21st Century Battlefield Dominance
Remarks of Paul G. Kaminski, undersecretary of defense for acquisition and technology, to the American
Defense Preparedness Association and Association of the U. S. Army Symposium, Redstone Arsenal,
Huntsville, Ala., Jan. 16, 1996.
Ladies and gentlemen, it's a great pleasure to be with you here at Redstone Arsenal this evening.
Redstone and the U.S. Army Missile Command have a rich tradition of providing our country with the
winning edge. America will continue to rely on your innovation, skills and expertise to field land combat,
air defense and aviation missile systems that are second to none.
From a missile defense planning perspective, this is a very important time for all of us. When I leave
Washington for a visit like this, I find that I benefit enormously from my interaction with all of you, so I plan
to leave time for questions and answers. This type of interaction is important to me.
Last December, Gil Decker [assistant secretary of the Army for research, development and acquisition]
and I had the wonderful opportunity to be hosted by Maj. Gen. Jack Costello [commander, U.S. Army Air
Defense Artillery Center and Fort Bliss, Texas] .... While we were there, we met with the soldiers
operating our currently fielded air and missile defense systems like the Patriot, Avenger and the
supporting Battlefield Management Command Control, Communications, Computer and Intelligence.
We also met with the soldiers preparing for and supporting equipment under development, systems like
the THAAD [Theater High-Altitude Air Defense] and JTAGS [Joint Tactical Ground Station]. It was a very
rewarding experience for me to see the equipment, to gain an understanding of how it is employed, but
most of all to see our very capable soldiers, who are exploiting this equipment to its full potential. How
blessed we are as a nation to attract and retain such able people in our armed forces!
As I visited MICOM [U.S. Army Missile Command] today -- for the first time ever -- I was left with a similar
impression -- how blessed we are as a nation to attract and retain the technical and management talent
that I met today.
My experience at Fort Bliss and this afternoon at Redstone [U.S. Army Redstone Technical Test Center]
is sobering for me, causing me to take very seriously the responsibilities I have in helping to chart a
course for the future of our missile defense programs. I have been involved in a total review of our missile
defense programs for a few months now. We are now putting the finishing touches on that review as we
prepare the FY [fiscal year] 1997 budget. Since that budget has not yet been finalized, I am not prepared
to discuss the final results of the review tonight. Instead, I am prepared to share with you my thoughts on
the objectives, approach and principles underlying this review.
First, our objective was to seek a balance between what I would describe as the external and internal
components of our missile defense capability. For the external, we were trying to balance our investment
in other priority programs, such as trucks, ships and fighter aircraft, with our BMD [ballistic missile
defense] programs. The Joint Staff felt that we were spending too much at $3 billion per year on BMD.
Some believed that we should have a target ceiling of $2.5 billion or maybe even as low as $2 billion per
year. We considered these targets during our review, but we were not driven by them.
For the internal balancing, we had three levels upon which we focused. The first level would be the pillars,
which are active defense, passive defense, attack operations (which includes some of our external
capabilities) and BMC4I.
As we dropped to the second level, we focused on the capabilities and systems which comprise active
defense. They consist of the lower-tier systems, the upper-tier systems, boost phase intercept and the
enabling BMC4I. As we dropped down one more level we took a more detailed look at specific missions
and the capability required to address those missions.
Our approach was to consider first the requirements and their priority while also reviewing the underlying
acquisition strategy. To assist us in this task, we considered several elements such as:
Maturity -- We need to consider and account for the difference between well-defined systems and "view
graph engineering." During our review, we considered the fact that the more mature the system or
capability, the more apparent would be the known limitations. A more mature system would also have
more reliable cost data.
Executability -- Is this program executable? What are the risks, and are they prudent risks considering
the maturity and the urgency of the need?
Critical Mass -- At what funding levels do we go below a critical mass, with output so low that we are
better off to make a termination decision?
Stability -- How can we plan to obtain long-term stability in the program, to include consideration of
external influences which could effect its execution?
Competitive Forces -- How to make use of dissimilar as well as head-to-head competitive approaches for
similar missions. This caused us to add the business strategy as an important consideration.
As the conduct of our review progressed, the importance of BMC4I grew. That importance has been
reinforced by my visit here today. This is what I want to focus on in the remainder of my remarks tonight.
During the Cold War, our intelligence systems were cued to a relatively stable, predictable set of targets
for exploitation. An example was obtaining intelligence on weapons systems being developed by our
adversaries. Our national intelligence systems were not well-integrated with our combat forces. Today,
we must cope with a more dynamic environment in which there is an expanded range of ambiguous,
unpredictable threats.
To counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, increase the effectiveness of attack
operations against enemy ballistic missile launchers and facilitate an improved cruise missile defense,
our battle management and intelligence systems need to be considerably more robust and timely in
collecting multisource and continuous surveillance data as well as storing, processing, disseminating and
managing much larger quantities of information.
The coming decades promise a quantum shift in the evolution of armed conflict. Our forces are being
designed to achieve dominant battlefield awareness and combat superiority through the deployment of
fully integrated intelligence systems and technologically superior weapons systems.
Dominant battlefield awareness is critical, but it is not the whole story. It is a necessary condition, but not
a sufficient condition to prevail on the 21st century battlefield. What one really needs is something I call
dominant battle cycle time. This is the ability to turn inside an adversary, to act before the adversary can
act.
A more stressing objective is to be able to act before the adversary's battlefield awareness system can
see you act. In addition to possessing a dominant battlefield awareness capability, achieving a dominant
battle cycle time capability means one also must possess rapid planning tools, strong command and
control systems, and superior mobility.
As I envision the future, I see at least 10 enabling technologies and architectural concepts that are
needed to build dominant battlefield cycle times. Many of these BMC4I technologies and concepts are
being deployed to better support our troops in Bosnia.
The first key technology is to continue to build on advances in processing. Here a key issue will be the
ability to do more on-board processing as well as to increase our capability to do off-board processing.
The general trend we have seen since the 1970s as a result of increasing the number of gates per chip
by decreasing the minimum feature size of a chip device has been about a ten-thousandfold
improvement in capability while cost has been held nearly constant.
These advances in processing are proceeding at a rate described by Moore's Law [computer
microprocessor capability will double every 18 months]. ... We project that we will have another
thousandfold improvement over the next 15 years at the rate of advance predicted by Moore's Law.
I would wish to make two points here. One is that there is an enormous amount of improvement ahead
for us to make great strides in both on-board and off-board processing, and they are strides that will be
needed to digest all the data collected.
Second, we do see an end to the linear relationship predicted by Moore's Law. It is 10 or 15 years out.
That end was seen 20 or 25 years ago, and nothing has changed our forecast of it. At that time, we will
be getting down to device sizes in which we are dealing with geometries that incorporate only a few
hundred silicon atoms.
So we will need to invent some new approach which may exploit different physical principles to make
smaller devices and continue making processing advances. This is an area in which we will need some
partnership involving government, universities and industry. As I said, it is still 10 to 15 years ahead, but it
is something that in five years or so we will probably have to be researching in a more systematic way.
The next key technology area will employ advanced processing and has to do with the field of automatic
target recognition and other productivity enhancement tools for our image analysts. The ATR [automatic
target recognition] problem has been reported to be "solved" at least twice before in this decade. Not so.
As we deal with the problem of sensory overload, we will have to do more and more automatically. We
are investing on the order of $100 million per year in this area, but it is an area which can be better
focused.
ATR will be key for providing the cueing for the sequential collection approach I will describe later. While
there is much to be done to help us extract information from data, I note that this audience is as
experienced as any, having dealt for years with the problem of extracting useful information from air
defense radars. As we become saturated with more and more data, this will be one of the most critical
pillars in the building blocks that I have been describing. The third, a key architectural concept, has to do
with indexing all collected information to common grids.
The idea is to be able to access all the data that we have collected and to have a built-in indexing system.
One natural way to index is based upon the location where the information is collected, and we can do
that with a three-dimensional position tag and also with a precise time tag.
A common grid, in combination with a distributed and open architecture, gives us the ability later to go
back and fuse information that was collected at previous times or to look at correlations of events. This
kind of index is essential to the development of very large, dynamic databases that we will be able to use
to retrieve and correlate information.
A common grid would also give us the flexibility to do coherent processing after the fact. A grid that has a
fine position and timing capability -- positions on the order of feet, timing on the order of nanoseconds -would support after-the-fact processing using multiple sensor systems, to include those in space, on
manned or unmanned aerial vehicles, on ships or on the ground.
The fourth key concept has to do with the creation of distributed and open architectures. You may think of
this as "plug and play," in which a variety of collection systems can play together in a compatible way. A
good example is our Joint Airborne SIGINT [signal intelligence] Architecture, or JASA. We want an
architecture that can accommodate our large and small satellite collectors, unmanned aerial vehicles,
unattended ground sensors and one which can accommodate and deal with HUMINT [human
intelligence] and other intelligence sources. The sensor architecture has to be able to accommodate
commercial collection systems and processing and do so in a distributed and open manner.
The idea here is the informed, sequential tasking of our intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
collection resources. You can think of this concept in terms of selecting the right spectral frequencies
over the right area and resolution and doing this over the right period of time.
We are now planning to make tenfold improvements in multispectral sampling, through combinations of
radar, infrared and electro-optical wavelengths, while at the same time making a tenfold increase in the
area of resolution of collection systems and then on top of this, making a tenfold improvement in the
continuity of coverage, moving towards around-the-clock day-and-night coverage under all weather
conditions.
The problem is that if we make all these improvements simultaneously, we are looking at a
ten-times-ten-times-ten, or thousandfold increases in the data to be analyzed and processed for the user.
That is probably not something we can deal with. Neither could we probably afford the full combination of
collection systems.
So the idea is not to apply all the improvements simultaneously. The concept is to be able to operate
sequentially, to do some sampling with technologies that may in a sensible way pick the appropriate path
in the appropriate spectral frequency band over the area of interest at the proper resolution and at the
right time interval to produce information that can be suitably digested and acted upon. ...
Digital processing techniques, such as data compression, will be used to limit transmission bandwidth or
to provide on-line storage of data when we have limited storage.
Recently I visited CNN [Cable Network News], who is putting online their first digital video storage system,
and one of the keys is the compression technique they are using to minimize the storage required to have
large video data bases on line. Data compression will be key to storing and transporting large data
bases.
The extent to which we are able to store the data collected and to put the data into systematic indexed
data bases, indexed in the way I was describing earlier based upon position, time and other key features,
will be the key to our ability to fuse data and intelligently query these large data bases.
In the past, when our forces deployed, there were a number of critical items, such as food and
ammunition, on the critical deployment list. In the future, data bases will be on this critical deployment list.
We must put much energy into deciding what data bases to deploy with our forces as they move forward
so they do not have to reach back to the CONUS [continental United States] unnecessarily. This will
require theater data bases of 10 to 100 or perhaps even 1,000 terabits.
We need the ability to leverage off of commercial developments, and there is also some very
high-leverage work required here to develop something that I would describe as a mediator to be able to
deal with the various disparate data bases that will be out there -- commercial, open and otherwise.
Here again, the commercial market is leading the way. Improvements in data storage are also following
the Moore's Law curve that I discussed earlier, and so we have about a thousand-fold improvement yet to
go here as well.
The problem that we in the Department of Defense and the intelligence community face is that our total
storage requirements are on the order of 1015 [10 quadrillion] bits -- larger than the Library of Congress.
We have recently developed a new commercial digital video standard high-end device that stores about
six gigabits per disk.
The problem is how to use that kind of a storage system. Given our requirements, we would need about a
million digital video disks. That is quite a large jukebox to put together. But if we consider a theater data
base of 10 to 100 terabits as I described earlier, a few thousand disks can do the job and we can put such
a juke box together.
The ninth technology area of interest is improved data dissemination. Here we are seeing great strides
with global broadcast systems that can give us hundredfold kinds of improvements in the bandwidth that
we can transmit to our forces. What is being developed commercially today is a static direct broadcast TV
system where the receiver locations are known and the programming is fixed.
For DoD and intelligence use, we will need a more dynamic system that can deal with users who are
moving in the field whose location isn't known a priori. Rather than fixed programs, we also need to allow
them to be able to interactively change their channel programming.
On the ground, we will need to make better use of the tremendous bandwidth already available through
fiber optic transmission media. Wave division multiplexing is one area we are just beginning to exploit.
Earlier, I mentioned that many of these 10 enabling technologies were being used to enhance operations
in Bosnia. Nowhere is this more evident than in the measures we're taking to improve the
communications infrastructure to our forces across Europe and the Bosnia area of operations. We are
doing this in two ways: first, using commercial TV satellite technology to provide a direct broadcast
communications capability; and secondly, by fielding a wide bandwidth, secure tactical internet through
commercial business satellite transponders to allow for distributed collaborative planning among
deployed C2 [command and control] nodes.
What this means to our forces is that everyone with the proper receive antenna, cryptologic equipment
and authentication will have access to the same data as everyone else at the same time, reducing the
latency in timeliness of information to the lowest levels. But more importantly, the fielding of this capability
will allow us to install and utilize, for this operation, some of the more advanced C4I capabilities being
developed by the government and industry today for use in the Global Command and Control System.
This leads me to the 10th enabling technology. Planning, analysis and training tools are needed to
provide us with the ability to move through the data bases I described so that we can fuse the collected
data to produce useful information and decide who needs that information and disseminate it to the right
place.
We will also be able to use these tools to improve our sensor planning. They will help us decide the best
path ahead to employ each particular collector system in an organized and responsive way.
We also need a set of tools to assist us in deciding what actions we want to take on the battlefield -- tools
that provide us the information to take decisive action and operate within the timelines of our adversaries.
To summarize, I believe we will soon complete a review of BMD that will provide for the air and missile
defense systems needed to protect our forces -- whether it be forces on the move or local and wide-area
defense of key staging areas and lodgments. Our task is to put in place the system of systems for
achieving dominant battle cycle times.
Along these lines, I feel that upgrades to BMC4I capabilities are a priority. I strongly support initiatives
like the Army's Tactical Operations Center, designed to contribute to command and control in attack
operations as well as all other aspects of missile defense engagement.
We have seen equally encouraging field demonstrations of the Navy's Cooperative Engagement
Capability, which has been deployed in TMD [theater missile defense] exercises with the [aircraft carrier
USS] Eisenhower battle group off the Atlantic coast and in the Mediterranean over the course of the past
12 months as part of the JTF-95 [joint task force] exercise activity.
We must bring machine processing into this game. While the relevant technologies, including image
understanding, ATR, pattern recognition, cannot support fully automated processing today, they can do a
great deal to increase the productivity of our analysts, perhaps by factors of 100 to 1,000.
Once exploited, we need to move the information (not necessarily the data) to those who need it.
Generally, there is inadequate understanding of who needs what information and what form it is best
presented.
Data bases are key to sensor processing and achieving dominant battlefield cycle time. The data bases
will be tens-to-hundreds of terabits for a theater and the data streams will be tens of gigabits/second. The
real time data streams must interact with the data bases. We have a lot to learn in the management of the
data and the data bases to achieve that kind of interaction.
The future effectiveness of our BMC4I architecture will depend upon how well we link all air, land, sea
and space assets into a common, shared view of the battle space. We are a team, and you are the key
players. I offer my personal support and commitment to you as we work together to achieve dominant
action cycle times on the battlefield.
Thank you all.
Building a Ready Force for the 21st Century
Prepared remarks of Paul G. Kaminski, undersecretary of defense for acquisition and technology, to the
Huntsville (Ala.) Chamber of Commerce, Jan. 17, 1996.
Ladies and gentlemen, it's a great pleasure to be with you this morning. ...
The people and leaders of Huntsville can be proud of those plans made by many of you in this room to
build the economy of this region -- you are not just surviving the defense downsizing, you are bouncing
back to actively map out your future.
America will continue to count on Huntsville for its critical contributions to the world's best missile defense
systems and technology. Today, I would like to share some of my views on where I think we're headed in
technology development and acquisition reform in the Department of Defense.
As I look broadly at the external environment that impacts our national security, I note that so many
things have changed -- not just in the past 20 years, but in the past year or two.
I have been in my job a little over one year now, and one of the moments that I want to share with you -one that helps in understanding the fundamental change in our relationships -- was a trip that I made with
Secretary of Defense Bill Perry to four of the former Soviet republics -- Russia, Ukraine, Kazakstan and
Uzbekistan.
We visited an SS-19 silo near the city of Pervomaysk in the Ukraine. I think I had seen that silo before,
but from a different orientation. On that day, an SS-19 missile, one previously targeted against six cities
in the United States, was being withdrawn from the silo and decommissioned.
On the same trip, we toured Russia's Engels Air Force Base and saw former Soviet Bear bombers being
dismantled using American equipment provided through the Nunn-Lugar program.
The use of Nunn-Lugar funds to support weapons dismantlement and defense conversion in the
republics of the former Soviet Union is part of our Cooperative Threat Reduction program -- it represents
a fundamental shift in our approach to security relationships and is a good investment in our national
security.
In the post-Cold War world, the United States no longer faces a single galvanizing threat such as the
former Soviet Union. Instead, there is increased likelihood of our forces being committed to limited
regional military actions -- coalition operations -- which allies are important partners.
This situation can be summed up in statistical terms. I'll risk sharing this statistical description with you
this early in my talk because you are an educated audience and George Bernard Shaw once observed
that: "One of the distinguishing marks of an educated person is one who can be emotionally moved by
statistics."
I would sum up our current national security environment in statistical terms by saying that the mean
value of our single greatest threat is considerably reduced. But the irony of the situation is that the
variance of the collective threat that we deal with, plan for and must counter is up.
This gives us some pause in trying to plan intelligently.
In response to reduced mean value of the threat, the United States has cut end strength by about a third
from 1985 levels. But at the same time, the increase in variance has caused deployments of U.S. forces
to go up by a third.
During this adjustment phase, we have brought the total defense budget down while maintaining the high
state of readiness needed to support increased operational tempos. We have done this by reducing our
procurement at a pace that is twice the rate of the overall downturn in total obligation authority. This
response is consistent with historical norms. Procurement has traditionally been the most volatile
component of the budget in a drawdown because it is not necessary to purchase new equipment for a
smaller force structure.
But this approach also defers long-term modernization and future readiness. I view this as a temporary
condition as we complete our drawdown, which is just about over. Our current level of investment -- it
was a little over $39 billion in procurement and $34 billion in RDT&E [research, development, test and
evaluation] in the president's FY [fiscal year] 96 budget request -- will not sustain the Bottom-up Review
force over the long term. The drawdown is nearly complete with the FY 96 budget, and so from FY 97 on,
we will have to increase our spending to sustain modernization of the force.
However, our investment outlays -- what industry actually receives -- lags budget authority by two to
three years due to our full-funding policy. The implication is that industry is still working off of dollars
appropriated for FY 93 and will need to deal with a further contraction on the order of 20 percent over the
next three years.
But now that the drawdown is nearly over, our modernization reprieve from aging is nearly over, too. So
next year, we have to start a ramp-up in modernization. That is absolutely critical to the readiness of the
forces -- not this year or next year, but the readiness of our forces by the end of the century.
By the year 2000, we plan for a modernization account to go up to $67 billion in current dollars -- almost
twice what it was in the fiscal '96 budget submitted to Congress. And this modernization plan will focus on
building a ready, flexible, responsive force for the changing security environment in which we live.
That means we will continue to maintain technological supremacy on the battlefield, especially by seizing
on breathtaking advances in information technology: advanced semiconductors, computers, software
and communication systems. We will maintain strong emphasis on missile defense and put greater
emphasis on fast transportation and mobility: airlift, sealift, groundlift and trucks.
Our future years modernization plan reflects these priorities. But I must be candid with you. We are
making three critical assumptions about where we will get the money to make this work. And the first of
these assumptions is that we will receive significant savings by closing bases.
As I said earlier, the DoD budget and force structure are both down about a third from their peak levels in
1985. Guess what? Our infrastructure is only down by 18 percent. It is the reason why the Base
Realignment and Closure '95 program is so important. The program we have laid out through BRAC '95
will reduce the infrastructure by an additional 11 percent over the next few years. It is important to bring
this infrastructure into balance with our smaller force structure. The savings produced are needed to plow
back into our investment program.
Unfortunately, there is a bad news-good news story here. The bad news piece is that it takes money to
save money. When we close down facilities, we actually end up spending money in the near term.
Typically, it takes between two to three years to break even before there is a net savings in this process.
We are still experiencing no net outflow due to the previous BRAC rounds. In the fiscal 99 budget, we will
be saving about $6 billion a year that will be available to plow back into our investment accounts. But we
have to succeed in our plans for closing bases.
Right now, integrated organizational planning teams from the Army's Aviation and Troop Command and
the Army Missile Command are working to prepare for the move and realignment of the aviation
management functions of ATCOM, the Army program executive officer for aviation and the Logistics
Systems Support Center from St. Louis to the Redstone Arsenal, here in Huntsville. If we hold to current
schedules, I would expect movement of some logistics support center functions beginning next summer
with all ATCOM, PEO Aviation and LSSC moves complete by the end of 1997.
The second big assumption in our defense planning is that we will get significant savings by overhauling
our defense acquisition system. The idea here is to be more efficient in what we buy, how we buy it and
how we oversee that buying process.
As I look at the defense acquisition system in detail, what I find is that the system is not broken -- it fields
equipment that is second to none in the world. What I find is that the system can and must operate more
efficiently.
We're implementing the provisions of the 1994 Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act to increase the
department's access to commercial products. We've now completed just about one full year of
implementation. The act contains multiple provisions that establish a preference for commercial items
while exempting those items from government-unique contracting and accounting requirements. In the
past, these requirements served as disincentives for commercial companies to participate in DoD
procurements.
Although the new federal acquisition streamlining regulations will help the department use commercial
procurement procedures, we are beginning to understand that the principal problems are not statutory or
regulatory. We are finding that there is considerable freedom in our acquisition statutes and regulations.
The issue is really cultural. To make a cultural change, we need the appropriate incentives to adjust the
behavior of our acquisition work force.
In fact, the whole situation reminds me of a Mark Twain story about a cat on a hot stove. Mark Twain
describes, "The cat, having once sat upon a hot stove lid, will not sit upon a hot stove lid again. The
problem is that neither will that cat sit on a cold stove lid." That is the problem we have overall in our
acquisition system. We have become so risk-averse that we end up spending billions to make sure we do
not lose millions.
We have set up a structure that discourages risk taking -- it settles for very, very conservative
performance at all levels. We are moving now to try to adjust that culture. The first change we made was
to stop required use of military specifications -- those reams of documents that spelled out in meticulous
detail how contractors must design and produce a system of supplies and services. It was safe to specify
conformance to military specifications and standards.
Instead, we are going to be using commercial and performance standards which call for the highest
quality standards available in the commercial market or if there is no commercial standard, describe how
we want our equipment to perform and then challenge the supplier to meet that performance standard.
We have effectively turned our procurement system on its head. A program manager in the past had to
get a waiver in order to use commercial and performance standards. Now the reverse is true. If a
program manager wants to use military specifications, then he has to get a waiver in order to justify the
extra cost entailed in military specifications.
At the current time, we are implementing a block changes policy to use best commercial practices
throughout a contractor's facility. It makes no sense to use best commercial practices on new contracts
and maintain a separate set of procedures for existing DoD contracts. We are seeking to use the same
inspection procedures on military production lines that are used for commercial lines -- for example,
changing from the MIL-Q-9858A quality control standard in favor of standards like ISO [International
Standards Organization] 9000, used by companies worldwide.
We are looking at our own internal acquisition processes within the department. We are beginning to
achieve real success in implementing a bold, new, re-engineered oversight and review process that will
better serve our warfighters and conserve public funds.
DoD Directive 5000.1 and DoD Instruction 5000.2 are now being revised to define an acquisition
environment that makes DoD a smarter, more responsive buyer of the best goods and services that meet
our warfighters' needs at the best dollar value over the life of the product.
The rewrite will take us from a very detailed, centralized management approach that was widely
perceived as inflexible and overly bureaucratic, to a set of more flexible policies and procedures that
emphasize the use of professional judgment and common sense to streamline the acquisition process.
The major themes in the new 5000 series documents are:

Teamwork among program managers, and OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] and
service staffs;


Tailoring acquisition process and procedures to fit individual programs;
Empowerment of managers and staff to reach agreements at lowest possible levels;

Cost as an independent variable to ensure lower-cost systems to meet mission needs and
life-cycle cost goals;

