COUNTER-IMPROVISED
EXPLOSIVE DEVICE
DOCTRINE REVIEW
0
Executive Summary
Although nations have been undertaking activities to counter the threat of Improvised
Explosive Devices (IED) for many years the holistic concept of Counter-Improvised
Explosive Device (C-IED) is relatively new and most of the specific doctrine in the field has
been produced in the 21st Century. C-IED doctrine draws together various themes and
activities and has been developed based on the experience of recent operations. It is
important that it continues to evolve to address emerging threats.
This review of C-IED related doctrine has looked at data available from open sources,
including NATO, other international organisations and national doctrine. An enclosure to this
report provides a list of all documents reviewed along with a summary of the metadata which
will enable searches for the documents. The scope of the review has been limited to
documents written or translated into English and by the requirement to remain unclassified.
The documents available were grouped by the pillars of doctrine described in the NATO
approach to C-IED and analysed against NATO Allied Joint Doctrine for Countering
Improvised Explosive Devices (AJP-3.15(B)) as a baseline. Common approaches and
methodologies were identified, as were differences and areas of friction. Where frictions
have been noted, the report makes brief recommendations on how these may be resolved.
In the review of documents from international organisations, many common themes were
identified, but there were some differences which reflect the different roles and ethos. The
national doctrine reviewed shows some differences as nations adapt the doctrine to meet
national requirements and capabilities.
Some of the NATO doctrine analysed is not C-IED doctrine per se, but covers essential
enabling capabilities. Future development of C-IED doctrine must be synchronised with the
enabling doctrine, but it is important that this is a two way process and that C-IED
requirements are adequately addressed in the enabling doctrine. Equally, NATO should be
cognisant of national doctrine in the C-IED field and should draw best practice into future
NATO doctrine. In the broader international context, the role and ethos of other
organisations must be understood and doctrine should be sufficiently flexible to allow
interoperability where necessary.
DISCLAIMER:
This document is a product of the C-IED COE. It does not represent the opinions or policies of NATO
and is designed to provide an independent position.
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Introduction
Countering Improvised Explosive Devices (C-IED) is a relatively new addition to the library of
Western military doctrine. Although many of the activities involved in successful C-IED
operations have been developed over a much greater period, it is the early 21st Century
conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq that have drawn these activities together into a C-IED
approach with the supporting doctrine developed to provide commanders and staff with the
broad framework in which to plan and conduct operations to counter the threat networks
utilising IEDs as a weapon of choice.
This analysis provides a summary of the openly available C-IED related doctrine. The
documents have been grouped by the NATO recognised pillars of C-IED – Attack the
Networks (ATN), Defeat the Device (DTD) and Prepare the Force (PTF), plus the enablers
that support these pillars. The essential metadata which enables searches for the
documents has been provided and each document has been analysed in detail by a team of
subject matter experts (SMEs).
Scope
The scope of this project was set as wide as possible and documents issued by NATO, the
European Union (EU), the United Nations (UN) and the International Red Cross/Red
Crescent (ICRC) as well as a number of national doctrine publications, principally from the
United States of America (USA). The documents reviewed in this paper were identified by a
search of open sources and through other documents legitimately provided to the review
team from other sources. The scope of the search was limited by classification. Although
some classified documents have been identified, detailed analysis is not included in this
report in order that it should remain unclassified. The scope was further limited by language:
only documents available in English could be reviewed. Summary translations of two French
documents were considered and analysis is included, but the full detail contained in the
parent documents could not be assessed.
Methodology
The doctrine publications and other associated documents were grouped by C-IED Pillar or
enabling capability and each group of documents reviewed by an SME. Some of the
documents reviewed are not doctrine in the strict sense of the term, but have been analysed
as they are assessed to make a useful contribution to understanding the differing
approaches between nations and/or international organisations. Furthermore, a number of
draft doctrine documents have been analysed when the team did not have the ratified
doctrine available for analysis. Where a Study Draft (SD) or Ratification Draft (RD) has been
analysed, this is identified and the reader should be aware that there may be some
inconsistencies between the material analysed and that which is eventually published as
doctrine. The same methodology was applied in all cases to identify the appropriate
metadata and to analyse the document.
The metadata provided covers:



Document Title
Reference
Originator
2



Related STANAG (where applicable)
Date
A brief summary of the document.
The summary of documents identified and reviewed, including the metadata, is provided as
an Excel® workbook. A summary sheet shows all documents identified by C-IED
Pillar/Enabler and by Organisation/Nation. The workbook contains individual summary
sheets for overarching C-IED doctrine, each C-IED Pillar and for Enablers. A separate sheet
is included for Technical Exploitation. Finally, some general documents are noted, but were
not reviewed. These are the glossaries of terms and definitions used in NATO doctrine, the
UN sponsored International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG) and International Mine
Action Standards (IMAS).
The review methodology was to read the document in detail; identify its target audience and
purpose; and to provide a general overview of the publication. The document was then
considered against the baseline of NATO Joint Doctrine for C-IED, AJP-3.15(B), identifying
common approaches and methodologies and where there were areas of difference or
friction. Where such areas of difference or friction were identified, they have been described
as “Observation – Analysis – Recommendation.” The individual document reviews are
included, by pillar/enabler at Annexes A to G at the end of this report.
Doctrine Analysis
Most of the doctrine analysed is focused at the Operational level, reaching up to the
Strategic and down to the Tactical levels where appropriate. The UN and ICRC documents
and some of the national doctrine are Tactical level publications, but have been analysed to
see how the higher levels of doctrine are being applied at the Tactical, or user, level.
The baseline document used for comparison during the analysis was AJP-3.15(B) – Allied
Joint Doctrine for Countering Improvised Explosive Devices, and about half of the
documents analysed were NATO doctrine and supporting publications. Within the NATO
doctrine there is a good degree of consistency, but it is noted that some of the publications
are Intelligence or EOD sponsored doctrine and there are some variations compared to the
C-IED doctrine. These variations do not cause significant concern, but the reader should be
aware of them. The limited amount of national doctrine available for analysis was from
NATO nations (Canada, France and the USA) and there is a general consistency with the
NATO doctrine. There are some points of friction that are discussed below, with more detail
provided in the individual document analyses included in the Annexes. The EU concept for
C-IED is generally in accord with NATO concepts and doctrine, whilst the limited amount of
information analysed from the UN and the ICRC falls in line with NATO thinking regarding
the need for Understanding & Intelligence, DTD and PTF (although these organisations do
not use this terminology), but, as would be expected of these non-aggressive organisations,
an equivalent to the NATO ATN pillar is not addressed.
C-IED Doctrine
The original version of AJP-3.15 was written to fill a gap in NATO doctrine and to help
commanders and units unfamiliar with C-IED operations to prepare, plan, co-ordinate and
undertake the necessary activities to counter this new style of operation. The focus of the
original doctrine was on DTD, but later revisions, AJP-3.15(A) and AJP-3.15(B) have taken
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the lessons learned during ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) operations and
shifted the emphasis to ATN, which is now the NATO Main Effort for C-IED. NATO thinking
on C-IED continues to evolve and reflections following the completion of combat operations
in Afghanistan may lead to the need for a further revision of AJP-3.15(B) to ensure its
relevance for future operations. One aspect of this in particular is the need to consider the
broadening of ATN activities to counter the wider adversary networks that may threaten
NATO nations and their interests, using other methods than IEDs. Many of the familiar ATN
style activities have potential for wider utility.
Figure 1 – The NATO Approach to C-IED
The Commanders’ and Staff Handbook for C-IED draws the doctrine provided in AJP3.15(B) into a useful user manual, which overlays the Pillars of the NATO approach to C-IED
and the Areas of Activity in the C-IED concept described in AJP-3.15(B) (see Figure 1
above) onto the traditional staff functions of a military HQ. The tasks suggested are neither
mandatory, nor exhaustive, but provide commander and staff with a template which they can
modify to meet the needs of the operation. The EU concept for C-IED is in line with NATO
doctrine, although it uses some of the ideas used in the early edition of AJP-3.15 and could
usefully be updated to reflect current NATO thinking. Since most EU nations are also
members of NATO, it is sensible for their respective doctrine to be closely aligned. This
would be particularly important should a future operation transition from NATO-led to EU-led,
or vice versa. The EU concept is not as detailed as the NATO doctrine, but it does highlight
the contributions of Air and Maritime capability, as well as Land and Special Forces, and the
value of Technical Exploitation and Information Operations.
The US Joint C-IED doctrine (JP 3-15.1) is consistent in most respects with NATO doctrine
and places considerable emphasis on the need for a Whole of Government approach to
tackling the C-IED fight. The national capabilities of the US are addressed and this does
provide some elements that are not addressed in NATO doctrine, such as the grouping of all
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C-IED assets into a Joint C-IED Task Force. This is an aspect that NATO may wish to
consider in future developments of NATO C-IED doctrine.
Attack the Network (ATN)
The Commanders’ and Staff Capstone Handbook for ATN takes forward the description of
ATN from AJP-3.15(B) in considerably greater detail. It shows the necessity for a
comprehensive approach and how transnational and regional threat networks do not always
match the operating boundaries of the NATO Joint Operational Area (JOA). Whilst ATN is
generally considered to apply with the JOA, there is a necessity to link with national and
international intelligence and law enforcement agencies, amongst others, to counter broader
threats, including the financing of terrorism, the use of cyberspace by adversary networks
etc. Although Countering Threat Networks (CTN) is not approved NATO doctrine, the future
development of thinking within NATO should address these wider needs, utilising some of
the capabilities already developed for ATN in C-IED. Consideration of a comprehensive
approach must address legal, judicial and ethical considerations and be aware that the
military contribution may not necessarily be to the forefront.
US C-IED doctrine addresses ATN and much of the detail of analytical techniques for ATN
described in the NATO ATN Handbook are drawn from US methodologies. The US Joint
IED Defeat Organisation (JIEDDO) ATN Handbook provides a useful reference document
that attempts to standardise terminology to aid understanding and sharing of information
between agencies and indeed nations. NATO readers should be aware that there is a slight
difference in taxonomy between the US lexicon and the ATN terminology used by NATO, but
this is not a significant issue. The JIEDDO ATN Field Guide (Afghanistan) is a tactical level
guide and as such it uses more simplified language than some of the higher level doctrine.
The particular strength of this guide is that it highlights some of the cultural issues that are
essential to the ground level understanding of the forces undertaking ATN operations.
Consideration may be given to producing a NATO version of this document for future
operations. Should this be done, it is important that the specific cultural issues for future
operational locations be addressed, perhaps as separate annexes.
Defeat the Device (DTD)
The NATO doctrine analysed for DTD comes under the auspices of the EOD community,
rather than C-IED. This shows one of the complexities of C-IED, in that it draws on a wide
cross-section of military activities. DTD is not only about the removal of the explosive
hazard, but also covers, inter alia, mitigation of the effects, force protection and use of
electronic countermeasures (ECM). However, most of the doctrine analysed concerns the
EOD aspects of DTD. The two overarching documents analysed were AEODP-3(B) Vol. I –
A Guide for Staff Officers and Vol. II – A Guide for Operators. These documents provide
guidance on the planning, conduct and execution of IED Disposal (IEDD) Operations and
are generally consistent with the DTD methodology described in AJP-3.15(B). IEDD is a
subset of EOD as well as being an essential component of C-IED and there is discussion of
the decision making process that must be undertaken in determining the appropriate
disposal method in order, where possible, to support technical exploitation, which contributes
not only to the DTD pillar, but also to ATN, PTF and, critically, developing Understanding &
Intelligence. It was noted that there are some minor differences in terminology and
definitions between AEODP-3(B) and approved NATO terminology in AAP-6, which should
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be resolved to avoid confusion. AEODP-10 describes the minimum proficiency standards for
EOD personnel. The document is consistent with AJP-3.15(B), but introduces the concept of
different levels of qualification for EOD personnel. For the most part the descriptions of
capability are adequate, but at the lower end of the scale it is left to nations to define the
competence levels for Explosive Ordnance Clearance (EOC) operators. These personnel
are not fully trained and competent in all aspects of EOD, but have specific capabilities for
identification of EO and destruction in situ of authorised items. A potential issue arises that
combat personnel will expect an EOD operator to be able to cover the full range of tasks, but
EOC operators are only competent in a limited scope. The differences in competence level
between EOC operators from different nations may cause further confusion and it is felt that
more consideration should be given in the doctrine to clarification of this role and the level of
competence required.
The French and US documents analysed are consistent with both AJP-3.15(B) and AEODP3(B). There are some differences in terminology in the French document and the issue of
different capabilities for EOD/EOC operators discussed above have the potential to cause
some confusion. Where NATO nations use doctrine that differs from approved NATO
doctrine, it would be beneficial to include footnotes to draw attention to the anomalies, in
order to minimise friction during multinational operations.
The role of Electronic Countermeasures (ECM) in DTD is an issue of friction between NATO
and US doctrine. In AJP-3.15(B) ECM is listed under the “Neutralise” and “Protect”
frameworks, whilst the US FM 3-24.210 – Explosive Hazard Operations lists it only under
“Protect.” Although the NATO listing is technically correct, using the term “neutralisation”
may give non-specialists a false impression that an IED is disabled, when there is no
confirmation that this is in fact the case. It is recommended that in any future revision of
AJP-3.15(B) the categorisation of ECM be clarified to avoid potential confusion amongst
users.
The UN Mines Action Service Landmines and Explosive Remnants of War Safety Handbook
is a tactical level, general awareness guide and not specifically for EOD personnel. It is
consistent with DTD aspects of NATO doctrine, but there is potential confusion with
terminology between “Booby Traps” and “Victim Operated IEDs” (VOIED).
Prepare the Force (PTF)
ACIEDP-01 – NATO C-IED Training Requirements is derived from AJP-3.15(B) and is
entirely consistent with it, using the five areas of activity (Understand, Pursue, Prevent,
Protect and Prepare) to identify individual and collective training requirements. It is generally
pitched at the Tactical level, but some of the training requirements and tasks reach up to the
operational level.
The two other documents analysed under this section, the UN Infantry Battalion Manual Vol
II (UNIBAM) and the Red Cross Mine Risk Education (Nepal) handbook are tactical level
documents, the purposes of which are not specifically C-IED. Whilst both are consistent with
AJP-3.15(B) to an extent, they only cover PTF aspects as far as DTD and to an extent
Understanding & Intelligence. There is no discussion of ATN methodologies, due to the
roles of the originator organisations.
