Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy University of Michigan IPC Working Paper Series Number 121 CHINA AND CAMBODIA: PATRON AND CLIENT? John D. Ciorciari June 14, 2013 1
CHINA AND CAMBODIA: PATRON AND CLIENT?
By John D. Ciorciari*
International Policy Center Working Paper No. 121
Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy, University of Michigan
June 14, 2013
Abstract
In recent years, Cambodia has become one of China’s closest international partners and
diplomatic allies. Cambodia’s recent support for China during multilateral talks on the South
China Sea has demonstrated the strength of the partnership and led some critics to depict
Cambodia as a Chinese “client state.” This paper examines the extent to which that label is
valid. In its ideal form, a patron-client relationship entails an asymmetric exchange of benefits,
typically including material support and protection from the stronger state and a degree of
deference and political support from its weaker partner. This deference, which reduces the
weaker state’s autonomy and often generates political backlash, is what makes governments
reluctant to embrace client state status. This paper argues that the Sino-Cambodian relationship
has strengthened largely because China has offered Cambodia’s governing elites a favorable
bargain, providing extensive economic and political benefits without demanding costly forms
of political fealty in return. That has begun to change, however. Cambodia’s governing elites
have become more dependent on China, more beholden to Beijing’s policy preferences, and
more closely identified with China by critics at home and abroad. The relationship has thus
taken on an increasing patron-client character, exposing Cambodia to the downside risks
inherent in such an arrangement and auguring poorly for the future if current trends continue.
In July 2012, the foreign ministers of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) assembled in Phnom Penh for their 45th annual meeting. At the top of their
agenda was the question of how to respond to China’s far-reaching claims in the South
Assistant Professor, Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy, University of Michigan. The author thanks
Sokunpanha You for his valuable research assistance and Erin Spanier for her editorial assistance. This
working paper is prepared as part of a project led by Donald Emmerson at Stanford University on
China’s relations with Southeast Asian states in the 21st century.
*
2
China Sea. The ASEAN members most directly affected by China’s claims sought to
deliver a unified message through the joint communiqué that typically follows the
ministers’ meeting. Leaked records show that several ASEAN foreign ministers favored
language regarding possible violations of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) and stressing the need for a regional Code of Conduct (COC) in the South
China Sea—language clearly directed at China. Vietnam and the Philippines also
championed a more specific provision that expressed “serious concern” over possible
violations of UNCLOS provisions on Exclusive Economic Zones and noting discussions
of Scarborough Shoal, the site of an ongoing Sino-Philippine feud.1 However,
Cambodian Foreign Minister Hor Namhong, the meeting’s chair, refused to accept that
language, citing a lack of consensus and arguing that ASEAN should avoid “strong
wording” that could “escalate tension.”2 Negotiations broke down, and for the first
time in 45 years, no joint communiqué was issued.
To many outside observers, Cambodia appeared to be doing China’s bidding,
perhaps as payback for years of liberal Chinese aid and investment. A senior diplomat
in the region reportedly said, “China bought the chair, simple as that.”3 At least one
report suggested that “the Cambodians, in a breach of ASEAN protocol, showed it to
the Chinese, who said it was unacceptable unless the South China Sea reference was
removed.
So the Cambodians sent it back for amendment.”4 Former Singaporean
1 For a detailed blow-by-blow account of the negotiations based on leaked records, see Carlyle A. Thayer,
“ASEAN’s Code of Conduct in the South China Sea: A Litmus Test for Community-Building?” The AsiaPacific Journal: Japan Focus, Aug. 20, 2012, pp. 5-13 (citing a leaked record of discussions at the ministerial
retreat).
2
Ibid.
3 Jane Perlez, “Asian Leaders at Regional Meeting Fail to Resolve Disputes Over South China Sea,” N.Y.
Times, July 12, 2012.
Roger Mitton, “ASEAN Struggles for Unity,” Phnom Penh Post, July 23, 2012. See also Ernest Z. Bower,
“China Reveals Its Hand on ASEAN in Phnom Penh,” Southeast Asia from the Corner of 18th and K Streets
(July 19, 2012), p. 2. Cambodia’s ambassador to Thailand called this claim “extremely disparaging and
slanderous” but did not explicitly refute the allegation. You Ay, Letter to the Editor, Bangkok Post, July
27, 2012.
4
3
diplomat Kishore Mahbubani added, “The whole world, including most ASEAN
countries, perceived Cambodia’s stance as the result of enormous Chinese pressure.”5
Cambodian foreign ministry official Kao Kim Hourn called Mahbubani’s claim
an “unfair accusation.”6 Other Cambodian diplomats accused Vietnam and the
Philippines of trying to “hijack” the ASEAN meetings and hold the communiqué
“hostage” to their national interests.7 Yet the evidence of Chinese influence was clear.
Two months after the ASEAN deliberations ended in stalemate, Cambodian Prime
Minister Hun Sen visited Beijing, where his counterpart Wen Jiabao announced more
than $500 million in new soft loans and grants to Cambodia. In an article in the China
Post, Aun Porn Moniroth, a senior official at the Cambodian Ministry of Economy and
Finance, noted that “the Chinese government also voiced high appreciation for the part
played by Cambodia as the chair of ASEAN to maintain good cooperation between
China and ASEAN.”8
These events reinforced a growing view that Cambodia is drifting from a
position as “China’s closest friend in Southeast Asia”9 toward something beyond an
arm’s-length diplomatic friendship.10 Thai analyst Thitinan Pongsudhirak argued that
Cambodia had become “beholden to Beijing” to a degree that makes China an “open
patron state of Phnom Penh.”11 Scholar Carlyle Thayer contended that Cambodia was
5
Kishore Mahbubani, “Is China Losing the Diplomatic Plot?” Project Syndicate, July 26, 2012.
Daniel Ten Kate and Nicole Gaouette, “Asean Fails to Reach Accord on South China Sea Disputes,”
Bloomberg News, July 12, 2012.
6
7 See Koy Kuong, Letter to the Editor, Cambodia Daily, July 26, 2012; and Hos Sereythonh, “Communiqué
only through full consensus,” Letter to the Editor, Philippine Star, July 30, 2012.
“Cambodia’s ASEAN Help Leads to Chinese Aid,” China Post, Sept. 5, 2012. Whether the loans were
planned before July is unclear.
8
9 Chheang Vannarith, “China and the Creation of ASEAN-China Free Trade Area: Implications for
Cambodia,” CICP Working Paper No. 19 (Phnom Penh: Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace,
Aug. 2007), p. 11.
Scholar Ian Storey argues that “China-Cambodian relations have gone a bit further than the rest” in
Southeast Asia. “Cambodia has put Asean’s future in jeopardy,” The Nation (Thailand), July 15, 2012.
10
11 Thitinan Pongsudhirak, “China, US widen Asean rifts,” Bangkok Post, July 27, 2012 (asserting that China
had contributed more than US $10 billion of aid to Cambodia in the past decade).
4
“showing itself as China’s stalking horse.”12 The Economist referred to Cambodia as
China’s “de facto proxy within ASEAN,”13 and others have referred to it as a Chinese
“client” or “satellite.”14
Portrayals of Cambodia as a Chinese client have had strong normative
undertones, as critics have sought to de-legitimatize Cambodia’s position on the South
China Sea by suggesting that Cambodian officials spoke not for themselves but instead
as Chinese puppets. Although small states often seek great-power support, their leaders
seldom if ever wish to become “clients,” both because they value their own freedom of
action and because identification as a client can have damaging domestic and
diplomatic repercussions.15 It is thus unsurprising that Cambodian leaders have
responded fiercely to such claims. Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen said angrily in
April 2012: “What I hate and am fed up with is talk about Cambodia working for China
and must be under some kind of influence. That is completely wrong.”16 He chided
domestic political opponents who criticized undue Chinese influence in the country and
added that Cambodia was “not going to be bought by anyone.”17 After the events of
July 2012, Cambodian ambassador to Thailand You Ay asserted that “Cambodia is a
sovereign nation. It does not kowtow to any country.”18
In fact, the Sino-Cambodian partnership has taken on an increasingly clientelistic
character. Ties have strengthened over the past fifteen years largely because
policymakers in Phnom Penh have been able to reap considerable economic and
12 Michelle Fitzpatrick, “ASEAN talks fail over Chinese territorial dispute,” Agence France Presse, July 13,
2012.
13
“Losing the Limelight,” Economist, July 17, 2012.
14 See, e.g., Rick Wallace and Michael Sainsbury, “Between a Rock and a Reef,” The Australian, Sept. 24,
2012; “All Cambodia’s—and China’s—Fault,” Manila Times, July 19, 2012; and “Booming South East Asia
in a quandary over US-China rivalry,” Reuters, July 9, 2012.
See John D. Ciorciari, The Limits of Alignment (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2010), pp.
18-25.
15
16
Greg Torode, “Asean left on a knife-edge,” South China Morning Post, July 21, 2012.
17
Martin Vaughan, “Cambodia’s Hun Sen Proves a Feisty Asean Chair,” Reuters, Apr. 4, 2012.
18
You Ay, Letter to the editor.
5
political gains from China with acceptable costs in autonomy. China has sought
resources and fealty on issues of much greater concern to Beijing than Phnom Penh,
while incumbent Cambodian elites have sought opportunities for development
assistance, personal enrichment, and political entrenchment—all of which the PRC has
supported consistently. Over time, however, Cambodia’s political economy has evolved
to render the country and its elites increasingly reliant on Chinese aid and thus
beholden to the PRC’s policy concerns. These trends bode poorly for Cambodia’s
domestic political development, both states’ regional relations, and the long-term
stability of their bilateral partnership.
