10.
URAM of Chu Hsi’s Metaphysical Concept of the
Li-Ch’i Universe for the Postmodern World
1. INTRODUCTION
As we know, the postmodern world is overwhelmed by untold anarchic
relativism. Many people in this generation no longer believe in the real
existence of any definitive set of unchanging laws, everlasting principles,
timeless forms or mind-independent universals in the world. Hence, there
is nothing acknowledged as eternally universal for all peoples and at all
times in the formation of conscience or the understanding of the Ultimate
Reality and Meaning of life. This is reflected in the inconsistencies and
changeableness of the laws in various countries. People in general find it
increasingly difficult to ‘justify universal values to guide human life’
(Tarnas 1993, p. 412).
In other words, the postmodern world, having been immensely
influenced by the Kantian mind-dependent idealism, is still struggling,
even as never before, with the perennial metaphysical problem of
universals (hence POU) in its view of the universe. In 1999, Martin
Bieler, a Reformed minister and theologian observed: “The question of
truth will be of decisive importance for the coming millennium’ (Bieler
1999, p. 455). Indeed, the bone of contention in future debates will not be
merely about what or who is the truth, but, more fundamentally, about
whether there is such a thing as ‘absolute truth’, eternally independent of
time and space, as well as of our mind (Ibid.).
‘The postmodern human exists in a universe whose significance is at
once utterly open and without warrantable foundation’ (Tarnas 1993, p.
398). To that extent, what the world needs today is a universal sense of
some warrantable foundation of the totality of reality. According to Chu
Hsi (Chu Yüan-hui, CE 1130-1200), whose Neo-Confucianism ‘for
centuries dominated not only Chinese thought but the thought of Korea
and Japan as well’ (Chan 1973, p. 588), the eternal Supreme Li (or T’ai
Chi) resides not only in heaven and earth, but also in everyone and
everything. It is hoped that by studying Chu Hsi’s metaphysical concept
of the Li-Ch’i (i.e., form-energy, principle-energy, or universal-energy)
universe, the postmodern human might: (a) be enriched with this
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Neo-Confucianist cosmology, (b) be more inspired metaphysically about
the importance of acquiring a certain sense of universal foundation in all
things, and (c) be more enlightened with regards to the possible existence
of absolute, timeless, or mind-independent truth in terms of the POU.
After the introduction, I will give a summary of Chu Hsi’s life,
influence, and achievements, followed by an explanation of this
metaphysical concept or theory of Li-Ch’i universe. Then, I will describe
briefly the metaphysical POU, as well as the conflict between the
Ch’eng-Chu and Lu-Wang Schools of thought in terms of the POU.
Indeed, this metaphysical battle can be compared to that between Plato’s
mind-independent realism and Kantian mind-dependent anti-realism or
idealism in Western philosophy, a controversy ‘as to whether the laws of
nature are or are not legislated by the mind of Mind’ (Fung 1966, p. 281).
Finally, before drawing the conclusion, I will talk about the Ultimate
Reality and Meaning (hence URAM) of Chu Hsi’s metaphysical concept
of the Li-Ch’i universe for the present postmodern Kantian world. In
addition, insofar as the transliteration of Chinese words is concerned, it
must be acknowledged that this paper follows the Wade-Giles system, not
that of the p’in-yin method.
2. CHU HSI’S LIFE, INFLUENCE, AND ACHIEVEMENTS
2.1 Chu Hsi’s Chaotic Political Career and Devoted Scholarly Life
Chu Hsi came from a family with a considerable literary reputation in Wu
Yüan in the modern Hui Chou. His Father, Chu Sung, was a NeoConfucianist educated in the tradition of Chou-Tun-i (1017-1073).
Ch’eng Hao (1032-1085) and Ch’eng I (1033-1107). In the course of his
career Chu Sung was appointed Magistrate of Yu Hsi, a county in Fukien
(Bruce 1923, p. 56). However, he later resigned from his post in
opposition to the government’s policy of making unjust peace with the
invading Tartars. Chu Hsi was, thereby, given an opportunity to study
under his father for several years until he died when Chu Hsi was only 14.
Nevertheless, following his father’s last will, Chu Hsi continued to
receive an excellent education or foundation of massive scholarship from
his father’s three great scholarly friends, before studying for three years
under Li T’ung (1088-1163), another well-educated Neo-Confucianist.
Chu Hsi was married with three sons and five daughters. Despite his
impoverished life, he wrote many important works for future generations.
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Apparently, his father’s life had a lasting impact on Chu Hsi’s. As a
government officer, Chu Hsi was constantly critical of the government’s
officials and their policies, in particular their corruption and humiliating
peace terms with the northern invaders. As a consequence, he always had
career troubles. Yet, in the midst of such a turbulent career, this patriotic
scholar spent a great deal of time studying, writing, and teaching students
in many areas, especially with respect to Neo-Confucianism. Naturally,
Chu Hsi was much more devoted in his scholarly pursuits than his
political career. ‘His lectures at the White Deer Grotto attracted all the
prominent scholars of the time’ (Chan 2001, p. 99). Chan Wing-tsit, a
renowned Chu Hsi scholar, gives us further details about Chu’s life (Chan
1973, pp. 588-589):
In 1154-57, Chu Hsi was a district keeper of records. But he preferred quiet
study. From 1158 he studied Li T’ung (Li Yen-p’ing, 1088-1163) who
continued the traditions of the Neo-Confucianism of Ch’eng Hao and
Ch’eng I. Most of his life, Chu Hsi was off and on a guardian of some
temple, utilizing the peace and quiet to study, write, and talk with the most
prominent scholars of the day. His official life, other than the guardianship,
was intermittent and turbulent, for he strongly opposed concluding peace
and repeatedly memorialized [sic presented memorials to] the throne to
criticize officials and politics. Time and again he declined official positions.
In 1179 he was appointed a prefect. In 1182 he was demoted to a minor post
because he incurred the anger of the emperor by attacking the incompetency
of officials on all levels. In 1188 he was appointed to the army department,
but the vice-minister himself vigorously attacked him and he was shifted to
a small position. Later in the year he was appointed a junior expositor in
waiting to expound the Classics to the emperor, but he declined. In 1190 he
became a prefect in Fukien and in 1194 a prefect in Hunan for one month.
Later that year he was dismissed and given the sinecure of a temple
guardian. Two years later a censor accused him of ten crimes, including
refusing to serve and spread false learning, and someone even petitioned for
his execution. All his posts were taken away. Although the attack on “false
learning” was severe, almost a thousand people attended his funeral when
he died.
In the above brief biographical sketch, we, therefore, get a glimpse
into Chu Hsi’s chaotic political career and devoted scholarly life.
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2.2 Chu Hsi’s Immense Influence in East Asia
Chu Hsi’s immense influence in East Asia and achievements in his
philosophy of principle known as Li-hsüeh (i.e., study of Li, law, reason,
principle, universal, or form) are inextricable from each other. Let me
first note briefly his great influence before summing up his monumental
achievements. While Confucius (551-497 BCE) and his classical
Confucianism had apparently exerted the greatest influence over Chinese
thought and culture until Chu Hsi, Chu Hsi and his Neo-Confucianism
reigned supreme in China for seven centuries until a century ago (Ch’ien
1971, v. 1, p. 1).
Besides Confucius, there is no other person whose intellectual
influence over Chinese history as a whole is as vast as Chu Hsi’s (Ibid.)
For example, the Four Books, which he compiled in 1190, remained basic
texts in school education until recent years in China, Taiwan, and Hong
Kong. His commentaries on Confucian classics prevailed from 1313 to
1907 as the orthodox interpretation in the state’s civil service examination
system. The family rituals, which he formulated, are still the models of
many social customs (cf. Chan 1987, p. 71).
