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DUFFY, THOMAS
AALS FACULTY ID PROGRAM
9393 SPRINGBORO PIKE
MIAMISBURG, OH 45324
Page 1
1 of 4 DOCUMENTS
UNITED STATES, Petitioner v. GEORGIA et al. TONY GOODMAN, Petitioner v.
GEORGIA et al.
(No. 04-1203), (No. 04-1236)
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
546 U.S. 151; 126 S. Ct. 877; 163 L. Ed. 2d 650; 2006 U.S. LEXIS 759; 74
U.S.L.W. 4042; 17 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) 673; 19 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 32
November 9, 2005, Argued
January 10, 2006 *, Decided
Together with No. 04-1236, Goodman v. Georgia et al., also on certiorari to the
same court.
NOTICE: [***1]
The LEXIS pagination of this document is subject to
change pending release of the final published version.
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: On remand at, Remanded
by Goodman v. Ray, 449 F.3d 1152, 2006 U.S. App.
LEXIS 12108 (11th Cir. Ga., May 17, 2006)
PRIOR HISTORY: ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT. Goodman v. Ray, 120
Fed. Appx. 785, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 27938 (2004)
DISPOSITION: Reversed and remanded.
CASE SUMMARY:
independently violated the provisions of U.S. Const.
amend. XIV, § 1, which incorporated the Eighth
Amendment's guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 5, included the
power to abrogate state sovereign immunity by authorizing private suits for damages against the states. Thus,
insofar as Title II of the ADA created a private cause of
action for damages against the states for conduct that
actually violated the Fourteenth Amendment, Title II of
the ADA validly abrogated state sovereign immunity.
The Eleventh Circuit erred in dismissing the inmate's
Title II of the ADA claims that were based on such unconstitutional conduct.
OUTCOME: The judgment of the Eleventh Circuit was
reversed, and the suit was remanded for further proceedings.
LexisNexis(R) Headnotes
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Petitioner disabled inmate sued respondents, a state and its department of corrections, alleging his confinement conditions violated
Title II of the Americans with Disability Act of 1990
(ADA), 42 U.S.C.S. § 12131 et seq. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed
summary judgment to respondents on Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. A writ of certiorari was
granted as to the abrogation of state sovereign immunity.
OVERVIEW: 42 U.S.C.S. § 12202 was an unequivocal expression of Congress's intent to abrogate state
sovereign immunity. The inmate's claims for money
damages against the state under Title II of the ADA were
evidently based, at least in large part, on conduct that
Civil Rights Law > Protection of Disabled Persons >
Americans With Disabilities Act > General Overview
[HN1] See 42 U.S.C.S. § 12132.
Civil Rights Law > Protection of Disabled Persons >
Americans With Disabilities Act > Remedies
Civil Rights Law > Protection of Disabled Persons >
Americans With Disabilities Act > Scope
Civil Rights Law > Protection of Disabled Persons >
Rehabilitation Act > Remedies
Page 2
546 U.S. 151; 126 S. Ct. 877, *;
163 L. Ed. 2d 650, **; 2006 U.S. LEXIS 759, ***
[HN2] A "qualified individual with a disability" under
Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,
42 U.S.C.S. § 12131 et seq., is defined as an individual
with a disability who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of
architectural, communication, or transportation barriers,
or the provision of auxiliary aids and services, meets the
essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity. 42 U.S.C.S. § 12131(2). The
Act defines "public entity" to include any state or local
government and any department, agency, or other instrumentality of a state. 42 U.S.C.S. § 12131(1). This
term includes state prisons. Title II of the Act authorizes
suits by private citizens for money damages against public entities that violate 42 U.S.C.S. § 12132. 42
U.S.C.S. § 12133 incorporates by reference 29 U.S.C.S.
§ 794a).
Civil Procedure > Federal & State Interrelationships >
Sovereign Immunity > State Immunity
Constitutional Law > State Autonomy > Abrogation of
Immunity
Civil Rights Law > Protection of Disabled Persons >
Americans With Disabilities Act > Scope
Civil Rights Law > Immunity From Liability > State
Consent & Waiver of Immunity
[HN3] In enacting the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990, Congress invoked the sweep of congressional authority, including the power to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment. 42 U.S.C.S. § 12101(b)(4).
Civil Procedure > Federal & State Interrelationships >
Sovereign Immunity > State Immunity
Constitutional Law > State Autonomy > Abrogation of
Immunity
Civil Rights Law > Protection of Disabled Persons >
Americans With Disabilities Act > Scope
Civil Rights Law > Immunity From Liability > State
Consent & Waiver of Immunity
[HN4] See 42 U.S.C.S. § 12202.
Civil Procedure > Federal & State Interrelationships >
Sovereign Immunity > State Immunity
Constitutional Law > State Autonomy > Abrogation of
Immunity
Civil Rights Law > Protection of Disabled Persons >
Americans With Disabilities Act > Scope
Civil Rights Law > Immunity From Liability > State
Consent & Waiver of Immunity
[HN5] Courts have accepted 42 U.S.C.S. § 12202 as an
unequivocal expression of Congress's intent to abrogate
state sovereign immunity.