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C-IED in the Maritime Environment (CME)
C-IED in the Maritime Environment (CME) is generally accepted as NATO terminology,
although not yet enshrined in doctrine. Within NATO there is no recognised lead for CME
and as a result understanding and terminology may be variously interpreted and applied by
nations, resulting in an understanding of the core fundamentals of C-IED being either lost or
misinterpreted. Within NATO there is not considered to be a requirement to create additional
CME doctrine, but there is a need to comprehensively review maritime and all C-IED related
doctrine to ensure that CME issues are adequately addressed. Of the three pillars
comprising NATO C-IED activities and approach, ATN poses the greatest challenge for CME
in interpreting the current guidance given. Maritime conventions and environmental
considerations do not completely permit compliance, as recommended by the underpinning
C-IED doctrine, to the accepted approach across all the levels of involvement, and although
tactical applications are entirely viable, beyond this there is, as yet, no quantified approach
or methodology. In due course, consideration may be given to developing an equivalent of
the Commanders’ and Staff Handbook for C-IED specifically for the maritime environment.
Changes to three maritime doctrine publications are currently under consideration to include
C-IED. ATP-01 - Allied Maritime Tactical Instructions and Procedures, Ed (G). Version (1),
SD2 (October 2013) lends itself to amendment in respect of implementation of the C-IED
approach but may, when fully considered, provide argument for a stand-alone guidance
document capturing maritime specific elements of C-IED doctrine. A proposal was made to
amend certain chapters in Vol. 1 and to include a C-IED chapter, but it is assessed that this
is unlikely to succeed. However, a new publication dealing with a variety of threats (CPiracy, CBRN, C-IED etc.) may be an alternative. A change proposal to ATP-71 - Allied
Maritime Interdiction Operations, RD (December 2011) is in the process of submission. This
change proposal is to be discussed at MAROPS 2015 and will provide a test in considering
the implications of CME and possibly dictate the future effort in respect of identifying the
requirement. A change proposal to ATP-74(A) Allied Maritime Force Protection, Ed (A),
Version (1) (January 2014) has been submitted for ratification. From a Force Protection (FP)
perspective, ATP-74 has been extensively amended in draft by the custodian (Portugal) to
include a greater scope of operations and, if read in whole, the threat from IEDs as
weapons, is clearly stated and provides commanders and FP coordinators with a clear
understanding of the possible employment of IEDs against their ships and other maritime
assets. Terminology and IED related phrases used in this draft are unique and do not follow
convention. This has been raised as part of the recent ACT review on the change
submission and should be rectified before ratification.
Military Search
Military Search is an important enabling capability for C-IED. Study Draft 4 (SD4) of ATP3.12.x.x – Allied Tactical Doctrine for Military Search provides useful information for planners
across the Strategic to Tactical levels. The ATP is not a C-IED specific document, but it
does describe the same methodologies as the section on Military Search in AJP-3.15(B).
ATP-3.12.x.x SD4 provides a good description of the value of Military Search and how its
inclusion in the planning process can help with collection of valuable intelligence, which in
turn may support ATN activities. This should be included in AJP-3.15(B) when it is next
updated. Since NATO Military Search doctrine is in its infancy there is some terminology
which is not included in AAP-6. Unfortunately the abbreviation MST is used for two different
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purposes between AJP-3.15(B) (Mission Specific Training) and ATP-2.12.x.x (Military
Search Team). These contradictory definitions need to be addressed as the doctrine is
developed.
The UNIBAM Vol. II provides a general description of search, which has the same basis as
the NATO Military Search description in AJP-3.15(B). The UNIBAM Vol. II does not include
offensive search operations, as this may not be considered compatible with the UN role.
The French and US documents are also based on the same principles and objectives as
NATO doctrine. Since Military Search is a relatively new concept for most NATO nations,
there is a good opportunity for the NATO doctrine to become the standard against which
nations develop their future national doctrine.
Military Working Dogs (MWD)
Although Military Working Dogs (MWD) have been employed by individual NATO nations for
a considerable time, there has been no common NATO doctrine or policy regarding the use
of this capability. AJP 3.15(B) mentions MWD in the section on Enablers under Military
Search and a NATO Study Draft (20140617 Study Draft 1 AMWDP-2 MWD) provides a
basis for the use of MWD in C-IED. IMAS 09.40 provides a guide to the use of Mine
Detection Dogs (MDD) for humanitarian demining activities with other references (e.g. US
FM 3-34.210 Explosives Hazard Operations) using the same terms for military use. The use
of MWD beyond just explosive detection is outlined in Study Draft 1 AMWDP-2 MWD,
attempting to illustrate the applicability of this capability to ATN and PTF as well as DTD.
However, direct comparisons of doctrine cannot be made at this stage as production of such
is relatively immature.
Route Clearance (RC)
The NATO Route Clearance (RC) Project running until June 2015 will inform future NATO
RC Doctrine. In the meantime ATP-3.12.1.x – Route Clearance SD3 has been used for
comparative analysis. There is commonality between the principles and outputs described
in both AJP-3.15(B) and ATP-3.12.1.x SD3, although the latter is not C-IED specific. The
levels of RC outlined in ATP-3.12.1.x SD3 give a better idea of the capability and limitations
of RC than the activities described in AJP-3.15(B) and the ATP also describes Dismounted
and Mounted methods of RC, which are not covered in AJP-3.15(B). Once the RC doctrine
has been ratified, it is suggested that AJP-3.15(B) be amended to cover these aspects, as
well as any further issues that might arise during the continuing development of RC Doctrine.
The Canadian and US publications covering RC are focused at the tactical level and are
engineer publications emphasising RC as a mobility support function, that is not just
applicable to C-IED, but to the spectrum of operations where there may be an explosive
hazard. Although based on the same principles as those described for the RC capability in
AJP-3.15(B), there are differences in the national capabilities, in particular the US doctrine
provides descriptions of different RC packages to those included in AJP-3.15(B). It is
recommended that the Exemplar RC Package in AJP-3.15(B) remains the basis of NATO
RC thinking, although additional examples of how other nations organise their RC capability
may be of value. An aspect of US doctrine that NATO may wish to develop is that of
“Offensive RC,” described in US doctrine as “Explosive Hazard Hunting,” which may be
developed to support ATN as well as DTD activities.
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Technical Exploitation
Within NATO doctrine Technical Exploitation is seen as an intelligence function and
therefore the overarching doctrine governing the subject comes under the Intelligence series
of publications. There is one exception to this which is STANAG 2298 Weapons Intelligence
Teams (WIT) Training Standards which is a C-IED doctrine publication. The tier 2 doctrine
governing exploitation of captured material and personnel is AJP-2.5(A) – Captured
Persons, Material and Documents, but this document was written in the context of
conventional operations and does not adequately address the asymmetric style of warfare
encountered in recent conflicts. It provides lots of tactical level detail, but only superficial
coverage for the exploitation of captured weapons, ammunition and explosives. AJP-2.5(B)
– Intelligence Exploitation of Information from Material and Captured Persons is due to
supersede AJP-2.5(A) and has been analysed in the form of Study Draft 2 (SD2). This
document is more focused at the Operational level, although it does include some tactical
detail, and has been updated to reflect recent operational experience. As such it covers
Technical Exploitation in much greater detail. AJP-2.5(B) provides guidelines covering the
planning, structure and conduct for all aspects of intelligence exploitation operations, whilst
the detail for Technical Exploitation is contained in the Ratification Draft (RD) of the
subordinate document AIntP-10 – Technical Exploitation in Support of Military Operations.
These documents describe the three levels of exploitation, which accord with the
descriptions in AJP-3.15(B), but the exploitation process goes beyond the confines of C-IED.
AJP-2.5(B) SD2 and AIntP-10 RD address the principle of modularity and scalability of
Technical Exploitation capabilities, which is beneficial when considering the potential
expansion of the ATN concept to cover wider CTN activities. AJP-2.5(B) SD2 and AIntP-10
RD describe the levels of exploitation by Tactical/Operational/Strategic terminology, as well
as the Field/Theatre/Out-of-Theatre terminology used in AJP-3.15(B). The Theatre/Out-ofTheatre terminology is a little misleading as this appears to indicate that the levels of
exploitation are bounded geographically. Deployable technology and the timeliness of
information provision to commanders blurs the boundaries between exploitation levels and
capabilities previously seen only at Level 3 are now often available at Level 2. It is
suggested that in any future re-write of AJP-3.15(B) that the section on Technical
Exploitation is rewritten and aligned with AIntP-10, once ratified. AIntP-10 RD also includes
Principles of Exploitation, which could usefully be included in any update of AJP-3.15(B).
The WIT provides the Level 1 Technical Exploitation capability for C-IED operations and is
included in AJP-2.5(B) SD2 and AIntP-10 RD. STANAG 2298 is subordinate to AJP3.15(B), but when updated it must be kept aligned with AIntP-10 as well. It is important that
the WIT Tasks, Equipment and Training Qualifications suggested in AIntP-10 and those in
the WIT Training STANAG are complementary and not contradictory.
The US JIEDDO Weapons Technical Intelligence (WTI) Lexicon 4th Edition provides
common terminology and definitions that will help standardise reporting, data management
and education, aiding multinational co-operation. Although a US document, the terminology
is aligned with NATO terminology and was developed with the co-operation of NATO Allied
Command Transformation.
Conclusions and Recommendations
For the most part the doctrine analysed has shown good consistency with AJP-3.15(B).
There are some aspects in which capabilities that support C-IED, but reside in other
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capability areas, have developed in slightly different directions. This is not necessarily a
major problem, but C-IED doctrine should be kept under constant review and when updates
are made, they should include developments in other areas. This is relevant to enablers
such as Military Search, Route Clearance and Technical Exploitation, where developing
methodologies could be used to enhance C-IED doctrine. At the same time, it is important
that these enablers are cognisant of the needs of C-IED when developing their specific
concepts and doctrine publications.
The doctrine of international organisations is developed to meet their own specific
requirements. There is considerable commonality between UN and ICRC “doctrine” and that
of NATO, to a point, but clearly these organisations do not have the same need as NATO for
offensive doctrine. That said, the threat from extremist terrorist groups to international
organisations may in future mean that some of the activities developed for ATN may be
applicable to the UN and other agencies, albeit perhaps in more of a Law Enforcement than
a Military capacity.
The national doctrine examined was generally found to be in accordance with the principles
of NATO doctrine, but there are nuances and differences due to specific national
requirements and the capabilities and technologies that some nations have access to which
others do not. It is important that nations are not constrained by NATO doctrine, but where
there are differences with NATO doctrine they should be highlighted and methods to resolve
the differences developed when operating in a multinational context.
Annexes:
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
C-IED Documents Analysis
Attack the Network Documents Analysis
Defeat the Device Documents Analysis
Prepare the Force Documents Analysis
Military Search Documents Analysis
Route Clearance Documents Analysis
Technical Exploitation Documents Analysis
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Enclosure:
1.
C-IED Doctrine Summary and Metadata
Abbreviations
AEODP
AIntP
AJP
AMWDP
ATN
ATP
C-IED
CME
COE
CTN
DTD
ECM
EO
EOC
EOD
EOR
EU
FM
FP
IATG
ICRC
IED
IEDD
IMAS
ISAF
JIEDDO
JOA
JP
MDD
MST
MWD
NATO
PTF
RC
RD
SD
SME
STANAG
UN
UNIBAM
UNMAS
US/USA
VOIED
WIT
WTI
Allied Explosive Ordnance Disposal Publication
Allied Intelligence Publication
Allied Joint Publication
Allied Military Working Dogs Publication
Attack the Network(s)
Allied Tactical Publication
Counter(ing)-Improvised Explosive Devices
C-IED in the Maritime Environment
Centre of Excellence
Counter(ing) Threat Networks
Defeat the Device
Electronic Countermeasures
Explosive Ordnance
Explosive Ordnance Clearance
Explosive Ordnance Disposal
Explosive Ordnance Reconnaissance
European Union
Field Manual
Force Protection
International Ammunition Technical Guidelines
International Committee of the Red Cross/Red Crescent
Improvised Explosive Device
Improvised Explosive Device Disposal
International Mine Action Standards
International Security Assistance Force
Joint IED Defeat Organisation
Joint Operational Area
Joint Publication
Mine Detection Dog
Military Search Team OR Mission Specific Training
Military Working Dog
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
Prepare the Force
Route Clearance
Ratification Draft
Study Draft
Subject Matter Expert
NATO Standardisation Agreement
United Nations
United Nations Infantry Battalion Manual
United Nations Mine Action Service
United States/United States of America
Victim Operated Improvised Explosive Device
Weapons Intelligence Team
Weapons Technical Intelligence
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ANNEX A
C-IED DOCTRINE REVIEW
C-IED Documents Analysis
Allied Joint Doctrine for C-IED (AJP-3.15(B))
Commanders' & Staff Handbook for C-IED
Concept for C-IED in EU-Led Military Operations
C-IED Operations (JP 3-15.1)
Title
Allied Joint Doctrine for Countering Improvised Explosive
Devices
Reference
AJP‐3.15(B)
Originator
NATO
STANAG
2295
Date
May 2012
Target Audience
Operational Commanders and Staff. The document does, however,
address C‐IED activity from the Military Strategic down to the
Tactical level.
Aim/Purpose
The purpose of AJP‐3.15 (B) is to provide Allied joint operations with
a useful framework and guidance for the approach known as C‐IED.
It addresses the roles, links and responsibilities from the tactical,
operational and strategic commands and the political guidance and
oversight inherent in this process. It introduces the concept for C‐
IED: Defeat the Device, Prepare the Force and Attack the Networks,
underpinned by Understanding and Intelligence. AJP‐3.15(B) is the
principal publication for NATO C‐IED Doctrine at the operational
level.
AJP‐3.15(B) is the overarching doctrine for the NATO approach to C‐
IED and is subordinate to AJP‐3 Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct
of Operations and should be read in conjunction with AJP‐3.4.4
Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency. Although focused at the
Operational level, it addresses the roles, links and responsibilities
from tactical up to strategic level, plus the political oversight and
guidance necessary to make the approach effective. AJP‐ 3.15(B) is
an updated version of the document and in addition has been
declassified to make it accessible to all partners as well as NATO
nations.
Overall Impressions
The doctrine introduces the IED system as a threat and provides an
overview of the C‐IED approach, breaking it down into "Ends, Ways
and Means". The approach is then detailed in the three pillars of
NATO C‐IED: Attack the Networks (ATN), Defeat the Device (DTD)
and Prepare the Force (PTF) as well as the underpinning
Understanding and Intelligence. An appendix to Chapter 1 provides a
concept of operations for NATO C‐IED, showing how five
overlapping Areas of Activity ‐ Understand, Pursue, Prevent, Protect
and Prepare ‐ can be integrated into a coherent C‐IED approach.
The document contains a huge volume of information as guidance
for the operational commander, but is easy to read and follows a
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good logical structure.
Common Approaches
& Methodologies
Areas of Difference &
Frictions
Summary/Conclusion
AJP‐3.15 (B) is the baseline document against which other have
been analysed.
AJP‐3.15 (B) is the baseline document against which other have
been analysed.