AN ASYMMETRIC BUT RECIPROCAL RELATIONSHIP
In its ideal form, a patron-client relationship involves what James Scott has
described as an “instrumental friendship,” in which a patron of superior power and
status deploys its resources and influence to provide protection and benefits to the
client, who reciprocates with other forms of support and assistance.19 The contemporary
Sino-Cambodian partnership is highly unequal in material terms. Cambodia’s
population, gross national product, and military spending are all less than 1 percent the
size of China’s. While this gives China the clear capacity to benefit Cambodia—
especially in terms of aid and investment—Cambodia is far from powerless in this
dyad. Cambodia’s natural resources, its roles in multilateral forums, and its geographic
position in the heart of Southeast Asia all give it the potential to help advance China’s
pursuit of economic development and a larger diplomatic and strategic footprint.
Foundations of the Partnership
Chinese and Cambodian officials often speak of the continuity in friendship
between the two states, which developed in the 1950s, shortly after Cambodia’s
independence, during the royalist Sangkum regime led by then-Prince Norodom
19 James C. Scott, “Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia,” American Political Science
Review 66:1 (1972), p. 92. Although the theoretical literature focuses primarily on intra-state patronage,
the model also applies between highly unequal states.
6
Sihanouk. At a groundbreaking ceremony for an infrastructure project in February 2012,
Hun Sen lauded “the magnificent bond of relations between Cambodia and China
which was built by previous generation[s of] leaders…Norodom Sihanouk and leaders
Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and Liu Shaoqi.”20 In October 2012, after Sihanouk’s death in
Beijing, where he was receiving medical treatment, Premier Wen Jiabao lauded his role
in building a “profound traditional friendship” between the two states.21
The contemporary Sino-Cambodian partnership is not a product of habit or
historical affection, however. Throughout the latter stages of the Cold War, China and
the men who comprise the contemporary CPP leadership were mortal adversaries. In
addition to its support for Sihanouk, China backed the Pol Pot regime. The leaders of
the CPP—including Hun Sen, Chairman of the National Assembly Heng Samrin, and
President of the Senate Chea Sim—defected from Khmer Rouge ranks to lead the
Vietnam-backed resistance to the Pol Pot regime and fought the Third Indochina War
against PRC-supported Khmer Rouge and royalist forces between 1979 and 1991.22
It was only in the 1990s that the CPP and Chinese government put aside past
animosity to rebuild an instrumental partnership between the two states. After UNsponsored elections in 1993, the CPP brokered a compromise whereby Hun Sen served
as co-prime minister with the leader of the royalist Funcinpec party, Sihanouk’s son
Norodom Ranariddh. As tension rose between the rival parties, China read the tea
leaves of Cambodian politics, correctly wagered that the CPP would achieve
dominance, and began mending fences with Hun Sen.23 When CPP leaders sought
international support—especially after July 1997, when Hun Sen assumed control in a
Hun Sen, Selected Impromptu Address to the Groundbreaking Ceremony for the Enlargement of
National Road 6 from PK4 through to Thnal Kaeng under the Presidential Buyer’s Credit Loan from the
Government of the People’s Republic of China, Feb. 14, 2012, www.cnv.org.kh.
20
21
“Chinese premier visits Cambodian royals for condolence,” Xinhua, Oct. 15, 2012 (paraphrasing Wen).
During the 1980s, Cambodian royalists led by Sihanouk aligned with the Khmers Rouges as part of a
Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) to resist the Vietnamese occupation of
Cambodia and the Vietnam-backed People’s Republic of Kampuchea—the antecedent to the CPP.
22
23 Ian Storey, Southeast Asia and the Rise of China: The search for security (London: Routledge, 2011), p. 181
(noting that China arranged for a fully-funded visit by Hun Sen to Beijing in 1996).
7
series of partisan clashes that Western powers widely condemned as a coup—China,
which was engaged in a “charm offensive” to extend its economic and political reach in
Southeast Asia, seized the diplomatic opening.
Beijing provided Hun Sen with an immediate $10 million loan, declined to join
the chorus of the CPP’s foreign critics, and provided $2.8 million of military equipment
six months later. Facing ostracism from the West, the CPP embraced Chinese assistance
and reciprocated by cutting ties with Taiwan.24 China also gave Cambodia an estimated
$600 million in investment and development aid between 1997 and 2005 and backed
Cambodia by helping to block a purely international tribunal for the Khmers Rouges.25
According to Cambodian analyst Chheang Vannarith, “Hun Sen’s administration
inclined towards China in order to have…political and economic breathing space.”26
Against a backdrop of lingering mistrust, the two governments thus began constructing
a partnership based on twin foundations: asymmetrical economic and diplomatic
exchange and mutual non-interference on matters of core policy concern.
The relationship has since strengthened considerably, but it remains rooted in
those foundations. Just days before the July 2012 ASEAN talks, Hun Sen met with
Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, and the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs
issued a statement summarizing the relationship:
Cambodia appreciates the valuable support and help of the Chinese government
and people for Cambodia’s economic and social development. The people of
Cambodia are deeply moved by the fact that China has always lived up to its
24 Long Kosal, “Sino-Cambodia Relations,” CICP Working Paper No. 28 (Phnom Penh: Cambodian Institute
for Cooperation and Peace, July 2009), p. 8.
See Craig Etcheson, After the Killing fields: Lessons from the Cambodian Genocide (Lubbock, TX: Texas Tech
University Press, 2005), pp. 54-55; and John D. Ciorciari, “History and Politics behind the Khmer Rouge
Trials,” in John D. Ciorciari and Anne Heindel, eds., On Trial: The Khmer Rouge Accountability Process
(Phnom Penh: Documentation Center of Cambodia, 2009), chapter 1.
25
26
Chheang, “Cambodia,” p. 7.
8
word…The Chinese side appreciates the long-standing, firm support of
Cambodia for China on issues that concern China’s core interests…27
That statement captured some of the basic elements of the contemporary SinoCambodian entente. China provides economic aid and reliable political defense of
Cambodia’s sovereignty, and in exchange Cambodia provides access to resources and is
deferent on issues of core concern to Beijing—namely the PRC’s policies on Taiwan,
Chinese dissidents and separatist groups, and perhaps now the South China Sea.
The Importance of Reciprocity
It is precisely this type of reciprocity that distinguishes patron-client dyads from
relationships based on coercion or formal authority.28 Despite highly asymmetric power
resources, the Sino-Cambodian relationship is premised on a consensual exchange.
China’s limited military reach, the availability of “balancing” options, and its interest in
convincing neighbors of its peaceful intentions all lessen the appeal of coercive
strategies. There is little evidence that Beijing has attempted to compel Cambodian
allegiance through economic threats and no evidence of military coercion. As it has
done throughout the region, China has relied more heavily on inducement to pursue
stronger ties with Cambodia. Beijing has used its economic largesse and political heft as
attractive forces, becoming Cambodia’s top investor and aid provider, as well as a key
diplomatic friend.
As the literature on social exchange theory suggests, power inequality in
reciprocal relationships does not necessarily translate into an exchange of benefits that
favors the stronger state.29 The effective rate of exchange depends on the value that each
party attaches to the benefits that the other can provide. For the smaller partner, the net
benefits, typically economic assistance and various forms of political or military
27 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China, “Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen Meets
Yang Jiechi,” July 10, 2012, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t949689.htm.
John Duncan Powell, “Peasant Society and Clientelist Politics,” American Political Science Review 64:__
(1970), pp. 411-25.
28
29 Robert O. Keohane, “Reciprocity in International Relations,” International Organization 40:1 (1986), p. 6,
note 25.
9
protection, offset to some degree the risks of dependence and diminished autonomy.
The stronger state typically earns access to resources and deference on certain
diplomatic matters. It is this political deference that most typically invites critics to label
the weaker party a “client” in the pejorative sense of the term.
The degree of policy deference that a small state feels compelled to “pay” for the
benefits it receives depends on a number of factors. These include the value of the
benefits provided by the stronger partner, the other forms of reciprocation at the
weaker state’s disposal, and the international context of the interaction. When a great
power is eager to build consensual friendships, its weaker partner may be able to
extract considerable rewards while conceding little policy deference—or at least
deference that carries low political costs. In such cases, an asymmetric bond can become
quite strong without generating charges that the small state is a lackey.
The risk of diminished policy autonomy is a key reason why leaders of small
developing states are generally wary of entering into close asymmetric relationships
with great powers. Most such leaders preside over societies that have suffered from
colonial rule and subsequent imperial intrusion, leading them to prize their sovereignty
and understand the risks of dependence. Cambodia is a case in point. Throughout its
history, Cambodia has struggled with foreign intrusion. Centuries of Siamese and
Vietnamese encroachment were followed by seven decades of French rule. When
Cambodia finally won its independence from France in 1953, it became the site of an
elaborate proxy war marked by frequent foreign intervention and a decade of
Vietnamese occupation. Why, then, have Cambodian leaders accepted closer ties to
Beijing at a time when China’s relative power is rising and presents increased risks of
dominance or dependency? The answer is twofold: China has been willing and able to
provide economic and political benefits prized by the incumbent Cambodian leadership
and, until quite recently, Beijing has not demanded costly forms of policy deference
from Cambodia in return.
AN EXCHANGE OF BENEFITS
10
Any reciprocal partnership entails an exchange of benefits. Although China
provides substantial economic aid to Cambodia, which reciprocates to some degree
with policy deference, the bidirectional flow of benefits is more complex than a simple
aid-for-influence swap. China also derives important economic benefits from the
relationship, and the Cambodian government gets more than money for development—
it gets assistance in a form that reinforces elite positions in the domestic political
economy and buttresses the government against domestic and foreign critics.
