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Simposio: El desarrollo histórico de las economías latinoamericanas en perspectiva
comparada
Coordinadores: Luis Bértola y Gabriel Porcile
LURCHING TOWARD MODERNITY: CHILE AND MEXICO, ECONOMIES AND
STATES, FROM THE GREAT DEPRESSION THROUGH THE SECOND WORLD
WAR, 1924-1945
Michael Monteón
History Department
University of California, San Diego
mmonteon@ucsd.edu (fax 619-534-7283)
In general, Latin Americanists rarely look at two nations in the same period and to
discuss, in some detail, different responses to a common set of circumstances. Specific
comparisons of Chile and Mexico are rare. A title search through the massive University of
California computerized library yielded fewer than 100 titles that included Chile and Mexico and
only one that focused on those two countries.(Askari 1991) The events of the Great Depression
and the early 1940s, however, allow us to be very specific and, hopefully, more precise about
why and how governments and economies evolved in response to global change. The
Depression and the onset of the Second World War ripped through every Latin American nation,
altering two fundamental characteristics in the region. Since the late nineteenth century, most of
Latin America had embarked on a pattern of export-led progress and had rationalized its goals in
the prevailing rhetoric of economic liberalism. In each country, the collapse of export prices
between 1925 and 1932 brought severe crises to important, often crucial, economic sectors. In
each, too, economic liberalism, already on the defensive in the aftermath of World War One,
suffered a reversal. Even those who claimed to believe in a market economy tied their
expectations to greater governmental intervention.(Cortés Conde and Stein 1977; Maddison
1985; Thorp 1992; Bulmer-Thomas 1994) Historians of the period usually use 1930 as a dividing
point between the era of export economies and that of "growth from within," when one nation
after another ignored liberal economic theory and emphasized the protection of industry and
industrial growth as the principal stimuli to employment and progress.
Chile and Mexico reflect these changes. In each nation, the depression leads to a more
centralized government with broader economic powers. In each, there is a political mobilization
of business associations, professional guilds, labor unions, and, in the case of Mexico, peasant
leagues as well. In each, the origins of these mobilizations are in the export era. Historians of
Chile have often ascribed these changes to the depression, but the historiography of Mexico is

I am deeply indebted to Guillermo Guajardo for the careful reading he gave an earlier version of
this paper. He is also the only other specialist I know who is comparing Chile’s history to
Mexico.
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different. With the exception of John Womack, Jr.'s essay on the Mexican economy, more than
twenty years ago, an obscure essay by Arnaldo Córdova and the more recent work of Enrique
Cárdenas and Stephen Haber, the changes of the 1930s in Mexico are usually described as the
outcome of the Mexican Revolution that began in 1910.(Womack Jr. 1978 Winter; Córdova
1981; Cárdenas 1987; Haber 1989; Cárdenas 1994; Córdova 1995) While no one can ignore the
importance of the Revolution in Mexico, it is important to explore the reorganization of the
Mexican state in the 1930s and early 40s in relation to the rest of Latin America. Nonrevolutionary factors may be central to Mexico's evolution. Or, we may find that despite the
Revolution, factors external to both Mexico and Chile were driving the basic political evolution
of both countries.
Let me consider four elements common to both nations. The first is the general economic
trends in response to the Great Depression. The second was the need to reconfigure the state,
especially the relation of political parties to the government. And the third, which can only be
suggested here, is the rise of populist sentiment. Laborers in both nations and, in Mexico,
peasants as well, become part of the "nation," which must be organized by political leaders if
they are to maintain office. Finally, the Second World War is the moment that crystallizes
possibilities. We can say that, in each country, the class and party characteristics that exist in
1945 remain central to the political economy for the next three decades.
We know at the outset that these common elements have very different political
outcomes. Chile witnesses the revival of a multi-party system and a centralized government,
dominated by the presidency, but beset by problems of underdevelopment that explode in the
brief era of Salvador Allende's socialist experiments and the military coup of 1973. The story of
Mexico is the formation of single-party state run by civilians. The party, which takes its final
name as the PRI [Partido Revolucionario Institucional or Institutional Revolutionary Party] in
1946, has authoritarian qualities but permits public discussion. It demonstrates a remarkable
ability to recast itself in new images, change its economic policies, and continue dominating the
political economy.(Heise González 1974; Meyer, Krauze et al. 1977; Meyer 1978; Monteón
1982; González Casanova 1983-1986; Loveman 1988; Camín and Meyer 1989; Ruiz 1992;
Monteón 1998) Mexico is as great an exception to Latin American generalizations in the
twentieth century as socialist Cuba. I cannot explain this exceptionalism but I do find that, in
comparing Chile and Mexico, some of the standard hypotheses for each nation do not seem to
bear very close scrutiny
1. Some Broad Generalizations
In many respects, Chile and Mexico seem too different in their make-up and histories to
bear much comparison at all. Mexico is more than two and half times the size of Chile; in the
1930s, it had 16.5 million people and Chile only 4.2 million. Mexico has had a different state
administration since the early nineteenth century, and its leaders have faced the problem of
building a nation out of disparate societies with large Indian populations. Ethnic differences in
Chile are not as pronounced or involve as large a Native American population. What is more, in
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the 1930s, much more of Chile's population lived in "cities" (larger than 2,500 residents) than
Mexico's: 49.5 per cent as opposed to 33 per cent.
During the 1920s, events in Latin America, as elsewhere in the Atlantic economy, reflect
the disorientation and financial problems caused by the world war, problems that led directly to
the stock market crash of 1929 and the banking collapse of 1930-1933. Disillusionment with
democratic rhetoric was accompanied by desperate measures to revive market economies.
Mexico became dependent on the United States prior to the Revolution; Chile switched from
relying on Great Britain to a dependence on the United States during the First World War. In the
1920s, this dependence -- despite the impact of the Mexican Revolution -- increased in both
nations.(Cardoso 1980, p271; Monteón 1982, chap. 5; Albert 1988, p307-309) U.S. investment
in each country by the end of the 20s was about 700 million dollars, and most of it was in mining
or oil.(Rippy 1958, p43) Thus, one of the factors that would influence the political stability of
each country was the behavior of the U.S. government in response to pressures from U.S.
corporations that had invested in that country.(Meyer, Krauze et al. 1977,chap. 1; Hall
1995,p142)
The 1920s provide us with some crucial similarities in each nation. In each, the political
leadership must contend with the breakdown of an export-oriented liberalism. The course of the
breakdown is different, of course, but the fact that forms of political organization that had
maintained basic stability since the 1880s in the case of Mexico and since 1891 in Chile no
longer worked in 1925 bears some discussion. Whether we wish to call this the end of
oligarchical liberalism or tag it with some other label is less important than how political leaders
in the 1920s envisioned a new state. What was their project?