Note: Although covered by STANAG 2295, there are some Specific
Reservations recorded by the USA at the start of the document.
AJP‐3.15 (B) is a useful reference document for C‐IED Operations
and provides good detail. In some aspects it is a little dated and
could usefully be considered for updating in light of Lessons
Identified during the ISAF mission in Afghanistan.
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ANNEX A
C-IED DOCTRINE REVIEW
Title
Commanders' and Staff Handbook for Countering Improvised
Explosive Devices
Reference
5000 TSX 0170/TT‐7579/Ser: NU0462
Originator
NATO (ACT C‐IED IPT)
STANAG
Date
15 July 2011
Target Audience
Operational and Tactical level Commanders and Staff. The
Handbook does up to the Strategic level where appropriate.
Aim/Purpose
This Handbook is designed to assist commanders and their staff in
understanding, planning and conducting C‐IED processes in an
operational environment. It recommends the organisation, processes
and capabilities to facilitate the planning, integration and execution of
C‐IED activities in all operational staff functions.
The Commanders' and Staff Handbook is a planning guide for use in
military HQs in operational theatres with a C‐IED threat. In doctrinal
terms it is subordinate to
AJP‐3.15 (B) and STANAG 2294 ‐ C‐IED Training Standards, but it
is intended to be complementary to them in that it draws out the
specific requirements expected of commanders and their staff.
Overall Impressions
It starts by describing the C‐IED approach and the Areas of Activity
detailed in AJP‐
3.15 (B), before addressing the C‐IED tasks and responsibilities of
commanders and their staffs. C‐IED staff activities are described in
detail, showing how the traditional staff functions in military HQs are
all required to contribute to the C-IED effort. The Handbook includes
Annexes covering the C‐IED Specified Tasks, C-IED Inputs and C‐
IED Structures and Responsibilities within the HQ. Further Annexes
cover C‐IED terminology and a list of Reference material.
The C‐IED Specified Tasks Annex is presented in tabular form,
suggesting possible specified tasks by staff function, the purpose of
the task and which pillars of the C-IED approach the task will
contribute to achieving. The list of tasks is not exhaustive, nor
mandatory, but gives commanders and staff material to consider and
build upon. This is particularly important for HQs and staff members
that are not familiar with C‐IED operations. The C‐IED Inputs Annex
provides some examples of the inputs that might be expected and
how these can be developed into specified tasks for the staff. The
Annex covering structures and responsibilities describes how the
existing staff branches might contribute to the overall C-IED effort.
This is important as it demonstrates that C-IED is part of everybody's
role, not just for specialists. Although the structures and
responsibilities are recommended and not mandatory, they have
been proven on NATO level trials and successfully used on
operations in Afghanistan.
Common Approaches
This Handbook is derived from AJP‐3.15 (B) and uses all of the
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C-IED DOCTRINE REVIEW
& Methodologies
Areas of Difference &
Frictions
Summary/Conclusion
NATO approaches, concepts, methodologies and terminology as
described in the AJP.
There are no areas of difference or friction between this Handbook
and AJP‐ 3.15 (B). It should be noted that the Handbook is intended
as a "living" document and must be updated to reflect any update to
AJP‐3.15 (B) and/or C‐IED Training Requirements.
This is a good reference document for commanders and staff, tested
on operations with ISAF. It should be updated in line with any
revision of AJP‐3.15 (B) and other related doctrine.
A-4
ANNEX A
C-IED DOCTRINE REVIEW
Title
Concept for Countering Improvised Explosive Devices in EU‐
Led Military Operations
Reference
EEAS 01602/12
Originator
EUMS
STANAG
Date
17 September 2012
Target Audience
Focus is at Theatre (Operational) level, but includes reach‐back to
out‐of‐theatre assets (Strategic level).
Aim/Purpose
This concept is intended to provide a foundation to develop C‐IED
capabilities to defeat the IED System in theatres of operation where
EU‐led military forces are engaged.
Although NATO doctrine is not directly referenced, much of the
terminology and definitions used are common. The concept uses the
interrelated activities of Attack the Network, Defeat the Device and
Prepare the Force and the supporting requirement for knowledge,
information and intelligence.
Overall Impressions
The Concept describes the IED System, including Human and
Material components, and the process by which an adversary may
plan and execute an IED attack. It then outlines the EU response,
the Counter‐IED System, noting the contributions of the Land, Air,
Maritime and Special Operations components and specifically
mentioning some of the essential enablers, such as a Technical
Exploitation capability, Military Search and Electronic
Countermeasures.
Common Approaches
& Methodologies
The section of "Defeating the IED System" looks at the elements of
threat networks, how to identify them and how to take effective action
to disrupt and neutralise the networks. An important part of this is
Technical Exploitation, which is described in similar terms to those
used by NATO. The importance of Information Operations as part of
a holistic C‐IED approach is emphasised and the concept provides
some guidance to EU nations on developing C‐IED capability across
all Lines of Development, using the DOTMLPFI breakdown.
Most of the EU concept is aligned with NATO doctrine, including the
three pillars of ATN, DTD and PTF with underpinning understanding
and Intelligence. The enablers mentioned in the EU concept reflect
most of the key enablers in NATO C-IED doctrine.
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C-IED DOCTRINE REVIEW
Areas of Difference &
Frictions
Observation: In the section covering DTD, the EU Concept uses six
"Key Operational Areas" rather than the four "Areas of Activity" used
by NATO.
Analysis: This is about the only aspect where there is a divergence
from NATO doctrine, albeit not a major concern. The original AJP‐
3.15 included the Key Operational Areas of Predict, Prevent, Detect,
Neutralise, Mitigate and Exploit, which are used in the EU Concept.
In the revision of AJP‐3.15(A) and (B) these six KOAs are distilled
into four Areas of Activity‐ Prevent, Protect, Prepare and
Pursue. This just reflects a slight change of emphasis by NATO. In
the NATO doctrine these KOAs/AOAs are not limited to the DTD
pillar, but cover the spectrum of the C‐IED concept of operations.
Recommendation: Readers should be aware of this small
difference between the NATO and EU concepts and adapt according
to which organisation is leading the operation.
Summary/Conclusion
The EU Concept for C‐IED is closely aligned with NATO doctrine,
which will be of value should a NATO operation transition to an EU‐
led operation (or vice versa) at some future time. It does not include
the same detail as the NATO doctrine publications, but it is assessed
to provide the higher level guidance required for planning purposes.
A-6
ANNEX A
C-IED DOCTRINE REVIEW
Title
Counter‐Improvised Explosive Device Operations
Reference
JP 3‐15.1
Originator
USA (DOD)
STANAG
Date
9 January 2012
Target Audience
US Joint Staffs, Combatant Commands and their subordinates, Joint
Task Forces and their subordinates and the Services. This is US
Joint Doctrine that applies at all levels from Strategic to Tactical.
Aim/Purpose
JP 3‐15.1 provides the doctrinal basis for the planning and conduct
of joint C‐IED operations. Within it is military guidance for the
exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force
commanders and it prescribes the joint doctrine for operations,
education and training. The doctrine outlines responsibilities;
provides command and control considerations; details the C‐IED
process and Attack the Network methodology; and introduces
models for coordinating with C‐IED supporting organisations.
US Joint Doctrine for C‐IED Operations provides authoritative
direction and guidance to US commanders and their subordinate
commands and units on the conduct of joint C‐IED operations and
the associated planning, co‐ordination and training required. The
document introduces the IED threat and the notion that they are
tactical weapons used by adversary networks to achieve tactical,
operational and often strategic effect. It outlines the need for a whole
of government approach to counter the IED threat and describes the
three Lines of Operation ‐ Attack the Network, Defeat the Device and
Train the Force ‐ required to respond to the IED threat.
Overall Impressions
The doctrine goes into the detail of the functions usually found in
threat networks that utilise IEDs, their characteristics and
components. It then addresses the planning considerations for the
conduct of effective operations against these networks and describes
how a C‐IED concept of operations may be developed, using the
three basic lines of operation, but with additional lines to meet the
requirements of specific operations, such as the need to develop
multinational and Host Nation C‐IED Capabilities. The importance of
Attack the Network is emphasised to prevent the emplacement of
IEDs and different methodologies that may be used to target
networks, using both kinetic and non‐kinetic means, are discussed.
A-7
ANNEX A
C-IED DOCTRINE REVIEW
Common Approaches
& Methodologies
The basic construct of US joint doctrine for C‐IED is very similar to
the NATO doctrine. It uses the term "Line of Operation" rather than
"pillar", but fundamentally the approach to C‐IED is the same: Attack
the Networks, Defeat the Device and Train the Force (cf Prepare the
Force). The importance of
Intelligence to aid understanding of the networks and underpin the
other lines of effort is also emphasised.
Areas of Difference &
Frictions
Observation: The US doctrine uses "Train the Force" rather than
"Prepare the Force."
Analysis: This is not a major issue, but NATO doctrine has been
expanded to "Prepare" in order to cover wider capability
considerations, including provision of specialist equipment and other
assets. It should be borne in mind that early NATO C‐IED doctrine
also used the term "Train the Force".
Recommendation:
NATO forces operating with US forces should be aware of this slight
difference in doctrinal terminology. It should not have any significant
effect on operations.
Observation: Being US national doctrine, JP 3.15 refers to certain
US capabilities that may not be available to NATO/other nations.
Analysis: The US doctrine is not only for NATO/multinational
operations and therefore describes national capabilities, e.g.
Terrorist Explosive Device Analysis Centre (TEDAC), National
Ground Intelligence Centre (NGIC) and the Threat Finance
Exploitation Unit. These assets may be offered to support NATO
operations and may be available to friendly nations by bi‐lateral
agreement. Some other nations may have similar or equivalent
national capabilities.
Recommendation: Readers should be aware that these are US
national capabilities and should adapt accordingly if these assets are
not available.
Summary/Conclusion
This is a comprehensive and valuable national doctrine publication. It
closely matches NATO doctrine in most respects, but there are some
variations of which allied nations should be aware when operating in
coalition with the US. The document is well‐written and includes
some useful diagrams to illustrate the text.
A-8
ANNEX B
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Attack the Networks Documents Analysis
Commanders' & Staff Capstone Handbook for ATN
JIEDDO ATN Lexicon
JIEDDO ATN Field Guide (Afghanistan)
Title
Reference
Commanders' and Staff Capstone Handbook for Attacking the
Networks
3400 TSX FCX 0010/TT‐10533/Ser:NU0454
Originator
NATO (ACT C‐IED IPT)
STANAG
Date
28 May 2014
Target Audience
Commanders and Staff at Operational Level (Theatre), but also
covers Tactical level actions and the necessity for integration at the
Strategic level.
Aim/Purpose
This Handbook is intended to assist in establishing the concepts of
ATN at all levels in order to enhance NATO's capability to deliver its
core purpose of ensuring the freedom and security of its members. It
provides commanders and staff at the Tactical and Operational
levels with a concise, easy to use reference document to assist in
the understanding, planning and conduct of ATN operations. It
provides guidance on "What needs to be done and why" rather than
the "How." The Handbook clearly explains how many of the aspects
of ATN in the Joint Operational Area are inextricably linked with
Strategic level activities, which may be applicable to Countering
Threat Networks (CTN), more widely applicable than just the C‐IED
environment.
This Handbook take the ATN Pillar described in AJP‐3.15 (B) and
develops it in considerable detail. It is particularly useful as a tool for
commanders and their staff at theatre level, but cover the spectrum
from Tactical up to Strategic level. Building on the Revised NATO C‐
IED Action Plan and Bi‐Strategic Command C‐IED Campaign Plan,
the Handbook dissects the ATN Pillar, the NATO C‐IED Main Effort,
and considers the wider applicability of the techniques to countering
other threat networks that threaten the Alliance.
Overall Impressions
The ATN Handbook describes the Dynamic Operating Environment
faced by NATO and the threat to stability posed by threat networks,
with particular emphasis on those utilising IEDs. It provides an
overview of ATN/CTN methodology in the operational planning
process and then goes into detail of the analysis of threat networks,
leading to identification of vulnerabilities and opportunities to engage
and neutralise them, using both kinetic and non‐kinetic means.
In NATO doctrine ATN is generally considered to take place within
the JOA. The concept of CTN has not yet been approved by NATO,
but the need to address the threat from regional and transnational
networks is explained and the necessary strategic activities that
enable ATN activities within the JOA are described.
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ANNEX B
C-IED DOCTRINE REVIEW
Common Approaches
& Methodologies
Areas of Difference &
Frictions
The ATN Handbook is closely aligned with AJP‐3.15(B), taking the
ideas described in Chapter 2 ‐ Understanding & Intelligence and
Chapter 3 ‐ Attack the Networks and developing them in much
greater detail. The Handbook goes into much greater detail on the
analytical techniques used to identify threat networks, detect their
points of vulnerability and the targeting processes required to exploit
those vulnerabilities, using both kinetic and non‐kinetic means.
NATO thinking on C‐IED has developed since the first edition AJP‐
3.15 was issued. ATN is now recognised as the Main Effort for
NATO C‐IED and the emphasis of some aspects in the ATN
Handbook reflects this.
Observation: ATN in AJP‐3.15 (B) is focused on operational and
tactical activities, whereas the ATN Handbook expands to examine
the strategic level linkages in greater detail.
Analysis: The ATN Handbook recognises that the regional and
transnational nature of threat networks means that ATN operations in
theatre must be supported by a Comprehensive approach, including
other government departments, NGOs and international
organisations (e.g. UN and ICRC) to isolate the in‐theatre networks
from wider international support.
Recommendation: As NATO thinking on CTN develops it may be
necessary to consider updating AJP‐3.15 (B) to reflect the wider
requirements of CTN.
Observation: The ATN Handbook notes that many of the techniques
and processes used in ATN are applicable to targeting threat
networks that may not (but may) utilise IEDs, e.g. narcotics, piracy or
organised criminal networks.
Analysis: Some of the techniques that may be used on military
operations may have restricted applicability outside the JOA due to
legal or ethical considerations. This is not to say that they are illegal
in theatre, but considerations such as personal privacy and the
presumption of innocence may have an impact. Furthermore,
outside the JOA military capabilities should be subordinate to the
Judicial and Law Enforcement processes.
Recommendation: Further development of ATN and CTN must be
cognisant of the military role in supporting law enforcement and
judicial processes.
Observation: CTN requires a Comprehensive and Whole of
Government approach to address issues such as Threat Finance,
Cyber Security etc.
Analysis: Military Forces are not necessarily the most appropriate
agents to address some of the necessary task required for effective
CTN and hence ATN within the JOA.
Recommendation: As NATO thinking on CTN develops it may be
necessary to consider updating AJP-3.15(B) to reflect the wider
requirements of CTN.