Commercial products utilized when possible to reduce cost and time to field; and

Best practices modeled on sound commercial/business experience.
To make a cultural change, we are putting the appropriate incentives in place to adjust the behavior of
our acquisition work force.
On May 10, 1995, Secretary Perry signed a letter directing the use of integrated product and process
development and integrated product teams in DoD acquisition.
The intent of the department's IPPD-IPT initiative is to replace after-the-fact oversight with early and
continuous insight. The goal is to institutionalize a management approach that encourages partnership
by stakeholders vs. sequential, adversarial relationships between and among organizations. We want to
build in quality rather than inspect in quality.
I would like to see service and OSD staffs discover problems and help develop solutions early rather than
find and report on problems at the DAB [Defense Acquisition Board]. I expect to reduce government
decision cycle times using IPPD and IPT commercial practices.
Earlier, I spoke of some visible progress in acquisition reform. I've been keeping book on the acquisition
process at my level. For example, the cycle time for acquisition decision memorandums -- it averaged 23
days in 1994 -- it was 2.5 days in 1995. Seventeen of 23 scheduled DAB reviews in 1995 were not held -they were not needed because there were no issues as a result of our new Overarching Integrated
Product Team process.
On the Space-Based Infrared program, we shortened the DAB preparation cycle from six to two months
and supporting documentation for the DAB went from [more than] 1,000 pages to 47 pages.
The story is the same on the Joint Direct Attack Munition program -- a joint Air Force/Navy program to
develop an affordable, accurate, all-weather guidance kit for 1,000- and 2,000-pound bombs in inventory.
In fact, JDAM is probably one of the first programs to benefit from the full combination of our year-long
implementation of FASA acquisition reform initiatives. The first JDAM RFP -- request for proposal -- was
issued in August of 1993 and required 87 military specifications and standards to be enforced. As we
enter engineering and manufacturing development today, the number of milspecs and standards
required to build the system is zero. In August 1993, the number of pages in our statement of work was
137; the number of pages today is two.
I credit the combination of our acquisition reform initiatives and a very able, aggressive program manager
with reducing the unit price estimate from $40,000 at the 40,000th unit to $18,000 at the first unit -- a
savings of $1.5 billion.
These savings are predictions; they will not be validated until we enter production. But they provide a
quantitative indication of the range of savings that can be achieved. This is a good news story. I predict it
will end up to be a good news story even if we do not achieve all of our aggressive objectives.
The third big assumption in our defense planning is that the defense budget modernization line will stop
declining and begin to go back up. This will depend ultimately on actions taken by Congresses three and
four years from now.
When I think of the future investment budget, I'm reminded of the Peanuts cartoon in which Charlie
Brown is getting ready to kick a field goal and just down field, Lucy is kneeling on a hash mark
representing the year 2001.
The football she is holding represents a procurement budget that we are counting on to grow by nearly 50
percent to pay for much-needed modernization programs across the department. Despite having been
burned so many times before, Charlie Brown wants to believe the football will be there when he tries to
kick it.
I am not confident that the projected increases we are counting on will be there in 2001. ... It compares
the difference in budget authority set by the congressional budget resolution with that of the president's
budget. As you can see, there is an unsustainable ramp in the near term -- and in the long term, Lucy
could be planning to pull the football!
It is a sobering state of affairs. But my concern here is not directed only at the Congress. The DoD must
continue to reduce infrastructure and to execute our plans to achieve greater efficiency if we are to
prevent Lucy from pulling the football away.
Our success in fielding superior systems will depend upon our success in reducing excess infrastructure,
implementing lasting acquisition reforms and maintaining sustainable increases in our modernization
accounts.
We are in the process of making the most revolutionary change in the defense acquisition system in the
past 50 years. The true measure of our success in reforming our buying practices will be acceptance in
the field -- not policy pronouncements in Washington.
For this reason, it is important to "bubble up" the best ideas from the field -- that means closing the
feedback loop -- in government and with industry.
I sincerely hope that you will not be shy in raising your concerns. ...
The time is ripe to go forth and leave a legacy, a foundation, for those that will follow -- for U.S. forces in
2010.
Thank you all.
DoD Single Process Initiative
Keynote address of Paul G. Kaminski, undersecretary of defense for acquisition and technology, to the
Lockheed-Martin Common Processes Conference, Arlington, Va., Jan. 18, 1996.
Ladies and gentlemen, it's a great pleasure to be with you here this morning. The government and
Lockheed-Martin representatives present in the audience today are clearly demonstrating your
commitment to the department's single process initiative. Thank you for your proactive approach.
From an acquisition reform perspective, this is a very important time for all of us. When I attend a meeting
like this, I find that I benefit enormously from my interaction with all of you, so I plan to leave time for
questions and answers. This type of interaction is important to me.
When it comes to meaningful procurement reform, it has been my sense that it is easy to talk about why,
harder to talk about how and even harder to do.
In June of 1994, DoD took a major step towards implementing real reform by authorizing the use of
commercial specifications and standards. But those changes, as important as they were, effectively
applied to new contracts only. We have now taken the next major step toward reforming DoD purchasing
practices. Last month, I approved guidance implementing a single process initiative to reduce the number
of government-imposed processes on existing contracts.
This initiative addresses a very real problem. Its implementation requires a streamlined approach so that
we can get it done quickly and so that we can begin to benefit from the savings and the cost avoidance
associated, sooner rather than later.
I launched this initiative with the idea of achieving four basic objectives. The first one -- quick
implementation -- for the reasons I've just stated.
No. 2, it's my intention to obtain consideration when there are one-sided savings in the process. For most
contracts that we have in place, there will be bilateral cost avoidance. That is, the savings will be passed
directly to the government and in the end, to the taxpayer. This occurs on cost-reimbursable contracts
and cases where we have priced options that can be renegotiated.
In the case of longer-term fixed-price contracts, there is a possibility of what I would describe as unilateral
cost avoidance. savings would be realized by the contractor, but the contract's fixed-price structure has
no mechanism to automatically pass along these savings to the government. In these unilateral cases,
we would seek consideration -- either nonmonetary or as adjustments to the contract prices.
Thirdly, I wish to minimize the cost of implementation. We could go through a very cumbersome
procedure to implement this change. I have asked this be done on a[n] expedited basis. We will not
spend months having detailed cost proposals prepared, audited and negotiated unless the initial review
by an administrative contracting officer indicates that the possibility exists for substantial unilateral
savings after the contractor transition costs and the government administration costs are considered. We
expect the number of these unilateral savings cases to be few.
Fourthly, we want to protect the interests of the principal stakeholders in this process -- the individual
program managers who may be affected and the individual program teams who are operating in a given
facility.
We will be using an integrated product team approach to make a block change for modifying the
specifications and the standards for all existing contracts on a facilitywide basis rather than on a
contract-by-contract basis. Here, really, the issue is you can't make a contract-by-contract change for a
facility that has many contracts. You have to try to go through a set of common processes across the
whole facility.
Our goal here is to consolidate or eliminate multiple management and/or multiple manufacturing
processes when they're not needed. These multiple processes add unnecessary costs to the goods and
the services that are purchased by the department.
Let me give you my frame of reference here. About a year back, we commissioned a study conducted by
Coopers and Lybrand [accounting firm]. They looked to see what were the added costs of
government-unique requirements -- imposed by the DoD on our major contractors -- costs above what
would be imposed by normal commercial practice.
I would cite for you a couple of examples that they found. They looked, for example, at one military
standard -- our MilQ [military quality standard] Q 9858A. As many of you may know, it's a particularly
intrusive quality standard used by the DoD. They found that the contribution of that standard caused a
cost premium of doing business with the DoD. That premium was about 1.7 percent of the cost of items
purchased by the department in the facilities that they serviced. So that's a pretty significant number if
you look at the overall cost, say, on a procurement budget of about $40 billion per year.
They also looked at material management and accounting systems imposed by the government and
found this, too, to be a major contributor to cost, adding about six-tenths of a percent to the department's
cost. In one facility, for example, we found that the same parts were being stocked in 15 different
locations because of multiple contracts, each with their own requirements. This, obviously, drives up the
stockage levels of parts required, adds to obsolescence and also deterioration problems, and it creates
inefficiencies that we would like to avoid.
Another example of the sort of problem that we're trying to fix is the imposition of government-unique
soldering specifications. In just one factory, a defense contractor was forced to use eight different
soldering specifications -- five for the government and three for commercial clients purchasing similar
types of products. This meant the workers had to be trained on all eight soldering and inspection
techniques. It also meant that the contractor had to maintain eight different types of production
documentation. This cost him more. In turn, he passed those costs on to us. That's fair, but it is
expensive. It's expensive for us and the taxpayer.
It's very difficult to streamline manufacturing processes across a facility in this kind of overregulated
environment. If we can consolidate to one or two major specifications, manufacturing personnel can
become more efficient, the inspection requirements and the paperwork can be reduced, and we can,
where possible, leverage off the commercial process.
What I've tried to illustrate here is how this may play out over time. There's going to be a period of
transition... in which there will be costs of transitioning to a new process base. On the other hand, I've
seen situations where there are easy savings to be reaped.
We don't know enough today to predict whether in the short term there's going to be a net savings of a
small cost. Whatever is going to happen in the short term, it is probably going to be small because we've
already identified much of the low-hanging fruit. But there are some places where the savings will be less,
and there will be some cost during a transition period.
I would expect this to play out in a year or a year and a half or so,[ehj1] where we now start to cross the
line and get out of the red and into the black, where there's a net cost avoidance to the department. The
focal point for this activity will be the administrative contracting officer assigned to the Defense Contract
Management Command ... [who] is located in the contractor's facility. They will follow a process that will
include the streamlined review and the adoption of contractors' proposals to proceed with this initiative
across the whole facility.
This doesn't mean that the customers, the program managers and the buying activities won't be involved.
Our local DCMC [Defense Contract Management Command]activities will use management councils, to
include the involved program managers and other customers, as well as our Defense Contract Audit
Agency, to review contractor proposals related to elimination or consolidation of these requirements.
Only when there is agreement on the extent of the change will the administrative contracting officer
execute the block changes to the contracts for that facility.
But we intend for this to be a streamlined approach. We will not spend months having detailed cost
proposals prepared, audited and negotiated unless the initial review by an administrative contracting
officer indicates that the possibility exists of substantial unilateral savings after the contractor transition
costs and the government administration costs are considered. As I said earlier, we expect the number of
these unilateral savings cases to be minimal, so we don't want to overburden the system to deal with
them where it isn't required.
In summary, the longer it takes us to implement this, the longer we will bear the cost of inefficiency on
these separate processes. So in my opinion, we want to move very quickly to get on with it and to see if
we can't begin to reach closure here in this year or year and a half timeframe that I've targeted.
Second, we want to take prudent measures to ensure significant unilateral cost savings do not occur.
Third, we want to minimize the cost of implementation.
And fourth, we want to protect the interests of the principal stakeholders.
I believe the department has put tangible procurement reform into play with this single process initiative.
Together, DoD and industry can now step up and do something real for the American taxpayer.
We are a team, and you are the key players. I offer my personal support and commitment to you as we
work together to implement this important initiative.
Thank you all.
Ten Things I Never Imagined Doing Five Years
Ago
Remarks by Secretary of Defense William J. Perry at the Business Week Forum, followed by questions
and answers, Washington, D.C., Jan. 18, 1996.
How appropriate it is to speak to a forum on change by way of advanced interactive satellite technology.
Indeed, thanks to modern telecommunications, I do not have to come to Palm Springs this January -- I'm
able to stay in Washington with the snow and the ice and the fog. This is one case where technology
makes life easier, but not necessarily better.
The question before this forum is whether America can really change. I can tell you that when it comes to
protecting our national security interests, America not only can change, it has changed, and has changed
dramatically.
We face challenges and opportunities we never could have imagined five years ago. These challenges
require us to pursue new and creative approaches to the way we protect our nation and advance our
interests.
To illustrate just how much our security world has changed, and our security strategies, I want to share
with you a list of 10 unique events that have occurred over the past year. I call this the list of 10 things
that I never imagined an American secretary of defense would do. Let me start off with the least important
and work my way up.
No. 10. I never imagined that I would cut off the ear of a pig in Kazakstan or listen to an Uzbeki colonel
sing a Frank Sinatra song or eat rendered Manchurian toad fat in China. All of these incidents which
happened in the last year tend to illustrate how different today the job of secretary of defense is from any
of my predecessors. All of my predecessors, when they traveled, would visit our conventional allies -- the
British, the French, the Germans, the Japanese, Koreans and perhaps a few others.
Last year, I visited 40 different countries. Many of them had not even existed 10 years ago. This year, the
first week of this year already, I have visited eight different countries -- Italy, Bosnia, Hungary, Ukraine,
Oman, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Israel, just to reflect the diversity and the scope of the interests today of
the secretary of defense.
The opportunity today to forge new security relationships with these nations is there, and the challenge is
to try to build these new relationships where none ever existed before.
No. 9. I never imagined that I would host the defense leaders from 33 democratic nations in the Western
hemisphere at a conference to discuss mutual security problems.
First of all, I never thought there would be 33 democratic nations in the hemisphere; and a few years ago
it would have been unthinkable that our hemispheric colleagues would be interested in such discussions
with their imperialist neighbor to the north. But now that democracy, peace and market reform are
ascendant in our neighborhood, we have an opportunity to promote regional trust, cooperation and
security, and we seized that opportunity last summer at Williamsburg, Va., when I hosted the 33 defense
leaders of these nations at the first Defense Ministerial of the Americas. By the way, the Argentine
defense minister picked up on this, and this year he will be hosting the second such meeting.
No. 8. I never imagined that I would actually dismantle the system of military spec[ification]s, and yet we
are now in the process of doing that.
A few years ago if a defense program manager wanted to use a commercial or industrial specification,
he'd have to get a waiver. Today, if he wants to use a defense specification, a milspec, he has to get a
waiver. The whole system has been turned on its head so that we're forcing compliance with industrial
and business specifications because we want to make a much greater use of the technology, the
components, the parts that exist in the U.S. commercial sector today.
No. 7. I never imagined that as secretary of defense I would be worrying about day care, but I am. It's
turned out to be a critical part of quality of life for our military forces, and I've come to believe that
enhancing the quality of life is a key to maintaining the high readiness of our forces.
Therefore, I have focused our energy and resources not only to building up readiness, but specifically to
taking every action that I can take as secretary to improve the quality of life for our military personnel.
Because of the enormous amount we invest in our training, a key, then, is that we are able to retain them.
The key to retaining our military personnel today is maintaining a reasonable and an adequate quality of
life.
No. 6. I never imagined that I would be running a school to teach Soviet military officers about democracy,
budgeting and testifying to a parliament, and yet that's exactly what we do at the Marshall Center in
Garmisch [Germany] and have been doing it the last two years. Every six months a new class -- 60 to 70
officers from the former Warsaw Pact countries -- convene there to learn about those subjects.
I have met with each of these classes, spoken to them, met with them in small groups. This is the most
successful experiment we have today in actually introducing the emerging military leaders in these
countries to the practices of a democracy.
No. 5. I never imagined that I would be in Louisiana, welcoming troops from the Warsaw Pact. But there
they were -- Albanians, Bulgarians, Czechs, Hungarians, Poles, Rumanians -- 14 nations in all. Each of
them had sent a platoon, and each of these 14 platoons was carrying their flag and marching by the
reviewing stand.
After the greeting, I went down and met with each of these individual platoons from the 14 nations. They
were there to participate in a joint exercise, the first ever such exercise held on American soil, in
peacekeeping under the NATO's Partnership for Peace institution.
No. 4. I never thought I would be in Kansas watching United States and Russian troops training together,
but there they were last October, training, again, for joint peacekeeping operations. It is the new
U.S.-Russia security relationship at work. I was there, the Russian defense minister was there, meeting
with, speaking with the Russian and American forces who were training together.
As Minister [Pavel] Grachev and I gathered the Russian and American troops around us and I heard him
telling them how important their activity was to our children and our grandchildren there on the plains of
Kansas, I thought to myself, "Toto, we're not in Kansas any more."
No. 3. I never imagined that I would be helping the Russian defense minister blow up a U.S. missile silo
in Missouri. Last October I did that, too. He and I stood together in the cornfield in Missouri. Both of us
pressed the detonator button that blew up a Minuteman silo. This was part of the START -- Strategic
Arms Reduction Treaty -- program to reduce those missiles. I might mention that just last week I went to
Ukraine, and there he and I and the Ukrainian defense minister pressed a three-pronged detonator and
blew up a former ICBM silo. That was a[t] Pervomaysk. At Pervomaysk just a year ago, there were 700
nuclear warheads at that one site -- all aimed at targets in the United States. This coming June, that
missile field will be transformed into a wheat field, and those 700 warheads will no longer be any threat to
the United States.
No. 2, I never imagined that Dayton, Ohio, would become synonymous with peace in the Balkans.
Frankly, I wasn't sure that the warring parties in Bosnia would ever be able to reach a peace agreement,
but in Dayton, that was the hardest thing for me to understand. There they were, finally ready to stop the
killings and atrocities in Bosnia. They signed the peace accord. We're now one month, almost, into the
implementation of that peace accord. So far, so good.
The No. 1 thing that I never imagined that an American secretary of defense would ever do, the No. 1
thing, was to witness the participation of a Russian brigade in an American division in a peacekeeping
operation in Bosnia. This past week, based on an agreement we made last year, this past week the
advance elements of that Russian brigade arrived at Tuzla, were met by [Maj.] Gen. [William L.] Nash,
who is our division commander, and are beginning to be integrated into that force.
These 10 things -- none of which I could have imagined a few years ago -- demonstrate just how much
the world has changed, just how much our security has changed, just how much the Department of
Defense has changed and, of course, just how much my job has changed.
Samuel Johnson once said, "Change is inconvenient, even when it is for the better."
These changes, indeed, have been inconvenient, but I believe they have definitely been for the better.
History will be the ultimate judge, of course, as to whether the dramatic changes we have seen last year
will cause 1995 to be regarded as the pivotal year in the transition from the Cold War to a post Cold War
new security order.
Thank you very much.
Q. You have 1,450,000 people under arms or in the armed forces, and you have said that Republican
plans to balance the budget in seven years, as opposed to the Democratic plan to do that, would force
you to reduce these numbers.
Many of the C[hief] E[xecutive] Officer]s here have gone through this kind of downsizing of staff, and in
many cases they have realized tremendous improvements in the productivity of their activities. Why
would this not occur in the armed forces?
A. It has occurred in the armed forces. We have reduced, in the last five or six years, from 2.1 million
down to that 1.45 million -- about a one-third decrease. We have, today, a much smaller force than we
had during the '80s. I believe it is a highly ready force, a very efficient force and a very effective force.
We could cut that force further, but if we did, we would not be able to take on all of the missions which we
are now scheduled to take. The best measure I have of that is the very high operational tempo rate of the
current force. I think it is at a rate about as high as we dare have it.
So if we were to cut the force another 10 or 20 percent, then I would be seeking ways of being relieved of
some of the missions which the U.S. armed forces are now carrying out.
Q. Has the first cut you just referred to resulted in any loss of effectiveness ... ?
A. I think we have been very effective in it to this point, but I would like to suggest to you that even though
the reduction to 1.45 is essentially reached now, that many other aspects of this drawdown are still ahead
of us.
The base closings has been proclaimed, but it's going to take us three or four more years to actually
effect the closing of the bases and starting to gain some of the efficiencies of that. Let me just give you
one example.
In this year's budget, we have $4 billion cost associated with closing bases. In the FY [fiscal year] 99
budget, we have a $6 billion savings associated with that. So there's a $10 billion swing there, but we
haven't reached that point yet, we haven't gotten the benefit.
So far, every year I've been secretary, the base closings have been nothing but a cost; it's been a burden
to carry it out. But towards the end of this decade, my successor will get some of the benefits from that
cost in the very substantial savings.
We are also making substantial efforts to improve or reform the acquisition system. I mentioned already
changing the milspecs. It's also changing over to commercial buying practices. We will be making major
efforts in those in this year, last year, next year, but the benefits from them are probably towards the end
of the decade.
Q. We've heard about the very high regard that the military has achieved in the minds of the public. What
can we as businessmen do to make sure that we reinforce the proper budget allocations so they maintain
their military readiness?
A. The first and most important aspect is having an adequate top line for the budget. I think both the
Democratic and Republican proposals for budgets over the next five years have an adequate top line to
maintain a good defense.
Second is the allocation within that top line. That's where most of our differences are lying. I have placed
my primary emphasis on maintaining high-readiness forces -- forces that are well-educated and
well-trained -- and I think that has paid off in a very big way. My predecessor did that as well. That's paid
off so that we have, I believe, the best trained, the most capable military force in the world today.
We have had a substantial reduction in the amount of funds allocated to modernization of the forces over
the last five years. We have been able to get away with that because the force has been drawing down
during that period. But now that the drawdown is essentially over, we have to start putting money into
modernization again. We must get that money through these savings that I described through base
closing, we must get it through the savings we hope to get in the acquisition reform. If we cannot get
those savings, I would not be in favor of cutting readiness; I would be in favor of reducing the size of the
force and therefore, taking on fewer missions than we now have.
Q. Not too long ago we were all quite concerned about North Korea's possible offensive intentions and
their ability to bring some nuclear capability to bear. We've not heard too much about that recently.
What's your sense now about the legitimacy of that risk, and what we might expect to see?
A. There are two aspects to the Korean threat. One of them is their conventional military forces. They
have more than a million men in their army. Two-thirds of these are based within about 50 miles of the
DMZ [demilitarized zone], so they pose a very great threat to South Korea.
The combination of the South Korean military forces, the U.S. forces in country, plus the U.S. forces that
could be quickly brought into the country in an emergency, have been sufficient to deter that threat now
for more than 40 years, and I think will be sufficient into the future as well.
The second part of the Korean threat, though, is that a few years ago we became greatly concerned at
their program to develop nuclear weapons, because if they would add nuclear weapons to this equation it
could really upset the deterrence balance, which had been very delicately achieved up to this point.
Therefore, we made a major effort to stop that nuclear weapons program. We were prepared to take
actions such as very substantial sanctions, putting more troops over into Korea, to put pressure on the
North Koreans to stop that program. Those actions would have risked a war, but we believed it was better
to take that risk now than to take the risk after they got nuclear weapons.
They were successful, however, and we were able to negotiate an agreement with the North Koreans to
terminate that nuclear program. That agreement has been in process now for more than a year. North
Koreans continue to comply with the agreement. No more nuclear material has been generated. If it
continues for another three or four years, then the program will be essentially behind us -- the whole
implementation of this program, it's a 10-year program. But the most critical phase of that is the first three
or four years.
So as long as the North Koreans continue to comply with this framework agreement to terminate the
nuclear weapons program, I think we have then only to deal with the conventional threat, and I think the
conventional forces that we and the South Koreans have in place is sufficient to deter that threat from
becoming serious.
Q. Mr. Secretary, could you fight two simultaneous regional wars now as you're currently structured and
supplied, say something in the Korean Peninsula and something in the Iran/Iraq region?
A. Let me say first of all we do not expect to have to fight two conventional wars. That we size our force
structure that way does not mean we expect it. It means that if we ever get in another major regional
conflict, we do not want to be so strapped for forces that we might invite or tempt some other country to
be optimistic and to attack us at that point.
With that in mind, the answer to your question is yes. We do have adequate forces for dealing with two
major regional contingencies. That's not a hypothetical or an academic issue in my mind. Two times in
1994, in June of '94, we were challenged. In June of '94 we had a crisis with the North Koreans over their
nuclear weapon program, and in October of '94 we had a crisis with Iraq. In both of these cases, we went
through a very detailed review of our war plan, down to the allocation and preparing for deployment of
forces, down to the brigade level. We would have been quite prepared to deal with that problem in 1994.
We're better prepared to deal with it today.
I might add one thing to that, that the stressing aspect, what our detailed war planning showed us, that
where we were stretched in dealing with two major regional conflicts was not in the force structure, per se,
it was in having sufficient airlift and sealift to swing from one theater to another if the two of them
happened too close together.
Q. Could you tell us the two or three things that you hope will be on your '96 list that was equivalent to
your '95 list?
A. The No. 1 that I expect and hope to have on my '96 list is that we will have successfully completed the
mission in Bosnia and brought our forces back home again.
I also expect, and we're very near to it now, that we will have completed our mission in Haiti and brought
our forces home from there. That I expect to happen in the first quarter of this year.
I expect to also have on this list ... that three nations in the world -- Kazakstan, Belarus and Ukraine -- will
become totally nonnuclear. Ukraine, I might mention, is the third largest nuclear power in the world. It has
the third largest arsenal of nuclear weapons in the world. It should become nonnuclear this year.
Those are three things that come immediately to my mind of what I consider to be very major and
dramatic events coming up in 1996.
Q. Your involvement of the Eastern European forces in these exercises, the Partnership for Peace,
seems to indicate that you feel extremely confident that the changes that have occurred in the East are
quite permanent, and yet we see the pendulum of democracy swinging back in a socialistic direction in
Poland, and this could happen elsewhere. The problems that these countries face are very daunting.
Nobody can cure them in just a five-year term or whatever it might happen to be. What is your view of the
stability of these new friends of ours in Eastern Europe?
A. Nobody could be more concerned about the difficulty of the transition that these countries are going
through than I am. What is happening in Eastern Europe today is truly unprecedented. It's a revolution,
but to date, and hopefully forever, a bloodless revolution. It's a revolution from where these nations are
going, from an authoritarian society trying to converge to a democratic society, from a state-run economy
to a market economy. This is really unprecedented, that change of that magnitude could occur peacefully.
So there have been many problems in many of the countries in Eastern Europe as this change is taking
place. The surprising thing is not that there are problems, but that the problems have not been more
serious than have already been manifested.
In terms of our working with these countries, we consider that what we are doing with them in the
Defense Department, these military-to-military contacts, the exercises we conduct with them, the way we