At the same time, next to Confucius and Mencius (c. 372 – c. 289
BCE), he was simply ‘the most prominent philosopher for the whole area
of East Asia’ (Ibid., p. 72). The influence of this world philosophy in
Korea and Japan began in the early fourteenth century. ‘Chu Hsi
practically overwhelmed the entire Yi dynasty (1392-1910) for five
hundred years’ (Ibid., p. 71). While ‘surely by the middle of the thirteenth
century, Chu Hsi’s commentaries on the Confucian Classics were
available in Japan’ (Ibid.), his Neo-Confucianism replaced Buddhism and
Shinto as the supreme system for the entire Tokugawa period (1603-1867)
(Ibid., p. 72).
2.3 Chu Hsi’s Monumental Achievements in His Philosophy of Li
Chu Hsi was a prolific, record-breaking Neo-Confucian scholar. ‘He
wrote, annotated, commented on, and compiled about eighty works,
including about 2,000 surviving letters. His recorded conversations
number 140 chapters, the longest record of dialogues in Chinese
literature’ (Chan 1987, p. 40). Chu Hsi had 467 students, more than any
other Neo-Confucianist. He also built more retreat-and-study centers than
anyone else. Throughout his life, ‘he was involved in twenty-one
academies ― reconstructing two, lecturing in six, writing accounts or
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plaques for thirteen, and staying in at least one’ (Ibid.).
From a statistical perspective, he ‘would emerge as the champion or
daily output in Chinese literature’ (Ibid., p. 41). His important works
include Chou-i pen-i (original meanings of the Book of Changes), Shih
chi-chuan (Collected commentaries on the Book of Odes), I-li
ching-chuan t’ung-chieh (General explanation of the text and
commentary of the Book of Ceremonial), and Chin-ssu lu (Reflections on
things at hand). His most important contribution is his innovative
compilation of the Great Learning, the Analects, the Book of Mencius,
and the Doctrine of the Mean. His surviving poems and letters are
gathered in Chu Hsi wen chi, while his classified conversations are put
together in Chu Hsi yü lei. Further, a complete list of his works can be
found in the 12-volume set of Chu Tzu ch’üan chi (Chu, 1963) as well as
Chu Tzu ch’üan-shu (Complete works of Master Chu), the imperial
edition compiled by Li Kuang-ti (1642-1718) at the command of emperor
K’ang-hsi (cf. 1662-1722) during the Ch’ing dynasty.
On the whole, Chu Hsi may be described as ‘the greatest
Neo-Confucianist who brought Neo-Confucianism to the highest
development’ (Chan 1987, p. 103). In terms of his philosophy of Li, he
developed, systematized, and synthesized Neo-Confucian ideas into ‘a
harmonious whole’ (chi-ta-ch’eng) (Ibid.), which became the new
direction of Neo-Confucianism and were enthusiastically embraced by
China, Korea, and Japan for centuries. The historical, monumental
establishment of Neo-Confucianism of Li may be briefly described in the
following six points. While three points are listed in this section, the other
three, which concern Chu Hsi’s metaphysical dual concept of the universe
in terms of Li and Ch’i, will be spelled out in the next section.
2.3.1 Determining the Direction of Neo-Confucianism for the Next Seven
Centuries
After the revival of Taoism and the introduction of Buddhism during the
fifth, sixth, and seventh centuries, classical Confucianism began to lose
vitality as people became more interested in metaphysical problems, as
well as the problems of the nature and Destiny of man (cf. Fung 1966, p.
266). Since such problems are not lacking in Confucian works, and
especially in the Book of Changes, genuinely new interpretation and
elucidation of classical Confucianism were needed (Ibid., pp. 266-267).
Consequently, relatively anti-Buddhist and anti-Taoist Neo-Confucianist
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started to emerge. The problem, however, was that their teaching was too
heterogeneous and even in many respects contradictory (Ibid., p. 269).
Towards the latter part of the eleventh century, there were at least
four tendencies in Neo-Confucianism: Chou Tun-i (1017-1973) with a
Taoist flavor though rational, Chang Tsai (1020-1077) centering on
material Ch’i, Shao Yung (1011-1077) on number, as well as Ch’eng Hao
(1032-1085) and Ch’eng I (1033-1107) on principle (Chan 1987, pp.
107-108). But Chu Hsi ‘chose the philosophy of the Ch’eng brothers,
more specially that of Ch’eng I, with the result that the whole
Neo-Confucian movement has been known as Li-hsüeh (philosophy of
principle) and the Ch’eng Chu School’ (Ibid., p. 108). While he
overlooked Shao Yung’s philosophy of number, he sought to interpret
Chang Tsai’s teaching on material Ch’i and Chou Tun-i’s Taoist tendency
in Confucian terms (Ibid.). Whether consciously or unconsciously, he
directed Neo-Confucianism away from any possible Buddhism,
‘materialism (as in the case of Chang) and Taoist naturalism (as in the
cases of Chou and Shao) but along the line of principle’ (Ibid., p. 110).
2.3.2 Establishment of the Proper Confucian Lineage of the Way
(Tao-t’ung)
Being an anti-Buddhist and anti-Taoist Neo-Confucianist, Chu Hsi
seemed quite concerned about the proper philosophical way, and hence its
proper lineage or Tao-t’ung, of thinking among his countrymen.
Considering himself as the direct heir of the Confucian tradition, he
wanted to guide the Chinese people to think in accordance with their
Confucian heritage, which he attempted to revive in term of Li and T’ai
Chi (i.e., the Great Ultimate, the Supreme Ultimate, or the sum-total of all
Lis). According to Chu Hsi’s pupil Huang Kan, ‘the transmission of the
correct orthodox tradition of the Way required the proper men. From the
Chou dynasty on, there have been only several people capable of
inheriting the correct tradition and transmitting the Way and only one or
two could enable the Way to become prominent.
After Confucius, Chou Tun-i, the two Ch’engs, and Chang Tsai
continued the interrupted tradition, but only with our Master did it
become prominent’ (Mien-chai chi, 36:48a-b: in Chan 1987, p. 122). Chu
Hsi was convinced that ‘the transmission went way back to legendary
emperors Fu-hsi and the Yellow Emperor and down from Mencius to
Chou Tun-i and the Ch’eng brothers’ (Ibid., p. 121). Indeed, the line
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which was later accepted in the History of Sung and practically by
Neo-Confucianists with only minor variations is as follows: ‘Fu-hsi
Sheng-nung — the Yellow Emperor —Yao — Shun — Yü — T’ang
Wen, Wu — Duke of Chou — Confucius — Yen Tzu, Tseng Tzu
Tsu-ssu — Mencius —Chou — Ch’engs — Chu Hsi’ (Ibid., p. 122).
all
—
—
―
2.3.3 Historical Grouping of the Four Books
In 1190 Chu Hsi published the Great Learning, the Analects, the Book of
Mencius, and the Doctrine of the Mean as the Four Books or Four Master.
For some thirty years he had been working on their meanings and
comments. Three days before he died, he was still working on a revision
of his comments on the Great Learning. ‘From 1313 to 1912, they were
the basic texts in civil service examinations and in school education’
(Chan 1987, p. 130). Philosophically, the publication of the Four Books
also replaced once and for all the authority of the Five Classics (i.e., the
Book of Odes, the Book of History, the Book of Changes, and the Book of
Rites, and the Spring and Autumn Annals).
Chu Hsi believed that the Four Books could provide a direct return to
Confucius and Mencius whereas the Classics were merely secondary
materials (Ibid., p. 136). ‘Principles are brilliantly expressed in the Four
Books, and what principles can’t one investigate therein and what
practical affairs cannot be settled?’ (Yü-lei, ch. 14, sec. 2: Chu, 1970, p.