B-2
ANNEX B
C-IED DOCTRINE REVIEW
Summary/Conclusion
This Handbook contains a huge amount of detail on ATN and CTN.
Although CTN is not yet approved as a NATO concept, it is
recognised that out of theatre activities are necessary enablers of in‐
theatre ATN operations. Further the C‐IED ATN concept has value
for the identification and targeting of threat networks other than those
using IEDs and as such the CTN concept requires further
consideration and development.
B-3
ANNEX B
C-IED DOCTRINE REVIEW
Title
JIEDDO Attack the Network Lexicon
Reference
Originator
USA (JIEDDO)
STANAG
Date
May 2011
Target Audience
Principally HQs, Units and Individuals operating at the Operational
and Tactical levels. Some of the material, particularly the intelligence
aspects needed to understand the operational environment and the
threat networks reach up to the Strategic level. It is a US document
prepared by the Department of Defense, in conjunction with the
Departments of Justice and Homeland Security.
Aim/Purpose
The ATN Lexicon is intended to provide a common vocabulary
amongst all agencies undertaking ATN activities against a variety of
adversary networks. Adoption of the common lexicon is desirable to
enable information exchange through standardised reporting and
data management; common training and education; and supporting
harmonisation and development of ATN policy and doctrine.
The ATN Lexicon breaks the subject down into six main areas:
Understand the Mission; Understand the Operating Environment;
Understand the Networks; Organise for the Fight; Engage the
Networks; and Assess. Within each of these areas the topic is further
broken down in a series of branch diagrams and a succinct definition
is provided for each term.
Overall Impressions
Common Approaches
& Methodologies
Although the document is a US product, most of the terminology is
also used by NATO. Some of the agencies described are US
national assets, including non-military organisations. As such, the
document would require some adaptation to be used as a
multinational reference. The lexicon was developed for US Forces in
Afghanistan and some of the definitions specifically refer to
Afghanistan as the host nation and/or the Afghan National Army.
Generalising these definitions to fit any theatre of operations,
including peace support missions, would enable the lexicon to have
even greater utility.
Although developed as a US product, the ATN Lexicon has many
similarities with the ATN concept described in AJP‐3.15 (B).
Understanding the Networks and how to engage them are covered in
both documents, along with the underpinning intelligence
requirements.
B-4
ANNEX B
C-IED DOCTRINE REVIEW
Areas of Difference &
Frictions
Observation: The structural breakdown used in the ATN Lexicon is
not exactly the same as used in NATO doctrine, both AJP-3.15(B)
and the supporting ATN Handbook.
Analysis: The US ATN Lexicon breaks the topic into six main areas,
whereas NATO doctrine is broken into four. This is not critical as the
NATO consideration of the Dynamic Operating Environment covers
both "Understand the Mission" and "Understand the OE" in the US
Lexicon and similarly the NATO "Engaging Adaptive Threat
Networks" encompasses "Organise for the Fight," Engage the
Networks" and "Assess."
Recommendation: Should it be decided to "internationalise" the US
lexicon, it may be desirable to restructure the breakdown to more
closely reflect NATO doctrine. There is no reason why the US
document in its current form should not be used as an
information/reference document in its current form.
Observation: Some of the agencies described in the ATN Lexicon
are US national assets, including Department of Justice and
Department of Homeland Security organisations.
Analysis: Multi- or Bi-lateral agreements or an offer of the asset by
the US to support a NATO operation means that often the assets will
be available, but international readers should be aware that these
assets are not always going to be available to NATO or individual
nations. Conversely, other nations may have similar capabilities,
which are not included in this lexicon.
Summary/Conclusion
Recommendation: Should it be decided to "internationalise" the
lexicon, a review of which assets should be included may be
necessary. It may be appropriate to provide a general description of
the capability, rather than name specific
organisations/establishments.
This lexicon provides a good breakdown of ATN activities in a useful
format. It includes good definitions of ATN activities. Although a US
national document, it is a valuable reference for any nation
undertaking ATN operations and will aid understanding through
promotion of common terms and definitions.
B-5
ANNEX B
C-IED DOCTRINE REVIEW
Title
JIEDDO Attack the Networks Field Guide ‐ Afghanistan
Reference
Originator
USA (JIEDDO)
STANAG
Date
April 2011 (version 1)
Target Audience
Tactical level. For Commanders of small units and for individual
personnel engaged in ATN activities. This is a US document,
specifically developed for operations in Afghanistan, but could easily
be adapted for wider use.
Aim/Purpose
This Guide provides personnel operating at the tactical level with a
collection of field‐tested actions to enable mission success in a
Counter‐Insurgency environment with an IED threat. As well as
describing action to attack adversary networks, it emphasises the
need for tactical actions to build and enable friendly networks, indeed
acknowledging that development of the friendly networks may at
some phases of the operation become the Main Effort.
This is a useful tactical level guide which starts by describing the
purpose of ATN and describes the activities that work toward
attainment of the end state. It breaks these activities into three areas:
Build Relationships; Gather Valuable Intelligence; and Neutralise the
Adversary.
Overall Impressions
Since the Guide is written for use at the tactical level it is written in a
simple and understandable format. Much of the terminology used in
higher level doctrinal publications is absent from this document, but
the meaning is there in words that the combat infantryman will
understand. Each of the three areas of activity includes a one page
aide memoire of the principal tasks to be undertaken, which is
expanded upon in the following pages with pithy, bullet‐point
statements of the "on the ground" actions that will achieve the
desired end state.
Common Approaches
& Methodologies
Although the structure of this document is different to higher level
doctrine the overall objectives of ATN ‐ understand the operating
environment; understand the networks; and target the adversary
network vulnerabilities (by kinetic and non‐kinetic means) ‐ are all
present in this Guide.
The need to understand the operating environment, including cultural
norms, and use that understanding to support friendly networks,
positively influence neutral networks and neutralise adversary
networks is clear in this document, albeit using rather more
straightforward language than some of the doctrine intended for
higher level audiences. The clear underlying theme is that good
Understanding & Intelligence is crucial to effective ATN at the tactical
level, as it is also at the Operational and Strategic levels.
B-6
ANNEX B
C-IED DOCTRINE REVIEW
Areas of Difference &
Frictions
Observation: This Field Guide was specifically prepared for use by
personnel conducting ATN operations in Afghanistan.
Analysis: Higher level doctrine publications are not usually theatre
specific. Indeed much of the content of this document is not theatre
specific and by inclusion of more general references to "Host Nation"
and its associate forces the document could easily be developed for
more general use. A strength of this document is that it does address
some specific Afghanistan cultural issues, so care should be taken to
ensure that any broadening of scope would continue to highlight
theatre specific cultural issues.
Summary/Conclusion
Recommendation: Consideration be given to developing an
"international "version of this Guide, so that it could be used by all
NATO forces in a variety of operational theatres. Theatre specific
cultural issues should be addressed, perhaps as an Annex.
This useful tactical guide was developed for operations in
Afghanistan. Now that the combat mission there has finished, it
would be useful to update the document and make it more generic.
In doing so the valuable material on local culture and customs should
not be lost, but should be included for each specific operation.
B-7
ANNEX C
C-IED DOCTRINE REVIEW
Defeat the Device Documents Analysis
Interservice IEDD Operations on Multinational Deployments - A Guide for Staff Officers
Interservice IEDD Operations on Multinational Deployments - A Guide for Operators
Minimum Standards of Proficiency for Trained EOD Personnel
Landmines & ERW Safety Handbook
Concept about Treatment of Ammunition & Explosive Device Hazards
Explosive Hazard Operations (FM 3-34.210)
Title
Interservice Improvised Explosive Device Disposal Operations
on Multinational Deployments ‐ A Guide for Staff Officers
Reference
AEODP‐3(B) Vol. I
Originator
NATO
STANAG
2370
Date
September 2010
Target Audience
The AEODP‐3(B) Vol. I is intended to provide guidance to staff
officers involved in the planning and conduct of IEDD operations.
Aim/Purpose
The purpose of the AEODP‐3(B) Vol. I is to highlight considerations
and provide interservice guidance for the planning and conduct of
Improvised Explosive Device Disposal (IEDD) on multi‐national
operations.
This publication is specifically intended for staff officers for the
purpose of planning and the utilization of EOD forces in an IED
threat environment. It supports the policy and guidance of AJP‐3.15
(B). It provides a general description and understanding for tactical
IEDD considerations.
The AEODP‐3 (B) Vol. I aligns with the AJP‐3.15 (B) for the Defeat
the Device pillar of Counter Improvised Explosive Device operations
in that it provides understanding for planning and coordinating EOD
assets in support of IEDD operations required to neutralize an IED
threat. It provides basic understanding on how the decision for the
final disposition of the IED, whether RSP or
Destruction in Situ, may affect or limit efforts of other C‐IED pillars
such as the ability for exploitation for Attack the Network when
deciding to dispose of an IED by Destruction in Situ. It addresses the
environmental considerations required for planning the influences on
adversary networks (example: understanding motives and tactics for
emplacement).
There are no major areas of difference or friction with AJP‐3.15 (B)
identified.
Overall Impressions
Common Approaches
& Methodologies
Areas of Difference &
Frictions
Summary/Conclusion
AEODP‐3(B) Vol. I is a good source document to help staff officers
understand the tactical considerations required to plan and
coordinate EOD assets for IEDD operations.
C-1
ANNEX C
C-IED DOCTRINE REVIEW
Title
Interservice Improvised Explosive Device Disposal Operations
on Multinational Deployments ‐ A Guide for Operators
Reference
AEODP‐3(B) Vol. II
Originator
NATO
STANAG
2370
Date
September 2010
Target Audience
The AEODP‐3(B) Vol. II is intended as a tactical guide for the benefit
of operators and their chain of command.
The purpose of the AEODP‐3(B) Vol. II is to highlight considerations
and to provide guidance to EOD operators on the conduct and
execution of IEDD operations. The guiding principles were
formulated as the result of lessons learned by many nations in
theatres of operations around the world and can be applied to any
IED situation.
This publication is specifically intended for IEDD operators and
supports the policy and guidance of AJP‐3.15 (B). It is a tactical level
publication with good capture of the basic safety and operating
principles internationally applied by professional EOD/IEDD
operators during a response to an IED. The provided guidance for
IEDD begins with categorizing the priority (CAT A through CAT D) to
determine mandatory actions. The emphasis on the operator's threat
assessments and the tactical situation allows the IEDD operator to
adjust a template of guide lines to the best course of action to meet
the EOD principles and philosophies of preserving life, property,
evidence, and return the area to normal status. The publication
includes guidance on sequence of events, protective measures for
the IEDD operator and surrounding personnel, and turning over the
scene.
The AEODP‐3 (B) Vol. II aligns with the AJP‐3.15 (B) for the Defeat
the Device pillar of Counter Improvised Explosive Device operations.
It supports protecting the force by neutralization through render safe
and disposal procedures to eliminate the IED threat and allowing
manoeuvre forces the Freedom to Operate. EOD forces, as an
enabler, provide key elements to Attack the Network by the
underpinning philosophy of Preservation and collection of forensic
material without compromising personal safety, which provides
forensics and expert analysis of function design, enemy tactics, and
emplacement methods of the devices encountered. DTD is also a
key element to Security and Stability operations supporting Host
Nation to protect the local population.
There are no major areas of difference or friction with AJP‐3.15 (B)
identified. Minor administrative difference: for the definition of IED
device, this document uses “incendiary materials” vs. “incendiary
chemicals” as found in AAP‐6.
AEODP‐3 (B) Vol. II is a good source document to help understand
the philosophies, principles, and guidance an IEDD operator
considers and follows during a response to an IED.
Aim/Purpose
Overall Impressions
Common Approaches
& Methodologies
Areas of Difference &
Frictions
Summary/Conclusion
C-2
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C-IED DOCTRINE REVIEW
Title
Minimum Standards of Proficiency for Trained Explosive
Ordnance Disposal Personnel
Reference
AEODP‐10 Edn A, Ver 1
Originator
NATO
STANAG
Date
April 2013
Target Audience
EOD forces and commanders of participating nations assigned to
NATO.
Aim/Purpose
The purpose of this publication is to establish minimum standards of
proficiency for trained Explosive Ordnance Reconnaissance (EOR)
Operator, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) operators and
specialist EOD Staff Officers and to provide guidance to
commanders on EOD operators’ capabilities.
The AEODP‐10 Edn A, Ver 1 is a good support document for the
AJP‐3.15 (B) by providing a baseline for specialized EOD skills at the
varying levels. It allows for nations to define their own understanding
of each proficiency task as it generally describes a broad use of a
given task.
AEODP‐10 Edn A, Ver 1 supports the C‐IED methodology described
in AJP‐3.15 (B) for key tasks by specially trained operators and
provides a general description of the expected proficiencies
associated with the given titles for these operators. It uses consistent
terms, such as neutralization, render safe procedures, explosive
ordnance, and the like to help planners and staff better understand
what the different levels of operators can provide in the C‐IED
mission. The main focus for the AEODP‐10 Edn A, Ver 1 is on
Defeat the Device. Each operator level, with the exception of
Explosive Ordnance Clearance operator (EOC), identifies the threat
category they can respond to and to neutralize by RSP or Destroy. It
also describes support to other pillars these specialist should be able
to provide, such as Attach the Network, through subject matter
advice and analysis.
Observation: The AEODP-10 provides a good baseline
understanding for EOR, IEDD, CMD, BCMD, U/W EOD, and EOD
staff officer, but does not address the category of EOC. For EOC, it
fundamentally states that this category is too varied to define and left
to each nation to submit its proficiency definition.
Overall Impressions
Common Approaches
& Methodologies
Areas of Difference &
Frictions
Analysis: It is very costly and time consuming for a nation to have a
fully capable EOD team which is trained and equipped to respond
and neutralize all the EO threats (conventional, non-conventional,
improvised). The training cycle to bring a new recruit up to a safe
operational level is slow and demanding. Finding personnel with the
needed qualities and characteristics, intelligence, physical
conditioning and mechanical coordination, limits the “production” of
EOD capable forces due to costs, selection, and attrition. Over the
decades, the demand for these skills on the battlefield has led to the
C-3
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C-IED DOCTRINE REVIEW
varying levels of response seen today by the Alliance. This category
is, by the AEODP-10, the Explosive Ordnance Clearance (EOC)
operator. These operators (excluding nations that only allow fully
trained CMD or IEDD operators to provide this capability) have
quality, but limited training for specific tasks only. This has been a
positive initiative to provide a force multiplier to the explosive threat
reduction efforts, but has some secondary effects. This is the most
ambiguous category to the average war fighter and serves to cause
confusion about the EOD community as a whole. To the average
war fighter EOC is EOD; all equal and should be there to provide the
service called for. This can potentially place EOC personnel in
situations beyond their skills and with undesired results. The AJP3.15(B) does state in several areas that EOD team make-ups and
training can vary, but lacks to provide understanding or reference of
what the differences. Further to complicate the matters, many units
possess the capabilities in more than one mission area (example:
most US Navy EOD teams provide all the proficiencies listed in the
AEODP-10, whereas US Army EOCA engineers can cover
neutralization for both UXO and IEDD, but only specific to their guide
and only for Destroy. They have no RSP capabilities).
