Pork-barreling, Rent-Seeking and Clientelism: Disaggregating
Political Exchange
Royce A. Carroll
Rice University
Department of Political Science- MS 24
P.O. Box 1892
Houston, TX 77251-1892
e-mail: rcarroll@rice.edu
Mona M. Lyne
Department of Political Science
University of South Carolina
Columbia, SC 29208
Phone: 803-777-7309
e-mail: lynemm@sc.edu
September 2006
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2006 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political
Science Association, Chicago, Ill., and the 2006 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science
Association, Philadelphia, PA.
Abstract
Despite growing interest in the questions of how and why politicians deviate from national
public goods provision, the study of narrow goods remains largely balkanized. Each of the major
types of narrow goods and associated practices, including pork-barreling, rent-seeking, and
clientelism is the subject of a distinct and typically self-contained literature. In this essay we seek to
take an important step in the integration of these disparate literatures by identifying and
differentiating commonly studied types of narrowly targeted goods and the associated political
practices, and by providing clear analytic definitions that allow scholars to analyze these goods and
practices in commensurable terms. Focusing on the nature of the political exchange involved, we
present a typology accounting for both the scope (how targeted) and the ‘directness’ (how
excludable) of delivery. Our typology provides an analytic basis for differentiating narrow political
goods and practices that are easily conflated, explaining how even very “broad” policy may be
“clientelistic” while even very narrow targeting may not. We provide examples of prominent
puzzles that have proven intractable in the absence of a more complete typology such as the one we
offer here.
2
Introduction
Among the central concerns of comparative politics is the nature of policy provision in
democratic societies. The longstanding question of when politicians will favor the provision of
narrow goods with concentrated benefits and diffuse costs, rather than broad collective goods, has
sparked several highly successful lines of research in the fields of legislative and electoral studies,
political economy, and political development. These efforts to understand how politicians seek and
maintain electoral advantages through the targeting of goods to narrow groups of beneficiaries have
produced several related concepts – pork-barreling, rent-seeking and clientelism – which now
occupy important roles in their respective literatures.
With the post-war wave of democratization, early studies of democracy in the developing
world sought to understand how representation and policymaking functioned in these new
democracies. This research revealed a pervasive presence of political patterns characterized as
clientelism, and still provides some of the most cogent analyses of the phenomenon.1 As many
developing countries succumbed to authoritarianism in the 1960s and 70s, much succeeding
research on political market failures focused upon advanced industrial countries, producing many of
the canonical works on pork-barreling and rent-provision.2 Following the most recent wave of
democratization in the late twentieth century, scholars have once again focused on clientelism, using
case studies, formal models and statistical methods, extending the frontiers of the study of
representation and patron-client politics.3
1
See for example, Almond and Coleman (1960), Almond (1958), Scott (1972), Powell (1970), Landé (1973), Kaufman
(1974), Graziano (1976), Schmidt, et. al (1977).
2
The early canonical studies include, among others, Ferejohn (1974), Mayhew (1974), Fiorina (1977), Krueger (1974),
Posner (1975), Peltzman (1976), Buchanan, et al. (1980).
3
On multi-country studies, see for example, Piattoni (2001), Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007), and Schaeffer and Schedler
(forthcoming). On formal models, see Stokes (2005), and on extensive new empirical tests see Jones (2005), Naoi (2006),
1
Each of these literatures has advanced our understanding of the different ways in which
policy deviates from the provision of national public goods, but has typically done so in a
disconnected fashion. As a result, our understanding of both the forms and the consequences of
policies that “serve the few at the expense of the many” remains limited in important ways.
Systematic analysis of the causes and the consequences of “particularism“ becomes more difficult in
the absence of a framework that clearly distinguishes different forms of narrow goods provision.
The central goal of this paper is to build a definitional framework that helps clear the underbrush
and clarify relationships among different types of narrow goods provision. We believe this is an
indispensible initial step toward the goal of developing a more unified analytic account of narrow
goods provision.
First, we provide a typology of political exchange relationships and apply it to several basic
types of narrow goods provision identified by the literature. Often, national public policy and
clientelistic private goods are implicitly considered polar opposites on what might be thought of as a
particularistic “scale,” while rents, pork and other types of merely narrow policy lie between these
two extremes. We emphasize instead the need two distinguish two dimensions: the scope of the
targeted constituency and the directness of the exchange. With this distinction in hand, we can
distinguish narrowly-targeted ‘rents’ such as tariffs, from mercantilist-type policies that may apply to
a sector but that selectively distribute goods – such as production rights – among individual firms.
Similarly, we draw a distinction between geographically targeted collective goods in the form of
“pork,” and localized benefits provided to individuals on a selective basis within a restricted
geographic scope. The utility of this framework lies in its ability to account for political exchange
relationships that are clientelistic even when the policy has a very broad scope, as well as exchange
Lindberg (2003), Taylor-Robinson (2006), and Diaz-Cayeros and Magaloni (2003). On developing new systematic and
general measures of clientelism, see the chapters in Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007).
2
relationships involving goods of quite narrow scope that are not made on the basis of exchanging
political goods directly for votes.