The Forms of Chinese Patronage
Cambodian decision-makers have derived a number of benefits from their
partnership with China. The most obvious are economic. Although China has invested
heavily in economic links throughout Southeast Asia and beyond, its penetration in
Cambodia has been particularly great and can best be explained by reference to the
structure of Cambodia’s domestic political economy, which enables China to operate in
the country on favorable terms and makes Chinese investment practices particularly
appealing to Cambodian elites. The relationship has also had related domestic political,
diplomatic, and security payoffs for Phnom Penh.
Chinese Development Assistance
Chinese aid and investment have provided important benefits both to national
development and the pecuniary and political interests of Cambodia’s decision-making
elites. Official Chinese aid is often difficult to disentangle from ordinary loans
channeled through China’s state-run banks, because China does not use standard
international definitions of official development aid.30 Volumes of Chinese financial
assistance are also difficult to assess due to frequent double-counting in official
announcements. Nevertheless, China clearly has become Cambodia’s largest foreign
investor and donor for large infrastructure projects.
30 See May Tan-Mullins, Gile Mohan, and Marcus Power, “Redefining ’aid’ in the China–Africa context,”
Development and Change 41:5 (2010), pp. 857–881.
11
Between 1994 and 2011, China was responsible for more than $8.8 billion of
approved investments in Cambodia—much larger than any other bilateral partner and
approximately 36 percent of Cambodia’s total approved foreign investments during
that period.31 Moreover, China’s share has risen over time. In 2011 alone, Chinese
investment in Cambodia totaled $1.9 billion, ten times the U.S. investment and more
than double the combined ASEAN figure.32 Cambodia’s GDP during the same year was
only $13 billion, making clear the importance of the Chinese financial contribution.33
China’s project-based lending—typically via infrastructure deals in which
Cambodia borrows from China and then hires Chinese firms to lead the project—has
also increased dramatically. The PRC’s largesse in Cambodia largely reflects the high
degree of congruence between China’s comparative advantages as an investor and
Cambodia’s very real development needs. Cambodian officials and international
advisors agree that Cambodia’s path to sustainable growth and more equitable wealth
distribution must include diversifying its domestic industry portfolio to include exportoriented agriculture and extractive industries. Both of these industries, however,
require costly energy and infrastructure improvements.34 Many such improvements
have been funded by the PRC in recent years. Between 2009 and 2012, for example,
China provided Cambodia a $436 million soft loan for irrigation and agricultural
development;35 soft loans of $73 million and $52 million for expansions of the national
Road to the outlying areas of Preah Vihear, Pailin, and Ratanakiri;36 and several major
Suon Sophal, Council for the Development of Cambodia, “Cambodia: FDI and Government Policy,” p.
20, available at http://www.adbi.org/files/2012.10.09.cpp.sess3.3.suon.cambodia.fdi.pdf. South orea was
next at $4 billion, and the European Union followed with $3.6 billion.
31
32
“Cambodia’s ASEAN Help Leads to Chinese Aid.”
33
World Bank, Data: Cambodia, available at http://data.worldbank.org/country/cambodia.
34
Steve Heder, “Cambodia in 2010: Hun Sen’s Further Consolidation,” Asian Survey 51:1 (2011), p. 210.
“China provide largest loan to Cambodia for agriculture, irrigation development,” Xinhua, July 17, 2012
(noting that several other states and organizations contributed much smaller amounts).
35
“Cambodia inaugurates China-funded road,” Xinhua, Aug. 8, 2012; “China provides soft loan for
Cambodia’s road development,” TTXVN Vietnam, May 21, 2009; and “China to continue helping
Cambodia with infrastructure,” Xinhua, Mar. 12, 2011.
36
12
“Cambodia-China friendship bridges.”37 Other major Chinese-funded projects include a
$3.8 billion beachfront property development project in Kampot, and eight
hydroelectric dam projects worth $1 billion.38
The Chinese firms that typically manage PRC-funded projects tend to have
ample experience in energy and infrastructure projects and are relatively efficient
providers from a cost standpoint—especially since their projects are normally not
“encumbered” by conditions pertaining to environmental protection, labor regulations,
or human rights. China is also willing to undertake projects that other donors are not.
For example, China is managing most of Cambodia’s hydroelectric dam projects, and a
leaked U.S. State Department cable reports that some, including the Kamchay Dam in
Bokor National Park, are “in areas that other donors explored and then dismissed,
citing environmental and economic concerns.”39
Although the quality of some Chinese infrastructure projects has been poor, even
leading Hun Sen to complain in 2012 about crumbling Chinese-funded roads,40
Cambodian officials are wary of Japanese and Western donors who work much more
slowly and attach complex conditions to funding. In general, Cambodia welcomes
China’s willingness to build quickly and with few environmental and social
conditions.41 In June 2012, Cambodia announced that it was approaching China to fund
a $600 million extension of the trans-ASEAN rail line to Vietnam, citing problems with a
“complicated” loan from the Asian Development Bank (ADB)—widely understood to
refer to the ADB’s environmental and other safeguards.42
See, e.g., “Construction of 4th Cambodia-China friendship bridge begins in Cambodia,” Xinhua, July 6,
2011.
37
38 “China top investor in Cambodia in 2008,” Xinhua, Feb. 5, 2009; and John Pomfret, “China’s muscular
embrace of Cambodia,” Washington Post, Nov. 21, 2010.
Unclassified cable form the U.S. Embassy in Phnom Penh, “Cambodia’s Race for Hydropower
Continues,” Cable 08PHNOMPENH1003 (Dec. 18, 2008), ¶6, available at www.dazzlepod.com.
39
40
“PM wants better roads,” Radio Free Asia, Oct. 11, 2012.
41
See ibid. ¶¶ 7, 22.
42
“China may fund Cambodia-Vietnam rail,” Phnom Penh Post, June 13, 2012.
13
The Cambodian government has also welcomed expanded trade. While
Cambodia remains a minor trading partner for China—accounting for less than 0.1
percent of the PRC’s total two-way trade in 201143—the reverse is no longer true.
Between 2001 and 2011, official Chinese exports to Cambodia soared from less than $90
million to roughly $2.5 billion—approximately one quarter of all Cambodian imports,44
while official Cambodian exports to China rose from negligible levels to $184 million
over the same period.45 In addition to its obligations under the ASEAN China Free
Trade Agreement, China has enacted measures to reduce barriers to Cambodian goods,
especially rice, and the two governments have announced a goal of 1 million tons of
Cambodian rice exports to China by 2015.
Political Consolidation and the Neopatrimonial State
Cambodian
elites
have
profited
handsomely
from
Chinese
economic
engagement, both in pecuniary and political terms, because the political and economic
systems in Cambodia are so closely intertwined. Kheang Un and Sokbunthoen So
characterize Cambodia as a “neopatrimonial state” in which elements of a modernized
bureaucracy are combined with personalized patronage networks, blurring the line
between the public and private spheres.46 Indeed, Hun Sen has achieved dominance in
Cambodian politics largely through patronage relationships. His military, economic,
and political levers of power are closely intertwined. Decisions are made by a relatively
small number of elite officials and business tycoons connected closely to them through
blood, marriage, and shared business interests. Many of the decision-makers are ethnic
Chinese who have built some trust with Chinese counterparts due to cultural and
linguistic affinity.
43
Derived from data in Asian Development Bank, Key Indicators 2012 (Manila: ADB, 2012).
44
Asian Development Bank, Key Indicators 2012: Cambodia (Manila: ADB, 2012), p. 5.
“Cambodia’s trade with China in 2011 up 73.5 pct,” Xinhua, Feb. 10, 2012 (citing a report from the
Chinese embassy in Cambodia). These numbers almost certainly understate the true volume of trade due
to the prevalence of illicit commerce in lumber and other commodities.
45
46 Kheang Un and Sokbunthoeun So, “Land Rights in Cambodia: Now Neopatrimonial Politics Restricts
land Policy Reform,” Pacific Affairs 84:2 (2011), p. 294.
14
CPP members control almost all aspects of the bureaucracy and security services,
enabling them to command loyalty through the unequal distribution of public resources
and selective application of the law. The CPP’s bureaucratic grip on society—which has
its roots in the 1980s—has also helped the party win over key elite constituencies and
much of the general population, which in turn has given the CPP an important source
of governing legitimacy and has helped diminish legislative and judicial checks on
executive power, which are now extremely weak. The CPP also has used business
licenses and lucrative government positions to win the allegiance of key elite
constituencies, who channel funds back toward the top of the pyramid of patronage.47
Managing this system is made easier by the fact that Cambodia’s economy relies
heavily on natural resource rents and foreign aid, which provide large revenue streams
that government officials can distribute to preferred constituencies. To some extent,
Cambodia is what Giacomo Luciani has called an “allocation state”—one that relies on
the allocation of non-tax revenue to survive rather than the promotion and taxation of
productive private economic enterprise.48 Approximately half of the government’s
revenue comes from foreign aid alone.49 Rents from natural resources and land
concessions also provide substantial foreign exchange, though the precise volume of
official and unofficial flows is difficult to estimate.
Foreign investment tends to be channeled through a group of what Steve Heder
calls “economic mandarins,” most of whom are ethnic Chinese. These include tycoons
such as Ly Yong Phat and Lao Meng Khin.50 Foreign investment—which is now
enormous relative to the size of Cambodia’s economy—flows through their private
companies to the military and police forces, which are paid to secure (or sometimes
obtain) land or facilities. It also flows back to civilian officials through bribes and kick-
47
Un and So, “Land Rights in Cambodia,” pp. 294-95.
48 Giacomo Luciani, “Allocation vs. Production States: A Theoretical Framework,” in Giacomo Luciani,
ed., The Arab State (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1990), pp. 65-84.
49
U.S. State Department, Fact Sheet on U.S.-Cambodian Relations, June 13, 2012.
