d upon i t s a b i l i t y t o r e g u l a t e s t a t e s
'
activities.
The
f e d e r a l c o u r t s a r e a l l e g e d t o have s h i r k e d t h e i r c o n s i d e r a t i o n of s t a t e s ' i n t e r e s t s and, a s a r e s u l t , t h e a b i l i t y of t h e s t a t e s t o f u n c t i o n a s l e g i t i m a t e
and a u t h o r i t a t i v e u n i t s
is
believed
t o have been hampered u n j u s t i f i a b l y .
FEDERALISM AND POLITICAL VALUES
The l i t e r a t u r e on American f e d e r a l i s m c o n t a i n s a d i v e r s i t y of o p i n i o n on
e x a c t l y how a s t r u c t u r a l d i v i s i o n of a u t h o r i t y between l e v e l s of government
f o s t e r s c e r t a i n values.
For example, whereas some observe f e d e r a l i s m enhanc-
p o l i t i c a l freedom, o t h e r s s e e i t a s e i t h e r h a v i n g no c o n n e c t i o n (Neumann, 1962)
r
o r p e r m i t t i n g l o c a l m a j o r i t i e s t o t y r a n n i z e m i n o r i t i e s ( R i k e r , 1964; but s e e
R i k e r , 1982). One c o n t r i b u t i n g Eactor t o t h e l a c k of unanimity on f e d e r a l i s m ' s
r e l a t i o n s h i p t o p o l i t i c a l v a l u e s i s t h e changing d i v i s i o n of a u t h o r i t y .
h i s t o r i a n s have noted (e.g.,
As
S c h e i b e r , 1980), t h e p a t t e r n began w i t h a l o n g
p e r i o d of d u a l f e d e r a l i s m (1789-1861) and was followed by i n c r e a s i n g c e n t r a l i z a t i o n (1862-1945) and t h e n s t a t e involvement, p r i m a r i l y i n form of administ e r i n g n a t i o n a l programs (1946-80).
return t o
dual
federalism,
at
Some a n a l y s t s s e e t e n d e n c i e s of a l i m i t e d
least
in
certain
areas
(Schetber,
1980).
Y e t , d e s p i t e t h e f a c t t h a t s h i f t s i n t h e d i v i s i o n of a u t h o r i t y have oc-
c u r r e d , c e r t a i n b a s i c b e n e f i t s remain a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e p r i n c i p l e of d i v i d e d
authority.
Modern t h e o r i s t s p o s i t t h a t f e d e r a l i s m promotes p o s i t i v e v a l u e s ,
b u t d i f f e r e n t academic d i s c i p l i n e s emphasize p a r t i c u l a r f e a t u r e s t h a t c r e a t e
d i f f e r e n t c o n c e p t u a l frameworks of f e d e r a l i s m ( e . g . , A C I R , 1981). A s a r e s u l t ,
a l t h o u g h t h e r e i s no one, d e f i n i t i v e t h e o r y of f e d e r a l i s m , t h e f o l l o w i n g i s a
l i s t of t h e advantages t h a t have been a s c r i b e d t o t h e r o l e of t h e s t a t e s i n
t h e f e d e r a l system.
-20-
1.
I n a d i v e r s e s o c i e t y , t h e e x i s t e n c e of i n d i v i d u a l s t a t e s e n s u r e s a
g r e a t e r d e g r e e of correspondence between p u b l i c p o l i c y and l o c a l
p r e f e r e n c e s (Macmahon, 1962; O a t e s , 1972; Olson, 1969 ; Ostrom, 1973;
T i e b o u t , 1956; T u l l o c k , 1969).
2.
Autonomous s t a t e s y i e l d g r e a t e r e x p e r i m e n t a t i o n and d i f f u s i o n of poli c y i n n o v a t i o n s (Grodzins, 1966; Macmahon, 1962; S c h e i b e r , 1980).
3.
Independent s t a t e s a r e s o u r c e s of c o u n t e r v a i l i n g power t o n a t i o n a l
monopolies (Ostrom, 1971, 1973; Truman, 1971).
4.
S t a t e governments a r e c l o s e t o t h e people i n a v a r i e t y of ways, p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s encouraged, a l i e n a t i o n i s minimized, and c i t i zens a r e more informed, a l l of which makes s t a t e and l o c a l governments more r e s p o n s i b l e ( E l a z a r , 1968; Grodzins , 1966; Ostrom, 1973 ;
S c h e i b e r , 1980) and p r o t e c t s i n d i v i d u a l l i b e r t y (Brennan and Buchana n , 1980, 1982).
5.
Autonomous s t a t e s reduce t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e and p o l i t i c a l burdens
p l a c e d on t h e n a t i o n a l government's agenda and, t h e r e b y , minimize t h e
s e r i o u s problems i n h e r e n t i n managing complex p o l i c i e s i n a c e n t r a l i z e d manner (Ostrom, 1973; S c h e i b e r , 1980; Weidner, 1962).
These v a l u e s
are directly
relevant t o the federal
When a s s e s s i n g t h e r e l a t i v e importance of t h e s t a t e s
'
courts
'
decisions.
i n t e r e s t s and t h e e f -
f e c t s of j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n s on t h o s e i n t e r e s t s , t h i s l i s t s u g g e s t s t h a t t h e r e
a r e advantages t o be g a i n e d from d i v i d e d governmental a u t h o r i t y .
I f these
v a l u e s a r e t h r e a t e n e d by a p a r t i c u l a r n a t i o n a l p o l i c y , such a t h r e a t c o n s t i t u t e s a ground f o r d e c i d i n g t o r e s t r a i n t h e n a t i o n a l government by denying i t
the authority t o act.
F i n a l l y , t h e s e v a l u e s a r e p e r t i n e n t t o e m p i r i c a l a n a l y s e s of t h e c o n t r o v e r s y c o n c e r n i n g t h e impact of t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t s on t h e s t a t e s .
They p r o v i d e
a r a t i o n a l e f o r choosing s u b s t a n t i v e a r e a s f o r t h e purpose of t e s t i n g p r o p o s i t i o n s concerning
the
consequences
of
court
decisions;
the areas
selected
s h o u l d a c c e n t u a t e t h e v a l u e s of f e d e r a l i s m .
SUMMARY
The p r i n c i p l e s and values of f e d e r a l i s m have been s u b j e c t t o r e d e f i n i t i o n
and refinement a s s o c i e t y h a s changed.
Some p o i n t s i n American h i s t o r y mark
c r i t i c a l s h i f t s i n f e d e r a l i s m ' s s t r u c t u r e w h i l e o t h e r s s i g n a l more i n c r e m e n t a l
modlf i c a t i o n s .
The f a c t remains t h a t t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t s a r e key a c t o r s i n de-
t e r m i n i n g t h e d i r e c t i o n of t h e s e changes.
The Supreme Court and t h e lower f e d e r a l c o u r t s have been f o r c e s f o r g r e a t e r c e n t r a l i z a t i o n i n t h e f e d e r a l system by a g r e e i n g t o a n expansion of Con-2 1-
gressional authority t o regulate, tax,
and spend, w h i l e s i m u l t a n e o u s l y re-
s t r i c t i n g t h e same a b i l i t y of t h e s t a t e s .
For a n i n t e r m i t t e n t p e r i o d between
1918 and 1936 t h e Supreme Court a t t e m p t e d t o u s e t h e Tenth Amendment t o l i m i t
t h e scope of t h e rlatiorlal goverument 's economic p o l i c y making.
However, t h a t
e f f o r t , which was t e r m i n a t e d by t h e upheaval of t h e G r e a t D e p r e s s i o n , was p o l i t i c a l l y unpopular, and became i n t e l l e c t u a l l y d i s c r e d i t e d . Although t h e f e d e r a l
c o u r t s have been r e l a t i v e l y i n a c t i v e i n r e s t r i c t i n g t h e n a t i o n a l government,
contemporary c r i t i c s contend t h a t t h e j u d i c i a r y h a s a g g r e s s i v e l y c o n s t r a i n e d
s t a t e a u t h o r i t y through t h e i m p o s i t i o n of
wide range of p o l i c y a r e a s .
constitutional standards across a
Moreover, c r i t i c s of c u r r e n t c o u r t involvement may
f e a r t h a t a n asymmetric a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e s u b s t a n t i v e due p r o c e s s d o c t r i n e t o
s t a t e s but n o t t o t h e n a t i o n a l government, may p o r t e n d f u r t h e r s h i f t s i n t h e
b a l a n c e of power between t h e n a t i o r l a l government arld t h e s t a t e s .
Much of t h e c r i t i c i s m of t h e c o u r t s i s four~ded on t h e b e l i e f t h a t t h e y
have not honored s u f f i c i e n t l y t h e autonomy of t h e s t a t e s and t h a t t h i s l a c k of
r e c o g n i t i o r l h a s e r o d e d t h e p r i n c i p l e s and h a s impaired t h e v a l u e s of f e d e r a l ism.
Consequently, a review of t h e ways t h a t t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t s have come t o
t h i s p o s i t i o n w i l l c l a r i f y t h e f o r c e s behind t h e t r e n d s i n c o u r t p o l i c y t h a t
a r e t h e s u b j e c t of t h i s s t r o n g c r i t i c i s m .
NOTES
11 There a r e o t h e r p r o v i s i o n s of t h e C o r ~ s t i t u t i o r lt h a t b e a r 011 t h e a u t h o r i t y
of s t a t e governments a l t h o u g h t h e y a r e q u i t e secondary t o t h e Tenth Amendment, t h e Necessary and P r o p e r C l a u s e , and t h e Supremacy Clause. For a n
e x h a u s t i v e l i s t of t h e s e p r o v i s i o n s , s e e Choper , 1977, and M i l l e r , 1985.
21
-
There a r e l l m i t s t o how f a r t h e j u d i c i a l p r o c e s s of i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e meani n g of " n e c e s s a r y " can go b e f o r e t h e power of t h e s t a t e s i s vanquished.
The outcomes from t h e e s t i m a t i o n of r ~ a t i o n a l i u t e r e s t p o t e n t i a l l y can
undermir~et h e v i a b i l i t y of t h e s t a t e s a s p o l i t i c a l u n i t s . Hence, i f t h e
c o r ~ d i t i o r l sf o r t h e s t a t e s t o e x i s t a s a l t e r n a t i v e l e v e l s of government
a r e t h r e a t e n e d by Corlgressiorlal a c t i o n , t h e Court presumably would d e c i d e
c a s e s i n t h e s t a t e s ' f a v o r . For a more e l a b o r a t e explarlatiorl of how t h e
v i a b i l i t y of t h e s t a t e s can b e , and h a s been t a k e n i n t o account by t h e
Supreme Court s e e Nagel, 1981.
Nagel has proposed t h a t t h e r e a r e a t
l e a s t f o u r c o n d i t i o n s and a r g u e s t h a t some Supreme Court o p i n i o r ~ shave
t a k e n them l rlto account. Although Nagel c l a i m s t h a t t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s can
be c u l l e d from t h e w r i t i n g s of t h e Founding F a t h e r s , one such d e c i s i o n
-31
For some c r i t i c s of Garcia, the degree of the s t a t e s ' representation i n
Congress i s i r r e l e v a n t , because the question of the limits of the national
government's powers is a constitutional rather than a p o l i t i c a l matter.
Chapter 3
DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENTS
INTRODUCTION
I n t h e l a s t 50 y e a r s , t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t s have s t e a d i l y expanded t h e meani n g of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s i n many p o l i c y a r e a s and have reviewed s t a t e p o l i c i e s and p r a c t i c e s a c c o r d i n g l y . l/
T h i s e x t e n s i o n o c c u r r e d n o t only i n t h e
c o u r t s ' negating s p e c i f i c s t a t e a c t i o n s a s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l , but a l s o i n imp o s i n g a f f i r m a t i v e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y based o b l i g a t i o n s on t h e s t a t e s .
Under-
l y i n g t h i s t r e n d h a s been t h e development of s u p p o r t i n g l e g a l d o c t r i n e s t h a t
d e f i n e t h e s o u r c e of c i t i z e n s ' c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s , t h e s p e c i f i c c o n t e n t of
t h o s e r i g h t s , and t h e f o r m a t i o n of
remedies when t h e c o u r t s determine t h a t
r i g h t s have been v i o l a t e d .
Much of t h i s i s due t o a n expanded i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of p o r t i o n s of t h e Constitution, i n particular,
t h e 1 4 t h Amendment.
P r i o r t o t h e a d o p t i o n of t h e
1 4 t h Amendment, t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n o f f e r e d few and o n l y l i m i t e d p r o h i b i t i o n s on
t h e s t a t e s w i t h r e g a r d t o governance of t h e i r c i t i z e n s .
The 1 4 t h Amendment,
adopted i n t h e a f t e r m a t h of t h e C i v i l War, provides t h a t t h e n a t i o n a l government h a s t h e a u t h o r i t y t o p r o t e c t c e r t a i n i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s a g a i n s t p o s s i b l e
a c t i o n s by t h e s t a t e s .
The p r e c i s e scope of t h e s e r i g h t s i s not obvious from
t h e language of t h e 1 4 t h Amendment and h a s been a s u b j e c t of c o n s i d e r a b l e deb a t e over t h e years.
The f o u n d a t i o n s f o r many of t h e s p e c i f i c d e c i s i o n s r e s t r i c t i n g s t a t e act i o n s and implementation of s p e c i f i c c o u r t o r d e r s depend upon modern i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s g i v e n t o t h e 1 4 t h Amendment.
Although t h e r e a r e c o n f l i c t i n g views of
e x a c t l y what a u t h o r i t y i s g i v e n t o t h e n a t i o n a l government and what r e s t r i c t i o n s a r e p l a c e d on t h e s t a t e s under t h a t amendment, c e r t a i n views have p r e v a i l e d i n terms of d o c t r i n e , custom, and t r a d i t i o n .
CREATION OF RIGHTS
The f e d e r a l government is e x p l i c i t l y p r o h i b i t e d i n t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n from
i n t e r f e r i n g w i t h t h e r i g h t s of i n d i v i d u a l s .
These r e s t r i c t i o n s a r e l a r g e l y
l a i d o u t i n t h e B i l l of R i g h t s , t h e f i r s t e i g h t amendments t o t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n .
I n c o n t r a s t , t h e r e a r e very few and l i m i t e d p r o t e c t i o n s of i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s
-2 5-
from s t a t e i n t e r f e r e n c e .
An example i s Article I , S e c t i o n 10, which p r o h i b i t s
s t a t e s from "pass [ i n g l any B i l l of A t t a i n d e r , e x p o s t f a c t o law, o r law i m p a i r i n g t h e O b l i g a t i o n of Contracts..."
Those o r i g i n a l r e s t r i c t i o n s on s t a t e a c t i o n s c l e a r l y were overshadowed by
t h e a d o p t i o n of t h e 1 4 t h Amendment.
The f i r s t s e c t i o n of t h e amendment r e a d s
a s follows:
A l l p e r s o n s born o r n a t u r a l i z e d i n t h e United S t a t e s ,
and s u b j e c t t o t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n t h e r e o f , a r e c i t i z e n s of
t h e United S t a t e s and t h e s t a t e wherein t h e y r e s i d e . No
s t a t e s h a l l make o r e n f o r c e any law which s h a l l a b r i d g e
t h e p r i v i l e g e s o r immunities of c i t i z e n s of t h e United
S t a t e s ; n o r s h a l l any s t a t e d e p r i v e any person of l i f e ,
l i b e r t y , o r p r o p e r t y , w i t h o u t due p r o c e s s of law; nor deny t o any p e r s o n w i t h i n i t s j u r i s d i c t i o n t h e e q u a l prot e c t i o n of t h e laws.
Of t h e C i v i l War Amendments, t h e 1 4 t h had t h e s p e c i f i c purpose of ensuri n g t h e l e g a l p r o t e c t i o n of newly f r e e d s l a v e s .
Although i t s a r g u a b l y broad
language h a s provoked c o n t i n u i n g c o n t r o v e r s y a s t o whether i t s purpose was
i n t e n d e d t o be s o l i m i t e d , i t i s c l e a r t h a t i t has become t h e primary j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r p r o h i b i t i o n s a g a i n s t s t a t e a c t i o n a f f e c t i n g i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s . 2-1
The f e d e r a l c o u r t s through t h e i r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e 1 4 t h Amendment
have played a key r o l e i n modifying t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p of t h e s t a t e s t o i n d i v i d ual citizens.
Development of
from i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s
of
the
14th Amendment d o c t r i n e h a s come e x c l u s i v e l y
Due P r o c e s s
and Equal
Protection
Clauses. 3/
These two c l a u s e s became n o t merely r e s t r i c t i o n s a g a i n s t s t a t e i n t e r f e r e n c e
w i t h p r i v a t e a c t i o n but a l s o s o u r c e s of a f f i r m a t i v e s t a t e o b l i g a t i o n s (Cox,
1976b).
The e f f e c t was g r e a t l y t o expand t h e n a t i o n a l government's
(read
f e d e r a l c o u r t s ') s c o p e of a u t h o r i t y i n s e t t i n g p u b l i c p o l i c y ,
I n a d d i t i o n t o whatever c o n t e n t t h e Due P r o c e s s Clause h a s i n i t s e l f , i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i n t h e 20th c e n t u r y has made i t t h e b a s i s f o r t h e e x t e n s i o n of
t h e B i l l of R i g h t s i n t o b a r r i e r s a g a i n s t s t a t e a s w e l l a s n a t i o n a l government
activities.
Commonly c a l l e d t h e I n c o r p o r a t i o n D o c t r i n e , t h e r e a s o n i n g t h a t
h e l d t h e B i l l of R i g h t s a p p l i c a b l e t o s t a t e a s w e l l a s f e d e r a l government act i o n became t h e u n d e r p i n n i n g f o r t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t ' s involvement i n t h e admini s t r a t i o n of c r i m i n a l j u s t i c e i n t h e s t a t e s .
F i n a l l y , not only h a s t h e B i l l
of R i g h t s been made a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e s t a t e s ,
but over time t h e Court h a s
expanded t h e meaning of t h e s e r i g h t s , w i t h t h e e f f e c t of f u r t h e r c o n s t r a i n i n g
s t a t e action.
-26-
Equal P r o t e c t i o n .
The c r i t i c a l t a s k conf r o n t i n g t h e j u d i c i a r y h a s been
t o f a s h i o n a n a p p r o p r i a t e t e s t t o d e t e r m i n e whether s t a t e a c t i o n v i o l a t e s
equal protection--treating
i n d i v i d u a l s i n l i k e circumstances a l i k e .
Absolute
e q u a l i t y of t r e a t m e n t h a s never been r e q u i r e d because v i r t u a l l y e v e r y a c t of
government r e q u i r e s t h a t d i s t i n c t i o n s be made between c l a s s e s of c i t i z e n s o r
c a t e g o r i e s of a c t i v i t i e s .
These d i s t i n c t i o n s , f o r example, may determine who
w i l l be t a x e d ; which a c t i v i t i e s w i l l be r e g u l a t e d and which w i l l n o t ; which
t y p e s of governmental s e r v i c e s w i l l be p r o v i d e d , t o whom, i n what amounts and
i n what circumstances.
Recognizing s t a t e d e c i s i o n makers
'
need f o r d i s c r e t i o n
i n making p o l i c y judgments, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n economic and r e g u l a t o r y m a t t e r s ,
t h e s t a n d a r d t h a t evolved f o r a s s e s s i n g t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l v a l i d i t y of s t a t e
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s was a l e n i e n t one: L e g i s l a t i v e l y c r e a t e d c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s were
presumed t o be v a l i d i f t h e y were r a t i o n a l l y r e l a t e d t o l e g i t i m a t e governmental
objectives.
A s t a t e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n would t h u s be i n v a l i d a t e d o n l y when t h e r e
was no r e a s o n a b l e b a s i s f o r i t .
i f any
set
of
facts
A r e a s o n a b l e b a s i s would be found t o e x i s t
c o u l d be p o s i t e d
i n support
of
the
classification.
The " r a t i o n a l b a s i s " t e s t was grounded i n a s t r o n g d e f e r e n c e t o s t a t e
p o l i c y judgments and a presumption i n f a v o r of t h e v a l i d i t y of a c t i o n s by s t a t e
d e c i s i o n makers.
Those c h a l l e n g i n g l e g i s l a t i v e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s on e q u a l pro-
t e c t i o n grounds had a very heavy burden t o bear.