We know that it was not democracy. Still, rulers in each nation wanted elections to
legitimize holding office. Both nations faced the prospect of mass politics, and in each country,
those who held political office were determined that this should not lead to popular sovereignty.
The initial project was to share office with portions of the middle class -- mostly lawyers, school
teachers, and some labor leaders -- and to claim that such a reapportionment meant the
government now represented everyone. The engineers of this effort in Chile were Arturo
Alessandri, a reforming Liberal, and Carlos Ibáñez del Campo, once a cavalry officer. The two,
through a series of dramatic events, grew to fear and hate each other. In Mexico, the project was
launched by the victors of the Revolution, particularly, Generals Alvaro Obregón and Plutarco
Elías Calles.(Meyer, Krauze et al. 1977,chap.1; Meyer 1986) Each project required, in each
nation, the use of armed force.
Alessandri, Ibáñez, Obregón and Calles shared not only an appetite for office but an
exploration of new political coalitions. They were not above experimentation, often used
rhetoric that threatened the economically privileged, and were actively seeking models of
political organization for a new state. All of them called themselves revolutionaries, none called

Census data for both nations.
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himself a "corporatist," but that is how we would label them.(Pike and Stritch 1974; de Sousa
1978; Wiarda 1981; Lehmbruch and Schmitter 1982; Williamson 1985; Morales-Gomez and
Torres 1990; Wiarda and Klein 1996; Wiarda 1997) Each wanted a more centralized form of
government, relating administrative organization and policy to specific economic sectors, and
based on hierarchical relations between public and private interests and the rich and the general
population. Each rejected the consequences of unbridled capitalism by which he meant the
problems of mass poverty, illiteracy, and the threat of social revolution; none, however, rejected
a market economy. Each attempted an alliance with urban labor, either by coopting the labor
organizations that existed or by instituting new ones that could be regulated by the government.
Thus, in ways that must have made all of them uncomfortable, each flirted with populism -calling up the politics of redistribution -- while trying to avoid antagonizing capital, foreign and
domestic.
Anyone looking at Chile and Mexico in the late 1920s would have bet that it was Chile
that would be the more stable and prosperous of the two nations. President Arturo Alessandri's
administration had failed to achieve his reformist program and the military had moved in after a
coup in 1924. But by 1927, Chile's economy was recovering and Carlos Ibáñez was very much
in charge and well-liked by foreign and domestic business interests. By contrast, Mexico was
still obviously recovering from revolution and had plunged into a religious civil war.(Meyer
1974; Ruiz 1992,p339-385)
Hindsight argues that, nonetheless, it was Mexico that generated the more dynamic and
successful political organizations. It used to be argued that Mexico also had the more successful
economy. The scholarly literature on Chile's political economy in this period emphasizes
disorganization and a stagnating or slow-growing economy. That on Mexico stresses the origins
of the "miracle," the striking growth of industry and rapid economic expansion that accompanied
the onset of World War II and continued into the 1950s and 60s.(Mamalakis and Reynold 1965;
Reynolds 1970; Ffrench-Davis 1973; Mamalakis 1976; Cárdenas 1987) Economic success can
obviously stabilize political support and continuity. But was Mexico before 1940 or even 1950
that much more successful than Chile? I do not think so.
In an admittedly gross approximation, I looked at the pattern of growth in the gross
domestic product of each country from 1925 until the late 1940s. In Appendix I.1 and I.2, I
turned these figures into indices based on 1925-1927 to avoid the distortions created by events in
1929 and the crash of the depression. The results are quite interesting. By these estimates, Chile
recovers from the crash faster than Mexico and remains somewhat more successful economically
thereafter; the contrast is even more surprising when population growth is taken into
consideration: Chile's GDP per capita in 1935 is 104 while Mexico's is 87; in 1940, 114 to
Mexico's 96; and in 1948, 135 to Mexico's 117.
One might argue that this is a misleading indicator, that particular sectors are more
important in generating a successful political economy than the overall GDP. As Appendices II.1
and II.2 demonstrate, however, up until 1940, Mexico was not a more industrialized nation than
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Chile; the sharpest contrast in the distribution of economic activities was that, until then, mining
and petroleum played a larger role in Chile than in Mexico and that the Chilean government
represented a much greater share of the total GDP: ranging from around 9 to 20 per cent in these
years, while the Mexican government was only five or six per cent of the economy. This seems
to me a key point, and I will return to it later. There is also another element of the numbers that
is misleading, and this too, is worth revisiting. The numbers may hide the depths of the Crash,
by most accounts the slide from 1929-1932 was much sharper in Chile than in Mexico; the
sectors hit in Chile, mining and government spending, had an impact on employment and hunger
that exceeded the decline of various sectors in Mexico. The Crash hit Chilean society harder
than that of Mexico, but my point here is that its impact on Mexico has been understated. (An
exception is, (Cárdenas 1994))
But first, it is necessary to make one observation that struck me as I assembled these
numbers. In almost every study of politics and economics that I have read on either country,
great weight is given to a handful of sectors: agriculture, mining, industry, construction and
government. But as the percentages illustrate in Appendices II.1 and II.2, these sectors combined
accounted for no more than about two thirds of the economy of Chile until 1940 and only a little
more than half of it thereafter. They make up, in many years, less than half of the economy of
Mexico. Have we, in all these studies, been basing our explanations on totally inadequate
assumptions? Changes in a third to half an economy can cause no end of political instability.
And what are we to make of the internal dynamics of these economies? To my
astonishment, well into the 1930s, Chilean agriculture expanded more rapidly than Mexico's;
mining and/or petroleum as well as construction in Chile recovered relatively better than
Mexico's. (See Appendices III and III.2) By some indices -- compare III.2 and III.4 -- the
decisive expansion of Mexico appears only in the late 1940s. Yet, there is no doubt, that by that
date the hegemony of the official ruling party was well established while Chile's perennial shuffle
of cabinets and political coalitions was beginning to undo the capacity of any government to act
with authority.
I would suggest one other modification, that of Andre Gunder Frank and others who view
the depression as a chance for greater economic autonomy.(Frank 1967) In the crucial moment
of 1929-1932, a significant element in regime survival and, therefore, in the overall development
of the political economy was not in breaking ties to the United States but in strengthening them.
The United States, despite strong Republican opposition to the "bolsheviks" in Mexico City,
improved relations with Mexico in the 1920s, opposed or neutralized Calles' enemies, and
permitted the Mexican government to suspend debt payments without retaliation. In Chile,
neither Ibáñez nor the governments that followed him were able to articulate a set of policies that
simultaneously built support at home and won at least acceptance from the United States.