50
Heder, “Cambodia in 2010,” p. 209.
15
backs.51 Some of those funds are recycled through patronage networks to bolster the
CPP’s position, especially in advance of commune-level and national elections.
Hun Sen and the CPP enjoy genuine appeal in the countryside for delivering
relative peace and stability—and more recently uneven but significant economic
growth—to Cambodia. But their control over the flow of money through key patronage
networks remains an important pillar of their political power. China has been more
than willing to acquiesce in those arrangements. Chinese willingness to engage in
corrupt practices has also strengthened the link, as Cambodian officials take payment
from the Chinese for licenses, permits, and contracts. In 2011, Cambodia ranked 164th
out of 182 states in the annual Transparency International Corruption Perceptions
Index. Within Asia, only Myanmar was lower.52
Chinese support has also helped abet another pillar of the CPP’s power—
repression of political dissent. Funcinpec has since receded as a viable opposition party
in Cambodia, but Western governments and the populations of expatriate Khmers in
Western states continue to support opposition parties. The liberal Sam Rainsy Party
(SRP) rose as Funcinpec weakened and is now joined by the Human Rights Party as the
principal opposition parties. The CPP has co-opted some of its opponents but has used
violence and intimidation to weaken others—as in cases such as the murder of labor
activist Chea Vichea. Despite such practices, and sometimes precisely when Cambodia
has faced pressure for reform from Western and Japanese donors, China has taken
symbolic steps to voice its political support for the CPP, most notably by building the
Council of Ministers building in Phnom Penh beside the Prime Minister’s office.
The relationship between a great power and a “friendly,” heavy-handed
government in a smaller state is nothing new—the United States has forged many such
ties. For the CPP, there are few if any alternatives to China. Little trust of Western
For a detailed account of how this system has functioned in the logging sector, see Global Witness,
Cambodia’s Family Trees (June 2007).
51
52
Transparency
International,
Corruption
Perceptions
http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2011/results/#CountryResults.
16
Index
2011,
available
at
governments exists in the ranks of the CPP, making those options unappealing.
Vietnam is also not a viable alternative. Opposition parties have long sought to
characterize the CPP as Vietnamese puppets—a charge deeply resonant in a country
that was occupied for a decade by Vietnamese troops.53 Opposition figures also have
criticized CPP leaders for becoming too cozy with Thailand—a charge that has also
been sensitive due to ongoing territorial disputes and a history of perceived Thai (and
Vietnamese) encroachment on Khmer territory. The absence of other appealing patrons
makes China a particularly attractive aid provider to the CPP as it manages its
“allocation state.”
The Diplomatic Payoffs from Chinese Aid
In addition to helping keep the Cambodian power elite at the top of the food
chain, the influx of Chinese aid and investment has helped them resist international
pressure on a variety of governance issues. As Sophal Ear argues, “When Cambodia
falls under pressure from international bodies to reform its human rights abuses,
corruption, oppression of its people, or misuse of power, it turns to China for financial
support.”54 China has seized such opportunities. For example, the World Bank ceased
lending to Cambodia in 2010 due to flooding and forced evictions of villagers in the
area of a development project to fill the Boueng Kak Lake in Phnom Penh. Rather than
address the remedy the situation, Cambodia simply turned to China to finance the
project.55
China’s large aid packages also have made it more difficult for Western donors
and UN agencies to link annual aid packages to political reforms.56 In early 2006, while
Western and UN donor agencies pressed Cambodia to uphold its promise to draft and
See “Opposition Slams Border Agreement,” Radio Free Asia, June 18, 2012 (noting Hun Sen’s rejection of
opposition charges that he is a Vietnamese puppet); and A. Gaffar Peang-Meth, “Cambodians must join
to oust Hun Sen,” Pacific Daily News, May 11, 2011.
53
54
Ear, Aid Dependence in Cambodia, pp. 29-30.
55
“Land Evictions Still the Main Risk,” Business Monitor Online, Sept. 13, 2011.
56
Paul Marks, “China’s Cambodia Strategy,” Parameters Journal 30 (2000), p. 94.
17
enact an anti-corruption law, China delivered $600 million in aid.57 Cambodia’s other
donors soon followed, pledging a similar figure despite Cambodia’s meager progress
toward the anti-graft law.58 Hun Sen lauded the PRC as Cambodia’s “most trustworthy
friend” and thanked the PRC publicly several months later for not lecturing him on
governance and noting that “no condition was imposed, no benchmark was set” for the
Chinese aid.59 Cambodia’s enhanced capacity to resist pressure from Western aid
agencies and multilateral development banks may not be in the interest of the general
Cambodian population, but it is certainly appreciated by CPP leaders and helps cement
the Sino-Cambodian relationship.60
Chinese aid has given Cambodia added leverage vis-à-vis the United States and
other key bilateral donors fearful of China’s strategic reach. In November 2010, U.S.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said in a public meeting with Cambodian students
“you don’t want to get too dependent on any one country.”61 Concerned about China’s
growing influence in Cambodia, she indicated at a joint press conference that the
United States would add to its support for the UN-backed Khmer Rouge tribunal and
lauded Cambodia’s (dubious) “progress in countering corruption.” She also said that
the United States was “very, very interested” in exploring ways to retire roughly $450
million in debt that Cambodia owes the United States from the early 1970s, when
Washington lent money to the Lon Nol regime.62
Just three days later, China
57
Amy Kazmin, “China boosts Cambodian relations with $600m pledge,” Financial Times, Apr. 10, 2006.
58
Hannah Beech, “Cambodia Keeps Taking, Gives Little,” TIME, July 22, 2007.
“PM Hun Sen thanks China for not reprimanding Cambodia when giving aid,” Associated Press, Nov. 1,
2006.
59
60 Scholar Brantly Womack argues, “the international aid community feels that it loses leverage because of
China’s independent behavior. However, given the needs of Cambodia and the ignorance and arrogance
of some international donors, the steadfastness of China’s support is appreciated.” Womack, China
Among Equals, p. 241.
61
John Pomfret, “Clinton urges Cambodia to strike a balance with China,” Washington Post, Nov. 1, 2010.
62 Jay Solomon, “Clinton Presses Cambodia on China,” Wall Street Journal, Nov. 2, 2010; and “Clinton
pushes for Khmer Rouge trials,” UPI, Nov. 1, 2010. Clinton also said that the United States was keen to
support the Khmer Rouge tribunal
18
announced that it would forgive $4 million of debt owed to China from the Khmer
Rouge era.63
A leaked U.S. Embassy cable issued in January 2007 revealed clearly how China’s
interest in Cambodia has contributed to Cambodia’s leverage with the United States:
As has long been the case, Cambodia remains something of a “sideshow” in
which world and regional powers (China, Vietnam, Thailand, and the U.S.) vie
for influence or, at the very least, compete to preempt others from gaining too
strong a hold on Cambodia. The Cambodians, for their part, have long tried to
play off these competing powers against one another in order to advance their
own interests. In these equations, the role of China is pivotal, as it expands its
influence in the region. In Cambodia, the Chinese have been particularly
successful given USG reticence in the past to engage more energetically with the
Cambodian government.64
In recent years, the U.S. government has indeed increased its engagement. The United
States is not the only country to court Phnom Penh with an eye toward countering
Chinese influence. Japan has provided tens of millions of dollars to the Cambodian
government in support of the Khmer Rouge tribunal,65 along with other aid that some
analysts perceive as part of a broader effort to balance Chinese political clout in
Cambodia.66
A Modest Military Dimension
In addition to economic and political support, patron-client relationships
typically imply an exchange of security services; the patron offers protection, and the
63
Chun Sakada, “China Forgives $4 Million in Khmer Rouge-era Debt,” VOA Khmer, Nov. 4, 2010.
64 Unclassified cable from the U.S. Embassy in Pnhom Penh, Cable 07PHNOMPENH16, “Scenesetter for
PDAS Kathleen Stephens January 2024 Visit to Cambodia,” Jan. 5, 2007, ¶1, available at
www.dazzlepod.com.
See Cable from the U.S. Embassy in Phnom Penh, “Friends of the ECCC or RGC?” Cable
07PHNOMPENH429 (Mar. 16, 2007) ¶ 2, available at www.dazzlepod.com.
65
66 See John D. Ciorciari and Anne Heindel, Hybrid Justice: The Extraordinary Chamber in the Courts of
Cambodia (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, forthcoming), chapters 1 and 3. See also Puy Kea,
“Japan in Cambodia has China aid rival,” Kyodo News, Feb. 9, 2011; “Japan in Cambodia,” Japan Times,
Feb. 27, 2011.
19
client helps its stronger partner project power or wage security campaigns. There is
some realist, balance-of-threat logic to Sino-Cambodian security cooperation.
Historically, both countries have sought to avoid encirclement by hostile neighbors.
China has long been fearful of encirclement by rival great powers such as the United
States and Soviet Union and their allies along the Pacific Rim, including the Indochinese
states. Cambodia’s strategic circle is defined primarily by the larger states flanking its
western and eastern borders, Thailand and Vietnam. Border and maritime disputes
with Vietnam and Thailand—most notably over the temple of Preah Vihear—give
Cambodian leaders reason to seek external support.