A s a p r a c t i c a l m a t t e r , under
t h e r a t i o n a l b a s i s t e s t only a r a r e s t a t e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n scheme would f ail--one
t h a t was c l e a r l y u n r e l a t e d t o a l e g i t i m a t e p o l i c y g o a l and r e s u l t e d i n i n v i d i ous d i s c r i m i n a t i o n .
The Supreme Court 's i n c r e a s i n g s e n s i t i v i t y t o c i v i l l i b e r t i e s over t h e
l a s t 50 y e a r s h a s l e d t o i t s a r t i c u l a t i o n of a second t e s t f o r a s s e s s i n g t h e
v a l i d i t y of
l e g i s l a t i v e classifications--"compelling
state interests.
"
Al-
though most l e g i s l a t i o n c o n t i n u e s t o be examined under t h e r a t i o n a l b a s i s t e s t ,
a d i f f e r e n t t e s t i s used when s t a t e laws a r e c o n s i d e r e d t o c r e a t e what i n t h e
eyes of t h e Court a r e " s u s p e c t " c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s of i n d i v i d u a l s o r t o a f f e c t
what a r e c h a r a c t e r i z e d by t h e Court a s "fundamental r i g h t s . "
I n those instan-
c e s , t h e presumption i n f a v o r of t h e v a l i d i t y of s t a t e l e g i s l a t i o n is r e v e r s e d :
The burden of proof i s s h i f t e d t o t h e s t a l e and i t is r e q u i r e d t o show n o t
merely t h a t t h e r e i s a r a t i o n a l p o l i c y b a s i s f o r t h e d i s t i n c t i o n s b u t t h a t t h e
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n scheme
is
justified
The development and u s e
of
by
a
"compelling
state
i n t e r e s t . " 4-/
t h e "compelling s t a t e i n t e r e s t " t e s t have
r a i s e d problems on both d o c t r i n a l and p r a c t i c a l l e v e l s .
-2 7-
One b a s i c problem i s
t h a t t h e r e a r e no o b j e c t i v e o r agreed-upon s t a n d a r d s f o r d e t e r m i n i n g which
t e s t t h e Court w i l l apply.
classifications are
"fundamental"?
I n a d d i t i o n t o t h o s e on t h e b a s i s of r a c e , which
"suspect"?
The l a c k of
On what
b a s i s does
one d e f i n e a r i g h t as
c e r t a i n t y a s t o t h e circumstances i n which t h e
"compelling s t a t e i n t e r e s t " t e s t w i l l be used compounds t h e p r a c t i c a l e f f e c t s
I n t h o s e i n s t a n c e s where t h e t e s t i s a p p l i e d , t h e s t a t e must jus-
of i t s use:
t i f y t h e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n , and t h e burden which i t must s a t i s f y has been thought
by some t o be v i r t u a l l y insurmountable.
An i l l u s t r a t i o n of t h e d i f f i c u l t y s t a t e s have i n meeting t h e t e s t designed
t o d e f i n e t h e meaning of
Shapiro v. Thompson.
"equal p r o t e c t i o n " i s shown i n t h e
1965 c a s e of
I n t h a t c a s e t h e Supreme Court h e a r d a c h a l l e n g e t o regu-
l a t i o n s t h a t mandated a one-year
r e s i d e n c y p e r i o d f o r e l i g i b i l i t y f o r assis-
t a n c e under t h e Aid t o F a m i l i e s w i t h Dependent C h i l d r e n (AFDC) program.
e f f e c t of t h e r e g u l a t i o n was t o c r e a t e two c l a s s e s of needy r e s i d e n t s :
The
those
who had l i v e d i n t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n more t h a n one y e a r and t h o s e who had been
r e s i d e n t l e s s t h a n one y e a r .
The s t a t e had sought t o j u s t i f y t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between needy r e s i d e n t s
by showing t h a t t h e w a i t i n g p e r i o d requirement was d i r e c t e d p r i m a r i l y a t pres e r v i n g t h e f i s c a l i n t e g r i t y of t h e AFDC program.
It would f a c i l i t a t e budget
p l a n n i n g , p r o v i d e a n o b j e c t i v e c r i t e r i o n of r e s i d e n c y , minimize t h e opportun i t y f o r f r a u d , and encourage a n i n d i v i d u a l ' s e a r l y e n t r y i n t o t h e work f o r c e .
The C o u r t , however, r e q u i r e d more t h a n a r a t i o n a l b a s i s f o r t h e c l a s s i f i c a t ion.
The one-year
w a i t i n g p e r i o d burdened i n d i v i d u a l s
i n exercising
t h e i r " r i g h t t o t r a v e l , " which t h e Court recognized a s a fundamental c o n s t i t u tional right.
I n reviewing t h e o b j e c t i v e s advanced i n s u p p o r t of t h e c l a s s i -
f i c a t i o n , t h e Court found no compelling s t a t e i n t e r e s t s u f f i c i e n t t o j u s t i f y
t h e infringement of t h i s r i g h t t o t r a v e l .
The w a i t i n g p e r i o d requirement was
t h e r e f o r e i n v a l i d a t e d a s i n v i d i o u s d i s c r i m i n a t i o n denying r e s i d e n t s e q u a l protection.
Problems w i t h t h e u s e of t h e "compelling s t a t e i n t e r e s t " t e s t were l a i d
out i n t h e vigorous d i s s e n t i n Shapiro by J u s t i c e Harlan.
Harlan f i r s t c r i t i -
c i z e d t h e C o u r t ' s d e f i n i t i o n of t h e r i g h t t o t r a v e l , which t h e m a j o r i t y d i d
n o t ground i n any p a r t i c u l a r c l a u s e of t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n , a s fundamental.
In
h i s view, t h e Court was merely " p i c k [ i n g ] o u t p a r t i c u l a r human a c t i v i t i e s ,
c h a r a c t e r i z [ i n g ] them a s fundamental, and g i v [ i n g ] them added p r o t e c t i o n under
a n unusually s t r i n g e n t e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n t e s t .
-28-
"
The r e s u l t of such an approach,
a r g u e d H a r l a n , was t h a t t h e Court was t a k i n g on t h e c h a r a c t e r of a "superl e g i s l a t u r e , " i n t e r j e c t i n g i t s e l f and new C o n s t i t u t i o n a l s t a n d a r d s i n t o broad
a r e a s of l e g i s l a t i v e p o l i c y making.
The normal presumption i n f a v o r of t h e
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of s t a t e l e g i s l a t i o n was r e v e r s e d , and t h e l i k e l i h o o d f o r
d i v e r s i t y and e x p e r i m e n t a t i o n i n s t a t e p o l i c i e s and programs was s h a r p l y r e duced i f n o t e l i m i n a t e d .
I n l i g h t of t h e h i s t o r y , of t h e 1 4 t h Amendment and
i t s e x p l i c i t f o c u s on e n s u r i n g t h e l e g a l r i g h t s of t h e f r e e d s l a v e s , H a r l a n
would have l i m i t e d t h e "compelling s t a t e i n t e r e s t " t e s t t o c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s
made on t h e b a s i s of race.
H a r l a n , t h u s , would have reviewed--and
upheld--the
s t a t e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n a c c o r d i n g t o t h e r a t i o n a l b a s i s test.
Due Process.
A major development o v e r t h e l a s t two decades i n t h e evolv-
i n g i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e 1 4 t h Amendment h a s been t h e Supreme Court 's expansion
of what c o n s t i t u t e s " p r o p e r t y " under t h e Due P r o c e s s Clause.
t h e law h a s drawn a l i n e between " r i g h t s " and " p r i v i l e g e s .
"
Historically,
With r e s p e c t t o
due p r o c e s s p r o t e c t i o n , r i g h t s were c a r e f u l l y p r o t e c t e d from governmental i n t e r f e r e n c e ; p r i v i l e g e s , on t h e o t h e r hand, were n o t .
However, t h e growth i n
s o c i a l w e l f a r e l e g i s l a t i o n w i t h i t s wide range of s t a t u t o r y e n t i t l e m e n t s t o
government s e r v i c e s caused t h e Court t o r e j e c t t h e r i g h t s and p r i v i l e g e s d i chotomy.
Under t r a d i t i o n a l c a t e g o r i z a t i o n s , s e r v i c e s o r b e n e f i t s provided by
t h e s t a t e were c o n s i d e r e d p r i v i l e g e s which could be o f f e r e d o r withdrawn a t
t h e government's s o l e d i s c r e t i o n .
a property
entitlements as
U l t i m a t e l y , t h e Court r e c o g n i z e d s t a t u t o r y
interest
w a r r a n t i n g due p r o c e s s
p r o t e c t i o n . 5-1
C a t e g o r i z i n g v a r i o u s governmental e n t i t l e m e n t s a s c r e a t i n g c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y p r o t e c t e d p r o p e r t y r i g h t s and imposing due p r o c e s s r e q u i r e m e n t s on t h e
t e r m i n a t i o n of
program b e n e f i t s
h a s had
consequences
i n a wide
range
of
policy areas.
The immediate r e s u l t h a s been t h e " c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n " of
d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e d u r e s w i t h r e s p e c t t o government programs and s e r v i c e s ,
r a n g i n g from income maintenance and s o c i a l s e c u r i t y b e n e f i t s t o p r o b a t i o n ,
o c c u p a t i o n a l and p r o f e s s i o n a l l i c e n s i n g , e d u c a t i o n , employment, and s o f o r t h .
P l a c i n g t h e s e governmental a c t i v i t i e s u n d e r a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s h i e l d ,
i t is
a s s e r t e d , s u b j e c t s t h e a d m i n i s t r a t o r s t o a s i g n i f i c a n t d e g r e e of f e d e r a l overs i g h t , c o n s t r i c t i n g t h e a u t h o r i t y and d i s c r e t i o n t h a t may be needed t o r u n
v a r i o u s programs
efficiently
and
within
budgetary
limits
(Frug,
1978).
The l e v e l of involvement i n s t a t e a c t i v i t i e s t h a t h a s o c c u r r e d i s i l l u s t r a t e d by Goss v. Lopez, (1975).
This c a s e i n v o l v e d a due p r o c e s s c h a l l e n g e
t o p r o c e d u r e s i n t h e Ohio p u b l i c s c h o o l s which p e r m i t t e d s t u d e n t s t o be s u s -
-29-
pended f o r up t o t e n days w i t h o u t a h e a r i n g e i t h e r b e f o r e o r a f t e r t h e suspens i o n decision.
I n examining t h e s t u d e n t s ' c o n t e n t i o n , t h e Court f i r s t looked
t o t h e r i g h t o r i n t e r e s t f o r which they sought due p r o c e s s p r o t e c t i o n .
Al-
though Ohio h a s no c o n s t i t u t i o n a l o b l i g a t i o n t o o p e r a t e a p u b l i c s c h o o l s y s -
t e m , t h e Court determined t h a t t h e s t a t e ' s d e c i s i o n t o e s t a b l i s h and m a i n t a i n
s u c h a system and t o make a t t e n d a n c e mandatory c r e a t e d a s t u d e n t ' s " l e g i t i m a t e
e n t i t l e m e n t t o a p u b l i c e d u c a t i o n a s a p r o p e r t y i n t e r e s t which is p r o t e c t e d by
t h e Due P r o c e s s C l a u s e and which may n o t be t a k e n away f o r misconduct w i t h o u t
adherence t o t h e minimum p r o c e d u r e s r e q u i r e d by t h a t c l a u s e . "
The Court t h e n examined t h e p r o c e d u r e s i n u s e i n t h e Ohio s c h o o l s i n l i g h t
of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s t a n d a r d s .
The C o u r t , a f t e r reviewing t h e n a t u r e and s e v e r -
i t y of t h e d e p r i v a t i o n ( s u s p e n s i o n ) and t h e i n t e r e s t s of t h e s c h o o l a u t h o r i -
t i e s , concluded t h a t i n t h e c o n t e x t of a ten-day s u s p e n s i o n o r l e s s , due process r e q u i r e d t h a t t h e s t u d e n t s r e c e i v e o r a l o r w r i t t e n n o t i c e of t h e c h a r g e s .
I n t h e event t h a t t h e c h a r g e s a r e d e n i e d , evidence must be p r e s e n t e d t o t h e
s t u d e n t and a n o p p o r t u n i t y must be g r a n t e d t o r e f u t e i t .
The Ohio procedures
flunked.
A d i s s e n t by J u s t i c e Powell focused on two r e l a t e d i s s u e s - - t h e
basis f o r
t h e C o u r t ' s c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e s t a t u t o r y e n t i t l e m e n t invoked due p r o c e s s prot e c t i o n and t h e e f f e c t of t h e d e c i s i o n on t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of t h e p u b l i c
schools.
F i r s t , Powell c r i t i c i z e d what h e saw a s t h e Court 's a u t o m a t i c a c -
c e p t a n c e of s t a t u t o r y e n t i t l e m e n t s a s w a r r a n t i n g due p r o c e s s p r o t e c t i o n .
Re-
viewing t h e a l l e g e d d e p r i v a t i o n caused by a s u s p e n s i o n of l e s s t h a n t e n d a y s ,
Powell would have h e l d t h a t no c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y p r o t e c t e d r i g h t was v i o l a t e d .
Second, J u s t i c e Powell d e c r i e d t h e C o u r t ' s deepening involvement i n t h e operat i o n of t h e p u b l i c s c h o o l s .
way f o r f u r t h e r j u d i c i a l
l o c a l school o f f i c i a l s
.
Powell f e a r e d t h a t t h e d e c i s i o n would open t h e
o v e r s i g h t and f u r t h e r undermine t h e a u t h o r i t y
I n c o r p o r a t i o n of t h e B i l l of R i g h t s .
Constitution, the B i l l
of
of
The f i r s t e i g h t amendments t o t h e
Rights, e x p l i c i t l y define individual
r i g h t s and
p r o t e c t i o n s a g a i n s t n a t i o n a l governmental a c t i o n , i n c l u d i n g freedom of speech,
assembly, r e l i g i o n , and p r o c e d u r a l g u a r a n t e e s t o d e f e n d a n t s i n f e d e r a l crimin a l proceedings.
Very e a r l y i n American h i s t o r y i t was u n d e r s t o o d t h a t t h e
amendments were d i r e c t e d o n l y a t t h e n a t i o n a l government and n o t a g a i n s t t h e
states.
Any doubt i n t h a t r e g a r d was e x p l i c i t l y r e s o l v e d by t h e Supreme Court
i n a c a s e d e c i d e d i n 1833 (Barron v. B a l t i m o r e ) .
-30-
The p r o p r i e t y of s t a t e law
enforcement p r a c t i c e s and c o u r t p r o c e d u r e s was t h u s determined s o l e l y by s t a n d a r d s s e t f o r t h i n s t a t e laws o r c o r ~ s t i t u t i o n s . Likewise s t a t e s were f r e e t o
l e g i s l a t e w i t h o u t r e g a r d t o f e d e r a l c o o s t i t u t i o r ~ a llaw i n s u c h a r e a s a s s e p a r a t i o n of church and s t a t e , and speech.
However, t h e 1 4 t h Amer~dment, adopted
i n 1868, e v e n t u a l l y became t h e b a s i s f o r a d o c t r i n e t h a t o v e r t u r n e d t h i s long-
st a n d i n g t r a d i t i o n .
The d o c t r i n e p r o v i d e s t h a t t h e 1 4 t h Amendment's Due P r o c e s s C l a u s e i n c o r p o r a t e s t h e p r o t e c t i o n s of t h e B i l l of R i g h t s .
Hence, t h e B i l l of R i g h t s
c o n t a i n s b a r r i e r s a g a i n s t s t a t e government a c t i o n s .
This p o s i t i o n , ref e r r e d
t o a s t h e I n c o r p o r a t i o n D o c t r i n e , was reached d e a p i t e c o n f l i c t i n g views conc e r n i n g t h e s c o p e of t h e r i g h t s t h a t were i n c o r p o r a t e d . b-/
S p e c i f i c a l l y , t h e t o t a l i r l c o r p o r a t i o r l i s t p o s i t i o n argued t h a t t h e Due
P r o c e s s Clause of t h e 1 4 t h Amendment was i n t e n d e d t o i n c o r p o r a t e i n t o t o t h e
p r o t e c t i o n s of t h e B i l l of R i g h t s .
The e f f e c t of such a t o t a l i r ~ c o r p o r a t i o r ~
would have been t h a t each p r o v i s i o n of t h e B i l l of R i g h t s would be a u t o m a t i c a l l y applicable t o s t a t e a s well a s federal action.
Although t h i s t o t a l i n c o r -
p o r a t i o n d o c t r i n e h a s never been a c c e p t e d d i r e c t l y by t h e Supreme C o u r t , t h e
Court u l t i m a t e l y reached t h e same b a s i c r e s u l t .
The f i r s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t h a t any of t h e p r o t e c t i o n s c o n t a i n e d i n t h e
B i l l of R f g h t s p r o p e r l y r e s t r a i n e d s t a t e a c t i o n came i n a 1925 o p i n i o n ( G i t l o w
v. New York) when t h e Court assumed t h a t freedom of t h e p r e s s and freedom of
s p e e c h f e l l w i t h i n t h e " l i b e r t y " p r o t e c t e d by t h e Due P r o c e s s Clause.
Over
t h e next two decades each of t h e p r o t e c t i o r ~ s of t h e F i r s t Amendment--press,
s p e e c h , assembly, a s s o c i a t i o n , religion--were
rights restraining s t a t e action.
h e l d t o be f urldamental l i b e r t y
By 1947, a l l F i r s t Amendment g u a r a n t e e s had
been h e l d t o be a p p l i c a b l e Lo s t a t e a c t i o n .
The a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e p r o t e c t i o n s of t h e B i l l of R i g h t s came even more
slowly t o t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of c r i m i n a l j u s t i c e .
I n t h e 1937 c a s e of Palko
v. C o r ~ r ~ e c t i c u tt,h e Supreme Court r e a d t h e Due P r o c e s s Clause a s p r o t e c t i n g
from s t a t e i n t e r f e r e n c e t h o s e r i g h t s c o n t a i n e d i n t h e B i l l of R i g h t s which
were c o n s i d e r e d "fundamental" o r " i m p l i c i t i r ~t h e concept of o r d e r e d l i h e r ties." This a r t i c u l a t i o n
of
a s t a n d a r d f o r t h e e x a m i r ~ a t i o n of
r i g h t s r e q u i r e d t h e Court t o make a case-by-case
p r o t e c t i o n s c o n t a i n e d i n t h e B i l l of R i g h t s .
individual
examination of t h e v a r i o u s
Upon making such a n examination
i n P a l k o , t h e Court h e l d t h a t p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t double jeopardy was n e i t h e r
"fundamental"
n o r " i m p l i c i t i n t h e concept of o r d e r e d l i b e r t i e s " even when
-3 1-
t h e defendant's
l i f e hung i n t h e balance.
of d e a t h a g a i n s t t h e defendant t o s t a n d .
The Court p e r m i t t e d t h e s e n t e n c e
U l t i m a t e l y however, i n a series of
d e c i s i o n s i n t h e 19609, t h e Supreme Court h e l d t h a t most of t h e g u a r a n t e e s i n
t h e B i l l of R i g h t s were "fundamental r i g h t s " which t h e s t a t e s had t o o b s e r v e
i n t h e i r c r i m i n a l proceedings.7/
T h i s case-by-case
p r o c e s s h a s been r e f e r r e d
t o as "selective incorporation. "
The s e l e c t i v e i n c o r p o r a t i o n d o c t r i n e h a s been s u b j e c t e d t o c r i t i c i s m from
b o t h w i t h i n and o u t s i d e t h e Court.
Most o b v i o u s l y , t h e d o c t r i n e i s s u b j e c t
t o c r i t i c i s m on t h e grounds t h a t i t proceeded t o do piecemeal e x a c t l y what a
l a r g e body of Supreme Court d e c i s i o n s h e l d s h o u l d n o t be done--application
t h e e n t i r e B i l l of R i g h t s t o t h e s t a t e s - - a n d
of
did s o during t h e exact period
of time a m a j o r i t y of t h e Court was r e s i s t i n g w h o l e s a l e i n c o r p o r a t i o n .
It i s
argued t h a t t h e s e l e c t i v e i n c o r p o r a t i o n p r o c e s s provided no c r i t e r i a t o e n s u r e
t h a t t h e b a s i s of s e l e c t i o n i s n o t t h e s u b j e c t i v e judgment of a curremt (and
p o s s i b l y s h i f t i n g ) m a j o r i t y of t h e j u s t i c e s .