work together in peacekeeping operations, help contribute to that stability. It's not something that's sitting
off to the side independent of what happens in the country. It's close involvement of the United States
and other Western European countries. The associations that are formed there, the friendships that are
formed there, the contacts that are made -- all of that, I believe, makes a positive contribution to stability.
It's not a guarantee, it's not an assurance, but a positive contribution to the success of the transition to
democracy and free market systems.
Thank you.
Military Medicine: In Step, Adept, Flexible
Prepared remarks of Dr. Stephen Joseph, assistant secretary of defense for health affairs, to the DoD
TRICARE Convention, Washington, Jan. 22, 1996.
Good morning. It is a pleasure to see so many gathered together here. I want to add my welcome to
those already offered. We have a terrific line-up scheduled for this week. This conference is a bit different
from our past conferences in that we have invited more people from outside the MHSS [military health
services system] to give us their perspectives on TRICARE and to perhaps give us some pointers on how
we might improve our approach. These are people from our congressional oversight committees, our
beneficiaries represented by the military coalition, the media and our watchful advisers, the GAO
[General Accounting Office], CBO [Congressional Budget Office] and DoDIG [Department of Defense
inspector general]. Please find time to meet and speak with some of these individuals, listen to them, and
tell them what you are doing with TRICARE. ...
As I look out toward the horizon of 1996, I see a number of challenges, challenges that carry potential
obstacles to mission achievement. These expected events we can plan for, accommodate and turn to our
advantage. There are other events, however, which will appear unexpectedly, and they too will present
obstacles for us. In this category I would include natural and man-made disasters, such as our recent
Blizzard of '96 or the shootings at Fort Bragg [N.C.]. However we are involved, we must be prepared to
deal with unanticipated events. How well we deal with them is a reflection of our leadership and the
underlying quality of our system.
In addition to the events that will occur in 1996, there will be a variety of decisions made by others quite
apart from the military health services system. Many of these decisions will assist us in pursuing our
mission and goals. Others will pose difficulties for us. Consider the effects of the recent government
furloughs or of our participation in the NATO force in Bosnia.
These decisions were not made with military medical operations in mind, yet they carry significant
influence on our operations. Again, we must recognize that such decision making occurs and that we can
and must plan for it. Solid leadership, guided by an understanding of our primary mission, will not only
handle the effects of such decisions, it will find the means to capitalize on the situation.
For example, in Operation Joint Endeavor, in addition to Job No. 1 -- taking care of our people -- we will
have an opportunity, and will take that opportunity, to demonstrate and develop advances in
epidemiologic surveillance and the newest use of telemedicine cubed in that theater.
No matter where you sit within the military health services system, there are events and decisions that
affect what you are doing and how you do it. Your mission responsibilities continue regardless of
obstacles placed in your path; you will exercise your leadership to reach your goals.
This underscores for all of us the very real need for growing well-experienced, flexible, knowledgeable
leaders for the MHSS. I say that particularly for those of you who are now experienced lead agents,
experienced leaders in our system. Remember the importance, the capital importance, of the people who
come behind us, who will be smarter than we are.
Our conference this week is about being prepared and about having the ability to achieve our goals -- it is
about readiness and leadership.
What I want to do this morning is to take a look at the landscape of military medicine. Just what does it
look like all around us? Then I will examine some of the steps we are taking to ensure that the MHSS is
prepared to fulfill its obligations. Finally, I want to discuss what military medicine is doing that
demonstrates its leadership within the community of health care delivery and in some ways within the
military itself.
Ten, even 15 years ago, there began a hue and cry in this country about the steeply rising costs of health
care delivery and about increasing dissatisfaction with the state of that delivery.
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Corporate America became increasingly aware of and involved in the health benefits offered by
its companies for its employees.
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Unions held up labor negotiations until the health benefit was a comprehensive one.
Debates raged about where the blame rested for these increasing costs of health care.
Many suggested solutions. Early in this administration, President Clinton offered a solution. It was
considered too complex, threatening to some, and it did not gain congressional approval. Emerging from
this decade of debate, with no comprehensive answer to the issues of cost, came a proliferation of
managed health care plans. Though around for a number of years, their ability to control health care
costs was not a necessity. Today, it is.
Managed care gradually is taking hold in all parts of the U.S. And when it is well done, managed care:
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Enhances the care patients receive;
Focuses on personal involvement in one's own health;
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Guards against unnecessary care;
Enables a clearer projection of annual costs; and
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Controls the costs of health care delivery.
At the same time, it necessarily limits, or defines, the choice of providers from whom care may be sought
and, without a good quality program, managed care can become more concerned with the immediate
costs of care rather than the long-term health of its patient population. I mention that to deplore the
rapidly increasing shift from the original not-for-profit shape of the managed care industry to an
increasingly for-profit array.
Practicing within a managed care organization clearly is different from independent practice. There are
guidelines and rules to follow, there is accountability, and in staff models the providers are salaried. For
many, this change in practice habits is difficult to accomplish. For many more, it is an alternative to the
tremendous costs involved with setting up and operating one's own practice. The growth of managed
care, with its emphasis on accountability and effective practice, is influencing the delivery of health care
across the nation.
With managed care's emphasis on patient health, it has the potential to greatly assist the public health
capabilities in the nation today. Clearly, public health and our organizations that monitor, detect and offer
preventive advice and measures need greater attention and assistance.
Infectious diseases are resurgent around the world due to a variety of factors. The mobility of our national
population raises the risk of exposures. The increased resistance to antibiotics for some diseases, such
as TB [tuberculosis], malaria and many common bacterial strains, is another example of why strong
public health programs in this country are very important, and managed health care delivery systems can
contribute to these programs.
Another public health factor, very important to military medicine, is the ability to gain a clear picture of
disease patterns and disease trends in all parts of the world. Our forces must be prepared to rapidly
deploy anywhere in support of our national security interests.
Being prepared includes being knowledgeable about all potential threats, including health threats, and
having the means to protect the force in the face of those threats. U.S. military medicine is unique in that
we have medical capabilities spread around the globe, and these capabilities are linked to the larger
military health care delivery system for communication, discussion and consultation.
We are positioned to contribute in a major way to a worldwide system of disease surveillance, and we
also would be a clear beneficiary of such a system. Such a capability would assist as we embark on any
one of the continuum of missions now emanating from the National Security Strategy of our nation.
Turning to the environment within DoD, we all recognize that there has been significant change in the
past few years. The National Security Strategy is now one of engagement and enlargement. We want to
be globally involved to help spread the tenets of democracy and to assist countries and regions to
stabilize and become productive economic participants in the world marketplace.
Our military missions range from disaster assistance to peacekeeping to peacemaking to conflict and war.
The way we carry out those missions is to rapidly project the appropriate force to the area of need. In
most instances, the size force required is small compared to the force mobilized for Operation Desert
Storm or to that we planned for the defense of Western Europe.
The thrust of the department today is to assemble and train the U. S. armed forces as flexible, highly
mobile, technologically expert units prepared to deploy anywhere in the world. This involves creating a
smaller forward footprint. Military medicine, as a supporting service to the line forces, must also be
organized as flexible, agile and technologically adept.
As the forces have downsized to meet the new strategic objectives, the requirements for manpower,
infrastructure and dollars also have downsized. There is much debate within the department on such
questions as
how much of which weapon systems should we have, should one service have full functional
responsibility for a given system, where research dollars ought to be spent and whether one of every four
O-6s on active duty should be in the health care community?
These are extremely difficult issues facing the leadership of the military services and DoD.
A false, but seemingly simple fix to the MHSS facet of these issues would be to privatize or outsource
those military functions which can be most easily accomplished by the civilian sector. It is this line of
thinking that leads to suggestions for severely scaling back the military health services system -manpower, infrastructure and dollars.
We have been successful thus far in articulating the inseparability of our everyday health care delivery
responsibilities from our operational support responsibilities and therefore, establishing the requirement
for a very robust military health care delivery system. In fact, we are in the process of looking again at
medical personnel requirements, the minimum number of active duty physicians required, and the
number and size of our medical treatment facilities here in the U.S.
This re-examination is known by many names, but it is the update to the original 733 Study. The most
significant difference in this evaluation is the recognition by those outside the medical community that
counting only deployed manpower does not represent the true requirement. We expect to see some
study results toward the end of March.
As the armed forces are downsizing, they are also becoming significantly more advanced in their use of
technologies: The digital battlefield involves sophisticated imagery, worldwide video communications,
global positioning, precision bombing. In some ways, these technologies ease the difficulties produced
by downsizing.
Military medicine, too, is using many of these technologies in applications designed to enhance our
capabilities to project sophisticated, specialized, health care forward to the patient, even to the point of
injury. They provide us the means to ensure rapid, high-quality care. They enable injured or ill manpower
to remain on the job and avoid the costs of medical evacuations and replacement processing.
Naturally, all health care cannot be delivered via telemedicine and the many other advanced
technologies that we have begun to analyze and test. We will continue to require medical support units,
hospital complements aboard ships and aeromedical evacuation systems. And there will never be a
substitute for what [Vice] Adm. [Harold M.] Koenig [Navy surgeon general] calls "care at the deckplates."
These units, complements and systems must be prepared to deploy with little or no notice, and they
increasingly have to be able to communicate with one another.
I want to spend a few minutes describing for you just how we are building the readiness of our medical
forces to be prepared to deploy rapidly, to have the resources they need to maintain the health of our
service members and to be able to communicate seamlessly with medical personnel of another service in
the theater and beyond.
It is my belief that the most important accomplishment we have achieved within military medicine over the
past two years has been the solid ability to work together -- Army, Navy, Air Force medicine and [Office of
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for] Health Affairs. This ability is expressed in a number of forums, but
the result is a crumbling of the territorialism, the parochialism, and a realization that our unity -- or
jointness -- has become military medicine's strength.
The surgeons general, and [Dr.] Ed Martin [principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for health
affairs] and I meet weekly to discuss and decide the policies that will direct the operations of the military
health services system. I think of us as DHP [Defense Health Program], Inc., very much like a corporate
board. And as many of you know, we have now expanded the TRICARE Executive Committee to the
TRICARE Readiness Executive Committee with the strong participation of J-4 [Office of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, Logistics].
It is the Medical Readiness Strategic Plan 2001 that is our blueprint for ensuring a jointness in our
planning, training and doctrine. This long-range plan supports execution of the full array of defense
strategic planning documents and addresses how, jointly, military medicine will achieve that smaller
forward footprint.
There are today over 1,000 action items being worked and implemented by military and civilian medical
personnel throughout the military services in support of this plan. DHP, Inc., in cooperation with the Joint
Staff, identified six highest-priority action items. Each of the six is under way, and each is a building block
for follow-on actions. These first six deal with doctrine, information support systems, readiness reporting,
medical evacuation, medical personnel fitness and readiness oversight within the military health services
system.
Within the Medical Readiness Strategic Plan 2001 are specific issues focused on our reserve
components. It is important to recognize the essential role these units and personnel play in our ability to
meet our medical mission responsibilities. Should our commitments to peacekeeping and peacemaking
operations continue to increase, we must consider the increased use of our Reserve and National Guard
personnel.
In view of this, the assistant secretary for reserve affairs, Debbie Lee, and I have established a Joint
Reserve Health Coordinating Committee, which is tackling the role of our reserves and the issues that
arise from such roles. In addition, the TRICARE Readiness Executive Committee includes the reserve
affairs principal deputy.
What is the relationship between TRICARE and readiness? A fair question. TRICARE is the military
health services system. It includes everything and incorporates the dual responsibilities of our military
medical mission -- what [Air Force Maj.]Gen. George[K.] Anderson [deputy assistant secretary of defense
for health services, operations and readiness] calls "Big TRICARE."
The transformation of our system of health care delivery to managed care brings a new flexibility to
military medicine that enhances its ability to meet its readiness responsibilities. This flexibility is
generated through the regional organization and planning for health care to a defined population.
In that planning is a dependence upon interservice resource sharing. This sharing in the everyday
delivery of care not only makes it possible to have our military personnel gain essential readiness training;
it also builds familiarization among the personnel who work together.
Second, the managed care support contracts bring a supplemental capability to our military medical
treatment facilities. It is a capability and a partnership that can support our beneficiary population in the
event of a deployment of hospital staff or of a readiness exercise.
TRICARE changes our health care delivery system to make it more accessible to our beneficiaries and
more cost effective for the department. Both accessibility and cost effectiveness are essential in order to
retain the delivery structure. And that delivery structure is vitally important as the source of training and
skills maintenance for our medical personnel. TRICARE makes enhanced medical readiness possible.
TRICARE also promises to make the military health services system a leader within the defense
establishment and within the national medical community.
Many of the initiatives and characteristics of TRICARE that I have mentioned are goals among other
communities of the armed forces. Jointness and the ability to use one another's resources places military
medicine ahead of those who continue to vie for aircraft, vehicles, weapons. We are planning together,
developing policy together, creating systems together.
Civilian-military partnerships are clearly reflected in our managed care support contracts. Our delivery
system improvements have come to depend upon these partnerships in order to accomplish our health
care responsibilities. Our improved business practices, such as use of Prime Vendor, have significantly
increased our relationship with and reliance on the civilian sector to meet our needs. And we have a
number of partnerships, affiliations or agreements with civilian medical facilities and medical schools for
specialized education and training. TRICARE has us actively engaged in civilian-military partnerships,
equal to or surpassing other functional proponents within DoD.
One of our significant accomplishments is our National Quality Management Program. This program
encompasses personnel readiness certification, facility accreditation, practitioner licensure, clinical
credentialing and privileging, the National Practitioner Data Bank and special studies leading to "best
practice" models.
The Centralized Credentials and Quality Assurance System is a single data base which provides the
means to rapidly assess the credentials of about 200,000 privileged providers throughout our military
health services system, including members of the reserve components. Having this information readily
available to all of our facilities, lead agents, major commands and service headquarters facilitates the
transfer and sharing of personnel among facilities and across services.
Supporting the quality management program is a comprehensive contract designed to ensure uniform
application of utilization management criteria and to monitor the quality of health care delivered
throughout the system -- in military medical facilities and by civilian network providers -- with the goal of
discovering and implementing "best clinical practices."
An example of the benefit of these best-practice guidelines for how we use our resources is the recent
study on hysterectomies. We found that we could avoid $1 million in costs annually by using our
resources in a more effective way.
The last area I will mention that I believe places us out ahead, both in the defense and in the national
medical sector, is strategic planning. Our process to look ahead, to identify what we need to get under
way today so that it will be there tomorrow, to create a framework for evolving our whole system has
been a very energizing one.
It began about a year ago with the surgeons general and myself and now involves an ever-growing
number of our personnel throughout the military health services system and even a good number from
other organizations, such as the assistant secretary for reserve affairs, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
representatives of the surgeons of our unified commands.
It is a tremendous accomplishment that we have all facets of military medicine and those who have a
stake in military medicine working together on how we should jointly plan and approach our future.
We have published a strategic plan for the military health services system, we have articulated our five
goals, and we have begun to identify the metrics by which we can determine the progress we are making
in achieving those goals. The measures will differ for each organization.
For example, hospital commanders will need finer, more detailed information about their own facility than
the lead agent or the surgeon general. And members of the health affairs staff will need greater detail
than I on a given facet of the system. So this task of determining metrics is one we are working with
diligence, finding the right set of measures and not collecting information for the sake of having it
available. As you go about the task of developing your own metrics, I encourage you to make these
rather fine distinctions.
In closing, it seems appropriate to borrow from President John F. Kennedy. These were his words when
he addressed the University of California at Berkeley in March of 1962:
"The wave of the future is not the conquest of the world by a single dogmatic creed but the liberation of
the diverse energies of free nations and free men."
That thought can be interpreted to apply to our participation in the operational missions designed to
implement our National Security Strategy of engagement and enlargement -- striving for democracy
around the world and the regional stability that would accompany that achievement. Our participation
presents challenges to our readiness posture, of our inclusion of the reserve components, and to
everyday health care for all of our beneficiaries.
A second interpretation could be applied to the significant dialogue we, together, are accomplishing
within the military health services system. This open dialogue has created the atmosphere which
encourages the "diverse energies" of all of you to help face our challenges, learn from them and move on
to prepare for the next century.
This year of 1996 does indeed pose challenges. We expect to award the remaining managed care
support contracts this year. We will continue to close medical treatment facilities identified in the BRAC
[base realignment and closure] process. We will redouble our efforts to explain the details of our
TRICARE triple option benefit plan to our beneficiaries and those who retain an interest in military
medicine. And we will continue our initiatives to meet the five goals of our strategic plan for the military
health services system.
Thank you. ...
Bosnia: So Far, So Good
Remarks by Secretary of Defense William J. Perry at Nellis Air Force Base, Nev., Jan. 27, 1996.
I can't tell you how delighted I am to be here at Nellis ... and how grateful I am for the support that the Air
Force gets here from the local leaders, political and civic leaders and from our congressional delegation.
It takes a team like that to really produce the fantastic results that we're getting out of Nellis. ...
I'm going to talk to you tonight about Bosnia, because it's very much on my mind. One day after I was
sworn in as secretary of defense ... about two years ago, the Serbs dropped an artillery shell in the
marketplace in Sarajevo and killed more than 60 people. And I was immediately thrown into the problem
of what could the United States do about that, what could the international community do about that.
I had a historic meeting with my minister counterparts -- the British, the French, the Italian, the Dutch -- in
Aviano, which is one of our air bases in Italy. And at that meeting we agreed that we would support -vigorously support -- a political decision that would cause the Serbs to move all of their heavy weapons
out of the Sarajevo area. It was historic because that was the first really significant move in getting NATO
-- in this case NATO air power -- involved to try to affect the outcome of that tragic war.
Most recently, just three weeks ago, I was in the Bosnia theater to see how our deployment was going.
And so, from the first day I've been in the job until this present month, I have been deeply and personally
involved. I want to give you my own personal appreciation of what has transpired there, what's likely to
transpire in the future. I'll do it, first of all, by briefly describing the trip that I just made in Bosnia and trying
to draw some lessons and conclusions from it.
I spent the first day at our air bases in Aviano and Vincenza, both of which are in Italy. And there I saw
firsthand -- I've been to those bases many times before, but it's still gratifying to see firsthand again -- the
results of the United States Air Force and the NATO air operations that are going on there.
For 2½ years out of Aviano, we have conducted an operation called Deny Flight, which has prevented
any of the sides in that war from conducting aerial bombardments of cities. It has saved countless
thousands of lives. You don't hear much about that operation precisely because it has been so
successful.
Deny Flight was challenged once. Bosnian Serbs sent up four fighter-bombers to bomb a city in Bosnia.
They were detected immediately by AWACS [Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft]. We sent
two F-16s in, which in about two minutes' time shot down three of them -- the fourth managed to get away.
Since that time, nobody has bothered to challenge NATO's air, in terms of Deny Flight. As I said, the
result of all that is thousands of lives have been saved that otherwise would have been lost in the
indiscriminate bombing of cities which surely would have followed.
The second major activity going on from Aviano has been the strike force which is located there. It was
first brought in to bear as a threat to the Bosnian Serbs if they did not remove their heavy weapons
around Sarajevo, which they did, and so we did not have to fight immediately. That was done in February
of '94.
Later in '94, the Bosnian Serbs decided to test how serious we were about that and conducted some -basically, made some violations of this policy, and unfortunately, found out we were not very serious.
That is, the U.N. forces which were on the ground there, which had to give the permission for the NATO
forces to operate, withheld the permission. And so, the Serbs succeeded in getting away with a violation
of these actions, and not surprisingly, then, they escalated from that point on into 1995.
This was a sorry page in history of the Bosnian operation and a sorry page in NATO's history -- although
it was not NATO's fault. Nevertheless, we were in a position where we were basically impotent to deal
with the problem.
The Bosnian Serbs were emboldened by this, and I told a group that I was talking with today that in poker
terminology, they overplayed their hand, because in the spring of '95, they violated the so-called "safe
area" of Srebrenica and not only took that city, but conducted unspeakable atrocities in the course of
taking it. This action was so outrageous that even the nations who had been resisting strong NATO
action to that point realized that they had to meet this provocation with a real show of military force.
Winston Churchill, I think, said it once -- and perhaps best. He said, "Powerful force is a powerful
persuader." With that injunction in mind, we met in Winston Churchill's city, London, last July, and agreed
that if there were any further violations by the Bosnian Serbs that NATO air would not only react, but in
the proposal which I made in that meeting -- the phrase that I used was, we would unleash a massive "air
campaign."
We thought that would be sufficient to deter the action. It was not, because just two weeks later, they
began bombarding Sarajevo again.
Two days after that, we unleashed a massive air campaign. That was done out of Aviano, plus carriers in
the Adriatic. It was one of the most effective campaigns of the sort that has ever been launched. Every
target that was specified by the NATO air commander, every target was destroyed, and most amazingly,
there was absolutely no collateral damage. We took very special pains to avoid collateral damage. We
used only precision guided munitions, and we did not drop any munitions whenever the weather
prevented positive identification of the targets.
We know now, having talked in some detail with a number of the Bosnian Serbs, including both the
civilian and military leaders, that this was an absolutely stunning development to them. It totally
demoralized them and drove them effectively to the peace table.
These are two of the important components of the air operation that was being run out of Aviano. On this
trip, I also went to Vincenza, which is another one of the NATO air bases in northern Italy. Vincenza had
been -- is the location of the CAOC, which is our Combined Air Operations Center. It basically, provides
all sorts of intelligence to our air operations in Bosnia. It is a splendid operation. Most of you will never
have the opportunity to see it, but I want to tell you if you want to have pride in something that your
military is doing, and doing well, and doing something that really has not ever been done before just like
that -- if you ever have an opportunity to tour that facility, it is really impressive.
In addition to that, Vincenza manages the airlift operation. For more than two years, NATO has been
providing airlift into Bosnia as part of the humanitarian mission and again, how many thousands of lives
have been saved by that it's really impossible to tell. But it's been the longest sustained airlift, airdrop
operation in history, longer even than the Berlin airlift.
In the last month, it's been doing something quite different. It has been providing the airlift to make the
deployment into Bosnia of the NATO forces. And I believe, it is the best managed airlift operation that I've
ever seen. I'll share a little bit more about that airlift operation later.
From Vincenza, I went to Taszar, Hungary. What does Hungary have to do with this? We have decided
and gotten the Hungarian government to agree with our decision that we would put a sustainment base,
logistics base, in Hungary, just across the border from Croatia and Bosnia, and that all of our forces
flowing in there from Germany by train or by air would go to Taszar. They would be consolidated and
regrouped there, and then from Taszar they would go in tactical units, with their guns loaded, into Bosnia.
We did this for a number of reasons. First of all, it worked out well logistically, but secondly, we did not
know what we were going to run into [in] Bosnia. We thought there was a possibility we would run into
organized, armed opposition. We didn't think it likely, but we could not rule it out, and therefore we
wanted to be prepared for it.
We have 7,000 people in Taszar running this logistics operation. It's a major accomplishment and very
successful accomplishment, and we're getting tremendous support from the Hungarian government in
that regard.
From Taszar, I flew on into Bosnia first into Sarajevo. We landed at the Sarajevo airport and then drove
down to their president's residence. I was meeting with President [??] Izetbegovic and his cabinet. I was
heartsick on the trip into Sarajevo. This at one time was one of the most beautiful cities in Europe.
For the last four years, Serbs have had their artillery and mortars on the hills outside of Sarajevo and just
been pounding the city. In fact, before we began this exclusion zone I described to you, there were as
many as a thousand shells a day landing in Sarajevo. You could imagine what the city looked like. I had
imagined it, but it wasn't the same thing as seeing it. There wasn't a building that I saw that had not
received some damage from the shelling. Most of the buildings were in rubble.
That was the sad news, the bad news. The good news is we drove into the town with no danger. We
drove the 10 blocks down what used to be called "sniper's alley," where you would have risked your life to
have gone down that street just a month earlier. I went to the president's palace, met with him and his
cabinet for about an hour and a half. All of this had been done under a certain amount of security, so we
were kind of whisked into the office and met with him and whisked out again.
But the security wasn't as good as we thought, because when we walked out of the president's office,
there was a huge crowd of Bosnians on the other side of the street. Word had gotten out that the
American secretary of defense was in town. It must have been 300 or 400 of them there.
As I walked out the door surrounded by my security people, they started cheering and saying, "U-S-A,
U-S-A." And then, I did something which drove my security people absolutely bonkers. I broke out of my
group and crossed the street and went over and mixed with and started talking with the Bosnians there.
I cannot convey to you the warmth and the gratitude from these people, who have been living in this town
and subjected to this pounding for the last four years, who now believed there was a prospect of peace,
real peace. And they believed that the United States was responsible for that, and they just wanted to
show their gratitude.
I went from Sarajevo into Tuzla, which is the headquarters of the American multinational division: I met
with [Army Maj.] Gen. [William L.] Nash, his commanders; the American forces there; the commanders of
the other nations who were part of our division there. We have a Nordic brigade. The Nordic brigade has