Civil Rights Law > Protection of Disabled Persons >
Americans With Disabilities Act > Scope
Civil Rights Law > Prisoner Rights > General Overview
[HN6] Services, programs, or activities in 42 U.S.C.S. §
12132 includes recreational, medical, educational, and
vocational prison programs.
Constitutional Law > Bill of Rights > Fundamental
Rights > Criminal Process > Cruel & Unusual Punishment
Constitutional Law > Substantive Due Process > Scope
of Protection
Civil Rights Law > Prisoner Rights > General Overview
[HN7] The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment incorporates the Eighth Amendment's guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment.
Civil Procedure > Federal & State Interrelationships >
Sovereign Immunity > State Immunity
Constitutional Law > State Autonomy > Abrogation of
Immunity
Civil Rights Law > Protection of Disabled Persons >
Americans With Disabilities Act > Scope
Civil Rights Law > Immunity From Liability > State
Consent & Waiver of Immunity
[HN8] No one doubts that U.S. Const. amend. XIV, §
5, grants Congress the power to enforce the provisions of
the Fourteenth Amendment by creating private remedies
against the states for actual violations of those provisions. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 5, authorizes Congress to create a cause of action through which the citizen may vindicate his Fourteenth Amendment rights.
This enforcement power includes the power to abrogate
state sovereign immunity by authorizing private suits for
damages against the states. Thus, insofar as Title II of the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42
U.S.C.S. § 12131 et seq., creates a private cause of action for damages against the states for conduct that actually violates the Fourteenth Amendment, Title II of the
ADA validly abrogates state sovereign immunity.
DECISION: [**650]
With respect to Georgia prisoner's claims concerning
alleged conditions of confinement, Title II of Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C.S. § § 12131 et
seq.) held validly to have abrogated state sovereign immunity for conduct that actually violated Federal Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment.
Page 3
546 U.S. 151; 126 S. Ct. 877, *;
163 L. Ed. 2d 650, **; 2006 U.S. LEXIS 759, ***
SUMMARY:
Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990, as amended (ADA) (42 U.S.C.S. § § 12131 et
seq.), in 42 U.S.C.S. § 12133, authorized suits by private citizens for damages against public entities that violated 42 U.S.C.S. § 12132. The latter section provided
that a qualified individual with a disability would not, by
reason of such disability, be (1) excluded from participation in, or denied the benefits of, the services, programs,
or activities of a public entity; or (2) subjected to discrimination by any such entity. Also, the United States
Supreme Court had (1) held that the term "public entity"
included state prisons; and (2) accepted a statement in an
ADA provision (42 U.S.C.S. § 12202)--to the effect that
a state would not be immune, under the Federal Constitution's Eleventh Amendment, from suit--as an unequivocal expression of Congress' intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity.
A Georgia prisoner, who was paraplegic, filed
against the state, its department of corrections, and several individual prison officials a complaint in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia,
concerning alleged conditions of the prisoner's confinement. The prisoner (1) asserted claims under provisions
including 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 and Title II of the ADA;
(2) sought both injunctive relief and damages against all
defendants; and (3) included allegations to the effect that
prison officials had deliberately [**651] refused to
accommodate the prisoner's disability-related needs in
such matters as mobility, hygiene, medical care, and virtually all other prison programs. However, the District
Court, adopting a Magistrate Judge's recommendation,
dismissed the § 1983 claims against all defendants
without providing the prisoner an opportunity to amend
his complaint. The District Court also dismissed the
prisoner's Title II claims against all individual defendants. Later, the District Court granted (1) summary
judgment to the state defendants on the prisoner's Title II
claims for damages; and (2) expressed the view that
those claims were barred by state sovereign immunity
On appeal, the United States intervened to defend
the constitutionality of Title II's abrogation of state sovereign immunity. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit (1) determined that the District
Court had erred in dismissing all of the prisoner's §
1983 claims, as the Court of Appeals ruled that some of
the prisoner's filings had alleged facts sufficient to support a limited number of claims under the Constitution's
Eighth Amendment; and (2) ordered that the suit be remanded to the District Court to permit the prisoner to
amend his complaint; but (3) affirmed, on the basis of
Court of Appeals precedent, the District Court's holding
that the prisoner's Title II claims for damages against the
state were barred by sovereign immunity (judgment order reported at 120 Fed. Appx. 785).
On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. In an opinion by Scalia, J., expressing the
unanimous view of the court, it was held that:
(1) Title II validly abrogated state sovereign immunity, insofar as Title II created a private cause of action for
damages against the states for conduct that actually violated the Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment, for:
(a) Congress, in enacting the ADA, had invoked the
sweep of congressional authority, including the power to
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.
(b) On the assumption, without deciding, that the
prisoner in question had alleged actual violations of the
Eighth Amendment by state agents, the prisoner's Title II
claims were based, at least in large part, on conduct that
independently violated the provisions of § 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, where (i) the Supreme Court
had held that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process
clause incorporated the Eighth Amendment's guarantee
against cruel and unusual punishment; and (ii) the prisoner urged, and the state did not dispute, that this same
alleged conduct that violated the Eighth Amendment also
violated Title I.