Summary/Conclusion
Recommendation: Provide nationally excepted definitions for levels
of response for an EOD team for which explosive threats (i.e. UXO,
CB munitions, IEDs, …) they are capable of neutralizing and by what
EOD procedure (RSP, Destroy, Remove). This would support
standardization and understanding from the lowest level up and help
synchronize the C-IED lines of operation.
To the average war fighter, the terms and actions of the varying EO
operators all seem the same. It is important to define the different
levels of response provided in order to safely and efficiently task
EOD assets and resources to achieve the desired effects in support
of the overall C‐IED mission.
C-4
ANNEX C
C-IED DOCTRINE REVIEW
Title
Landmines and Explosive Remnants of War Safety Handbook
Reference
Originator
UNMAS
STANAG
Date
2005 (2nd Edition)
Target Audience
Landmines and Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) safety
handbook is intended for Humanitarian and United Nation workers
in a country that experienced armed conflict…
Aim/Purpose
The purpose of the Landmines and Explosive Remnants of War
(ERW) Safety Handbook is to raise awareness and provide basic
safety information concerning the threat of landmines and other
ERW to organizations and individuals working in war‐torn areas.
The majority of the Landmines and ERW safety handbook
addresses landmines/ERW/UXO, with a small section on IED and
booby traps. It is a good source for non‐military personnel workers
or the general public to gain basic awareness for these explosive
threats and reasonable safety guidelines and practices for working
in an area where the potential for mines, EWR, or UXO exists.
Although it covers ground sign and human behavioural indicators
for landmine/ERW/UXO threats, it does not go to the same level of
detail for IEDs.
Some of the lessons learned from deminers and humanitarian
workers in war torn regions can and have been applied to C‐IED,
such as ground signs, vegetation and wildlife tell‐tales, behavioural
patterns of locals, the use of improvised danger markers, and
awareness of high traffic areas used by military forces. Clearance
efforts, either by UN deminers in the cases reference in this
handbook, or by alliance forces for IEDs, are positive actions that
physically remove the explosive threat and protect the force. Such
activities reduce casualties and provide freedom of movement to
Alliance forces, the host nation security forces and the wider
population. It can lead to positive interaction with locals and, like
demining activities, gain their valuable support and cooperation. By
AJP 3.15(B), C‐IED clearance activities would include IED, UXO,
and landmines.
The definition of an IED differ in that this handbook is more a
general description and only includes explosives verses the AJP
3.15(B) has a more technical, broader and inclusive capture of the
modern nature of IEDs. In the Landmine and ERW handbook, IEDs
are identified as separate threats from UXO and states that booby‐
trap devices that contain explosives are considered IEDs. The AJP
3.15 (B) does not addresses booby‐traps, but it would be prudent to
keep IEDs and booby traps in separate categories.
The Landmine and ERW safety handbook reaches its intended
audience and provides good guide for the public, however is not a
valuable resource for the CIED mission since many of the
applicable guide lines are integrated into more detailed and
elevated programs, such as operators search.
Overall Impressions
Common Approaches
& Methodologies
Areas of Difference &
Frictions
Summary/Conclusion
C-5
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C-IED DOCTRINE REVIEW
Notes:
The debate on whether a VOIED is a booby trap or not (or vice
versa) may continue. To the EOD operator, how to categorize it
may lie on understanding the tactical intent of the item, how it's
fabricated, and most importantly how he/she will take actions to
render it safe under the situational constraints, threat assessment,
and tactical mission.
C-6
ANNEX C
C-IED DOCTRINE REVIEW
Title
Concept About the Treatment of Ammunition and Explosive
Device Hazards
Reference
CIA‐3.18
Originator
STANAG
FRA (Joint Concepts, Doctrine and Experimentation Centre)
Date
22 January 2007
Target Audience
CIA‐3.18 is intended to be an operational and tactical level guide to
the French approach to explosive hazards for joint service
planners, staffs, and operators.
Aim/Purpose
The purpose of the CIA‐3.18 is to provide guidance and
understanding for explosive hazards, EOD operations, planning
considerations, and multinational cooperative operations.
This analysis is limited to a translated summary from French to
English. The major points highlighted in the summary support the
NATO doctrines and the CIA‐ 3.18 is a good source for planners
and operators to gain needed tactical and operational details for
EOD operations, their capabilities, and integration considerations
for joint and multinational explosive hazard responses and
missions.
The CIA‐3.18 is in alignment with the C‐IED methodologies as per
the AJP‐3.15 (B). Defeat the Device capabilities described in the
document follow NATO standards for EOD personnel. The CIA‐
3.18 emphasises the utilisation of EOD forces to enable freedom of
movement and force protection through detection (recce),
neutralization (intervention), and proper resourcing and
coordination for multinational operations within C‐IED.
Observation: The CIA-3.18 does not include IEDs and UXOs
under the same category as does the AJP-3.15(B) which uses the
AAP-6 definition for explosive ordnance as All munitions containing
explosives, nuclear fission or fusion materials and biological and
chemical agents. This includes bombs and warheads; guided and
ballistic missiles; artillery, mortar, rocket and small arms
ammunition; all mines, torpedoes and depth charges, demolition
charges; pyrotechnics; clusters and dispensers; cartridge and
propellant actuated devices; electro-explosive devices; clandestine
and improvised explosive devices; and all similar or related items or
components explosive in nature. The CIA-3.18 separates UXO and
IEDs as two differing explosive hazards. AJP-3.15(B) does
separately define UXO and IED as per the AAP-6. The AJP3.15(B) also states that for the commander or staff officer, will not
necessarily want to make the technical distinction between them.
Overall Impressions
Common Approaches
& Methodologies
Areas of Difference &
Frictions
Analysis: For operational forces outside the EOD community, the
definition has no significant differences to their actions, however, to
the responding EOD specialist it does. Equipment, levels of
training, country of origin national restrictions, and resourcing are
not equal when it comes to neutralizing an IED verses an UXO. To
an EOD unit, an UXO is of a military fabricated weapon that is not
improvised. When it is improvised, usually to be used for a main
C-7
ANNEX C
C-IED DOCTRINE REVIEW
charge in the device or the fuzing/S&A/sensor package is altered to
cause it to function by a desired action, it is an IED and it may be
beyond their training to perform the preferred RSP. This
understanding of the differences can help planners and staffs more
effectively support C-IED missions by proper tasking of EOD units
by their capabilities. All EOD assets in the multinational C-IED
alliance are not equal; therefore, all explosive threats should not be
grouped into one category and reported as such. NATO STANAG
2337 contains multinational information on a strategic level of the
EOD capabilities, but does not provide a detailed category or
description of what those capabilities apply to in regards UXO or
IEDs. Being that exploitation of a device is a critical element to
Attack the Network operations, it is imperative for the war fighters
at the operational and tactical levels to understand when requesting
EOD support, which capability they truly desire and the expected
possible outcome post blast/post incident. An EOD unit capable
and allowed to RSP an UXO, may only be able to destroy in situ an
IED.
Summary/Conclusion
Recommendation: Because of the many variables that determine
a response unit’s capabilities and limitations, it is understood why
many of the NATO publications are purposely written vague and
flexible, however, this leads to misconception by war fighters
outside the EOD community. In a multinational alliance, the tactical
level over time, will come to realize the differing units EOD
capabilities, but not without risks and possible loss of resources
and evidence at a minimum. The COE should propose a set matrix
for countries to place their capable units in for the war fighter to
understand the level of response a unit can provide. For example:
Response level 1 = a unit is trained, manned, and equipped to
perform render safe procedures, destroy in situ, site exploitation,
post blast investigation, support special operations in an EOD role,
insert/extract via land and air (when provided), for all UXO land and
air munitions as define in AAP-6 and all IEDs as defined in AAP-6
for permissive, semi-permissive, hostile, and chemically/biologically
contaminated environments.
CIA‐3.18 supports AJP‐3.15 (B) for Defeat the Device with regards
to standard operating procedures. Throughout the NATO and
multinational doctrines, there are minor differences that have the
potential to mislead non‐EOD forces on capabilities and limitations.
Even through, AEODP‐10 outlines the minimum standards for
EOD, there is no capture document for the war fighter that outlines
a unit's response as it applies to the varying explosive threats and
what final disposition is desired in the C‐IED lines of operation.
C-8
ANNEX C
C-IED DOCTRINE REVIEW
Title
Explosive Hazard Operations
Reference
FM 3‐34.210
Originator
USA (Department of the Army)
STANAG
Date
March 2007
Target Audience
FM 3‐24.210 is intended for all levels of the combined arms team
and the staff and planning cells in the U.S. armed forces.
Aim/Purpose
The purpose of the FM 3‐24.210 is to provide the U.S. armed
forces with the tactical, technical, and procedural guidance and
doctrine required to bridge the gap between current force
capabilities and the requirement of future forces for explosive
hazards (EH) mitigation. It is subordinate to FM 3‐34 Engineer
Operations. The FM 3‐24.210 expands beyond mine warfare to
encompass all conventional EH encountered in the contemporary
operational environment (COE); however, it does not include
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) hazards. It
focuses on the asymmetric threat and establishes the doctrine to
defeat those threats.
During the last decade of war, the U.S. Army has been faced with a
high tempo/high threat demand for explosive hazard reduction
capable units. In response, the U.S. Army developed a new
certification within its Combat Engineer corps, the Explosive
Ordnance Clearance Agent (EOCA). The FM 3‐24.210 provides
understanding and guidance for this U.S. Army qualification and
capability. It is a good source to help planners task organize their
U.S. assets for explosive hazard reduction and mitigation and for
requesting units to understand the different capabilities U.S. EOD,
EOCA, and Engineer teams can provide. The major focus of the
manual is on route and mine clearance operations (a core
capability for Combat Engineers), and expands this capability to
IEDs, UXO, and booby‐traps encounter for this mission.
The FM 3‐24.210 supports general C‐IED methodologies as stated
in the AJP‐3.15 (B). The manual retains the C‐IED framework of
predict, prevent, detect, avoid, neutralize, and protect, which are
now integrated throughout the C‐IED
CONOPS pillars of Prepare the Force, Attack the Network, Defeat
the Device, and underpinned by Understanding and Intelligence.
The essential elements for mitigations, avoidance, Render Safe
Procedures, destroy, and C‐IED enablers and functions such as
Explosive Ordnance Disposal, route clearance, and military search
reside in both documents and are conceptually aligned.
Overall Impressions
Common Approaches
& Methodologies
C-9
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C-IED DOCTRINE REVIEW
Areas of Difference &
Frictions
Observation: There is a difference in the term EOD teams
between NATO and US doctrine in their presumed capabilities.
The U.S. armed forces understand an EOD team to be fully IEDD
capable in addition to all capabilities associated with conventional
and non-conventional ordnance disposal. NATO forces understand
most EOD teams to be capable of conventional ordnance and
would need to request additional capabilities for IEDD. This is
attributable to the varying national capabilities and terms each
country upholds. In addition to this term, there are less qualified,
but important enablers from both NATO and US which support
neutralization of explosive hazards. All NATO countries that report
have EOD forces must meet the standards of AEODP-10, however
what they title them as may differ. This analysis is only between FM
3-24.210 and AJP-3.15(B).
Analysis: The United States armed forces are trained and taught
to call in specialists for any explosive hazard. EOD forces are their
primary responding choice. In a high tempo/high conflict
environment, the US Army has developed progression response
levels for explosive hazards, as outlined in FM 3-24.210 chapter 3,
as a force multiplier and enabler to the war fighter. This falls more
in line with how NATO differentiates EOD and IEDD teams. The
US Army Explosive Ordnance Clearance Agent (EOCA) engineer is
more similar to the capabilities of the EOD Assistant as understood
by most NATO countries (based off the UK programs) in regards to
UXO, where they can destroy in situ (or in US terms: blow in place).
Additionally, EOCA can destroy in situ IEDs which they can identify
in their guide and authorized by their theatre commanders. They
are not authorized to conduct Render Safe Procedures (RSP) on
any explosive hazard, whether conventional or improvised. Under
US doctrine, only EOD teams (referring to US EOD teams) can
perform RSPs. US Army Combat Engineers are similar to NATO
referenced Mechanized and Combat Heavy Engineers in that they
are trained to neutralize hand-emplaced mines and can assist with
UXO hazards on a limited basis and under the direct technical
guidance of EOD forces. With all the different levels of
qualifications and capabilities, it is easy to surmise that war fighters
and staffs, working with multiple countries, can easily be confused
by which type of team to request and what the responding team is
able to do for them. This could lead to a less efficient use of
resources, could place responders in a situation they are not
qualified or equipped for, could create an even greater threat
(making UXO even more sensitive and dangerous or scattered)
and could have counter-productive results for the C-IED lines of
operation.
Recommendation: Include an additional paragraph or footnote to
state the general capabilities of the different levels of qualifications
for NATO and US personnel responsible for responding to an
explosive hazard as per the AEODP-10 minimum standards for
EOD.
Observation: The FM 3-24.210 only includes electronic
countermeasures in the Protect framework, whereas AJP-3.15(B)
includes it in neutralization.
C - 10
ANNEX C
C-IED DOCTRINE REVIEW
Analysis: Within C-IED, electronic countermeasures are an
important level of protection for troops. It serves to interrupt a
potential firing signal to a radio-controlled (term used to cover all
frequencies) explosive hazard, however there is no positive
indication or action to show it is working. To imply that it is
neutralizing a device would only be in theory and serve no actual
evidence during the tactic situation and could lead to a false sense
of security around the device. Stating that it provides an added
layer of protection to some types of firing devices may keep the war
fighter’s mind set on the alert and lean to the safer side of chance.
Unlike the other actions in neutralization (avoid, RSP, destroy),
inhibition which may be achieved by electronic support measures
does not require the war fighter to make a conscious decision for
positive actions.
Summary/Conclusion
Recommendation: Place electronic countermeasures under
protection and remove from neutralization. The remaining part of
the definition …means employed to separate essential components
of unexploded ordnance… more closely describes Disruption, a
type of EOD procedure used against UXO and IEDs.
The majority of the FM 3‐34.210 supports the C‐IED CONOPS as
per the AJP‐3.15 (B). It will give planners and operators valuable
details on the capabilities and operating procedures of US Army
explosive hazard operations as they apply to Defeat the Device.