Norwegian, Finns, Swedes, Danes, soldiers from Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and Poland all in that brigade.
They have a Turkish brigade. And when I was there, the Russian brigades were just starting to arrive -the advanced party from the Russian brigade was there. I met with them.
We drove. The first thing we did was get in the helicopter and flew out to the Sava River. The bridge
across the river had just been opened the day before, and I wanted to see it, eat with the soldiers -- the
combat engineers -- who had put it up. ... It's a pretty wide river. It's about as wide as the Rhine. But
nevertheless we had put pontoon bridges over the Rhine many times in practice. We figured this was
going to take us about a week, but this was 2½ weeks after we started and it had just been finished.
What had happened ... -- it's a pontoon bridge and it floats in the water, but you have to have it anchored
down on two sides, and our two anchor positions went underwater about the second day. They had the
greatest flood in the Sava River that they've had this century. Water flowed out of the banks, and we
ended up having to build a bridge twice as wide as we had anticipated. Indeed, we ended up building the
longest pontoon bridge that's ever been built in history. But we got it built.
And I got there -- landed the helicopter in Croatia and then got on the bridge and walked into Bosnia. And
halfway across the bridge, there was a contingent of about 20 or 30 combat engineers who built that
bridge. They were exhausted, but very proud. We stopped and talked with them and thanked them. One
of them turned, had just finished and wanted to be re-enlisted. So [Army] Gen. [George] Joulwan and
Gen. [John] Shalikashvili and I signed him up; re-enlisted him; swore him in for one more term.
As I left the bridge and thought about that event, I told the media ... walking with me that the American
soldiers had demonstrated "true grit." They had prevailed over enormous forces of nature. They refused
to give up, and after they had finished the bridge, one decided to re-enlist. I thought that was a great
story.
I then went back to the base camp at Tuzla and went around and met with perhaps a dozen of the
different units -- ones who were on patrol, ... some of them were in offices doing planning; some were in
offices doing intelligence. The ones on patrol were standing out in the snow and the mud and the ice
looking pretty uncomfortable. There was an Air Force unit there called "Red Horse."
One of the "Red Horse" groups is right here at Nellis. This was a different one. This is one that I think that
is at Hurlburt [Field, Fla.]. We have three "Red Horse" units. These are the teams that go out and build
bases. The best in the world.
Army doesn't usually get very excited about the arrival of Air Force troops, but in this case, they were
cheering them. And as the Army units would come in from patrol, the first thing they'd do is walk over to
their area that the "Red Horse" team was working to see if any -- how many more tents have been put up
since they've gone out. They were building them at the rate of 20 tents a day -- ten-person tents with
floors, walls, heaters. Quite comfortable, actually -- particularly compared with what they had up until
now.
I spent a lot of time talking with the intelligence people on their assessment of the mine situation. One of
the real problems, we knew from the beginning. We think there's several million mines in that country.
That's the bad news. There's some good news -- all three of the warring parties are trying to cooperate
with us to get rid of the mines. They had given us their maps, their charts of where they thought the mines
were. They didn't really know all of them, but they had quite a few of them marked. And they were busy
removing and dismantling the mines.
So we're getting a lot of cooperation and a lot of support on that. We've been there a little over a month
now, and to this point we've had one mine accident, fortunately, not a fatal mine accident. [Editor's note:
The first American casualty in Bosnia, Army Sgt. 1st Class Donald A. Dugan, died in an
explosives-related accident on Feb. 3, a week after this speech.] I talked to a number of congressmen
about that who asked me whether the vaunted American technology was what made the difference,
because some of our NATO allies have had many more mine accidents than that.
Technology is only a minor contributor to dealing with mines. It's mostly a matter of discipline and
procedure and just being very damned careful -- paying attention to detail. And before all of our units
went down there, ... each battalion spent a couple of months specifically training for that ... ground
operation. And a very key part of that was mine awareness, mine location, mine removal and, most
importantly, mine avoidance. Since you can't remove them all, the key is avoiding them.
We still have 11 months to go in Bosnia, and we're going to run into more mines before we're done. But
so far, so good. And the reason it's been good has been, first of all, cooperation from the warring parties
and, secondly, very good discipline and very good professionalism on the part of the American soldiers.
I'm going to come to a few conclusions about this, generalizing from some of the specifics that I've given
you here. ... I testified to the Congress about seven or eight times, about going into Bosnia. I got about
every possible question I could get. And I contemplated every bad scenario that could possibly happen
and tried to deal with it in my testimony.
The three bad scenarios -- there are really three scenarios that are bad -- that we worried about from the
beginning: The first is that there would be major resistance and armed resistance by one or more of the
warring parties as our soldiers went in. The second is that there would be a major problem with mines,
and the third is there would be a major problem, not with organized resistance, but with terrorists -basically dissident groups.
The first of those we can now, I believe, safely dismiss. If any of those warring parties had wanted to
resist us and wanted to try to block us, they should have done it two weeks ago or three weeks ago or
four weeks ago when we were coming in and when we were most vulnerable. Basically, it's too late to do
that now. We have a powerful force in the country -- 20,000 U.S. forces directly in-country, very heavily
armed, with M-1 tanks, Bradleys, artillery, very well trained, very well disciplined soldiers -- 60,000 NATO
troops.
There is not a force in the country or any combination of forces that could stand up to this force. We were
criticized -- some in Congress and some in the media -- for sending such a large and powerful force in.
And in retrospect that criticism, perhaps, was right.
We did not run into armed resistance, but I am unrepentant on the decision to send in that powerful force.
If I had to err, I wanted to err on the side of too large and too strong a force rather than the other way
around. And we'll never know whether we might have gotten the armed resistance if we had gone in with
a smaller or a weaker, force. In any event, I believe that danger is behind us now.
The second danger is mines -- I've already discussed that. So far, so good. We'll see more mines. We'll
have more mine accidents before we leave there. At this stage, though, the biggest problem -- the
problem I worry most about -- is simply becoming complacent, because this attention to detail and the
discipline is motivated by being concerned. So our leaders, our commanders, will have to continually
alert the troops to the dangers of this, to keep their attention so they do pay attention to detail.
And the third worry we still have, and that is the worry that there would be some dissident individuals or
gangs who will attack our forces, not on any theory that they're going to be able to defeat them, but to
make a point, to harass them. And that's still a very real probability, and that's still the greatest concern,
the greatest worry we have about our troops over there.
We are well trained, well armed, well disciplined and very much alert to that possibility, but there are no
certainties and no way we can conduct ourselves which can preclude that possibility. Even in Oklahoma
City, we have been subject to terrorist attacks.
So one general conclusion that I make on this, I would sum up by the phrase I've already used, "so far, so
good." The second general conclusion -- we still have 11 tough months ahead of us, and we have to keep
our eye on the ball, pay attention to detail. When I talked with our soldiers over there and our
commanders, I had two messages for them: one is, keep your focus, keep paying attention to detail; and
the other was, take care of each other.
Another generalization I would draw from this is that this whole operation in Bosnia is going to cast a long
shadow on European security, certainly for the rest of this decade, first of all because it has brought
together NATO -- and not just NATO but about 16 or 17 other countries who volunteered to participate
with NATO in this.
So the single biggest security problem in Europe since the ending of the Cold War, all of Europe is pulling
together finally to deal with under the United States' leadership and with NATO being the institution that is
actually conducting the operation. And countries that are participating -- fully participating -- like the
Czech Republic and Slovakia and Hungary and Poland and Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia -- all of these
countries see the opportunity not only to help out in Bosnia, but to be a part of this larger European
security.
The last generalization I would like to make has to do with the role of Russia in this operation. I personally
devoted a large amount of time to trying to work that arrangement and met for three months before we
finally went in there.
I met four different times with the minister of defense of Russia, [Pavel] Grachev, to try to come to an
arrangement whereby the Russian troops could participate with this NATO force in Bosnia. They wanted
to participate. We wanted them to participate. They didn't want to be under NATO.
In Russia, NATO is a four letter word. For decades, it has been the face of the enemy for them. They
could not quite bring themselves to do that.
The agreement we finally reached was a strange agreement in some ways. It was intended to be
face-saving for them. They are there. They are under NATO. But they describe this as working for an
American general, instead of working for a NATO general. Actually, two American generals: One is Gen.
Joulwan, from whom they take their operational commands; and the other is Gen. Nash, who is the head
of the American division there, from whom they get their tactical control.
It's remarkable and surprising to me that they were able to accept direction from an American general,
where they could not quite swallow the idea of direction from the NATO general. Now, of course, Gen.
Joulwan is the supreme commander of NATO also, but he is an American general.
So as I said, I believe this operation in Bosnia is going to cast a very long shadow on European security,
certainly for the rest of this decade. Besides giving a prospect of finally ending this tragic war in Bosnia, a
war in which millions of people remain homeless and several hundred thousand were killed, it finally
gives them a chance to end that war. But perhaps over the long-term, even more importantly, it sets a
pattern for European nations cooperating and dealing with important security problems in Europe, in
cooperating under the leadership of the United States.
Finally, it demonstrated once more the capability, effectiveness of the U.S. military forces. And I hope all
the American people can feel as proud of the American military as I do for what they are doing in Bosnia
today.
I should also say another very clear lesson of Bosnia was the importance of training, in particular the
importance of the kind of combat training that you do here and that the U.S. Army did at Grafenwoehr
[Germany] before they went in there. This is what distinguishes the U.S. military, which gives us the
competitive advantage over any other military force in the world, and you are at the tip of the spear in
demonstrating that.
Completing Marshall's Plan In Europe
Remarks by Secretary of Defense William J. Perry, Wehrkunde Conference, Munich, Germany, F
Behind my desk at the Pentagon hangs a portrait of the great statesman George C. Marshall. Marshall,
who was the third secretary of defense in the United States, is a role model of mine. He had a great
vision for Europe -- a Europe which from the Atlantic to the Urals was united in peace, freedom and
democracy -- and a strong trans-Atlantic partnership sustained by bipartisan political support in the
United States.
Marshall not only had this vision, he also had a plan to make this vision a reality in postwar Europe. And
in a famous speech at Harvard University in 1947, he outlined what came to be called the Marshall Plan.
A little known fact is that joining Marshall on the dais that day was the famous poet T.S. Eliot, who 10
years earlier had written:
Footfalls echo in the memory
Down the passage we did not take
Towards the door we never opened.
These words by T.S. Eliot foreshadowed the fate of Marshall's plan in Eastern and Central Europe,
because on that day 50 years ago, as the footfalls of World War II still echoed across a shattered
continent, the Marshall Plan offered Europe a new passage toward reconstruction and renewal. Half of
Europe took this passage and opened the door to prosperity and freedom. Half of Europe was denied this
passage when Joseph Stalin slammed the door on Marshall's offer. And for 50 years, the footfalls of what
might have been echoed in our memories.
Today, as the Cold War becomes an echo in our memory, we have a second chance to make Marshall's
vision a reality: To go down the passage we did not take 50 years ago, towards the door we never
opened. Behind that door lies George Marshall's Europe. To open this door, we do not need a second
Marshall Plan, but we do need to draw on Marshall's vision.
Marshall recognized that peace, democracy and prosperity were ultimately inseparable. And Marshall
understood that if you identify what people desire most and provide them with a path to reach it, then they
will do the hard work necessary to achieve their goals.
In the late 1940s, what Western European countries desired
most was to rebuild their societies and economies. And the Marshall Plan provided a path for achieving
this goal. By taking this passage, the nations of Western Europe built an economic powerhouse. And
along the way, they built strong democracies and a strong security institution called NATO.
Today, countries in the other half of Europe are struggling to rebuild their societies and economies, and
the one thing they all desire is greater security. NATO's challenge is to provide these Europeans a path
for achieving their security goal. And along the way, we want them very much to develop strong
democracies and strong economies.
This other half of Europe includes the nations of Central and Eastern Europe and the newly independent
states. It includes Russia, and it includes the nations of the former Yugoslavia. Today, NATO is reaching
out to all three areas and providing a path to Marshall's Europe.
The primary path NATO has provided is the Partnership for Peace. Just as the Marshall Plan worked
because it was rooted firmly in the self-interest of both the United States and Europe, so too does the
Partnership for Peace work because it is rooted firmly in the self-interest of both NATO and the partner
nations.
PFP is bringing the newly free nations of Europe and the former Soviet Union into the security
architecture of Europe as a whole. Our nations are working and training together in military joint
exercises. But make no mistake, the Partnership for Peace is more than just joint exercises. Just as the
Marshall Plan had an impact well beyond the economies of Western Europe, PFP is echoing beyond the
security realm in Central and Eastern Europe, and into the political and economic realms as well.
Just as the Marshall Plan used economic revival as the catalyst for political stabilization -- and ultimately
the development of the modern Europe -- the PFP uses security cooperation as a catalyst for political
and economic reform.
PFP members are working to uphold democracy, tolerate diversity, respect the rights of minorities and
respect freedom of expression. They are working to build market economies. They are working hard to
develop democratic control of their military forces, to be good neighbors and respect the sovereign rights
outside their borders. And they are working hard to make their military forces compatible with NATO.
For those partner countries that are embracing PFP as a passage to NATO membership, these actions
are a key to opening that door. For many of these nations, aspiration to NATO membership has become
the rock on which all major political parties base their platforms. It is providing the same
overlapping consensus that NATO membership engenders in NATO countries, making compromise and
reconciliation possible.
In Hungary, all six major political parties in the Parliament united to pass a resolution in support of IFOR
[implementation force], the Bosnia peace implementation force, by a vote of 300 to 1. In Poland, the new
president -- a former member of the former communist party -- reaffirmed Poland's NATO aspirations. In
Slovakia, Hungary and Rumania, governments are quietly resolving border disputes and putting into
place protection for ethnic minorities. For these countries, the Partnership for Peace is becoming a
passage to democracy and market reform, as well as a passage to security cooperation with the West.
But even those countries that do not aspire to NATO membership are realizing many of the same political
and social gains from active participation in the PFP. Moreover, PFP is providing them the tools and the
opportunities to develop closer ties to NATO, and learn from NATO -- even as they choose to remain
outside the alliance. And PFP is building bonds among the partner nations -- even outside the framework
of cooperation with NATO.
That is why defense ministers from many partner nations have said to me that even if, or when, they
eventually join NATO, they want to sustain their active participation in PFP. In short, by creating the
Partnership For Peace, NATO is doing more than just building the basis for enlargement. It is, in fact,
creating a new zone of security and stability throughout Europe.
That is why I believe that the creation of the Partnership for Peace has been one of the most significant
events of the post-Cold War era. By forging networks of people and institutions working together to
preserve freedom, promote democracy and build free markets, the PFP today is a catalyst for
transforming Central and Eastern Europe, much as Marshall Plan transformed Western Europe in the
'40s and '50s. It is the passage this half of Europe did not take in 1947; it is the door that we never
opened.
To lock in the gains of reform, NATO must ensure that the ties we are creating in PFP continue to deepen
and that we actually proceed with the gradual and deliberate, but steady, process of outreach and
enlargement to the East. NATO enlargement is inevitable. And if NATO enlargement is a carrot
encouraging reforms, then we cannot keep that carrot continually out of reach. So it is critical that we
implement the second phase of NATO enlargement agreed upon at the NAC (North Atlantic Council)
Ministerial Meeting in December.
And even as some countries join NATO, it will be important to keep the door open for others down the
road. We must make sure that PFP continues to provide a place in the security architecture of Europe so
that we keep the door open to Marshall's Europe even for those nations that do not aspire to become
NATO members.
For Marshall's vision to be truly fulfilled, one of the nations that must walk through this door is Russia.
Russia has been a key player in Europe's security for over 300 years. It will remain a key player in the
coming decades, for better or for worse. Our job is to make it for the better.
Unlike with the Marshall Plan 50 years ago, Russia today has chosen to participate in the Partnership for
Peace. And in the spirit of Marshall, we welcome Russia's participation and hope that over time it will take
on a leading role in PFP commensurate with its importance as a great power.
But for Russia to join us as a full and active partner in completing Marshall's vision, NATO and Russia
need to build on our common ground, even when we don't agree with each other's conclusions. It is fair
to say that most members of Russia's political establishment do not welcome or even accept NATO's
plans for enlargement. Anybody that doubted that yesterday, if you heard Mr. Andrey Kokoshin's [first
deputy minister of defense] speech, realized the extent of the opposition to NATO enlargement in Russia.
When I was in Russia last June, I had a number of conversations with Russian government leaders and
Duma members about the future of European security. I offered them a series of postulates about that
future. I told them if I were in Russia's shoes, I would want the future security picture in Europe to have
the following characteristics:
First, I said, if I were a Russian leader, I would want the United States to be involved in the security of
Europe. They agreed with that postulate.
Then, I said, if I were a Russian leader, I would want to see Germany an integrated part of the European
security structure. And they agreed with that postulate.
And third, I said, if I were a Russian leader, I would want Russia to be in the security architecture of
Europe, not isolated outside of it. They agreed with this postulate also.
Finally, I asked them how could a Russian leader best achieve these goals?
I concluded they could only be achieved through a healthy and vibrant NATO. That is, NATO, far from
being a threat to Russia, actually contributes to the security of Russia as well as to the security of its own
members.
When I reached that conclusion, most of the Russians I talked to fell off the cliff. They agreed with each of
my premises, but they did not agree with my conclusion. But in the absence of NATO and its partnership
arrangements, I do not see any way of achieving those goals -- our shared goals -- of a safe and peaceful
Europe.
I have to tell you that I did not persuade my Russian colleagues with my argument. But I do believe that
as Russia deepens its involvement with NATO, it will come to believe in the truth of my conclusion as well
as my premises. And I believe that Russia will want to have a cooperative relation with NATO and a
leading role in the Partnership for Peace and that Russia will come to understand that NATO
enlargement means enlarging a zone of security and stability that is very much in Russia's interest, not a
threat to Russia.
But the way for this new understanding to occur is for NATO to continue to reach out to Russia not only
from the top down but from the bottom up. Last year at Wehrkunde, I proposed that NATO and Russia
begin a separate plan of activities, outside the Partnership for Peace. Since then, we have all discussed
and even agreed upon this proposal in principle, but we have not yet put it on paper. We must do so. We
cannot let disagreements over the "theology" of building NATO-Russia relations get in the way of "here
and now" opportunities to work together where our interests clearly overlap. Instead of letting theology
dictate our practice, we should let our practice shape our theology.
One example of where the United States is already doing this is with our program of bilateral training
exercises with Russia. We have held four such exercises in the last year, each a great success, and each
conducted in a spirit of trust and good will. This summer, the United States and Russia will move beyond
the bilateral and jointly participate in a major regional Partnership For Peace exercise with forces from
Ukraine, Russia, United States and other regional powers.
Our bilateral contact program with Russia is not confined to joint exercises or even to just the security
field. Through the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, it extends to the fields of science and technology,
space, defense conversion, business development, the environment, health care and agriculture.
Just this past week the commission met in Washington, and Mr. Kokoshin and I both participated in the
defense conversion program of this commission. I urge all NATO nations to build on this model. These
contacts provide important exchanges of information. They help break down years of distrust and
suspicion. They weave the Russians into the kind of personal and professional networks that have long
characterized relations among all of the allies. These are the kind of activities that will build trust between
Russia and NATO. And these are the kind of activities that will keep Russia on the passage toward
integration with Europe, to pass through that open door.
Mr. [Russian Defense Minister army Gen. Pavel] Grachev and I attended the joint U.S.-Russia exercise
in Kansas last October. And we met after the exercise with the American and the Russian soldiers
conducting that exercise, and talked to them. He told the Russian soldiers what they were doing was very
important, that they should extend their friendship and cooperation with the American soldiers and that
this was the basis for creating a peaceful world for their children. The American soldiers were as much
interested in what he was saying as the Russians were, I can assure you.
Ironically, the place where a distinct NATO-Russia relationship is occurring in practice is in Bosnia.
Today, as we speak, a Russian brigade is serving in the American Multinational Division of IFOR. It took
an enormous amount of work to make this happen. Minister Grachev and I met four times over a
two-month period to iron out the details. Gens. [Army Gen. George] Joulwan and [Army Maj. Gen.
William] Nash work closely every day with their counterparts, Gen. [Col. Gen. Leontiy] Shevtsov and Col.
[Alexsandr] Lentsov. NATO and Russia do have a special relationship today in Bosnia, and Russia is
demonstrating its commitment to participating in the future security architecture of Europe.
The reason we are all working so hard to make this relationship successful is not just because of the
additional troops Russia brings to Bosnia, but because Russia's participation in Bosnia casts a very long
shadow that will have an impact on the security of Europe for years to come. When we deal with the most
important security problem which Europe has faced since the Cold War was over, we want to have
Russia inside the circle working with us, not outside the circle throwing rocks at us.
Indeed, the more you think about what NATO and Russia are doing together in Bosnia, the more
amazing it becomes. I can only imagine what Gen. [Dwight D.] Eisenhower, the first SACEUR [supreme
allied commander Europe], would think if he saw a general from Russia sitting with Gen. Joulwan, today's
SACEUR, at the SHAPE [Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe] compound reviewing a secret
NATO OPLAN [operational plan]. We need to build on this model, to institutionalize it and expand it to
cover the entire range of NATO and Russia's overlapping security interests. By so doing, NATO and
Russia can move forward as full partners in completing Marshall's vision.
Just as the NATO-Russia relationship is being forged in Bosnia, so too is the future of NATO itself. I was
in Bosnia several weeks ago. I was struck by the dedication and professionalism of every unit from every
country that is participating. I was also struck by the stark contrast between the devastation and suffering
I saw in Sarajevo, and the rebirth and renewal I have seen in the other capitals of Central and Eastern
Europe.
Bosnia is what happens when newly independent nations focus on old hatreds instead of new challenges.
Four years ago, some people in the former Yugoslavia chose not to join Marshall's Europe. And the
death and bloodshed that resulted will long echo in our memory. But today, the door to Marshall's Europe
is open again for them -- and holding that door open are NATO, Russia and the newly free peoples of
Central and Eastern Europe.
The success or failure of IFOR is crucial to whether or not we will complete Marshall's vision. It is in
Bosnia where we are sending the message that NATO is the bedrock on which the future security and
stability of Europe will be built. It is in Bosnia where NATO is first reaping the benefits of joint
peacekeeping training with our new peace partners. It is in Bosnia where future NATO members are
showing themselves ready and able to shoulder the burdens of membership. And it is in Bosnia where
we are showing that we can work as partners with Russian forces. Bosnia is not a peacekeeping exercise.
It is the real thing.
Bosnia is also teaching us important lessons about the kind of NATO that Marshall's Europe will require.
Ever since the end of the Cold War, NATO has struggled to develop a mechanism for executing the new
missions using NATO assets with the voluntary participation of NATO members.
In the conference room, we have so far failed to come up with an agreement on a combined joint task
force, CJTF. But in the field, we have cut through these theological arguments and put together IFOR,
which is a CJTF. As with the NATO-Russia relationship, we need to take the practical lessons learned in
putting IFOR together and extrapolate back until we have a CJTF that works.
Bosnia also casts in sharp relief something we have suspected for some time: that it is time for NATO to
adapt itself internally to deal with the new challenges of this new era. NATO was not well structured for
the Bosnia mission. At a time when our political and geostrategic thinking has been completely reoriented,
symbolized by our partnership in peacekeeping with former adversaries, and at a time when our
individual military forces have streamlined and modernized for the battlefield of the future, NATO's
command and decision-making structure is still geared for the challenges and the battlefields of the past.
The time has come to streamline and modernize NATO, recognizing that our challenge is no longer
simply to execute a known plan with already designated forces, as it was during the Cold War.
We must make NATO's command structure more responsive and more flexible, and streamline the
planning and force preparation process, and simplify and speed up the entire decision-making process.
And we must complete the task of giving NATO's European members a stronger identity within the
alliance. These kinds of internal changes will ready NATO for enlargement and will allow us to better
respond to the future challenges to European security and stability.
It is in this context that we welcome the French decision to participate more fully in NATO's military
bodies. And we look forward to working with France as we transform the alliance and realize Marshall's
vision of a Europe united in peace, freedom and democracy.
In 1947, Marshall told America that it must "face up to the responsibility which history has placed upon
our country," Today, it is not only America, but also Russia; is not only NATO nations, but all of Europe -all of us must face up to the responsibility which history has placed upon us. This means reaching out to
each other not only in the spirit of friendship, but also in the spirit of self-interest. This means working
towards our goals not only from the top down, but also the ground up. And it means recognizing that
when the outside world changes, we must look inside our institutions and see what changes are needed
there.
If we do these things, then next year, when we commemorate the 50th anniversary of the Marshall Plan,
we will be able to say that we made Marshall's vision our own; that Partnership for Peace is a strong,
permanent pillar of Europe's security architecture; that NATO and Russia have a relationship where trust,
understanding and cooperation are givens, not goals; that all the nations of the former Yugoslavia are
adding, not detracting, from Europe's security; and that we have taken the passage to a new Europe and
opened the door to a new era of peace, freedom and democracy.
Thank you very much.
National Guard, Reserve -- Central Parts of Total
Force
Prepared statement of Deborah R. Lee, assistant secretary of defense for reserve affairs, to the
Readiness Subcommittee, Senate Armed Services Committee, March 21, 1996.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee for the opportunity to talk to you about
America's reserve components. Over the years, this committee's actions have supported reservists, their
families and their employers. You have modernized their equipment and infrastructure, and you have
ensured mission-ready forces in the reserve components. Your efforts are appreciated, and on behalf of
each and every reservist, I thank you very much.
Since the congressional hearing season has been compressed this year, I want to take this opportunity to
present you with a broad overview of the accomplishments made possible by your support, our goals for
the coming year and areas where your continued support is needed.
Before I begin, I want to acknowledge the bipartisan basis for today's increased reliance on the Guard
and Reserve forces. In 1973, under Secretary [of Defense Melvin] Laird, the Department of Defense
adopted a Total Force policy, which recognized that all of America's military assets -- active, Guard,
Reserve, civilians and contractors -- should be fully used to provide for our defense.
Each succeeding administration has supported this policy. The integration of reserve forces into the
services' warfighting capability, as required by the National Military Strategy, has reached an all-time high.
The lower peacetime costs of reserve forces, when compared to similar active units, have made possible
a fully capable total force at a smaller defense budget.
This year I established four overarching goals for the National Guard and Reserve to support Secretary
[of Defense William] Perry's goals for the total forces:

Maximizing the reserve component contribution and promoting its accessibility in support of the
total force;


Promoting readiness of the reserve forces;
Promoting further integration and jointness of the reserve components in the total force; and

Improving reserve component quality of life to support a ready force.
I will address each goal in greater detail and describe initiatives we have under way within each goal.
You can feel proud of the contributions that the reserve forces made this past year in support of their
services and the CinCs [commanders in chief]. This year, I want to make it possible for them to contribute
to their full capabilities. My three objectives under this goal are to promote increased peacetime
operational use of the RC, to promote reserve component accessibility for the full range of military
operations and to address force structure options for increased reliance on Guard and Reserve forces.
Promoting increased peacetime use of the RC by leveraging existing training resources and
opportunities overseas and in the U.S. communities is a win-win proposition. The use of existing RC
training resources to support real-world mission requirements overseas for the CinCs and services
generates valuable training as a byproduct.
In addition, the RC undertake medical and engineering projects which enhance mission readiness skills
and help address pressing community needs here in the United States. These innovative readiness
training projects provide training normally not available, involve the military in our communities (thus
improving recruiting, retention and morale), while leveraging taxpayers' dollars to provide cost-effective
medical and engineering support.

In FY [fiscal year] 96 Secretary Perry set up a pilot program to increase the peacetime
operational use of the RC to relieve active perstempo/optempo [personnel tempo/operations
tempo]. He provided a central fund of $25 million per year to cover increased transportation
costs and incremental days of active duty associated with training outside the U.S. In PSRC
[Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up] 96, more than 120 CinC missions for the Guard and
Reserve were approved and funded worldwide.

In the FY 97 budget, we will need your support in providing us some flexibility to overcome an
obstacle we have encountered to effectively implement these initiatives. We have requested
authority to transfer small levels of O&M [operations and maintenance] funds to military
personnel, should the CinCs desire, in order to pay some of the incremental costs associated
with these initiatives.
Promoting reserve component accessibility is key to expanded RC use. The Commission on Roles and
Missions concluded that reserve accessibility is no longer a major issue. I agree. The department greatly
appreciates your help in providing greater access to the Guard and Reserve by allowing for a 270-day
call-up duration under PSRC.
The voluntary and involuntary use of reserve component units and individuals in Haiti and Bosnia have
been good news stories about the accessibility of the RC. In both instances, all the reserve components
have been involved. I will continue to push for streamlining of DoD's procedures to implement involuntary
call-up.
Providing analysis and advice on force structure options for increased reliance on Guard and Reserve
forces is an important part of my job. The Bottom-up Review established a DoD force structure capable
of fighting and winning two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts and conducting a wide range of
other military operations.
The department is always looking at ways to adjust the force structure and the use of Guard and Reserve
forces to meet these threats more effectively and at lower cost. I intend to continue to participate fully in
these reviews and to advise the secretary on how Guard and Reserve forces can be helpful.
I continue to focus on the readiness of the reserve forces. In seeking innovative ways to man, train and
equip RC units, I am guided by the concept of mission readiness. This concept requires that peacetime
resourcing -- for personnel, for training, for equipment and facilities -- be adequate to ensure that units
can reach deployment standards in time to meet their most stringent contingency. This approach allows
differing levels of readiness resourcing in peacetime, based on the time available to bring a reserve unit
to full mission readiness.
Support continues to be provided to people affected by the RC downsizing. We have worked diligently to
reduce the hardships associated with force structure changes by providing transition benefits to those
forced out of the Selected Reserve. The drawdown of the reserve forces to achieve BUR target levels is
now over 80 percent complete. Today, the Selected Reserve comprise[s] a higher percentage of the total
force than during the Cold War. The department will continue to use the full range of Guard and Reserve
transition initiatives to provide fair treatment of Selected Reservists who will be involuntarily separated.
Improving the effectiveness of recruiting and retention programs is particularly important now. The
perceptions caused by downsizing, reduced budgets and the inactivation of local units all contribute to a
public impression that the reserve forces are no longer hiring.
With the completion of the active force drawdown in FY 98, fewer prior service personnel will be available
to enter the Selected Reserve. This will increase the need to expand nonprior service recruiting and
intensify retention efforts. To address these concerns, I formed a RC Recruiting and Retention Task
Force to analyze the current programs supporting recruiting and retention and to explore innovative ways
to maintain National Guard and Reserve strength.
Ensuring adequate full-time support is critical to unit readiness. The full-time support people perform the
training, administration and maintenance functions, and so maximize the training time available to
reservists during weekend and annual training periods.
Recognizing that all four categories of full-time support -- active Guard and Reserve personnel, military
technicians, active component personnel and civil service employees -- will continue to decrease through
the drawdown, my No. 1 priority for full-time support is to ensure the right mix, placement and use of the
full-time support force.
In the coming year, I have several objectives:

To revise department policy to have a more effectively managed program;

To review each component's program to assess its effectiveness;


To better manage and account for military technicians;
To revise reporting requirements for more effective program evaluation and management;

To assess readiness impacts that may result from any reductions in full-time support personnel
and assist the components in maintaining the proper mix and use of each of the four categories
of full-time support personnel.
Protecting activated reservist students is important for recruiting because 30 percent of our reservists are
college students. USERRA [Uniformed Services Employment and Re-employment Rights Act] provides
civilian job protection for reservists, but there is no similar college education protection for reservists.
I have worked to get voluntary support from colleges and universities to ensure that student-reservists
are treated fairly, so they receive partial course credit for completed course work or a refund of tuition and
fees for that portion of the course they cannot complete, so they have the right to return to their
educational institution without prejudice. I'm pleased to report to you that we have been successful in
gaining cooperation and voluntary support from the education community. New legislation is not needed.
Implementing Title XI initiatives is well on its way toward full completion. The amendments Congress
made to Title XI last year increased emphasis on prioritizing resources for early deploying units. Most
initiatives are nearing completion.
The Army is moving towards assigning the entire mandated 5,000 AC [active component] soldiers to RC
units by FY 1997. One obstacle is the active duty officer grade strength caps. If the relief proposed by the
department is granted, then the Army could fully implement Title XI without adversely impacting joint duty
assignments, acquisition officer assignments and deployable unit leadership. I encourage your support
for this relief.
Promoting the medical fitness and medical readiness of RC forces. Our reserve medical force plays an
important role in the total force. We remain committed to maintaining National Guard and Reserve
medical force capability at the highest possible level. Our reserve medical forces have successfully
supported not only Operation Desert Storm but also operations in Guantanamo Bay, Haiti and Bosnia.
In addition to supporting operational requirements and missions, reserve medical forces support the
military health care mission within the United States, and,while continuing to practice their go-to-war skills,
they provide underserved Americans quality health care services.
While being called upon more, our National Guard and Reserve medical force has also been under a
great deal of change. Force reductions, reorganizations and mission changes have had a significant
impact. This kind of turbulence, coupled with the increased frequency of call-up, continues to challenge
our ability to recruit, train and retain a quality medical force.
Last year, to address our concerns, we modified several of the incentives we use to recruit critical
medical skills, thanks to your support. I would also like to thank you for the recent enactment of the
Ready Reserve Income Insurance program. While I will talk more about this program later, I want you to
know that this will significantly relieve one of the major concerns expressed by our health care providers.
Providing reserve forces with a new medical and dental insurance program. A critical element of
readiness is the medical and dental health of the reserve forces. However, unlike the active force,
National Guard and Reserve members rely primarily on health care provided through civilian providers
for their medical and dental care needs.
Since most of their health care is not provided through the military health care system, we are developing
strategies to incorporate all health care information, medical and dental, in each member's health record.
The addition of the Selected Reserve dental insurance program will assist National Guard and Reserve
members in maintaining their dental readiness. Implementation of the dental insurance program is
scheduled for Oct. 1, 1996. It provides for voluntary enrollment and premium sharing between the
Department of Defense and the member. A separate contract is being awarded to support this insurance.
Distance-learning initiatives can improve training effectiveness, efficiency and access for both individuals
and units. A team was formed within DoD by my office to review the status of distance-learning usage
and potential RC requirements. Our next step is to expand the analysis to total force requirements. DoD
is also a principal player in a group which promotes sharing of distance-learning resources -- the
Government Alliance for Training and Education -- an organization of agencies across the federal
government.
Implementing my RC equipping strategy is a key step in meeting the equipment and logistics needs of
the RC. The goal is to have reservists equipped with modern, compatible equipment to enable them to do
their job side by side with the active components and coalition partners. The strategy calls for identifying
all RC equipment requirements, using smart business practices whenever possible to solve equipment
shortfalls and procuring new equipment only when necessary. The strategy seeks to ensure that RC
units are equipped to respond to two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts and peacetime
engagement.
As part of the RC equipping strategy:

I am taking an in-depth look at the services' policies and practices for distributing new and used
equipment to the RC. I chair semiannual RC equipment execution reviews to assess progress
on service plans to provide equipment to the RC and to identify how each service is providing
the resources to properly accomplish planned distribution and redistribution.

Equally important, I have established the Equipment Working Group, which I chair, to provide a
DoD focus semiannually on the management initiatives directed at reducing ongoing RC
equipping issues and to begin to address new ones.
Supporting critical RC real property maintenance needs requires adequate Real Property Maintenance
Activity funding. Unfortunately, funds for replacing RC infrastructure are decreasing at the same time the
average age of our facilities (and hence repair and maintenance costs) is increasing.
This strains our limited RPMA funds and our ability to fully operate safe facilities. The reserve
components backlog of maintenance and repair has grown steadily each year -- despite the relief you
provided us in FY 96 -- and is currently over $1.2 billion. Although FY 97 RPMA funding is constrained,
we are committed to fund requirements driven by urgent situations, health and safety, and environmental
laws and regulations.
Investing in reserve component military construction continues to be affected by many factors. These
factors -- downsizing of the reserve force; realignment among active, Reserve and Guard components;
leasing buyout programs; BRAC-created opportunities for reserve enclaves and joint reserve bases; and
privatization and outsourcing efforts -- make it very difficult to see the future.
Facilities investment this year focuses near term on projects that address critical mission needs and/or
enhance readiness. Joint use of reserve bases can pool resources, and I intend to promote this concept
not only to save money but also to promote integration and jointness of the reserve components into the
total force.
DoD is committed to meeting environmental challenges at sites used by the RC as well as by the active
forces. We have identified 3,704 sites currently used by the RC that require cleanup. The services have
estimated the cost of cleanup at about $1.3 billion and plan to achieve full compliance at these sites in 10
years. To keep costs down, the RCs have developed one of the best, most comprehensive
environmental training and awareness programs in the department. The many environmental awards that
the Guard and Reserve received in the last year speak to the excellence of these programs.
The Army's Reserve Component Automation System has been restructured to meet fiscal constraints
and changed requirements. I want to thank you for your continued strong support of RCAS. I believe the
restructured program will meet the long-standing need for a modern, yet affordable system able to
exchange data with DoD and Army systems as well as support day-to-day decision-making needs
required to have Army National Guard and Reserve ready to mobilize. The chief of the National Guard
Bureau, with the Army's support, is currently seeking Milestone III approval to begin fielding the new
RCAS architecture later this fall.
To make full use of the reserve components, we must increase the RCs' capability to perform
successfully in a joint environment as fully integrated partners in the total force. This means anticipating
and acting on opportunities to increase the reserve components' experience and capability to work
effectively with their active force counterparts in a joint environment.
To accomplish this, we will be looking into the benefits of maximizing joint use of facilities. We will also be
exploring ways to best employ RC units in long-term peacetime missions, expand opportunities for joint
training and promote new opportunities for RC integration with the CinCs.
As reserve component officers occupy an increasing number of positions in joint organizations and are
called upon ever more frequently to support operational missions, the time has come to develop a
personnel management policy that will put them on a more equal footing with their active component
counterparts.
Toward that end, we have developed an initiative to identify ways to promote reserve component officer
readiness for those assigned joint responsibilities. With other defense agencies, the Joint Staff and the
services, we plan to develop policies and the framework for a reserve component joint officer
management program in FY 97.
The primary quality of life issues for reservists and their families are centered around four areas:
protection against economic loss, quality of participation, family readiness and support, and employer
support.
In the area of providing protection against economic loss, I want to thank you for two recent changes to
the law that provide support mechanisms to protect and assist reserve component members: the
enactment of the Uniformed Services Employment and Re-employment Rights Act, and the Ready
Reserve Income Insurance Program. Both of these legislative actions help provide the economic safety
net that is critical to the men and women of the Guard and Reserve.
An important part of quality participation is ensuring our members are provided with adequate incentives
for their service in the reserve forces. This not only includes adequate pay and allowances, but also other
incentive programs.
Last year, we issued a DoD directive providing for the first time policy guidance on reserve component
incentives. An accompanying DoD instruction that provides implementation procedures will be issued
soon. These two DoD publications, in conjunction with the DoD financial management regulation, will
combine to provide comprehensive guidance on all reserve component incentives and will form the
framework for the effective utilization of these incentives.
Another important incentive tool is the Montgomery GI Bill-Selected Reserve. During FY 95, more than
97,000 individuals participated in the Selected Reserve Educational Assistance Program. Since the
program started, there have been 378,000 National Guardsmen and reservists who have applied for
educational assistance. This high level of overall participation is evidence of its effectiveness as a
recruiting and retention incentive for the reserve components. Nearly 38 percent of all members eligible
for educational assistance through the end of FY 95 had actually applied for educational benefits.
Furthermore, studies conducted by the Sixth Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation and the Rand
Corporation indicate that the Montgomery GI Bill-Selected Reserve continues to be one of the most
important recruiting and retention incentives for the reserve components, especially for the first six years
of a reservist's military affiliation.
Finally, the Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act will provide a comprehensive management
system for approximately one-quarter million officers not on the active duty list. It will also give the
reserve components the needed flexibility to manage their reserve officer force while simultaneously
providing visible career progression opportunities to the individual reserve officer. We are now in the
process of incorporating the ROPMA provisions into DoD publications, which will serve as the basis for
full implementation of ROPMA by Oct. 1, 1996.
Our efforts in family readiness and support are designed to ensure mechanisms are in place to support
reserve families across the spectrum of reserve service, from week-end training to mobilization. Our DoD
instruction on family readiness in the National Guard and reserve components has formalized service
policies and procedures to ensure National Guard and Reserve members, and their families are prepared
and adequately served by the family care systems and organizations of the services for the uncertainties
and stresses incident to military service. Additionally, we are studying the feasibility of conducting a test
of weekend child care for drilling reserve members and have requested authority to run a regionalized
test of unlimited commissary benefits for reserve members.
We are committed to providing assistance to reservists and their employers through the National
Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve. NCESGR operates a volunteer outreach
program to generate nationwide employer support for the nation's reserve forces on behalf of the
secretary of defense.
NCESGR's strategy of "Strength in Partnership" stresses the importance of the interrelationship among
employers, their reservist employees and the military chain of command. It builds on the success of past
outreach programs in concert with new programs to increase understanding of, and appreciation for, the
needs and concerns of all involved in the partnership.
Programs such as the Employer Action Council build on this strategy. The EAC brings together business
leaders and key members of the state committees to discuss employers' concerns about reserve military
service. These concerns are forwarded to DoD so that individuals who formulate and implement reserve
policies are sensitive to the current corporate environment and needs of employers.
Now, more than ever, as the nation's reliance on the reserve components continues to increase,
NCESGR's aggressive programs are an invaluable asset to the reserve forces. We believe NCESGR's
positive approach will prevent potential problems and build strong relationships among employers,
reservists and DoD so that all understand and support each other.
Let me assure you that this administration views a mission-ready National Guard and Reserve as an
essential part of our post-Cold War strategy. As a result, reservists will play an expanded role in war and
also be more engaged in these turbulent times of peace. While we ask our people to do more, we must
never lose sight of the need to balance a reservist's commitment to country with his or her commitment to
family and their civilian employer.
We have covered much ground in the last few years, and the future promises to be equally challenging. I
commit to you that I will do all in my power to support and protect reserve component people and their
families, and to work hard to ensure that the National Guard and Reserve is a well trained, mission-ready
and accessible force capable of taking on missions overseas and here at home.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today on behalf of the finest National Guard and Reserve military
forces in the world.
Addendum to prepared statement:
Reserve Forces Revitalization Act of 1995, H.R. 1646
I appreciate the opportunity to submit my comments for the record on the Feb. 13, 1996, version of HR
[House of Representatives] 1646. The following comments address the issues identified by the Military
Personnel Subcommittee.
General. It is difficult to establish a comprehensive department position on a bill that has undergone so
many changes in such a short period of time. Pending modifications to important provisions of the bill
were provided for the department's review last week. Given the frequency and extent of informal
modifications to the original HR 1646, it is important that the department be provided an opportunity to
thoroughly assess the implications of the various provisions, once revised legislation is actually
introduced.
The fact that this bill focuses on the organization, management and sustainment of the reserve
components at a time when increased reliance on reserve forces for peacetime operational support is
becoming an essential part of department planning makes this an important piece of pending legislation.
There are clearly provisions that are intended to enhance the status of the reserve components within the
total force and the ability of the reserve leadership to more effectively represent the needs and
capabilities of their reserve forces. At the same time, there are provisions of the bill that could potentially
create barriers to more effective integration of reserve and active forces. These provisions require
modification before the department could accept the bill in its entirety.
Organizational (Sections 201-208)
Issue: Evaluate the rationale for the statutory establishment of a separate Army, Navy, Air Force and U.S.
Marine Corps Reserve commands.
DoD supports the modifications outlined in the official DoD general counsel response to Congress, dated
Feb. 27.
These modifications are intended to provide greater flexibility in the proposed legislation and to ensure
consistency with existing statutory authorities. The statutory establishment of separate Army, Navy, Air
Force and Marine Corps Reserve commands supports the increased role and importance of reserve
forces within the total force. It would institutionalize the reserve chief's direct control over most reserve
forces until they are mobilized. In actual effect, we would see little direct change to the way we are doing
business today.
Issue: Evaluate the requirement that the commander of each of the services' separate reserve
commands report directly to the service's chief, as well as the rationale for and implications of the
assignment of some or all (depending on the service) non-mobilized reserve forces to the service's
reserve command.
As the chief of the reserve force, the chief of each of the reserve components already reports directly to
the respective service chief. This bill would not change that relationship.
It should be noted that the commander of the Army Reserve does not report directly to the chief of staff of
the Army. I would support the Joint Staff concerns that the provisions of the draft bill regarding the
assignment of forces be consistent with department efforts to clarify command authority for reserve
component forces.
I would agree that it is essential for combatant commanders to be directly involved in establishing training
standards and in evaluating the readiness of reserve forces, and that reserve component forces currently
assigned to combatant commands remain so assigned. I would also note that reserve component units
face some unique challenges not faced by active forces, such as limited training times, geographical
dispersion and civilian employer-employee conflicts.
Peacetime management by reserve commanders who understand these unique challenges is as
important as training and readiness oversight by combatant commanders who need visibility and
influence over reserve forces that will be operating in their areas of responsibility.
Issue: Assess the proposed increases in numbers and rank/grade of general and flag officers required for
the headquarters of the separate reserve commands and for the headquarters, National Guard Bureau.
In addition, assess the rationale for the increase in the number of U.S. Marine Corps reserve general
officers from 10 to 16.

Although it is difficult to support proposed grade increases during a downsizing of the force, I
believe that the numbers and grades of general and flag officers supporting the reserve
command establishment may need to be reviewed on the basis of the relative size of the
reserve force within the total force and the increased responsibilities inherent in the missions
being assigned to that force. Reserve forces are no longer follow-on forces. They are now an
integral element in nearly all military operations -- peacetime, wartime, contingency operations
and operations other than war.

The provision to increase the number of Marine Corps Reserve general officer billets from 10 to
16 reflects the growing emphasis on more effective joint planning and joint operations. I am
advised that the need to provide reserve expertise and perspectives on the capabilities, roles
and missions of reserve forces in the joint arena has led to an increase in the requirements for
reserve general and flag officers to serve on the staffs of combatant commanders.
Issue: Review the justification for and implications of the proposed exemption of general/flag officer
positions from statutory active duty grade ceilings.
In its 1992 evaluation of reserve general and flag officer positions, the Hay Group concluded that
counting reserve general and flag officers against the active duty ceilings imposed by Sections 525 and
526 of Title 10 U.S. Code has the potential to set up a competition between the active force and the
reserve force for the limited general and flag officer authorizations.
Hay concluded that a separate ceiling or separate management of the full-time reserve general and flag
officer billets within the active duty allocation would provide for a better management process and would
ensure proper emphasis of management on the key issue of delivering a ready reserve. The department
chose to make no recommendations at the time that it submitted the Hay Study to Congress, nor has any
subsequent action been taken to implement any of the study's findings.
Issue: Assess the expanded responsibilities of each service's chief/commander of the reserve, including
the new responsibility to make preparation, justification and execution of the reserve procurement
program a principal duty.
The budget and appropriations management responsibilities as specified in this bill are for the most part
inherent in the duties and functions of the reserve chiefs and do not represent an expansion of those
responsibilities. The proposed language would serve to formalize these responsibilities in law.
One exception to the above comments and an area of concern is the assignment of responsibility to the
chiefs of the reserve components for preparation, justification and execution of procurement
appropriation budgets. There are currently no separate reserve component investment/procurement
appropriations.
The creation of a separate reserve component procurement responsibility would duplicate current efforts,
create additional staff overhead and result in higher procurement costs. The additional administrative
burden would not ensure additional procurement funding. In fact, it could jeopardize existing processes
which allow reserve component modernization requirements to be managed as a part of larger service
initiatives, making it easier to accommodate small pricing adjustments.
The proposal, if adopted, does not include the two National Guard components, which would create
serious inconsistencies in procurement appropriations. I am concerned that this provision would result in
a less efficient procurement process and one that is less effective in considering procurement decisions
as an investment in the total force.
Mission and Accessibility (Section 301)
Issue: Review the need for the proposed new authority and procedures permitting the president to
involuntarily recall reserve component units and individuals to respond to natural disasters.
The National Guard continues to provide the first line of defense to support local authorities responding to
domestic emergencies. The regional compacts being ratified by state legislatures facilitate emergency
response by Guard assets across state lines.
We are also improving the process for using reserves in support of domestic emergencies. In FY 1995,
over 400 Army Reserve soldiers supported seven domestic disaster operations contributing more than
12,000 man-days. In recent years, reservists [have] been used in various natural disasters, to include
Hurricanes Andrew and Iniki, the Midwest floods and the Northwest fires.
Reserve officers serve as emergency preparedness liaison officers to FEMA [Federal Emergency
Management Administration]. Automated data bases can identify reserve units located in the vicinity of
local disasters. Regulations provide for loaning reserve equipment to Guard forces for disaster relief. The
activation of reserve forces in support of disaster relief is already provided for in law, either as volunteers
or, if necessary, under a declaration of national emergency. What is needed is not so much a change to
the law, but an improved process that ensures more effective state support and, when needed, adequate
and timely federal assistance. This has been the core of our effort over the last several years and will
continue to be the focus for the future.
Issue: Assess the proposed change in reserve activation authority that restricts the president's partial
mobilization authority to involuntarily recall reserve units and personnel to situations when the president
determines that augmentation of the active forces is necessary. Current law permits the president to
invoke partial mobilization "in time of national emergency declared by the president," without regard to a
determination of a need to augment the active forces.
We have worked very hard to ensure the full understanding and acceptance of reserve component
capabilities and the premise that reserve components are now fully accessible. Reliance on the
President's Selected Reserve Call-up authority, under Section 12304 of Title 10 U.S. Code, has evolved
into an essential element in the planning for virtually any operational contingency.
I am concerned that the new reporting requirements and limitations on reserve activation could prove
administratively burdensome and could potentially hinder flexible decision-making. This could have the
unintended effect, either real or perceived, of limiting reserve component accessibility.
I can understand the intent but am concerned about legislating requirements such as 48-hour notification
before activating reserves, limitations on activating reserves more than once in any 24-month period and
mandatory deactivation of reserve personnel whenever active personnel are available to perform the
mission.
The department recognizes the need to protect our reservists from burnout and overuse. The services
have made a concerted effort not to call the same members or units repeatedly for either peacetime
support or contingency operations. For example, the reserve units that were called up for Bosnia were
not the same units that were called for Haiti.
Issue: Evaluate the implications of the proposed requirement that the president provide Congress 48
hours' prior notice of the proposed exercise of the reserve recall authority, a description of the anticipated
use of the reserves and the anticipated length of service.
We need to ensure that we do not legislate requirements that would tend to limit the use of reserve
component forces due to additional reporting, monitoring, timing or other restrictive requirements.
Limitations or restrictions on the president's use of his authority to call up reserves would have the effect
of making those forces appear to be a less viable and responsive asset.
Similarly, I can see little benefit from imposing additional reporting requirements beyond those required in
law today. The creation of added administrative tasks or burdens could adversely influence the
willingness of force planners and operators to rely on reserve forces.
Resourcing (Sections 401-403)
Issue: Evaluate the proposed limitation on the secretary of defense that any funds in a reserve
component appropriation may be transferred to an active component account only when specifically
authorized by law.
My concern is that this provision would restrict the flexibility of the secretary of defense and the
secretaries of the services to manage their resources most effectively in support of the total force.
Requests to reprogram between appropriation accounts already requires congressional approval.
Requiring legislation would make for a much less expedient process.
Issue: Assess the desirability of the proposed annual report to Congress that would detail reserve
component resource shortfalls.
The services already conduct extensive reviews of all personnel, operations and maintenance and
construction requirements and programs as part of the planning, programming and budgeting process.
These programs, to include shortfalls, are addressed in current annual reports to Congress, which could
be modified if necessary. Such reports include the Secretary of Defense Annual Report to Congress, the
National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report to Congress, the Reserve Forces Policy Board Annual
Report, the Force Readiness Assessment and the Joint Military Net Assessment, to list a few.
I think we should consider modifying current reporting requirements in lieu of establishing additional
report requirements in law.
Sustainment (Sections 501-508):
Issue: Assess the desirability and cost of the several proposed sustainment initiatives including revised
transient housing allowances, and a local community and military personnel mutual benefits program.

The proposed revision to Title 37, U.S. Code, to authorize reimbursement of transient housing
charges for members performing active duty for training, is already provided in a recurring
provision of the annual DoD Appropriations Act. It also is consistent with long-standing service
practice of providing cost-efficient accommodations for reservists who perform training outside a
reasonable commuting distance. We would support making this authority permanent law.