397; Chan 1987, p. 136). The Four Books are truly the sources or
‘reservoir of ideas on principles such as principles of the nature and the
mind, and of humanity and righteousness’ (Chan 1987, p. 136). In
addition, the Four Books have given us a new methodology with respect
to the investigation of things. Indeed, ‘the beginning of the whole process
of learning and living is the investigation of things. Only after this will
extension of knowledge, sincerity of the will, rectification of the mind,
cultivation of the self, regulation of the family, ordering of the state, and
bringing peace [happen] to the world’ (Ibid., p. 137).
3. CHU HSI’S METAPHYSICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE UNIVERSE
IN TERMS OF LI AND CH’I
Metaphysics and cosmology can be viewed as two similar philosophical
terms in the sense that they both study what really exists in the whole
universe or totality of reality. While both may also be called an analogical
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theory of everything that exists, cosmology in a real way is a branch of
philosophy that treats of the origin, nature, and structure of the universe
(Weiss 2001, p. 124). On the other hand, metaphysics defined as ‘the
study of being, its principles and causes’ (McGuire 1979, p. 2352) or
‘most generally, the philosophical investigation of the nature, constitution,
and structure of reality’ (Butchvaron 1999, p. 563) is a broader and more
fundamental subject of knowledge which employs specially chosen
universals or categories of things to help us organize or reorganize all that
we know in both the natural and supernatural, or sensible and
supersensible realms. Hence, we may acquire, as a whole, a greater
ultimate reality and meaning towards the universe (Cheng 2002, pp.
315-6). All in all, this broad, all-encompassing metaphysical approach
towards the universe should be complementary to any modern scientific,
analytical, and detail-oriented approach to cosmology or study about the
universe.
In any case, there are four major metaphysical concepts of Chu Hsi’s
theory of the universe, namely, Li (immaterial principle, law, reason, form,
or universal), Ch’i (material force or energy), T’ai Chi (the Supreme or
Great Ultimate), and Jen (love or humanity). In the following subsections,
we will first briefly sum up his dual, inseparable Li-Chi metaphysical
conception of the universe, before we deal with his concepts of T’ai Chi
and Jen which can be described as the Supreme or Ultimate Li of Lis.
Below are the three other points regarding this achievement on Li.
3.1 Chu Hsi’s Metaphysical Description of the Universe in terms of Li
and Ch’i
Historically, the Ch’eng brothers had developed the concept of Li to the
highest level before Chu Hsi (Chan 1987, p. 110). Li to them ‘is evident
and self-sufficient, extending everywhere and governing all things. It
cannot be augmented or diminishing. It is many but is essentially one, for
“definite principles” are but one principle. Li is the mind, truth, universal
order, universal law, and the universal principle of creation. It is identical
with the nature of man and things. And it is the source of goodness’ (Ibid.,
p. 110). Nonetheless, they never made the relation between Li and Ch’i
clear (cf. Ibid., pp. 110-111). It is Chu Hsi who completed the important
task of clarification.
Fundamentally, Chu Hsi’s universe is a complementary Li-Ch’i
universe. In other words, two main distinct, irreducible substances or
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elements, i.e., Li and Ch’i, constitute his universe infrastructurally. Both
terms have indeed gone through different versions of English translation,
according to varying authors’ different interpretations of Chu Hsi’s
metaphysics or cosmology (cf. Bruce 1923, pp. 99-125; Chan 1987, pp.
110-119; Fung 1966, pp. 294-301). The present author is convinced that
Li is better understood by the present generation as ‘principle, law, form,
or universal’ which is eternal, uncreated, and immaterial, while Ch’i is
‘energy’ which is created in the sense that Ch’i or ‘energy’ can be
spiritual, human or physical in substance. As the most appropriate English
term for Ch’i, ‘matter’ or ‘ether’ was perhaps preferable to ‘energy’
during the early period of the 20th century. In 1923, J. Percy Bruce wrote
what follows in his doctoral thesis (Bruce 1923, pp. 106-107):
Ch’i, then, must be interpreted in three senses. It is the primordial substance
in which both spirit and matter originate; it is that part of the primordial
substance which becomes spirit, in contrast to chih the part which becomes
solid matter; and it is the general term which represents the material element
in all the myriad transformations of the cosmos in contrast to the immaterial
element li. Obviously, in the more general sense of the term, as the antithesis of li, its meaning is best expressed by the word matter; while in its
primordial sense, and in the sense in which it is contrasted with chih, the
world ether is the more appropriate rendering. It must be borne in mind,
however, that, notwithstanding the three different senses in which the word
is used, ch’i is but one; whether as the primordial substance, or as spirit, or
as matter, it is the same ch’i which runs through all ages in the evolution of
the cosmos.
Hence, there is definitely a priority of existence between Li and Ch’i
in Chu Hsi’s metaphysics or cosmology. In fact, this is the second
classified question Chu Hsi attempted to answer as recorded in Chu Hsi
yü-lei (cf. Yü-lei, ch. 1, sec. 1: Chu, 1970, p. 1). He ‘repeatedly said that
there must be the principle of a thing before that thing can come into
being. Even before the existence of heaven and earth, there is the
principle’ (Chan 1987, pp. 1112-113). However, after the existence of
heaven and earth, Li and Ch’i are inseparable. There is not one thing or
one Ch’i in which Li does not inhere; and there is not one Li with which
Ch’i is not united in heaven and earth (cf. Yü-lei, ch. 1, sec. 1: Chu, 1970,
p. 1). Nevertheless, Li is ultimately eternal and independent of Ch’i in
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existence. For example, if the whole mountain with all its rivers were
suddenly to collapse in ruins, their Li or Lis would remain intact (cf.
Yü-lei, ch. 1, sec. 1: Chu, 1970, p. 2) as their uncreated principles, laws,
forms, or universals.
3.2 Chu Hsi’s Metaphysical Concept of T’ai Chi (the Supreme or Great
Ultimate)
The term T’ai Chi originates from Yi Ching (Book of Changes), which
may have existed in some form as early as the seventh century BCE. A
statement from its Third Appendix has greatly affected Chu Hsi’s
cosmology: “In the system of Change, there is the Great Ultimate (T’ai
Chi) which engenders the Two Modes (Ying and Yang). The Two Modes
engender the Four Secondary Modes (hsiang), which in turn give rise to
the Eight Trigrams (pa kua). These Eight Trigrams (or Elements)
determine all good and evil and the great complexity of life’ (cf. Chan
2001, p. 238). Philosophically, the idea of T’ai Chi was not important
before the time of Chou Tun-i. However, anxious to get rid of the
meanings given by Taoist and the divinationists before him, Chou wrote
the classic T’ai Chi T’un-shu (The Diagram of the Supreme Ultimate) on
which Chu Hsi based his philosophy of Li. Metaphysically, one may say
that Chu Hsi’s Neo-Confucian cosmology is a philosophy of T’ai Chi
grounded on The Diagram of the Supreme Ultimate.
The following sums up Chu Hsi’s evolutionary cosmology in which
he tends to use many synonyms for T’ai Chi (cf. Bruce 1923, pp.
128-155): In the beginning is the Infinite, the Supreme Ultimate or Wu
Chi (without limit), ‘the uttermost extreme beyond which you cannot go;
most high, most wonderful, most subtle, most spiritual, and
all-surpassing’ (Ibid., p. 139). ‘It is before all things, and yet did not cease
when the world came into existence’ (Ibid., p. 136). It is also called the
Law of the Universe’ (Ibid.). This highest Law, the ultimate extreme of
law, is the source of all laws as well as all things’ (Ibid., p. 137). As the
First Cause, this immaterial Li of all Lis produced the active Mode (Yang)
and the passive Mode (Ying) of Ch’i, which at this stage can be called the
primordial energy, matter or ether, i.e., an infinite mass of primordial
world stuff. As the uncreated self-existent Law, the most excellent and
supremely good ethical principle or Li of the universe, it is constituted by
four major principles, i.e., love, righteousness, reverence, and wisdom
(Ibid., p. 141). T’ai Chi has also been inherent in this infinite mass or
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chaos as the director and controller of all its evolutionary stages, being
present even in every single thing later evolved, while the two modes of
Ch’i have become the material manifestation of this immaterial moral
law.