President Alessandri (1932-1938), the most successful of Chile's chief executives during the
Depression, was unable to elect a successor. Conservative corporatism was never cemented into
the political system. The problem for Chile was accented by the fact that it was a far more tradedependent nation than Mexico.(Thorp 1992,p182) There is ample evidence, in short, that the
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Depression did not constitute a break in the role of the United States in the development of these
two countries.(Puig Casauranc 1938,p282ff; Portes Gil 1941,p197-200; Zevada 1971,p64-81;
Meyer 1978,p36-46; Medin 1982; Garrido 1991,p68-85; Monteón 1998,chap. 1)
Indeed, if there is any ongoing legacy of the crash, it is that Chile's capacity to import
remained well below the average in Latin America and much poorer than that of Mexico -- well
into the 1940s. (Appendices IV.1.h and i; IV.2.h and i; IV.3.h and i) The constriction on the
Chilean economy as a whole involved everything from shortages of fuel to shoddy consumer
imports from European nations. The theme of shortages of key imports does not seem an
omnipresent in Mexican history.
II. The Timing of Institutional Arrangements
I assume, for the sake of brevity, that the most important political fact in each nation was
the reconfiguration of the state that followed the crash, 1929-1932. We know, to take one facet
of this process, that everyone in the 1920s paid close attention to both Mussolini and Stalin.
Ibáñez and Calles studied various means of creating a more vertically organized set of
institutions that would reach from the elite to the general populace and, in some sense or other,
represent the economic and social segments of the country while concentrating authority in a
political leader. Each of these figures had to improvise in response to events no one could have
foreseen. Both did what they could to placate the United States and major U.S. corporations that
operated within their countries.
Ibáñez chose to create a more presidential government but not to form a government
party. He relied on the expansion of government, based not only on a brief surge in exports, but
on massive borrowing from New York and London, to buy public support. The communists and
anarchists were banned, and government created labor regulations for a new set of "syndicates"
that would represent workers. Non-leftist parties were permitted but were not really the basis of
the contest for state power. That took place largely within the executive branch.
Calles chose to form a dominant party, originally called the PNR (Partido Nacional
Revolucionario). It was a loose knit coalition of his supporters and those of Obregón, who had
just been assassinated. In an effort to avoid revolutionary fratricide, Calles took himself out of
presidency but became the jefe máximo -- reducing Mexico's next three chief executives to men
who served at his will. He had the support not only of a large part of the revolutionary chieftains,
but of the newly developing professional army, and a corrupt labor federation. This was the
beginning of new institutional consolidation -- a reformulation of party and state that remains to
this very day. This does not mean that the party’s internal coalitions did not change; in a
fundamental way, its purpose changed. The military was eventually removed. And, under
Cárdenas, the president came to dominate the party, turning it into a vehicle of
executive.(Garrido 1991,p37-51; Knight 1991; MacLachlan and Beezley 1994, 283-294)
There are several elements about both the timing and consequence of these institutional
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changes that are worth mentioning. Ibáñez in many respects is a common figure in twentiethcentury Latin American history, the modernizing caudillo. And like most of them, he failed to
make a distinction between governing and mobilizing support. He thought a reformulated
presidency could serve as a basis of both functions. Laurence Whitehead notes that the Chilean
government was far more developed in its transportation networks and administrative capacity
than almost any other Latin American nation.(Whitehead 1994,p20) But such a development,
with the growing dependence of the general public on deficit spending, brought a severe price in
the Crash itself. Calles did not make this mistake. The party he created contributed significantly
to political continuity during the Crash, so that Mexico is one of only two (Venezuela is the
other) major Latin American nations to endure the crash of 1929-1932 without a change of
executive caused by rebellion or coup.
A second element is spending your way to popularity is more expensive and less effective
than organizing a dominant party. Ibáñez increased the national government until, by late 1929
and 1930 it was 20 per cent of the GDP; by the time his government collapsed, it made up almost
a quarter of the economy. (Appendix II.1.e) If one uses 1928 as the base year, within a year a
half, the Chilean index of government spending rose to 136. (Appendix II.2.e) By comparison,
the Mexican national government made up only about five per cent of the GDP (Appendix
II.2.e), it was actually shrinking in size in the late 1920s. (Appendix III.2.e) A third
consideration is that an expensive government, which fell into fiscal crisis, left a mobilized,
dependent urban sector behind it that caused political trouble for every subsequent administration
in Chile. As the crash swept through the nation and the government cut back its spending, it left
behind three distinct urban "armies" of unemployed in Santiago and Valparaiso -- the miners
from the north, laborers in public works, and white collar government workers -- who raised hell
thereafter. Mexico, which had about the same number of unemployed, does not seem to have
had this political concentration of anger in its capital. On Chile, see (Chile 1929; United States
1929-1930) On Mexico, seev(Meyer 1978, chap. 1; Malpica Uribe 1985). In a discussion of
public institutions, below, I elaborate the much greater success that Mexico had in controlling its
labor forces. This is another factor that helps explain why a shrinking government in Mexico
could ride out its contraction. It is one thing to become unpopular, as the Maximato was; another
to be overthrown.
Beyond the crash, institutional arrangements and economic recovery interacted over this
simple fact: Chile lacked political continuity and so faced the revival of instability as a constant
prospect in the 1930s, while Mexico was developing greater stability despite intense sources of
conflict. Five chief executives followed Ibáñez within a year and half of his removal: two of
these came to office by means of national election, the others by actions of the armed forces.
This was the highest executive turnover in Chilean history. The Mexican Maximato with its
three subservient Presidents gave way to the election and administration of Lázaro Cárdenas
(1934-1940). The Cárdenas' sexenio is still the most important populist administration in the
nation's history. The core of that mobilization was the creation of new labor and peasant
organizations, within the ranks of the official party -- and a renaming of the party, the PRM
[Partido Revolucionario Mexicano or Mexican Revolutionary Party] in 1938. From the time of
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the CROM [Confederación Regional Obrero de México or Regional Labor Confederation of
Mexico] in 1919, Mexican leaders had been forming pacts with workers in the capital; the
CROM and, later, the CGT (Confederación General de Trabajadores or General Confederation of
Labor) had each made deals that traded legal recognition in return for not opposing the
government. In his administration, Cárdenas instituted the most sweeping land reform that Latin
America had ever seen and consolidated peasant loyalty through the CCM (Confederación
Campesina Mexicana or Mexican Peasant Confederation).(Clark 1934,p57-69; Barboso Cano
1980,p93-111; Córdova 1980,chap. 1; Carr 1981, 86-193; Tamayo 1987,chap. 2; Zimerman
1991,p42,196,255) The results were uneven, a majority of peasants never received any land. But
these twin changes brought labor and peasants within the networks of legitimate lobbyists, albeit
abusive networks, with channels through bureaucratic caciquismo that they could use to present
their grievances.(Knight 1992,p138) No such set of structures evolved within Chile before 1950.