(c) While members of the Supreme Court had disagreed regarding the scope of Congress' "prophylactic"
enforcement powers under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, no one doubted that § 5 granted Congress
the power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment's provisions by creating private remedies against the states for
actual violations of those provisions.
(2) The Court of Appeals had erred in dismissing
those of the prisoner's Title II claims that were based on
conduct that independently violated the provisions of §
1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
(3) Once the prisoner's complaint was amended on
remand, the lower courts would be best situated to determine in the first instance, on a claim-by-claim
[**652] basis, (a) which aspects of the state's alleged
conduct violated Title II; (b) to what extent such misconduct also violated the Fourteenth Amendment; and (c)
insofar as such misconduct violated Title II but did not
violate the Fourteenth Amendment, whether Congress'
purported abrogation of sovereign immunity as to that
class of conduct was nevertheless valid.
Stevens, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., concurring, expressed the view that (1) the Supreme Court's opinion--rather than attempting to define the outer limits of
Title II's valid abrogation of state sovereign immunity on
the basis of the existing record--wisely permitted the
parties to create a factual record that would inform such
Page 4
546 U.S. 151; 126 S. Ct. 877, *;
163 L. Ed. 2d 650, **; 2006 U.S. LEXIS 759, ***
a decision; and (2) although the prisoner's Eighth
Amendment claims provided a sufficient basis for reversal, the Supreme Court's opinion did not suggest that this
was the only constitutional right applicable in the prison
context and therefore relevant to the abrogation issue.
LAWYERS' EDITION HEADNOTES:
[**LEdHN1]
CIVIL RIGHTS § 3
STATES, TERRITORIES, AND POSSESSIONS § 90
-- prison conditions -- Americans with Disabilities Act
-- abrogation of sovereign immunity
Headnote: [1A] [1B] [1C] [1D]
For purposes of determining whether a state prisoner, who was paraplegic, could properly sue the state for
damages under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, as amended (ADA) (42 U.S.C.S. § §
12131 et seq.), concerning alleged conditions of the
prisoner's confinement, Title II validly abrogated state
sovereign immunity, insofar as Title II created a private
cause of action for damages against the states for conduct
that actually violated the Federal Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment, for:
(1) In 42 U.S.C.S. § 12133, Title II authorized suits
by private citizens for damages against public entities
that violated 42 U.S.C.S. § 12132.
(2) The United States Supreme Court had held that
the term "public entity" included state prisons.
(3) Congress, in enacting the ADA, had (in 42
U.S.C.S. § 12101(b)(4)) invoked the sweep of congressional authority, including the power to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment.
(4) The Supreme Court had accepted a statement in
an ADA provision (42 U.S.C.S. § 12202)--to the effect
that a state would not be immune, under the Constitution's Eleventh Amendment, from suit--as an unequivocal
expression of Congress' intent to abrogate state sovereign
immunity.
(5) On the assumption, without deciding, that the
prisoner in question had alleged actual violations of the
Constitution's Eighth Amendment by state agents, the
prisoner's Title II claims were based, at least in large
part, on conduct that independently violated the provisions of § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, where (a)
the Supreme Court had held that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause incorporated the Eighth
Amendment's guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment; (b) the prisoner urged, and the state did not
dispute, that this same alleged conduct that violated the
Eighth Amendment also violated Title II; and (c) it was
plausible that § 12132 [**653] covered the alleged
deliberate refusal of prison officials to accommodate the
prisoner's disability-related needs in such fundamentals
as mobility, hygiene, medical care, and virtually all other
prison programs.
(6) While members of the Supreme Court had disagreed regarding the scope of Congress' "prophylactic"
enforcement powers under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, no one doubted that § 5 granted Congress
the power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment's provisions by creating private remedies against the states for
actual violations of those provisions.
(7) This enforcement power included the power to
abrogate state sovereign immunity by authorizing private
suits for damages against the states.
[**LEdHN2]
APPEAL § 1206
-- erroneous dismissal -- damages claims
Headnote: [2A] [2B] [2C]
With respect to claims by a state prisoner, who was
paraplegic, against the state for damages under Title II of
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, as amended
(42 U.S.C.S. § § 12131 et seq.), concerning alleged
conditions of the prisoner's confinement--given the
United States Supreme Court's holding that Title II validly abrogated state sovereign immunity, insofar as Title
II created a private cause of action for damages against
the states for conduct that actually violated the Federal
Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment--a Federal Court
of Appeals erred in dismissing those of the prisoner's
Title II claims that were based on conduct that independently violated the provisions of § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
[**LEdHN3]
APPEAL § 1752
-- remand -- amendment of complaint -- determinations
Headnote: [3A] [3B] [3C] [3D]
With respect to claims by a state prisoner, who was
paraplegic, against the state for damages under Title II of
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, as amended
(42 U.S.C.S. § § 12131 et seq.), concerning alleged
conditions of the prisoner's confinement--given the
United States Supreme Court's holding, in reversing and
remanding on certiorari, that the Federal Court of Appeals below had erred in dismissing those of the prisoner's Title II claims that were based on conduct that independently violated the provisions of § 1 of the Federal
Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment--where the Court
of Appeals also had ordered that the suit be remanded to
a Federal District Court to permit the prisoner to amend
his complaint, then, once the prisoner's complaint was
amended, the lower courts would be best situated to de-
Page 5
546 U.S. 151; 126 S. Ct. 877, *;
163 L. Ed. 2d 650, **; 2006 U.S. LEXIS 759, ***
termine in the first instance, on a claim-by-claim basis,
(1) which aspects of the state's alleged conduct violated
Title II; (2) to what extent such misconduct also violated
the Fourteenth Amendment; and (3) insofar as such misconduct violated Title II but did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, whether Congress' purported abrogation of sovereign immunity as to that class of conduct
was nevertheless valid.