Apparently, the dictum that Two Modes engender the Four Secondary
Modes (Symbols) which in turn produce the Eight Trigrams has become
the theoretical foundation regarding the evolutionary formation of the
five agents (i.e., water, fire, wood, metal, and earth), the male (Ch’ien)
and female (K’un) elements, as well as the innumerable phenomena of the
universe. It is particularly so with respect to the human person through
whom the four ethical principles of the Supreme Ultimate can fully be
manifested. Being permeated by the moral Li of Lis which can be
compared with the Tao in Taoism or the Good in Platonism, the inner true
nature of every Ch’i, including every particle, thing, and person, is
always good. If it has become evil, it is because of the inordinate
movement or circulation of Ch’i.
3.3 Chu Hsi’s Metaphysical Concept of Jen (Humanity or Love)
Similar to the idea of love in Christianity, Jen (humanity or love) has
been the single most important concept in the development of the
Confucian and Neo-Confucian traditions (Lo 1985, pp. 545-546).
According to the summary of Chan Wing-tsit (Chan 1987, p. 119):
Although jen was the chief subject in Confucius’ conversations, it was not
much developed on the philosophical level. Confucius turned the hitherto
particular virtue of jen in the sense of benevolence into the general and
universal virtue of humanity (or love). It was also understood in ancient
Confucianism as the essential character of man. Mencius taught it as human
heartedness, Han Confucianists as love, and Han Yü (768-824) as universal
love. But all this evolution remained on the ethical level. The growth of the
concept took a great leap in the Ch’eng brothers, more especially Ch’eng I.
He gave jen a new interpretation by equating it with seeds…as the nature to
grow. Thus the traditional concept acquired a metaphysical character.
Humanity or love is the universal virtue or the source of virtue because it
possesses the nature to grow, to give life, and to create. For these reasons it
is the chief character of the universe.
Without doubt, Chu Hsi’s conception of Jen owed much to the
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individuals mentioned above, especially to Ch’eng I who provided him ‘a
metaphysical basis for Confucian ethics’ (Ibid., p. 120). This is an
important way in which Confucianism became renewed and completed
(Ibid.). In defining Jen as the character of the mind and the principle of
love, he regarded this Li to be the mind of Heaven and Earth too, which is
to produce or create, so that Jen can grow and become realized in all
things (Ibid.). Apparently, Chu Hsi never indicated clearly that Jen was
T’ai Chi, but only the chief characteristic of this Li of Lis (cf. Hitoshi
1986, pp. 212-217). In the final analysis, Chu Hsi’s cumulative concept of
Jen as (a) the creative principle of life, (b) the loving way of life, (c) the
potential for growth, and (d) life’s dynamic activity permeating all things
in the evolution of the universe, is not very different from his
metaphysical and cosmological concept of T’ai Chi as ‘an
all-encompassing unity’ (Ibid., p. 221) and the ‘one thread running
through all’ (Chan 1989, p. 144). To that extent, insofar as T’ai Chi is
essentially characteristic of Jen (Love), we may say that T’ai Chi is
essentially Jen, and vice versa.
Metaphysically, as everything is Ch’i (energy) in the Chinese culture
and that all encompassing T’ai Chi pervades the whole universe and
everything in it without exception, we may say that the whole universe
and everything in it is a Li-Ch’i, Jen-Ch’i, or Love-Ch’i. Apparently, Jen
is in all Ch’is, and all Ch’is are in Jen. As Jen is not only the First Cause
which has permeated all Ch’is, i.e., the whole universe and everything in
it. Indeed, Jen is also their directing and guiding principle, the principal
Li, T’ai Chi, the Great or Supreme Ultimate. Just as Love (Jen) exists for
all Ch’is, all Ch’is should exist for Love (Jen) as their Ultimate Reality
and Meaning. As Love (Jen) is moving through all Ch’is, all Ch’is should
be moving or evolving through Love (Jen), so that Love (Jen) may be
manifested in all Ch’is as the All in all. In brief, we may say that Love
(Jen) is the uncreated beginning of all Ch’is, the evolutionary guide of all
Ch’is, as well as the ultimate evolutionary goal and fulfillment of all
Li-Ch’is, Jen-Ch’is, or Love-Ch’is.
4. CHU HSI’S LI-CH’I UNIVERSE AND THE PROBLEM OF
UNIVERSALS (POU)
Metaphysics is an ‘attempt to provide and to justify an account of the
most basic constituents of realty, and the manner in which these are
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related to one another’ (Meynell 1983, p. 361). In reality, no person,
culture, or historical age, at whatever intelligent level, can avoid being
metaphysical. Once we are born, we begin our metaphysical inquiry, even
throughout our whole life, consciously, subconsciously, or unconsciously.
The same can be said about our relationship with the POU. Indeed, ‘a
philosopher’s commitment to a particular solution of the problem of
universals determines his entire philosophical system’ (Miller 1967, p.
455).
‘It has often been said by historians, and not without good reasons,
that the whole of philosophy of the Middle Ages was little more than an
obstinate endeavour to solve one problem — the problem of the
Universals’ (Gilson 1938, p. 3). However, ever since the beginning of the
modern scientific age, the West has given much less attention to the
problem of the one and the many in the supersensible realm. Having
adopted the Cartesian-Kantian anti-realism, it has focused its energies
exclusively in the natural scientific realm. That may be the main reason
why many Westerners have insufficiently understood the philosophical
question of absolute truth.
The POU, ultimately speaking, is the probe with respect to the
possibility of absolute truth in terms of the real existence of eternal,
mind-independent universals in the supersensible realm. As Platonic and
Augustinian realism teaches us, necessary, timeless truth is the
conformity of human thought to the timeless, mind-independent
universals (cf. O’Farrell 1967, p. 327). If we deny the ontological
existence of any mind-independent universals as anti-realists do, then
there is no possibility of any timeless truth.
Hopefully, our investigation will help shed some light on this
problem. Here, we will first explain tersely the POU before we determine
Chu Hsi’s particular metaphysical solution with regards to his Li-Ch’i
concept of the universe. Then, we will briefly compare the metaphysical
controversy between the Ch’eng-Chu School and the Lu-Wang School
with that between Plato-Augustine and Descartes-Kant in terms of the
POU. Such an effort should pave the way for the next section regarding
the URAM of Chu Hsi’s metaphysical concept of the Li-Ch’i universe for
the postmodern Cartesian-Kantian world.
4.1 A Brief Explanation of the Problem of the Universals
Edward A. Synan offers us the following succinct definition of the term
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‘universal’: ‘The term universal, derived from the Latin universalis
(unum versus alia, one against many), signifies a unity with reference to
some plurality. Unlike the singular, which cannot be communicated, the
universal is by definition something that is communicated or
communicable to many’ (Synan 1967, p. 452). Hence, the POU can be a
simple and universal problem in the sense that it is a simple
the-one-and-the-many problem, which is universal to all individuals in all
ages. We often encounter various things, properties or relations largely of
the same type, like different tress, green colors, and good friendship. As
soon as we begin to ask if there is one universal model tree, greenness, or
friendship among these diverse ones, we begin to encounter the POU.
