Exercise in Industrial Economics Consumer Utility 1.2 Producers

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Exercise in Industrial Economics
Consumer Utility
1.1
For consumer i, the utility function is 𝑉𝑉(π‘₯π‘₯𝑖𝑖 , π‘₯π‘₯𝑖𝑖0 ) = οΏ½π‘₯π‘₯𝑖𝑖 + π‘₯π‘₯0𝑖𝑖 . Consumer i has the
endowment 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 , which can be spent for purchase of π‘₯π‘₯𝑖𝑖 ≥ 0 goods or π‘₯π‘₯0𝑖𝑖 ≥ 0 units of the
numeraire good.
(a) How many units of the numeraire is consumer i willing to pay for π‘₯π‘₯𝑖𝑖 = 4, if 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 ≥ 2 ?
Is his willingness to pay influenced by an increase in 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 ?
(b) Suppose consumer i has bought 4 units of good π‘₯π‘₯𝑖𝑖 for 1 unit of the numeraire good.
What is the size of his additional utility from this transaction? How many units of the
numeraire good would he be willing to spend for 4 additional units of π‘₯π‘₯𝑖𝑖 ?
(c) Let the price of π‘₯π‘₯𝑖𝑖 be 𝑝𝑝 = 1. How many units does consumer i want to acquire, if
𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 >
1
4
? How many units of π‘₯π‘₯𝑖𝑖 will be bought for 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 <
typical for a setting in Industrial Economics?
1.2
1
4
? Which of these cases is more
Producers’ profits, Consumers’ utility
A market for a homogeneous good consists of 𝑖𝑖 = 300 consumers.
Consumers 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2, … 150 have the willingness to pay π‘ˆπ‘ˆπ‘Žπ‘Ž (π‘₯π‘₯π‘Žπ‘Ž ) = 2οΏ½π‘₯π‘₯π‘Žπ‘Ž .
Consumers 𝑖𝑖 = 151, … 300 have the willingness to pay π‘ˆπ‘ˆπ‘π‘ (π‘₯π‘₯𝑏𝑏 ) = 4οΏ½π‘₯π‘₯𝑏𝑏 .
There are two suppliers with the cost functions 𝐢𝐢1 (π‘₯π‘₯1 ) = π‘₯π‘₯12 and 𝐢𝐢2 (π‘₯π‘₯2 ) = 2π‘₯π‘₯22 .
(a) Show that the social welfare is maximized by the allocation of goods with π‘₯π‘₯π‘Žπ‘Ž =
consumers 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2, … 150 , π‘₯π‘₯𝑏𝑏 =
producer 1 and π‘₯π‘₯2 =
allocation?
5
2
4
100
1
100
for
for consumers 𝑖𝑖 = 151, … 300 , π‘₯π‘₯1 = 5 for
for producer 2. What is the size of the social welfare for this
(b) Show that for the price p, the aggregate demand is represented by 𝐷𝐷(𝑝𝑝) =
the size of the consumer surplus for 𝑝𝑝 = 10 ?
750
π‘₯π‘₯ 2
. What is
(c) What will be the supply function as a function of p of the two producers in a competitive
market? Suppose the price is 𝑝𝑝 = 10 . What is the size of the producer surplus?
(d) Show that for the case of a competitive market, 𝑝𝑝 = 10 is an equilibrium price. Compare
this result to the result of (a)!
1.3
Monopoly and Social Welfare
A monopolistic producer is represented by the cost function 𝐢𝐢(π‘₯π‘₯) = 0.5𝑐𝑐π‘₯π‘₯ 2 . He is facing a
demand represented by 𝐷𝐷(𝑝𝑝) = π‘Žπ‘Ž − 𝑝𝑝 .
(a) Calculate the monopoly supply π‘₯π‘₯ π‘šπ‘š and the monopoly price π‘π‘π‘šπ‘š . What is the size of the
monopoly profit Π(π‘π‘π‘šπ‘š )?
(b) Show that the elasticity of demand πœ‚πœ‚π‘π‘ is bigger than one!
(c) Calculate the consumer surplus 𝑅𝑅𝐾𝐾 (π‘π‘π‘šπ‘š ) for the monopoly price π‘π‘π‘šπ‘š !
(d) What is the amount π‘žπ‘ž ∗ that maximizes social welfare? Calculate the amount of the loss of
social welfare caused by the monopoly!
1.4
Discriminating Monopoly
A monopoly with the cost function 𝐢𝐢(π‘₯π‘₯) = π‘₯π‘₯ 2 faces two types of consumers:
-
a fraction πœ†πœ† >
1
2
is represented by π‘ˆπ‘ˆπ‘Žπ‘Ž (π‘₯π‘₯) = π‘₯π‘₯ − 0.5π‘₯π‘₯ 2
a fraction (1 − πœ†πœ†) is represented by π‘ˆπ‘ˆπ‘Žπ‘Ž (π‘₯π‘₯) = 2π‘₯π‘₯ − 0.5π‘₯π‘₯ 2 .
Suppose πœ†πœ† + (1 − πœ†πœ†) = 1 and that πœ†πœ† is located in a range such that the good will be
offered to both types of consumers.
(a) Calculate the demand functions of the two consumer types!
(b) Calculate the optimal two-part tariff for the case of perfect discrimination.
(c) Calculate the optimal two-part tariff for the case where the monopolist can only achieve
discrimination by a price schedule!
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