[**LEdHN4]
APPEAL § 1293
-- assumption -- allegations by prisoner
Headnote: [4]
On certiorari to review a Federal Court of Appeals'
judgment as to whether a state prisoner, who was paraplegic, could properly sue the state for damages under
Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,
as amended (42 U.S.C.S. § § 12131 et seq.), concerning
alleged conditions of the prisoner's confinement, the
United States Supreme Court assumed, without deciding,
[**654] that the prisoner had alleged actual violations
of the Federal Constitution's Eighth Amendment by state
agents, where:
(1) The Court of Appeals had so held when discussing other claims by the prisoner under 42 U.S.C.S. §
1983.
(2) The state did not contest this holding.
(3) The Supreme Court had not granted certiorari to
consider the merits of the prisoner's Eighth Amendment
claims. [**655]
SYLLABUS:
Goodman, petitioner in No. 04-1236, is a paraplegic
who sued respondent state defendants and others, challenging the conditions of his confinement in a Georgia
prison under, inter alia, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title II of
the Americans with Disability Act of 1990. As relevant
here, the Federal District Court dismissed the § 1983
claims because Goodman's allegations were vague, and
granted respondents summary judgment on the Title II
money damages claims because they were barred by
state sovereign immunity. The United States, petitioner
in No. 04-1203, intervened on appeal. The Eleventh
[***2] Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgment as
to the Title II claims, but reversed the § 1983 ruling,
finding that Goodman had alleged facts sufficient to
support a limited number of Eighth Amendment claims
against state agents and should be permitted to amend his
complaint. This Court granted certiorari to decide the
validity of Title II's abrogation of state sovereign immunity.
Held:
Insofar as Title II creates a private cause of action
for damages against States for conduct that actually violates the Fourteenth Amendment, Title II validly abrogates state sovereign immunity.
(a) Because this Court assumes that the Eleventh
Circuit correctly held that Goodman had alleged actual
Eighth Amendment violations for purposes of § 1983,
and because respondents do not dispute Goodman's claim
that this same conduct violated Title II, Goodman's Title
II money damages claims were evidently based, at least
in part, on conduct that independently violated § 1 of
the Fourteenth Amendment. No one doubts that § 5
grants Congress the power to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment's provisions by creating private remedies
against the States for actual violations of those [***3]
provisions. This includes the power to abrogate state
sovereign immunity by authorizing private suits for
damages against the States. Thus, the Eleventh Circuit
erred in dismissing those of Goodman's claims based on
conduct that violated the Fourteenth Amendment.
(b) Once Goodman's complaint is amended, the
lower courts will be best situated to determine in the first
instance, on a claim-by-claim basis, (1) which aspects of
the State's [**656] alleged conduct violated Title II;
(2) to what extent such misconduct also violated the
Fourteenth Amendment; and (3) insofar as such conduct
violated Title II but did not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment, whether Congress's purported abrogation of
sovereign immunity in such contexts is nevertheless valid.
120 Fed. Appx. 785, reversed and remanded.
COUNSEL:
Paul D. Clement argued the cause for petitioner in
No. 04-1203.
Samuel R. Bagenstos argued the cause for petitioner in No. 04-1236.
Gregory A. Castanias argued the cause for respondents.
Gene C. Schaerr argued the cause for Tennessee, et
al., as amici curiae, by special leave of court.
JUDGES: Scalia, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Stevens, J., filed a concurring opinion, in
which Ginsburg, J., joined.
OPINION BY: SCALIA
OPINION: [*878] Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court.
Page 6
546 U.S. 151; 126 S. Ct. 877, *;
163 L. Ed. 2d 650, **; 2006 U.S. LEXIS 759, ***
[**LEdHR1A]
[1A]
[**LEdHR2A]
[2A]
[**LEdHR3A] [3A] We consider whether a disabled
inmate in a state prison may sue the State for money
damages under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 104 Stat. 337, as [***4]
amended, 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq. (2000 ed. and
Supp. II).
I
A
[**LEdHR1B] [1B] Title II of the ADA provides
that [HN1] "no qualified individual with a disability
shall, [*879] by reason of such disability, be excluded
from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be
subjected to discrimination by any such entity." §
12132 (2000 ed.). [HN2] A "'qualified individual with a
disability'" is defined as "an individual with a disability
who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules,
policies, or practices, the removal of architectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or the provision of
auxiliary aids and services, meets the essential eligibility
requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity." § 12131(2). The Act defines "'public entity'" to
include "any State or local government" and "any department, agency, . . . or other instrumentality of a State,"
§ 12131(1). We have previously held that this term
includes state prisons. See Pennsylvania Dep't of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 210, 118 S. Ct. 1952,
141 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1998). Title II authorizes [***5]
suits by private citizens for money damages against public entities that violate § 12132. See 42 U.S.C. §
12133 (incorporating by reference 29 U.S.C. § 794a).