A Typology of Narrow Goods Provision
Most theoretical work on political market failure has focused on the scope of the political
goods supplied. Generally, broad collective goods are the point of departure and variations are
conceived largely on the basis of the policy’s distributive impact. From this perspective, two
canonical types of particularistic goods—rents and pork—would seem to capture the relevant
effects of political market failure based on targeting sectoral or territorial groups, while clientelism
simply represents the extreme of such narrowness.4 This simplification of the complex array of
policy makes a variety of important analytical enterprises tractable, but also risks conflating very
different types of policy. Emphasizing only the scope of beneficiaries does not differentiate policy
very similar in terms of ostensibly targeting a sector or a territorial constituency but that varies
considerably in terms of the type of political exchange taking place.
To see why this is important, consider the introduction of a second dimension: the “direct”
or “indirect” nature of the exchange. The distinction between direct and indirect exchange might be
compared to that between barter and monetary exchanges. In a barter economy, partners to an
exchange directly assess and exchange the goods—one type for another. In a monetary economy,
partners to an exchange accept a symbolic representation of the goods they actually wish to
exchange, and a future promise to honor that symbol, in order to address temporal discontinuities.
4
Often, such work implicitly emphasizes pork and rents, even while acknowledging clientelism. For a prominent example,
see Cox and McCubbins’ (2001) influential work on the policy consequences of institutional design, which employs a
single-dimensional framework along these lines to explain the “public-regardedness” or “private-regardedness” of policy.
Similarly, studies emphasizing “distributive politics” tend to imply that policy varies along a single dimension of scope,
and such work is usually built upon assumptions regarding the function of the electoral connection that imply what we here
call “indirect exchange.” See Stokes (2005) for a discussion of how distributive models cannot account for direct,
clientelistic exchange.
3
Like a barter economy, when political goods are exchanged directly there is no more to the
exchange than the vote and the good that is received in return. In an indirect political exchange, on
the other hand, the vote is given based on a symbolic promise to promote legislation aimed at
achieving certain goals, be they distributive (pork or rents) or programmatic. Votes provided in an
indirect exchange may be used to reward or punish politicians for any sort of outcome, or weighted
combination of outcomes, be it overall policy performance or goods targeted to a territorial or
sectoral group. Different voters might give varying weights to each and the same voter may vary the
relative weight of different types of goods from election to election.
These different types of exchange imply different types of delegation from voters to their
representatives, and therefore may fundamentally shape our assumptions about representation in a
given context. In a direct exchange, delegation is discrete. Politicians5 signal their ability and
intention to reward supporters with immediate and excludable goods.6 Voters respond to credible
claims, and trade their vote in a direct exchange with that politician, subject to renewal upon
effective delivery. Although a politician may engage in any number of activities while in elected
office, matters unrelated to the direct exchange are outside of this “contract.” Voters may value
other outcomes, but to the extent voters depend on the relationship, the agent is freed from
accountability for actions beyond the consistent delivery of the excludable good.7
5
We use the term “politicians” in order to generically refer to candidates, parties and other relevant elected actors.
Although organizational forms are not our focus here, the variation behind our subsequent discussion is noteworthy. When
seeking power through indirect exchange, politicians’ might wish to create an informative party reputation that tells
constituencies what they can and will deliver in terms of collective goods or a personal reputation that indicates what they
will deliver specifically to their local constituency. By contrast, the key problem for a strategy of direct exchange is
identifying and monitoring contributions of support. Pre-existing social organizations, rather than parties, may provide a
readily adaptable template to organize direct exchange and monitoring (Chandra 2004). In other cases, groups coming to
power through force may abolish the social organizations used for clientelist organization by the vanquished--and political
parties can serve as the new mass vehicle for clientelist organization.
6
For a discussion of how parties organize to signal their ability and willingness to provide private goods, see the papers in
the Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007) volume. On credibility, see Keefer (2005).
7
This is not to say that trades of votes for goods are simply one-off exchanges. Some exchanges, particularly those
involving very low income voters, may be characterized by such one-shot interactions. The exchange relationship,
however is iterated: the exchange is repeated and institutionalized such that relatively stable behavioral expectations
are possible (Hawkins 2003). We will elaborate on this time dimension below when we discuss aggregation.
4
In an indirect exchange, voters delegate a representative role. Votes or other support is won
on the basis of political platforms or pronouncements, representations of the legislation politicians
will promulgate once in office, which may be programmatic or targeted to narrow groups, but not
politically excludable within those groups. Political platforms, campaigns, and voting records allow
politicians to signal their ability and intention to provide certain goods if elected—including
narrowly targeted goods. Among these proposals, supporters choose those they find preferable and
credible; politicians pursue policies given these electoral constraints.
Narrow indirect exchanges account for the familiar forms of pork-barreling and rentprovision where particular segments of society benefit at the expense of the public. The more
concentrated the benefits of a given policy, the more narrowly it is targeted—as is a single local
school in comparison to a policy to allocate school construction funds across a region. Until we
consider the directness of the exchange however, we do not know the political basis upon which
such goods are provided. When we focus attention on the degree to which delivery is selective in
our hypothetical polity, we find that the very same scope of goods may be provided not simply to
seek, but rather to directly reward support. That is, as the exchange becomes more direct, access to
goods may not be regulated only by geographical location or economic sector, but by political
behavior in a form of quid pro quo. More counterintuitive, once we restrict our consideration to
direct exchanges across the full range of scope, we can conceive of policies – such as development
policy – designed to impact large segments of the population, not just local bailiwicks, but where the
actual beneficiaries, in terms of production licenses and jobs, for example, are designated on the
basis of a direct exchange of political support.