Undoubtedly, the POU can be a profound and complicated one when
we begin to ponder and answer the above question philosophically as
regards the real existence of universals. Between the realism and
anti-realism of universals, there can be three major camps or schools of
thought. First, Plato’s ante rem (before thing) realism would say that there
is indeed one real, universal ideal tree, greenness or friendship, but that
exists only in the suprasensible, transcendent realm, independently of
things and our mind (Blackburn 1994, p. 387). But its opponent may
demand a solid scientific proof of the existence of this ideal tree.
Second, Aristotle’s moderate in re or in rebus (in thing or things)
realism (Ibid.) would deny any real, independent and substantial
existence of this ideal tree, etc., in the transcendent realm. ‘Universals are
not substances existing independently of particulars. They exist only as
common elements in particulars’ (Woozley 1967, p. 197). In other words,
this ideal tree, etc., would exist only as an ideal, mind-dependent
universal, form, or concept in things, if its essence could be abstracted or
individuated from concrete singular things. Indeed, the skeptic of in re
realism may question, among other things, whether it is an ideal or
correct theory to deal with relativism.
Third, post rem (after thing) anti-realism would disclaim or explain
away the existence of any ideal, universal tree, etc., anywhere. For
example, according to the nominalistic anti-realism of William of
Ockham (c. 1285-1349), only names or words are universal and real for
classification purposes. However, names ‘do not validly describe reality.
Every substance is irreducibly individual; there is no common nature; and
universal concepts exist only in the mind… Elements of nominalism are
found in some forms of modern language philosophy and existentialism’
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(O’Collins and Farrugia 1991, p. 158). According to the conceptualistic
anti-realist nominalism of George Berkeley (1685-1753), only concepts
like names and words serving as mental representations are universal and
real. ‘The supposed classificatory function of universals is actually served
by particular concepts in the mind’ (Butchvarov 1999, p. 169). Further, as
a representative of general postmodern skepticism, Michael Foucault
(1296-1984) espoused deconstructionist anti-realism which tends to
deconstruct the traditional arrangements or universals of European culture
‘without knowing either what its form will be or what it promises’
(Foucault 1970, p. 387).
4.2 Chu Hsi’s Li-Ch’i Metaphysics and Its Opponents
From our study it is clear that Chu Hsi’s concept of the Li-Ch’i universe
is determined by his Platonic ante rem solution of the POU. Without
doubt, Li, T’ai Chi, or Love is the indestructible, unchanging and eternal
(or uncreated) universal of universals, i.e., the Li of Lis, which permeates
the whole universe and everything in it. According to Chu Hsi the realist,
these Lis or universals are non-mental or mind-independent. Like the ante
rem universals of Plato and St. Augustine of Hippo (354-430), Chu Hsi’s
ante rem universals, borrowing here the expression of A. D. Woozley,
‘exist in themselves and would exist even if there were no minds to be
aware of them; if the world were and would exist even if there were no
minds to be aware of them; if the world were exactly what it is now, with
the one difference that it contained no minds at all, no consciousness of
any kind, the existence of universals would be unaffected. They are
public somethings with which we are somehow or other acquainted, and a
mindless world would lack not universals but only the awareness of them;
they would be available for discovery, even if there were nobody to
discover them’ (Woozley 1967, pp. 194-195).
The philosophical conflict between the Ch’eng-Chu School and
Lu-Wang School which has continued by and large to the present consists
precisely in the metaphysical conflict between the ante rem realists and
the post rem nominalists or conceptualist anti-realists among Chinese
philosophers for the last few centuries. Against Ch’eng I and Chu Hsi’s
School or Li Hsüeh (School of Laws or Principles), Lu Chiu-yüan
(1139-1193) and Wang Shou-jen (1473-1529) in their Hsin Hsüeh
(School of Mind) believed that universals such as Li and T’ai Chi are not
eternal, absolute, and self-subsisting entities. They are necessarily mental
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or mind-dependent. For these conceptualists, using again Woozley’s
expression, ‘universals are in the mind in a private sense, such that if
there were no minds, there could be no universals, in the same way as
there could be no thoughts or imagery or memories or dreams’ (Ibid., p.
195).
Whereas Chu Hsi embraces Ch’eng Yi’s conviction that nature is Li,
Lu Chiu-yüan believes that the mind is Li (Fung 1966, p. 307). Restating
his extreme subjective mind-dependent idealism, Lu said on one occasion:
‘The universe is my mind; my mind is the universe’ (Ibid.). Wang
Shou-jen also espouses the mind as Li: ‘How can there be affairs and Li
outside the mind?’ (Ibid., p. 309) To the School of Mind, one’s mind,
spirituality or consciousness is the measure of all things, including
universals like Li and T’ai Chi. In other words, ‘if there is no mind, there
will be no Li. Thus the mind is the legislator of the universe and is that by
which the Lis are legislated’ (Ibid., p. 310; Chao 1980, pp. 9-10). Indeed,
according to these relativistic idealists, conceptualists, or anti-realists
with regards to the existence of mind-independent universals, an absolute,
unchanging, and eternal Li, T’ai Chi or any warrantable foundation does
not permeate the universe and everything in it. Everything, hence, may
change tomorrow, since the existence of any thing depends on the very
state, perception, and operation of our mind or consciousness.
4.3 Various Battles between Ante Rem Realism and Post Rem
Anti-realism: East and West
If there were a deciding point of departure (or line of thought) defining or
separating various Eastern and Western philosophical theories and
systems into two major schools, one of the most comprehensive
metaphysical determinants would definitely be the philosopher’s
conviction with respect to the ontological existence of some absolute,
unchanging, eternal or uncreated universals. In general, while ante rem
realists like Plato (c. BCE 428-348) and Chu Hsi in their ante rem
realisms have built their theories indispensably on the mind-independent
existence of these universals, post rem anti-realists like Immanuel Kant
and Wan Shou-jen categorically refute the existence of any absolute,
eternal universals, stating that the existence of any universal is within
space and time, existing only in the human mind. Strictly speaking,
Aristotle’s in re moderate realism belongs to the anti-realist camp since
he believes ‘that universals exist in things but not independently of them’
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(Blackburn 1994, p. 387). To that extent, Aristotle’s in re realism is
directly contrary to Plato’s ante rem realism, which states that universals
exists independently of mind, space, and time. We will not delve into in
re realism in this short paper.
On closer examination, the metaphysical battle between Ch’eng-Chu
School and the Lu-Wang School is basically the philosophical conflict
between ante rem realists and post rem anti-realists with respect to the
existence of Li, T’ai Chi, Jen or Love. Such a conflict is characteristic
also of the recent metaphysical battle between the traditional Chinese
Neo-Confucian scholars (who endorse Chu Hsi’s ante rem realism) and
the Chinese Marxist Communists (who are fundamentally anti-realist,
Marxist materialists). The same can be applied to the philosophical battle
in both Hong Kong and Taiwan between the traditional Confucian (or
Neo-Confucian) generation and the new generations who have been
overwhelmingly influenced by the Western anti-realist postmodernism
which is very much Cartesian and Kantian in its true colors (Lo 1985, pp.
535-543).
Further, the controversy between the Ch’eng-Chu School and the
Lu-Wang School in the East can also be compared with that between the
Plato-Augustine School and the Descartes-Kant School in the West. As
we know, Plato’s ante rem realism ‘has survived and even prospered.
From St. Augustine, Boethius, Johannes Scotus Eriugena, William of
Champeaux, and John Scotus to Hegel and Alfred North Whitehead,
theoreticians have defended the objective reality of universals’
(Hennessey 1979, p. 3614). On the other hand, the post rem anti-realism
of William of Ockham has continued strong largely through the influence
of René Descartes, John Locke, David Hume, George Berkeley,
Immanuel Kant, and Michael Foucault, having dominated modern and
postmodern philosophy (Ibid.). However, such anti-realism can be traced
back to the relativistic Sophists like Protagoras (c. BCE 590-420) and
Gorgias (c. BCE 480-380) at the time of Plato.