Peasants were excluded, and any time they attempted to organize, they were repressed. Labor
organized in the face of government hostility in the 1930s, but it was never part of any set pact –
it had no set connections to the executive branch of the government.(Monteón 1998,chap.7-8)
Curiously, the most violent state within the most violent society created the greatest
degree of political stability. Over and over again, it is clear that Mexico in the late 1920s and in
the 1930s is a much more violent set of places than anywhere in Chile. This was not mean that
Chile was peaceful or without major tumult – far from it. There were class confrontations
throughout the interwar period in which hundreds of ordinary people lost their lives: 1925
Coruña, 1932 Naval Uprising, 1935 at Ranquil, and so on. But this is nothing in comparison to
the major bloodlettings of the 1920s in Mexico. The elimination of Mexican revolutionary
caudillos in the 20s is a well-known story as is the Cristero rebellion. The first process included
two military rebellions, that of de la Huerta in 1923 and of Escobar in 1929. The second led to
tens of thousands dead.(Meyer 1974) In the state of Veracruz alone, armed peasants (forming
guerrilla bands) fought against white guards of landowners, and occasionally, state forces from
1920 through the late 30s.(Salamini 1978) In addition, the archival materials on regional
protest make it clear that confrontations between labor organizers, peasant committees and even
common householders with local bosses -- most of them municipal office holders, governors,
and/or landowners -- were much nastier than anything I have read occurring in Chile in the same
period.(Chile 1929-1940; Salazar 1990) (México 1929-1943) Ibáñez was overthrown in 1931 in
the wake of killing two middle class young men during demonstrations in Santiago; Alessandri
cost conservatives the election of 1938 when the carabineros slaughtered a few dozen Nacis in
the capital. How many thousands died under Calles alone? Violence was a much more effective
instrument of local and national political control in Mexico than Chile.
Another consideration is the relation of economic expansion and political stability. And
here, again, the numbers tell an interesting story; one that is at odds with portion's of the
"progressive" mythology in each nation.
The standard view of Chile in the 1930s goes something like this: Arturo Alessandri won
the presidency in 1932 with a liberal-left electoral coalition, then (for reasons usually
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unexplained except his perfidy), he abandoned the left and socially progressive concerns and
realigned his government with the parties of the right, especially the Conservatives and Liberals
in Congress. He betrayed his working class supporters, improved the prospects of the rich, and
abandoned his populist roots of the 1920s. In 1938, the right ran Alessandri's Finance Minister
Gustavo Ross Santa María for the presidency and lost to a center-left Popular Front, led by Pedro
Aguirre Cerda. Aguirre Cerda was the working man's great hour in Chile (before the
administration of Salvador Allende in the early 1970s), raising real wages and enacting social
reforms that had been pending since the 1920s.(Palma Zuñiga 1963; Palma Zuñiga 1967) In fact,
both Alessandri and Aguirre Cerda labored under the shadow of the Depression. Alessandri cut
back government spending and raised taxes because an inflationary spiral had already begun, and
he knew from his presidency in the 1920s how disastrous that could be. His efforts cost him the
support of the middle class and labor. Aguirre Cerda engaged in deficit spending and heavy
borrowing from the export-import bank; wages went up briefly before inflation created the class
cleavages that brought down the Radical presidencies in the late 1940s.(Monteón 1998, chap.
6,8)
The Cárdenas' administration presents a different trajectory, albeit over terrain that is
much more heavily contested by historians and contemporary politics. But in any reckoning of
reputations -- who did most for the working people of his nation? -- it is safe to say that Cárdenas
would rank well above either Alessandri or Aguirre Cerda. This is a judgement with which I
agree.(González 1979; Hernández Chávez 1979; González 1981; Hamilton 1982; León and
Marván 1985; Knight 1994) While government expansion does not equal an improvement in
popular welfare, it is at least a clue to how active the government has become. The government
under Cárdenas doubled in size, rising on the index from 75 in 1933 to 158 in 1940. (Appendix
III.2.e) And this expansion outran the pace of change in GDP per capita, 79 in 1933 and 96 in
1940. (Appendix I.2.d) By comparison, the index of Chilean government spending went from
55 in 1933 to 86 in 1940 -- in short, even as late as 1940 the government was not spending as
much as it had in 1928, let alone anything like the sums Ibáñez expended before he fell.
(Appendix III.1.e) And government spending did rise faster, 56 per cent, than the GDP per
capita, 39 per cent.
But, according to the available figures, which differ rather dramatically according to
source, the government of Chile in 1940 was either 12.5 per cent or 5.7 per cent of the GDP in
1940. (Appendix II.1.e) Mexico's was 7.2 per cent. (Appendix II.2.e) In short, Chile's
government was relatively the same size or relatively much larger than Mexico's despite all the
Cardenista reforms. But wait, things get stranger still. The ironic outcome of these comparisons
is that by the end of the 1940s, when both governments were cracking down on radical labor
movements and cooperating with the United States government in its Cold War policies,
government spending in Chile was expanding more rapidly than that of Mexico: Chile's
government more than doubled its economic size, that of Mexico rose about 44 per cent. (same
appendices) Obviously, the expansion of the GDP played a role in this change, but it was also
due to a deliberate expansion of government as an engine of change in Chile. By 1950, the
breakdown of the GDP indicates that the government of Chile was once again relatively larger
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than that of Mexico.
To me, the Appendices II.1 and II.2 also indicate something of great interest to the
historian: the sectoral structure of the economy of each country remains remarkably similar from
the 1920s through the 1940s. Unfortunately, the indices I have for Chile are discontinuous in
terms of sources but each index does not change much within its own terms. By 1950,
agriculture and mining made up less of the economy of Chile and industry was substantially but
not decisively larger. The overall structure of the Mexican economy changed even less, with
mining and petroleum falling to five per cent of the economy at the end of the period and
manufacturing rising from 10 to 17 per cent in these years.