Although the concept of Section 506 of the bill, concerning the establishment of a local
community and military personnel mutual benefits program to provide price discounts for
members of the armed forces, has some interesting aspects, I have been advised by DoD
general counsel about the potential for conflicts of interest. Specifically, the provisions of the
draft legislation may be contrary to existing statutes governing ethics in government.
Soliciting or leveraging merchants to provide discounts for military members would create the
appearance of department endorsements of merchants who agree to participate in the benefits program
over those businesses that do not participate. This, in turn, could lead to the perception that the
department is awarding certain government contracts on the basis of the discounts provided by
businesses that choose to participate in the program -- a clear violation of procurement laws and
regulations.
Issue: Evaluate the requirement for and potential cost of the proposed requirement that there be no
distinction between active duty personnel and reserve component members (and their dependents)
serving on active duty in pay, benefits, eligibility for medical care or any other benefit if such distinction is
based simply on length of active duty service.
Today, the compensation and benefit structure for reserve component members is not strictly dependent
upon the length of active duty service, nor should it be. We must continue to ensure that it is also based
on duty status, mission and other factors.
The full impact of a blanket policy change, such as that effected by this bill, on the overall system of
benefits is difficult to assess. Each specific change that is intended to provide greater parity of benefits
needs to consider the member's contribution (e.g., support for a contingency operation), the equity
provided by the change, the capability of the military system to support the change and the cost of the
change.
For example: The proposed provision would presumably reverse a previous decision to eliminate
entitlement to Variable Housing Allowance for Reserves on short-term reserve service. Providing an
entitlement to VHA for all reserve members on active duty for less than 140 days would achieve parity
with regular active duty members, but would not be consistent with the intent of VHA and could generate
an annual cost of more than $200 million.
A second example: The provision would also entitle the family members of reservists called for active
duty for just one day to the full range of medical and dental benefits provided by the military health care
system. The cost and administration of such a change could well be unmanageable.
A third example: Parity could work to the disadvantage of the reserve components. Reserve are
compensated for inactive duty training on the basis of one-thirtieth of basic pay, which serves as an
incentive for qualified personnel to enter and remain in the reserve components and encourages them to
maintain and improve their military skills through regular training. The parity provision of the draft
legislation could result in a reserve compensation system that is less fair and less reasonable in
considering the part-time nature of reserve duty.
These are only a few examples of potential problem areas.
Alternative to Section 301 (Draft dated Feb. 29, 1996)
My concern with these alternative provisions is that they may require revisiting the Army Offsite
Agreement, which was an unprecedented collaborative effort by the senior leaders of the Army, active
and reserve components, and supporting organizations. This overall restructuring plan has provided the
basis for overall reductions, assignment of missions and force structure for the Army.
The new Section 209 may overemphasize state and domestic requirements in making force structure
decisions. Any major restructuring between the National Guard and Reserve must consider full-time
support, equipment and other resource implications.
The Reserve Components and the Real
World
Prepared remarks by Secretary of Defense William J. Perry , Adjutants General Association of the United
States, Washington, Wednesday, February 07, 1996
Thank you very much. ... Last June when I spoke to you, the National Guard had just made history when
it deployed the 4th [Battalion] of the 505th Infantry [Regiment], a unit made up mostly of guardsmen, to
perform multinational peacekeeping duties on the Sinai Peninsula. Well, the 4th of the 505th made
history a second time when they returned to the United States because they had proven the reserve
component's capabilities for dealing with post-Cold war missions and playing an even greater role in our
national defense. We are confident that the Guard can play this greater role in the total force because
over the years in national disasters and national security threats, the Guard has proven itself ready and
capable time and time again.
One of the Guard's roles today has been unfolding during the mission to bring peace to war-torn Bosnia,
where the Guard is serving from the flight lines in Aviano to the supply lines in Germany and Hungary to
the front lines in Bosnia itself.
Today, I want to talk to you about Bosnia, because it's very much on my mind and it's probably very much
on your minds as well. Last month, I went to the Bosnia theater to see how our deployment was going. I
spent the first day at our air bases in Aviano and at Vicenza in Italy. For 2½ years, NATO has conducted
an operation called Deny Flight, which has prevented the warring parties in Bosnia from conducting aerial
bombardments of cities. It didn't get much publicity. Most people don't understand what it did, but it saved
thousands and thousands of lives because it prevented that war from degenerating into indiscriminate
bombing of cities.
Deny Flight was in operation 2½ years and was challenged by the Bosnian Serbs only once. They sent
four fighter bombers out and began bombing a city. Two F-16s intercepted those four, shot down all four
of them, and it was never challenged after that. So that was a very successful operation.
The second major activity in Aviano was the NATO air strike force that was put in place to coerce the
Serbs to move their heavy weapons out of Sarajevo and stop the ground bombardment of that city. That
threat worked initially, and the weapons were silent. Prior to the institution of that threat, there were as
many as a thousand shells a day being launched from the hills and mountains around Sarajevo into the
city. That was stopped. But then later in '94, the Serbs began testing the limits and began challenging
that exclusion. And the U.N. command, fearing Bosnian Serb reprisals against their troops on the ground,
would not give the authorization for the NATO air strikes to be used effectively.
Unchecked, the Serbs continued to escalate their violations until finally they overplayed their hand when
they violated the so-called safe area of Srebrenica. That violation was so egregious that even the nations
with troops on the ground with the U.N. agreed at a meeting in London that it was time to use NATO air
power and to use it effectively.
In fact, at that meeting in London, I made the proposal if there's any further violations, that there would be
a massive air campaign -- not just a bombing or two, but an air campaign. There was another violation.
The nations had agreed to that air campaign, and we had such a campaign. From Aviano and from the
decks of carriers in the Adriatic, we launched one of the most effective air campaigns that we've ever had.
It was over 1,000 sorties. Every target that had been designated was destroyed, and there was zero
collateral damage. This was a rare instance where by combination of exclusive use of precision guided
ammunitions and very strict rules of engagement we conducted this massive campaign with no damage,
no damage to civilians, no collateral damage of any kind.
Quite aside from the military effectiveness of the campaign, we know now, having talked with the Bosnian
Serbs and the Serbian Serbs, that they were stunned by the power and effectiveness of this campaign.
And more than anything else, that's what led them to conclude that the continuing fighting was a losing
proposition, and they decided to go to the peace table at Dayton. This was one of the rare examples in
history of successful use of coercive diplomacy. That is, the use of military power to achieve diplomatic
objectives.
On this trip, I also went to Vicenza. Vicenza is the air base near Aviano where we have the CAOC, which
is the Combined Air Operations Center. This is one of the most effective air intelligence operations that
has ever been put together. At the CAOC, we bring in national intelligence, tactical intelligence,
synthesize it and get it to the user -- to the pilots in the air -- in a matter of seconds.
This whole operation was rejuvenated after the shoot-down of [U.S. Air Force] Capt. [Scott] O'Grady. We
looked very carefully in the after-action analysis there and discovered that we had the information which
could have warned off Capt. O'Grady three minutes before the missile was fired. We got it to him five
minutes later, which is two minutes after the missile was fired. Five minutes is pretty good, but not good
enough -- not good enough to prevent the shoot-down of that airplane.
And so at that point, we decided to completely restructure and organize air intelligence support. We had
to do two things. We had to change our procedures to get the information out to the field quickly, and we
had to find a way of downgrading some of the highly classified strategic intelligence which was needed
by the pilot -- by the warrior. Most of those things have been done, and they are now operating quite
effectively at Vicenza.
The other thing that's operating out of Vicenza is the management of the airlift operation into Bosnia. We
have a massive airlift to deploy our forces and deploy our equipment into Bosnia. Everything is being
coordinated out of Vicenza. I've seen the most effective logistics management that I've ever seen at
Vicenza. The National Guard airplanes, Reserve airplanes, the active duty airplanes, all coming from the
United States and from Germany into Bosnia. All were being managed out of Vicenza.
From Italy, I got on a C-17 and flew into Taszar, Hungary. In Hungary we are managing the logistics for
all of the equipment and personnel flowing into Bosnia. The concept that [U.S. Army] Gen. [George A.]
Joulwan [supreme allied commander Europe] had was that we would take all of our forces that are in
Germany and instead of moving them directly to Bosnia, we would move them to a staging area in
Hungary. So we have 300 trains over a period of a month, each one with 20 or 30 freight cars, go from
Germany to Taszar. We unload it, regroup, and then from Taszar we proceed by road in combat units
into Bosnia. In combat units in full march with guns loaded ready for combat.
As it turned out, we did not meet any combat. We did not meet any armed resistance when we went into
Bosnia. But we did not know we would not meet resistance, so we went in prepared for resistance. We
will probably be criticized for having overreached on this or having had too large a force, too well-armed a
force. But my judgment was the same then as my judgment is now -- that if I'm going to err, I want to err
on the side of being too strong and too ready rather than the other way around.
Also, we will never know -- since we cannot rewrite history -- the extent to which the strength and the
capability of that force deterred or dissuaded people from resisting. As it turns out, we have had
absolutely no armed resistance in Bosnia. In fact, we're being met with full cooperation by all the parties
there. And there was no question that the U.S. forces, when they entered Bosnia, were met with great
respect. They came in, as I said, fully armed with flak jackets, with their helmets, with their guns at the
ready position and loaded. And people paid attention to that.
Now, our reserve components have played a key role in all of these operations I've described to you.
They provided significant airlift access including a large percentage of the truly tremendous C-17
capability, which is being used to airlift the supplies in there and which I used to hitchhike a ride when I
went into Bosnia. They're being used in the aeromedical capability, and they provide about half of the
tanker support. The reserve components continue to be crucial as we are slowly turning peace into a
reality in Bosnia.
Now, we also saw reserve component forces at the logistics staging area in Taszar, Hungary. We now
have 7,000 people running this logistics center. One incidental side feature of the operation in Hungary is
it has built up a new relationship with the Hungarian government. We requested permission of Hungary to
have a base in Hungary. Hungary's parliament met, and by a vote of 300 to 1 they agreed to let the
United States use their base. And when I visited that base, I was met by the leaders of the Hungarian
government, and I've never seen such a warm relationship between two countries as developed between
Hungary and the United States -- all because of our use of the Taszar base.
From Taszar, I flew on to the Sarajevo Airport and then drove down to the president's residence where I
met President [Alija] Izetbegovic and his cabinet. On the drive from the airport into the president's office
in downtown Sarajevo, I drove through the destruction that had been wrought by years and years of
shelling in this city, and I was just heartsick to see this once beautiful city in Europe reduced almost to
rubble.
But as I drove through it, I also was heartened to see that this had now stopped. We drove right down
sniper alley without any danger. The shelling has stopped. I had a very good meeting with the president,
and when I left the meeting, I came out of the office building and there were 300 to 400 Bosnians on the
other side of the street being held off by a police cordon. They wanted to see the American secretary of
defense.
I had no idea what kind of reaction we would have in the crowd, but as I walked out the door, they started
cheering and shouting "U-S-A, U-S-A!" And I drove my security people actually wild at that point. I left my
group, crossed the street, went through the police cordon and started shaking hands and talking with the
Bosnians who were there.
For me, it was the most emotional moment of the trip -- to see their gratitude. These are people who for
four years have been living in this city that was subjected to continues shelling for much of that period.
They now saw a prospect of peace. And there's no doubt in their minds that peace was being delivered to
them by the United States. I was a symbol of the U.S. and they wanted to show their gratitude.
From Sarajevo, I flew to Tuzla, which is the headquarters of the American forces there, and met [U.S.
Army Maj.] Gen. [William] Nash. We got into Black Hawks and flew over to the Sava River, landing on the
Croatian side of the Sava River. This was the day after they had finished the bridge, opened the bridge.
I got out of the helicopter and walked up to the bridge and walked into Bosnia across the bridge. It was a
cold, windy, muddy walk. Halfway across the bridge there were 30 or 40 American combat engineers still
working on some aspects of the bridge. They were dirty, cold and tired, but very proud of what they had
done.
As it turned out, one of them had just completed his first enlisted term that week and had decided to
re-enlist. And so we had the re-enlistment ceremony there on the bridge. Gen. Joulwan, [U.S. Army] Gen.
[John] Shalikashvili [chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff] and I swore in this soldier for four more years in
the U.S. Army. And I can tell you I have never been more proud of the Army than standing there that day
and swearing in this soldier in the mud and the ice and snow. He had just been through that, and he was
ready for four more years of it. That tells you something about the spirit and the pride of the U.S. soldier.
I went back then to the base camp at Tuzla. I got a real taste of the flavor of this operation and the
jointness of it. This base is the headquarters for Army Gen. Nash and his division, and many of the
battalions are based there. But working alongside of these Army units was an Air Force unit called Red
Horse. Red Horse is an engineer team that builds bases. And if you ever want to see jointness in
operation, go out to Tuzla and watch these Army soldiers not only working but living in the mud and the
snow and the ice, coming back after a patrol and finding that the Air Force had just completed building a
tent for them with a wooden floor and a stove -- a warm, dry place to sleep that night. So this was
jointness in operation, and the Air Force were the heroes of the day for the Army soldiers who were there.
Besides the jointness, this was a multinational operation. Gen. Nash ..., in addition to two American
brigades, has a Nordic brigade -- 4,500 people in the Nordic brigade. That is a build-up of a battalion that
had been there in the U.N. forces. They brought a knowledge of the territory and knowledge of the people
-- a great asset to Gen. Nash to have that Nordic brigade there.
There is a Turkish brigade. They also had been there with the U.N., and they also brought a familiarity
with the people and terrain which is a great value to us. And most amazingly, we have a Russian brigade.
When I was there, the advanced guard of that brigade had just arrived. But as of a few days ago, the
entire brigade is there, is out conducting patrols, and it's just one of Gen. Nash's brigades doing the job
there.
I spent my whole career as a cold warrior and I never, never would have contemplated the possibility of
having a Russian brigade working in an American division conducting a peacekeeping operation in the
Balkans. But there it is. And it seems to be working very well.
I can only imagine what Gen. [Dwight D.] Eisenhower, the first SACEUR, would think if he saw a general
from Russia sitting with Gen. Joulwan, today's SACEUR, at the SHAPE [Supreme Headquarters, Allied
Powers Europe] compound reviewing NATO's operation plan for deployment in Bosnia. But indeed, Gen.
Joulwan and [counterpart Russian commander Col.] Gen. Leontiy Shevtsov spent a week at SHAPE
headquarters planning this whole operation which I saw getting started.
I spent a lot of time while I was in Bosnia talking with the intelligence people on their assessment of the
mine situation. The good news is all three of the warring parties are trying to cooperate with us, providing
charts where they think the mines are located and helping to clear the mines.
Before all of our units went down there, each battalion spent a couple of months specifically training for
combat operations that involved mine awareness, mine location, mine removal and most importantly,
mine avoidance.
I spent some time yesterday at our Advanced Research Projects Agency, reviewing some of their
technology. One of the specific things I was looking at was the technologies that might be useful in this
area. They're working on it, but I'm afraid the realistic assessment is that mine avoidance and detection is
still a matter of training and
discipline and attention to detail. And so the training that we have done to prepare our soldiers was the
best thing that we could have done in preparing our soldiers for the very real problems they're running
into in Bosnia.
They've been there now for almost seven weeks and we've not had a fatality yet from a person stepping
on or a vehicle going over a mine. We have had one fatality [Army Sgt. 1st Class Donald A. Dugan, Feb.
3], but it turned out it was not a mine accident. We have had four or five different mine incidents.
Fortunately no one was killed in those incidents, but it's going to be a problem as long as we are in
Bosnia. A way of dealing with that problem is going to be twofold: continuing to work with the warring
parties for removal of mines on the one hand, and the second, very careful attention to detail, discipline,
training to minimize our chance of the mine accidents.
I'm going to come now to a few conclusions about Bosnia to share with you. The first conclusion is so far,
so good. I say this even as our hearts go out to the family of the American soldier who lost his life over
the weekend. My second conclusion, which is suggested by that, though, is that we still have 10 tough
months ahead of us and we must not get complacent.
When Gen. Shali and I talked with our soldiers over there and our commanders, we had two messages
for them really. The first, keep your focus. Pay close attention to detail. And the other was, take care of
each other.
My third conclusion is that this whole operation in Bosnia is going to determine the character of European
security certainly for the rest of this decade and probably on into the next decade. One of the single
biggest security problems at the end of the Cold War was finding the right formula for maintaining the
kind of security umbrella that NATO had provided for 45 years.
We found that formula in Bosnia, where all of Europe is pulling together for peace. Not only all of the
NATO countries but one -- 15 in all (we had to exclude Iceland, which does not have military forces) -- but
even more non-NATO countries. Nineteen non-NATO countries are participating as well as the 15 NATO
countries. The United States is leading the way, even leading the Russians.
This U.S. military performance in Bosnia demonstrates once more the capability and the effectiveness of
our forces. Our equipment, our training and our people are the best in the world. This goes both for the
active and for the reserve components, and our challenge is to make wise and full use of all of these
assets. That means we need to involve the Guard and Reserve more deeply in the ongoing missions of
our military.
You all know that last year we announced what we called the Increased Use Initiative. The goal was to
find creative ways to include our reserve forces in real missions of the active duty forces, to increase their
proficiency and their readiness and to make more use of your talent and capability.
One of the important benefits of this is we helped reduce the very high operational tempo rate of the
active duty force. After one year, preliminary reports say, yes, we can do these things. But it's not just the
reports that are saying it. More importantly, the CinCs [commanders in chiefs] are saying it, too. They are
saying it by spending time, effort and money to make use of Guard and Reserve talents.
In 1995, for example, the CinCs called on reserve component personnel for 97 missions. In 1996, it will
be up to 167 missions. The CinCs have pledged about $10 million to make this integration possible.
However, the CinCs are assigning Guard and Reserve personnel to real-world, not make-work, missions.
The Army Guard, for example, is supporting the Combat Maneuver Training Center in Hohenfels,
Germany. Navy reserve engineer units are deploying to Haiti to work with the United Nations forces there.
The Colorado National Guard will assume command of the 4th Space Warning Squadron, taking over for
an active unit which formerly performed that job.
The Defense Department has added $25 million over the next two years to help the CinCs make more
use of Guard and Reserve. I'm optimistic that if we put the total effort of our total force behind the
program, it will be successful. But to make the program work, we must ensure that it achieves its
intended effect of increasing the CinCs' war-fighting capability as well as the readiness of our reserves by
not having unintended bad side effects, such as hurting the recruiting and retention in the reserves.
One way to protect the Guard and Reserve recruitment and retention is by doing what we can to protect
the quality of life of the reserve component. We can provide more support and outreach to Guard and
Reserve families when their head of the household is on deployment. And we can also give employers
better warning when we send their employees on deployment, and give employers a voice in our Guard
and Reserve policies. Debbie Lee [assistant secretary of defense for reserve affairs] told you more about
these and other quality of life initiatives for the reserve components. They are critical to making our
Increased Use Initiative a real success.
I'm going to wrap up now by telling you that in case you did not know it, I do believe in a strong Guard and
Reserve, and I believe in taking care of our citizen-soldiers, their families as well, who serve our country.
Gen. Omar Bradley once said our military forces are a team, a team that's in the game to win. And each
player on that team must be an All-American. Every member of today's Total Force -- the active forces,
the reserves, the National Guard, their families and their employers -- is an All-American. The National
Guard and its leadership are doing an All-American job at home, around the nation, and wherever our
country sends them.
I am proud of your work, and I am proud to be your secretary of defense. Thank you very much.
It's Time To Dream Again
Remarks delivered by Edwin Dorn, undersecretary of defense for personnel and readiness, at The
Citadel Greater Issues Series, Charleston, S.C., Feb. 8, 1996.
Thank you. Today I would like to talk with you about change. Change. The inexorable march of time. The
future.
Many of you are in college, anticipating what you'll do when you graduate. To some of you, everything
seems uncertain, up in the air. You probably think that things once were more predictable, and for some
people, they were. A generation or so ago, if you were among the fortunate, you finished school, went to
work in a well-established company, and 40 years later you retired with a gold watch and a good
retirement fund.
And how did you find a job? Well, many of the big companies came to you; they'd set up booths in the
student union. Or you might find a job by word of mouth. A friend or relative might drop by your house
and say,"Hey, they've got an opening down at the plant." Of course, those who didn't have contacts down
at the plant were left out of this word-of-mouth advertising. But for those with the right connections, it
worked well.
Things have changed. There are still lots of jobs out there, lots of career opportunities, but the
opportunities look different. For one thing, you probably won't stay with the same company for an entire
career. For another, lots of those big companies have broken up or are downsizing. Instead of one big
national phone company, for example, we now have several regional companies and several
long-distance carriers. Another big difference is that you'll be working with a much more diverse group of
people than your parents and your grandparents worked with.
There also are a few people in this audience my age. Like me, you probably are worried about the
long-term prospects for Medicare and Social Security, because somebody in Congress keeps
threatening to cut them. It seems things used to be a lot more certain.
Nowhere have things changed more in recent years than in the area of national security. Today, instead
of a cold war, we have a fitful peace. We have moved from a focus on one overarching danger to several
diverse dangers. Today, we need a military that is extraordinarily flexible, equally capable of warfighting
and peacekeeping.
For five decades, our nation competed economically, ideologically and militarily against a Soviet monolith.
We equipped and trained our soldiers to fight Soviet bloc soldiers on the plains of Central Europe.
Less than a decade ago, Soviet bloc divisions were lined up facing NATO divisions in the center of
Europe. But last year, U.S. and Russian units trained together on the plains of Kansas; and today they're
helping to keep the peace together in the mountains of Bosnia.
Those are huge changes. They constitute nothing less than a redrawing the map of the world, and they
call for a major reshaping of U.S. defense policy.
It takes time -- years -- to reshape something as large and complex as America's defense establishment.
We have to make decisions about people, equipment and training. For example, it takes about a decade
to design and build a modern nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, and it takes about 25 years to develop a
Navy captain capable of commanding that carrier. So in DoD, we have to think ahead -- way ahead.
When the evil empire collapsed, we could have said, "All right, we've done our job. Now let's go home."
And some people wanted us to do that. They wanted us to pull our forces out of Europe and the Pacific,
to cut our active military dramatically and revert to an essentially militia military defending fortress
America.
The Bush administration resisted that; so does the Clinton administration. Why? Because we are a great
nation, the sole remaining superpower. We have worldwide economic and political interests to protect.
We also have values that we want to share with other societies -- democracy, free enterprise, human
rights.
And we as a people are moved by the suffering of others. When the television news carries pictures of
war, of starvation, of unspeakable brutality, we Americans ask ourselves, "Isn't there something we can
do?"
Several times in recent years, we have been moved to do something about war or injustice or natural
disaster in some distant country. We assembled an international force under a United Nations mandate
to rout Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. We kept tens of thousands of people from starving to death in
Somalia. We helped restore the legitimate, democratically elected government in Haiti. And now, we are
trying to give peace a chance in Bosnia.
What we've done -- what we're doing -- takes a generous spirit. It also takes vision, a sense of the
nation's greatness and of the obligations that flow from world leadership.
Let me give you an example of what I mean. In December of 1993, I had the pleasure of meeting several
soldiers from the 10th Mountain Division, which is based at Fort Drum, N.Y. They'd just returned from
Somalia. As you'll recall, in the fall of 1993, 18 of their comrades had been killed in a firefight on the
streets of Mogadishu.
I asked one of the soldiers, a young, ramrod-straight sergeant, how he felt about our Somalia
involvement.
"Well, sir ," he said, "all I can say is, 'God bless America.'" He said it in a deep southern drawl, and
immediately I thought I knew what he would say next. I thought he d start talking about how much better
this country is than any other. I thought he'd speak bitterly about how we'd done so much for other
countries and how they didn't appreciate it. I thought he'd make disparaging remarks about Somalis.
But that's not what he did. Instead, he said,"Sir, they sent us over there to keep people from starving to
death, and we did that. They sent us over to build hospitals and roads, and we did that. Sir, we
accomplished our mission."
And he went on, to point out that we were the only country that would have or could have done those
things. We had the equipment and the trained people. More importantly, we had the generosity of spirit to
help out in a land that nobody else cared about. We were willing to come to the aid of strangers.
One of the great joys of my job is that every year I get to meet thousands of people just like that 10th
Mountain Division sergeant. They're men and women who are committed to serving their country, not just
enriching themselves. They understand that America has a special role and responsibility in the world,
and they want to be a part of it.
They're sailors who spend hour after hour on the storm-tossed deck of an aircraft carrier, doing the
complex, dangerous tasks needed to launch and land aircraft. They're soldiers on a windswept dune in
Saudi Arabia, working in 120-degree heat to keep their Patriot missiles in peak operating condition.
They're Air Force doctors and nurses rushed to Panama to set up a field hospital to treat Cuban and
Haitian refugees. They're reservists who are willing to be called away from their homes and jobs in order
to help this country meet the obligations of world leadership. They are ordinary men and women who do
extraordinary things.
My job as the undersecretary for personnel and readiness is to ensure that the rewards of their service
are commensurate with the sacrifices they make. These men and women don't join the military to get rich,
but they don't expect to take a vow of poverty either. So we have to make sure that their pay and benefits
are fair. On several occasions, we in the Clinton administration have had to fight back congressional
assaults on military pay and benefits.
The men and women of the armed forces exemplify the kind of can-do optimism that made this nation
great. But I worry about something. I worry that this country's can-do attitude is being replaced by a
no-can-do attitude. I worry that we focus more on short-run costs than on long-term benefits. I worry that
we have become instead of a nation of visionaries, a nation of bean counters.
Let me tell you what I mean. I came of age in the 1960s. When I was in high school, President John
Kennedy came to my hometown of Houston and gave a speech at Rice Stadium. He made a
commitment: By the end of the decade of the 1960s, he promised, we would send a man to the moon and
bring him back safely. That was a bold vision. This nation got behind it, and we made it happen.
I also remember a summer day in 1963, when Martin Luther King Jr. stood at the Lincoln Memorial and
inspired the nation to share his dream of racial harmony. And for a few years, following the passage of
civil rights legislation, we made enormous progress. We eliminated legal segregation. For the first time,
African Americans who had fought for this country in Germany and Korea and Vietnam had the right to sit
at a lunch counter in downtown Houston and Atlanta and Charleston.
And I remember in 1964, President Lyndon Johnson promising to fight a war against poverty. For a few
years during the mid to late 1960s, we made enormous progress on that front. We reduced poverty rates;
we improved health care for the poor and elderly; we reduced infant mortality; we reduced hunger; and
we reduced the number of people living in overcrowded, substandard housing. We helped poor children
get a head start on elementary school, and we helped a lot of poor high school graduates go to college.
It has become fashionable to criticize the Great Society, but much that happened during that period was
good. It helped people, it promoted economic growth, and for a brief shining moment, it brought us
together as a nation. I don't think I would be where I am today were it not for the bold challenges that
John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson and Martin Luther King Jr. inspired this nation to take on in the
1960s.
But then, some very bad things started to happen, and we began to lose our boundless optimism. What
happened? First, our dreamers were slain. President Kennedy was assassinated in 1963, followed in
1968 by Martin Luther King Jr. and Bobby Kennedy. Next, the war in Vietnam distracted us, disheartened
us, divided us and depleted our precious resources.
Later, the OPEC oil boycott of the early 1970s brought home the degree to which our nation's economic
well-being depended on countries and on events we could not control. The realization that there were
things we could not control was further enhanced by the Iranian hostage incident. By the late 1970s,
many citizens and political leaders, frustrated by our inability to find quick fixes for social and economic
problems that had been festering for decades, concluded that our efforts were doomed.
That combination of things -- the economic shocks, the divisive war, our inability to bridge the racial gulf,
the slaying of our dreamers, all of that -- made us susceptible to a message which said, "Dream less lofty
dreams." The corollary was, "Forget about the other guy, just look out for No. 1." We had moved, in the
course of just a few years, from being visionaries to being members of the Me Generation. A can-do
nation was turning into a no-can-do nation.
I keep hearing people -- members of Congress, political pundits and policy wonks -- talking about what
we Americans cannot do. I keep hearing about the investments we cannot afford to make, the lives we
cannot uplift, the commitments we cannot fulfill. It's depressing. The no-can-do crowd sounds like a
bunch of accountants dividing up the remaining assets of a bankrupt corporation.
Well, I do not believe that this country is bankrupt. We are a great country filled with people who, when
we share a dream, can achieve great things. It's time for us to come out of our shells. It's time to embrace
change and be more positive about this country and its future.
Look at the economy: Growth is up, productivity is up, employment is up. The unemployment rate is
going down, and so is the federal deficit. The economy is growing at a good clip: real gross domestic
product grew at 3.3 percent in 1995. Productivity continues to rise. In 1994, output grew 4.4 percent, the
largest increase since 1984! Employment continues to grow: 8 million new jobs have been created since
December 1992. Unemployment is down: It's at a five year low, 5.6 percent.
So I ask myself, if things are going so well, how come so many people feel so lousy? Why do opinion
surveys show such low public confidence in the future? A couple of reasons, I think.
One is that our economy changed in odd ways during the 1980s. Relatively high-paying manufacturing
jobs were being replaced by relatively low-paying service jobs. At the same time, a wave of corporate
mergers and acquisitions and restructuring had the effect of increasing the stock value of companies
without increasing the number of jobs or of the number of things produced. As a result, we actually saw a
growth in income inequality during the 1980s. The rich got richer, the poor got poorer, and the middle
class got squeezed.
So for a lot of people, economic growth has not brought prosperity. A lot of us are like those boats people
talk about all the time -- the boats that are not able to rise with the rising tide. Indeed, when the tidal wave
of business restructuring struck in the 1980s, a lot of us got swamped.
But there's another reason many of us are feeling lousy. It's because so many people are telling us we
should. They keep telling us we're bankrupt. They keep telling us what we, as a nation, cannot do.
Well, if you believe that this country's best years are behind her, then they are. If you believe that we can't
get out of this rut, then we won't get out of this rut. I, for one, believe that this nation's best days are
ahead. I, for one, want to focus on the future and the many opportunities it holds.
We Americans have always had a very distinctive view of the future. In most of the world, the view has
always been that tomorrow will be pretty much like today, just as today is pretty much like yesterday.
That's the way things were. If your father was a goatherd, then you would grow up to be a goatherd. If
your mother was a member of the royal court, then you would grow up to be a member of the royal court.
If the Montagues and the Capulets feuded during your father's generation, then you were honor-bound to
continue the feud in your generation.
We Americans have always had a very different view. We believe that tomorrow will be different -- indeed,
that it should be different -- from today. We value our past, but we do not seek to live in it. We cherish our
traditions, but we don't wallow in them. We understand that history is about where we've been, not about
where we're going. We know that we cannot find our future in our past.
We believe that we can settle the wilderness, that we can end racial oppression, that we can cure dread
diseases, that we can put people on the moon. We believe that we can do almost anything if we unite
behind a common purpose.
But in order to do anything but complain, we must replace our preoccupation with the short term with a
willingness to invest for the long term. We must abandon this "Look out for No. 1" attitude with the
realization that we're all in this together. We have to replace the can't-do with the can-do.
We, as a nation, need a vision for the future. We need to come together decide where we want to be in
10 or 20 or 50 years. As the Bible tells, where there is no vision, the people perish. If we cannot envision
a future different from the present, we cannot achieve a future different from the present.
I think we need to ask ourselves: Do I believe in this country's greatness? Do I support leaders who bring
us together -- and reject those who spread bitterness and spite? Can I embrace change? Am I willing to
join hands with my fellow Americans and walk toward tomorrow's light?
Bobby Kennedy once said, "Some people see things as they are, and ask, why? I dream things that
never were and ask, why not?"
In that spirit, I say my friends, it's time to dream again.
Dr. King's Appeal to an Uneasy Conscience
Remarks by Emmett Paige Jr. assistant secretary of defense for command, control, communications and
intelligence, for the Martin Luther King Jr. Executive Breakfast,Executive Dining Room, Pentagon,
Washington, D.C., Feb. 8, 1996.
This is the 11th annual breakfast observance of the national holiday honoring an outstanding American,
Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.
His many contributions toward human justice have been acknowledged internationally. I will only briefly
recap some of those acknowledgments:
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An annual Martin Luther King Jr. memorial award is sponsored in England.