[HN3] In enacting the ADA, Congress "invoke[d]
the sweep of congressional authority, including the power to enforce the fourteenth amendment . . . ." 42 U.S.C.
§ 12101(b)(4). Moreover, the Act provides that [HN4]
"[a] State shall not be immune under the eleventh
amendment to the Constitution of the United States from
an action in [a] Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction for a violation of this chapter." § 12202. We
[HN5] have accepted this latter statement as an unequivocal expression of Congress's intent to abrogate state
sovereign immunity. See Board of Trustees of Univ. of
Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363-364, 121 S. Ct. 955,
148 L. Ed. 2d 866 (2001).
B
Petitioner in No. 04-1236, Tony Goodman, is a paraplegic inmate in the Georgia prison system who, at all
[**657] relevant times, was housed at the Georgia State
Prison in Reidsville. After filing numerous administrative grievances in the state prison system, Goodman filed
a pro se complaint in the United States District [***6]
Court for the Southern District of Georgia challenging
the conditions of his confinement. He named as defendants the State of Georgia and the Georgia Department of
Corrections (state defendants) and several individual
prison officials. He brought claims under Rev. Stat. §
1979, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Title II of the ADA, and other
provisions not relevant here, seeking both injunctive relief and money damages against all defendants.
Goodman's pro se complaint and subsequent filings
in the District Court included many allegations, both
grave and trivial, regarding the conditions of his confinement in the Reidsville prison. Among his more serious allegations, he claimed that he was confined for
23-to-24 hours per day in a 12-by-3-foot cell in which he
could not turn his wheelchair around. He alleged that
the lack of accessible facilities rendered him unable to
use the toilet and shower without assistance, which was
often denied. On multiple occasions, he asserted, he had
injured himself in attempting to transfer from his wheelchair to the shower or toilet on his own, and, on several
other occasions, he had been forced to sit in his own feces and urine while prison [***7] officials refused to
assist him in cleaning up the waste. He also claimed
that he had been denied physical therapy and medical
treatment, and denied access to virtually all prison programs and services on account of his disability.
The District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge's
recommendation that the allegations [*880] in the complaint were vague and constituted insufficient notice
pleading as to Goodman's § 1983 claims. It therefore
dismissed the § 1983 claims against all defendants
without providing Goodman an opportunity to amend his
complaint. The District Court also dismissed his Title II
claims against all individual defendants. Later, after our
decision in Garrett, the District Court granted summary
judgment to the state defendants on Goodman's Title II
claims for money damages, holding that those claims
were barred by state sovereign immunity.
Goodman appealed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. The United States,
petitioner in No. 04-1203, intervened to defend the constitutionality of Title II's abrogation of state sovereign
immunity. The Eleventh Circuit determined that the District Court had erred in dismissing all of Goodman's §
1983 claims, [***8] because Goodman's multiple pro
se filings in the District Court alleged facts sufficient to
support "a limited number of Eighth-Amendment claims
under § 1983" against certain individual defendants.
App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 04-1236, p 17a, judgt. order
reported at 120 Fed. Appx. 785 (2004). The Court of
Appeals held that the District Court should have given
Goodman leave to amend his complaint to develop three
Page 7
546 U.S. 151; 126 S. Ct. 877, *;
163 L. Ed. 2d 650, **; 2006 U.S. LEXIS 759, ***
Eighth Amendment claims relating to his conditions of
confinement:
"First, Goodman alleges that he is not
able to move his wheelchair in his cell.
If Goodman is to be believed, this effectively amounts to some form of total restraint twenty-three to twenty-four
hours-a-day [**658] without penal justification. Second, Goodman has alleged
several instances in which he was forced
to sit in his own bodily waste because
prison officials refused to provide assistance. Third, Goodman has alleged sufficient conduct to proceed with a § 1983
claim based on the prison staff's supposed
'deliberate indifference' to his serious
medical condition of being partially paraplegic . . . ." App. to Pet. for Cert. in No.
04-1236, pp 18a-19a (citation and footnote omitted). [***9]
The Court remanded the suit to the District Court to
permit Goodman to amend his complaint, while cautioning Goodman not to reassert all the § 1983 claims included in his initial complaint, "some of which [we]re
obviously frivolous." Id., at 18a.
The Eleventh Circuit did not address the sufficiency
of Goodman's allegations under Title II. Instead, relying
on its prior decision in Miller v. King, 384 F.3d 1248
(2004), the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's
holding that Goodman's Title II claims for money damages against the State were barred by sovereign immunity. We granted certiorari to consider whether Title II of
the ADA validly abrogates state sovereign immunity
with respect to the claims at issue here. 544 U.S. 1031,
125 S. Ct. 2256, 161 L. Ed. 2d 1057 (2005).
II
[**LEdHR1C]
[1C]
[**LEdHR2B]
[2B]
[**LEdHR3B] [3B] [**LEdHR4] [4] In reversing
the dismissal of Goodman's § 1983 claims, the Eleventh
Circuit held that Goodman had alleged actual violations
of the Eighth Amendment by state agents on the grounds
set forth above. See App. to Pet. for Cert. in No.