5
The Directness of Political Exchange
Clientelism is widely studied, but as with other studies of narrow goods provision, the directversus-indirect nature of the link between voters and politicians is not always highlighted as an
independent dimension from the narrowness of scope . Like scholars of indirect exchange, students
of clientelism primarily conceptualize clientelism as diametrically opposed to national collective
goods provision.8 Recent scholarship, however, has begun to reconsider this perspective.9 In one of
the most important contributions to date on the subject, Kitschelt (2000) underscores direct
exchange as the defining characteristic of clientelism. Politicians are not clientelist, Kitschelt notes,
“as long as they disburse rents as a matter of codified, universalistic public policy applying to all
members of a constituency, regardless of whether a particular individual supported or opposed the
party that pushed for the rent-serving policy” (2000:850).
The defining feature of clientelism is the presence of a quid pro quo, but the directness of
exchange has even broader implications for our understanding of political market failure. Indirect
exchange, even based on universalistic public policy, need not be built on programmatic linkages or
broad groups. As we will discuss, indirect exchange includes both broad national collective goods
like a stable currency, as well as instances of highly particularistic goods distributed to very narrow
targeted groups, such as local infrastructure. At the same time, regardless of whether a policy is
designed around a large group of any identity, if political goods are ultimately exchanged in a quid
pro quo based on political support, ostensibly “group” or “national” policies can be
indistinguishable from clientelism in function. Governments can designate that members of
relatively large groups -- whether defined sectorally, territorially, or on ascriptive characteristics – as
potential beneficiaries, but still only deliver them conditional on political support. To put it another
8
9
For an excellent review of some of the conceptual weaknesses of the early clientelist literature, see Kaufman (1974).
See for example, Kitschelt (2000), Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2006), Warner (2001).
6
way, membership in a group is a necessary but not sufficient condition for receiving the benefits of
direct exchange.10
While scholars who focused on political market failure in advanced industrial nations
typically did not consider variation in the directness of political exchange (focusing on scope), those
studying developing countries often were less concerned with the scope of the good (focusing on
the nature of the exchange).11 Many scholars whose point of departure was the advanced
democracies viewed targeting of narrow constituencies even in developing countries through the
lens of rent-seeking and pork-barreling.12 At the same time, some work focused on developing
countries suggested that if clientelism was necessarily a phenomenon of narrow distributional scope,
national policy programs were by contrast essentially collective goods.13
Any given policy may fall anywhere on the dimension of narrowness. A regulatory policy or
pork-barrel project may target a smaller or larger fragment of the population—ranging from a large
industry or region, to a few firms or a single town. In the sections that follow, we use the distinction
between direct and indirect exchange to understand the most commonly studied types of political
market failure within which any given policy (with any degree of narrowness) may lie. We divide the
following sections on qualitative grounds into four basic categories, shown in figure 1, divided by
direct/indirect exchange and by the type of constituency, primarily to distinguish the indirect
10
It should be clear, then, that this distinction is not the same as that often made between “programmatic” and
“particularistic”, as the latter could describe all of the practices we discuss below. Although similar to the notion of
“public” and “private” goods in the abstract, the conflation of these terms with the physical nature of the good is
something we wish to avoid here. Instead, we emphasize that it is the type of exchange that creates privateness.
Direct exchange indeed implies the distribution of private goods, in the sense of access. As we shall note below, it is
the access that defines the political nature of the good: goods that are apparently identical in form (for example,
local educational services or utilities) can be delivered on an indirect or direct basis.
11
Of course, this analytic choice was typically due to focus on single case studies where these parameters do not change or
have no external point of reference. As scholars increasingly emphasize cross-national studies, it is critical to take this
dimension of variation explicitly into account.
12
A particularly prominent example is Krueger’s (1974) famous examination of “rents” in India and Turkey, which we will
discuss more fully below.
13
For example, in his groundbreaking study of Chilean politics, Valenzuela (1977) considers ISI policy as a programmatic
component to post-War Chilean parties’ appeal due its national scope. However, as we argue here, this relationship does
not follow as a matter of course; a broad scope is not synonymous with collective goods or programmatic policy.
7
targeting of narrow groups with pork and rents from what we will call “sectoral” and “territorial”
clientelism. In each section, we provide examples illustrating the range of narrowness that can be
found within each type.
[Figure 1 about here]
As the implications for policy-making would seem to diverge so significantly across the
dimension of directness of exchange, it is important to clearly distinguish highly particularistic
indirect exchange from clientelism and identifying when general policy is implemented as a direct
exchange. If one of the central goals of research on political market failure is to understand when
and why politicians will provide narrow goods at the expense of national public policy, then
attention must be given to distinguishing direct versus indirect exchange.
“Pork Barrel” politics and Territorial Clientelism
A long tradition of American political science has focused on pork barreling within the U.S.
Congress (Fiorina and Noll 1978; Fiorina 1977, 1983; Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen 1981; Ferejohn
1974). These studies focus on how individual politicians claim credit for providing locally targeted
collective goods to their districts, despite the cost to other districts or for national policy. Voters,
meanwhile, are aware of (or focus on) the benefits, but not the diffuse costs of this behavior. Even
if doing away with pork barrel distributions has broad public appeal, members have no incentive to
sacrifice their continuing access to a reliable mechanism of local reputation building (Mayhew
1974).14 These ideas have been adapted to countless comparative applications.