One of t h e s e v e r e s t c r i t i c s of
s e l e c t i v e i n c o r p o r a t i o n was J u s t i c e Harlan, who, i n c r i t i c i z i n g t h e "fundament a l " r i g h t s approach, urged t h e Court i n s t e a d t o adopt what h e c o n s i d e r e d t o
be a more o b j e c t i v e t e s t : whether t h e procedure was n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e defendant
t o r e c e i v e a f a i r t r i a l ( s e e , H a r l a n ' s d i s s e n t i n Duncan v. L o u i s i a n a , 1968).
I t is u n c l e a r , however, whether t h i s t e s t i s u l t i m a t e l y any l e s s s u b j e c t i v e
o r whether i t would have l e d t o s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t r e s u l t s i n many c a s e s .
Expansion of t h e Meaning of R i g h t s .
A p p l i c a t i o n of
the protections
of
t h e B i l l of R i g h t s t o t h e s t a t e s through t h e 1 4 t h Amendment h a s had profound
s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r t h e o p e r a t i o n of t h e f e d e r a l system.
posed i n a r e a s t r a d i t i o n a l l y l e f t t o s t a t e law.
L i m i t s have been i m -
The a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of c r i m i n a l
j u s t i c e by t h e s t a t e s , i n p a r t i c u l a r , h a s become s u b j e c t t o e x t e n s i v e f e d e r a l
supervision.,
However, t h e 14th Amendment h a s not been t h e only v e h i c l e f o r t h e c r e a t i o n
of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s i n t h e p a s t 50 y e a r s .
The Supreme Court h a s found
new r i g h t s through a t l e a s t t h r e e o t h e r modes oE a n a l y s i s .
1)
2)
3)
They i n c l u d e :
r e c o g n i t i o n of "fundamental r i g h t s , " n o t i n any s p e c i f i c p r o v i s i o n of
t h e R i l l of R i g h t s ;
e v o l u t i o n i n t h e c o n t e n t o r meaning of c l e a r l y e s t a b l i s h e d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o t e c t i o n s ; and
a p p l i c a t i o n of due p r o c e s s requirements t h a t r e s t r a i n t h e s t a t e s '
a b i l i t i e s t o a c t i n areas t h a t a r e not otherwise protected a g a i n s t
t h e i r actions.
I l l u s t r a t i o n s of t h e f i r s t form of a n a l y s i s i n c l u d e t h e r i g h t t o t r a v e l ,
which i n v a l i d a t e d s t a t e r e s i d e n c e r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r income maintenance ( S h a p i r o
v. Thompson, 1969); t h e p r i s o n e r ' s
r i g h t of a c c e s s t o t h e c o u r t s , which r e -
q u i r e d t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of adequate l a w l i b r a r i e s a t c o r r e c t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s (Bounds v.
Smith, 1977); and t h e r i g h t of p r i v a c y i n a b o r t i o n and r e -
Roe v.
l a t e d m a t t e r s (e.g.,
Wade, 1973).
The s p e c i f i c j u s t i f i c a t i o n s g i v e n
f o r t h e s e r i g h t s vary from c a s e t o c a s e , r e s t i n g on one o r more of t h e followi r ~ gl i n e s of r e a s o n i n g :
i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o imagine a complex s o c i e t y w i t h o u t
such a r i g h t ; t h e r i g h t r e s t s on a presumed t r a d i t i o n r e f l e c t e d i n p a r a l l e l
c a s e s ; o r , i t i s i m p l i e d by s p e c i f i c s e c t i o n s of t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n and r e l e v a n t
s t a t u t o r y law.
These j u s t i f i c a t i o n s t e n d t o be g e n e r a l and a b s t r a c t . For example, wherea s t h e r i g h t t o freedom from s t a t e r e s t r i c t i o n s on i n t e r s t a t e t r a v e l may be
deemed fundamental, i t s a p p l i c a t i o n i n t h e c o n t e x t of e l i g i b i l i t y r u l e s f o r
income s u p p o r t i s l e s s compelling, e s p e c i a l l y when e l i g i b i l i t y r u l e s i n o t h e r
a r e a s (e.g.
,
voting,
attendance a t
S i m i l a r l y , t h e Court's
b r a s , " "emanations,
"
s t a t e u n i v e r s i t i e s ) remain p e r m i s s i b l e .
argument t h a t p r i v a c y r i g h t s a r i s e from t h e "perlum-
o r "shadows" of p a r t i c u l a r amendments makes i t d i f f i c u l t
t o s e e t h e l i n k a g e between t h e a b s t r a c t r i g h t and t h e s p e c i f i c a p p l i c a t i o n of
t h e r i g h t i n a p a r t i c u l a r case.
A s a r e s u l t , i n t h e s e c a s e s , t h e d i s s e n t i n g o p i a i o r ~ shave c r i t i c i z e d t h e
Court 's d i s c o v e r y of r i g h t s l y i n g i n t h e shadows of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n s ,
s t r e s s i n g t h e absence of language i n any a r t i c l e o r amendment t o t h e C o u s t i t u t i o n t h a t p r o v i d e s a n underpinning t o t h e m a j o r i t y ' s o p i n i o n t h a t t h e s e r i g h t s
a r e "fundamental."
It may be argued t h a t t h e c o n t r o v e r s y o v e r what i s a fun-
damental r i g h t d i v e r t s a t t e n t i o n from t h e r e a l issue--whether
t h e n o t i o n of a
h i e r a r c h y of r i g h t s , a s implied by t h e j u d i c i a l n o t i o n of fundamental r i g h t s ,
i s indeed c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n . Yet, a s long a s t h e s e d e c i s i o n s a r e
i n p l a c e , they a f f e c t how w e l f a r e a d m i n i s t r a t o r s set e l i g i b i l i t y r e q u i r e m e n t s ;
they r e q u i r e t h a t c o r r e c t i o n a l a d m i n i s t r a t o r s p r o v i d e inmates w i t h r e a s o n a b l e
a c c e s s t o decent l e g a l l i b r a r i e s ; and t h e y p r e s c r i b e what r e g u l a t i o n s s t a t e s
may e s t a b l i s h c o r ~ c e r n i n ga b o r t i o n s .
The second c a t e g o r y of
a n a l y s i s i s i l l u s t r a t e d by t h e Supreme C o u r t ' s
review of p r i s o n c o n d i t i o n s i n Rhodes v. Chapman, 1982.
The E i g h t h Amendment,
a s a p p l i e d t o t h e s t a t e s through t h e 1 4 t h , limits t h e e x t e n t t o which s t a t e s
may punish c o n v i c t s , l e v y e x c e s s i v e f i n e s , and i u f l i c t punishments t h a t a r e
-33-
There is no q u e s t i o n t h a t t h e E i g h t h Amendment i s meant
" c r u e l and unusual."
t o a p p l y , almost e x c l u s i v e l y , t o c r i m i n a l of f e n d e r s .
It is t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n
of t h i s amendment and t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n of whether s p e c i f i c c o n d i t i o n s and
p r a c t i c e s meet i t s s t a n d a r d s t h a t have provoked c r i t i c a l r e a c t i o n s .
I n Rhodes v.
tions]...
Chapman, t h e Supreme Court used p h r a s e s such a s " d e p r i v l a -
of t h e minimal c i v i l i z e d measure of l i f e ' s n e c e s s i t i e s " i n a n a t -
tempt t o g i v e s u b s t a n c e t o t h e words " c r u e l and unusual. "
"evolving s t a n d a r d s of
The Court recognized
decency" r a t h e r t h a n t h e s t a n d a r d s i n vogue a t t h e
t i m e of t h e passage of t h e Eighth Amendment i n d e t e r m i n i n g c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y .
D e s p i t e t h e advantages t h a t t h e f l e x i b l e n a t u r e of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p h r a s e s
o f f e r i n a d j u s t i n g t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n t o changing r e a l i t i e s , t h i s s o r t of modif i c a t i o n h a s consequences t h a t a f f e c t t h e s t a t e s .
As t h e Rhodes c a s e i l l u s -
t r a t e s , one consequence i s t h a t lower c o u r t s may s u b s e q u e n t l y expand on t h e
C o u r t ' s a l r e a d y expansive language.
I n Hoptowit v. Ray and Capps v. A t i y e h ,
c o u r t s h e l d t h a t t h e E i g h t h Amendment r e q u i r e s t h e p r o v i s i o n of
" b a s i c human
needs," i n c l u d i n g "adequate food, c l o t h i n g , s h e l t e r , s a n i t a t i o n , medical c a r e ,
and p e r s o n a l s a f e t y . "
Although medical c a r e and p e r s o n a l s a f e t y may be r e -
garded a s e s s e n t i a l t o a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y sound p r i s o n system, i s s u e s of f o o d ,
c l o t h i n g , s h e l t e r , and s a n i t a t i o n may be beyond t h e coverage of what c o n s t i t u t e s p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t c r u e l and unusual punishment and p r o p e r l y remain withi n t h e s t r i c t d e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e s t a t e s ( s e e , e.g.,
B r a k e l , forthcoming).
A second consequence of t h e Rhodes d e c i s i o n l i e s i n i t s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n
t h a t a d e p r i v a t i o n t h a t might not be found i n d i v i d u a l l y t o be c r u e l and unu s u a l could,
i n combination w i t h o t h e r s ,
be r u l e d u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l .
It i s
such broad " t o t a l i t y of c o n d i t i o n s " c l a i m s t h a t have been a t t h e h e a r t of t h e
major c l a s s a c t i o n s brought by l i t i g a t o r s such a s t h e American C i v i l L i b e r t i e s
Union's N a t i o n a l P r i s o n P r o j e c t , t h e NAACP Legal Defense Fund,
and o t h e r s .
Some of t h e s e c a s e s , i f s u c c e s s f u l , w i l l r e q u i r e massive i n s t i t u t i o n w i d e o r
systemwide changes a t enormous f i n a n c i a l expense.
An example of t h e t h i r d form of a n a l y s i s i s t h e Supreme C o u r t ' s p o l i c y
concerning c a p i t a l punishment.
In 1972, t h e d e c i s i o n i n Furman v.
Georgia
h e l d t h e i m p o s i t i o n of t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y t o c o n s t i t u t e c r u e l and unusual punishment under t h e E i g h t h Amendment.
L e g i s l a t u r e s i n 35 s t a t e s r e v i s e d t h e i r
s t a t u t e s t o a d d r e s s t h e concerns about uneven i m p o s i t i o n t h a t had been a r t i c u l a t e d i n Furman.
S t a t u t e s based on d i f f e r e n t approaches t o e l i m i n a t e a r b i -
t r a r i n e s s and t o c o n s t r a i n d i s c r e t i o n came t o t h e Supreme Court on E i g h t h
-34-
Amendment c h a l l e n g e s i n 1976.
I n t h e l e a d c a s e , Gregg v. Georgia, t h e Court
upheld i n d i v i d u a l i z e d s e n t e n c i n g and made t h a t approach "a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y
indispensable part
of
the
A s J u s t i c e Rehnquist
process
of
inflicting
the
penalty
of
death."
observed i n h i s d i s s e n t i n g o p i n i o n , t h e Court ap-
p e a r s t o be import i n g due p r o c e s s c o n s i d e r a t i o n s i n t o E i g h t h Amendment analy-
sis.
That i s , t h e Court is c o n c e i v i n g of what i t c o n s i d e r s d e s i r a b l e proce-
d u r a l p r o t e c t i o n s when t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y i s t o imposed.
EQUITABLE RELIEF
The f e d e r a l c o u r t s ' expansion of r i g h t s has been p a r a l l e l e d by a s h i f t
i n t h e r e l i e f t h a t c o u r t s w i l l o r d e r upon a f i n d i n g of
T h i s s h i f t has been s e e n f i r s t i n t h e a v a i l a b i l i t y of
most t y p i c a l l y t h e i n j u n c t i o n .
rights violations.
"equitable r e l i e f ,
"
E q u i t a b l e r e l i e f was once viewed a s a n e x t r a -
o r d i n a r y remedy; i t now h a s become t h e t y p i c a l form of r e l i e f i n l i t i g a t i o n
i n which p r a c t i c e s of
s t a t e s ' a g e n c i e s o r programs have been c h a l l e n g e d a s
f a l l i n g below c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c r i t e r i a .
An e v o l u t i o n h a s a l s o o c c u r r e d i n t h e form of i n j u n c t i v e r e l i e f .
The
i n j u n c t i o n h a s evolved from a predominantly n e g a t i v e remedy t o a n a f f i r m a t i v e
one, t h a t i s , from a n o r d e r p r o h i b i t i n g t h e defendant from engaging i n s p e c i f i c conduct t o one r e q u i r i n g t h e defendant t o u n d e r t a k e c e r t a i n a c t i o n .
This
s h i f t h a s been t r a c e d t o t h e 1954 Supreme Court d e s e g r e g a t i o n d e c r e e i n Brown
v. Board of Education.
I n t h a t d e c i s i o n (Brown I ) , t h e Supreme Court h e l d t h a t t h e r a c i a l s e g r e g a t i o n of c h i l d r e n i n p u b l i c s c h o o l s v i o l a t e d t h e Equal P r o t e c t i o n Clause of
t h e 1 4 t h Amendment t o t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n .
I n d e v i s i n g a remedy, t h e Court could
simply have e n j o i n e d s t a t e s from e n f o r c i n g t h e i r laws t h a t r e q u i r e d o r p e r m i t t e d t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o r maintenance of d u a l s c h o o l systems.
Instead, the
Court i n a d e c i s i o n t h e n e x t y e a r (Brown I T ) c a l l e d f o r an a f f i r m a t i v e program
of d e s e g r e g a t i o n .
The Brown I1 d e c i s i o n was unprecedented, i n terms of t h e
scope of t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t s ' involvement i n f o r m u l a t i n g and e n f o r c i n g v a r i o u s
forms of r e l i e f .
Under Brown 11, primary r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r developing d e s e g r e g a t i o n p l a n s
r e s t e d with school a u t h o r i t i e s i n the s t a t e s .
The lower f e d e r a l c o u r t s , which
had o r i g i n a l l y heard t h e c a s e s , were charged w i t h t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of overs e e i n g t h e s e e f f o r t s , w i t h j u r i s d i c t i o n t o e n t e r such o r d e r s and d e c i s i o n s a s
were n e c e s s a r y t o e f f e c t u a t e t h e d e s e g r e g a t i o n holding.
-3 5-
The lower c o u r t s , perhaps i n e v i t a b l y , became deeply i n v o l v e d n o t only i n
reviewing state-devised
plans,
but i n f o r m u l a t i n g p l a n s themselves,
s u p e r i n t e n d i n g t h e i r implement a t ion.
and i n
This involved " d e t a i l e d administration
f o r p r o t r a c t e d p e r i o d s under c o n s t a n t j u d i c i a l s u p e r v i s i o n " (Cox, l976b: 77).
The c o n t e n t of t h e r e l i e f was wide ranging.
Undoing t h e consequences of p a s t
v i o l a t i o n s was f e l t t o r e q u i r e t h e s t a t e s t o a l t e r b a s i c a s p e c t s of t h e i r
p u b l i c s c h o o l systems--including
organization,
employment,
curriculum,
and
extracurricular a c t i v i t i e s .
Brown I1 set what was t o become t h e p a t t e r n f o r t h e c o u r t s ' involvement
i n i n s t i t u t i o n a l adjudication--cases
h o s p i t a l s , and s o f o r t h .
i n v o l v i n g s c h o o l s , p r i s o n s , mental h e a l t h
Upon e s t a b l i s h m e n t of a v i o l a t i o n of t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s by t h e d e f e n d a n t , t h e remedy h a s r a r e l y been a n e g a t i v e
injunction--a
simple p r o s c r i p t i o n a g a i n s t t h e defendant's continuing t h e chal-
lenged p r a c t i c e s o r a g a i n s t t h e enforcement of t h e c h a l l e n g e d law.
Rather,
r e l i e f has been p r e s c r i p t i v e , a d e c r e e o u t l i n i n g , t y p i c a l l y i n c o n s i d e r a b l e
d e t a i l , t h e a c t i o n s t o be t a k e n by d e f e n d a n t s t o e n f o r c e t h e r i g h t s found t o
have been v i o l a t e d .
The r a t i o n a l e f o r t h i s approach h a s been twofold.
On t h e one hand, pro-
v i d i n g a remedy i s understood t o be t h e t r a d i t i o n a l
f u n c t i o n of t h e c o u r t
upon a showing of
i n j u r y and l e g a l e n t i t l e m e n t .
adjudication, therefore,
i s t o be e x p e c t e d .
Doing s o i n i n s t i t u t i o n a l
I n that
context,
the
court's
t a s k i s t o f a s h i o n r e l i e f i n such a way a s t o r e d r e s s t h e u n d e r l y i n g c o n d i t i o n
( s e e , e.g.,
E i s e n b e r g and Y e a z e l l ,
1980; F i s s ,
1979).
On t h e o t h e r hand,
g i v e n t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s of many of t h e s e c a s e s , i t is b e l i e v e d t h a t j u d i c i a l
f o r m u l a t i o n of t h e remedy and c l o s e s u p e r v i s i o n of i t s implementation i s t h e
o n l y avenue t h a t
can reasonably
assure an effective
remedy (Cavanagh and
S a r a t , 19 80). 8/
The u s e of a f f i r m a t i v e i n j u n c t i o n s has been t h e s u b j e c t of c o n s i d e r a b l e
c o n t r o v e r s y on a number of grounds.
u s e of i t s e q u i t y powers.
One c h a l l e n g e i s d i r e c t e d a t t h e c o u r t ' s
According t o some ( s e e , e. g., McDowell, l982), t h e
Supreme Court i n Brown 11, i n o r d e r t o reach t h e a f f i r m a t i v e outcome of req u i r i n g t h e i n t e g r a t i o n of
public schools,
abandoned r e q u i r e m e n t s t h a t had
p r e v i o u s l y c o n s t r a i n e d t h e c o u r t ' s u s e of e q u i t y r e l i e f , t h e r e b y e s t a b l i s h i n g
t h e b a s i s of a n e n t i r e l y new j u d i c i a l paradigm t h a t would t a k e s h a p e over he
n e x t 20 y e a r s .
These p r e v i o u s c o n s t r a i n t s were n e c e s s a r y , even e s s e n t i a l , be-
c a u s e of t h e e x t r a o r d i n a r y n a t u r e of t h e e q u i t y power, which t r a d i t i o n a l l y had
-3 6-
s e r v e d t o g i v e t h e c o u r t broad d i s c r e t i o n t o f a s h i o n r e l i e f t o t h e needs of
individual cases.
Without t h o s e c o n s t r a i n t s , t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t s have assumed
under t h i s new paradigm a n enhanced power t o f o r m u l a t e r a t h e r t h a n simply t o
negate public policies.
Other c h a l l e n g e s f o c u s more d i r e c t l y on t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s of
t h e a f f i r m a t i v e i n j u n c t i o n on t h e f e d e r a l system.
t h e u s e of
The a f f i r m a t i v e i n j u n c t i o n
c o n s t i t u t e s a c o n s i d e r a b l e i n t r u s i o n upon s t a t e f u n c t i o n s . If n o t d i s p l a c i n g
e l e c t e d and a p p o i n t e d s t a t e o f f i c i a l s from t r a d i t i o n a l decision-making
t i o n s , t h e n i t o f t e n c r e a t e s a s e p a r a t e s o u r c e of a u t h o r i t y .
v a t e d by t h e l e v e l
of
func-
T h i s i s aggra-
s p e c i f i c i t y t y p i c a l l y found i n a f f i r m a t i v e d e c r e e s ,
t h e i r l o n g d u r a t i o n , and t h e i r wide impacts.
STATUTORY POLICIES AND INTERPRETATIONS
The g e n e r a l e x p a n s i o n i n t h e scope of government a t a l l l e v e l s over t h e
p a s t 50 y e a r s h a s undoubtedly c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e s h e e r volume of t h e f e d e r a l
c o u r t s ' business.
D i s p u t e s a r i s i n g o v e r governmental r u l e s , p r o c e d u r e s ,
and
programs have i n c r e a s e d w i t h t h e passage of s t a t u t e s and t h e c r e a t i o n of exec u t i v e a g e n c i e s and c o r r e s p o n d i n g a d m i n i s t r a t i v e r u l e making.