Populism was not a matter of economic recovery nor about the size of government. It
was more a matter of symbols, of governmental economic intervention in a market economy, and
of delivering some benefits as a political down payment for the future. Latin American populism
in the 1930s may have served a very different function than it did in the region after World War
II. The intense moments of populist activism were brief in each nation, but the memory of those
moments had a long trajectory. Groups remained loyal long after government policies had turned
against them. Can anyone make the case that peasants in Mexico remained better off in the
1940s as a result of land reform in the 1930s? Perhaps. Obviously, the starkest contrast in the
populist legacy of both nations is that in this era there was no land reform in Chile and
unionization of rural laborers was repressed. The urban context is a little more similar. Even as
both governments grew, it is clear from the research of Jeff Bortz on Mexico and from the
existing tables on real wages in Chile that urban workers suffered substantial reversals of fortune
in the 1940s.(Chile 1940-1955; Bortz 1986)
There was much talk of "socialism" in both countries during the 1930s but this had
nothing to do with a command economy or government control of the means of production. In
each nation, it was a tactic for extracting concessions from business interests -- even Alessandri
called himself a socialist -- while expanding the role of government. Still, to return to
comparison, the role of the national government -- always relatively larger in Chile than in
Mexico -- developed in a very different domestic context in each nation. In Chile, the
government was in a recovery mode throughout the 1930s so that even as it expanded, it
remained incapable of reviving the boom era of the late 1920s. In Mexico, the expansion was a
historic first in the simple sense that the government was moving beyond the size and function of
any earlier era.
But in each country, this governmental expansion left public administration as a
significant but minor economic player. Indeed, most of the economy in both nations remained
outside the sectors so often stressed by economic historians: industry, agriculture, construction,
et. al. One wonders looking at such data as that of Appendices II.3.g and II.4.g what might have
happened had governments come up with a means to expand the dynamism of retail trade and
commerce (about 20 per cent of Chile's economy and 30 per cent of Mexico's)? These sectors,
obviously intertwined with industrial changes, exceeded the size of industry well into the 1940s;
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nor do we possess conclusive evidence that industry was driving the expansion of these sectors.
In conclusion, there is the single most important element within the political life of each
nation: the persistence of the spoils system based on a multiplicity of parties in Chile, one whose
history turned on the formation, deformation, and decomposition of party coalitions; and the rise
of that great mutating monster, the PRI, in Mexico, based on patronage but able constantly to
relegitimize itself as the legacy of Revolution and of stability. These differences had enormous
repercussions in the structure of access to government and influence-peddling. The situation
with regard to labor and peasants in both countries has been mentioned. At the other end of the
social spectrum, industrialists and landlords retained enormous power but with a major
distinction. In Mexico, industrialists lobbied through channels that supported the PRI’s
candidates but did not control either the party or the candidates directly. Landlords retained
enormous regional power – including their own armed guards into the 1930s – but they lost their
seat at inner councils of the executive branch of government. Both groups could be surprised by
sudden changes in economic policy.(Story 1986,p54; Knight 1994,p109-110) This difference in
institutional structures had enormous importance for the middle class that counted on
employment as the state expanded. Middle class rewards in both countries seem to outrun
benefits to the working class by the late 1940s. In Chile, the number of laborers covered by
social security rose 69 per cent between 1935 and 1955; the number of public employees covered
rose 180 per cent, and the number of private white collar employees rose 240 per cent.(Arellano
1985) In both countries, the middle class turned on labor in the Cold War. But fights over spoils
in Chile and labor repression eventually cost the Radicals the key middle class, and with that
loss, the presidency. The middle class in Mexico goes on accommodating itself to the shifting
coalitions within the PRI and the presidency grew ever stronger. Executive stability provided
the basis for policy continuities that sustained government inputs for the “miracle” in the 1950s
and 60s.
All of this has implications for any interpretation of corporatism and populism. Each
state was dealing with the massification of politics, each tried to delimit popular pressures.
Mexico found in a very strong executive system and a hierarchical party structure the
combination to maintain some social peace while funneling substantial investment by the state
and foreign capital into industry, irrigated agricultural estates, and infrastructure. Contrary to the
assertions of Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards, not every populist experiment in Latin
America ended badly.(Dornbusch and Edwards 1991) The question of success turned on whether
or not a state could channel popular demands (or repress them) without too high a cost to itself.
Mexico confronted labor and peasants with a choice, leave the party and you loose all political
legitimacy. In Albert Hirschman’s phrasing, the cost of “exit” became too high.(Hirschman 1970)
What is more, the state had acquired a nationalist legimacy in the oil expropriation of 1938 that
cemented popular sentiment that this was not a democratic government but it did defend Mexico
itself Chile, however, lacked all these qualities. Labor was never incorporated into a dominant
party and was repressed broadly in 1948 when the objective target was the Communist Party –
the tactic cost the government labor legitimacy for years. Peasants were excluded altogether and
remained tied to the servility of inquilinaje. The masses had a stake in the system but paid no
12
12
price for leaving any party – the result was a “fluid” situation as military men describe it.
I would suggest one other modification. In contrast to the views often argued by
dependistas such as Andre Gunder Frank, the depression did not represent a fundamental break
toward greater economic autonomy.(Frank 1967; Arellano 1985) During the crucial moment of
1929-1932, a significant element in regime survival and, therefore, in the overall development of
the political economy was not in breaking ties to the United States but in strengthening them.
The United States, despite strong Republican opposition to the "bolsheviks" in Mexico City,
improved relations with Mexico, opposed or neutralized Calles' enemies, and permitted the
Mexican government to suspend debt payments without retaliation. In Chile, neither Ibáñez nor
the governments that followed him were able to articulate a set of policies that simultaneously
built support at home and won at least acceptance from the United States. President Alessandri
(1932-1938), the most successful of Chile's chief executives during the Depression, was unable
to elect a successor. Conservative corporatism was never cemented into the political system as it
was in Mexico. There is ample evidence, in short, that the Depression did not constitute a break
in the role of the United States in Latin American development. Ironically, too, for all the
rhetoric about Mexican nationalism, it was Chile which ran most afoul the United States during
World War II, while Mexico became much closer to the U.S., a factor that helps explain its
rapidly growing exports in the war.
Neither political system by the late 1940s was managing to maintain populist gains for the
working class, and in both nations, the workers, especially those on the left, made demands for
betters wages and conditions and were repressed. That having been said, before 1950, the
political system in Mexico did not deliver an "economic miracle" in comparison to Chile. But
during the 1940s, it did begin to dramatically expand those industry and agriculture that paid high
dividends for the next twenty years. A more intensive populism and a one-party state, therefore,
proved to be more successful in some economic terms than a more expansive government with a
multiparty system. But the course of this relative success was neither uniform nor predictable.
In short, one political economy had not developed some clearly superior direction before 1940
(or even 1950) than the other, but each nation had set itself up for a different form of politics that
had far-reaching economic consequences.