As defined in these classical accounts, politicians distribute pork in search of but not in
direct exchange for political support. Support may come either from the provision of the goods
14
More recent work, of course, tempers this traditional individualist view with the importance of the party label and
associated national policy reputation even for a legislator’s own reelection in the U.S. (e.g. Cox and McCubbins
1993).
8
themselves, through cultivating a local voting constituency, or through the business it funnels to
local interests, leading to campaign contributions. Given that narrow political considerations
determine relative distributions of pork, it is almost always assumed to be inefficient in relation to a
distribution of resources based on national social welfare alone. However, when legislators use pork
primarily to build up a local voting constituency, pork-barreling may be efficient from a local social
welfare standpoint—that is, it provides needed locally-targeted public goods like roads, hospitals,
schools, etc.
Diffuse costs and concentrated benefits typically conceal the social welfare losses of pork
provision. The negative political consequences of pork provision manifest when the social costs
become apparent to voters benefiting the least15 and competing political entrepreneurs have the
means and will to clarify the source of such failures.
Without focus on the direct or indirect dimension of narrowly targeted goods, all local
targeting may appear similar and is often treated as such. Yet pork-barreling as defined above does
not differentiate within the territorial constituency based on a quid pro quo and the costs are largely
imposed on those outside the district (Ferejohn 1974). Indeed, the electoral theory of pork-barreling
and cultivating a local voting constituency suggests there should be fierce competition to maximize
the number of local beneficiaries.
Though clientelism is well studied in isolation, little work has endeavored to distinguish fully
between direct and indirect targeting of policy on a territorial basis. This may be due in part to
observational equivalence between the legislative strategies aimed at delivering both pork-barrel and
clientelistic goods to a territorial constituency. Legislators seeking resources to provide pork
(locally-targeted public goods) and those seeking resources to trade locally in a direct exchange
15
Take for example, such tension over spending priorities in Japan in the late 1990s where "urban voters were outraged not
only by the deepening recession but also by the way in which fiscal stimulus through public works benefited mostly rural
constituencies but implied future tax hikes for all." (Mulgan 2003:175)
9
might behave quite similarly in the legislature, both avidly pursuing resources for their region or
town. Thus, studies emphasizing particularism more generally tend to group such goods on the
basis of their territorial nature, putting aside the direct or indirect quality of the exchange.
Legislators pursuing either strategy will seek funds for their district or region with little
regard for the costs imposed on other districts, or the effects on purported national policy goals.
Detecting the difference in how funds are used often requires close attention to implementation
strategies and how they are designed to organize political support (Kitschelt 2000). Thus differences
between direct territorial exchange and pork barreling might appear as a matter of degree.16 Yet there
is a very important difference of kind: pork-barreling does not exclude at the local level, while
clientelism does.
Any truly direct system of exchange must employ some system of determining whether
recipients have indeed fulfilled their end of the agreement. The less accurate this accounting, the less
“direct” the exchange, by definition. However, politicians are extremely resourceful when it comes
to enforcing such arrangements in practice, even in the modern context of secret voting.17
Selective distribution may entail monopolizing the provision of goods demanded by local voters,
such as a region’s supply of state jobs or a central aspect of the local economy, or it may mean
devising ways to turn what appear to be local public goods into vehicles for direct exchange. As
Greenfield (1972) documents, a road might be started, but never finished if votes are not reliably
delivered over time to the state-level politicians with the power to order it finished. Similarly,
Geddes (1994) discusses public works departments with no spare parts, and hospitals with no
16
See Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith (2002:6) for example, who differentiate between pork, as a locally targeted public good
with “spillover benefits for the community” and the “purely private goods associated with clientelism,” but who argue that
pork is a “variation of clientelism.”
17
As Brusco, Nazareno and Stokes (2003) explain: “parties compensate for their inability to observe the vote directly by
observing a range of other actions and behaviors, actions and behaviors that allow party operatives to make good guesses
about the vote choices of individuals.” In Argentina, the “operative can’t know with full certainty how people in his area of
responsibility voted. But if his guesses are at least correlated with the voters’ actual choices, and if he then conditions the
future flow of goods on support, the voter who wants the goods should vote for the clientelist party.”
10
medicine, which would appear to render the locally spent resources ineffectual as local public goods.
Souza’s (1997) study of the Brazilian state of Bahia during the early 1990s provides an example of
the use of political exclusion strategies in the area of local ‘public’ education. She found that head
teachers at publicly funded schools were gubernatorial patronage appointments, education spending
tracked with electoral cycles, and school construction in the state was disconnected from social
demand, instead tied to the political needs of the governor’s local affiliates. In addition to the
clientelistic use of these construction and staffing funds, however, access to the good was also based
on direct exchange. As one ex-governor explained, “Children could register in a school only if they
had a letter from a local politician, a state deputy or an influential politician” (Souza 1997:145).
Alternatively, even short of monopolization, politicians in power may simply have such an
overwhelming comparative advantage in providing a reliable supply of needed direct benefits that
voters are inclined to perpetuate the relationship between their region’s elites and the state.18
However, the weaker the ability to enforce the political selectivity of policy, the less direct the
political exchange.
Legislators’ access to locally targeted resources can be more or less transparent and
formalized. In the U.S., some localized federal spending is transparent while other is obtained
through the rather opaque procedure of “earmarking,” in which provisions for locally targeted
resources are inserted into bills after they have formally been approved. In both Brazil and
18
Komeito (1984), for instance, describes how constituency service became a direct exchange in Ireland even lacking
monopoly, due to comparative advantage: “politicians were claiming personal credit for providing legal entitlements.