This i n c r e a s e
i n s o c i a l and economic r e g u l a t i o n s h a s been accompanied by a w i l l i n g n e s s of
c i t i z e n s , o r g a n i z a t i o n s , and governmental u n i t s t o p r e s s t h e i r p r e f e r r e d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of t h e s e r e g u l a t i o n s i n t o t h e l e g a l a r e n a .
consequently, c o u r t s
have become more i n v o l v e d i n a d j u d i c a t i n g d i s p u t e s i n v o l v i n g s t a t e laws and
p o l i c i e s because t h e laws and p o l i c i e s themselves have i n c r e a s e d i n scope and
complexity.
However, t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t s have been p a r t of t h e p r o c e s s t h a t h a s i n c r e a s e d t h e magnitude of a c t i v i t i e s s u b j e c t t o j u d i c i a l review.
The emphasis
p l a c e d on t h e F i r s t and t h e 1 4 t h Amendments by t h e Supreme Court h a s encouraged
many t o s e e k j u d i c i a l r e l i e E from l e g i s l a t i v e o r a d m i n i s t r a t i v e bodies.
The
c o u r t s and t h e Congress a b e t t h i s encouragement by i n c r e a s i n g a c c e s s through
loosening the
ripeness.
requirements
of
standing,
jurisdiction,
justiciability,
and
I t i s extremely d i f f i c u l t , if n o t i m p o s s i b l e , t o s o r t o u t t h e r e l a -
t i v e c a u s a l importance of t h e c o u r t s
'
a c t i o n s v e r s u s t h e Congress
'
actions.
Some of t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y l i e s w i t h t h e c o u r t s and some l i e s w i t h t h e Congress
and t h e n a t u r e of a l i t i g i o u s s o c i e t y (Rosenbloom, 1983).
W i t h i n t h e maze of f a c t o r s t h a t have c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e i n c r e a s i n g workl o a d of t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t s , one element t h a t i s a s s i g n e d s p e c i a l s i g n i f i c a n c e
-37-
i s t h e c r e a t i o n of new r i g h t s f o r i n d i v i d u a l s s e e k i n g t o oppose p u b l i c agencies.
The v e h i c l e used by t h e c o u r t s t o h o l d p u b l i c a g e n c i e s a c c o u n t a b l e was
e s t a b l i s h e d l o n g b e f o r e t h e " a d m i n i s t r a t i v e s t a t e " a r o s e but was p u t i n t o eff e c t only a f t e r t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e s t a t e was w e l l under way.
The concept of
e n a b l i n g c i t i z e n s t o h o l d p u b l i c o f f i c i a l s a c c o u n t a b l e through l i t i g a t i o n i n
t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t s was p l a c e d i n s t a t u t o r y form i n t h e C i v i l R i g h t s A c t of
1871,
-
which was i n t e n d e d t o e n f o r c e t h e 1 4 t h Amendment.
a s 42 U.S.
Subsequently c o d i f i e d
Code, S e c t i o n 1983, i t p r o v i d e s i n p a r t :
Every p e r s o n who, under c o l o r of any s t a t u t e , o r d i n a n c e ,
r e g u l a t i o n , custom, usage, of any s t a t e o r t e r r i t o r y ,
s u b j e c t s , o r causes t o be s u b j e c t e d any c i t i z e n of t h e
U n i t e d S t a t e s o r any o t h e r p e r s o n w i t h i n t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n
t h e r e o f t o t h e d e p r i v a t i o n of any r i g h t s , p r i v i l e g e s , o r
immunities s e c u r e d by t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n and laws, s h a l l be
l i a b l e t o t h e p a r t y i n j u r e d i n a n a c t i o n a t law, s u i t i n
e q u i t y , o r o t h e r proper proceeding providing f o r redress.
I t s o r i g i n a l purpose was s t r a i g h t forward--to
p o p u l a t i o n i n t h e South.
p r o t e c t t h e emancipated s l a v e
However, S e c t i o n 1983, a s i t i s commonly c a l l e d , was
dormant f o r n e a r l y 100 y e a r s .
A primary r e a s o n why t h e meaning of
Section
1983 was c o n s t r u e d n a r r o w l y , and i g n o r e d a s a l e g a l remedy f o r many y e a r s is
t h a t p a r a l l e l Supreme Court c a s e s gave narrow i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t o t h e p r o t e c t i o n s of i n d i v i d u a l s ' r i g h t s a g a i n s t s t a t e a c t i o n s .
The s c o p e of c i t i z e n s '
" r i g h t s , p r i v i l e g e s , and immunities" under t h e 1871 a c t was r e s t r i c t e d by t h e
C o u r t ' s l i m i t e d view
Cases (1873).
of
"privileges
or
immunities"
i n t h e Slaughterhouse
S i m i l a r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of t h e 1871 a c t were made by t h e f e d -
e r a l j u d i c i a r y u n t i l 1961.
-
That y e a r , i n Monroe v. Pape, t h e Supreme Court
upheld a c i t i z e n ' s r i g h t t o s u e p o l i c e o f f i c e r s f o r damages.
I n i t s o p i n i o n t h e Court i n t e r p r e t e d "under c o l o r of s t a t e law" t o i n c l u d e any misconduct by o f f i c i a l s .
This led J u s t i c e F r a n k f u r t e r t o w r i t e a
d i s s e n t i n g view c o n t e n d i n g t h a t S e c t i o n 1983 was i n t e n d e d t o c o v e r o n l y misI n s p i t e of t h e broadening e f f e c t of
conduct t h a t t h e s t a t e had a u t h o r i z e d .
Monroe v. Pape on S e c t i o n 1983, t h i s law was s t i l l c o n s t r a i n e d t e m p o r a r i l y by
t h e C o u r t ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of "every person" t o p r e c l u d e s u i t s a g a i n s t municip a l i t i e s and o t h e r governmental e n t i t i e s .
Monroe v. Pape e s t a b l i s h e d S e c t i o n 1983 a s a remedy t h a t c i t i z e n s c o u l d
invoke af Firmat i v e l y a g a i n s t o f f i c i a l s
'
misconduct.
Subsequent d e c i s i o n s ex-
panded i t s potency by s t r i p p i n g away p a s t immunities a v a i l a b l e t o i n d i v i d u a l s
-38-
,
and government' d e f e n d a n t s i n S e c t i o n 1983 a c t i o n s ( s e e , Schuck, 1983).
The
governor of a s t a t e was found n o t t o be e n t i t l e d t o a b s o l u t e imrmnity, even
i n a crisis s i t u a t i o n (Scheuer v. Rhodes, 1974).
M u n i c i p a l i t i e s l o s t immuni-
t i e s i n c l u d i n g t h e q u a l i f i e d immunity of a "good f a i t h " d e f e n s e i n t h e 1980
d e c i s i o n i n Owen v. C i t y of Independence.
That y e a r t h e Court a l s o i n t e r p r e -
t e d S e c t i o n 1983 t o apply not o n l y t o c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and c i v i l r i g h t s t o r t s
b u t t o v i o l a t i o n s of t h e many f e d e r a l s t a t u t e s t h a t s t a t e and l o c a l o f f i c i a l s
h e l p t o a d m i n i s t e r o r e n f o r c e (Maine v. T h i b o u t o t ) .
Although s t a t e
judges
and
prosecutors
continue
to
enjoy
immunities
a g a i n s t p e r s o n a l l i a b i l i t y , and p u n i t i v e damages awards a g a i n s t governmental
e n t i t i e s a r e b a r r e d , t h e Court h a s transformed S e c t i o n 1983 i n t o a powerful
tool.
The Court c o n t i n u e s t o open up new avenues f o r t h e p l a i n t i f f s :
the
p o s s i b i l i t y of a s s e r t i n g n e g l i g e n c e c l a i m s ( P a r a t t v. T a y l o r , 1981) and pun i t i v e damages a g a i n s t i n d i v i d u a l o f f i c i a l s ( C i t y of Newport
c e r t s , Inc.,
v.
F a c t s Con-
1981).
Thus, t h e Supreme Court h a s made a
s e r i e s of
interpretations
C i v i l R i g h t s Act of 1871 t h a t has c r e a t e d t h e r i s k of
of
the
l i a b i l i t y f o r public
t o r t s a c r o s s a wide range of s t a t e and l o c a l a c t i v i t i e s .
F i n d i n g s of o f f i -
c i a l misconduct under S e c t i o n 1983 have i n v o l v e d t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t s i n o r d e r i n g complex remedial changes i n s t a t e and l o c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s .
SUMMARY
The l a s t 50 y e a r s have s e e n t h e development of s e v e r a l key d o c t r i n e s and
s t a t u t o r y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s by t h e Supreme Court t h a t l e a d t h e f e d e r a l j u d i c i a r y
t o t h e p o s i t i o n of reviewing s t a t e laws and p o l i c i e s f o r p o s s i b l e v i o l a t i o n s
of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s .
The d o c t r i n e s flow p r i m a r i l y from a n a l y s e s of t h e
1 4 t h Amendment 's Equal P r o t e c t i o n and Due Process C l a u s e s , a l t h o u g h t h e l a t t e r
is a l s o t h e b a s i s f o r t h e I n c o r p o r a t i o n D o c t r i n e .
The c r e a t i o n of r i g h t s i n -
c l u d e s v a r i o u s means by which t h e Court h a s expanded t h e c o n t e n t o r meaning of
rights.
F i n a l l y , t h e Court has made a s e r i e s of d e c i s i o n s t h a t v a s t l y expands
t h e r i g h t s of
c i t i z e n s t o s u e s t a t e and l o c a l governments.
S e c t i o n 1983,
which i s t h e l e g a l remedy used by c i t i z e n s , i s a c r i t i c a l f o u n d a t i o n f o r f e d e r a l c o u r t involvement i n s t a t e and l o c a l a f f a i r s .
T h i s c h a p t e r 's overview of d o c t r i n e s and i n t e r p r e t a t i ons d e s c r i b e s t h e
g e n e r a l manner i n which f e d e r a l c o u r t s have a r r i v e d a t t h e i r c u r r e n t l e v e l of
involvement i n both r e s t r i c t i n g c e r t a i n a c t i o n s of s t a t e governments and p r e -
-39-
s c r i b i n g c e r t a i n s t a n d a r d s t o which t h e y must adhere.
Having been p u t i n
p l a c e , t h e s e i d e a s c o n s t r a i n s t a t e s and l o c a l governments i n t h e conduct of
t h e i r business.
NOTES
The g e n e r a l t r e n d toward i n c r e a s e d j u d i c i a l involvement i n s t a t e p o l i c y
making h a s n o t been without e x c e p t i o n . A n o t a b l e r e c e n t example i s Saa
Antonio Independent School D i s t r i c t v. Rodriguez, 1973.
I n t h a t case
t h e Supreme Court upheld a g a i n s t a n e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n c h a l l e n g e a p u b l i c
s c h o o l f i n a n c i n g s y s t e m based on l o c a l p r o p e r t y t a x e s . D e s p i t e t h i s and
analogous d e c i s i o n s (e.g., Dandrige v. Williams, 1970; Lindsey v. Normet,
1972; and Rizzo v. Goode, 1976) t h e r e h a s been a n u n d e n i a b l e t r e n d toward
j u d i c i a l involvement i n o t h e r p o l i c y a r e a s , i n c l u d i n g p r i s o n s and mental
h e a l t h h o s p i t a l s , which, some o b s e r v e r s (e.g. Kaden, 1980) n o t e , do n o t
i n v o l v e t h e c o u r t i n t h e i n t r i c a c i e s of s t a t e a d m i r ~ i s t r a t i o r lt o t h e same
extent as i n public school finance.
The argument t h a t t h e 1 4 t h Amendment was i n t e n d e d ' t o p r o t e c t only f r e e d
b l a c k s a g a i n s t r e p r i s a l s , and t h e r e b y , s h o u l d be i n t e r p r e t e d c o n s i s t e n t l y
S e e , f o r example,
w i t h t h i s i n t e n t i o n , i s made by s e v e r a l o b s e r v e r s .
B e r g e r , 1977; Fairman, 1949; Morrison, 1949. A c o n t r a r y p o s i t i o n t h a t
c l a i m s t h a t t h e amendment was d e s i g n e d w i t h much b r o a d e r o b j e c t i v e s and
t h o s e o b j e c t i v e s permit a wide range of a p p l i c a t i o n s i s t a k e n by o t h e r s ,
i n c l u d i n g Dworkin, 1977a.
E a r l y j u d i c i a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s gave t h e " P r i v i l e g e s o r Immunities"
Clause a n e x t r e m e l y l i m i t e d meaning, e s s e n t i a l l y e l i m i n a t i n g i t a s a
s o u r c e of r i g h t s . I n 1873, t h e Supreme Court h e l d , i n t h e S l a u g h t e r h o u s e
Cases, t h a t t h e P r i v i l e g e s o r Immunities Clause of t h e 1 4 t h Amendment
provided f o r t h e p r o t e c t i o n of i n d i v i d u a l s ' r i g h t s a g a i n s t f e d e r a l act i o n s but n o t s t a t e a c t i o n s .
On t h e b a s i s of t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , t h e
Court h e l d t h a t a s t a t e s l a u g h t e r h o u s e monopoly d i d n o t d e p r i v e t h e
b u t c h e r s of New O r l e a n s of t h e i r r i g h t s under t h e 1 4 t h Amendment. I n s t e a d , t h e y were t o l d t o s e e k r e d r e s s in L o u i s i a n a ' s s t a t e c o u r t system.
Court d e c i s i o n s d i s c l o s e a t h i r d s t a n d a r d which f a l l s somewhere between
" r a t i o n a l b a s i s " and "compelling s t a t e i n t e r e s t . " To w i t h s t a n d a n e q u a l
p r o t e c t i o n c h a l l e n g e , a c l a s s i f i c a t i o n must s e r v e a n " i m p o r t a n t " goverumental o b j e c t i v e and be " s u b s t a n t i a l l y " r e l a t e d t o t h e achievement of
t h o s e o b j e c t i v e s . Although t h e Court h a s n o t acknowledged t h e e s t a b l i s h ment of a t h i r d t e s t , t h i s s t a n d a r d h a s been used i n a number of c a s e s
i n v o l v i n g c l a s s i f i c a t i o r ~a c c o r d i n g t o s e x , e.g., C r a i g v. Boren, 1976.
The u s e of t h i s "middle t i e r " does n o t r e s o l v e t h e problems w i t h r e s p e c t
t o t h e s t a t e s a s t h e e f f e c t of i t s u s e i s t o o v e r t u r n c l a s s i f i c a t i o r l s
t h a t would have been upheld under a r a t i o n a l b a s i s t e s t .
The f e d e r a l c o u r t s have p r e v i o u s l y used t h e 1 4 t h Amendment t o p r o t e c t
property rights.
However, t h e concept of p r o p e r t y r e f e r r e d t o p r i v a t e
ownership and t h e p r o d u c t i o n of goods and s e r v i c e s .
Using t h i s d e f i n i t i o n , t h e c o u r t s i n t e r p r e t e d both n a t i o n a l and s t a t e government economic
regulations as unconstitutional.
T h i s a p p l i c a t i o n of
p r o c e s s o c c u r r e d i n t h e l a t e 1800s and t h e e a r l y 1900s.
s u b s t a n t i v e due
There i s n o t a n obvious c o n n e c t i o n between t h e 1 4 t h Amendment and t h e
I n c o r p o r a t i o n D o c t r i n e judging by t h e l e n g t h of time t h a t e l a p s e d between
t h e enactment of t h e 1 4 t h Amendment i n 1868 and t h e d o c t r i n e ' s manif e s t a t i o n . It may be argued t h a t a n e a r l y e x p r e s s i o n of t h e d o c t r i n e o c c u r r e d
i n 1884 i n t h e d i s s e n t i n g o p i n i o n of J u s t i c e Miller i n Hurtado v. C a l i f o r n i a . However, i t seems f a i r and a c c u r a t e t o s a y t h a t t h e I n c o r p o r a t i o n D o c t r i n e was n o t e x p r e s s e d by a m a j o r i t y of t h e Supreme Court u n t i l
1925, o v e r a h a l f a c e n t u r y a f t e r t h e 1 4 t h Amendment's a d o p t i o n , and t h e
p r e c e d e n t was o n l y i n terms of t h e F i r s t Amendment's i n c o r p o r a t i o n . The
a p p l i c a t i o n s t o c r i m i n a l d e f e n s e p r o c e d u r e s , which began i n 1961, d i d
n o t o c c u r u n t i l n e a r l y a c e n t u r y a f t e r t h e a d o p t i o n of t h e Amendment.
71
-
Search and s e i z u r e [Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 ( 1 9 6 1 ) l ; c r u e l and u n u s u a l
punishment [Robinson v. C a l i f o r n i a , 370 U.S. 660 ( 1 9 6 2 ) ) ; c o u n s e l [Gideon
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 ( 1 9 6 3 ) l ; s e l f - i n c r i m i n a t i o n [Malloy v. Hogan,
378 U.S. 1 ( 1 9 6 4 ) .l ;. c o n f r o n t a d v e r s e w i t n e s s e s [ P o i n t e r v. Texas. 380
U.S. 400 ( 1 9 6 5 ) l ; speedy t r i a l [Klopfer v. North C a r o l i n a , 386 u.s'. 213
( l 9 6 7 ) I ; compulsory p r o c e s s [Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) 1 ;
j u r y t r i a l [Duncan v. L o u i s i a n a , 391 U.S. 145 ( l 9 6 8 ) I ; double jeopardy
[Benton v. Marvland. 395 U.S. 784 ( 1 9 6 9 ) l .
8/
-
However, t h e r e a r e i n s t a n c e s where f e d e r a l c o u r t s have o r d e r e d and monit o r e d s u b s t a n t i a l changes i n s t a t e p o l i c i e s a l t h o u g h t h e o r i g i n a l g r i e vances i n t h e s u c c e s s f u l complaint were not g r a n t e d r e l i e f . For example,
s t a t e w i d e changes i n West V i r g i n i a ' s p u b l i c s c h o o l system were made
p u r s u a n t t o a c o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n but t h e p l a n t i f f 's o r i g i n a l c l a i m s were
n o t s a t i s f i e d . See Oakerson, 1983.
Chapter 4
CONSEQUENCES OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL DECISIONS
INTRODUCTION
The p o s i t i o n of t h e s t a t e s i n t h e f e d e r a l system i s g r e a t l y a f f e c t e d by
how t h e c o u r t s i n t e r p r e t t h e l i m i t s of t h e n a t i o n a l government and by t h e i r
review of
rights.
state policies
in
light
of
citizens
'
expanding
constitutional
I n r e c e n t y e a r s , t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t s have extended t h e a u t h o r i t y of
t h e n a t i o n a l government by r e q u i r i n g s t a t e adherence t o a broad spectrum of
constitutional standards.
Doctrinal
developments have p r o v i d e d t h e
courts
w i t h a r a t i o n a l e f o r t h i s i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t p o s t u r e a l t h o u g h , i n some i n s t a n c e s ,
C o n g r e s s i o n a l l e g i s l a t i o n promotes and i n v i t e s t h e c o u r t s t o become i n v o l v e d
i n state affairs.
The c o u r t s
' decisions
have provoked c r i t i c i s m of t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n s g i v e n
f o r j u d i c i a l i n t e r v e n t i o n s and produced s k e p t i c i s m of t h e c o u r t s
make d e c i s i o n s r e g a r d i n g a p p r o p r i a t e s t a t e p u b l i c p o l i c y .
t h e r e a r e two d i f f e r e n t t y p e s of c r i t i c a l r e a c t i o n s .
'
ability to
I n a general sense,
F i r s t , t h e r e i s a two-
( 1 ) t h a t , i n g e n e r a l , t h e n a t i o n a l government, whe-
p a r t normative argument:
t h e r t h e c o u r t s o r o t h e r w i s e , s h o u l d n o t become i n v o l v e d i n t r y i n g t o reform
s t a t e p u b l i c policy--absent
explicit
constitutional
delegation
t o do so--
because t h e s e a t t e m p t s v i o l a t e t h e i n t e n t i o n s of t h e Founding F a t h e r s concernt h e n a t i o n a l government t o t h e s t a t e s , and ( 2 ) t h a t
i n g t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p of
t h e c o u r t s , i n p a r t i c u l a r , s h o u l d r e f r a i n from e f f o r t s t o reform p u b l i c p o l i cy a t any l e v e l , e s p e c i a l l y a t t h e s t a t e l e v e l , because such a t t e m p t s v i o l a t e
t h e Founding F a t h e r s
'
intentions
c o u r t s i n a f e d e r a l system.
concerning t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l
role
of
the
T h i s normative argument c o n c l u d e s , t h e r e f o r e ,
t h a t much c u r r e n t f e d e r a l c o u r t involvement i n s t a t e a f f a i r s r e s t s on questionable legal doctrines.
