Exercise in Industrial Economics Consumer Utility 1.1 For consumer i, the utility function is ππ(π₯π₯ππ , π₯π₯ππ0 ) = οΏ½π₯π₯ππ + π₯π₯0ππ . Consumer i has the endowment π€π€ππ , which can be spent for purchase of π₯π₯ππ ≥ 0 goods or π₯π₯0ππ ≥ 0 units of the numeraire good. (a) How many units of the numeraire is consumer i willing to pay for π₯π₯ππ = 4, if π€π€ππ ≥ 2 ? Is his willingness to pay influenced by an increase in π€π€ππ ? (b) Suppose consumer i has bought 4 units of good π₯π₯ππ for 1 unit of the numeraire good. What is the size of his additional utility from this transaction? How many units of the numeraire good would he be willing to spend for 4 additional units of π₯π₯ππ ? (c) Let the price of π₯π₯ππ be ππ = 1. How many units does consumer i want to acquire, if π€π€ππ > 1 4 ? How many units of π₯π₯ππ will be bought for π€π€ππ < typical for a setting in Industrial Economics? 1.2 1 4 ? Which of these cases is more Producers’ profits, Consumers’ utility A market for a homogeneous good consists of ππ = 300 consumers. Consumers ππ = 1,2, … 150 have the willingness to pay ππππ (π₯π₯ππ ) = 2οΏ½π₯π₯ππ . Consumers ππ = 151, … 300 have the willingness to pay ππππ (π₯π₯ππ ) = 4οΏ½π₯π₯ππ . There are two suppliers with the cost functions πΆπΆ1 (π₯π₯1 ) = π₯π₯12 and πΆπΆ2 (π₯π₯2 ) = 2π₯π₯22 . (a) Show that the social welfare is maximized by the allocation of goods with π₯π₯ππ = consumers ππ = 1,2, … 150 , π₯π₯ππ = producer 1 and π₯π₯2 = allocation? 5 2 4 100 1 100 for for consumers ππ = 151, … 300 , π₯π₯1 = 5 for for producer 2. What is the size of the social welfare for this (b) Show that for the price p, the aggregate demand is represented by π·π·(ππ) = the size of the consumer surplus for ππ = 10 ? 750 π₯π₯ 2 . What is (c) What will be the supply function as a function of p of the two producers in a competitive market? Suppose the price is ππ = 10 . What is the size of the producer surplus? (d) Show that for the case of a competitive market, ππ = 10 is an equilibrium price. Compare this result to the result of (a)! 1.3 Monopoly and Social Welfare A monopolistic producer is represented by the cost function πΆπΆ(π₯π₯) = 0.5πππ₯π₯ 2 . He is facing a demand represented by π·π·(ππ) = ππ − ππ . (a) Calculate the monopoly supply π₯π₯ ππ and the monopoly price ππππ . What is the size of the monopoly profit Π(ππππ )? (b) Show that the elasticity of demand ππππ is bigger than one! (c) Calculate the consumer surplus π π πΎπΎ (ππππ ) for the monopoly price ππππ ! (d) What is the amount ππ ∗ that maximizes social welfare? Calculate the amount of the loss of social welfare caused by the monopoly! 1.4 Discriminating Monopoly A monopoly with the cost function πΆπΆ(π₯π₯) = π₯π₯ 2 faces two types of consumers: - a fraction ππ > 1 2 is represented by ππππ (π₯π₯) = π₯π₯ − 0.5π₯π₯ 2 a fraction (1 − ππ) is represented by ππππ (π₯π₯) = 2π₯π₯ − 0.5π₯π₯ 2 . Suppose ππ + (1 − ππ) = 1 and that ππ is located in a range such that the good will be offered to both types of consumers. (a) Calculate the demand functions of the two consumer types! (b) Calculate the optimal two-part tariff for the case of perfect discrimination. (c) Calculate the optimal two-part tariff for the case where the monopolist can only achieve discrimination by a price schedule!