However, politicians argued that, whatever the legal entitlements, the person would have received nothing without the
politician's help. The broker's ‘profit’ derived from providing a service that was easy and quick for him, but difficult and
time-consuming for an outsider. He thus hoped to create a debt at little actual cost to himself.” (Komeito 1984:182) A
similar and common phenomenon in Latin America is the bureaucratic fixer. These fixers were licensed by the state to cut
the red tape of the bureaucracy for those who are willing to pay a fee. Although citizens could petition the bureaucracy
without paying a fee, the chances of a helpful response were so slim that most that had the money would pay a fixer to deal
with the bureaucracy for them. These fixers were available for both trivial and serious needs for bureaucratic assistance,
from dealing with minor traffic violations to ensuring receipt pensions. Constituency service as a form of local
accountability exists in some form in every democracy, but its use as a currency for direct rather than indirect political
exchange is the crucial distinction for its impact on general democratic accountability.
11
Colombia, there have been more transparent formal procedures by which legislators receive
resources for their local districts. In Brazil, legislators can formally propose amendments to the
budget for clearly specified local projects. In Colombia for many years, all legislators were allotted
what were known as auxilios parlamentares, a fixed sum that each was entitled to spend in her local
district.19
Although pork provision and clientelism both have social costs, all else equal (including the
amount of targeted resources), distribution via direct exchanges should be considerably more
socially costly than providing locally targeted pork because each voter (or group of voters) must be
regulated in their benefit conditional on some aspect of the locality’s political behavior. The long
literature on pork barreling in the modern U.S. provides considerable evidence that this locallytargeted spending is used to procure local public goods, although direct exchanges were more
common earlier in the nation’s history and in certain geographical areas. In many other countries,
particularly developing countries, it is less clear whether locally targeted resources become local
public goods or currency for direct exchange. Clear distinctions between pork-barreling and
clientelism would shed important light on why what current analysis concludes is the same emphasis
on “localism” produces such extreme differentials in the level of collective goods provided, and
social welfare costs incurred across democracies.
A central reason for the conflation of pork-barreling and territorial clientelism20 is the lack of
a straightforward, generalizable method for determining which strategy a given legislator or party is
employing.21 Developing measures of clientelism at differing levels of aggregation is a crucial hurdle
facing the advancement of cross-national scholarship on political market failure. Short of such
19
This was the practice until the 1991 revisions to the constitution.
Also known as “broker clientelism”
21
Some recent work has made important progress, avoiding the common pitfall of conflating all local targeting. DiazCayeros and Magaloni (2003) argue that the PRI used the anti-poverty program called PRONASOL to provide locally
targeted public goods in some districts, and to buy votes directly in other districts. Similarly, Stokes (2005) and Brusco et
al. (2003) view the Peronists in Argentina after the recent transition to democracy as buying votes in some areas and
providing local public goods in others.
20
12
measures, the distinctions noted above warrant a cautious analysis of empirical patterns that do not
disaggregate direct and indirect exchange in territorial targeting.
The label of ‘clientelism’ does not itself give us analytical leverage in understanding electoral
or legislative politics unless it connotes a clear political distinction from ‘pork-barreling’ as just
described. If constituencies can vote their choice without threat of exclusion from targeted goods,
then no degree of narrowness makes the exchange truly direct. Conversely, if constituencies must
demonstrate their political allegiances in order to obtain and preserve access to local goods, no
amount of breadth in the formal goals of the associated policy makes the relationship any less direct.
This becomes especially clear when clientelism is part of the implementation of policies with a
sectoral scope, discussed in the next section.
Interest Group Rents and Sectoral Clientelism
Just as pork barreling involves targeting narrow territorial interests, indirect sectorally
targeted goods, or “rents”,22 provide relatively narrow benefits to sectorally-defined constituencies
via tariffs, regulatory rules and other types of subsidies that favor a particular sector of production.
This definition of rents, like pork-barreling, entails non-excludability within the narrow group
(Buchanan et al. 1980). Goods targeted to a narrow sub-national group that are a collective good for
members of that group are sometimes called “club goods” (Buchanan 1980). These are not public
or collective goods in the colloquial sense in that they are not designed to serve the “general
interest” and instead provide subsidies to producers at consumers’ expense. Yet, from the point of
view of these narrow groups, policies extracting rents from the majority are in fact a collective good
22
Note that we restrict our use of the term “rents” to sectorally narrow policy benefits obtained through formally legal
means. Illegal provision of rents is discussed later.
13
in the strict sense.23 A tariff, for example, provides benefits to all producers in the product category
and a typical regulatory intervention is formally universal--applying equally to the affected producers
and any who might become producers.24
A number of prominent scholars concluded that the rent-seeking framework captures the
relevant aspects of government interventions in the market around the globe. Krueger (1974), for
example, in her classic work that coined the phrase “rent-seeking”, treats licensing and other
interventions in India and Turkey as of the variety described by Kitschelt above—favoring some
firms or sectors over others in practice, but formally based on some ostensibly neutral,
developmentally-oriented criteria such as installed capacity. More recently, Lohmann (1998) argues
that information asymmetry across different groups of voters can explain variation in the provision
of rents to special interest groups across both developed and developing democracies. Many
scholars rely on an exogenously determined market-orientation of export sector interests, as
contrasted to the rent-seeking interests of the import-competing sector to explain policy choice.