Second, t h e r e i s t h e e m p i r i c a l q u e s t i o n whether t h e c o u r t s have t h e cap a c i t y t o d e c i d e what
constitutes
n e c e s s a r y and a p p r o p r i a t e
s t a t e policy.
Hypotheses c o n c e r n i n g t h e consequences of c o u r t d e c i s i o n s a r e import a n t f o r
s e v e r a l reasons.
One r e a s o n i s t h a t many s c h o l a r s b e l i e v e t h a t t h e performance of t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t s i n d e t e r m i n i n g what programmatic changes a r e r e q u i r e d t o meet con-
-43-
s t i t u t i o n a l s t a n d a r d s has been n e c e s s a r y ,
a p p r o p r i a t e , and p o s i t i v e .
These
s c h o l a r s view t h e c o u r t s a s p o s s e s s i n g t h e c a p a c i t y t o a s s e s s s o c i a l a l t e r n a t i v e s and t o choose t h e one w i t h t h e g r e a t e s t n e t gain.
However, t h e p u r p o r t e d
b e n e f i t s of j u d i c i a l involvement have been challenged.
One r e c u r r e n t theme of
t h e c r i t i c s is t h a t t h e consequences of much c o u r t involvement have been s e r i o u s l y n e g a t i v e outcomes a c c o r d i n g t o any s t a n d a r d (e. g.
leading t o increased segregation).
, desegregation
orders
The examination of t h e consequences of
c o u r t d e c i s i o n s p e r m i t s t h e t e s t i n g of competing i d e a s and, t h e r e b y , may o f f e r
s y s t e m a t i c i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t i s r e l e v a n t t o a n important debate.
E m p i r i c a l r e s u l t s a l s o have an important b e a r i n g on t h e normative argument.
I f t h e c o u r t s a r e found t o be i n e f f e c t i v e , i n e f f i c i e n t , o r c o u n t e r pro-
d u c t i v e , t h i s evidence c o n s t i t u t e s a sound r e a s o n f o r c o n c l u d i n g t h a t t h e y
s h o u l d r e s t r a i n themselves and adopt a l e s s i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t r o l e .
The l o g i c f o r t h e i n f e r e n c e t h a t t h e c o u r t s need t h e c a p a c i t y t o s u p p o r t
t h e i r j u r i s d i c t i o n i n t h e s e m a t t e r s is based on t h e fundamental premise t h a t
"ought i m p l i e s can."
Accepting t h i s major premise, i t f o l l o w s t h a t when a n
i n d i v i d u a l o r group of i n d i v i d u a l s cannot do something, t h e a c t i o n s h o u l d n o t
I n t h e c o n t e x t of
be p r e s c r i b e d o r attempted.
means t h a t i f
the federal
courts
the current research,
this
cannot achieve a p p r o p r i a t e s o c i a l p o l i c y
g o a l s , t h e n they s h o u l d n o t engage i n t h i s form of a c t i v i t y .
However,
it
does not f o l l o w t h a t i f t h e c o u r t s a r e shown t o be e f f e c t i v e , t h e n t h e y s h o u l d
be i n v o l v e d , because t h i s i s committing t h e " n a t u r a l i s t i c f a l l a c y " of concludi n g t h a t "whatever i s , should be. "
Hence, evidence of n e g a t i v e consequences
from t h e proposed e m p i r i c a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n s can s e r v e only t o c a l l i n t o q u e s t i o n
t h e j u d i c i a l r o l e i n s t a t e a f f a i r s , but evidence of p o s i t i v e consequences does
n o t j u s t i f y t h e involvement by normative s t a n d a r d s .
critics
'
That i s , r e j e c t i n g t h e
c o n t e n t i o n s i s n e c e s s a r y b u t not s u f f i c i e n t t o af f i r m f e d e r a l c o u r t
involvement i n s t a t e a f f a i r s .
Some o b s e r v e r s might o b j e c t t o t h i s proposed l i n k a g e between t h e consequences of j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n s ( o r t h e c a p a c i t y of t h e c o u r t s ) and t h e normative
q u e s t i o n of whether t h e c o u r t s should be involved i n changing s t a t e p o l i c i e s .
For example, Dworkin (1977b) argues t h a t c o u r t d e c i s i o n s t o d e s e g r e g a t e p u b l i c
s c h o o l s do n o t r e s t on s o c i a l s c i e n c e evidence concerning t h e connections between s e g r e g a t i o n and s t u d e n t performance, c u r r e n t de j u r e s e g r e g a t i o n and de
f a c t o antecedents,
o r t h e b e n e f i t s and c o s t s of
d e c i s i o n s a r e r o o t e d i n " i n t e r p r e t a t i v e judgments"
-44-
integration.
of norms,
Rather,
the
v a l u e s , and a
s e n s e of
codnity.
consequences of
Hence,
f o r Dworkin,
evidence of
negative,
unintended
s c h o o l d e s e g r e g a t i o n d e c i s i o n s does n o t c a l l i n t o q u e s t i o n
what r e l i e f c o u r t s have designed and t r i e d t o implement, because t h e i r a c t i o n s
are j u s t i f i e d i n d e p e n d e n t l y of such d a t a .
Although Dworkin i s c o r r e c t i n assuming t h a t normative arguments must be
i n t e r n a l l y c o n s i s t e n t and must be argued on t h e i r merits, h i s complete s e p a r a t i o n of normative and e m p i r i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s makes t h e former i r r e f u t a b l e .
C e r t a i n l y , v a l u e s a r e s u b j e c t t o e m p i r i c a l a n a l y s i s , because no one speaks i n
f a v o r of i n e f f i c i e n t , i n e f f e c t i v e and counter-productive a c t i o n s .
Hence, e v i -
dence on t h e consequences of j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n s i s c o n s i d e r e d t o be r e l e v a n t
t o t h e s t u d y of t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t s and f e d e r a l i s m , no l e s s t h a n e v i d e n c e of
t h e e f f i c a c y of a rnedical procedure and t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of a d v e r s e s i d e e f f e c t s
is c o n s i d e r e d r e l e v a n t i n t h e d e c i s i o n t o r e n d e r a s p e c i f i c t r e a t m e n t i n c a s e s
where u n d e r t a k i n g none of t h e p o s i t i v e t r e a t m e n t s may l e a d t o t h e p a t i e n t ' s
death.
F i n a l l y , l i m i t e d v e r i f i c a t i o n of t h e p r o p o n e n t s ' and t h e c r i t i c s ' c l a i m s
l e a v e s a s e r i o u s gap i n our knowledge of an i s s u e of n a t i o n a l s i g n i f i c a n c e .
U n c e r t a i n t y over t h e a c t u a l consequences--both
p o s i t i v e and negative--of
court
d e c i s i o n s i n h i b i t s c l a r i f i c a t i o n of i s s u e s and r e s o l u t i o n of t h e p o l i c y deb a t e .l/
O b t a i n i n g a consensus on t h e a p p r o p r i a t e r o l e of t h e c o u r t s depends
on a f i r m e r base of d a t a concerning t h e n a t u r e of t h e c o u r t s ' i n t e r v e n t i o n s
and t h e i r e f f e c t s .
For a l l of t h e s e r e a s o n s , t h e r e i s a need t o conduct a
systematic inquiry i n t o t h e t e s t a b l e propositions t h a t hypothesize linkages
between c o u r t d e c i s i o n s and s o c i a 1 o u t comes.
LITERATURE REVIEW
A review of t h e c r i t i c a l commentaries on c o u r t c a p a c i t y r e v e a l s t h a t t h e r e
i s both a g e n e r a l r a t i o n a l e f o r why t h e c o u r t s a r e c o n s i d e r e d d e f i c i e n t when
t h e y a t t e m p t t o impose s t a n d a r d s , p o l i c i e s , and p r a c t i c e s on t h e s t a t e s and a
c a t a l o g u e of s p e c i f i c i n s t a n c e s of d i s a s t r o u s outcomes.
Both t h e e x p l a n a t o r y
scheme and t h e s p e c i f i c claims a r e h i g h l i g h t e d below.
General E x p l a n a t i o n s of Limited Court Capacity. Two f a c t o r s a r e g e n e r a l l y i d e n t i f i e d a s t h e reasons why t h e c o u r t s a l l e g e d l y e r r i n choosing among
s o c i a l p o l i c y a l t e r n a t i v e s (Horowitz, 1977:25-6,
b i n , 1987: 165-7).
290-1;
D i v e r , 1979: 60-1;
Ru-
F i r s t , t h e members of t h e bench a r e b e l i e v e d t o l a c k t h e
e x p e r t i s e n e c e s s a r y t o process t h e complex i n f o r m a t i o n needed t o u n d e r s t a n d
-45-
t h e relationships t h a t give r i s e e i t h e r t o alleged c o n s t i t u t i o n a l deprivations
o r t o t h e appropriate r e l i e f i n the event t h a t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l v i o l a t i o n s a r e
found.
Courts cannot a c c u r a t e l y determine t h e l i n k a g e s between t h e i n j u r y ,
s t a t e p o l i c i e s , and e x t r a n e o u s f a c t o r s .
A s a r e s u l t , c o u r t s may be misled i n -
t o a c c e p t i n g s p u r i o u s r e l a t i o n s h i p s between t h e d e p r i v a t i o n and a p o l i c y i n s t e a d of l e a r n i n g t h e t r u e s o u r c e of t h e a l l e g e d wrong.
T h i s d i f f i c u l t y i s compounded by t h e j u d g e s ' l a c k of u n d e r s t a n d i n g of how
t o f a s h i o n r e l i e f t h a t f i t s each c o n t e x t .
Even i f r e l i e f i s w a r r a n t e d , judges
may n o t know what needs t o be changed i n o r d e r t o achieve t h e d e s i r e d amelioration.
I n f a c t , court-ordered changes may prove c o u n t e r p r o d u c t i v e because of
a l a c k of i n f o r m a t i o n on t h e complex network of a u t h o r i t y and i n c e n t i v e s t h a t
e x i s t among t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s i n every p o l i c y a r e a .
Second, t h e p r o c e s s of a d j u d i c a t i o n i s not conducive t o t h e s o r t of problem s o l v i n g r e q u i r e d t o a c h i e v e d e s i r e d e n d s , because i t t r e a t s t h e a l l e g e d
f a c t s of
each c a s e i n i s o l a t i o n from b e h a v i o r a l t h e o r i e s .
Adjudication i s
o r i e n t e d toward a n a n a l y s i s of t h e f a c t s s t r i c t l y a s p r e s e n t e d by t h e p a r t i e s
r a t h e r t h a n i n l i g h t of more g e n e r a l e x p l a n a t i o n s .
T h i s means t h a t t h e o r i e s
a r e n o t used t o i n t e r p r e t t h e n a t u r e and s i g n i f i c a n c e o f - a l l e g e d i n s t a n c e s of
rights violations.
A s a r e s u l t , consequences of j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n s f o r s t a t e
p u b l i c p o l i c y may f r e q u e n t l y be n e g a t i v e .
A d d i t i o n a l l y , l i t i g a t i o n i s not conducive t o needed problem s o l v i n g because i t n e g l e c t s c o s t s .
Problem s o l v i n g g e n e r a l l y i n v o l v e s t h e examination
of t h e g a i n s and l o s s e s of a l t e r n a t i v e s , t h e amount of s c a r c e r e s o u r c e s consumed by each a l t e r n a t i v e , and t h e o p p o r t u n i t y c o s t of n o t being a b l e t o u s e
r e s o u r c e s f o r o t h e r purposes.
c i a l assessment of
These f a c t o r s a r e seldom c e n t r a l t o t h e j u d i -
constitutional rights.
Cost may even be d i s r e g a r d e d a s
i r r e l e v a n t t o t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n of r i g h t s o r t h e v i o l a t i o n of r i g h t s and t h e
d e s i g n of r e l i e f i n t h e event of v i o l a t i o n s .
A d j u d i c a t i o n a l s o l a c k s a r o u t i n e feedback mechanism t o i n f o r m t h e c o u r t
when i t s o r d e r s a r e e n c o u n t e r i n g problems of implementation.
Without a mec-
hanism t o c o r r e c t i t s d e c i s i o n because of u n f o r e s e e n problems, t h e c o u r t must
r e l y on t h e p a r t i e s t o i n f o r m i t of any d i f f i c u l t i e s .
Although m a s t e r s o r
monitors may be employed t o a s s i s t t h e c o u r t i n managing p o s t - t r i a l implement a t i o n of c o u r t o r d e r s , t h e s e a d j u n c t s have a tendency t o develop t h e i r own
agendas and., hence c r e a t e a n o t h e r t y p e of feedback problem f o r t h e c o u r t . 2-1
A
.
In virtually
-46-
every
area i n
which t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t s have i n t e r v e n e d and s e t s t a n d a r d s
t o which
the
s t a t e s must a d h e r e , a body of l i t e r a t u r e h a s a r i s e n t h a t i s c r i t i c a l of t h e
interventions
'
effects.
I n many of t h e w r i t i n g s , t h e c r i t i c a l o b s e r v a t i o n s
are drawn from i n s t a n c e s where a f e d e r a l d i s t r i c t c o u r t h a s reviewed a p a r t i c u l a r social policy
and r e n d e r e d a
s p e c i f i c decision.
The e f f e c t s
c o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n a r e d e s c r i b e d i n g r e a t d e t a i l but w i t h o u t
the
t h e b e n e f i t of
A review of t h i s
p a r a l l e l o b s e r v a t i o n s from o t h e r c o u r t s and o t h e r p o l i c i e s .
l i t e r a t u r e , however,
of
r e v e a l s c e r t a i n common themes i n t h e k i n d s of e f f e c t s
t h a t a r e a t t r i b u t e d t o t h e c o u r t s ' involvement.
These themes a r e i l l u s t r a t e d i n t h e f o l l o w i n g summary of t h e l i t e r a t u r e
on c o u r t involvement i n t h r e e b a s i c s t a t e and l o c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s :
prisons,
31 The themes f o l l o w .
mental h e a l t h f a c i l i t i e s , and p u b l i c s c h o o l s . F i r s t , c o u r t involvement i n s t a t e a f f a i r s a l l e g e d l y weakens t h e l e g i t i macy, a u t h o r i t y and c o n t r o l of governmental o f f i c i a l s .
The a u t h o r i t y of ad-
m i n i s t r a t o r s i s reduced w i t h r e s p e c t t o s t a f f members, s u b j e c t s , r e c i p i e n t s ,
and u s e r s of t h e governmental p o l i c i e s and i n s t i t u t i o n s ( D i v e r ,
19 79: 81-2).
T h i s phenomenon i s a l l e g e d t o o c c u r i n p r i s o n s (Marquart and Crouch,
mental i n s t i t u t i o n s
(Rubin,
1978: l 6 6 ) ,
and p u b l i c
G r a g l i a , 1976; Morgan, 1984; W o l t e r s , 1984).
schools
(Glazer,
1984),
19 78;
I n public schools, the decline
i n a u t h o r i t y a l s o a f f e c t s how s t u d e n t s view t h e a d m i n i s t r a t o r s ' a u t h o r i t y o v e r
r e b e l l i o u s pupils--they
be punished ( G l a z e r ,
b e l i e v e t h a t s t u d e n t s who cause d i s t u r b a n c e s w i l l n o t
19 78; Wilkinson,
1975: 72).
In f a c t , administrators are
d i s c o u r a g e d from t a k i n g d i s c i p l i n a r y a c t i o n where i t i s w a r r a n t e d (Wilkinson,
1975: 72).
The r e d u c t i o n i n s c h o o l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s
'
a u t h o r i t y i s evidenced by
a n i n c r e a s e i n s c h o o l - r e l a t e d crime (Morgan, 1984: 69; W o l t e r s , 1984: 242), conf r o n t a t i o n s between r a c i a l -groups ( W o l t e r s , 1984:190-7),
and g e n e r a l d i s c i -
p l i n a r y problems ( G r a g l i a , 1976:275), w h i l e a d e c l i n e i n a u t h o r i t y a t p r i s o n s
i s evidenced by a n i n c r e a s e i n v i o l e n c e among inmates (Marquart and Crouch,
19 84) and v i o l e n c e by inmates a g a i n s t c o r r e c t i o n a l o f f i c i a l s ( A l p e r t , Crouch,
and H u f f , 1984).
court-ordered
Yet, c o n t r a r y t o t h e s e v i e w p o i n t s , o t h e r s have found t h a t
reform improves t h e a u t h o r i t y and power r e l a t i o n s h i p s by allow-
i n g i n n o v a t i v e a d m i n i s t r a t o r s t o come forward (D.
Rothman and S .
Rothman,
1984 :353-60).
Second, c o u r t
involvement
i n s t a t e a f f a i r s imposes
c o s t s on st a t e governmental a g e n c i e s .
onerous f i n a n c i a l
I n some i n s t a n c e s , i n d i r e c t expendi-
t u r e s may be r e q u i r e d t o meet an o b j e c t i v e (e.g.,
-4 7-
p u r c h a s e s of v e h i c l e s t o
I f j u d i c i a l involvement c r e a t e s a l a c k of c o n f i d e n c e
i n t h e f e d e r a l system.
i n s t a t e governmental i n s t i t u t i o n s , t h i s is a more c h r o n i c problem t h a n t h e i m mediate p o l i c y impact of c o u r t d e c i s i o n s on budgets, p e r s o n n e l , o r o p e r a t i o n a l
procedures.
Finally, the belief
i n t h e e f f i c a c y of
l e g a l r e f o r m sometimes l e a d s
c o u r t s t o impose s t a n d a r d s o r procedures on s t a t e p o l i c i e s t h a t a r e w i t h o u t
That i s , f e d e r a l c o u r t s may r e q u i r e h e a r i n g s t o be h e l d on due
substance.
p r o c e s s grounds i n o r d e r t o e n s u r e a f a i r e v a l u a t i o n of t h e e d u c a t i o n a l needs
of handicapped c h i l d r e n o r w e l f a r e r e c i p i e n t s who have had t h e i r p u b l i c a s s i s t a n c e terminated.
Yet, t h e h e a r i n g s may prove t o be empty g e s t u r e s w i t h
no m a t e r i a l improvement i n t h e s e r v i c e s rendered (Kirp and J e n s e n , 1983) b u t
w i t h a d d i t i o n a l c o s t t o t h e s t a t e s i n conducting t h e h e a r i n g s
( F e u r s t and
P e t t y , 19 85).
ASSESSING WHAT I S KNOWN CONCERNING THE CONSEQUENCES OF
FEDERAL COURT DECISIONS
A prominent b e l i e f among l e g a l s c h o l a r s i s t h a t j u d i c i a l involvement i n
s t a t e a f f a i r s i s j u s t i f i e d because c o u r t s a r e b e t t e r equipped t o s o l v e t h e s e
s o r t s of problems t h a n a r e o t h e r governmental bodies and t h a t t h e c o u r t s a r e ,
i n f a c t , r e l a t i v e l y successful.
However, t h e r e is a growing l i t e r a t u r e t h a t
c a l l s these b e l i e f s i n t o question.
C r i t i c s contend t h a t f e d e r a l c o u r t i n t e r -
vent i o n weakens t h e l e g i t i m a c y and a u t h o r i t y of s t a t e o f f i c i a l s , reduces t h e
officials
'
c o n t r o l , imposes u n d e s i r a b l e budgetary r e a l l o c a t i o n s on t h e s t a t e s ,
and produces n e g a t i v e s i d e e f f e c t s e i t h e r through t h e c o u r t s ' f a i l u r e t o und e r s t a n d t h e implementation p r o c e s s o r through t h e c o u r t s ' i l l - c o n c e i v e d
lutions t o ill-defined
problems.
A s s t r o n g a s t h o s e claims a r e ,
so-
they a r e
more u s e f u l , because of c e r t a i n methodological shortcomings, i n r a i s i n g i s s u e s
t h a n i n s e t t l i n g e m p i r i c a l q u e s t i o n s a s t o t h e t r u e consequences of c o u r t dec i s i o n s . An u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e s e d e f i c i e n c i e s w i l l permit f u t u r e r e s e a r c h
t o b u i l d on t h e
ground-breaking
q u e s t i o n of t h e c o u r t s
'
s t u d i e s t h a t have drawn a t t e n t i o n t o t h e
c a p a c i t y and, t h e r e b y , t o c o n t r i b u t e t o a cumulative
body of p r o p o s i t i o n s r e l e v a n t t o t h e debate.