To quite an extent, we may describe the postmodern post rem
anti-realism as characteristic of the subjectivism of René Descartes (CE
1596-1650), as well as the idealism of Immanuel Kant (CE 1724-1804).
Directed by his cogito ergo sum (I think, therefore I am) approach,
Descartes, the father of modern philosophy, believes that all knowledge
of external things is in the mind (Osborne 1992, p. 73). Kant, the founder
of German idealism, in denouncing traditional metaphysics and
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embracing Newton’s natural science, can only accept the real existence of
transcendental ideas or universals for sense-data in the natural, material
realm (cf. Gilson 1930, pp. 227-244).
Further, Kant was convinced that ‘Plato and those who followed him
were misled in believing that we could have knowledge of this
supersensible reality. That was, in truth, no knowledge except through
sense-experience, with the result that the whole metaphysical enterprise
turned out to be an impossible one’ (Walsh 1966, p. 39). However, for the
sake of sustaining the traditional moral standards as taught by religion,
Kant takes the instrumental approach, treating the existence of
supersensible universals as if they were real. Indeed, the traditional
supersensible universals in our religion, such as God and the Ten
Commandments, do not have to be real in existence, as long as they serve
the purpose of sustaining our high ethical standards instrumentally. In
other words, Kant allows these supersensible universals to exist only in
our mind. Accordingly, Cartesian-Kantian mind-dependent anti-realism
would say: ‘I think about these universals in my mind, and, therefore,
they are. But if I cannot convince myself that they are, they, then, are
not.’
5. URAM of CHU HSI’S LI-CH’I CONCEPTION OF THE UNIVERSE
FOR THE POSTMODERN WORLD
In the final analysis, being overwhelmed by untold anarchic relativism ‘in
a universe whose significance is at once utterly open and without
warrantable foundation’ (Tarnas 1993, p. 398), the postmodern world is
facing a crisis with hardly any precedence. ‘Here in a sense the Cartesian
critical intellect has reached its furthest point of development, doubting
all, applying a systematic skepticism to every possible meaning’ (Ibid., p.
399). Such an extreme crisis or skepticism about truth, value, and
meaning can, to a large extent, be explained in terms of its crisis in
cosmology and metaphysics, which has been substantially influenced also
by Kant as mentioned.
Richard Tarnas is correct in saying that ‘if ever boldness, depth, and
clarity of vision were called for, from many, it is now. Yet perhaps it is
this very necessity that could summon forth from us the courage and
imagination we now require’ (Ibid., p. 413). Respectively, in each of the
two following subsections (i.e., 5.1 and 5.2), we will first briefly state the
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crisis of the postmodern world in terms of cosmology (in 5.1) and
metaphysics (in 5.2), before we approach it individually with the
ingenuity of Chu Hsi’s Li-Ch’i concept of the universe. As cosmology
and metaphysics are intrinsically intertwined and impossible to be
distinctively separated, we may find ourselves talking about metaphysics
when focusing on cosmology, and vice versa. The two subsections should
be seen, therefore, as complementary to each other, just as the two
subjects are largely so to one another.
5.1 The Crisis of Cosmology in the Postmodern World
Cosmology — understood here as traditional cosmology, as a subject of
serious intellectual inquiry, can be defined as ‘the branch of philosophy,
often considered a subdivision of metaphysics, that deals with the
Universe as a totality of phenomena, attempting to combine metaphysical
speculation and scientific evidence within a coherent framework. The
problems generally falling within its province include those of space,
time, eternity, necessity, change, and contingency. Its method of rational
enquiry distinguishes it from purely mythic accounts of the origin and
structure of the Universe’ (Flew 1984, pp. 78-79).
The crisis of cosmology in the postmodern world, therefore, is
largely the crisis of cosmology itself as a subject of importance and
relevance to our anti-metaphysical intellectual and scientific mentality
today. Although many people are beginning to be open again to the study
of metaphysics and cosmology in the present postmodern pluralistic age,
cosmology as a metaphysical and speculative subject is still far from
being recognized as it was formerly during the ancient Greek and
Medieval Christian periods. ‘Hume had destroyed both metaphysics and
science; in order to save science, Kant decided to sacrifice metaphysics’
(Gilson 1938, p. 312).
Awestruck by the incredible advances in natural science, and
convinced of Kant’s exclusive emphasis on sense-data with regards to
what really exists, most modern and postmodern intellectuals no longer
take the traditional metaphysical approach to the study of the universe
seriously. Anthony Flew sum up the history of cosmology succinctly
(Flew 1984, p. 79):
The Presocratics discussed cosmological issues, which were modified and
systematized in the works of Plato and Aristotle. In medieval philosophy,
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Christian theology significantly coloured the whole approach to cosmology,
until Renaissance science caused a radical revision of the world-picture.
Kant maintained that the problems of cosmology were a kind that could
never be solved. While some elements in cosmology have tended to be
subsumed in metaphysics, others have become increasingly the concern of
the physical sciences.
Expressed in terms of Chu Hsi’s concept of the Li-Ch’i universe,
many intelligent minds today have been serious or interested only in the
dimension of Ch’i as the material energy of the universe without the
dimension of Li. Astrophysicist Carl Sagan has stated that “The [material]
Cosmos is all that is or ever was or ever will be’ (Sagan 1980, p. 4). To
some extent, this materialistic approach has reduced cosmology to high
energy physics, focusing ‘on such things as the spectral investigation of
the distribution of elements throughout the universe and the study of the
red shift associated with the recession of the galaxies’ (Flew 1984, p. 79).
Such a Cartesian-Kantian post rem anti-realism with regards to the
suprasensible existence of eternal universals, laws, principles, or Lis in
cosmology has left the postmodern universe in uttermost Heraclitean flux,
without any absolute, universal, warrantable foundation.
As a consequence, cultural or multi-cultural relativism in our present
age has run amok. ‘So cultural relativism can lead to ethical relativism,
which can itself slide into ethical skepticism, and fall finally into deeply
worrying ethical nihilism’ (Robsinson and Groves 2000, p. 40). In the end,
most people conclude that there is no truth; and if there were, we could
not know it. ‘There are no moral rules, so you can do what you like’
(Ibid.). Indeed, ‘we must rely on opinion, and so speakers who can
change people’s opinions have great power’ (Ide 1999, p. 863). One
might say that the postmodern epoch is dominated by the famous
Protagorean claim: “Humans are the measure of all things — of things
that are, that they are, of things that are not, that they are not’ (Ibid.). In
the midst of such a pluralistic cultural and moral crisis, there is an urgent
demand for a review with regards to our general anti-realist approach to
the existence of mind-independent universals.
The genius of Chu Hsi’s Li-Ch’i concept of the universe consists
precisely in teaching us that we can no longer afford to conceive or
perceive our universe as merely a Ch’i universe without any Li. Being
inspired by Chu Hsi’s ante rem realism towards the existence of eternal,
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self-subsisting Lis or universals, which have permeated the whole
universe since its very beginning, we too no longer can have the luxury to
continue on with our conceptualist, nominalist, or deconstructionist
anti-realism. We have suffered too much as a consequence of the view of
the modern science of ‘a world devoid of spiritual purpose, opaque, ruled
by chance and necessity, without intrinsic meaning’ (Tarnas 1993, p. 418).
This generation is living in ‘the post-Cartesian dilemma of being a
conscious, purposeful, and personal subject confronting an unconscious,
purposeless, and impersonal universe’ (Ibid., p. 420) and simultaneously
‘compounded by the post-Kantian dilemma of there being no possible
means by which the human subject can know the universe in its essence’
(Ibid.).