Thus, Sachs (1985) argues that the continued strength of the agricultural sector during the phase of
industrial promotion led East Asian governments to opt for the more neutral exchange and trade
regimes, which were the linchpin of their successful development policy.25 And new economic
23
A prominent example of club goods in the United States is the famed sugar lobby, which has succeeded in restricting
imports of sugar for over two centuries. Notorious campaign contributors, sugar companies benefit from import quotas
that raise US sugar prices to two to three times the world market rate, creating an additional $1 billion profit annually
(Washington Post 4.16.05). Similarly, cotton growers receive $3 to $4 billion dollars a year in federal government
subsidies (The New Republic 9.29.03). There are a plethora of such trade and regulatory interventions in every advanced
industrial economy.
24
Club goods are referred to by economists as “excludable” in that they are designated to be practically available
only to a narrow group—in these cases, an existing set of producers or a subset of the general population. While this
is certainly a form of excludability in a broad sense (which we call the narrowness or “scope”), such exclusion is
common to all of the types of narrow goods provision we treat here. Indeed, this commonality is at the root of
tendencies to conflate all forms of narrow goods provision. As discussed above, our classification is political,
emphasizing the presence or absence of direct exchanges in restricting access beyond the formal group designation.
It is the selective delivery based on how one voted that determines whether apparently similar goods are de facto a
“private” or “club.”
25
This linchpin of the comparative logic – the purported weakness of the Latin American agricultural sector – is debatable.
See for example Balassa’s (1985) objections in the same volume.
14
historians have relied on a similar derivation of policy preferences to explain Latin America’s
relatively poor economic performance over several centuries (Haber 1997 2002).
These analyses do not clearly distinguish state interventions that produce narrow benefits
that are non-excludable within the favored interest group from those characterized by direct
delivery to firms within a sector in a quid pro quo.26 Just as an undifferentiated analysis of territorial
targeting has substantial limitations, the single dimension of scope implicitly used in studies of
sectoral targeting fails to capture variation across policies with very different effects on market
production and development outcomes.
The political economy literature on developing countries hints that an undifferentiated rentseeking analysis is problematic. For example, Bates (2001:71), de Soto (2000:102-3) and Little et al.
(1971: 41) all emphasize that ISI producers were sheltered from both international and domestic
competition, with the clear implication that these policies are more akin to mercantilism than to
internally non-excludable, sectorally-targeted rents.27 These are clearly different from the sectorally
targeted goods of indirect exchange, which do not confer such sectoral goods as production rights
directly, but provide an advantage to whole groups. Though none of these authors systematically
analyze the industrial policies of developing countries in contrast to the classical notion of rentprovision, their work suggests we need to give special consideration to policies ostensibly designed
around an economic sector, but in fact supplied only in a quid pro quo. Once we differentiate
collective goods for a favored sector from those akin to mercantilist policies we should expect clear
differences in terms of the social welfare costs.
26
Krueger considers a direct quid pro quo in terms of an illegal bribe. But as we will discuss below, it is important to
distinguish between resources obtained from narrow interests that enrich the politician personally, and resources that are
employed in the electoral arena. Strictly defined, bribes are distinct from the electoral resources obtained from other gains
derived from catering to narrow interests, in that they are designed to directly enrich the individual politician and not
necessarily to influence elections.
27
De Soto makes the point explicitly that policies in developing countries are akin to European guilds, where the right to
produce is a political right.
15
Even relatively mild tariffs or regulatory interventions can produce very large rents for
producers, while the diffusion of costs across all consumers minimizes the impact on the average
voter. This oft-cited characteristic of rents enables some form of rent provision in every democracy.
How does this differ from sectoral targeting delivered through direct exchange, when political
authorities single out firms, either directly through licensing, or indirectly through differential access
to subsidies? The monographic literature provides numerous examples. Weingrod (1977:327-8), for
example, describes how in Italy politicians assign loans and licenses to families of his supporters. In
Mexico, Grayson (2000:382) recounts how import substitution industrialization became one of the
pillars of clientelistic support for the PRI under Cardenas as “bureaucrats and politicians conferred
contracts on businessmen, slashed the regulatory ‘red tape’ that complicated their lucrative deals, and
obtained official approvals required for economic transactions.”
Direct targeting of firms does more than provide a competitive edge, it confers monopoly or
oligopoly profits on the selected few firms in official favor. All else equal, we would expect sectoral
clientelism to generate greater costs to national social welfare than rent-provision because it affects
the market-wide production of a given product. Rents handicap some producers, but they do not
completely eliminate competitors’ ability to challenge existing producers on price and quality.28
Moreover, with this kind of policy, the right to produce is an exclusively political right, and is a
function of government favor rather than market prowess.
Using excludable implementation strategies, sectoral policy provides a mechanism to
construct political coalitions on the basis of direct exchange on a broad scale under the guise of
national policy. Post-War import substitution industrialization policies implemented across the
developing world are especially worthy of rethinking in this light. Prominent analyses of developing
countries treat ISI as either a national collective policy or one providing categorical club goods to
28
Consider, for example, the case of US auto manufacturers who were successfully challenged by Japanese producers
heavily handicapped by export restraints.