S i x l i m i t a t i o n s i n t h e knowledge base on which t h e c r i t i c i s m s r e s t des e r v e mention.
F i r s t , most of t h e s t u d i e s l a c k c l e a r l y s t a t e d q u e s t i o n s t o
g u i d e i n q u i r y i n t o t h e consequences of j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n s .
of key phases (e. g.
ing.
Clear d e f i n i t i o n s
, " s u c c e s s f u l " and " u n s u c c e s s f u l " i n t e r v e n t i o n ) a r e lack-
Even t h o s e s t u d i e s t h a t adopt more of a n e m p i r i c a l approach a r e ambigu-
-49-
ous as t o what a n a l y s e s of s p e c i f i c c o u r t d e c i s i o n s a r e i n t e n d e d t o r e v e a l .
What a r e we l o o k i n g f o r ?
How do we know when t h e o r g a n i z i n g q u e s t i o n s a r e
answered? G r e a t e r c l a r i f i c a t i o n of what i s meant by c a p a c i t y , and how we can
know i t when we s e e i t , a r e e s s e n t i a l f o r a meaningful dkalogue between a l t e r n a t i v e p e r s p e c t i v e s on t h e c o u r t s .
Second, t h e s t u d i e s g e n e r a l l y f a i l t o e s t a b l i s h a c a u s a l c h a i n between
f e d e r a l c o u r t d e c i s i o n s and t h e a l l e g e d consequences of t h o s e d e c i s i o n s .
At
t h e most b a s i c l e v e l , t h e r e i s l i t t l e s y s t e m a t i c evidence of how t h e components
of an i n d i v i d u a l case--the
p r e t r i a l l i t i g a t i o n , t h e i s s u a n c e of a c o u r t o r d e r ,
and t h e m o n i t o r i n g of a decree--set
minate i n some d i s a s t r o u s outcome.
a sequence of e v e n t s i n motion t h a t c u l There i s no q u e s t i o n t h a t n e g a t i v e outcomes
are c i t e d by t h e c r i t i c s , b u t an e m p i r i c a l account of how t h e d e c i s i o n s and
t h e outcomes a r e l i n k e d i s l e s s w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d .
a r i s e s because of t h e d e s i g n of t h e s t u d i e s :
This g e n e r a l l i m i t a t i o n
The o b j e c t i v e of many of t h e
c r i t i c s i s t o p o i n t o u t d o c t r i n a l weaknesses i n t h e c o u r t s ' d e c i s i o n s .
do n o t p u r p o r t t o have c r a f t e d sound s t u d i e s of d e c i s i o n a l outcomes.
They
T h i s li-
m i t a t i o n must be recognized i n o r d e r t o s o r t out what we know and do n o t know
e m p i r i c a l l y concerning d e c i s i o n a l outcomes.
C h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y , t h e s t u d i e s f a i l t o siphon off t h e e f f e c t s of e x t r a n eous f a c t o r s l i k e l y t o be p r e s e n t a t t h e same time a s t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t i n volvement.
For example, p r o b l e m of a u t h o r i t y and c o n t r o l can a r i s e i n p r i -
s o n s f o r reasons o t h e r t h a n t h e c r e a t i o n of
new r i g h t s .
r i s i n g e x p e c t a t i o n s , a s a p p l i e d by A l p e r t , Crouch, and Huff
I f t h e t h e o r y of
(1984) i s t r u e ,
t h e n one would expect noncourt e f f o r t s t o reform i n s t i t u t i o n s a l s o t o t r i g g e r
a gap between expect a t i o n s and achievement r e s u l t i n g i n problems of p h y s i c a l
v i o l e n c e by inmates a g a i n s t c o r r e c t i o n a l o f f i c e r s and o t h e r inmates.
Because
some evidence p o i n t s t o t h e connection between n o n j u d i c i a l l y i n s p i r e d reform
and d i s t u r b a n c e s , a t l e a s t i n p r i s o n s (Engle and S. Rothman, 1 9 8 3 ) , i t i s nec e s s a r y t o i s o l a t e t h e e f f e c t s of c o u r t o r d e r s from o t h e r f a c t o r s i n o r d e r t o
a t t r i b u t e o b s e r v a b l e outcomes t o t h e former.
This requirement i s g e n e r a l l y
n o t s a t i s f i e d i n t h e l i t e r a t u r e because a comparison i s seldom made between
j u r i s d i c t i o n s where f e d e r a l c o u r t involvement has occurred and o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s where i t has n o t .
The importance of c o n s i d e r i n g a l t e r n a t i v e s o u r c e s of t h e a l l e g e d outcomes
i s heightened because t h e s t u d i e s t e n d t o focus on one c o u r t d e c i s i o n i n a
given substantive policy area.
When t h e range and number of observed d e c i s i o n s
-50-
a r e l i m i t e d , a d e v i a n t c a s e may become magnified o u t of p r o p o r t i o u and t h e
g e n e r a l p a t t e r n obscured.
Moreover, t h i s l i m i t a t i o n is n o t r e s t r i c t e d t o t h e
c o u r t s ' c r i t i c s ; i t a r i s e s a s w e l l i n s t u d i e s t h a t claim t h a t t h e courts perform h e r o i c t a s k s i n a n admirable manner ( s e e e.g.
,
D. Rothman and S. Rothman,
19 84).
The s i n g l e c o u r t approach is r e l a t e d t o a n o t h e r d e f i c i e n c y i n most of
t h e s e studies--the
ance.
minimal use of measurable i n d i c a t o r s of j u d i c i a l perform-
Even i n examinations of s i n g l e d e c i s i o n s i n a n i r d i v i d u a l j u r i s d i c t i o n ,
m u l t i p l e i n d i c e s a r e e s s e n t i a l t o d e t e r m i n e whether t h e p o i n t of
court in-
volvement d i s t i n g u i s h e s t r e n d s i n p o l i c y outcomes. I n many s t u d i e s , a reasoned
argument i s n o t g i v e n a s t o why a g i v e n s e t of d a t a i s used.
Descriptive
f a c t s of some u n d e s i r a b l e behavior o r outcome a r e o f f e r e d a s d i r e c t evidence
of c o u r t i n c a p a c i t y w i t h o u t a n adequate d i s c u s s i o n of what a c t u a l l y i s beirlg
measured.
T h i r d , t h e measurement and c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n of c o s t a p p e a r s t o be n a r rowly r e s t r i c t e d t o t h e d i r e c t budgetary consequences of c o u r t - o r d e r e d r e l i e f
on a g i v e n agency.
I n measuring c o s t , t h e s c o p e of a c t i v i t i e s s h o u l d e x t e n d
beyond t h e r e s o u r c e s consumed by a g i v e n agency i n complying w i t h a s p e c i f i c
court order.
C o s t s may be i n c u r r e d by m u l t i p l e a g e n c i e s and m u l t i p l e l e v e l s
of government.
Consider, f o r example, t h e l i t i g a t i o n brought by s t a t e p r i s o n e r s c h a l l e n g i n g t h e c o n d i t i o n s of t h e i r confinement because t h e c o n d i t i o n s a r e a l legedly unconstitutioual.
There a r e c o n s i d e r a b l e c o s t s i n r e s o l v i n g p r i s o n e r
g r i e v a n c e s i n t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t s d e s p i t e t h e f a c t t h a t v e r d i c t s a r e made i n
t h e p r i s o n e r s ' f a v o r only 1% t o 2% of t h e time.
S t a t e s i n c u r t h e c o s t s of
d e f e n d i n g themselves a s r e f l e c t e d i n t h e time s p e n t by s t a t e a t t o r n e y s g e n e r a l
and c o r r e c t i o n a l o f f i c i a l s i n p r e p a r i n g answers, motions,
interrogatories; attending hearings;
and t r a n s p o r t i n g
and r e s p o n s e s t o
inmates t o h e a r i n g s .
C o s t s a r e a l s o i n c u r r e d by t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t s i n t h e time s p e n t by m a g i s t r a t e s
i n h a n d l i n g p r e t r i a l p r o c e e d i n g s and t h e time s p e n t by judges i n c o n d u c t i n g
t r i a l s and i n h e a r i n g a p p e a l s .
m i l l i o n a n n u a l l y (Hanson,
Because t h e s e s o c i a l c o s t s may r e a c h $100
1986), which is a
s u b s t a n t i a l p r o p o r t i o n of
the
$900 m i l l i o n budget f o r t h e e n t i r e f e d e r a l j u d i c i a r y , t h e d i s c u s s i o r ~of c o s t s
s h o u l d n o t be r e s t r i c t e d t o t h e budgetary impact of
remedial d e c r e e s on a
single institution.
From a c o n c e p t u a l p o i n t of view, budgetary c o s t s f i t very n i c e l y i n t o a
-5 1-
l a r g e body of l i t e r a t u r e on budgeting.
T h i s l i t e r a t u r e g u i d e s t h e c h o i c e of
u n i t s , l e v e l s , and methods of a n a l y s i s used t o e s t i m a t e t h e budgetary consequences of c o u r t o r d e r s (e. g.
, Harriman
and Straussman, 19 83).
However, bud-
g e t i n g i s b e s t viewed a s a h i g h l y v i s i b l e a c t i v i t y of t h e much more g e n e r a l
p r o c e s s of governmental d e c i s i o n making.
It i s i m p o r t a n t , t h e r e f o r e , t o begin
by a s k i n g q u e s t i o n s a b o u t how f e d e r a l j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n s a f f e c t t h e g e n e r a l
s t r u c t u r e and p r o c e s s of s t a t e d e c i s i o n making.
a r e n a i n w h i c h key s t a t e d e c i s i o n s a r e made?
p o s i t i o n of
decision-making bodies?
p l a n n i n g and
forecasting
normally
Does
Do j u d i c i a l o r d e r s a f f e c t t h e
Do t h e y a f f e c t t h e s i z e and comjudicial
associated
with
involvement
affect the
s t a t e d e c i s i o n making?
Viewed i n t h i s c o n t e x t , t h e e f f e c t s of c o u r t o r d e r s on budgets become i n d i c a t o r s of more fundamental changes i n t h e p r o c e s s of
government (Straussman,
19 85).
Broader c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n and measurement of c o s t a r e e s p e c i a l l y r e l e v a n t
i n l i g h t of f e d e r a l i s m ' s v a l u e s .
Given f e d e r a l i s m ' s emphasis on t h e v a l u e of
k e e p i n g government c l o s e t o t h e p e o p l e , one concern is whether c o u r t o r d e r s
produce changes i n t h e p r o c e s s of governmental d e c i s i o n making, i n c l u d i n g budg e t i n g , t h a t a f f e c t c i t i z e n d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h government.
Do t h e s e changes
c a u s e i n d i v i d u a l s t o view s t a t e and l o c a l government a f f a i r s a s being beyond
t h e i r c o n t r o l a s v o t e r s o r worse, i r r e l e v a n t ?
with court orders,
Do f i n a n c i a l burdens a s s o c i a t e d
o v e r which t h e v o t e r s have no c o n t r o l , l e a d c i t i z e n s t o
b e l i e v e t h a t government i s u n a c c o u n t a b l e ?
F o u r t h , d e s p i t e t h e r e l e v a n c y of f e d e r a l i s m t o t h e c o u r t s 1 c r i t i c s , t h e
v a l u e s of
f e d e r a l i s m appear t o
be
outside the
scope
Questions of i n n o v a t i o n , d i v e r s i t y , and self-government
of t h e c r i t i c s ' a s s e s s m e n t s of t h e consequences of
of
their
analyses.
t e n d n o t t o be p a r t
judicial decisions.
At
l e a s t i n some s u b s t a n t i v e i s s u e a r e a s , c o u r t d e c i s i o n s may very w e l l impede
o r prompt t h e s t a t e s ' c h a r t i n g new c o u r s e s of a c t i o n .
For example, i n t h e
a r e a of w e l f a r e , f e d e r a l c o u r t d e c i s i o n s expanding t h e r i g h t s of w e l f a r e r e c i p i e n t s have i n h i b i t e d t h e development of new p r i n c i p l e s of w e l f a r e administ r a t i o n (Williams, P r i c e , Hanson, 1981).
Hence, t h e s e a r c h f o r t h e d e c i s i o n a l
consequences s h o u l d e x t e n d beyond c o s t and c o n t r o l .
F i f t h , t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n p r o c e s s and what i n t e r e s t s a r e r e p r e s e n t e d a r e
n o t s u f f i c i e n t l y a d d r e s s e d i n t h e a n a l y s i s of p u b l i c law l i t i g a t i o n .
" m u l t i p o l a r i t y " h a s been i d e n t i f i e d a s a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of
Although
such l i t i g a t i o n
(Chayes, l 9 7 6 ) , i n s u f f i c i e n t a t t e n t i o n h a s been p a i d t o t h e d i v e r g e n t i n t e r -52-
ests r e p r e s e n t e d by v a r i o u s p l a i n t i f f s ( b u t s e e , B e l l , 1976).
An i s s u e a l m o s t
t o t a l l y overlooked h a s been t h e p r o c e s s and q u a l i t y of t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of
defendants' i n t e r e s t s .
I n many i n s t a n c e s t h e lawyers r e p r e s e n t i n g d e f e n d a n t s
have i n c e n t i v e s q u i t e d i f f e r e n t from t h e s t a t e i n s t i t u t i o n a l o f f i c i a l s whose
a c t i o n s a r e being c o n t e s t e d .
t i o n h a s been
I n a d d i t i o n , t h e uneven q u a l i t y of r e p r e s e n t a -
c i t e d a s a r e a s o n why s t a t e s f a i l t o p r e v a i l i n l i t i g a t i o n
b e f o r e t h e Supreme Court (O'Connor,
1983).
S i x t h , t h e r e i s l i m i t e d knowledge on how t h e c o u r t s have gone about exercising t h e i r capacities.
The absence of comparative c o u r t s t u d i e s i n a g i v -
e n p o l i c y a r e a means t h e r e a r e l i m i t e d d a t a on outcomes and t h a t t h e e f f e c t s
of v a r i a t i o n s i n t h e methods used by t h e c o u r t s t o a c h i e v e t h e s e outcomes r e main unknown.
For example, t h e use of m a s t e r s i n m o n i t o r i n g c o u r t o r d e r s i s
d e s c r i b e d by t h e c r i t i c s a s a t h r e a t t o t h e c o u r t s ' independence and s h o u l d
n o t be encouraged (Horowitz, 1977).
t e r s c o u l d improve t h e c o u r t s '
T h i s c r i t i c i s m i m p l i c i t l y s a y s t h a t mas-
capacity
if
t h e y were
organized properly.
Because t h e r e a r e d i f f e r e n t s t y l e s of m o n i t o r i n g (Kalodner and Fishman, 1978;
Kirp and Babcock,
1981a), d i f f e r e n t s t y l e s ought t o be matched w i t h t h e i r
r e s p e c t i v e outcomes t o determine i f some ways of monitoring p r o v i d e t h e c o u r t
with desired information b e t t e r than others.
A PLAN FOR FUTURE POLICY RESEARCH
There a r e s e v e r a l q u e s t i o n s t h a t r e v o l v e around t h e b a s i c r e s e a r c h i s s u e
of whether t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t s have t h e c a p a c i t y t o make d e c i s i o n s t h a t d i r e c t l y
c a u s e b e h a v i o r a l changes c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e p o l i c y sought by t h e c o u r t .
t h e c o u r t s ' d e s i r e d o b j e c t i v e s met?
A t what expense t o t h e s t a t e s ?
Are
Have t h e
r e s t r i c t i o n s i n s t a t e a u t h o r i t y r e s u l t e d i n u n d e s i r a b l e consequences?
Gaps i n t h e knowledge concerning answers t o t h e s e q u e s t i o n s j u s t i f y
a
s e a r c h f o r more p r e c i s e e s t i m a t e s of how w e l l t h e c o u r t s have f a r e d i n s h a p i n g
s t a t e public policy.
More needs t o be known about t h e consequences of c o u r t
d e c i s i o n s i n o r d e r t o gauge t h e c o u r t s ' c a p a c i t y more completely and c o r r e c t l y .
For t h i s r e a s o n , t h e f o l l o w i n g s i x f o l d scheme, which b u i l d s on p r i o r r e s e a r c h ,
i s proposed t o a d d r e s s t h e unanswered q u e s t i o n s :
1.
P o l i c y s t u d i e s s h o u l d be undertaken i n s u b s t a n t i v e s t a t e and l o c a l
i s s u e a r e a s where t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t s s e e k t o impose e i t h e r a f f i r m a t i v e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y based o b l i g a t i o n s o r t h e n e g a t i o n of s p e c i f i c
s t a t e actions.
2.
The p o l i c y s t u d i e s should be organized around a c o r e s e t of q u e s t i o n s
s u r r o u n d i n g t h e e f f e c t s of c o u r t d e c i s i o n s on f e d e r a l i s m i n c l u d i n g
t h e impact on s t a t e a u t h o r i t y , governmental p r o c e s s e s , p o l i c y benef i t s and c o s t s , and p o l i c y i n n o v a t i o n .
3.
The p o l i c y s t u d i e s should examine t h e e f f e c t s of t h e m u l t i p a r t y
n a t u r e of t h e l i t i g a t i o n on t h e development of t h e l e g a l and f a c t u a l
bases f o r l i a b i l i t y .
4.
The p o l i c y s t u d i e s should d e s c r i b e t h e p r o c e s s e s through which t h e
c o u r t s have g a t h e r e d and analyzed i n £ ormation (e. g., s p e c i a l m a s t e r s ,
m o n i t o r s ) concerning t h e d e s i g n and implementation of r e l i e f .
5.
The r a t i o n a l e f o r s e l e c t i n g s u b s t a n t i v e i s s u e s a r e a s and t h e f o r m l a t i o n of o r g a n i z i n g q u e s t i o n s s h o u l d r e f l e c t t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l framework of f e d e r a l i s m and i t s v a l u e s .
6.
The methodology used t o conduct t h e p o l i c y s t u d i e s s h o u l d be approp r i a t e t o t h e state-of-the-knowledge
i n each i s s u e a r e a and t h e
f e a s i b i l i t y of making q u a n t i t a t i v e assessments.
S e l e c t i o n of S u b s t a n t i v e I s s u e s Areas.
A c r i t i c a l r e s e a r c h t a s k is t h e
choice of s e t t i n g s f o r t h e s t u d y of t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t s ' impact on s t a t e p o l i c y .
Because t h e number of p o s s i b l e i s s u e a r e a s from which t o choose i s l a r g e and
t h e amount of t i m e and r e s o u r c e s w i t h which t o conduct t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n s i s
l l m i t e d , t h e s e l e c t i o n p r o c e s s should be on a s y s t e m a t i c b a s i s .
I n f o r m u l a t i n g s e l e c t i o n c r i t e r i a , c o n s i d e r a t i o n s h o u l d be g i v e n t o b o t h
t h e i n h e r e n t f e a t u r e s of f e d e r a l i s m and r e s e a r c h f e a s i b i l i t y .
It i s a p p r o p r i -
a t e t o s e l e c t i s s u e a r e a s t h a t a c c e n t u a t e t h e values of f e d e r a l i s m .
This w i l l
f a c i l i t a t e t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e consequences i n a manner t h a t i s meaningf u l f o r understanding the s t a t e s
'
p o s i t i o n i n t h e f e d e r a l system,
although
t h i s c o n s i d e r a t i o n does not a u t o m a t i c a l l y imply t h a t f e d e r a l c o u r t involvement
i n such a r e a s i s w i t h o u t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l foundation.
One of t h e v a l u e s of f e d e r a l i s m t h a t i s e s p e c i a l l y p e r t i n e n t i s t h e c l o s e
correspondence between p u b l i c p o l i c i e s and c i t i z e n s
'
preferences.
The argu-
ment i s t h a t f e d e r a l i s m c r e a t e s g r e a t e r harmony between p o l i c i e s and c i t i z e n s '
p r e f e r e n c e s when views and i n t e r e s t s vary on r e g i o n a l and s t a t e bases.