The logic of counter-encirclement helps explain the emergence of the SinoCambodian relationship during Prince Norodom Sihanouk’s royalist Sangkum regime in
the 1950s and 1960s, as well as the unsavory alliance between China and the Pol Pot
regime in the late 1970s, when China funneled extensive military aid and training to
Cambodia to confront Vietnam. The contemporary Sino-Cambodian relationship is
much more modest from a defense standpoint. The two states have no formal alliance
or agreement on mutual defense, and their informal security ties are quite limited. This
reflects the high perceived risks to both sides of entering into a robust military pact,
which would compromise China’s “charm offensive” in Southeast Asia, alienate
Cambodian’s neighbors, and undermine both the actual and apparent autonomy of the
Hun Sen government.67
Nevertheless, China has provided military aid to Cambodia and is now the
largest foreign source of such assistance.68 China provided Cambodia with $60 million
in soft loans to buy nine naval patrol boats, which arrived in 2007, and financed
Cambodia’s upgrade of the Ream Naval Base.69 In 2011, China lent Cambodia $195
million to purchase Zhishengji-9 twin-engined light utility helicopters,70 and in May
67
Ciorciari, The Limits of Alignment, pp. 198-200.
68
Chheang, “Cambodia,” p. 9.
69
Storey, Southeast Asia, p. 187.
“China to supply Z-9 helos to Cambodia,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, Aug 22, 2011. These helicopters
transport up to 8 troops and are typically used for search and rescue operations.
70
20
2012 the two states signed a military cooperation agreement to support military
capacity building, including training for Cambodian military personnel.71
The supplies and training China has provided to the Cambodian armed forces
are far from a level that would enable Cambodia to rival its neighbors, however. Even
in the period between 2008 and 2011, when the Thai army posed a clear threat to
Cambodian territorial interests and clashed with the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces
(RCAF) over the temple of Preah Vihear, China did not intervene visibly. Perhaps this is
due partly to the partnership China has enjoyed with the Thai military since the end of
the Vietnam War. If Cambodian leaders seek strong Chinese protection against
Thailand through arms or explicit diplomatic intervention, they have likely been
disappointed.
Rather than attempting to arm Cambodia heavily, China has used military aid as
a sign of political support. The clearest example occurred in April 2010, after the United
States cancelled a shipment of 200 military trucks to Cambodia to protest Phnom Penh’s
deportation of 20 Uighur asylum seekers back to China. Less than three weeks later,
China donated 257 military trucks to Cambodia to compensate Cambodia for the loss of
the U.S. trucks. Cambodia’s deputy defense minister Moeung Samphan said, “What
Cambodia has requested, China has always provided us with whatever it could.” 72
Some analysts have suggested that China’s close ties to Cambodia and provision
of military aid suggest an “implicit security guarantee.”73 Although the extent of that
implicit assurance is unclear, China’s political and economic support has offered
Cambodia an additional layer of protection from encroachment or bullying by its larger
immediate neighbors. Thai analyst Pavin Chachavalpongpun argues that China’s ties
with the Hun Sen regime have had the effect of “pulling the country out of the
71
“Cambodian Chinese defense ministers ink military cooperation pact,” Xinhua, May 28, 2012.
72
Sopheng Cheng, “China gives 257 military trucks to Cambodia,” Associated Press, June 23, 2010.
73 See, e.g., Catherin E. Dalpino, “Consequences of a Growing China,” Statement before the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, June 7, 2005.
21
Vietnamese and Thai orbit.”74 That is true indeed, but in the process Cambodia has
drifted toward a Chinese orbit that is likely to have an even stronger gravitational pull.
The Myth of Unconditional Aid
A common refrain in analysis of Chinese relations with Cambodia—and many
other states in the Global South—is that Beijing curries favor by providing
unconditional aid. Cambodian officials often stress their appreciation for Chinese noninterference. “China talks less but does a lot,” Hun Sen declared in 2006 after receiving
a $600 million pledge of Chinese aid.75 In September 2009, while opening a Chinesefunded bridge, he added: “China respects the political decisions of Cambodia. They
build bridges and roads and there are no complicated conditions.”76 Cambodian and
Chinese officials repeat the mantra of non-interference at regular bilateral investment
fêtes as ribbons are cut on new roads, bridges, and dams. In February 2012, Hun Sen
lauded China at a groundbreaking ceremony for the China-funded expansion of a major
national highway, stressing the “respect” shown by China’s leaders and that “China
always responds to projects judged to be Cambodia’s priority.”77
Chinese officials have likewise been keen to emphasize the extent to which it
adheres to the norm of non-interference—a norm reified both in ASEAN diplomatic
circles and in China’s Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. For example, at a bridge
opening in 2011, PRC Ambassador to Cambodia Pan Guangxie said that “China
supports Cambodia to develop its economy independently and with its ownership.”78
To some degree, shared experiences of imperialism and consequent attachment to
sovereignty norms have provided a basis for Sino-Cambodian friendship in the past.79
74
Pavin Chachavalpongpun, “ASEAN at 45: Still unsettled over China,” Straits Times, Aug. 10, 2012.
Patrick Barta, “Cambodia Says No Strings Attached in Recent Chinese Aid,” Wall Street Journal, Sept. 6,
2012.
75
76
Sebastian Strangio, “China’s Aid Emboldens Cambodia,” YaleGlobal, May 16, 2012.
77
Hun Sen, Selected Impromptu Address.
78
“Cambodia opens china-funded bridge for traffic,” Xinhua, Jan. 24, 2011.
For an argument on the importance of the Five Principles in the evolution of the modern SinoCambodian relationship, see Sophie Richardson, China, Cambodia, and the Five Principles of Peaceful
Coexistence (New York, Columbia University Press, 2007).
79
22
However, the rhetoric of unconditional lending and respect for sovereignty is often a
thin veil for a reciprocal arrangement that shows ample evidence of an implicit quid pro
quo.
The implicit conditions China attaches are quite different than the strings
attached to grants and loans from the Bretton Woods institutions or major Western
capitals. Loans from the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and Japanese and
Western donors typically feature numerous conditions and disbursement triggers
pertaining to matters including project transparency, environmental and social
assessments, labor rights, and broader economic policies. Chinese aid packages come
without explicit policy conditions, but not without expectations of reciprocity. Claims
on both sides to the contrary are insincere. The main difference between Chinese and
Western aid is that the implicit conditions China attaches generally have been the types
that CPP leaders are more willing to fulfill.
Preferential Access to Resources and Cheap Labor
Among the implicit conditions of Chinese aid are that Cambodian officials will
deal with the PRC largely through bilateral channels and facilitate China’s access to
coveted resources. A leaked 2007 cable from the U.S. Embassy in Phnom Penh asserted:
Prime Minister Hun Sen frequently seizes on China’s “no strings attached”
attitude to criticize other donors who seek to tie aid to political and economic
reforms—rather than the Chinese model of just tying assistance to greater and
easier access to natural resources. China’s persistent refusal to engage with other
donors in Cambodia undermines the efforts of all donors to promote
accountability and progress on Cambodia’s toughest governance challenges. A
number of ASEAN missions openly worry about China’s increasing influence
and the Japanese especially complain about China’s “no strings” assistance.80
The quotations around the words “no strings” were not accidental. As U.S. Ambassador
Carol Rodley wrote in a separate cable, “many point to the Chinese access to mineral
80 Unclassified cable for the U.S. Embassy in Phnom Penh, Cable 07PHNOMPENH926, “Encouraging
Chinese Engagement with Cambodia’s Donors,” July 10, 2007, ¶2, available at www.dazzlepod.com.
23
and resource wealth as number one among a number of non-transparent quid pro
quos.”81
Foremost among China’s resource needs is energy. In 2004-2005, the U.S. energy
firm Chevron discovered hydrocarbon deposits in Cambodia’s coastal waters in the
Gulf of Thailand and estimated the available oil to be between 700 million and two
billion barrels. China competed for rights to drill in the six identified offshore blocks
with oil and gas deposits. In 2007, Cambodia awarded exclusive exploration and
production rights to one of the blocks to the state-owned China National Offshore Oil
Company (CNOOC),82 which began drilling its first well in December 2011 and was
proceeding on its fourth by August 2012.83 Cambodia awarded the other five blocks to
an array of bidders, two of which had close links to China. The oil these concessions
will produce remains unclear, but China has been keen to establish a leading position in
Cambodia’s fledgling oil industry. In late 2012, a Chinese state-owned firm also agreed
to build Cambodia’s first oil refinery in partnership with the state-owned Cambodian
Petrochemical Company.84
China has also sought access to lumber, mining, and other resources. Many of
the companies involved in logging in Cambodia are Chinese-owned or joint ventures,
including the two holding the largest land concessions, Wuzhishan and Pheapimex, and
the Chinese firm Green Rich, accused of illegal logging in 2004.85 In Mondul Kiri in
northeast Cambodia, Chinese firms have extensive concessions. Cambodian Interior
Minister Sar Kheng reportedly said that the area around one Chinese gold mine and
hemp plantation “is like a country within a country” where Cambodian police do not
81 Confidential cable from the U.S. Embassy in Phnom Penh, “Cambodia’s Year of China,” Cable
08PHNOMPENH1025 (Dec. 24, 2008), ¶ 9, available at www.dazzlepod.com.
82
Neil Gough, “CNOOC wins rights for Cambodian oil block,” South China Morning Post, June 9, 2007.
83 “CNOOC to start drilling 1st oil well in Cambodia,” China Daily, Dec. 14, 2011; and “CNOOC’s drilling
rig performing ‘well,’” Shanghai Daily, Aug. 23, 2012.
84
“Cambodia, Chinese firms unveil 1st refinery project in Cambodia,” Xinhua,¸Dec. 28, 2012.
85
Cable 07PHNOMPENH926, ¶ 5.