16
import-competing sectors (Haggard 1990, Kaufman 1990, Valenzeula 1977). This treatment derives
from the policy’s ostensible promotion of national development (Valenzuela 1977) or the presence
of coherent sectoral policies that appeared to benefit import substituting capital and labor as a class
(Haggard 1990, Kaufman 1990). Other analysts of ISI viewed its flaws as driven by indirect rents to
interest groups (Frieden 1991, Sachs 1985, Krueger 1974).
These characterizations are worth revisiting through the lens of direct exchange. A multicountry study of these policies by the National Bureau of Economic Research highlighted the
general absence of universal, codified criteria for distributing incentives both between and within
sectors. As Bhagwati states (Bhagwati 1978:91, emphasis added).
“It is interesting to note that no import control authority among the countries studied ever
attempted to lay down explicitly the rules in this regard [inter-firm allocations], and varying
elements of executive discretion always remained, defying the analyst's ability to decipher
what exactly were the criteria utilized in the end … It is noteworthy that in these studies the
inter-firm variations in [domestic resource costs] were almost as large as the inter-industrial
variations in [domestic resource costs]…” 29
Without clear and neutral codified rules, rents are likely to be distributed on an ad hoc and political
basis, as this pattern of domestic resource costs suggests. If ISI were implemented as a targeted, but
otherwise neutral sectoral policy, all firms in a given sector should be protected and subsidized,
creating high variation in domestic resource costs across sectors, but low variation across firms
within the same sector. If all firms in a given sector receive the same state subsidies and protection,
then those that survive and prosper should exhibit similar domestic resource costs. If firms across
the economy survive not based on their ability to compete on the relatively level playing field within
29
The two countries for which such data were available were India and Turkey. The data on intra-industry variation in
effective protection rates in Brazil which were part of the Little, et al. study, supports the same conclusion.
17
a given sector, but instead by virtue of selective production rights that go only to politically
connected firms within that sector, then it is no surprise that domestic resource costs vary
substantially within sectors across the economy. The high variation in domestic resource costs
across firms within a sector reflects the fact that individual firm survival is not determined by any kind
of efficiency in producing within the given sector, but rather on the basis of direct exchange of
political support for exclusive production rights.
Though ISI is not often thought of as a clientelist
strategy, production rights excludable at the firm level can provide an efficient mechanism for
networking units of directly exchanged political support.
The Level of Aggregation of Direct Exchange
The strong association between clientelism and narrowness makes the notion of a “broad”
direct exchange as just described especially counterintuitive. Disaggregated clientelism, in which a
politician or “boss” constructs an independent system of monitoring votes and distributing benefits
was closely associated with pre-modern social organization where a natural patron with organic ties
to clients can emerge, typically on the basis of land ownership. Under this kind of traditional
clientelism, a local landowner commonly provides directly for all the clients’ needs, and in return, the
client votes for the landowner’s political allies and supports him in other ways.
Direct exchange, however, should not be defined based on the ancillary characteristics of
this traditional form of clientelism. For example, a feature commonly considered inherent in the
practice, the deference and loyalty that typically accompanies traditional clientelism in the absence of
patron competitors, is not an inherent or necessary characteristic of direct exchange. Emphasis on
such extrinsic characteristics implies that clientelism only occurs in “traditional” societies. Much
18
recent work on the subject runs directly counter to this view (Roniger 2004, Piattoni 2001, Kitschelt
2000), characterizing clientelism simply as direct exchange, regardless of the presence or qualities of
a personal relationship between the exchanging parties. Clientelism, broadly defined, is highly
adaptable and politicians are typically capable of finding methods of distribution and monitoring that
can function in the presence of modern innovations such as computerized voting and the
anonymous urbanized voters of modern industrial societies. One need only consider the use of
voting machinery that allows detection of pulling the “right” lever30 or, more recently, the practice of
enforcement via camera-equipped mobile phones to appreciate the adaptability of the practice.
While the ultimately individual nature of enforcement is intrinsic to direct exchange,
disaggregated organization certainly is not. As a number of analysts have noted, as urbanization,
industrialization and integration of national markets ensue, there is typically a natural progression to
higher-order aggregation. Local patrons who excel at forging national ties and ensuring the steady
flow of resources from the center to the locality emerge as the key brokers in nationally-integrated
systems. What were once local patrons become brokers who “link” local constituencies to nationallevel patrons (Powell 1970; Martz 1997; Archer 1990). This process does not necessarily take place
as a direct mapping of existing patron-client ties into a national network—it is a highly competitive
selection process.
Industrialization and the expansion of national markets also implies large scale migration to
the cities, and expansion of the working and middle classes which results in large numbers of
“floating” voters with no connection to traditional rural-based clientelist networks. The solution in
some cases entailed institutionalization of direct exchange at high levels of aggregation on the basis
of urban employment, and these types of exchanges were called urban clientelism or corporatism
30
This method was used in Chicago, where voting machines were designed such that pulling the “wrong” lever
required voters to move their feet. Voters were carefully warned before entering the booth that in order to receive
their good in return, there must be no “dancing” in the voting booth.