04-1236, pp 18a-19a. The State does not contest this
holding, see Brief for Respondents 41-44, and we did not
grant certiorari to consider the merits of Goodman's
Eighth Amendment [***10] claims; we assume without
deciding, therefore, that the Eleventh Circuit's treatment
of these claims was correct. Moreover, Goodman urges,
and the State does not dispute, that this same conduct
that violated the Eighth Amendment also [*881] violated Title II of the ADA. See Brief for Petitioner in No.
04-1236, p 46; Brief for Respondents 41-44. In fact, it
is quite plausible that the alleged deliberate refusal of
prison officials to accommodate Goodman's disability-related needs in such fundamentals as mobility, hygiene, medical care, and virtually all other prison programs constituted "exclu[sion] from participation in or . .
. den[ial of] the benefits of" the prison's "services, programs, or activities." 42 U.S.C. § 12132; see also Yeskey, 524 U.S., at 210, 118 S. Ct. 1952, 141 L. Ed. 2d 215
(noting that the phrase [HN6] "services, programs, or
activities" in § 12132 includes recreational, medical,
educational, and vocational prison programs). Therefore, Goodman's claims for money damages against the
State under Title II were evidently based, at least in large
part, on conduct that independently violated the provisions of § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463, 67
S. Ct. 374, 91 L. Ed. 422 (1947) [***11] [HN7] (the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Eighth Amendment's guarantee against
cruel and unusual punishment). In this respect, Goodman differs from the claimants in our other cases addressing Congress's ability to abrogate sovereign immunity pursuant to [**659] its § 5 powers. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 543, n. 4, 124 S. Ct. 1978,
158 L. Ed. 2d 820 (2004) (Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting)
(respondents were not actually denied constitutional
rights); Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S.
721, 752, 755, 123 S. Ct. 1972, 155 L. Ed. 2d 953 (2003)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (Nevada provided family leave
"on a gender-neutral basis"--"a practice which no one
contends suffers from a constitutional infirmity"); Garrett, 531 U.S., at 362, 367-368, 121 S. Ct. 955, 148 L.
Ed. 2d 866 (failure to make the special accommodations
requested by disabled respondents was not unconstitutional); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62,
69-70, 83-84, 120 S. Ct. 631, 145 L. Ed. 2d 522 (2000)
(most petitioners raised nonconstitutional disparate-impact challenges to the State's age-related policies);
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 643-644, 119 S. Ct.
2199, 144 L. Ed. 2d 575, and n. 9 (1999) [***12]
(Florida satisfied due process by providing remedies for
patent infringement by state actors); City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 512, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 138 L. Ed. 2d
624 (1997) (church building permit denied under neutral
law of general applicability).
[**LEdHR1D]
[1D]
[**LEdHR2C]
[2C]
[**LEdHR3C] [3C] While the Members of this Court
have disagreed regarding the scope of Congress's
"prophylactic" enforcement powers under § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, see, e.g., Lane, 541 U.S., at
513, 124 S. Ct. 1978, 158 L. Ed. 2d 820 (majority opinion of Stevens, J.); id., at 538, 124 S. Ct. 1978, 158 L.
Ed. 2d 820 (Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting); id., at 554,
124 S. Ct. 1978, 158 L. Ed. 2d 820 (Scalia, J., dissenting), [HN8] no one doubts that § 5 grants Congress the
Page 8
546 U.S. 151; 126 S. Ct. 877, *;
163 L. Ed. 2d 650, **; 2006 U.S. LEXIS 759, ***
power to "enforce . . . the provisions" of the Amendment
by creating private remedies against the States for actual
violations of those provisions. "Section 5 authorizes
Congress to create a cause of action through which the
citizen may vindicate his Fourteenth Amendment rights."
Id., at 559-560, 124 S. Ct. 1978, 158 L. Ed. 2d 820
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing the Ku Klux Klan Act of
April 20, 1871, 17 Stat. 13); see also Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456, 96 S. Ct. 2666, 49 L. Ed. 2d
614 (1976) ("In [§ 5] Congress is expressly granted
authority to enforce . . [***13] . the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment" by providing actions for money damages against the States (emphasis
added)); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346, 25 L. Ed.
676 (1880) ("The prohibitions of the Fourteenth
Amendment are directed to the States . . . . It is these
which Congress is empowered to enforce . . ."). This
enforcement [*882] power includes the power to abrogate state sovereign immunity by authorizing private
suits for damages against the States. See Fitzpatrick,
supra, at 456, 96 S. Ct. 2666, 49 L. Ed. 2d 614. Thus,
insofar as Title II creates a private cause of action for
damages against the States for conduct that actually violates the Fourteenth Amendment, Title II validly abrogates state sovereign immunity. The Eleventh Circuit
erred in dismissing those of Goodman's Title II claims
that were based on such unconstitutional conduct.