The
s i g n i f i c a n c e of t h i s v a l u e i s brought o u t i n a r e c e n t a n a l y s i s on t h e b a s i c
" v i r t u e " of t h e n a t i o n a l government and s t a t e governments; t h e v i r t u e of t h e
former i s u n i f o r m i t y and t h e l a t t e r ' s v i r t u e i s d i v e r s i t y (Wildavsky, 1981).
D i v e r s i t y a s a v i r t u e , i t i s p o s i t e d , a r i s e s because i n d i v i d u a l s i n d i f f e r e n t
s t a t e s have d i f f e r e n t views and t h e s e views a r e r e p r e s e n t e d i n each s t a t e ' s
respective policy arena.
The f e d e r a l c o u r t s
-54-
'
involvement may be s e e n a s a n
a t t e m p t t o a c h i e v e u n i f o r m i t y through t h e i m p o s i t i o n of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s t a n d a r d s and,
consequently, t o c l a s h fundamentally with a b a s i c r a t i o n a l e f o r
p r e s e r v i n g t h e s t a t e s ' p o s i t i o n i n t h e f e d e r a l system.
The above s u g g e s t s t h a t i s s u e a r e a s be s e l e c t e d f o q a n a l y s i s where i t
most r e a s o n a b l y can be assumed t h a t t h e p o l i c i e s p r i o r t o c o u r t i n t e r v e n t i o n
were, i n f a c t ,
close t o citizens'
preferences.
According t o t h e o r i e s
of
p u b l i c c h o i c e , c l o s e correspondence i s f o s t e r e d when c i t i z e n s make d e c i s i o n s
on where t o l o c a t e g e o g r a p h i c a l l y i n o r d e r t o a c h i e v e t h e most d e s i r e d comb i n a t i o n of
have been
governmental s e r v i c e s ( T i e b o u t ,
a determinant
of
locational
1956).
One a r e a t h a t seems t o
choices is public education.
The
neighborhood s c h o o l h a s l o n g been a key f a c t o r i n s h a p i n g where pe6ple r e s i d e ,
a t l e a s t w i t h i n t h e d e g r e e of freedom p e r m i t t e d by t h e a v a i l a b i l i t y of employment and t h e i r own r e s o u r c e c a p a c i t i e s .
For t h i s r e a s o n ,
i n e s t a b l i s h i n g s t a n d a r d s f o r p u p i l placement
c o u r t involvement
is a r e l e v a n t i s s u e f o r t h e
s t u d y of f e d e r a l i s m and t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t s .
C i t i z e n s a l s o s e e k a h i g h d e g r e e of correspondence between t h e i r p r e f e r e n c e s and noneconomic p o l i c i e s .
S o c i a l norms, r e l i g i o u s views, and l i f e s t y l e s
shape c i t i z e n s ' p r e f e r e n c e s f o r t h e c o n t e n t of many p u b l i c p o l i c i e s .
Theories
of p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e ( E l a z a r , 1972: 82-126) s u g g e s t t h a t t h e r e a r e r e g i o n a l and
s t a t e v a r i a t i o n s i n b a s i c p e r s p e c t i v e s on what s t a t e government s h o u l d regul a t e and n o t r e g u l a t e , what s e r v i c e s they s h o u l d p r o v i d e , and how p u b l i c goods
and s e r v i c e s s h o u l d be f i n a n c e d .
Consequently, i t i s a p p r o p r i a t e t o c o n s i d e r
f e d e r a l c o u r t involvement i n a n i s s u e a r e a where s o c i a l v a l u e s a r e t h e c o n t e n t
of s t a t e p u b l i c p o l i c y .
For t h i s r e a s o n , i t i s a p p r o p r i a t e t o examine j u d i c i a l
d e c i s i o n s a f f e c t i n g t h e u s e of
public resources f o r religiously
supported
schools.
Another i m p o r t a n t v a l u e i s t h a t f e d e r a l i s m enhances t h e e f f e c t i v e n e s s of
p u b l i c p o l i c y because c e r t a i n p o l i c i e s r e q u i r e t h a t d e c i s i o n makers be i n a
proximate p o s i t i o n t o l o c a l c o n d i t i o n s i n o r d e r t o make t h e most a p p r o p r i a t e
choices.
P u b l i c p o l i c i e s i n v o l v i n g t h e maintenance of s e c u r i t y and o r d e r , i t
can be argued, r e q u i r e t h a t d i s c r e t i o n be p l a c e d i n t h e hands of i n d i v i d u a l s
who can o b s e r v e when s e c u r i t y and o r d e r a r e t h r e a t e n e d ,
Whereas p o l i c i e s t h a t
a l l o c a t e s e r v i c e s t h a t make l i f e more p l e a s a n t (e.g.,
support f o r t h e a r t s )
may permit o f f i c i a l s who a r e removed from t h e l o c a l s c e n e t o review d a i l y decisions, public safety
r e q u i r e s t h a t a u t h o r i t y be l o c a t e d where p o t e n t i a l
problems f o r s e c u r i t y and o r d e r a r i s e .
-55-
For t h i s reason, t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t s '
.
involvement i n
establishing
standards
for
the
operation
of
correctional
systems and t h e c r i m i n a l j u s t i c e p r o c e s s a r e two r e l e v a n t p o l i c y a r e a s f o r
study.
A d d i t i o n a l l y , a l t h o u g h mental h e a l t h f a c i l i t i e s a r e i n t e n d e d t o o f f e r
t r e a t m e n t and r e l i e v e i n d i v i d u a l s of mental s u f f e r i n g and a n g u i s h , t h e s e n s i t i v e n a t u r e of t h e p a t i e n t s r e q u i r e s l o c a l d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g autonomy.
Conse-
q u e n t l y , i t i s a l s o i n c l u d e d i n t h e l i s t of p o t e n t i a l i s s u e a r e a s f o r s t u d y .
A t h i r d v a l u e of f e d e r a l i s m i s t h a t i t promotes p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n ,
a s e n s e of community, a n informed c i t i z e n r y , and u l t i m a t e l y , more a c c o u n t a b l e
government.
A s a r e s u l t , t h e c o n t r o l and d e s i g n of
channels through which
c i t i z e n s e x p r e s s t h e i r p r e f e r e n c e s and how t h e i r v o t e s a r e t r a n s l a t e d i n t o t h e
s e l e c t i o n of s t a t e o f f i c i a l s a r e of c e n t r a l importance.
C i t i z e n s presumably
s e e k t o m a i n t a i n v o t i n g mechanisms t h a t a r e i n accordance w i t h how t h e y want
t h e i r views r e p r e s e n t e d .
Although t h e r e a r e many t h e o r i e s of p o l i t i c a l r e p r e -
s e n t a t i o n , t h e apportionment of l e g i s l a t i v e s e a t s i s p a r t of most c o n c e p t u a l i zations.
For t h i s r e a s o n ,
f e d e r a l c o u r t involvement
i n reapportioning the
d i s t r i b u t i o n of s t a t e l e g i s l a t i v e and c o n g r e s s i o n a l s e a t s i s a r e l e v a n t a r e a
t o study.
Thus, a t l e a s t s i x i s s u e a r e a s a r e d i r e c t l y r e l e v a n t t o t h e c e n t r a l r e s e a r c h problem of t h i s p r o j e c t .
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
They a r e :
p u b l i c a s s i s t a n c e t o r e l i g i o u s l y supported schools
criminal defense procedures,
l e g i s l a t i v e apportionment,
mental h e a l t h c a r e and f a c i l i t i e s ,
p u b l i c s c h o o l p u p i l placement, and
s t a t e c o r r e c t i o n a l systems.
These a r e a s have c e r t a i n advantages from a r e s e a r c h p e r s p e c t i v e .
A suf-
f i c i e n t amount of t i m e h a s e l a p s e d s i n c e t h e i n i t i a l j u d i c i a l involvement t o o k
place.
T h i s means t h a t each t o p i c can now be viewed i n p e r s p e c t i v e r a t h e r
t h a n examining a c o n t i n u o u s l y changing p r o c e s s .
Moreover,
during the t i m e
s i n c e t h e i n i t i a l j u d i c i a l i n t e r v e n t i o n i n each a r e a , t h e r e have been e m p i r i c a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n s conducted, which means t h a t p e r t i n e n t d a t a a r e a v a i l a b l e ,
a body of l i t e r a t u r e e x i s t s , and some b a s i c q u e s t i o n s have a l r e a d y been explored.
A s a r e s u l t , t h i s p r o j e c t can b u i l d on t h e work of o t h e r s and d e v o t e
a t t e n t i o n t o t h e s p e c i f i c q u e s t i o n s of f e d e r a l i s m and t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t s . 4-1
Organizing Questions.
The v a l u e s
of
federalism a l s o play
a
role i n
s h a p i n g t h e q u e s t i o n s around which t h e proposed p o l i c y s t u d i e s a r e organized.
A critical
value is
the
opportunity f o r policy experimentation with
- 56-
the
s t a t e s a s "laboratories."
Consequently, i t i s important t o a s k whether t h e
i m p o s i t i o n of j u d i c i a l s t a n d a r d s i n h i b i t o r f o s t e r p o l i c y i n n o v a t i o n s .
Are
s t a t e p o l i c y makers less w i l l i n g t o t r y new p r a c t i c e s because t h e y b e l i e v e
t h a t procedures e i t h e r w i l l f a l l s h o r t of
opinions?
o r be i n c o n f l i c t w i t h j u d i c i a l
O r does t h e i n t e r v e n t i o n by c o u r t s a l l o w i n n o v a t i v e a d m i n i s t r a t o r s
t o come forward i n s t e a d of remaining i n t h e shadows of e n t r e n c h e d and more
t r a d i t i o n a l personnel ?
The v a l u e s
of
f e d e r a l i s m and t h e
contending views
on t h e e f f e c t s
of
f e d e r a l c o u r t involvement p r o v i d e a f u l l agenda of q u e s t i o n s t o be a d d r e s s e d
i n each i s s u e a r e a .
Hence, t h e f o l l o w i n g c o r e s e t of q u e s t i o n s i s proposed:
1.
What l e g a l and p o l i c y arguments a r e p r e s e n t e d by t h e v a r i o u s p a r t i e s ?
2.
What s o r t of j u s t i f i c a t i o n do t h e c o u r t s o f f e r f o r t h e i r d e c i s i o n s ,
i n c l u d i n g both t h e f i n d i n g of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l v i o l a t i o n s and t h e
p r o m l g a t i o n of r e l i e f ?
3.
By what p r o c e s s do t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t s s e e k t o d e s i g n and implement
relief?
What r o l e do a d j u n c t o f f i c i a l s such a s m a s t e r s p l a y ? Does
t h i s e x t r a j u d i c i a l e f f o r t encourage o r d i s c o u r a g e s u c c e s s f u l implementation?
4.
What a r e t h e consequences of c o u r t imposed s t a n d a r d s on t h e a u t h o r i t y
of s t a t e o f f i c i a l s ? How does t h i s a f f e c t t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i t h
o t h e r s a a t e o f f i c i a l s , d i r e c t r e c i p i e n t s of s t a t e s e r v i c e s , and t h e
general public?
Are t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p s marked by g r e a t e r c o n f l i c t
o r g r e a t e r cooperation?
5.
What changes i n t h e p r o c e s s of s t a t e governmental d e c i s i o n making
o c c u r when t h e c o u r t s impose s t a n d a r d s ? What budgetary changes a r e
a s s o c i a t e d with executing court o r d e r s ?
6.
Are t h e o s t e n s i b l e o b j e c t i v e s of c o u r t i n t e r v e n t i o n a c h i e v e d ? To
what d e g r e e ? Do o b j e c t i v e s changes over t i m e ? What b e n e f i t s a r e
a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e s e o b j e c t i v e s ? Who r e c e i v e s t h e s e benef i t s ? 5/
7.
Does j u d i c i a l i n t e r v e n t i o n a f f e c t t h e confidence t h a t c i t i z e n s have
i n s t a t e government and i t s i n s t i t u t i o n s ?
8.
Does t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t involvement have any e f f e c t on t h e w i l l i n g n e s s
of s t a t e o f f i c i a l s t o t r y new i d e a s and implement new programs?
Methodology.
There i s no s i n g l e methodology t h a t t h e p o l i c y s t u d i e s must
f o l l o w because r e s e a r c h i n some a r e a s r e q u i r e s more o r i g i n a l d a t a c o l l e c t i o n
and a n a l y s i s and i n o t h e r a r e a s t h e r e is a c a l l f o r more review and a s y n t h e -
s i s of
existing studies.
However,
a l l of
t h e policy s t u d i e s w i l l seek t o
i s o l a t e t h e e f f e c t s of j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n s from o t h e r f a c t o r s , t o e v a l u a t e t h e
-57-
i n t e r a c t i o n between j u d i c i a l
involvement and t h e s e o t h e r f a c t o r s ,
m u l t i p l e i n d i c a t o r s t o measurable v a r i a b l e s p e r t i n e n t
t o apply
t o each p o l i c y a r e a ,
and t o compare s t a t e s where involvement h a s o c c u r r e d and where i t h a s n o t
occurred.
Furthermore,
e v e r y p o l i c y s t u d y w i l l p r o v i d e a s h o r t h i s t o r y of
However, t h e p o l i c y s t u d i e s w i l l n o t
t h e c o u r t c a s e s under i n v e s t i g a t i o n .
a t t e m p t t o p r o v i d e d e t a i l e d n a r r a t i v e a c c o u n t s of t h e l i t i g a t i o n i n t h e s t y l e
of t r a d i t i o n a l c a s e s t u d i e s .
The b a s i c a n a l y t i c a l framework f o r t h e p o l i c y s t u d i e s i s t h e q u a s i - e x p e r i m e n t a l d e s i g n (Campbell and S t a n l e y , 1963).
For t h i s p r o j e c t , a c o u r t ' s de-
c i s i o n and subsequent involvement i n s t a t e a f f a i r s c o n s t i t u t e t h e " t r e a t m e n t . "
S t a t e s e x p e r i e n c i n g such t r e a t m e n t a r e t h e e x p e r i m e n t a l group, and s t a t e s o r
communities w i t h i n s t a t e s t h a t have not r e c e i v e d t h e t r e a t m e n t a r e t h e compari s o n group.
To t h e g r e a t e s t e x t e n t p o s s i b l e , e v e r y p o l i c y s t u d y w i l l document
the longitudinal
changes
i n indicators
of
relevant
positive
and n e g a t i v e
consequences i n j u r i s d i c t i o n s where j u d i c i a l involvement h a s o c c u r r e d and t h e
cross-sectional differences
between
the
experimental
and
the
comparison
E x p l i c i t performance measures w i l l not be a p p l i e d t o t h e d e c i s i o n a l
groups.
outcomes of
agencies.
s t a t e and l o c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s such a s l e g i s l a t u r e s and e x e c u t i v e
However, t h e quasi-experimental
research designs guiding the poli-
cy s t u d i e s w i l l t r e a t t h e outcomes of o t h e r i n s t i t u t i o n s a s e x t r a n e o u s v a r i ables.
I f t h e e f f e c t s of t h e s e e x t r a n e o u s f a c t o r s a r e s c r e e n e d o u t from b o t h
t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n s where j u d i c i a l involvement h a s occurred and h a s n o t occurr e d , t h e observed consequences
can t h e n be a t t r i b u t e d t o t h e c o u r t s .
i n t e r a c t i v e e f f e c t s p r e s e n t may be s c r u t i n i z e d .
Hence,
w i l l o f f e r a t e s t of
judicial
t h e independent
effects
of
Any
the policy studies
d e c i s i o n s on t h e
s t a t e s as w e l l a s o f f e r i n g i n s i g h t on how c o u r t i n t e r v e n t i o n i n t e r a c t s with
other factors.
Each s t u d y w i l l f o c u s on a l i m i t e d number of c o u r t d e c i s i o n s i n o r d e r t o
c a p t u r e t h e n e c e s s a r y l e v e l of d e t a i l .
The e x a c t c o n f i g u r a t i o n of c o u r t de-
c i s i o n s and t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g comparisons may vary.
One approach r e l e v a n t t o
t h e i s s u e s of p r i s o n s , mental h e a l t h f a c i l i t i e s and t h e p u b l i c s c h o o l s i s t o
f o c u s on t h r e e f e d e r a l d i s t r i c t c o u r t d e c i s i o n s .
I n t h i s context, i n order
t o gauge j u d i c i a l i m p a c t , t h r e e s t a t e s o r communities might he analyzed i n t e n s i v e l y and t h e i n d i c a t o r s of c o u r t performance compared w i t h t h e same i n d i c a t o r s a p p l i e d t o t h r e e s t a t e s t h a t were n o t s u b j e c t t o c o u r t Involvement.
Another format may be t o c o n s i d e r changes Ln r e l e v a n t i n d i c a t o r s i n spe-58-
c i f i c s t a t e s b e f o r e and a f t e r a Supreme Court d e c i s i o n .
T h i s may be most
s u i t a b l e i n t h e a r e a s of c r i m i n a l d e f e n s e p r o c e d u r e s and l e g i s l a t i v e apportionment.
A t h i r d approach i s t o examine t h e r o l e and impact of t h e Supreme C o u r t ,
a C i r c u i t Court of Appeals, and f e d e r a l d i s t r i c t c o u r t s i n t h e c o n t e x t of a
p a r t i c u l a r i s s u e area.
T h i s s t r a t e g y h a s t h e advantage of i l l u m i n a t i n g how
each t y p e of c o u r t i n f l u e n c e s s t a t e p o l i c y (Combs, l 9 8 4 ) , a l t h o u g h l o n g i t u d i nal o r cross-sectional
comparisons w i t h j u r i s d i c t i o n s t h a t have e x p e r i e n c e d
no involvement remain n e c e s s a r y t o i s o l a t e t h e e f f e c t s of j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n .
The e f f o r t s t o s y n t h e s i z e e x i s t i n g s t u d i e s w i l l t a k e t h e s e t h r e e approaches i n t o account i n d e t e r m i n i n g t h e v a l i d i t y of v a r i o u s c l a i m s found i n
the literature.
The reviews w i l l do more t h a n r e p o r t on what p r i o r s t u d i e s
have p u r p o r t e d t o have found.
Previous s t u d i e s w i l l be s u b j e c t t o a c r i t i c a l
a n a l y s i s i n which t h e l o g i c of c a u s a l i n f e r e n c e s i s s c r u t i n i z e d i n o r d e r t o
p r e s e n t a p i c t u r e of what p r o p o s i t i o n s have v a l i d i t y .
Management Plan.
S c h o l a r s w i l l be r e c r u i t e d by t h e Commission t o under-
take the s p e c i f i c policy studies.
D i f f e r e n t groups of s c h o l a r s w i l l be s e -
l e c t e d f o r t h e i r competency i n a g i v e n s u b s t a n t i v e a r e a , i n c l u d i n g a n unders t a n d i n g of
f e d e r a l c o u r t involvement.
F a m i l a r i t y with t h e s u b j e c t matter
w i l l permit t h e r e s e a r c h teams t o begin work on s c h e d u l e and t o a v o i d s p e n d i n g
time on background r e s e a r c h . 6-1
It i s a n t i c i p a t e d t h a t t h e p o l i c y
studies
w i l l , on a v e r a g e , have t h e e q u i v a l e n t of two s c h o l a r s and two r e s e a r c h a s s i s t a n t s working h a l f - t i m e
o v e r a 12-month p e r i o d .
R e p o r t s w i l l be p r e p a r e d by
e a c h group of s c h o l a r s and a l l of t h e volumes w i l l be e d i t e d by t h e Commiss i o n ' s s t a f f members.
Commission s t a f f members, w i t h t h e a s s i s t a n c e of J u s t i c e Resources, w i l l
manage t h e s e l e c t i o n of t h e s c h o l a r s , t h e conduct of t h e i n q u i r y , t h e p r e p a r a t i o n of
policy
study
reports,
and
the
editing
of
the
final
volumes.
The Commission s t a f f members and J u s t i c e Resources w i l l r e c e i v e e x p e r t
h e l p from d i s t i n g u i s h e d l e g a l p o l i c y s c h o l a r s .