19
(Collier and Collier 1991; Kaufman 1977).31 These broad direct exchanges provide efficiency
advantages in capturing votes for the politician, and bargaining advantages for the voters.32
In short, direct exchange relationships can encompass large groups and many sectors when
groups of citizens vote as part of a quid pro quo arrangement with the state or a broker, rather than
based on general policy outcomes or even a policy that serves the common interests of their sector
or region. Such cases deviate from “traditional” clientelism only in that voters have delegated their
role in forging the direct exchange to some broader organization—be they vote brokers in a region
or elites in a corporatist arrangement with the state. Yet, the level of aggregation among clients does
not change the essentially direct exchange relationship between patron and client. The local broker,
state representative or corporatist leader who acts as broker metes out rewards and punishments to
voters.33
Exchange between Narrow Groups and Politicians: The Electoral Connection
Rent-seeking, pork-barreling, clientelism all share a key feature—groups benefit from
narrow goods and reward politicians who supply the goods. As we have defined them, each form of
narrow goods provision discussed above revolves around politicians’ search for electoral advantages. In
this way they are distinct from personal corruption, where politicians typically provide benefits such
31
Although studies of corporatist labor unions were often dominated by analytic concerns other than the direct or indirect
nature of the exchange, scholars of these organizations almost invariably mention their inability to pursue general
categorical interests (we elaborate on this below in our discussion of the implications of clientelism for electoral
incentives). They also commonly note the special name for the leaders of these organizations in each country, which
connotes co-optation and subservience to government control and policy, rather than independent representation of labor
interests. Also, studies of corporatist interest organizations in developing countries are dominated by studies of industrial
worker unions, but careful studies of single systems have noted that corporatist interest organization encompasses white
collar workers as well (Schmitter 1981).
32
For other important work on direct collective exchanges, or corporate clientelism, see Tarrow (1967), Weingrod (1968),
and Powell (1970).
33
Because of the close connection between the two concepts, patronage is sometimes used as a general term to subsume
clientelism and at other times connotes specifically the political use of government appointments. The practice itself is not
our focus here, but patronage is a currency is widely used in constructing the aggregated direct exchanges we describe.
20
as obtaining a contract or job for a supporter and are in turn personally and materially enriched. In
assessing the political consequences, it is useful to distinguish corrupt practices of personal
enrichment from practices in which groups supply some means to improve the electoral fortunes of
politicians.
While bribery and other forms of corruption are sometimes considered “rent-seeking” by
political economists, politicians provide sectoral rents as defined here in response to lobbying by
interest groups, and the campaign support they receive from those groups is directed at the
maintenance of political power. Similarly, politicians provide pork in hopes of securing support
from a local constituency, as when they rely on “personal” votes (Cain et al. 1987, Carey and Shugart
1995) or wish to insulate themselves from negative national trends (Mayhew 1974). For parties as
well, pork may help win votes in marginal districts or cultivate party strongholds (McGillivray 2004).
Forms of direct exchange are also primarily designed to use the electoral process to obtain
and maintain political power. Mercantilist production rights, a form of sectoral clientelism, are
delivered in return for resources that are used to build clientelist networks. Rather than a form of
corruption, direct licensing or other types of governmental support for specific firms may be
considered legitimate or even necessary practices in developing countries.34 Similarly, locally targeted
excludable goods delivered directly in return for the delivery of blocs of votes are usually part of an
electoral strategy. In short, rents, pork and clientelism in electoral democracies may also provide
politicians with indirect personal benefits, but unlike bribery, these practices are primarily designed
to exploit and adapt to electoral institutions in the maintenance of political office.
The distinction between direct and indirect exchange is therefore fundamentally connected
to how elections operate and the policy priorities of politicians in winning them. When politicians
34
Brazilian president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s recent declaration that it was not the government’s job to prop up failing
firms was thus a newsworthy event. Similarly, Lopez Obrador, the 2006 PRD presidential candidate in Mexico
prominently advertised that he would end the government practice of bailing out failing businesses if elected.
21
focus extensively on delivering pork, they satisfy constituent demands and improve their personal
election prospects at the expense of the general public. When politicians provide rents to interest
groups, they reward their backers in return for resources to enhance electoral prospects. At the
same time, in indirect political exchanges, voters retain access to targeted goods and services even if
voting against those who delivered them, as do sectors that cease to support politicians who have
the provided rents from which they benefit. Voters and firms engaged in the direct political
exchanges described above can also cast their vote for or against a given politician that may have
provided the targeted political goods from which they have benefited.
Unlike recipients of
indirectly targeted pork and rents, however, doing so entails sacrificing access to excludable goods of
potentially vital importance. The ability of politicians to politically orient and directly revoke access
to goods, services and economic rights implies a fundamentally distinct electoral purpose for
targeted goods provision.
Conclusion
Systematic analysis of the relationship between the parameters of political competition and
politicians’ policy choices requires clear and commensurate analytic definitions of narrow goods and
associated practices.
Here, we have taken a step in this direction by emphasizing the importance of
disaggregating the targeting of narrow policy on territorial or sectoral groups based on distinguishing
direct and indirect political exchange. With the dimensions of scope and directness treated
independently, it becomes clear not only that very narrow goods provision may not be clientelism,
but that policies delivered by way of direct exchanges can be broad or even national in scope. From
this perspective, it is clear that clientelism is not merely an extreme form of particularism, but a kind
22
of political exchange that can exist throughout a range of sectoral and territorially targeted policies.
Such disaggregation, in the form of emphasizing political relationships, is central to a better
understanding how of particularism can vary across democracies, in order to assess both its causes
and consequences.
23
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28
Figure 1: Common Narrow Political Exchanges
Type of Implementation
Type of Legislative Targeting
Territorial
Sectoral
I.
Excludable
Territorial Clientelism
Sectoral Clientelism
II. Nonexcludable
Pork-barreling
Rent-provision
29