As much as we are open to all other cultures and values, we ‘are at
once aroused and crushed. For inexplicitly, absurdly, the cosmos is
inhuman, yet we are not. The situation is profoundly unintelligible’ (Ibid.).
Pierre Teilhard de Chardin (CE 1881-1955) seemed to understand our
untold anxiety before the seemingly faceless universe when he wrote: ‘It
is a terrifying thing to have been born, I mean, to find oneself, without
having willed it, swept irrevocably along on a torrent of fearful energy
which seems as though it wished to destroy everything it carriers with it’
(Teilhard 1965, p. 128). In fact, Albert Einstein (CE 1879-1955) once
voiced concern over our profound sense of disorientation with regards to
the unruly material universe when he was asked: “What is the most
important question you can ask in life?’ His rely was another question: ‘Is
the universe a friendly place or not?’ (Fox 1988, p. 1)
Apparently, if we continue to hold on to our present anti-realist
solution to the POU towards the cosmos, we can only expect to fall from
bad to worse until our whole modern or postmodern fundamental belief,
trust, faith, confidence or hope in the universe completely collapses. This
is precisely where Chu Hsi’s idea of the universe as a Li-Ch’i being can
come in. His cosmology teaches us that the whole universe and
everything in it is not only permeated by Li, but also by T’ai Chi which is
principally Jen or Love. As the totality of reality is filled with this eternal,
all-loving, all-present, and mind-independent T’ai Chi (Jeng or Love), the
innermost nature of every thing and person in the universe is that of Jen
(Love).
Being the First Cause of the universe, T’ai Chi or Love is, thus, also
its Final Cause in the sense that T’ai Chi caused the universe (and every
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thing and person) to exist and, at the same time, T’ai Chi or Jen (Love) is
the ultimate reason of existence for the universe, as well as for every
thing and person in it. If we human beings live according to our
innermost nature (of T’ai Chi), then the innermost nature of the universe
itself (i.e., the nature of T’ai Chi ) will come alive. To that extent, T’ai
Chi or Jen (Love) can also become the Formal Cause of the universe.
Hence, there is no reason to be fearful of the universe if we live according
to our innermost nature as a Li-Ch’i, Jen-Ch’i, or Love-Ch’i being. In the
postmodern age, our faith, hope, and love of the universe will be restored
as we re-discover this most warrantable ethical foundation which, in fact,
has been permeating all creation since the beginning.
5.2 The Crisis of Metaphysics in the Postmodern World
It appears that the crisis of traditional metaphysics in the postmodern
world begins with the crisis of the current definition, understanding or
treatment of ‘being’, since metaphysics, traditionally speaking, is the
study of objects and entities in terms of ‘being’ itself. Aristotle first
referred to this type of philosophical discourse as ‘first philosophy’
because ‘its subject matter is being as being, the ultimate, most universal
aspect of reality’ (McGuire 1979, p. 2352).
In fact, ‘being’ and ‘thing’ are the two chief transcendentals with
respect to that which exists ontologically (Krapiec 1991, p. 16). Therefore,
in the study of ‘being’ as ‘being’, ‘being’ should first be treated as a
concrete generic noun for ‘thing’ in both the ‘one or singular’ sense as
well as the ‘many or all-encompassing’ sense for all sensible and
suprasensible, natural and supernatural, created and uncreated things in
the whole universe. We will, hence, attempt to explain briefly the current
crisis of metaphysics in terms of these two senses of ‘being’, in which
‘being’ is a generic representation of all things in existence.
In approaching ‘being’ as a ‘singular’ concrete generic noun, it seems
that this most singular, universal unifying paradigm in metaphysics which
served so well in the past ‘as a bridge between faith and reason, between
this world and the world beyond, between humans and God’ (Horvath
1993, p. 27) — is now in crisis. Once a brilliant problem-solving
macroparadigm in metaphysics, ‘being’ is regarded by this age as
something obsolete, i.e., too transcendent, abstract, static, non-empirical,
and as a result, too irrelevant (cf. Ibid.). Briefly stated, the West has lost
its all-embracing and all-unifying metaphysical macroparadigm to link up
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everything in the universe, i.e., between the sensible and suprasensible,
natural and supernatural, created and Uncreated dimensions respecting
what really exists in the totality of reality. Simultaneously, no universally
accepted replacement or substitute is found yet.
In fact, this crisis of ‘being’ has brought the West to the current crisis
of metaphysics, to the extent that ‘there is talk at times of “the end of
metaphysics”’ (John-Paul II 1998, no. 55). In other words, metaphysics as
a general analogical theory describing everything in creation coherently
in terms of ‘being’ (cf. Cheng 2002, pp. 317-319) is no longer taken
seriously. As a result, the fundamental worldview of many people as
regards what was, what is, and what will be of the universe in its totality
in a coherent, consistent sense is currently in utter shatters.
In retrospect, for more than two millennia, from Aristotle to the
discovery of modern or high energy physics at the beginning of the
twentieth century, our fundamental mode of observation of every ‘thing’
or ‘being’ in the universe has been formed by natural science, in
particular by classical physics. According to the latter, the universe is
made of small, sold, and static objects, which do not interpenetrate or
interact with one another. This traditional concept of ‘thing’ in classical
physics coheres consistently well, then, with the traditional sense of
‘being’. To people today greatly affected by modern physics, ‘being’ in
the sensible realm has become too wooly, static and non-interactive. At
the same time, ‘being’ in the suprasensible realm to the modern or
postmodern scientific generation has become also too vague, unsubstantial, un-verifiable or non-experienceable. Many people, therefore,
have turned to science or scientism exclusively to look for the ultimate,
most universal aspect of reality, i.e., in the scientifically verifiable realm.
However, impressed by the incredible success of high energy physics,
and having encountered in good faith the Eastern Orthodox tradition of
Divine Energy, in particular the East Asian traditional experience of Ch’i
or energy, many postmodern minds have begun to discover that every
‘thing’ or ‘being’, materially, humanly, and spiritually, is energy or Ch’i,
i.e., energy-like or Ch’i-like being. Consequently, a metaphysical
paradigm shift from ‘being’ to ‘energy-being’ is now taking place slowly
in the postmodern world (cf. Cheng 2002, pp. 314-330). This is where
Chu Hsi’s inherited all-embracing, all-permeating, all-penetrating concept
of Ch’i — which can describe every ‘thing’ in the universe pertaining to
both the sensible and suprasensible, created and uncreated realms — may
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help us understand more about ‘being’.
At the same time, Chu Hsi’s Li-Ch’i universe can also begin to
inspire many about their worldview. Whereas quite a few people today
still believe that supernatural Li and Ch’i are separated or separable in
their two-story mentality (cf. Maloney 1978, pp. 113-114). Chu Hsi
teaches us that they are impossible to separate. There is, in fact, no Ch’i
without Li. Just as we can experience Ch’i, we can also experience Li, Tai
Chi or Jen (Love), for they are in one another.
Indeed, when we approach ‘being’ as the ‘plural’ concrete generic
noun or the single most ‘all-encompassing’ unifying paradigm in
metaphysics, we discover that our scope has been too narrow. Following
Kant, we have been limiting our metaphysical inquiry exclusively to the
sensible, natural or created realm. As defined above, metaphysics is the
intellectual ‘study of being, its principles and causes’ (McGuire 1979, p
2352) with respect to what really exists in the whole universe.
Traditionally, it is a philosophical ‘attempt to provide and to justify an
account of the most basic constituents of reality, and the manner in which
these are related to one another’ (Meynell 1983, p. 361) pertaining to both
the sensible and supersensible, or natural and supernatural realms.