[**LEdHR3D] [3D] From the many allegations in
Goodman's pro se complaint and his subsequent filings
in the District Court, it is not clear precisely what conduct he intended to allege in support of his Title II
claims. Because [**660] the Eleventh Circuit did not
address the issue, it is likewise unclear to what extent the
conduct underlying Goodman's [***14] constitutional
claims also violated Title II. Moreover, the Eleventh
Circuit ordered that the suit be remanded to the District
Court to permit Goodman to amend his complaint, but
instructed him to revise his factual allegations to exclude
his "frivolous" claims--some of which are quite far afield
from actual constitutional violations (under either the
Eighth Amendment or some other constitutional provision), or even from Title II violations. See, e.g., App.
50 (demanding a "steam table" for Goodman's housing
unit).
It is therefore unclear whether Goodman's
amended complaint will assert Title II claims premised
on conduct that does not independently violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Once Goodman's complaint is
amended, the lower courts will be best situated to determine in the first instance, on a claim-by-claim basis, (1)
which aspects of the State's alleged conduct violated Title II; (2) to what extent such misconduct also violated
the Fourteenth Amendment; and (3) insofar as such misconduct violated Title II but did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, whether Congress's purported abro-
gation of sovereign immunity as to that class of conduct
is nevertheless valid.
* * [***15] *
The judgment of the Eleventh Circuit is reversed,
and the suit is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
CONCUR BY: STEVENS
CONCUR: Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Ginsburg joins, concurring.
The Court holds that Title II of the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 validly abrogates state sovereign
immunity at least insofar as it creates a private cause of
action for damages against States for conduct that violates the Constitution. Ante, at ____, 163 L. Ed. 2d, at
659-660, 126 S. Ct. 877. And the state defendants have
correctly chosen not to challenge the Eleventh Circuit's
holding that Title II is constitutional insofar as it authorizes prospective injunctive relief against the State. See
Brief for Respondents 6; see also Miller v. King, 384
F.3d 1248, 1264 (CA11 2004). Rather than attempting
to define the outer limits of Title II's valid abrogation of
state sovereign immunity on the basis of the present record, the Court's opinion wisely permits the parties, guided by Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 124 S. Ct. 1978,
158 L. Ed. 2d 820 (2004), to create a factual record that
will inform that decision. * I therefore join the opinion.
* Such definition is necessary because Title
II prohibits "'a somewhat broader swath of conduct'" than the Constitution itself forbids. Lane,
541 U.S., at 533, n. 24, 124 S. Ct. 1978, 158 L.
Ed. 2d 820 (quoting Kimel v. Florida Bd. of
Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81, 120 S. Ct. 631, 145 L.
Ed. 2d 522 (2000)). While a factual record may
not be absolutely necessary to our resolution of
the question, it will surely aid our understanding
of issues such as how, in practice, Title II's "reasonableness" requirement applies in the prison
context, cf. Lane, 541 U.S., at 531-532, 124 S.
Ct. 1978, 158 L. Ed. 2d 820 (explaining that Title
II requires only "'reasonable modifications'"), and
therefore whether certain of Goodman's claims
are even covered by Title II, cf. App. 83 (complaining of lack of access to, among other things,
"television, phone calls, [and] entertainment").
[***16]
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546 U.S. 151; 126 S. Ct. 877, *;
163 L. Ed. 2d 650, **; 2006 U.S. LEXIS 759, ***
[*883] It is important to emphasize that although
petitioner Goodman's [**661] Eighth Amendment
claims provide a sufficient basis for reversal, our opinion
does not suggest that this is the only constitutional right
applicable in the prison context and therefore relevant to
the abrogation issue. As we explain, when the District
Court and the Court of Appeals revisit that issue, they
should analyze Goodman's claims to see whether they
state "actual constitutional violations (under either the
Eighth Amendment or some other constitutional provision)," ante, at ____, 163 L. Ed. 2d, at 660, 126 S. Ct.
877 (emphasis added), and to evaluate whether "Congress's purported abrogation of sovereign immunity in
such contexts is nevertheless valid," ante, at ____, 163
L. Ed. 2d, at 660, 126 S. Ct. 877. This approach mirrors
that taken in Lane, which identified a constellation of
"basic constitutional guarantees" that Title II seeks to
enforce and ultimately evaluated whether Title II was an
appropriate response to the "class of cases" at hand.
541 U.S., at 522-523, 531, 124 S. Ct. 1978, 158 L. Ed. 2d
820. The Court's focus on Goodman's Eighth Amendment claims arises simply from the fact that those are the
only constitutional violations the Eleventh Circuit found
him to have alleged properly. See App. [***17] to
Pet. for Cert. in No. 04-1236, pp 18a-19a.
in his brief arguing that Title II's damage remedy constitutes appropriate prophylactic legislation in the prison
context, the record of mistreatment of prison inmates that
Congress reviewed in its deliberations preceding the enactment of Title II was comparable in all relevant respects to the record that we recently held sufficient to
uphold the application of that title to the entire class of
cases implicating the fundamental right of access to the
courts. See [*884] Lane, 541 U.S., at 533-534, 124
S. Ct. 1978, 158 L. Ed. [**662] 2d 820. And while it
is true that cases involving inadequate medical care and
inhumane conditions of confinement have perhaps been
most numerous, courts have also reviewed myriad other
types of claims by disabled prisoners, such as allegations
[***19] of the abridgment of religious liberties, undue
censorship, interference with access to the judicial process, and procedural due process violations. See, e.g.,
Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 100 S. Ct. 1254, 63 L. Ed.