A central element to the entire story is how each political system went into the
Depression, another is the links of export-oriented growth and foreign credit. Mexico's
government was relatively smaller and more cohesive than Chile's; this was true before the crash
and made a difference once the depression descended. And, as a result, the government was not
as vulnerable to a downturn in export earnings as the more trade-dependent Chile.. In addition,
Mexico had already made itself a pariah in international financial circles, it had to follow much
more conservative fiscal and borrowing policies in the late 20s and so its government did not
suffer the destabilizing cut-off of international credit that hit Chile. Chile's conservative
corporatist regime, so popular among U.S. investors in the 1920s, intensified the fiscal and
political vulnerability of the country to the international economy, while Mexico's
"revolutionary" regime laid the groundwork for the most successful, market-oriented, political
13
13
party in Latin American history.
APPENDICES
Appendix I.1: Chile Gross Domestic Product, 1925-1948
a: Population in Thousands
b: Millions of 1977 pesos
c: GDP Index 1925-27 ave = 100
d: GDP Per Capita Index 1925-1927 ave = 100
Year
a:
b:
c:
d:
1925
3929
61223
96
98
1926
3977
62776
100
99
1927
4034
66614
105
103
1928
4118
82788
130
126
1929
4199
91378
144
136
1930
4287
81600
128
119
1931
4322
67711
106
98
1932
4375
49527
78
71
1933
4420
57659
91
82
1934
4446
69813
110
98
1935
4485
74290
117
104
1936
4530
75295
118
104
1937
4572
88271
139
121
1938
4618
84707
133
115
1939
4645
86809
136
117
1940
5024
91469
144
114
1941
5094
91560
144
113
1942
5130
94945
149
116
1943
5237
98932
156
118
1944
5273
100317
159
119
1945
5349
109446
172
128
1946
5430
116232
183
134
1947
5525
108444
171
123
1948
5620
120915
190
135
Data for Chile are derived from the National Statistics by Sebastian Sáez, La economía política
de una crisis: Chile, 1929-1939 (Santiago: CIEPLAN, Notas Técnicas no. 130, Mayo de 1989),
14
14
8; Sáez also incorporated data from the classic study of Raúl Prebisch, United Nations, Economic
Survey of Latin America 1949 (New York: United Nations, Economic Commission for Latin
America, Department of Economic Affairs, 1951), 272ff. and four other
studies of the GDP; data for period after 1940 is from ECLA figures as presented in James W.
Wilkie and Carlos Alberto Contreras, eds., Statistical Abstract for Latin America (Los Angeles:
U.C.L.A., Latin American Center Publications, 1993), v. 29, part 2, 1290.
Appendix I.2: Mexico Gross Domestic Product, 1925-1948
a: Population in thousands
b: Millions of 1960 Pesos
c: GDP Index 1925-27 ave = 100
d: GDP Per Capita Index 1925-1927 ave = 100
Year
a.
b:
c:
d:
1925
15280
37402
97
99
1926
15527
39646
103
103
1927
15776
37902
99
97
1928
16237
36137
94
90
1929
16291
36662
95
91
1930
16554
34364
89
84
1931
16776
35503
92
85
1932
17017
30207
79
72
1933
17274
33620
87
79
1934
17550
35809
93
83
1935
17847
38549
101
87
1936
18167
41633
109
93
1937
18861
43011
112
94
1938
18501
43708
114
94
1939
19280
46058
120
97
1940
19653
46693
122
96
1941
20232
51241
134
103
1942
20289
54116
141
108
1943
21443
56120
146
106
1944
21075
60701
158
117
1945
22726
62608
163
112
1946
22396
66722
174
121
1947
24086
69020
180
116
1948
24796
71864
187
117
Data for Mexico are derived from: Enrique Cárdenas, La industrialización mexicana durante la
gran depresión (México: El Colegio de México, 1987), 194-195; Cárdenas, in turn, derived his
15
15
figures from an internal study by the Banco de México. Population figures are from the United
Nations, Economic Survey ... 1949, 408-409.
Appendix II.1: Breakdown of Chilean Gross Domestic Product by Principal Sectors. Percentage
of GDP, 1925-195
Index for 1925-1940, 1925-27 = 100
Index for 1940-1950, 1940 = 100
a. Agriculture and cattle
b. Mining and/or Petroleum
c. Industry and/or manufacturing
d. Construction
e. Government
f. Rest
a:
b:
c:
d:
e:
f:
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
------------1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
18.7
18.6
17.7
17.3
15.3
17.6
17.1
23.8
25.4
20.9
18.1
19.0
16.4
16.6
17.6
16.0
26.8
24.2
21.8
25.0
20.3
20.3
16.6
12.4
13.2
16.7
18.9
19.3
22.7
21.1
20.1
20.7
13.2
12.0
10.9
9.1
7.2
9.6
9.3
12.9
12.4
10.9
12.2
12.9
11.5
12.5
12.4
13.6
1.7
2.4
2.3
1.8
2.3
3.3
1.3
2.4
2.7
3.7
3.9
3.4
3.5
3.3
4.1
4.4
---14.5
13.0
20.1
24.1
14.9
11.4
9.2
12.1
11.7
8.9
11.0
11.8
12.5
39.4
43.0
39.8
32.0
24.5
29.7
31.3
33.4
34.5
32.2
33.3
33.6
36.9
35.5
33.9
32.6
16.0
14.8
15.3
16.8
15.0
13.5
14.8
14.5
15.4
14.7
9.0
9.0
7.5
7.4
7.0
5.9
5.8
6.4
6.9
6.0
17.5
17.5
21.0
21.4
21.7
22.8
20.9
22.2
22.7
23.7
2.3
2.3
2.3
2.4
2.9
2.7
3.8
3.0
2.5
2.6
5.7
5.7
6.6
6.3
6.3
6.9
6.5
7.6
6.3
7.0
37.8
46.3
46.7
45.6
46.9
48.0
48.7
46.2
46.1
45.9
16
16
1950
13.7
5.8
22.3
2.4
8.7
47.1
Data set 1925-1940, based on Sáez, La economía política de una crisis, 18; data on 1940-1950
derived from Markos J. Mamalakis, Historical Statistics of Chile: National Accounts (Wesport,
Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1978), I, 145-146.