24
go.86 This is an extreme instance of a more general phenomenon. Once high-level
approvals are issued, Chinese firms are subject to few checks by local authorities, who
often conspire in illicit or environmentally unfriendly activity in exchange for side
payments.87 This system, which to some degree puts Chinese firms above the law, offers
relatively cheap and easy access to coveted resources while lining the pockets of some
local Cambodian officials. Opposition to such arrangements has sometimes met with
brutal responses. In 2012, environmental activist Chut Wutty was killed while
investigating illegal logging in protected areas of the Central Cardammon Forest
around a Chinese-built dam project.88
Transportation infrastructure projects in Cambodia provide further profit
opportunities for Chinese investment and construction firms, as well as longer-term
promise as links connecting China to larger Southeast Asian markets.89 China envisions
an “M-shaped” engagement with Southeast Asia, or what has been described as a “One
Axis, Two Wings” strategy including the Pan Beibu Gulf Economic Zone and Greater
Mekong Subregion as the wings and the Nanning-Singapore Economic Corridor as the
Axis.90 Cambodia features prominently in China’s Mekong strategy.
China also has invested heavily in Cambodian hydropower, textiles, garments,
agriculture (especially rubber), tourism, minerals, finance, and transportation. Chinese
investors own approximately 90 percent of textile firms and nearly all hydropower
plants in Cambodia, which sell electricity to the public utility, Électricité du
Cambodge.91 When Chinese firms and their Cambodian business partners have
86
Pomfret, “China’s muscular embrace of Cambodia.”
87 This has been particularly apparent in the logging industry. See, e.g., Michael Sullivan, “As China
Builds, Cambodia’s Forests Fall,” NPR, Jan. 29, 2013.
According to several studies, China is the principal importer of illegal lumber from Cambodia. The
killer was given a light sentence and freed almost immediately after his conviction. Khuon Narim, “Killer
in Chut Wutty Case Could Be Free in Days,” Cambodia Daily, Oct. 23, 2012.
88
89
See Jonathan Holslag, “China’s Roads to Influence,” Asian Survey 50:4 (2010).
Zhiqun Zhu, China’s New Diplomacy: Rationale, Strategies, and Significance (London: Ashgate, 2010), p.
175.
90
91
Chheang, “Cambodia,” p. 15.
25
encountered opposition from local labor unions or human rights activists, the
Cambodian authorities have responded swiftly and harshly. In February 2012, when
workers protested for higher pay at Chinese and Taiwanese-owned garment factories in
the eastern province of Svay Rieng, the local governor shot into the crowd and
wounded three women. He was later fired, but not imprisoned.92
Again, this appears to be part of an understood quid pro quo; China invests, and
Cambodian authorities help minimize local impediments to quick project profitability,
often to the detriment of ordinary Cambodian citizens.93
Chinese investment has
brought mixed social results, injecting much-needed capital but contributing to
widespread land seizures and environmental degradation. These adverse consequences
almost exclusively affect ordinary people, however. Government-linked elites reap the
rewards of an economic system marked by low transparency and high corruption,94
contributing to rapidly rising wealth at the top of the income distribution.95 Pacts
between local elites and foreign investors are hardly unique, but Sino-Cambodian
investment practices are particularly unfettered and help give China an edge in seeking
resources vis-à-vis many foreign competitors.
Modest Military Support
China derives much less substantial defense-related benefits from its
contemporary partnership with Cambodia. Like Phnom Penh, Beijing has a major
interest in avoiding strategic encirclement. For China, the relevant circle extends across
Andrew Higgins, “Land disputes in Cambodia focus ire on Chinese investors,” Washington Post, Sept.
25, 2012.
92
93 See Sigfrido Burgos and Sophal Ear, “China’s Strategic Interests in Cambodia: Interests and Resources,”
Asian Survey 50:3 (2010).
U.S. ambassador Carol Rodley argued that “lack of transparency in the [Sino-Cambodian] economic
relationship and the decision-making process in general enables the politically connected to benefit from
concessions at the expense of the Cambodian people and the environment.”
Cable
08PHNOMPENH1025, ¶ 14.
94
95 According to the World Bank, in 2008 Cambodia’s Gini coefficient was 0.379, and 10% of the population
held 31.4% of national income. Those figures, the most recent available, are high in international
perspective though roughly in line with the high figures in most Southeast Asian states. World Bank,
Word Development Indicators 2012 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2012), p. 74.
26
the Pacific Rim and Eurasian landmass and includes the PRC’s geographic underbelly
in mainland Southeast Asia and the potential dagger of its traditional rival, Vietnam.
Territorial feuds in the South China Sea, Indo-U.S. rapprochement, and the U.S. “pivot”
to Asia have contributed to perceptions in Beijing of a tightening ring of containment.
Cambodia offers a potential breach in that ring.
Chinese dependence on the flow of goods and energy through the Indian Ocean
and Malacca Straits has driven China’s strategic interest in developing a blue-water
naval presence in those areas. The Cambodian port of Kampong Saom offers a potential
locus for the future projection of Chinese maritime power in the southern Asian
littoral.96
There is little indication that Kampong Saom will soon emerge as a significant
hub for expanded Chinese naval activity or a part of a Chinese “string of pearls” in
southern Asia, however. In late 2008, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy
vessel Zheng He became the first PRC naval vessel to stop at Kampong Saom on a
regional goodwill tour,97 but a similar tour in April 2012 left Cambodia off the itinerary
and chose Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei as its ports of call.98 During the same period,
the United States and others have sent a number of naval ships to Cambodian ports for
more substantive military engagement. In 2010, Cambodia began annual joint
Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) exercises with the U.S. navy,99
and in October 2012, three Japanese navy ships docked at Kampong Saom as part of a
visit to expand naval relations.100 Rather than abetting China’s naval expansion,
Cambodia is cooperating more substantially with China’s main naval rivals.
96 Ian Storey, “China’s Tightening Relationship with Cambodia,” Jamestown Foundation China Brief 6:9
(2006).
97
“Chinese military vessel makes first ever visit to Cambodia,” Xinhua, Nov. 5, 2008.
98 “‘Zheng He’ oceangoing training warship sets sail for round-the-world tour,” China Military Online,
Apr. 16, 2012.
“U.S., Cambodian naval forces to jointly conduct naval exercises next week,” Xinhua, Oct. 20, 2012
(noting that the 2012 exercises will last for five days and feature the participation of the USS Vandegrift of
the U.S. Seventh Fleet).
99
100
“Japanese navy vessels have docked in Sihanoukville,” Xinhua, Oct. 8, 2012.
27
Support for Core Chinese Political Concerns
Although China does not attach explicit conditions that infringe clearly on the
Cambodian government’s domestic political prerogatives, aid carries an implicit
expectation that Cambodia will support Beijing on certain interests of core concern to
Beijing. Cambodia has supported the one-China policy since 1997, when it closed the
Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in Phnom Penh and banned
Cambodian officials from visiting Taiwan in an official capacity. Since then, CPP
support for the policy has been resolute. At a 2010 meeting of sub-national Cambodian
officials attended by the Chinese chargé d’affaires, Hun Sen elaborated on that policy by
noting that Taiwan had repeatedly requested re-opening a representative office in
Cambodia but reminding the officials that hoisting the Taiwanese flag in Cambodia was
prohibited. He warned that any provincial governor violating that order would be
removed immediately.101 Beijing’s expectation of Cambodian support the one-China
policy is clear; official Chinese statements and news reports on bilateral relations
unfailingly follow descriptions of new aid programs with references to Cambodia’s
continued adherence to the one-China policy.102
Cambodia has also supported China on other policy issues of key concern to
Beijing, such as condemning the avowedly accidental 1999 NATO bombing of the
Chinese Embassy in Belgrade,103 refusing to grant a visa to the Dalai Lama and
repressing Falun Gong activities in the country in 2002,104 and withdrawing support for
Japan’s bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council in 2005.105 CPP leaders
have defended China’s domestic economic development schemes as well, even at some
cost to Cambodian citizens. In 2010, Hun Sen denied charges that the hydroelectric
101 Meng Chhai, “Cambodia Reiterates the Implementation of One-China Policy,” Reaksmei Kampuchea,
Aug. 10, 2010.
See, e.g., “Cambodia lauds China’s great achievement,” Xinhua, Sept. 28, 2009 (describing a speech
given by Cambodian deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Interior Sar Kheng); and Chheang,
“Cambodia,” p. 8 (noting similar remarks by Hor Namhong in 2005).
102
103
“Hun Sen condemns NATO attack on Chinese embassy,” Kyodo, May 17, 1999.
104
Chheang, “Cambodia,” p. 9.
105
Storey, Southeast Asia, p. 183.
28
dams China had built on the Mekong River in PRC territory had disrupted the river’s
flow and caused harm to the riparian communities in the lower Mekong.106 The dams
posed “no problems,” he said, instructing his diplomats not to complain about the issue
in regional forums despite assertions from NGOs that Chinese dams were partly
responsible for depressed water levels that endangered downstream species and the
livelihoods of local fishermen.107
Cambodian officials have also been sensitive to protecting China from human
rights critiques on Cambodian soil. Before the 2008 Beijing Olympics, activists sought to
protest China’s support for Sudan over Darfur by lighting an Olympic-style torch
outside the Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum in Phnom Penh—a reminder of China’s
support for the Pol Pot regime. Scores of Cambodian police blocked them, pushing the
protesters away from the site and accusing the protest leader, American Actress Mia
Farrow, of “a political agenda against China.”108
In late 2009, just two days after Cambodia deported 20 Uighur asylum seekers to
China, then PRC Vice President Xi Jinping arrived in Phnom Penh and announced a
new $1.2 billion package of grants and soft loans.109 U.S. officials noted privately that
those events “raise questions about the non-transparent quid pro quos often attached to
China’s ‘no strings attached’ assistance.”110 When the U.S. government protested the
move and canceled its planned shipment of surplus military trucks, China filled the
106 “Cambodia denies China dam impact,” China Economic Review, Nov. 19, 2010. Hun Sen blamed the
changing course of the river on “emissions that changed the pattern of the rains” and admonished critics
not to blame the dams, which “would be a mistake.”
Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive, p. 141. See also Save the Mekong Coalition Letter to Mekong River
Commission (June 25, 2010), available at http://eprf.probeinternational.org/node/8527.
107
108
Ker Munthit, “Mia Farrow confronts Cambodian Police,” Associated Press, Jan. 19, 2008.
Seth Mydans, “20 Uighurs are deported to China,” New York Times, Dec. 19, 2009; and Sebastian
Strangio, “China’s soft power hardens in Cambodia,” Asia Times, Jan. 12, 2010. A leaked U.S. cable
indicated that Cambodian Deputy Prime Minister Sar Kheng informed UN Refugee Agency
representative Giuseppe de Vincentis before deporting the Uighurs that Cambodia was in a “difficult
position due to pressure from outside forces,” which U.S. ambassador Carol Rodley interpreted as a
reference to Chinese demands. Confidential Cable from the U.S. Embassy in Phnom Penh, “Ambassador
Meets UNHCR to Discuss Uighurs,” Cable 09PHNOMPENH913 (Dec. 14, 2009), ¶5.
109
110 Confidential Cable from the U.S. Embassy in Phnom Penh, “A Grateful China Rewards Cambodia,”
Cable 09PHNOMPENH956 (Dec. 22, 2009), ¶7.
29
shortfall by supplying 257. Shortly afterward, Hor Namhong said: “China has no
influence on Cambodia at all. We accept all foreign aid if it is given without
conditions.”111 However, that aid did not appear unconditional; it looked instead like
recompense for returning Uighur asylum-seekers over strong protests from the
international community.
Although deporting the asylum seekers carried little domestic cost to the CPP
and China covered for lost U.S. military aid, the episode did subject Cambodia to
unwanted international criticism and thus bore some reputational cost.112 Thus far,
Cambodia has not set clear limits on the degree to which it will support Chinese policy
interests, but the risks to the CPP of dependency and diminished autonomy are clearly
mounting as the partnership takes on a more pronounced patron-client character.
THE RISING COST OF COOPERATION
Until relatively recently, both China and Cambodia appeared to be reaping
substantial rewards from their relationship. The partnership also appeared to avoid
unacceptable political costs for either party. Despite China’s past support for the
Khmers Rouges, which both Chinese and Cambodian officials have been loath to
discuss,113 ties to Beijing have generated relatively little domestic political controversy
in Cambodia until quite recently. One reason for this was the bond established through
King Sihanouk. When his son Norodom Sihamoni took the throne, his first overseas trip
was to China. Even opposition leader Sam Rainsy, who has characterized Hun Sen as a
111
Cheng, “China.”
See, e.g., U.S. Department of State, Statement on Cambodia’s Forcible Return of Uighurs to China (Dec. 19,
2009) (asserting that “This incident will affect Cambodia’s relationship with the U.S. and its international
standing); UNHCR, Press Release: UNHCR deplores deportation of asylum-seekers before claims heard (Dec. 19,
2009); “Forcible return of Uighurs sparks UN experts’ concern,” UN News Centre, Dec. 22, 2009 (noting
critical reports form a pair of special UN rapporteurs).
112
113 In 2010, China’s ambassador to Cambodia acknowledged that the PRC provided food aid but insisted
that “the Chinese government never took part in or intervened into the politics of Democratic
Kampuchea.” Kong Sothanarith, “China Played No Role in Khmer Rouge politics: Ambassador,” VOA
Khmer, Jan. 22, 2010.
30
Vietnamese puppet,114 has been loath to criticize the CPP’s support for China’s core
policy concerns—instead reserving his critiques for corrupt economic deals involving
Chinese investors and CPP officials.115 Another reason is that Cambodia’s ethnic
Chinese population has been comparatively well integrated into Cambodian society,
and thus closer relations with China have not activated some of the local ethnic strains
sometimes apparent in states such as Malaysia and Indonesia.
As ties have tightened, however, and as Cambodia’s deference to Chinese policy
concerns has become more apparent, both domestic and international costs have begun
to rise. Sino-Cambodian relations have also begun to generate modest domestic political
problems for the CPP. Cambodian analyst Lao Mong Hay, a prominent critic of the
CPP, argues:
China has become more arrogant in Cambodia now… They behave more and
more like the colonialists of the past…Cambodia has painted itself into the
Chinese corner…It has been lured by the Chinese Yuan.116
Ties to China have become closely linked to the issue of land takings—one of the most
sensitive topics in Cambodian domestic politics and a growing threat to the CPP in
upcoming elections. According to LICADHO, a prominent Cambodian human rights
group, more than 400,000 Cambodians have been victims of land grabs or evictions
since 2003; 117 many have been displaced by Economic Land Concessions granted by the
Cambodian government to foreign developers.118 China has been the dominant foreign
114 See, e.g., Seth Mydans, “Troops Shoot at Mobs and Beat Protesters Again in Phnom Penh,” New York
Times, Sept. 10, 1998.
See open Letter from Sam Rainsy to Hu Jintao, Mar. 29, 2012 (translated by Sokunpanha You, on file
with the author, noting Sam Rainsy’s support for China’s positions on Taiwan, the South China Sea, and
other issues.)
115
116
Sebastian Strangio, “China’s Aid Emboldens Cambodia,” YaleGlobal, May 16, 2012.
Cambodian League for the Defense and Promotion of Human Rights (LICADHO), Briefing Paper:
Cambodia’s Draft Law on the Management and Use of Agricultural Land (Phnom Penh: LICADHO, July 2012),
p. 6. See also “Cambodia’s Economy: Not a complete stitch-up” The Economist, Sept. 29, 2012 (with an
estimate of 300,000).
117
118 Under Cambodia, law, such concessions can be granted to companies for up to 99 years and for up to
10,000 hectares. German Ministry for Cooperation and Development, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in
Land in Cambodia (Dec. 2009), p. 8.
31
recipient of such concessions, accounting for more than 186,000 of the roughly 360,000
hectares awarded to foreign investors by 2011.119
The Chinese-funded Boeung Kak Lake project in downtown Phnom Penh has
been among the most controversial. In 2007, the company Shukaku Inc. was awarded a
99-year economic concession to the lake. The company’s owners are Lao Meng Khin, a
CPP senator and close personal friend of Hun Sen, and a number of Chinese firms.120
The deal, made with little consultation with area residents, allowed Shukaku and other
Chinese partners to begin filling the city’s largest lake with sand to support construction
of apartments and shopping malls. The sand displaced the lake’s water supply and
flooded homes in the area, while Shukaku representatives used a mix of threats and
compensation offers to evict thousands of people living beside the lake.121 After a series
of public protests and cessation of World Bank lending, the government set aside a
parcel of land to house remaining families,122 but complaints that some families were
excluded and that the new complex was flooded prompted new protests.
The
government repressed them, arresting and jailing several community leaders, which led
to further demonstrations and drew criticism from human rights groups.123
The CPP’s political opponents have been keen to capitalize on public frustration
with the adverse social and environmental effects of Cambodia’s growing ties to China
and the depletion of the country’s natural resources. Parliamentarian Son Chhay of the
liberal opposition Sam Rainsy Party said in 2010:
119 CDRI Cambodia, Foreign Investment in Agriculture in Cambodia (Nov. 22-23, 2011), p. 11, available at
http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/est/INTERNATIONAL-TRADE/FDIs/Saing_Cambodia.pdf.
The Chinese firms own a 50% stake. Laura Rena Murray, “Target Cambodia,” World Policy Journal
(Summer 2012).
120
121 World Bank, Investigation Report: Cambodia: Land Management and Administration Project (Credit No. 3650
– KH) (Nov. 23, 2010), pp. 30-33.
Tom Fawthrop, “Phnom Penh residents score landmark victory over proposed land grab,” The
Guardian, Sept. 14, 2011.
122
123 See, e.g., Amnesty International, Cambodia: Release mother imprisoned for housing rights activism (June 3,
2013),
http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/cambodia-release-mother-imprisoned-housing-rightsactivism-2013-06-03; ADHOC, Boeung Kak Lake Protesters Demonstrate Outside Prime Minister Hun Sen’s
House (Apr. 22, 2013), http://www.adhoc-cambodia.org/?p=3360.
32
Chinese investors are aggressive business people who capitalize on Cambodia…
They are given special rights by the government [that] invariably agrees with
what [Chinese businesses] want… If the government doesn’t take action and
improve their management of laws and principles, Cambodia will lose its current
resources and there will be no reason for other people to invest in the country.124
Mu Sochua, an SRP representative, argues that “Cambodia is for sale,” and “China is
the biggest beneficiary of economic land concessions.”125 SRP spokesman Yim Sovann
has similarly challenged the relationship, saying in August 2012:
Of course, it is good if the investors have enough capital, comply with the
country’s laws, as well as bring technology to the country. But if they just come
to violate people’s property rights, conduct illegal businesses by co-operating
with some officials and adversely impact on the people or the environment, such
as causing deforestation—the government should be mindful of this kind of
investment.126
He argued that Cambodia should specifically avoid some Chinese firms involved in
displacement and deforestation: “Our people always suffer at the hands of these
companies…because of the corrupt officials who conspire with [them].127
The SRP recently joined with the Human Rights Party to form the Cambodian
National Rescue Party (CNRP). Although they hold just 29 of the 123 seats in the
Cambodian National Assembly, the CNRP poses a non-negligible threat to the CPP’s
domestic hegemony in the upcoming 2013 national elections. As an apparent response
to public concerns, Hun Sen announced a temporary ban on new land concessions in
May 2012—a ban which he flouted by giving land to a trio of rubber companies just
three weeks later.128
124
Sun Narin and Kounila Keo, “Building on Chinese’s bill,” Phnom Penh Post (Lift), Oct. 6, 2010.