2d 552 (1980) (procedural due process); May v. Sheahan, 226 F.3d 876 (CA7 2000) (access to judicial process, lawyers, legal materials, and reading materials);
Littlefield v. Deland, 641 F.2d 729 (CA10 1981) (access
to reading and writing materials); Nolley v. County of
Erie, 776 F. Supp. 715 (WDNY 1991) (access to law library and religious services).
Moreover, our approach today is fully consistent
with our recognition that the history of mistreatment
leading to Congress' decision to extend Title II's protections to prison inmates was not limited to violations of
the Eighth Amendment. See Lane, 541 U.S., at
524-525, 124 S. Ct. 1978, 158 L. Ed. 2d 820 (describing
"backdrop of pervasive unequal treatment" leading to
enactment of Title II); see also, e.g., Board of Trustees
of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 391-424, 121 S.
Ct. 955, 148 L. Ed. 2d 866 (2001) (Appendixes to opinion of Breyer, J., dissenting) (listing submissions made to
Congress by the Task Force on the Rights and Empowerment of Americans with Disabilities showing, for example, that prisoners with developmental disabilities
were subject to longer terms of imprisonment than other
prisoners); 2 House Committee on Education and Labor,
Legislative History of Public Law 101-336: The Americans with Disabilities Act, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., p 1331
(Comm. Print 1990) (stating that persons with hearing
impairments "have been arrested and held in jail over
night without ever knowing their rights nor what they are
being held for"); id., at 1005 (stating [***18] that police
arrested a man with AIDS and "[i]nstead of putting the
man in jail, the officers locked him inside his car to
spend the night"); California Dept. of Justice, Attorney
General's Commission on Disability: Final Report 103
(Dec. 1989) (finding that inmates with disabilities were
unnecessarily "confined to medical units where access to
work, job training, recreation and rehabilitation programs
is limited"). In fact, as the Solicitor General points out
Indeed, given the constellation of rights applicable
in the prison context, it is clear that the Eleventh Circuit
has erred in identifying only the Eighth Amendment right
to be free from cruel and unusual punishment in performing the first step of the "congruence and proportionality" inquiry set forth in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521
U.S. 507, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 138 L. Ed. 2d 624 (1997).
See Miller, 384 F.3d at 1272, and n. 28 (declining to
entertain United States' argument that Lane requires consideration of constitutional rights beyond those provided
by the Eighth Amendment); [***20] App. to Pet. for
Cert. in No. 04-1236, p 19a (relying on Miller to find
Goodman's Title II claims for money damages barred by
the Eleventh Amendment). By reversing the Eleventh
Circuit's decision in this case and remanding for further
proceedings, we not only provide the parties an opportunity to create a more substantial factual record, but also
provide the District Court and the Court of Appeals the
opportunity to apply the Boerne framework properly.
Given these benefits, I agree with the Court's decision to
await further proceedings before trying to define the extent to which Title II validly abrogates state sovereign
immunity in the prison context.
REFERENCES:
Go To Full Text Opinion
Go To Supreme Court Brief(s)
Go To Supreme Court Brief(s)
Page 10
546 U.S. 151; 126 S. Ct. 877, *;
163 L. Ed. 2d 650, **; 2006 U.S. LEXIS 759, ***
Go To Supreme Court Transcripts
60 Am Jur 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions §
§ 23-28, 186, 193 [***21] ; 72 Am Jur 2d, States,
Territories, and Dependencies § § 97-101; Am Jur 2d
New Topic Service, Americans with Disabilities Act:
Analysis and Implications § 308
U.S.C.S., Constitution, Amendments 8, 11, 14; 42
U.S.C.S. § § 12131 et seq.
L Ed Digest, Civil Rights § 3; States, Territories,
and Possessions § 90
L Ed Index, Americans with Disabilities Act; Prisons and Prisoners; Sovereign Immunity
Annotation References
Supreme Court's views concerning § 5 of Federal
Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment, authorizing Congress to enforce Fourteenth Amendment's provisions.
146 L. Ed. 2d 1035.
Congressional abrogation of states' immunity, under
or as reflected in Federal Constitution's Eleventh
Amendment, from suits in federal court--Supreme Court
cases. 144 L. Ed. 2d 869 [***22] .
Conditions of confinement as constituting cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of Federal Constitution's Eighth Amendment--Supreme Court cases. 115 L
Ed 2d 1151.
Supreme Court's construction of Civil Rights Act of
1871 (42 U.S.C.S. § 1983) providing private right of
action for violation of federal rights. 43 L. Ed. 2d 833.
Federal constitutional guaranty against cruel and
unusual punishment--Supreme Court cases. 33 L. Ed.
2d 932.
Comment Note.--What provisions of the Federal
Constitution's Bill of Rights are applicable to the states.
18 L. Ed. 2d 1388, 23 L. Ed. 2d 985.
Rights of prisoners under Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act. 163 A.L.R. Fed. 285.
126HG0
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