Appendix II.2: Breakdown of Mexican Gross Domestic Product by Principal Sectors. Percentage
of GDP, 1925-1950
Index 1925-27 = 100
a. Agriculture and cattle
b. Mining and/or Petroleum
c. Industry and/or manufacturing
d. Construction
e. Government
f. rest
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
10.1
10.7
11.4
11.0
12.1
12.8
11.8
10.2
12.1
12.3
13.3
14.0
13.6
14.3
14.3
15.4
16.5
15.6
15.1
15.9
15.4
16.4
16.1
15.5
16.7
2.4
2.3
2.2
2.6
2.4
2.5
2.1
2.2
2.5
3.1
2.5
3.2
3.1
2.1
3.6
2.5
2.3
2.4
2.3
2.7
2.6
3.8
3.8
3.3
3.4
5.6
5.4
5.6
5.0
4.9
4.9
4.3
5.3
4.7
5.0
5.0
5.9
5.7
7.1
5.5
7.2
6.6
6.2
6.6
7.2
7.0
6.8
6.2
6.0
5.9
50.6
51.1
50.8
51.2
51.9
47.8
52.9
51.9
52.8
51.4
51.6
50.2
50.2
50.1
50.1
50.4
51.0
50.6
51.5
51.8
48.5
53.4
52.1
48.4
56.5
19.7
20.2
20.4
21.2
19.1
18.2
21.1
23.0
21.9
20.3
19.9
19.9
19.1
19.0
19.3
18.0
18.9
19.3
17.8
17.4
16.8
16.3
16.6
18.4
18.4
11.3
10.3
9.3
8.8
9.3
9.2
7.6
7.2
6.9
7.7
7.4
6.9
7.6
7.4
7.0
6.4
5.8
5.8
5.7
4.9
5.1
4.4
5.2
4.8
4.9
17
17
1950
18.1
5.0
17.1
3.6
5.8
50.4
Data for Mexico are derived from Leopoldo Solís, La realidad económica mexicana: retrovisión
y perspectivas (México: Siglo XXI, 1993, 20a. ed.), 79-80; Solís derives his figures from the
Banco de México.
Appendix II.3: Additional Information on Percentages of GDP for Chile, 1940-1950
a. rest in Appendix II
b. wholesale and retail trade
c. banking and real estate
d. ownership of dwellings
a.
b.
1940
37.8
18.9
1941
46.3
18.3
1942
46.7
19.1
1943
45.1
18.2
1944
46.9
19.2
1945
48.0
19.6
1946
48.7
20.9
1947
46.2
19.3
1948
46.1
17.9
1949
45.9
18.8
1950
47.1
17.7
Data adopted from Mamalakis, I, 145-146.
c.
d.
4.2
4.2
4.0
3.9
4.1
4.0
3.9
4.1
3.9
2.0
3.9
11.8
10.9
11.3
10.9
10.9
10.7
10.7
9.7
10.0
10.0
10.2
Appendix II.4: Additional Information on Percentages of GDP for Mexico, 1925-1950
f. rest from Appendix II.2
g. commerce
f.
1925
50.6
1926
51.1
1927
50.8
1928
51.2
1929
51.9
1930
47.8
1931
52.9
1932
51.9
1933
52.8
g.
29.8
31.1
30.4
30.6
31.1
31.5
32.9
30.6
31.7
18
18
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
51.4
51.6
50.2
50.2
50.1
50.1
29.0
31.1
29.8
30.0
32.6
31.0
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
50.4
51.0
50.6
51.5
51.8
48.5
53.4
52.1
48.4
56.5
50.4
30.9
32.2
31.6
32.0
32.9
32.5
41.7
32.3
29.4
31.5
31.6
Same source as Appendix II.2
Appendix III.1: Indices of Activity by Sector. Chile 1925-1950.
Index for data 1925-1940, 1925-1927 = 100.
Index for 1940-1950, 1940 = 100
a. Agriculture and cattle
b. Mining and/or Petroleum
c. Industry and/or Manufacturing
d. Construction
e. Government (for Chile, 1928 = 100)
f. Rest
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
a:
b:
c:
d:
e:
f:
98
100
101
123
120
124
99
101
106
99
94
135
151
107
73
40
106
99
95
99
108
102
83
84
81
99
120
116
207
160
71
91
---100
124
136
135
61
88
98
114
96
102
88
77
60
19
19
1933
125
50
94
120
55
1934
133
81
107
214
57
1935
117
92
120
229
75
1936
123
94
127
198
66
1937
122
130
133
238
59
1938
121
116
138
218
70
1939
131
113
141
277
77
1940
125
123
163
316
86
------------1940
100
100
100
100
100
1941
91
98
119
97
115
1942
99
87
130
97
115
1943
113
87
130
108
120
1944
102
86
136
137
122
1945
100
79
156
141
146
1946
117
82
152
203
144
1947
107
84
150
153
158
1948
128
103
173
143
149
1949
123
90
182
147
167
1950
120
91
180
145
217
Sources: Same as Appendix II, and Mamalakis, Historical Statistics of Chile, I, 151.
72
87
91
92
118
109
107
108
100
121
128
130
136
152
163
144
162
163
176
Appendix III.2: Indices of Activity by Sector. Mexico 1925-1950.
Index 1925-1927 = 100.
a. Agriculture and cattle
b. Mining and/or Petroleum
c. Industry and/or Manufacturing
d. Construction
e. Government (for Chile, 1928 = 100)
f. Rest
a:
b:
c:
d:
e:
f:
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
92
103
104
102
102
101
101
75
99
104
99
96
112
102
86
86
75
97
100
100
100
91
85
80
72
76
75
97
104
99
100
97
84
96
80
91
95
104
100
105
90
81
97
90
95
107
104
89
85
86
68
68
55
59
20
20
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
94
99
107
106
108
115
70
75
72
82
82
78
107
125
141
145
151
164
129
111
151
173
179
109
85
92
116
113
113
154
95
102
107
111
112
118
1940
109
75
174
133
1941
125
75
190
137
1942
135
79
205
146
1943
129
81
217
156
1944
136
75
234
188
1945
136
80
242
245
1946
141
74
265
292
1947
148
90
269
298
1948
164
91
286
289
1949
181
94
308
292
1950
195
106
345
344
Data for is table are derived from same sources as Appendix II.2
158
159
159
175
207
213
176
201
215
217
227
121
134
141
148
162
156
183
185
188
220
215
Appendix III.3: Additional Information on Sectoral Indices for Chile, 1940-1950
Mamalakis' Data on Sectors not on Appendix III
Chile:
f. rest from Appendix III
g. wholesale and retail trade
h. banking and real estate
i. ownership of dwellings
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
f.
g.
h.
i.
100
121
128
130
136
152
163
144
162
163
176
100
96
105
104
112
124
141
121
126
133
133
100
99
99
100
105
112
117
115
122
126
147
100
91
99
99
101
108
115
97
113
114
122
21
21
Data derived from Mamalakis, Historical Statistics of Chile, 145-146, 151.