125
Georgia Wilkins, “Call to stop firms accepting Cambodian land,” The Age (Australia), Apr. 16, 2012.
126
May Kunmakara, “Opposition urges China checks,” Phnom Penh Post, Aug. 17, 2012.
127
May, “Opposition urges China checks.”
128 “NGOs Criticize Flouted Land Grant Ban,” Radio Free Asia, June 12, 2012 (noting that critics considered
the ban to be nothing more than a “campaign ploy”).
33
The relationship recently has begun to carry more diplomatic costs as well.
China’s demands on Cambodian policy allegiance are growing.
In a March 2012
meeting with Hun Sen, Chinese President Hu Jintao advanced a four-part proposal on
how to build on the “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership of Cooperation” the two
states established in 2010. The first three parts were straightforward, comprising
increased governmental communication and official exchanges, trade and investment,
and security and military cooperation. The fourth pillar of the plan merits special
attention, however. Hu said:
China and Cambodia should manage to make multilateral coordination closer,
strengthen mutual support, and strengthen communication, coordination and
cooperation within the frameworks of the United Nations, East Asia cooperation,
the ASEAN Regional Forum and the Greater Mekong Subregion Economic
Cooperation to safeguard the common interests of the two countries and those of
other developing countries.129
In April 2013, Hun Sen and new Chinese President Xi Jinping agreed to establish an
“inter-governmental coordination committee” and take other measures to boost
cooperation, including steps to “enhance coordination and cooperation in international
and regional affairs.”130 The term “coordination” is a step beyond any expressed
rhetoric of the past and suggests China’s interest in using its clout to shape Cambodian
diplomacy on a wider range of issues.
One of those issues is China’s growing economic and strategic interest in the
South China Sea. Even after the tempestuous ASEAN ministerial meeting in July 2012,
Cambodia continued to defend Beijing. China has long resisted “internationalization,”
which is coded language referring to the involvement of the United States and other
Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, President Hu Jintao Meets with Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen
(Mar. 31, 2012).
129
130 Joint Press Communique between the People’s Republic of China and the Kingdom of Cambodia (Apr. 9, 2013),
available at http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/773724.shtml#.UboTBpzNlpM (noting that “China
appreciated Cambodia's long-term efforts in moving forward East Asian cooperation and promoting
China-ASEAN relations”).
34
non-claimant states in the negotiations.131 At the November 2012 summit, Cambodian
foreign ministry spokesman Kao Kim Hourn announced that “ASEAN leaders decided
that they will not internationalize the South China Sea issue from now on”—an
assertion the Philippines promptly denied.132
Cambodia’s support for China as 2012 ASEAN chair has brought criticism on
Phnom Penh from its neighbors, forcing Phnom Penh to play diplomatic defense.
Cambodia’s leaders are clearly sensitive to the risk of being perceived as Chinese clients
and losing their independent freedom of maneuver. A reputation for doing China’s
bidding will likely also hurt Cambodia’s efforts to exercise diplomatic leadership in
ASEAN, the United Nations, and other forums. Cambodia’s relationship with China
may have contributed to the weak support it garnered for a UN Security Council seat in
October 2012.133
Kishore Mahbubhani argues that the Chinese victory on the ASEAN
communiqué was Pyrrhic, as it compromised a longstanding Chinese effort to
accumulate goodwill in Southeast Asia.134 Analyst Ralph Cossa similarly argues that the
episode left China in a compromised position, “where essentially now the spotlight is
shining on China's bullying of Cambodia and some of the weaker ASEAN countries.”135
The CPP’s long-time political allies in neighboring Vietnam did not criticize Phnom
Penh openly, but analysts agree that Hanoi has been upset.136
See John D. Ciorciari and Jessica Chen Weiss, “The Sino-Vietnamese Standoff in the South China Sea,”
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs 13:1 (2012), pp. 64-65.
131
132
Irwin Loy, “South China Sea Dispute Flares at ASEAN summit,” Voice of America, Nov. 19, 2012.
Luke Hunt, “Human Rights Plague Cambodia’s UN Bid,” The Diplomat, Oct. 24, 2012. Some human
rights advocates contended that the prevalence of land-grabbing—a phenomenon linked to Chinese
investment—should bar Cambodia from winning a seat. See Global Witness, “Cambodia should not
stand for UN council until land grabs and repression stop,” Oct. 17, 2012, available at
www.globalwitness.org; and Glenys Kinnock, “Cambodia’s Brazen U.N. bid,” New York Times, Oct. 16,
2012. Cambodia received only 43 votes in the 2012 contest.
133
134
Kishore, “Is China Losing the Plot in Southeast Asia?”
135
William Gallo, “China Impacts ASEAN Unity on Sea Disputes,” Voice of America, July 19, 2012.
136
See, e.g., Gallo, “China” (quoting academic Path Kosal).
35
In recent years, Beijing has added the South China Sea and disputed territories in
the East China Sea to its list of “core interests” alongside Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang.137
As China’s definition of core interests expands and it demands Cambodian support on
an ever-wider range of issues, the diplomatic costs of the relationship to Cambodia are
bound to rise.
LOOKING FORWARD
For two decades, China has embarked on a “charm offensive” in Southeast Asia,
and it has been as successful in building strong government-to-government ties in
Cambodia as any state in the region. China has succeeded largely by supporting the
centralization of state power and pouring resources into a political economy based in
significant part on the allocation of funds through CPP-managed patronage networks.
Hun Sen and the CPP have embraced the relationship, because they have perceived the
terms of the deal as favorable, buttressing their financial and political positions without
requiring too much fealty in return.
Since the late 1990s, Hun Sen has managed to maintain a relatively high degree
of freedom from foreign interference by preserving multiple options and keeping doors
open to key foreign states, including both China and its rivals, such as Japan, the United
States, and Vietnam. In a confidential 2008 cable, U.S. ambassador Carol Rodley
emphasized that “Cambodia is intent on developing an outward-looking foreign policy
that not only ensures legitimacy in the world community but protects against
entangling alliances.”138 Hun Sen spent much of his career aligned against China, and
Rodley asserts that “Hun Sen does not forget—the RGC inherently does not trust its big
China has long identified Tibet, Taiwan, and Xinjiang as “core interests” but has added the disputed
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and South China Sea in recent years. See “Senkaku Islands are “core interest”
of China, Xi tells Obama,” Kyodo News International, June 11, 2013; Edward Wong, “Chinese Military Seeks
to Extend Its Naval Power,” New York Times, Apr. 23, 2010.
137
138
Cable 08PHNOMPENH1025, ¶ 6.
36
friends, including China…We expect, therefore, that Cambodia will continue to play its
balancing act among great powers…”139
Indeed, Cambodia’s economy does depend to some degree on China, but its
largest export market is still the United States,140 and it has attracted investment, aid,
and trade from a number of other sources inside and outside of Southeast Asia. A U.S.
firm, Chevron, is likely to be the first to produce oil from the Cambodian deposits in the
Gulf of Thailand.141 Vietnam has also promoted trade and investment in Cambodia,
particularly in telecom, retail, and agriculture.142
Thus far, Cambodia has been free to cultivate ties with China’s rivals and has
faced little pressure to enter into an unwanted military pact or to take positions that
would carry heavy domestic political costs to the CPP. China was itself subject to
external predation in the modern past, and Chinese leaders have long understood
Cambodian concerns about dependency, which helps explain both the nature and
success of its approach to Cambodia.
As China becomes more assertive and confident, however, it is demanding more
of its Cambodian friends.
China appears to be requesting diplomatic favors with
increasing regularity and expanding its demands into more sensitive issues—namely
the South China Sea disputes. China’s expanding footprint in Cambodia has also raised
opposition at home. Hun Sen—a master chess player known for his political cunning
and strategic thinking—rose to power during a period of Vietnamese occupation and
has spent much of his political career seeking to assert autonomy and control. He now
has reasons to set limits on his country’s relationship with China or even to reverse
course, as the Myanmar generals have done in recent years by opening to the West and
thus reducing their reliance on Beijing.
139
Ibid. ¶ 7.
140
Data from the Asian Development Bank, Key Indicators 2012.
141
May Kunmakara, “Cambodia hits oil revenue,” Phnom Penh Post, Sept. 28, 2012.
142 “Courting the Khmer,” The Economist, June 11, 2011 (arguing that “Cambodia is enjoying being fought
over, and plays one off against the other”).
37
The classic small-power game is not so much to avoid patron-client
relationships—an effort that would often leave small powers wanting for aid and
protection—but rather to make them work to one’s advantage. That requires cultivating
ties to multiple great powers to build bargaining leverage and reduce a patron’s scope
for dominance.143 For more than a decade, Cambodia has enjoyed the fruits of
engagement with many competing outside powers, and the country continues to have
many willing suitors, but the material and political incentives of Chinese patronage are
slowly drawing Cambodia toward an unbalanced foreign policy that threatens to close
doors to the outside.
Arresting these trends will not be easy or automatic.
As China’s role in
Cambodia grows, Cambodia’s political and economic structures evolve in a manner
that renders the country and its decision-makers more susceptible to Chinese pressure.
Cambodia’s elites now enjoy an influx of resources that facilitate personal enrichment
and near-term political entrenchment. If Cambodian leaders do not rebalance their
external relations, the country could face dim prospects ahead. Chinese dominance
would likely slow already sluggish governance reform, prompt mounting local unrest,
and further impair Cambodia’s international standing. CPP leaders thus have ample
reasons to resist some of the easy money available from Beijing and the troublesome
aspects of patron-client relations that come with it.
143
Ciorciari, The Limits of Alignment, pp. 21-22.
38