However, after Kant’s historical coronation of ‘our sense faculty and
experience’ stated that there is no true knowledge without them,
traditional metaphysics began to collapse. He proclaimed: “The true
method of metaphysics is fundamentally the same as that which Newton
has introduced into natural science, and which has therein yielded such
fruitful results’ (Gilson 1938, pp. 231-232; Kant 1956-1964, p. 756).
Étienne Gilson accurately observed: ‘On the very day and at the very
minute in which he wrote these simple words, Kant crossed the dead-line
beyond which lies the waste land where no metaphysics can live (Gilson
1938, p. 232). Ever since, our regard for knowledge in the natural,
sensible, or created realm has reigned supreme, whereas the traditional
honor for our knowledge in the uncreated, supersensible or supernatural
realm has been tragically treated as impossible.
In his encyclical letter, Fides et Ratio, Pope John-Paul II gravely
warned the world about the postmodern ‘crisis of meaning’ (John-Paul II
1998, no. 81). Apparently, ‘the end of metaphysics’ (Ibid., no. 55) is the
primary cause. Created with a soul and body, every human person as such
is a supernatural-natural being, a supersensible-sensible entity, and,
therefore, also a living everlasting-temporal existent. As a created being,
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he or she is also surrounded, filled and permeated by the uncreated
dimension, unceasingly so. A human person is, hence, not made up of
matter alone and nothing else, as taught by pure naturalism. He or she is
not what Bertrand Russell says when he claims: ‘No fire, no heroism, no
intensity of thought and feeling, can preserve an individual life beyond
the grave’ (Russell 1957, p. 107). Further, a person is not a material
machine (cf. La Mettrie 1996, pp. 1-39), interacting only with other
purely material, sensible, natural, created and temporal mechanical beings.
He or she is not solely a field of material energies moving inside a larger
fluctuating system of material energies (Ferguson 1973, p. 22). In Chu
Hsi’s term, a human person is not a material Ch’i without any immaterial
Li or universal.
In fact, deprive a human being of the immaterial universals, be they
supernatural, supersensible, eternal or uncreated, and he or she will be
deprived of any truth. Life will also become chaotic, absurd, and lost,
without any ‘ultimate and overarching meaning’ (John-Paul II 1998, no.
81). That is precisely what the postmodern, Kantian, anti-supersensible
and anti-supernatural anti-metaphysics have done to the postmodern
human mind. In the present pursuit of knowledge, we tend to set our
target categorically only on those subjects, beings, universals, principles
or causes, which are natural, sensible, created and hence temporal, as
worthy of our attention. Consequently, ‘we are experiencing something
that looks very much like the death of modern man, indeed that looks
very much like the death of Western man’ (Tarnas 1991, p. 44). This is
reflected in ‘the decline and fall, the deconstruction and collapse, of
virtually every one of the West’s great intellectual and cultural projects:
the end of theology, the end of philosophy….of literature… of arts, and of
culture itself’ (Ibid., p. 393).
To a substantial extent, the whole postmodern crisis of truth, of
relativism, and of ethical nihilism may be reduced to the postmodern
metaphysical crisis. Since the inception of the modern age, the modern
and postmodern splintering ‘fragmentation of knowledge’ (John-Paul II
1998, no. 81) has championed knowledge in the sensible, natural, created
realm while dismissing knowledge in the supersensible, supernatural,
uncreated dimension as impossible. As a result, there is now ‘no
all-encompassing transcendence or intrinsic ‘deeper’ order in the universe
to which the human mind could legitimately lay claim’ (Tarnas 1991, p.
354). In other words, the postmodern West has suffered immense
260
self-destruction due to its nominalistic, conceptualistic or deconstructionistic dismissal of any absolute, eternal, universal, and
mind-independent form, law, principle, universal, or Li in its metaphysics
or cosmology. This is where Chu Hsi’s concept of Li-Ch’i universe can
critically inspire us at this juncture, i.e., to rethink seriously our entire
metaphysical impasse in terms of Chu Hsi’s metaphysical concept of
Li-Ch’i universe.
6. CONCLUSION
Chu Hsi’s metaphysical concept of the universe has showed us (1) that
the divisive separation between our natural and supernatural concepts of
the universe can be united to become a well-integrated monism in terms
of his Li-Ch’i universe; (2) that perhaps what the postmodern West really
needs is the ontological realism of some eternal, absolute, and
mind-independent Li, T’ai Chi, Jen or Love which permeates the whole
universe as well as every thing and person in it; (3) that his Platonic
realism solution to the POU, rather than the Cartesian-Kantian
anti-realism which we have culturally adopted since the beginning of the
modern age, can offer the current postmodern or late-modern world the
real possibility of acquiring some kind of supersensible, supernatural or
uncreated universals as the sure warrantable foundation of our culture.
At the same time, we are convinced that Chu Hsi’s concept of Li and
T’ai Chi (the Li of Lis), just as Plato’s theory of forms, can teach us that
we do not lack in values or truths. They are to be discovered through
continued learning and development of our intellect. Ultimate values or
truths are eternal, absolute, and universal as they are necessarily the
conformity of our mind to the ante rem Lis or forms which are eternal,
absolute, and universal. According to St. Augustine, ‘Truth is divine mind
or word’ (Hankey 1999, p. 564). In other words, our minds are created to
conform to the uncreated ideas, forms, or universals in God’s Mind.
Absolute and eternal truth is, therefore, possible.
While Plato’s forms seem too transcendent and vague, nowhere to be
found concretely (cf. Woozley 1967, p. 197), Chu Hsi’s Li and Ch’i are
inseparable. In fact, Li and Ch’i interpermeate one another, so much so
that where there is Li, there is also Ch’i, and vice versa. Chu Hsi also said
that these Lis are brilliantly expressed in the Four Books (Chan 1987, p.
261
136). In comparing the Four Books with the Four Christian Gospels, one
may say that just as many Asians have discovered the uncreated Lis in the
former, it is about time for the postmodern world to re-discover those
mind-independent Lis in God’s Mind which are revealed, too, in the latter.
Further, our exploration has reminded us that Western culture as a
whole is composed of three main sources (cf. Russell 1961, p. 547), i.e.,
ancient Greek philosophy, Judaeo Patristic-Medieval Christianity, as well
as modern science and philosophy. In spite of its current ‘radical
openness’ to ancient Greek philosophy and modern scientific
enlightenment, in defiance of Christianity, the soul of the West is
substantially Christian. The West, therefore, cannot afford consciously to
cut itself off from Christianity and its ante rem solution to the POU. If the
West did as many have, its entire soul certainly would or will continue to
reflect unnecessary chaos and tragic death as a being of Ch’i without Li.
If the West were to examine itself and the surrounding world more
deeply, contemporary society would discover that its entire being, as well
as the universe itself, is a Li-Ch’i being, having been ceaselessly
permeated by God’s omnipresence and His Love even from the beginning
of creation. Traditionally, such a cosmology or metaphysical concept of
the universe has been cherished in particular by the Eastern Orthodox
Christians (cf. Lossky 1976, pp. 67-90). Chu Hsi’s concept of the Li-Ch’i
universe is, therefore, another cosmological expression comparable to,
and complementing, the earlier Christian tradition. Both of these
well-integrated metaphysical concepts of the cosmos, in which the whole
universe and every person and thing in it are permeated by Love, are now
waiting to be discovered or re-discovered by the postmodern West.
Indeed, the present metaphysical paper is characteristic of what
metaphysics is, as it attempts to grasp everything in the universe a whole.
In this way, this short essay cannot help but become ‘general’ or perhaps
‘too general’. Nevertheless, it is hoped that readers will utilize the
all-encompassing scope of this work a broad metaphysical base to attain
some cosmological balance when conducting detail-oriented researches
and studies into Ultimate Reality and Meaning within their distinctive
disciplines.
262
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