C - 11
ANNEX D
C-IED DOCTRINE REVIEW
Prepare the Force Documents Analysis
C-IED Training Requirements (ACIEDP-01)
UNIBAM Vol 2
ICRC Mine Risk Education (Nepal)
Title
C‐IED Training Requirements
Reference
ACIEDP‐01
Originator
NATO
STANAG
2294
Date
April 2013
Target Audience
This document is intended for HQs, units and individuals whose
role includes deployment to operational theatres with an IED threat.
The training requirements are principally at the tactical level, but
reach up to the operational level.
Aim/Purpose
NATO C‐IED Training Requirements draws on the NATO C‐IED
approach and concept described in AJP‐3.15 (B) and derives
training objectives and specific tasks to ensure that individuals,
units and HQs attain a minimum capability level to operate in an
environment with and IED threat. The document provides individual
and collective tasks under each of five overlapping areas of activity
described in the Concept of Operations: Understand, Pursue,
Prevent, Protect and Prepare. The need for in‐theatre refresher
training is described in a separate Annex and a further Annex
provides guidance to nations to assist them in the development of
training to meet the minimum training requirements.
ACIEDP‐01 is a straightforward and easy to use guide for HQs,
units and individuals. The NATO C‐IED Approach is briefly
described to show how the three pillars of Attack the Networks,
Defeat the Device And Prepare the Force are mutually supporting
and are underpinned by effective Understanding and
Intelligence. The document goes on to describe how proactive
training supports the C‐IED Approach by deriving training
requirements to degrade the adversary's ability to use IEDs, broken
down under the five Areas of Activity: Understand, Pursue, Prevent,
Protect and Prepare. ACIEDP‐01 includes Annexes for Individual
and Collective training C‐IED Training Requirements under each of
the Areas of Activity. The requirements are written to be both tasks
and training objectives, so that they can be easily developed by
nations into appropriate training packages and exercises necessary
to bring the individuals, units and HQs up to the required minimum
standard, appropriate to their role. The requirements are written to
be easily understood and implemented and will ensure that
individuals, units and HQs from different nations all have a common
minimum C‐IED capability on arrival in theatre.
Overall Impressions
A third Annex describes the need for in‐theatre training: as part of
the Reception, Staging and Onward Movement process to focus on
D-1
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C-IED DOCTRINE REVIEW
the specifics of the threat in the theatre and the operational
environment; as refresher training to ensure skills are maintained;
and to respond to any changes in the threat or changes in
Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (enemy or own).
Common Approaches
& Methodologies
Areas of Difference &
Frictions
Summary/Conclusion
The final Annex provides guidance on training and acts as a
reference sources, but is not prescriptive. Descriptions are
provided of the essential capabilities needed to conduct C-IED
Operations in a high threat environment and provides guidance on
how nations may design their operational concepts and training to
develop these capabilities. This guidance is not binding and should
not restrict nations in the methods they choose to meet the
minimum training requirements.
ACIEDP‐01 is derived from AJP‐3.15 (B), so is completely aligned
with the overarching NATO doctrine for C‐IED. It uses the NATO
"three pillars" approach and the five areas of activity in the concept
of operations described in Appendix 1 to AJP‐3.15 (B).
There are no significant areas of difference/friction between AJP‐
3.15(B) and
ACIEDP‐01.
This is an easy to use document which provides guidance on
training. It is compatible with AJP‐3.15 (B), but must be updated to
take account of any revision of the AJP.
D-2
ANNEX D
C-IED DOCTRINE REVIEW
Title
United Nations Infantry Battalion Manual Volume II
Reference
UNIBAM Vol. II
Originator
UN (DPKO & DFS)
STANAG
Date
August 2012
Target Audience
This is a Tactical level document intended for Infantry Battalion
Commanders, Battalion level staff and Company Commanders
deploying/deployed on UN operations.
Aim/Purpose
UNIBAM Vol. II is a stand‐alone, comprehensive and capability‐
based part of the UN Infantry Battalion Manual and provides best
practice information to assist infantry tactical level commanders to
plan, lead and manage UN peacekeeping operations.
UNIBAM Vol. II covers the spectrum of infantry operations and
tasks on UN operations. There are mentions of IEDs throughout the
document, but the main element worthy of analysis is Annex I: UN
Handling of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED). In addition,
Chapter 3 covers the capability standards that commanders are
expected to ensure that their battalions attain. This chapter
includes four checklists of capability standards to be achieved,
including a variety of battalion level tasks, which include actions to
prevent IED attacks against check points, on patrol and other
operational tasks.
Overall Impressions
The focus of Annex I is defensive. The UN manual does not
describe ATN activities at all. The Annex is aimed at ensuring that
UN infantry battalions are trained and equipped to minimise the
consequences should an IED attack take place. The annex does
cover intelligence activities to aid understanding of the threat, but it
does not seek to describe how to move "to the left of the boom", i.e.
to prevent an IED attack being launched.
Common Approaches
& Methodologies
Areas of Difference &
Frictions
Summary/Conclusion
The annex provides a useful basic description of the force
protection measures that should be undertaken by an infantry
battalion in an environment where there may be an IED threat.
The force protection measures described in Annex I of UNIBAM
Vol. II are in line with the defensive PTF measures that are required
in NATO doctrine (AJP‐3.15 (B) and ACIEDP‐01). These measures
are entirely in relation to defeating the device, or mitigating its
effects and to developing adequate Understanding & Intelligence.
The annex does not include any PTF measures that would
contribute specifically to ATN.
There are no areas of friction, other than to say that ATN is not
covered in this document.
This document is fit for purpose, but it is not doctrine and does not
add greatly to NATO understanding and C‐IED capability.
D-3
ANNEX D
C-IED DOCTRINE REVIEW
Title
ICRC Mine Risk Education (Nepal)
Reference
Originator
ICRC
STANAG
Date
March 2012
Target Audience
This booklet is designed to promote awareness amongst ICRC
personnel working in a post‐conflict situation in Nepal and to pass
on that mine/IED awareness to the civilian population. In military
parlance, therefore, it is a tactical level document.
Aim/Purpose
This booklet is specific to Nepal, but could be developed for wider
use by ICRC staff in other conflict and post‐conflict zones. It is
intended to promote awareness of the mine, ERW and IED threat
and to encourage safe behaviour. It is not a C‐IED document per
se, but does include some useful preventative (Force Protection
type) measures that in NATO terminology would be considered
under the PTF pillar of C‐IED.
The booklet is a mixture of information about the history of the
conflict in Nepal and its legacy mine/ERW/IED threat, and some
useful information for personnel on the ground to make them aware
and enable them to provide mine/IED awareness education to local
communities.
Overall Impressions
Common Approaches
& Methodologies
Areas of Difference &
Frictions
Summary/Conclusion
The two chapters that are of some interest are Chapter II ‐
Explosive Devices in Nepal and Chapter VII ‐ Basic Safety
Messages. The former is firmly focused on the local threat, which is
good bearing in mind the target audience. The latter chapter is
basic messages for Red Cross/Red Crescent workers and for the
local populace to enhance their personal safety. Chapter VII
includes some pictorial safety messages, which are of particular
use when language may be a difficulty.
This booklet is too far removed from NATO doctrine to make a full
analysis worthwhile. However its basic awareness and safety
messages are compatible with the PTF pillar.
This booklet is too far removed from NATO doctrine to make a full
analysis worthwhile.
This document is not doctrine and adds nothing to NATO C‐IED
understanding. It is however assessed to be fit for the purpose for
which it was produced.
D-4
ANNEX E
C-IED DOCTRINE REVIEW
Military Search Documents Analysis
Allied Tactical Doctrine for Military Search (ATP 3.12.x.x SD4)
UNIBAM Vol 2
Concept for Joint Operational Search
Explosive Hazard Operations (FM 3-34.210)
Title
Allied Tactical Doctrine for Military Search
Reference
Originator
ATP‐3.12.x.x
NATO
STANAG
2283
Date
Study Draft 4
Target Audience
Those involved planning Military Search: Commanders, Planners,
Military Search Specialists and personnel involved in supporting
search operations
This document provides a common understanding of and
framework for structuring, planning, preparing and conducting
Military Search operations across the full spectrum of operations
Noting that this is a Study Draft, this document provides a
comprehensive guide to the planning and execution of Military
Search operations. It ranges from the Strategic, through operational
to tactical levels with good use of Annexes.
For Planners it gives a great deal of information especially as it
would be expected that additional specific training would be given
to Military Search Specialists, especially Search Advisers (SA's)
and Military Search Teams (MST). The document also recognises
that there will be differences between national responsibilities and
organisations.
Both documents use the same methodologies and approach to
Military Search which is based on the UK model and experience.
Aim/Purpose
Overall Impressions
Common Approaches
& Methodologies
Areas of Difference &
Frictions
Observation: The reference to Military Search as an enabler within
AJP 3.15(B) is relatively short. Although Search Objectives and the
Levels of Search are mentioned, it does not cover Search Effects.
Analysis: ATP 3.12.x.x is not purely in support of C-IED and
therefore the objectives and required effects may not all be
relevant. However, AJP 3.15(B) does not bring out the full value of
Military Search, its role in planning and how it can support
intelligence (including ATN) operations.
Recommendation: Elements of ATP 3.12.x.x Ch1 Sections IV and
V are included in AJP 3.15.
Observation: ATP3.12.x.x uses the abbreviation 'MST' for Military
Search Teams. Within AJP 3.15 (B) 'MST' is used for Mission
Specific Training.
E-1
ANNEX E
C-IED DOCTRINE REVIEW
Analysis: Neither terms or abbreviations are recognised in AAP-6
(2014) or AAP-15 (2012). Mission Specific Training is a recognised
and well used term. Search Teams are usually referred to in full.
However, there is a need to differentiate between Military and nonmilitary (i.e. civil police) search teams. Nations may have their own
terminology based on levels of search i.e. High Assurance Search
Teams (HAST) and Unit Search Teams (UST)
Recommendation: The abbreviation for Military Search Teams
needs to be defined and submitted for inclusion into AAP-15.
Observation: The explanations of the levels of Search in AJP
3.15(B) are slightly different from ATP 3.12.x.x.
Analysis: AJP 3.15(B) divides basic search into Search
Awareness and Patrol Search whereas this differentiation is not
made in ATP 3.12.x.x Recommendation: Ensure the explanations
of Levels of Search are consistent. Figure 3/1 in ATP 3.12.x.x
which shows the relationship between Levels of Risk & Assurance
versus Training and Technology is very useful and could be
included in AJP 3.15(B).
Summary/Conclusion
COMMENT: ATP 3.12.x.x Table 3/1 SEARCH CAPABILITY refers
to 'Search' and 'Check' although there is no explanation of the
difference in either the text or Annex A.
ATP3.12.x.x is a comprehensive document which should be used
as the source for Military Search information for AJP 3.15(B).
COMMENT: As a study draft there are a number of minor typing
errors throughout.
E-2
ANNEX E
C-IED DOCTRINE REVIEW
Title
United Nations Infantry Battalion Manual Volume II
Reference
UNIBAM
Originator
UN (DPKO & DFS)
STANAG
Date
August 2012
Target Audience
Battalion Commanders, staff and Company Commanders involved
in peacekeeping operations
Aim/Purpose
This Manual is to assist key leaders in the planning and
preparations, training and equipping, organizing and evaluating and
in the execution of command and control responsibilities related to
UN Infantry Battalions. Provide the functional details of the
Battalion key leaders and staff sections, mission essential task
descriptions, checklists for commanders and amplification of
specific issues.
Designed specifically for peacekeeping operations, the tasks and
terminology are recognisable but may not directly relate to NATO
military operational terms.
Chapter 2.6 outlines Cordon and Search Operations. The
requirement is not IED specific but the general descriptions have
the same basis as those used for NATO Search Doctrine outlined
in AJP 3.15(B).
Observation: There are a number of differences in terminology,
methodology and purpose for search operations.
Overall Impressions
Common Approaches
& Methodologies
Areas of Difference &
Frictions
Analysis: The differences are due to the environment in which the
operations are expected to be conducted. The use of overt military
force and terms such as 'offensive search' would not be suitable for
a UN Mandated peace‐keeping operation. Although the terminology
used is different, the underlying principles for planning, conduct and
methodology are similar.
Summary/Conclusion
Recommendation: UN Peacekeeping terms and principles are
used to inform updated NATO Military Search and C‐IED Doctrine
to ensure it remains relevant to potential range of future operations.
An awareness of UN terminology and procedures is useful when
benchmarking NATO doctrine for future operations
E-3
ANNEX E
C-IED DOCTRINE REVIEW
Title
Concept for Joint Operational Searches
Reference
PIA 03.161 . No 165/DEF/CICDE/NP
Originator
France
STANAG
N/A
Date
24 Jun 2008
Target Audience
Distribution to Heads of Army, Navy, Air force, Military Intelligence,
Operations, Gendarmerie, all regions and colonies
This document outlines the purpose, framework and considerations
for Operational Searches
A document designed to provide a briefing on a relatively new
concept (in 2008) for the French armed forces.
Aim/Purpose
Overall Impressions
Common Approaches
& Methodologies
Areas of Difference &
Frictions
Summary/Conclusion
NOTE: Assessment based on translation of key points and not
a full technical translation
Refers to the three levels of search in accordance with NATO
methodology as well as search operations being used for
Defensive and Offensive purposes. Outlines the need for legality,
legitimacy and credibility. Differentiates between 'search' and
'exploitation'. Uses some English terms in the Glossary i.e. WIT,
LEGAD, military search. C‐IED is not a major strand.
Observation: No major areas of difference identified.
This document provides a basis for a French military search
capability which is in line with the NATO methodology
E-4
ANNEX E
C-IED DOCTRINE REVIEW
Title
Explosive Hazard Operations
Reference
FM 3‐34.210
Originator
USA (Department of the Army)
STANAG
Date
March 2007
Target Audience
FM 3‐24.210 is intended for all levels of the combined arms team
and the staff and planning cells in the U.S. armed forces.
Aim/Purpose
The purpose of the FM 3‐24.210 is to provide the U.S. armed
forces with the tactical, technical, and procedural guidance and
doctrine required to bridge the gap between current force
capabilities and the requirement of future forces for Explosive
Hazards (EH) mitigation. It is subordinate to FM 3‐34 Engineer
Operations. The FM 3‐24.210 expands beyond mine warfare to
encompass all conventional EH encountered in the Contemporary
Operational Environment (COE); however, it does not include
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) hazards. It
focuses on the asymmetric threat and establishes the doctrine to
defeat those threats.
FM 3‐24.210 Chapter 5 Military Search is a consolidated summary
and guidance for the conduct of Military Search operations within
the US Army. This Chapter recognises that Military Search is used
for non‐explosive targets but, as part of a document on Explosive
Hazard Operations, explosive ordnance, including IEDs, are a
major element. The term 'C‐IED' is not used. This Chapter also
outlines the principles for command and control of multi‐national
search operations.