22
22
Appendix III.4: Alternative Sectoral Indices for Chile, 1925-1950
Ballesteros and Davis Tables: 1925-27 = 100
Chile:
a. agriculture
b. mining
c. industry
d. government, 1928 = 100
e. GDP
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
1925
91
103
103
96
1926
101
97
98
99
1927
108
99
99
105
1928
128
136
95
100
130
1929
130
147
117
124
144
1930
133
107
117
136
128
1931
117
81
87
135
107
1932
115
45
99
61
78
1933
135
60
109
55
91
1934
142
93
119
57
110
1935
126
103
137
75
117
1936
133
102
140
73
118
1937
138
143
147
65
139
1938
143
129
133
77
133
1939
144
126
151
85
137
1940
140
134
167
85
144
1941
138
158
194
95
160
1942
141
159
202
103
159
1943
146
155
225
83
166
1944
159
154
232
98
171
1945
153
152
288
107
182
1946
154
133
243
129
166
1947
154
150
258
131
180
1948
165
161
283
145
200
1949
160
140
304
188
191
1950
159
137
322
178
196
Indices modified from table in Marto A. Ballesteros and Tom E. Davis, "The Growth of Output
and Employment in Basic Sectors of the Chilean Economy, 1980-1957," Economic Development
and Cultural Change, XI, 2, part 1 (Jan. 1963), 160-161.
23
23
Appendix III.5: Additional Information on Sectoral Indices for Mexico, 1925-1950
Mexico:
Index 1925-27 = 100
f. rest from Appendix III.2
g. commerce
f.
g.
1925
97
95
1926
104
106
1927
99
99
1928
100
100
1929
97
98
1930
84
93
1931
96
100
1932
80
79
1933
91
91
1934
95
89
1935
102
103
1936
107
106
1937
111
111
1938
112
111
1939
118
122
1940
121
124
1941
134
141
1942
141
147
1943
148
154
1944
162
171
1945
156
175
1946
183
239
1947
185
196
1948
188
191
1949
220
204
1950
215
225
Source, same as Appendix III.2.
Appendix IV.1: Raúl Prebisch Latin American Economic Indices. (Original used 1937 = 100; I
have changed this to 1925-1927 = 100, which tends to reduce the size of all index numbers.
Latin America:
a: Quantum of Exports
24
24
b: Quantum of Exports Per Capita
c: Quantum of Imports (not available)
d: Quantum of Imports Per Capita (not available)
e: Price Index of Exports
f: Price Index of Imports
g: Terms of Trade
h: Capacity to Import
i: Capacity to Import Per Capita
Year
a:
b:
c:
d:
e:
f:
g:
h:
i:
1925
93
95
107
104
102
95
97
1926
97
97
98
102
96
93
93
1927
109
107
95
93
102
111
109
1928
113
109
96
92
104
118
114
1929
120
113
92
91
97
116
111
1930
100
93
70
88
80
80
75
1931
108
99
48
74
65
71
65
1932
90
81
42
59
71
64
58
1933
93
83
45
62
73
68
60
1934
94
82
45
70
90
85
75
1935
103
89
61
71
85
87
75
1936
99
84
61
73
94
93
79
1937
110
92
78
78
101
110
92
1938
100
82
65
77
85
85
69
1939
107
85
64
77
83
88
70
1940
108
74
67
85
79
74
58
1941
103
79
73
91
80
82
63
1942
85
64
89
110
81
69
52
1943
98
72
98
120
81
80
58
1944
110
79
102
132
78
85
62
1945
115
81
105
130
81
93
66
1946
123
85
134
127
106
130
90
1947
127
87
171
149
115
146
100
1948
133
89
180
162
111
147
98
Data is from United Nations, the Secretariat of the Economic Commission for Latin America
[ECLA or, in Spanish, CEPAL], Economic Survey of Latin America 1949 (New York: United
Nations, Department of Economic Affairs, 1951), 17, 271-279, 408-409,413, 424-439.
25
25
Appendix IV.2: Prebisch data on Chile
a: Quantum of Exports
b: Quantum of Exports Per Capita
c: Quantum of Imports
d: Quantum of Imports Per Capita
e: Price Index of Exports
f: Price Index of Imports
g: Terms of Trade
h: Capacity to Import
i: Capacity to Import Per Capita
Year
a:
b:
c:
d:
e:
f:
g:
h:
i:
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
100
90
110
130
138
90
83
39
57
91
93
91
133
125
113
122
136
141
130
134
136
123
124
138
101
90
108
126
131
83
77
36
50
81
82
80
116
107
97
97
106
107
99
101
101
90
89
98
91
123
86
91
116
107
56
20
22
30
44
50
56
61
55
62
60
57
50
54
56
67
75
73
92
123
85
88
110
99
52
18
19
27
39
44
49
52
47
49
47
44
38
41
42
49
54
52
108
100
92
89
85
84
63
46
32
29
32
32
38
33
33
34
37
50
50
53
50
58
65
83
110
86
103
108
116
109
87
68
60
56
58
58
65
69
62
67
72
91
106
107
112
119
144
149
97
114
88
82
73
76
60
52
46
48
50
55
58
48
52
50
51
54
47
49
44
48
45
55
102
108
102
112
107
72
53
22
28
47
50
78
81
63
63
65
73
80
64
69
63
62
58
81
105
104
97
104
97
64
47
19
24
39
42
45
67
52
52
49
54
60
47
50
45
44
40
55
Appendix IV.3: Prebisch data on Mexico
a: Quantum of Exports
b: Quantum of Exports Per Capita
26
26
c: Quantum of Imports
d: Quantum of Imports Per Capita
e: Price Index of Exports
f: Price Index of Imports
g: Terms of Trade
h: Capacity to Import
i: Capacity to Import Per Capita
Year
a:
b:
c:
d:
e:
f:
g:
h:
i:
1925
97
99
109
110
94
96
98
95
96
1926
101
101
103
103
103
100
103
104
104
1927
102
101
89
87
103
104
99
101
65
1928
97
93
92
78
103
106
97
95
67
1929
97
93
98
93
98
108
91
88
84
1930
78
73
78
73
89
125
71
56
57
1931
82
76
52
48
63
111
56
46
35
1932
58
53
39
35
67
132
50
29
27
1933
61
55
46
41
76
144
52
32
32
1934
81
72
55
48
108
170
63
52
37
1935
88
77
61
53
129
176
74
65
41
1936
90
77
71
60
126
188
67
60
47
1937
96
80
89
74
140
198
71
68
57
1938
86
76
58
48
136
247
56
48
48
1939
82
66
69
55
164
260
63
51
43
1940
78
62
65
51
178
296
60
47
40
1941
80
61
96
73
143
281
51
41
57
1942
78
60
70
53
167
313
54
42
41
1943
82
60
82
59
204
310
66
54
46
1944
77
57
127
93
211
317
67
51
72
1945
84
57
147
100
230
326
71
59
77
1946
81
56
196
135
304
391
78
63
107
1947
90
58
201
129
362
461
79
71
100
1948
93
58
161
100
458
532
86
80
78
Sources: In addition to ECLA figures, the Mexican population data is from national census.
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