These i n d i v i d u a l s have been
o r g a n i z e d i n t o a p r o j e c t a d v i s o r y b o a r d , which w i l l meet t o review w r i t t e n
work p r o d u c t s , t o o f f e r s p e c i f i c a d v i c e on t e c h n i c a l m a t t e r s , and t o a s s e s s
t h e q u a l i t y of t h e e m p i r i c a l p o l i c y and t h e normative s t u d i e s .
composed of t h e f o l l o w i n g i n d i v i d u a l s :
Abram Chayes , Har vard
George C o l e , C o n n e c t i c u t
Robert Nagel, Colorado
Susan Olson, Utah
The board i s
Malcolm F e e l e y , Berkeley
Donald Horowitz , Duke
A. E. Dick Howard, V i r g i n i a
David K i r p , B e r k e l e y
Samuel K r i s l o v , Minnesota
Gary McDowell , Tulane
Vincent Ostrom, I n d i a n a
Harry S c h e i b e r , Berkeley
S t u a r t Scheingold, Washington
J e f f r e y Straussman, Syracuse
R u s s e l l Wheeler, Fefleral
J u d i c i a l Center
I n a d d i t i o n , t h e Commission s t a f f w i l l hold, p e r i o d i c b r i e f i n g s e s s i o n s
w i t h p o l i c y makers, p u b l i c i n t e r e s t group r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , and f e d e r a l judges
t o a p p r i s e them of t h e work i n p r o g r e s s .
individuals t o
suggest
ways
of
The s e s s i o n s w i l l a l s o a l l o w t h e s e
improving
the
quality
Proposed P r o j e c t Time Table and Work Products.
of
the
The p o l i c y
project.
studies a r e
e x p e c t e d t o begin i n March 1986, and a l l f i n a l r e p o r t s w i l l be s u b m i t t e d t o
t h e Commission by A p r i l 1987.
The Commission's s t a f f w i l l e d i t t h e s e s e p a r a t e
volumes which w i l l be p u b l i s h e d under t h e a e g i s of t h e Commission.
The Com-
m i s s i o n s t a f f w i l l t h e n p r e p a r e a summary volume t h a t combines t h e e s s e n t i a l
i d e a s from t h i s
framework paper t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e f i n d i n g s
s t u d i e s and t h e normative a n a l y s e s .
appropriate
in
D i s s e m i n a t i o n of t h e p r o j e c t ' s
the policy
T h i s document w i l l then be s u b m i t t e d t o
t h e Commission f o r review and comment.
recommendations a r e
of
The Commission w i l l determine what
light
of
the
project's
conclusions.
i n t e r i m and f i n a l work p r o d u c t s w i l l be
d i r e c t e d toward a broad audience of p o l i c y makers, judges, s c h o l a r s and c i t i zens.
To t h e e x t e n t r e s o u r c e s p e r m i t , t h e Commission w i l l p u b l i s h and make
a v a i l a b l e monographs on t h e s e p a r a t e p o l i c y s t u d i e s and t h e s y n t h e s i z i n g v o l ume.
Conference proceedings on t h e p o l i c y s t u d y t o p i c s w i l l a l s o be p r i n t e d
and d i s t r i b u t e d t o l a r g e number of i n d i v i d u a l s and o r g a n i z a t i o n s t h a t r e g u l a r l y r e c e i v e t h e Commission's p u b l i c a t i o n s .
C o l l a b o r a t i v e e f f o r t s w i l l be made
w i t h o r g a n i z a t i o n s such a s t h e American P o l i t i c a l Science A s s o c i a t i o n and t h e
American H i s t o r i c a l A s s o c i a t i o n t o r e a c h p r e c o l l e g i a t e and c o l l e g e e d u c a t o r s
w i t h a p p r o p r i a t e v e r s i o n s of t h e s t u d y ' s b a s i c f i n d i n g s .
FOOTNOTES
11
-
S c h o l a r s have p o i n t e d o u t t h a t t h e r e a r e methodological shortcomings t o
t h e r e s e a r c h t h a t concludes t h e r e a r e s e r i o u s n e g a t i v e consequences assoc i a t e d w i t h j u d i c i a l involvement i n s t a t e p u b l i c p o l i c y ( s e e e. g. , Z i m r i n g and Solomon, 1985). These same l i m i t a t i o n s , however, a r e e x t a n t i n
t h e r e s e a r c h t h a t claims j u d i c i a l involvement produces p o s i t i v e consequences. These d e f i c i e n c i e s a r e i l l u s t r a t e d i n a n i s s u e a r e a where
s o c i a l r e s e a r c h h a s been e x t e n s i v e but t h e b e n e f i t s of j u d i c i a l i n v o l v e ment remain ambiguous. For example, i n a r e c e n t review of t h e l i t e r a t u r e
on s c h o o l d e s e g r e g a t i o n , Hochschild (1984) o b s e r v e s t h a t t h e r e a r e numerous s t u d i e s t h a t p o i n t t o t h e p o s i t i v e e f f e c t s of d e s e g r e g a t i o n and f i n d
minimal n e g a t i v e consequences. These s t u d i e s , however, do n o t d i s t i n g u i s h
between t h o s e i n s t a n c e s of d e s e g r e g a t i o n brought about through j u d i c i a l
d e c r e e a s opposed t o o t h e r methods. Hochschild concludes t h a t i t is d i f f i c u l t t o a t t r i b u t e any p o s i t i v e b e n e f i t s found i n t h e s e s t u d i e s s p e c i f i c a l l y t o j u d i c i a l l y mandated d e s e g r e g a t i o n r a t h e r t h a n d e s e g r e g a t i o n produced by t h e a c t i o n s of l o c a l s c h o o l boards o r e x e c u t i v e a g e n c i e s .
She
a l s o n o t e s t h e r e a r e no s t u d i e s t h a t demonstrate t h a t c o u r t s have p e r f o r med b e t t e r t h a n o t h e r i n s t i t u t i o n s .
Thus, t h e r e is a need f o r f n r t h e r
r e s e a r c h t o f o c u s on both t h e c o s t s and b e n e f i t s of j u d i c i a l involvement.
-2/
Some w r i t e r s s h a r p l y c o n t e s t t h e a l l e g a t i o n t h a t judges a r e i n a d e q u a t e
problem s o l v e r s and t h a t t h e i r approach t o problem s o l v i n g i s d e f i c i e n t ,
see Youngblood and F o l s e , 1981 and Wasby, 1981. The disagreement s u r rounding t h e c a p a c i t y of judges c a l l s f o r t h e f o r m u l a t i o n and t e s t i n g of
propositions i n order t o resolve t h i s controversy.
3/
-
The i d e a s e x p r e s s e d i n t h e s e t h r e e a r e a s a r e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of t h e broade r spectrum of c r i t i c i s m s voiced i n o t h e r a r e a s such a s , l e g i s l a t i v e apportionment, criminal defense r i g h t s , p o l i c e p r a c t i c e s , public, housing,
e t c . However, i n l i m i t i n g t h e scope of t h e examples, t h e g e n e r a l n a t u r e
of u n d e s i r a b l e consequences i s h i g h l i g h t e d r a t h e r t h a n t h e s u b s t a n t i v e
c o n t e n t of p a r t i c u l a r complaints t h a t a r i s e i n i n d i v i d u a l p o l i c y a r e a s .
4/
-
An omission from t h i s l i s t of i s s u e a r e a s f o r s t u d y i s wage and hour
s t a n d a r d s f o r p u b l i c employees, s u b j e c t of t h e r e c e n t Garcia d e c i s i o n .
T h i s a r e a was not i n c l u d e d among t h e e m p i r i c a l s t u d i e s because i n s u f f i c i e n t t i m e has e l a p s e d s i n c e t h e d e c i s i o n t o make a thorough i n v e s t i g a t i o n
possible.
However, t h e t h e o r e t i c a l i s s u e s r a i s e d by t h e c a s e a r e t h e
s u b j e c t of ongoing Commission r e s e a r c h , which w i l l be i n t e g r a t e d i n t o t h e
normative s t u d i e s and t h e t h i r d p h a s e of t h e p r o j e c t (See A C I R , 1986).
5/
-
Unlike t h e c r i t i c s who h y p o t h e s i z e t h a t n e g a t i v e consequence f l o w from
j u d i c i a l i n t e r v e n t i o n , t h e proponents b e l i e v e t h a t t h e r e a r e p o s t i v e
consequences t o t h e same i n t e r v e n t i o n . Presumably, t h e s i n e qua non of
a p o s i t i v e impact i s t h a t t h e c o u r t s ' i n t e n d e d p o l i c y g o a l s a r e m e t .
To
t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e s e g o a l s can be o p e r a t i o n a l i z e d , t h e y w i l l be measured
and a n a l y z e d i n t h e same way a s o f f s e t t i n g n e g a t i v e outcomes. However,
i f t h e b e n e f i t s of promoting, e x t e n d i n g , and expanding c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
r i g h t s a r e c o n s i d e r e d t o be i n t a n g i b l e ( e . g . , J a c o b s , 1977; S c h e i n g o l d ;
1974) t h e y a r e beyond t h e scope of t h e p o l i c y s t u d i e s . Such b e n e f i t s a r e
more a p p r o p r i a t e s u b j e c t s f o r t h e normative a n a l y s e s of what r o l e t h e
c o u r t s should play i n c r e a t i n g c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s .
Research d e s i g n s t a i l o r e d t o i n d i v i d u a l i s s u e a r e a s w i l l be p r e p a r e d by
Commission s t a f f members and J u s t i c e Resources. The d e s i g n s w i l l f o c u s
on t h e s e l e c t i o n of u n i t s of a n a l y s i s , l e v e l s of a n a l y s i s , i n d i c a t o r s and
working hypotheses. They w i l l be d i s t r i b u t e d i n advance of a meeting w i t h
p o l i c y s t u d y s c h o l a r s . A t t h e meeting, s p e c i f i c d e t a i l s of t h e proposed
r e s e a r c h i n each a r e a w i l l be c r a f t e d i n a manner t h a t i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h
t h e p r o j e c t ' s o v e r a l l framework and t h a t i s harmonious w i t h t h e suggest i o n s of t h e p a r t i c i p a t i n g s c h o l a r s .
Chapter 5
SUMMARY
PROJECT OVERVIEW
The i n s t i t u t i o n. a 1 r o l e of t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t s i s a n i s s u e of c r i t i c a l i m p o r t a n c e i n d e t e r m i n i n g how America i s governed.
Q u e s t i o n s r e v o l v i n g around
t h i s t o p i c have been t h e s u b j e c t of d e b a t e s i n c e t h e c l a s h between t h e Federa l i s t s and t h e A n t i - F e d e r a l i s t s
a t the nation's
p e r s p e c t i v e of t h e A n t i - F e d e r a l i s t s
t o contemporary c o u r t
inception.
Recently,
the
h a s been e x p r e s s e d i n c r i t i c a l r e a c t i o n s
d e c i s i o n s and d o c t r i n e s t h a t
a f f e c t t h e a u t h o r i t y of
the states.
Concern i s e x p r e s s e d by o b s e r v e r s toward what t h e y s e e a s u n d e s i r a b l e
t r e n d s i n t h e way f e d e r a l c o u r t s a d j u d i c a t e d i s p u t e s i n v o l v i n g b a s i c s t a t e
i n t e r e s t s and p o l i c i e s .
One tendency i s a c o n t i n u a t i o n of a long-term t r e n d
by t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t s toward d e p r e c i a t i n g t h e autonomy of
s t a t e s when t h e y
d e c i d e c a s e s i n v o l v i n g t h e d i v i s i o n of a u t h o r i t y between t h e n a t i o n a l government and s t a t e governments.
S t a t e a u t h o r i t y erodes a s t h e c o u r t s i n c r e a s i n g l y
employ weaker mechanisms t o s e c u r e t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l powers of s t a t e governments, c u l m i n a t i n g i n t h e r e c e n t
Amendment
.
A second t r e n d t h a t
Garcia c a s e ' s
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of
began w i t h i n t h e p a s t few decades
t h e Tenth
i s t h e growing
number of c o u r t d e c i s i o n s t h a t r e s t r i c t t h e a u t h o r i t y of s t a t e governments by
f i n d i n g t h a t s t a t e a c t i o n s v i o l a t e newly expanded d e f i n i t i o n s of i n d i v i d u a l s
constitutional rights.
two ways.
'
Here t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t s have l i m i t e d s t a t e a c t i o n s i n
F i r s t , t h e c o u r t s s t r i k e down s t a t e r e g u l a t i o n s and programs a s
u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l because they i n f r i n g e on i n d i v i d u a l s
'
rights.
Second, t h e y
r e q u i r e t h a t a f f i r m a t i v e s t e p s be t a k e n i n terms of p o l i c i e s and p r a c t i c e s t o
b r i n g s t a t e and l o c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s i n t o conformity w i t h j u d i c i a l l y determined
constitutional standards.
specific criticisms.
These g e n e r a l t r e n d s provide t h e c o n t e x t f o r more
A growing body of l i t e r a t u r e c r i t i q u e s t h e c o u r t s
'
acti-
v i t i e s because of t h e c o u r t s ' p e r c e i v e d i n c a p a c i t y t o f o r m u l a t e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s t a n d a r d s f o r s t a t e p u b l i c p o l i c y and t o c r a f t r e l i e f when t h e s t a n d a r d s
a r e violated.
Judicial
a c t i o n s a r e a l l e g e d t o c o n f l i c t w i t h many
b a s i c v a l u e s of f e d e r a l i s m .
of
the
Court e f f o r t s t o reform p u b l i c p o l i c y a r e c r i t i -
-63-
c i z e d a s being i n e f f e c t i v e , i n e f f i c i e n t , and c o u n t e r p r o d u c t i v e .
t h e i n c r e a s i n g number of c r i t i c i s m s ,
Because of
t h e Commission proposes t o u n d e r t a k e a
m u l t i p h a s e d s t u d y of t h e r o l e f e d e r a l c o u r t s p l a y i n a f f e c t i n g t h e autonomy,
v i a b i l i t y , and l e g i t i m a c y of t h e s t a t e s a s a u t h o r i t a t i v e governmental u n i t s .
T h i s paper h a s i d e n t i f i e d a s e t of c e n t r a l r e s e a r c h q u e s t i o n s t o o r g a n i z e
e m p i r i c a l s t u d i e s of f e d e r a l c o u r t involvement i n s e v e r a l p o l i c y a r e a s i n c l u d i n g p u b l i c a s s i s t a n c e t o r e l i g i o u s l y s u p p o r t e d s c h o o l s , c r i m i n a l d e f e n s e proc e d u r e s , l e g i s l a t i v e apportionment, mental h e a l t h , p u b l i c s c h o o l p u p i l a s s i g n ments, and s t a t e p r i s o n s .
A c o r e s e t of q u e s t i o n s w i l l be a d d r e s s e d through
t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of quas i - e x p e r i m e n t a l r e s e a r c h d e s i g n s t o a number of j u d i c i a l
d e c i s i o n s i n each a r e a .
Data w i l l be c o l l e c t e d on t h e consequences of t h e
j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n s on t h e q u a l i t y of p u b l i c p o l i c y and t h e v a l u e s of f e d e r a l -
ism.
Comparisons w i l l be made between o b s e r v a b l e consequences i n j u r i s d i c -
t i o n s where j u d i c i a l
where i t h a s n o t .
involvement o c c u r r e d w i t h s i t u a t i o n s i n j u r i s d i c t i o n s
A s y n t h e s i z i n g volume w i l l draw t h e f i n d i n g s t o g e t h e r from
t h e s e p a r a t e p o l i c y s t u d i e s and p l a c e them w i t h i n t h e framework of f e d e r a l i s m .
Normative s t u d i e s w i l l f o c u s on more g e n e r a l arguments c o n c e r n i n g key iss u e s of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e s i g n , t h e l e g a l b a s i s of f e d e r a l i s m , and t h e r o l e of
contemporary l e g a l d o c t r i n e s t h a t have j u s t i f i e d t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t s ' i n v o l v e The competing viewpoints developed i n t h e s e a n a l y s e s w i l l h e l p i n t e -
ment.
g r a t e t h e framework paper and t h e e m p i r i c a l p o l i c y s t u d i e s .
P O L I C Y S I G N I F I C A N C E AND RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER P R O J E C T S
The u l t i m a t e o b j e c t i v e of t h i s p r o j e c t is t o p r o v i d e p o l i c y makers, judg e s , and l e g a l s c h o l a r s w i t h a b e t t e r u n d e r s t a n d i n g of i s s u e s r e l e v a n t t o t h e
d e b a t e over t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l r o l e of t h e c o u r t s .
c l a i m s of t h e c o u r t s '
By f o c u s i n g on t h e s p e c i f i c
c r i t i c s c o n c e r n i n g t h e consequences of j u d i c i a l d e c i -
s i o n s , t h e r e i s t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o t e s t important p r o p o s i t i o n s .
or rejection
of
Verification
hypotheses w i l l y i e l d valuable information with regard t o
s t r o n g claims made c o n c e r n i n g t h e consequences of j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n s on t h e
states.
The r e s u l t s w i l l a l s o have a b e a r i n g on normative arguments c o n c e r n i n g
t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l r o l e of t h e c o u r t s .
I f t h e c o u r t s a r e found t o be i n e f f e c -
t i v e o r i n e f f i c i e n t , t h i s i s a l o g i c a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r r e s t r a i n i n g and curt a i l i n g such a c t i o n .
The proposed normative s t u d i e s , of c o u r s e , w i l l o f f e r a
more d i r e c t comparison of a l t e r n a t i v e views of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and d o c t r i n a l b a s i s f o r and a g a i n s t c o u r t i n t e r v e n t i o n .
-64-
J u s t a s t h e forthcoming B i c e n t e n n i a l of t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n adds s i g n i f i cance t o t h i s p r o j e c t , i t a l s o c r e a t e s an o p p o r t u n i t y t o put f e d e r a l i s m and
t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t s i n t o a r i c h e r context.
One important c o n s i d e r a t i o n is
t h a t t h i s s t u d y be coordinated with t h e many p r o j e c t s designed t o c e l e b r a t e
t h e Bicentennial,
T h i s p r o j e c t w i l l communicate t h e r e s u l t s of both t h e em-
p i r i c a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n s and t h e normative a n a l y s e s t o o t h e r o r g a n i z a t i o n s t h a t
a r e dealing with r e l a t e d issues.
Those o r g a n i z a t i o n s i n c l u d e t h e American Bar
A s s o c i a t i o n , American H i s t o r i c a l A s s o c i a t i o n , American P o l i t i c a l Science A s s o c i a t i o n , and o t h e r n a t i o n a l and s t a t e and l o c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s .
O f s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t i s a companion p r o j e c t on t h e B i c e n t e n n i a l sponsored
by t h e Commission.
The Commission's B i c e n t e n n i a l p r o j e c t o f f e r s t h e p o t e n t i a l
b e n e f i t s of providing t h e o r e t i c a l i n s i g h t s i n t o i s s u e s of f e d e r a l i s m and t h e
f e d e r a l c o u r t s through i t s d i s c u s s i o n of t h e more g e n e r i c concepts of c o n s t i t u t i o n s and f e d e r a l i s m .
These d i s c u s s i o n s can inform both t h e conceptual un-
derpinnings of t h e p o l i c y s t u d i e s of f e d e r a l c o u r t involvement and t h e prepara t i o n of t h e f i n a l s y n t h e s i z i n g volume.
This p r o j e c t , i n t u r n , o f f e r s a l l of
t h e B i c e n t e n n i a l c o d t t e e s t h e b e n e f i t s of concrete evidence on a fundamental
i s s u e of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l theory and p r a c t i c e .
TABLE OF CASES
Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Peters 243 (1833).
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S.
784 (1969).
Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 484 (1954).
Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
Capps v. Atiyeh, 559 F. Supp. 894. (D. Oregon 1982).
Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20 (1922).
City of Cleburne, TX v. Cleburne Living Center, 1015 S.Ct. 3249 (1985).
City of Newport v.
Facts Concerts Inc.,
453 U.S.
247
S.Ct.
2748
(1981).
Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheaton 264 (1821).
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 ( 19 76).
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
,
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 Howard 393 (1857).
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
Furman v. Georgia, 4 0 8 U.S. 238 (1972).
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, et al., 105 S.Ct. 1005
( 19 85)
Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheaton 1 (1824).
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 1 5 3 (1976).
Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d.
1237 ( 9 t h Cir. 1982).
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
Uopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967).
Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803).
-67-
McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheaton 316 (1819).
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 176 (1961).
National Labor Relations Board v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1
(1937).
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
Owen v.
-
City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
Paratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 257 (1981).
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
Roe v. Wade,
-
410 U.S.
113 (1973).
San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez, 411
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 323 (1974).
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618 (1969).
Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wallace 36 (1873).
Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898).
Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 US 548 (1937).
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S.
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S.
1 (1936).
14 (1967).
Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
U.S.
1
(1973).
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