FM 3‐24.210 Chapter 5 Military Search uses the same NATO
definition of Military
Search as found in AJP 3.15(B) and ATP 3.12.x.x. It also gives the
same search
Objectives as found in AJP 3.15(B) and the same 3 levels of
military Search.
Observation: The points outlined separately under Principles and
Execution in ATP 3.13.x.x are combined under Principles in FM 324.210 Chapter 5 Military Search.
Overall Impressions
Common Approaches
& Methodologies
Areas of Difference &
Frictions
Analysis: The information and guidance remains similar between
the two documents with that in FM 3-24.210 Chapter 5 Military
Search being laid out to conform to US military doctrine.
Recommendation: No change required.
Observation: FM 3-24.210 Chapter 5 Military Search notes the
difference between Cordon and Search and Intermediate Search.
Analysis: Cordon and Search was a term introduced for a
particular response to an operational scenario. The techniques
used and the operational level at which they were conducted are
more aligned to the Intermediate Search.
E-5
ANNEX E
C-IED DOCTRINE REVIEW
Recommendation: Cordon and Search was a national term and
should not be used in NATO Military Search doctrine.
Observation: FM 3-24.210 Chapter 5 Military Search categorises
search incidents in the same manner as that used for EOD
Incidents (Categories A - D).
Analysis: While categorising search incidents would assist in
prioritising assets and resources for planning and deployment, it
may also lead to confusion with EOD operations. This may be
especially so when a search incident does not involve explosive
hazards.
Recommendation: The Categories for EOD incidents are
understood within NATO and using similar categories for other
capabilities may cause confusion. This system of categorisation for
search operations should not be adopted in NATO.
Observation: Although FM 3-24.210 Chapter 5 Military Search and
the short reference to Military Search in AJP 3.15 (B) does not
mention it, ATP 3.12.x.x states that military search is 'under the
responsibility of Military Engineers'.
Analysis: FM 3-24.210 Chapter 5 Military Search does not state
which branch or service should plan or conduct search operations
other than the individuals receive the appropriate level of training.
Recommendation: This is a national approach of which NATO
should be aware.
Observation: FM 3-24.210 Chapter 5 Military Search gives the
military search response to the threat as two levels: Strategic and
Operational while ATP 3.12.x.x aligns the search response to
Threat Assessment.
Analysis: FM 3-24.210 Chapter 5 Military Search use of 'Search
Response' gives more guidance on planning as it encompasses
Military Search Integration and Direction. This will align to US C2
structures.
Summary/Conclusion
Recommendation: Recognises the difference as a national
interpretation and retain NATO doctrine as is.
FM 3‐24h.21f0 Chapter 5 Military Search is aligned to NATO
Military Search methodology and doctrine. There are a number of
minor anomalies which are due to national requirements.
E-6
ANNEX F
C-IED DOCTRINE REVIEW
Route Clearance Documents Analysis
Route Clearance Doctrine SD3 (ATP-3.12.1.x)
Mobility Support - Route & Area Clearance
Afghanistan Route Clearance Handbook
Mine/Countermine Operations (FM 20-32)
Explosive Hazard Operations (FM 3-34.210)
Title
Route Clearance ‐ Study Draft 3
Reference
ATP‐3.12.1.x
Originator
NATO
STANAG
Date
2014
Target Audience
Military engineers, commanders and staff at the tactical level.
Primarily for NATO forces but also applicable to operations
conducted by a coalition of NATO with partners, non‐NATO nations
and other organisations
Aim/Purpose
This Draft Doctrine aims to provide a common understanding and
frame of reference for tactical Route Clearance principles as
opposed to prescribing methods.
This study draft provides the over-arching principles for Route
Clearance recognising that each nation will have different tactics,
techniques and procedures due to resources and policy. The
document gives a proposed definition for Route Clearance as "the
detection and if found, the confirmation, the identification, marking
and neutralisation, destruction or removal of explosive ordnance
(EO) and non‐explosive obstacles threatening a defined route to
allow a military operation to continue with reduced risk". This
document outlines the difference between RC and breaching but
allows that 'risk tolerance' plays a significant factor in planning.
Although concerned with EO, this document is not entirely focussed
on C‐IED.
AJP 3.15(B) provides an outline of RC as an enabler within an IED
environment and as such, there is commonality between the
principles and outputs of both documents. AJP 3.15(B) is much
more generic whilst ATP‐3.12.1.X looks at the RC in more detail.
Observation: AJP 3.15(B) outlines two distinct activities for RC
(Right of Way Clearance and Route Maintenance and Sweep
Activities). These terms are not used in ATP‐3.12.1.X.
Overall Impressions
Common Approaches
& Methodologies
Areas of Difference &
Frictions
Analysis: The levels of RC outlined in ATP‐3.12.1.X gives a better
idea of the capabilities and limitations of RC.
Recommendation: Include Levels of Route Clearance in AJP 3.15
(B).
Observation : ATP‐3.12.1.X gives two methods of RC:
Dismounted Clearance and Mounted Clearance.
F-1
ANNEX F
C-IED DOCTRINE REVIEW
Analysis: These two methods are more in line with national
capabilities and recognises the role that a military search capability
can play in RC.
Summary/Conclusion
Recommendation: Use Dismounted and Mounted Clearance
explanations in C‐IED doctrine to remove the perception that RC
can only be conducted by specialised vehicles.
ATP‐3.12.1.x should be used as the basis for explaining the RC
capability within an IED environment for future C‐IED doctrine
F-2
ANNEX F
C-IED DOCTRINE REVIEW
Title
Mobility Support ‐ Route and Area Clearance
Reference
B‐GL‐361‐021/FP‐001 (Study Draft 2)
Originator
CAN (Directorate of Army Doctrine)
STANAG
Date
1 December 2005
Target Audience
Commanders, staff and engineer personnel involved in planning,
conducting and supporting route and area clearance operations
Aim/Purpose
The purpose of this document is to allow Engineers to give
consistent advice to manoeuvre commanders, thus enabling the
latter to understand and manage the risks surrounding explosive
hazard (EH) threats and balance land force freedom of action and
mobility support controls within their area of responsibility
A comprehensive document which uses the mobility support
framework as a structure where Explosive Hazards (EH) are the
predominant obstacle. Ranges from strategic and operational
planning and risk management to the tactical and practical level,
including a chapter on minefield extraction. Recognises the need to
operate with other nations, where there may be differences but also
allows that while this particular doctrine is not prescriptive any
deviation must be approved. Provides useful comparison on the
strengths and weaknesses of various obstacle mobility methods.
The reference to Route Clearance as an Enabler in AJP 3.15(B) is
relatively limited. Both documents recognise that although mobility
support and therefore Route Clearance is primarily a military
engineer lead, other agencies and capabilities have certain
responsibilities and need to be involved.
Overall Impressions
Common Approaches
& Methodologies
Areas of Difference &
Frictions
B‐GL‐361‐021/FP‐001 uses AJP 3.15(A) as the reference for the
definition of C‐IED
Observation: AJP 3.15(B) breaks Route Clearance into 2 activities
‐ Right of Way Clearance and Route Maintenance and Sweep
Activities. B‐GL‐361‐021/FP‐001 uses: Route and Area
Confirmation plus EOD Clearance; Route and Area Search plus
EOD Clearance; Route and Area Clearance; and Obstacle
Reduction.
Analysis: AJP3.15 (B) is focussed on C‐IED operations whereas
B‐GL‐361‐021/FP‐001 covers a much broader spectrum of EH and
therefore, these terms may be more appropriate for national
purposes
Recommendation: NATO terminology should provide a more
generic framework to allow nations to adapt to their own
requirements. Review NATO terminology.
Observation: B‐GL‐361‐021/FP‐001 recognises that Route and
Area Clearance can be conducted Manually and Mechanically.
F-3
ANNEX F
C-IED DOCTRINE REVIEW
Analysis: B‐GL‐361‐021/FP‐001 has combined elements of CAN
Tactical Search Doctrine (B‐GL‐361‐021/FT‐001) into Mobility
Support ‐Route and Area Clearance Doctrine. Although in NATO
Military Search Doctrine, Route Search procedures are similar the
link to Route Clearance, especially in AJP 3.15 (B) is not fully
defined.
Summary/Conclusion
Recommendation:
Within AJP 3.15, make reference to the role of manual search (i.e.
Military Search) as a capability of route clearance in addition to
purely mechanical and vehicular.
B‐GL‐361‐021/FP‐001 is a comprehensive document which will be
useful in informing future iterations of NATO doctrine
F-4
ANNEX F
C-IED DOCTRINE REVIEW
Title
Afghanistan Route Clearance Handbook (Supplement)
Reference
No 09‐33
Originator
US Centre for Army Lessons Learned
STANAG
Date
May 2009
Target Audience
Common Approaches
& Methodologies
US, coalition and allied personnel involved in Route Clearance
Operations in Afghanistan
Provide a guide for Route Clearance (RC) operations with a focus
on Afghanistan, giving effective ways to employ latest RC and
support equipment.
A useful guide and aide‐memoire for individuals and units operating
in a specific theatre.
This Handbook uses the same general principles as outlined in AJP
3.15 although they are based entirely on US requirements.
Areas of Difference &
Frictions
Observation: The format of the RC package elements in the
Handbook are different to those in the AJP3.15 (B) Exemplar.
Aim/Purpose
Overall Impressions
Analysis: The Handbook is specific to a particular national
capability and theatre of operations.
Summary/Conclusion
Recommendation: Retain the exemplar in AJP 3.15 (B). Examples
of how different nation’s resource RCPs could be given in footnotes
for illustrative purposes.
This Handbook is not doctrine but provides an illustration of how
RC principles and methodology can be applied in a given
environment.
F-5
ANNEX F
C-IED DOCTRINE REVIEW
Title
Mine/Countermine Operations
Reference
FM 20‐32
Originator
HQ Department of the Army, USA
STANAG
Date
Apr 2005
Target Audience
All elements of the US combined arms team for manoeuvre and
engineer staff planning and coordination.
The purpose of this document is to provide focus on individual skills
of emplacing and removing mines, team and squad tasks, platoon
and company organization and coordination for successful obstacle
reduction and breaching operations.
This FM is primarily for military engineers dealing with conventional
mines across a spectrum of operations. It is specific to US
methodology and resources. It does not refer to IEDs or C‐IED.
Chapter 11 focusses on Route and Area Clearance, the definitions
of which are given as "the removal of mines along pre‐existing
roads and trails" and "the total elimination or neutralization of an
obstacle or portions of an obstacle" respectively.
Aim/Purpose
Overall Impressions
Common Approaches
& Methodologies
Areas of Difference &
Frictions
A number of the planning considerations are common to the NATO
RC perspective, including the need for intelligence preparation,
security and appropriate task organisation.
Observation: The Route Clearance method outlined in this
Chapter is primarily manual and is more aligned to NATO military
search procedures that the NATO perception of Route Clearance.
Analysis: FM 20‐32 is the basis for US Engineer conventional
Mine/Countermine doctrine and is not a new document but is
subject to updates. The concept of route clearance in a high threat
IED environment has not yet been included.
Summary/Conclusion
Recommendation: FM 20‐32 is updated to include reference to C‐
IED related RC requirements and operations.
FM 20‐32 is primarily focussed at conventional warfare and even
recommends planning for a "50% loss of sweep assets". However,
this FM does illustrate that the linkage between conventional Route
Clearance and how that can be modified for C‐IED focussed
operations.
F-6
ANNEX F
C-IED DOCTRINE REVIEW
Title
Explosive Hazard Operations
Reference
FM 3‐34.210
Originator
USA (Department of Army)
STANAG
Date
March 2007
Target Audience
FM 3‐24.210 is intended for all levels of the combined arms team
and the staff and planning cells in the U.S. armed forces.
The purpose of the FM 3‐24.210 is to provide the U.S. Armed
Forces with the tactical, technical, and procedural guidance and
doctrine required to bridge the gap between current force
capabilities and the requirement of future forces for explosive
hazards (EH) mitigation. It is subordinate to FM 3‐34 Engineer
Operations. The FM 3‐24.210 expands beyond mine warfare to
encompass all conventional EH encountered in the contemporary
operational environment (COE); however, it does not include
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) hazards. It
focuses on the asymmetric threat and establishes the doctrine to
defeat those threats.
FM 3‐34.210 Chapter 6 Clearing Operations provides guidance for
route and area clearance operations within the US Army. Although
it states that "a clearing operation is an operation designed to clear
or neutralize all mines and obstacles from an area", this Chapter
focusses on explosive hazards (EH). It is not C‐IED centric and is,
quite rightly, focussed on US methodology and resources.
The definitions of Route Clearance in FM 3‐34.210 Chapter 6 and
ATP‐3.12.1.X (AJP 3.15(B) has no specific definition) are similar
but not exact. The elements of a Route Reconnaissance and
Clearance (RCC) Team outlined in FM 3‐34.210 Chapter 6 are the
same as those of the Exemplar Route Clearance Package in AJP
3.15(B)
Observation: FM 3‐34.210 Chapter 6 uses the title of Route
Reconnaissance and Clearance (RCC) Team while AJP 3.15(B)
uses Route Clearance Package (RCP).
Aim/Purpose
Overall Impressions
Common Approaches
& Methodologies
Areas of Difference &
Frictions
Analysis: There is no difference in the effect of this capability.
Recommendation: Recognise as different national terminology.
Observation: FM 3‐34.210 Chapter 6 outlines the concept of
'Explosive Hazards Hunting' as part of counter‐EH operations.
Analysis: EH hunting is a concept which involves more assets
than just the RCC. It has been developed as a national response to
emerging threats in a particular theatre and illustrates that RC is
not just reactive. This concept can be termed 'offensive' operations
but does not appear in NATO doctrine at present.
F-7
ANNEX F
C-IED DOCTRINE REVIEW
Recommendation: Develop and include the concept of 'Offensive
RC' in NATO doctrine, especially C‐IED ATN as well as DTD
pillars, however do not use the term 'EH Hunting'.
Observation: FM 3‐34.210 Chapter 6 recognises that dismounted
or manual RCC may be required but recommends mounted or
mechanical.
Analysis: ATP‐3.12.1.X also differentiates between Dismounted
and Mounted Clearance but outlines advantages and
disadvantages of both.
Summary/Conclusion
Recommendation: Retain advantages and disadvantages in
NATO doctrine to allow NATO nations to determine most
appropriate method conducive with capabilities and resources
FM 3‐34.210 Chapter 6 Clearing Operations is rightly aimed at US
methodology and resources. It is aligned to NATO but illustrates
how a nation has adapted to a particular threat.
F-8
ANNEX G
C-IED DOCTRINE REVIEW
Technical Exploitation Documents Analysis
Captured Persons, Material and Documents (AJP-2.5(A))
Intelligence Exploitation of Information from Material and Captured Persons (AJP-2.5(B))
Technical Exploitation in Support of Military Operations (AIntP-10 RD)
WIT Training Standards (STANAG 2298)
JIEDDO WTI Lexicon v4.0
Title
Captured Persons, Material and Documents
Reference
AJP‐2.5(A)
Originator
NATO
STANAG
Date
August 2007
Target Audience
AJP‐2.5(A) is aimed at the Intelligence community, but also covers
all arms involved in the capture or recovery of material and persons
across the spectrum of warfare. It contains significant tactical level
detail and how material is handled at the operational level. It
discusses the strategic level, but this is not the main target of the
document.
Aim/Purpose
The purpose of AJP‐2.5(A) is to provide guidance on the
procedures for the handling, administration and interrogation of
captured persons and the procedures for the handling and
reporting of captured materiel (CMAT) and documents (CDOCs)
within the NATO alliance. The procedures outlined are primarily
applicable to conventional military operations, but can be adapted
to other types of operations, such as Non‐Article 5 Crisis Response
Operations and Defence Against Terrorism Operations. The
publication also provides general guidelines for the handling of
CPERS, CMAT and CDOCs in multinational operations based on
the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept with the
participation of both NATO member Nations and coalition partners.
AJP‐2.5 (A) is soon to be replaced by AJP‐2.5 (B) and is therefore
not analysed in detail. The document was written for conventional
military operations and although adaptable, has some
shortcomings for recent NATO operations in Afghanistan.
Overall Impressions
Chapter 5 deals with Captured Material and Associated Technical
Document, including weapons, ammunition and explosives;
Chapter 8 covers Non‐Article 5 Crisis Response Operations; and
Annex Q is about the Joint Captured Materials Exploitation Centre.
All are very generic, providing lots of tactical detail, but do not
adequately address the Technical Exploitation and Weapons
Technical Intelligence capabilities that are so important to
successful C‐IED operations.
G-1
ANNEX G
C-IED DOCTRINE REVIEW
Common Approaches
& Methodologies
Areas of Difference &
Frictions
Summary/Conclusion
This document was intended for general warfighting operations. It
has very limited applicability for Technical Exploitation during C‐IED
operations and has therefore not been analysed in detail. It is
expected to be superseded in 2015 by AJP‐2.5 (B), which has been
updated to reflect experience of NATO operations in Afghanistan.
G-2
ANNEX G
C-IED DOCTRINE REVIEW
Title
Intelligence Exploitation of Information from Material and
Captured Persons
Reference
AJP‐2.5(B)
Originator
NATO
STANAG
2195
Date
Study Draft 2 (Nov 2012)
Target Audience
AJP‐2.5(B) is an Intelligence community document, but has
applicability to commanders, HQ and operational units of all arms
and services. It is targeted at the operational and tactical levels, but
reached to the strategic level as required.
Aim/Purpose
The purpose of this publication is to provide joint functional doctrine
on the intelligence exploitation of information from material and
CPERS within NATO. It provides the NATO Commander with
general guidelines and options for the planning, modular and
scalable structuring, and conduct of intelligence exploitation
operations. It is also intended to improve cooperation between
NATO forces during operations and provide a sound base for
instruction in the service schools and establishments of NATO and
its member states.
It must be noted that this analysis is done of SD2, which is the
latest available.
The ratification draft may contain some differences, but it is
understood that SD2 is of similar structure and content to the RD.
Overall Impressions
AJP‐2.5 (B) SD2 describes the Intelligence Exploitation Framework
for NATO operations. It uses the three levels of exploitation ‐ Level
1 Field/Tactical, Level 2 Theatre/Operational and Level 3 Out‐of‐
Theatre/Strategic ‐ that are familiar from AJP‐3.15 (B) for C‐IED
operations. This AJP expands the exploitation framework beyond
that used for C‐IED operations, to cover the spectrum of operations
and discusses the passage of material, information and intelligence
between the tactical, operational and strategic levels.
AJP‐2.5(B) SD2 is a much more succinct and readable document
than AJP‐2.5(A) as it cuts out a great amount of tactical level detail
(which is moved to subordinate publications) and focuses on the
principal requirements of obtaining material and information;
recording and submitting it into the exploitation system; and
analysing it at the appropriate level to gain maximum benefit,
paying due cognisance to the time value of the information
obtained.
G-3
ANNEX G
C-IED DOCTRINE REVIEW
Common Approaches
& Methodologies
Areas of Difference &
Frictions
The three levels of exploitation described in AJP‐3.15 (B) have
been incorporated into AJP‐2.5 (B) SD2 to describe tactical
Operational and strategic level activities. In this document they are
also described as Field, Theatre and Out‐of‐Theatre activities.
Within the detail of activities, there is considerable overlap with the
type of supporting capabilities that are familiar elements of C‐IED
operations, such as forensic and biometric (DNA and Latent prints)
collection; explosives analysis; electronics exploitation; and tool
marks analysis.
Observation: When describing the three levels of exploitation this
SD includes Field/Tactical, Theatre/Operational and Out-ofTheatre/Strategic.
Analysis: AJP-3.15(B) does not use the Tac/Op/Strat terminology,
but this would be more appropriate as the Theatre/Out-of-Theatre
terminology brings to mind geographical constraints which may no
longer apply. For example, certain capabilities previously delivered
at Level 3 (Out-of-Theatre) may now be pushed forward to a Level
2 (Theatre) facility due to improved technology or the need for
timely exploitation. Using the Theatre/ Out-of Theatre terminology
may cause confusion in such instances.
Recommendation: A future revision of AJP-3.15(B) should align
C-IED doctrine with AIntP-10 and refer to
Tactical/Operational/Strategic levels of exploitation.
Observation: This doctrine SD has much broader applicability than
just C-IED and is intended primarily for the Intelligence community.
Analysis: The SD provides context for Technical Exploitation in CIED operations, but includes much detail that is not totally relevant,
including some tactical requirements.
Summary/Conclusion
Recommendation: Personnel involved in C-IED operations should
be aware of the context provided by AJP-2.5(B), but should use the
subordinate AIntP-10 for detail on Technical Exploitation.
This SD will lead to a much more useful AJP covering the
exploitation of information from material and captured personnel.
Much of the tactical level detail has been removed and it now better
addresses the requirements of nonArticle 5 operations as well as
the conventional war scenario.
G-4
ANNEX G
C-IED DOCTRINE REVIEW
Title
Technical Exploitation in Support of Military Operations
Reference
AIntP‐10
Originator
NATO
STANAG
6502
Date
Ratification Draft 1
Target Audience
Commanders and Staff at the operational level with responsibility
for technical exploitation of material and information obtained from
captured personnel. It is focused on those involved in C‐IED
operations, but can be expanded to other types of operation and
also provides guidance on technical exploitation to intelligence
specialists. Although focused at the operational level, it also
addresses tactical and strategic level issues where applicable.
Aim/Purpose
AIntP‐10 identifies the principles of NATO technical exploitation in
support of military operations and establishes minimum standards
and requirements that enable technical exploitation. This will
facilitate effective NATO exploitation efforts and the communication
of the resulting information through standardized dissemination
methods.
Although an Intelligence publication this document was developed
with considerable input from the C‐IED community and as such
contains many of the themes familiar to a C‐IED audience. It starts
with a brief introduction to technical exploitation and how this fits
into the intelligence exploitation framework. The principles of
technical exploitation emphasise the Intelligence lead on behalf of
the commander, but that preservation of life and other operational
priorities may drive the process. The technical exploitation system
is described in Chapter 3 and the importance of scalability and
modularity are discussed, to provide a capability adaptable to the
size, scope and nature of the operation. The three levels of
exploitation are discussed in detail, but it is noted that technology,
geography and timeliness may blur the boundaries between which
capabilities are delivered at which exploitation level.
Chapter 4 outlines the supporting and enabling capabilities required
for a successful technical exploitation capability and a series of
Annexes provides specific detail on these, including specific tasks
to be conducted; recommended generic equipment lists; and
desired qualifications for the exploitation personnel by exploitation
level.
AJP‐3.15 (B) introduces and briefly describes the NATO C‐IED
Exploitation system.
This document expands considerably, providing much better detail
of the range of capabilities applicable to technical exploitation.
AIntP‐10 includes the role of EOD teams and WIT as the first level
of technical exploitation, as well as describing the necessity for all
personnel involved in C‐IED (and other operations) to have a basic
understanding of information/material collection processes and to
be forensically aware.
Overall Impressions
Common Approaches
& Methodologies
G-5
ANNEX G
C-IED DOCTRINE REVIEW
Areas of Difference &
Frictions
Observation: When describing the three levels of exploitation this
SD includes
Field/Tactical, Theatre/Operational and Out‐of‐Theatre/Strategic.
Analysis: AJP‐3.15 (B) does not use the Tac/Op/Strat terminology,
but this would be more appropriate as the Theatre/Out‐of‐Theatre
terminology brings to mind geographical constraints which may no
longer apply. For example, certain capabilities previously delivered
at Level 3 (Out‐of‐Theatre) may now be pushed forward to a Level
2 (Theatre) facility due to improved technology or the need for
timely exploitation. Using the Theatre/ Out‐of Theatre terminology
may cause confusion in such instances.
Recommendation: A future revision of AJP‐3.15(B) should align
C‐IED doctrine with AIntP‐10 and refer to
Tactical/Operational/Strategic levels of exploitation. [NB ‐ This
observation is a duplicate of an observation on AJP‐2.5(B) SD2]
Observation: AIntP‐10 includes a section on the Guiding
Principles for Technical Exploitation.
Analysis: These principles ‐ Command & Control; Preservation of
Life; Preservation of Material; Tempo; Prioritisation; Information
Management; Exploitation Awareness; and Scalability and
Modularity ‐ are useful for all involved in C‐IED operations, in
particular EOD Teams and WIT.
Summary/Conclusion
Recommendation: Future updates of C‐IED doctrine should
consider inclusion of AintP-10
AIntP‐10 is a very useful document bringing together the C‐IED
community and the Intelligence community to maximise the
benefits of Technical Exploitation. Once ratified it should be an
essential element of C‐IED related doctrine.
G-6
ANNEX G
C-IED DOCTRINE REVIEW
Title
Weapons Intelligence Teams Training Standards
Reference
STANAG 2298
Originator
NATO
STANAG
2298
Date
20 September 2010
Target Audience
This STANAG defines the capability standards for tactical level
Weapons Intelligence Teams. It refers to Level 2 and Level 3
Exploitation capabilities, which are generally considered to be
operational and strategic levels respectively.
Aim/Purpose
The aim of this STANAG is to define the minimum capability
standards required for a Weapons Intelligence Team (WIT). It
supports NATO C‐IED efforts by articulating this common minimum
standard in an essential capability that is the first stage of the
Technical Exploitation process, which feeds all three pillars of CIED
through improved Understanding and Intelligence.
The STANAG provides a very brief description of the NATO
Technical Exploitation process, which is explained in greater detail
in AJP‐3.15 (B) and AIntP‐10, and shows how the WIT capability
provides the on‐site, initial (Level 1) exploitation capability. It then
goes into greater depth about the composition of a WIT and the key
considerations in their use. The outputs of WIT investigations are
used both in theatre (tactical/operational levels) and out of theatre
(strategic level). The STANAG includes five annexes, respectively
covering: the tasks to be conducted by WIT; WIT minimum
capability requirements; WIT Report Guidelines and formats; a
general WIT Equipment list; and a brief lexicon. The NATO WIT
capability was first described in AJP‐3.15 and this STANAG is
consistent with AJP‐3.15 (B). The STANAG pre‐dated the higher
level STANAG 6502, AIntP‐10 Technical Exploitation, but that
document takes the WIT capability as described in this STANAG
(2298) as the basis of the Level 1 exploitation capability.
This STANAG is derived from the description of the WIT capability
provided in AJP‐3.15 (B).
Overall Impressions
Common Approaches
& Methodologies
G-7
ANNEX G
C-IED DOCTRINE REVIEW
Areas of Difference &
Frictions
Observation: This STANAG pre‐dates AIntP‐10 by approximately
5 years.
Analysis: Although much of the WIT capability has been included
in AIntP‐10, exploitation improvements during recent operations
may not be reflected in this STANAG.
Recommendation: Future rewrite of STANAG 2298 should reflect
changes to the Exploitation process. This should also be aligned
with future updates of AJP‐3.15(B)
Summary/Conclusion
This STANAG is fit for purpose. It should however be considered
for revision to include developments in the NATO Exploitation
process during recent operations.
G-8
ANNEX G
C-IED DOCTRINE REVIEW
Title
Weapons Technical Intelligence Lexicon
4th Edition
Reference
Originator
USA (DOD and DOJ)
STANAG
Date
October 2012
Target Audience
All agencies involved in C‐IED and Weapons Technical Intelligence
(WTI) at Strategic, Operational and Tactical levels. This US
document, jointly sponsored by the Department of Defense and the
Department of Justice, has been offered to NATO and International
partners to promote a single common lexicon in the CIED/ WTI
arena.
Aim/Purpose
The lexicon provides a coherent conceptual framework and
common operational vocabulary to address the IED threat
worldwide. It categorises IED incidents both technically (key
components of the IED) and tactically (the planning, conduct and
intent of the incident) with the aim of improving the collection,
reporting and exploitation of IED related intelligence. The use of a
common lexicon is intended to standardise terminology used in
reports and improve database management; assist in IED‐related
education and training; and assist in the development of CIED/WTI
policy and doctrine.
The WTI Lexicon is an easy to use document. It breaks IED
incidents down by Tactical Characterisation ‐ the tactical design of
the incident and the purpose of the IED; and Technical
Categorisation ‐ the main components of the IED. From these trend
and pattern analysis; event signature development and device
profiling; and TTP development can take place, which in turn lead
to a better understanding of the networks using IEDs, their
motivations and intent.
Overall Impressions
Each section is broken down in a series of branch diagrams and a
succinct definition is provided for each term.
Although a US product, this lexicon was developed with NATO
involvement and has been widely distributed within both military
and law enforcement communities involved in C‐IED and WTI. The
adoption of this common lexicon amongst the international
community will provide a significant benefit in terms of reporting
and sharing of technical information and intelligence about IEDs
and the networks that use them.
G-9
ANNEX G
C-IED DOCTRINE REVIEW
Common Approaches
& Methodologies
Areas of Difference &
Frictions
Summary/Conclusion
This Lexicon is not a Technical Exploitation doctrine as such, but
supports doctrine through the promotion of common terminology
that should be used in reporting and data management. Although a
US document, it was developed in conjunction with NATO Allied
Command Transformation and has been offered to NATO and
Partner nations as a reference document.
Not applicable.
This is a very useful lexicon which if utilised on NATO operations
will promote better understanding through use of common
taxonomy and terminology.
G - 10