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Rome has a Martin Luther King Jr. middle school.
Sweden has a Martin Luther King Jr. Plaza opposite the ancient University of Uppsala.
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In 1964, he received the Nobel Prize.
The Martin Luther King Jr. Memorial Forest thrives in Israel's hills of Galilee.
In 1981, the official mint of France struck a Martin Luther King Jr. commemorative metal.

Commemorative stamps have been issued by over 30 nations.

His book has been translated into a number of languages.
Why are we having a service to recognize this national holiday? Why should this be a national holiday?
Why is Martin Luther King Jr. such an international hero? Is it because Dr. King was an exceptional
preacher? Is it because he was an outstanding humanitarian? Is it because Dr. King was a great civil
rights activist?
I submit that we can go on and on asking such rhetorical questions. There is a long list of renowned
pastors, humanitarians and civil rights activists who also dedicated their lives to great causes. Yet none
of these individuals are recognized by a national holiday. So why is Dr. King?
I submit that it is a national holiday because Dr. King, through his vision, leadership, courage and
dedication, moved this great nation to an enduring commitment to live up to the principles of democracy
established by the Declaration of Independence and the great Constitution of the United States of
America. In simple terms, He put the "all" in front of the word "Americans." He was personally committed
to, and fought for, the protection of the rights of all Americans, regardless of the color of their skin, ethnic
background or their religion.
He was the leader of our second revolution -- the revolution for democracy within America for all of its
people, and indeed for people all over the world. He enlisted our nation's conscience to right some
fundamental wrongs. His moral leadership so moved the conscience of this nation and the world that,
hopefully, lasting and unprecedented changes were made in this nation's social structure.
I am proud of this day not because Dr. King was a black man. I am proud that this great country of ours
finally recognized a giant who dedicated his life to the betterment of all mankind at home and indeed all
over the world. In my mind, Dr. King stands beside and equally tall with Abraham Lincoln.
Let us now for just a moment reflect not on the great man, but on the world as it is today.
We have troops deployed in Bosnia because of the terrible situation that existed there with ethnic hatred
and the various groups slaughtering each other. All is not well here on the home front with blacks killing
whites and whites killing blacks for no other reason than racism or the color of one's skin .
I am sure that Martin must be churning in his grave with terrible disappointment that even to this day we
still have such hatred and racial friction. We still have churches being burned down in Tennessee. We
still have malls in the so-called liberal North and elsewhere in this great country of ours where buses from
the inner cities cannot enter to take on or discharge passengers. ...
Let us not kid ourselves that all is well. We still have much work to do all over this land to bring our people
of all races, religions and ethnic backgrounds together. For all of us that are here this morning and those
that are not, we can reinvigorate our efforts beginning right here in the Pentagon, in our communities and
indeed wherever our military forces exist.
There are some people here in this building that might tell you that all is well and that we are far ahead of
other sectors of our society. We are far ahead of the rest of our society, but all is not well, and we must
not kid ourselves that the pot is cool out there. I submit to you that it is boiling, and we must forever work
to reduce the heat.
God forbid that we ever again have the racial strife that we lived with in our armed forces during the
Vietnam War. To believe that all is well out in the ranks is a disservice to ourselves, to the men and
women throughout DoD and to the country. We cannot wait until someone commits a horrible act such as
the events that took place at Fort Bragg and Fayetteville [N.C.] to emphasize to our troops that we will not
tolerate racism or discrimination in any form in our organizations. We must preach and practice what we
preach every day if we are to change the culture of the people we receive from our society at large.
Dr. King was very clear on how he wanted to be remembered. He wanted to be remembered as an
individual who gave his life serving others. He wanted to be remembered as a person who tried to love
everybody. He wanted people to know that he tried to be right on the Vietnam War question.
He tried to feed the hungry, clothe those who were naked, visit those who were in prison, and love and
serve humanity. His words are, "I was a drum major for justice -- I was a drum major for righteousness."
Many of us are old enough to remember the caste system that existed during the '40s and '50s. Under
that system, nonwhites in large areas of the country experienced daily indignities because of their color.
As a young black Army officer I can assure you that it was extremely difficult to travel to a new duty
station, to travel from Fort Monmouth, N.J., as an example, to my hometown of Jacksonville, Fla.
There were very few motels or restaurants that would provide service to blacks if they talked like and
dressed like they were Americans. Unfortunately, there were none along most routes that we had to
travel.
It was necessary to pack your food in your car with the wife and kids if you intended to have food to eat
without suffering the indignities of going to the rear door of a restaurant, even if it was a roadside dump. ...
You would eat in the car and you would sleep in the car if you were going to sleep at all. I would get up
early in the morning and hit the highway before 0200 [2 a.m.] and drive straight through from Fort
Monmouth, N.J., or Fort Devens, Mass., to Jacksonville -- or believe it or not, from Fort Carson, Colo., to
Jacksonville, Fla., without stopping except for gas. You never bought gas until you found out if the
service station permitted you to use their facilities.
Today, all of that has changed, thanks to the man named Martin.
Let us pretend for a few minutes as I try and bring Dr. King's vision to you in a more vivid fashion: A man
calling himself Martin appeared at several locations in greater Washington yesterday.
At each location he spoke about love, nonviolence, peace, justice and freedom. Some who heard him
reacted with anger, others lowered their head in shame, some stared expressionless into space. Others
simply walked away as he spoke. One minister who refused to give his name said, "Martin's speech and
manner presented a sense of urgency." He emphasized by several examples that "In this life, there is
such a thing as being too late."
According to those who saw him, Martin was ordinary in appearance and neatly dressed. His clothes
were not unusual and his hair was short. He was clean shaven with a neatly trimmed mustache. By all
measures, he personified America's middle class.
He spoke without smiling, yet his face and voice remained calm, never showing anger. Numerous
eyewitness accounts of what he actually said were given. The following is a compilation gathered from
those who were willing to talk about it:
His opening remarks were about love. He said, "The Lord sent me here, and I have to give you these
words. You will always serve the Lord if you remember the importance of love. Love leads to an
understanding of needs and aspirations far beyond that obtainable by fear, anger and hate. Love is a
great moral principle more powerful than violence. Do not forsake the words of Jesus, 'Love your
enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them that despitefully
use you, and persecute you.'"
He then spoke about nonviolence. Martin said, "During my lifetime, I consistently preached that
nonviolence demands that the means we use must be as pure as the ends we seek." I have tried to make
clear that it is wrong to use immoral means to attain moral ends, but I also affirmed that it is just as wrong,
or perhaps even more so, to use moral means to preserve immoral ends. I still believe that one day
mankind will bow before the altars of god and be crowned triumphant over war and bloodshed. And
nonviolent, redemptive good will be proclaimed the rule of the land."
Next Martin talked about peace. He said, "The increasing perils of racial conflict and war make it urgent
for us to pursue whatever may help to evolve a world with stable and enduring peace." Peace imposed
by violence is nothing more than suppressed conflict containing the seeds of its own destruction. Any
credible program of stable peace must ultimately rest on a foundation which is nonviolent. "I refuse to
accept the view that mankind is so tragically bound to the starless midnight of racism and war that the
bright daybreak of peace and brotherhood can never become a reality."
He continued by saying, "I have gained a measure of personal satisfaction being labeled an extremist for
justice. During my lifetime I elected to be courageous rather than cautious and outspoken rather than
silent. In the midst of a mighty struggle to rid our nation of racial and economic injustice, I watched many
churchmen stand on the sideline and mouth pious irrelevancies and sanctimonious trivialities." Today
"the judgment of God is upon the church as never before. If the churches of today do not recapture the
sacrificial spirit of the early churches, they will lose their authentic ring, forfeit the loyalty of millions, and
be dismissed as an irrelevant social club with no meaning for the 21st century."
Martin then reminded his audience of his "I have a dream speech." He said, "I expressed the dream then
and I express the dream now that one day all of God's children will be able to sing with a new meaning,
'My country 'tis of thee, sweet land of liberty, of thee I sing. Land where my fathers died, land of the
pilgrim's pride, from every mountainside, let freedom ring.' And if America is to have longevity as a great
nation, this dream must be fulfilled. He told his audience, "I have the audacity to believe that people
everywhere can have three meals a day for their bodies, education and culture of their minds, dignity,
equality and freedom for their spirits."
Martin finished by saying, "I'm not fearing any man. Mine eyes have seen the glory of the coming of the
Lord." This is a vision of Dr. King that you can build upon to truly understand the man.
Dr. King appealed to our nation's uneasy conscience. He brought this nation face to face with unjust
inconsistencies in our inner character. But neither he nor his followers ever fought force with force. They
opposed injustices by a peaceful refusal to cooperate, nothing more, but nothing less. They were cursed,
beaten and jailed. They accepted blow after blow, showing no sign of fear or anger, stating their belief in
the goodness of America and trusting in the power of God almighty.
Today, many feel that the progress made in human rights and the fight against racism has lost much of
its steam. Consider professional sports. The playing fields are fully integrated, but there is little
integration at the managerial level.
A study by Gary Oldfield, a political scientist at the University of Chicago found that "segregation of
blacks and whites dropped between 1960 and 1972, but little progress has been made over the past two
decades. He found that whites now only comprise 3 percent of the students in public schools in the
nation's 25 largest cities. He found churches remain highly segregated. He contends that in addition to
racial segregation, the 1980s brought a new segregation -- class segregation. This study is not in
consonance with the dreams of Martin Luther King Jr.
In a sense, one could almost feel that Martin may have lived and died in vain.
Obviously, this is not true, for we all know that without individuals like Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. this
nation would still be living in the dark ages of intolerance and injustice. For example, let's never forget the
injustice of the Dred Scott decision, which ruled that freed blacks were not raised to the rank of citizen;
the injustice of the decision that the first civil rights act was unconstitutional; and the injustice of the
50-plus years under the "separate but equal" doctrine.
Martin was a dreamer, but we should remember that America was founded by dreamers.
As we celebrate the birthday of Dr. King, and now Black History Month, we perpetuate the moral courage
so necessary to ensure that America remains the beacon light of democracy and religious freedom for
the world.
With the Martin Luther King Jr. national holiday we perpetuate that appeal for a just society -— a society
where all Americans, and indeed people all over the world, can live safely as free and responsible
individuals, where all people are able to use their abilities for any constructive purpose that does not
interfere with or harm the right of others and where all people can rise to the highest levels that their
talents and abilities can take them without being penalized because of race, color, religion, ethnic
background, sex or age.
Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. was assassinated 28 years ago.
Today, with this breakfast, we are trying to keep his dream alive. Whether the dream lives or dies rests
with each of us.
My challenge to you is to always do all you can to keep the dream alive.
My challenge to you is to love somebody.
My challenge to you is to feed the hungry, clothe the naked and serve humanity.
This is the challenge embodied in the dream and the sacred heritage of our nation and most importantly,
the eternal will of God.
God bless you. God bless us all everyday, and particularly as we celebrate the national holiday that
honors the life of Dr. King and all that he stood for.
God bless the men and women of our armed services as they serve faithfully to bring peace and a better
life to those who are less fortunate than we are all around the world.
God bless America, as it is still the best and greatest nation on earth in every respect, despite the warts
that still exist and the frailties of our people in many ways.
God bless each and every one of you, and thanks for letting me share a few minutes this morning in your
life.
I love you -- all of you.
Vision for the Navy's Future
Remarks as delivered by Navy Secretary John H. Dalton before the National Press Club, Washington,
Feb. 14, 1996.
Thank you very much for the kind introduction and warm welcome. I'm pleased to be at the National
Press Club to give you my thoughts on the state of the Navy-Marine Corps team.
First, I must tell you that I'm honored to be secretary of the Navy. The Navy's been awfully good to me.
I'm grateful for my Navy education and training. It's an honor and privilege to come back at this time to
serve as secretary of the Navy. And I thank President Clinton for his trust and confidence.
I love what I do, and I challenge anyone to find a better, more rewarding job in Washington than running
this department -- and that includes working budget negotiations with Congress!
You're familiar with what we do and where the Navy Department is today. So let me cut to the chase and
answer the question: "Where are we going?"
The right answer -- the only answer -- is that we are moving forward! The Navy and Marine Corps are
dynamic organizations with vision. We are forward-thinking and forward-operating -- that's our tradition,
and it's a tradition of success, which has played out over 220 years. We don't fight the last war, we
prepare for the next one. And when we get our nose bloodied, we clean up our act and enter the ring in
time for the next round.
This is my message for you: In an era of uncertainty and challenge, at home and abroad, the Navy
Department is not afraid of change! And we've got the leadership and vision to effectuate that change
which is appropriate and desirable for the future.
It's that future that I want to talk about. Since I've been secretary of the Navy, I've focused on four themes
with a vision for the future. Those themes are readiness,technology, efficiency and people.
When I had my confirmation hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee in July '93,
committee members were most concerned about readiness. Several senators in that hearing asked
about readiness in the Navy and Marine Corps, and they expressed deep concern that our Navy
Department was not as ready as it should have been.
Readiness may have been a concern three years ago, but let me ask you this: When was the last time
you thought about the readiness of the Navy and Marine Corps?
That's because it simply is no longer an issue. Looking back across my time as secretary of the Navy, I
have no doubt that America in now getting a solid return on its investment in the Navy and Marine Corps.
Here are a couple of examples to emphasize that we are indeed ready.
Remember back to early last summer when [Iraqi President] Saddam Hussein moved some of his force
toward Kuwait. The Navy-Marine Corps team was right there. Within hours, we had strike aircraft flying
sorties. We were ready, we responded, and we got the job done. And Saddam pulled back his forces.
The rescue of [Air Force] Capt. Scott O'Grady was another indicator of just how ready our people are. It
was a complex, difficult rescue mission that our team made look easy. When he had his press
conference after the rescue, Capt. O'Grady's first words were: "I'm not the hero. The real heroes are the
sailors and Marines out on USS Kearsarge."
There's probably no more human example of our readiness than Bosnia. Look at the success of the
peace talks in Dayton [Ohio] and the initial deployment of U.S. forces. American military leadership
brought the warring factions to the table. The [USS] Teddy Roosevelt and [USS] America battle groups,
including the cruiser [USS] Normandy conducting air and Tomahawk strikes last September, made the
difference. The parties ended up at the peace table because of what we did.
Training is the key to our readiness. Adm. Arleigh Burke was the chief of naval operations when I was a
midshipman in 1960, and I had the sad honor to participate in his funeral ceremony just last month. When
the USS Arleigh Burke was christened, the admiral told the crew, ... "This ship was made to fight. You
had better know how."
It's my job to ensure that our men and women of the Navy and Marine Corps know how, that they're
properly trained and ready to fight, because that's what we're in the business of doing -- to fight and win
our nation's wars, and to prevent them with the influence of our forward presence.
What you should walk away with today is that the Navy
Department's readiness is where it should be. However, my vision is that we'll be able to predict the
readiness challenges of tomorrow, to be ready to fight the wars in the Navy after next so that my
successors will have what they need.
My second priority for the Department of the Navy is technology.
One of my predecessors, the secretary of the Navy during the 1920s, was Curtis Wilbur. We had just
prevailed [in] World War I, and he was making a major thrust in Congress to fund naval aviation. Many
people in Congress were skeptical. We had just won "the war to end all wars," and the last thing we
needed was airplanes flying off ships.
But Secretary Wilbur persisted and got naval aviation off the ground. And 20 years later, we won World
War II, particularly the war in the Pacific, in large measure due to our naval aviation capability. Without
Wilbur's vision and his dogged persistence in the early 1920s to fund an emerging technology, the result
might have been catastrophic.
That's exactly the kind of vision I must have now to prepare the Navy after next for the challenges 20 to
30 years downstream.
Let me give you another example. Five years ago in the Gulf War, the world watched as our battleships,
cruisers, destroyers and submarines launched highly accurate Tomahawk cruise missiles. Tomahawk's
performance exceeded all expectations in its first operational use -- it wasn't perfect, but it was an
important element in the first days of the war. The missile worked; it was ready-made. We could have
stopped there, people would have said that success rates approaching 70 percent is "good enough for
government work."
Navy leadership didn't believe that, and I don't believe it now. We weren't satisfied with Tomahawk's
success, and the department had a vision to make a better missile. The improved Tomahawk cruise
missiles launched last summer into Bosnia had a better than 90 percent success rate. We took a great
product and made it even better. That's the Navy Department's standard of doing business.
Looking to the future, we have some important aircraft and ship programs in the works that indicate our
commitment to the technology necessary to win the wars in the Navy after next.
One is the next generation of aircraft carrier -- the CVX. I'll emphasize that "X" -- I don't know yet what
that carrier will look like. Probably the easy thing to do would be to build aircraft carriers just like we've
been doing. Well, we're spending the time, money and creativity on research and development to ensure
that we have the best aircraft carrier for the future.
Other platforms you'll hear a lot about: the Seawolf and new attack submarine programs. These now
generation of submarines are at the leading edge of our littoral warfare strategy.
And there are more programs - all across the board of sea, air, land and special forces requirements.
These are programs we will need for the challenges of the year 2015 and beyond. It's important that we
invest in science and technology, that we invest in research and development to ensure that we have the
right Navy and Marine Corps not just for today and tomorrow, but for the Navy and Marine Corps after
next.
My third priority is efficiency.
The department is taking a hard look at what decisions we must make now, particularly in modernization
and capital investment, to get us to the future with our powder dry and with a full load of beans and
bullets. This is a long, multistep process, but let me cite one area where our vision for the future rests in
changing the way things used to be done. That's acquisition reform.
My top research, development and acquisition leadership have a mandate that the Navy and Marine
Corps must learn how to develop, build and buy systems according to the most successful industry
models.
I recently hosted ... the First Annual DoN-CEO [Department of the Navy-Chief Executive Officer]
conference, where our acquisition leadership met with top industry executives to map out our relationship
for the future. We're breaking new ground in acquisition reform and becoming more innovative and
productive in the process.
The first major acquisition reform success story is the F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet. It's a program where
we've used a modern business approach to develop an aircraft that is on-time, on budget and
underweight -- three crucial elements of the right way to buy military hardware.
I'm also very pleased about the cost-effective way we're approaching the joint strike fighter, our next
generation aircraft. This program is truly joint. The Navy, Marine Corps and the Air Force all need a new
fighter-attack aircraft by the year 2010. If each service approached this requirement individually, the cost
would be around $27 billion. By combining forces and funding this project together, 80 percent of the
avionics and electronics will be common. We'll end up with an airframe unique to each service, but that
can be produced for around $17 billion, saving taxpayers $10 billion in the process. It's a program that
each service is committed to, and I'm pleased to say that we've engaged the United Kingdom to
participate in this program as well, improving the economies of scale still further.
Recently, I moved the senior leadership of the Marine Corps into the Pentagon. For the first time in
history, the commandant of the Marine Corps, his assistant and his leading staff operate in the Pentagon.
Gen. Chuck Krulak's office is next to mine, just as is the CNO's [chief of naval operations], Adm. Mike
Boorda. We'll be a more cohesive team and be more cost-effective as well.
These examples should tell you that there has, in fact, been a paradigm shift in the way we conduct
business. We are more efficient, more innovative and more productive. Our operational strategy is
aggressive and forward-looking, and the department has matched tactics with technology and equipment.
These are win-win improvements. But the big winner in this dynamic approach to developing, building,
buying and deploying our forces is the American taxpayer. That's a vision for the future America can take
to the bank.
Frankly, this is what good government is all about. Products stamped with "Made by DoD" should have
the reputation of being the best around. I really dislike the phrase "good enough for government work."
That was yesterday and a standard that should have never been acceptable. I want the stamp "Made by
the Navy Department" to be the positive standard to meet -- and we're going to get there.
It's been my goal for the Navy Department to be a leader in Vice President [Al] Gore's reinvention of
government efforts, and I'm pleased with many of the initiatives that we've developed. The department is
definitely more efficient, and I point with pride to the fact that in 1994 the Naval Air Systems Command
won the Presidential Quality Award -- the highest award the president offers to recognize excellence in
government.
Nowhere is our mission of reinventing government more essential than in our focus on the me and
women who run our Navy-Marine Corps team. So here's my last point, but my No. 1 priority -- our people.
We have the best people serving in the Navy and Marine Corps that we've ever had. I served on active
duty in the 1960s and early '70s. We had good sailors on our submarines then, but they are so much
better today. They're better educated, higher quality people who are more interested in community
service and being good citizens than those when I was a young naval officer.
Thirty years ago, just over 50 percent of our sailors and Marines had high school diplomas. Today, that
number is over 95 percent. Their test scores are higher, they're smarter, they're better. Just last week I
was in the Mediterranean visiting with men and women deployed with our ships and squadrons there.
Their morale is high, they know their mission, and they're proud of what they are doing. These are
tremendous men and women doing a very important job.
Don't take my word for it. I'd like to invite you to spend a day with our Navy [on] one of our aircraft carriers
or other ships to see our people and how they got the job done. Or spend a day with our Marines in the
field at [Marine Corps Base] Quantico [Va.] or Camp Lejeune [N.C.]. I encourage you to come see for
yourself the quality people we have.
I mentioned early on that the Department of the Navy team is a warfighting organization. We prove that
every day in the ways and places I've already described, and I'm very proud of our accomplishments.
That said, however, on this Valentine's Day, you shouldn't believe that I think everything is hearts and
roses in the Department of the Navy.
The simple and often overwhelming fact is that we are also an organization of tremendous cultural and
social responsibilities. America is in an era of peace, however uneasy, and the nonwarfighting aspects of
the Navy Department naturally have assumed a much more visible role. This in the area where we've
been in the public eye, and for good reason. We've made some mistakes. And we'll make more.
The process of change produces a range of side effects, some desirable, others less so. By its nature,
the process is imperfect. My expectation is that this change caused by moving forward will create friction,
throwing off sparks and introducing heat and light to some of the dark corners of the organization. A few
of these sparks have attracted a great deal of attention. They've been reported on, reviewed and
discussed in the public forum. I will tell you that this is a good thing.
Just like in the rest of our great democracy, open discussion of a Navy problem brings fresh ideas and
creates fertile ground for chance and improvement. It hurts me -- it hurts the entire team -- when even
one individual fails to meet our demanding standards of conduct. Yet the process of review that results
from our shortcomings leads to organizational introspection and corrective action.
There is certainly a price for identifying problems --embarrassment, wounded egos and self-doubt,
among others -- but that's the nature of change! And the more open the forum, the better environment for
organizational and public feedback. The steady give and take is the critical element in maintaining public
confidence in our institution.
This process of public renewal is fundamental to the traditions of the Navy and Marine Corps. The Navy
Department has hit patches of stormy water now and then throughout our history. We have, at times,
endured the critical scrutiny of insiders and outsiders alike. But it has attracted that scrutiny for the simple
reason that our standards are so high, that we represent, -- not just in my view, but also in the public's -- a
touchstone of extraordinary integrity, character and discipline.
Now more than ever we are a Navy in transition. For more than 200 years, our combatant force was
essentially all males. Beginning in 1976, we had women entering the Naval Academy and noncombatant
ships. In 1993, women began serving on combatant ships. Today, we have women serving in all types of
ships and aircraft.
Let me cite one example of how far we've come in the last few years. Just five years ago, we had six
aircraft carriers fighting in the Gulf War. Not a single one had women embarked. Today, USS Nimitz is
maintaining the peace off the coast of Kuwait with women serving in nearly every aspect on board.
But with these remarkable changes has come a change in our culture. In our past, we've done things
which might then have been considered acceptable that are no longer acceptable. Indeed, we must turn
the page on that part of our history.
I'll be the first to tell you not every one of our men and women absorbed the message right away -- they
didn't. There are some in our service that still don't get it. And that, unfortunately, includes some of our
flag and general officers and senior enlisted personnel. I liken our million-member department -- with an
average age of 24 -- to a 90,000-ton aircraft carrier. We've ordered the course change and the rudder is
over at right full, but we can't switch directions on a dime.
But the message is clear: The Navy and Marine Corps have zero tolerance for any behavior that
threatens the dignity and respect of any individual in this department. When I say zero, that's what I mean.
Behavior that doesn't conform to the high standard we've set will be identified and disciplined
appropriately.
Thirty years ago, we tackled race issues. Twenty years ago, it was drug use. Now, the Navy Department
sets the standard with our equal opportunity and our zero-tolerance drug-use policies.
My goal is to have zero tolerance for sexual harassment and fraternization as well. We are making
significant strides in that regard. Obviously, our cultural change presents a challenge. I'm confident we
will meet that challenge, and we'll meet it with honor, courage and commitment.
Although change will take time, I intend to speed the process along with some long-term, in-house
remedies. For example, when you look at the behavioral problems we've had, the common element in
many incidents is alcohol abuse. I've asked Mike Boorda and Chuck Krulak to take a hard look at the
matter and to recommend how we can deglamorize alcohol use. I'll review those recommendations and
will announce some changes in the coming weeks, with the goal of creating a healthier, safer atmosphere
for our people.
I have constantly referred to the importance of our people living up to the standards which go back to the
origins of our Navy, those standards set out by John Paul Jones in describing the qualifications of a naval
officer. He said, ...
"It is by no means enough that an officer of the Navy should be a capable mariner. He must be that, of
course, but also a great deal more. He should be as well a gentleman of liberal education, refined
manners, punctilious courtesy, and the nicest sense of personal honor."
If John Paul Jones had lived in our time, I'm sure he would provide the same guidance to female officers
as well.
My point is that the Navy and Marine Corps have always had a tradition of character, so our efforts at
re-emphasizing the need for ethical leadership is not something new. It's our naval heritage. It's strong
individual character that allows teamwork to flourish and ensures that our force is ready and capable to
meet any challenge to America's interests.
If you take away anything from my remarks today, I'd like you to remember this: The Navy and Marine
Corps are committed to lasting change in the way we do business. We are emphasizing our tradition of
strong character and ethical behavior. This renewal of our core values of honor, courage and
commitment is a crucial part of the military's self-help cycle. The Navy Department is stronger for the
change. We are poised to remain the pre-eminent military force, the force of choice for the our nation's
leaders, for decades to come.
Thank you for giving me this opportunity to speak to you. God bless you and God bless America.
Six Emerging Trends in Information
Management
Address by Emmett Paige Jr., assistant secretary of defense for command, control, communications and
intelligence, at the American Defense Preparedness Association's Information Management for the
Warfighter Symposium, Vienna, Va., Feb. 29, 1996.
Good morning. ... The topic of this symposium, "Information Management for the Warfighter," I believe
should be the assumed nature of all information systems for the Department of Defense. It may be that
our warfighters are being called upon to be peacekeepers, but peace is only enforceable when backed by
the clout of warfighting capabilities.
As Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. reminded us in his letter from the Birmingham jail, "Injustice anywhere is a
threat to justice everywhere." Indeed, in peacekeeping and humanitarian relief, as well as in warfighting,
our nation's capabilities must be second to none.
This means that we must maintain our edge in weaponry, in training, in motivation and in technology.
As we track our progress in Bosnia -- and information on that progress is openly and readily available to
everyone through DoD's BosniaLINK on the Internet -- we are reminded of the fortitude and dedication of
our men and women in the field.
The Internet was also the medium in December for the wide dissemination of a poem about Santa Claus
being reminded that he was safe to deliver gifts because of the American military presence around the
globe.
The Internet is a prime example of technology research funded and fostered by the Department of
Defense that has come to have massive payback to all aspects of our society. The idea started in the
1960s with the intent of having a computer communications network that would have no single point of
failure.
In 1969, the ARPANET [Advanced Research Projects Agency network] was begun by DoD for research
in data networking. It began with four nodes, all of which were within the research realm. Now the number
of users totals in the millions, and yet the Internet is still seen as being in its infancy.
Industry and entrepreneurs are running with the ball, but we didn't get to this point by just following the
philosophy of letting a thousand flowers bloom. It started with a vision that at the time seemed far-fetched
or of limited use.
President Clinton recently released a white paper detailing how investments in technology drive
economic growth, generate new knowledge, create new jobs and improve our quality of life. He also
emphasized that advances in technology are essential to sustaining our national security. It is these
national security aspects that I would like for us to keep uppermost in our minds today -- and throughout
this symposium -- and into the future.
As we do our planning for the future of our nation's security, we in the DoD and industry must be both
practical people and dreamers at the same time. While we in DoD must do rigorous analyses of our
requirements and mission needs, we must also envision defensive and offensive capabilities that do not
exist but that we believe are attainable. And we must do this in these times of austere resource levels to
operate our government.
I would like to cover with you today some of the future capabilities in the information systems arena that
have been identified as focus areas. These are areas that we believe should be exploited to our future
national security strategies.
Our warfighters need to be able to maintain near-perfect, real-time knowledge of an adversary and to
communicate that knowledge to all forces in near-real time. Note that I did not say deliver the information.
I said communicate.
This means we must not only have the mechanisms to obtain, assimilate and distribute information, we
must have the ability to filter it according to the recipients' needs. And we must be able to discern which
information and intelligence must be made most readily available to which combatants or potential
combatants.
We must have all our forces and coalition partners share information with great ease, but this information
must be secure, timely and accurate. We are placing higher priority on our information security initiatives,
and this increased emphasis is shown in our increases in funding levels for these programs for the
immediate and foreseeable future.
Protection of information is a high priority, and so is harmonization. We have set into motion the
mechanism to establish a single, unifying DoD technical architecture that will become binding on all
future DoD C4I [command, control, communications, computers and intelligence] acquisitions and
development efforts.
We are having to move away from our legacy of dissimilar systems and architectures. We need to have
systems that are born joint and interoperable. Our architecture working groups are setting up the genetic
blueprints for those new systems.
The need for interoperability and integration of C4I capabilities, along with those for surveillance and
reconnaissance, are recognized at the highest levels of the department. In October 1995, the deputy
secretary of defense directed the establishment of a DoD-wide C4I integrated product team. C3I
[command, control, communications and intelligence] is the sponsor, organizer and manager of the
effort.
The effort has evolved to become the C4ISR [surveillence and reconnaissance] integration task force
and has already produced results in identifying proposals that are "low-hanging fruit." Most notable of
these are the C4ISR decision support center and the complementary joint C4ISR battle center.
Efforts such as these can be best understood within the context of overall defense planning. The director
of the joint staff, in December 1995, forwarded to the secretary of defense a joint planning document that
identifies warfighting capabilities needed for the future and for related R&D [research and development]
initiatives.
It identified 12 emerging trends for achieving future joint warfighting objectives. Of the 12, half of these
are information system capabilities. These are:

Dominant battlespace knowledge. This requires the totality of C4ISR capabilities to work
together in a seamless fashion to acquire and assimilate information needed to dominate and
neutralize adversary forces.

The next is precision force. This capability to destroy selected targets with precision -- yet
limiting collateral damage to the fullest extent possible -- requires advances in sensor guidance
and control. Additionally, sensor-to-shooter C4I enhancements are necessary for responsive,
timely force application.

A key capability that must be enhanced is combat identification. We must have the capability for
assured, reliable identification, friend or foe. These decisions must be made quickly enough to
do good and not so quickly as to do harm. This thorny issue has been around as long as there
have been combatants.

This brings us to electronic warfare. This includes capabilities for deceiving or disrupting, as well
as destroying, the surveillance and command control systems that go along with an opponent's
weapons.

Information warfare is another leading, emerging trend. This is both offensive and defensive.
We must have the ability to affect adversary information and their information systems, while
leveraging and protecting our own information and information systems.

Another important emerging trend is for real-time logistics control. This is an information window
into the innermost workings of the entire logistics support structure. It includes both total asset
visibility across service and agency lines and in-transit visibility throughout all forms of
transportation.
We must bring all these capabilities together, so we will pursue the global command control system as
our core C2 [command and control] capability for the 21st century. We will continue to build the Defense
Information Systems Network, the Defense Messaging System and MILSTAR [Military Strategic and
Tactical Relay System] programs.
We must also turn to the commercial sector for many vital information capabilities: selected satellite
capabilities; mobile, personal communications services; and the commercial global fiber grid.
The expansion of DoD's use of commercial assets and capabilities was well articulated by the
commission on roles and missions of the armed forces.
The commission pointed out, and I staunchly agree, that outsourcing is a valuable tool to refocus our
attention and resources on our core competencies, increase efficiencies, save money and enhance
effectiveness. There are many companies out there who have a longstanding, excellent reputation for
providing information processing services in a cost-effective, reliable manner. Couple this with my views
that:

Our data centers do not have a compelling need to be operated and maintained by military or
civil servants;

In-house O&M [operations and maintenance] is not necessary for national defense; and

We would very likely achieve significant savings if these operations were contracted out.
I firmly believe that many of our data center operations can and should be outsourced, I am doing
everything I can to make this a reality. Prior to the commission's recommendation on outsourcing data
center operations, I requested that the director of the Defense Information Systems Agency conduct a
study, focusing on the 16 defense megacenters that are owned and operated by DISA. We just received
a report of the results of the study, and we are currently reviewing these results in conjunction with DISA.
Let me now turn your attention to software. I am a strong advocate for the use of commercial,
off-the-shelf software. Why? Because it makes good business sense and common sense to use COTS
software.
Simply put, we will use COTS software, whenever it exists, to satisfy DoD requirements. However, it must
indeed be a commercial product already in use, with a proven track record and a market demand.
In those cases where no COTS solution exists and DoD must develop new codes for which we are
responsible for life-cycle maintenance and support, we will write it in ADA. This includes the code for
interfacing among COTS packages and for interfacing among systems supporting various defense
functions. This policy applies to all -- let me repeat, all -- software-driven systems regardless of functions
supported.
As you can see from all the information-related capabilities that are deemed to be crucial to our nation's
defense, we cannot afford to squander resources on software that are not interoperable or are unreliable.
We must proceed with all due haste, but we must proceed methodically. President Truman told us,
"Patience must be our watchword if we are to have world peace." Patience must also be our watchword if
we are to have interoperable, seamless, robust C4 capabilities for all of our peacekeepers and
warfighters.
We must work together for results. This is especially true for information management programs, where
there is all too often the urge to charge individually ahead of the pack, rather than work cooperatively
toward a more solid and lasting foundation for all programs concerned.
We have accomplished much together already. We have re-engineered many processes away from
service-unique stovepipes to being truly joint. But we are just scratching the surface on what can be done.
We are just at the beginning of exploiting information systems for our warfighers.
I thank you for your kind attention this morning. I would be glad to entertain your questions.
Improving the Combat Edge Through
Outsourcing
A DoD report, released March 1996.
In the post-Cold War era, the Department of Defense must meet three major challenges:

Readiness -- Our fighting forces must be prepared at all times to respond to threats to our
national security interests anywhere in the world, participate in peacekeeping efforts and
provide humanitarian assistance. Readiness has been, and must remain, the department's
highest priority.

Quality of life -- Readiness depends on attracting top quality people and retaining them after
they have developed technical and leadership skills. To do so, DoD must offer not only
challenging and rewarding work, but also an appropriate quality of life, which encompasses the
entire package of compensation, benefits and work and living environments for military service
personnel.

Modernization -- Modernizing our forces is imperative for future readiness. The department
must increase investment to develop and acquire the weapons that will ensure our technological
superiority.
DoD can meet these challenges today and free up the additional resources required for modernization in
the future by managing its internal operations and particularly its support activities more efficiently.
Support activities, broadly defined, represent a sizable portion of the defense budget. In FY [fiscal year]
1996, DoD will spend approximately $93 billion on operations and maintenance. These activities were
largely established and organized during the Cold War when DoD had to depend predominantly on
organic support. Such support was driven by the possibility of an extended conflict with a rival
superpower and a less sophisticated private, commercial infrastructure.
Like the best companies and organizations in the United States, DoD has embarked on a systematic and
vigorous effort to reduce the cost and improve the performance of its support activities.
This report describes our initiative to determine where outsourcing, privatization and competition can
lower costs and improve readiness. (In this report, outsourcing is defined as the transfer of a function
previously performed in-house to an outside provider. Privatization is a subset of outsourcing which
involves the transfer or sale of government assets to the private sector.) It is submitted in response to
Section 357 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Public Law 104-106.
Our success in ending the Cold War has ushered in sweeping changes to the Department of Defense.
The United States no longer faces a long and protracted conflict with a rival superpower. Instead, we
must be prepared to fight and win two nearly simultaneous regional conflicts. These conflicts are often
described as "come as you are" wars, meaning that there will be little lead time for mobilization or surge
of production capability. They will require rapid transportation, tailored and flexible maintenance support
and greater reliance on private sector suppliers.
These conflicts will be technology intensive. Technology has improved our lethality, precision and
mobility. As a result, victory will require dominating flows of information and communication. As our
warfighting scenarios have changed, so too have attendant support functions. Best business practices,
tempered by risk and threat assessments, must be used to determine where outsourcing, privatization
and competition can improve the performance of these activities.
With the end of the Cold War, the Department of Defense has tailored its force structure and budget to
meet the changed security threats. DoD's force structure today is roughly 30 percent smaller than it was
in the 1980s. Our budget has also declined to about 60 percent (in real terms) of its peak in 1985. In FY
1997, DoD's budget amounts to $243 billion. Within this budget, the department must meet three
challenges:
Readiness. During this drawdown of forces and budget, the department provided full funding for
readiness. The department's actions ensured that U.S. forces have remained ready and prepared to
defeat any adversary and perform required missions to meet our national security objectives. As the
drawdown comes to an end, readiness indicators remain high.
Quality of Life. The quality of life for our military personnel is a paramount ingredient to attracting and
retaining a dedicated, motivated force. The department recognizes that a broad spectrum of services is
required to meet the needs of service members and their families. The department has therefore placed
a high priority on ensuring that our personnel are adequately paid, housed and otherwise supported.
Modernization. The U.S. armed forces are the best equipped in the world. As the department's overall
budget fell in the past decade, DoD reduced resources allocated to the purchase of new equipment and
the modification and upgrade of existing systems. Between 1985 and 1996, the procurement budget
declined by about 68 percent in real terms. In FY 1996, the department's procurement budget totaled $43
billion.
This reduction in the procurement budget came at little risk to our fighting forces. In fact, the armed
services were able to maintain the average age of most weapons in the hands of the fighting forces, even
though they bought fewer new systems, by discarding their oldest equipment and redistributing newer
equipment throughout the smaller force structure. However, this process is ending, and new equipment
must be purchased. In addition, new technologies are now emerging that will dramatically increase the
capabilities of our forces. In the coming years, therefore, the department must increase funding for
procurement to ensure our continued technological superiority in the future.
The commitment to reduce the federal deficit to zero by the year 2002 means that the department cannot
responsibly plan its future budget needs with the expectation of a significant sustained increase in its real
"top line." Solutions to our funding challenge must be found within our current and projected (i.e. FYDP
[Future Years Defense Program]) budget top line. To this end, DoD has initiated a series of initiatives to
increase the efficiency of its operations in order to gain more value for every dollar expended.
First, the department has significantly reduced infrastructure costs through the base realignment and
closure process. In FY 1996, the BRAC budget crossed over from a net loss on DoD budgets to a net
surplus. Over the next five years, BRAC will generate net savings of $17.8 billion. DoD estimates that the
results of the four rounds of base closures and realignments, when fully implemented, will produce
annual savings of about $5.5 billion.
Second, the department has initiated a thorough reform of the acquisition process. Over the years,
numerous blue ribbon panels and commissions have proposed reforming the defense-unique,
slow-moving and thus expensive acquisition system. Today, we are implementing those changes.
The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994, the Federal Acquisition Reform Act of 1996 and the
recently signed DoD Directive 5000.1 and DoD Regulation 5000.2 will enable significant changes to
DoD's procurement of goods and services. These initiatives, now in place, are beginning to show results
and will lead to substantial efficiencies and savings in the future.
Third, the department is now beginning a systematic review of its support operations to determine where
competitive forces can improve overall performance at lower cost. Outsourcing, privatization and
business re-engineering offer significant opportunities to generate much of the savings necessary for
modernization and readiness.
Summarizing the challenge for the DoD, [Army] Gen. John Shalikashvili, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, recently told the Senate Armed Services Committee that increasing funding for modernization
will take tough management decisions, innovation and even revolutionary approaches, as well as your
continued support to accomplish this challenging task within our top line budget projections. One answer
lies in aggressively pursuing institutional and business opportunities.
We must continue to push with all energy acquisition reforms, commercial off-the-shelf opportunities,
privatization, outsourcing of non-core activities and further reductions of our infrastructure.
The purpose of the department's initiative is to sustain or improve readiness, generate savings for
modernization and improve the quality and efficiency of support to the warfighters.
To achieve these goals, the deputy secretary of defense established a comprehensive, ongoing
DoD-wide review to identify functions that could be outsourced, analyze them to determine where
outsourcing is cost effective and begin the outsourcing process. The review involves the senior civilian
and military leadership in the military departments, defense agencies and the Office of the Secretary of
Defense.
Outsourcing, privatization and competition offer the prospect of lowering costs and improving
performance across a wide range of support activities. The department's total budget for operations and
support activities in FY 1996 amounts to approximately $93 billion. Such activities will only be considered
for outsourcing or privatization when they meet three conditions:
First, private sector firms must be able to perform the activity and meet our warfighting mission. DoD will
not consider outsourcing activities which constitute our core capabilities.
Second, a competitive commercial market must exist for the activity. Market forces drive organizations to
improve quality, increase efficiency and reduce costs. DoD will gain from outsourcing and competition
when there is an incentive for continuous service improvement.
Third, outsourcing the activity must result in best value for the government and therefore the U.S.
taxpayer. Activities will be considered for outsourcing only when the private sector can improve
performance or lower costs in the context of long-term competition.
Analyses of department activities are still under way. These assessments will likely determine that a
number of activities are not appropriate candidates for outsourcing or competition. However, the
remaining pool of candidates will be sizable, and we expect that the potential for increased savings and
improved performance will be significant, amounting to billions of dollars on an annual basis.
These savings will directly benefit modernization. To make this connection clear and to provide
appropriate incentives to the military departments, the deputy secretary of defense signed a
memorandum on Feb. 26, 1996, stating that the DoD components will not have their outyear budgets
reduced as a result of the savings they create through their initiatives, and that these savings should
benefit modernization.
DoD stands to create the most significant savings and improve readiness when it can augment its
internal capabilities with those available from competitive commercial markets. Outsourcing can
introduce:

Competitive forces. Competition drives organizations to improve quality, increase efficiency,
reduce costs and better focus on their customers' needs over time. For DoD, competition can
lead to more rapid delivery of better products and services to the warfighter, thereby increasing
readiness.

Flexibility. Outsourcing provides managers with flexibility to determine the appropriate size and
composition of the resources needed to complete tasks over time as the situation changes.

Economies of scale and specialization. Firms that specialize in specific services generate a
relatively larger business volume, which allows them to take advantage of scale economies.
Often these economies of scale mean that specialized service firms can operate and maintain
state-of-the-art systems more cost effectively than other firms or the government. Outsourcing
to such firms provides a means for the government to take advantage of technologies and
systems that the government itself cannot acquire or operate economically.

Better management focus. In recent years, our nation's most successful companies have
focused intensively on their core competencies -- those activities that give them a competitive
edge -- and outsourced support activities. The activities that have been outsourced remain
important to success, but are not at the heart of the organization's mission. Business analysts
frequently highlight the fact that the attention of an organization's leaders is a scarce resource
that should be allocated wisely. This is equally true for the Department of Defense.
The benefits of outsourcing and competition are apparent every day in our national economy; they are
not theoretical or based on uncertain assumptions. Companies report that outsourcing provides the
desired benefits. It enables the firms to focus on their core competencies; improve service quality,
responsiveness and agility; obtain access to new technologies; and employ more efficient business
practices.
Over the past two decades, competitive forces in the private sector have revolutionized how companies
obtain services. Entire new industries -- and companies -- have grown to meet this demand for
specialized services across a range of functions: aircraft and ship maintenance, inventory management,
accounting and finance, internal audit, data center operations, software maintenance, computer network
support, applications development, telecommunications, transportation services, facility management
and benefits administration. In 1996, these service industries will generate an estimated $100 billion in
sales.
Surveys performed by a range of organizations for different purposes all document the trend to more
outsourcing. For example:
A 1994 study conducted by Pitney-Bowes Management Services found that 77 percent of 100 Fortune
500 firms surveyed outsourced some aspect of their business support services.
A 1992 study of 1,200 companies conducted by the Outsourcing Institute found that 50 percent of firms
with information technology budgets over $5 million are either outsourcing or actively considering it.
A 1994 study conducted by KPMG-Peat Marwick of 309 Fortune 1,000 companies found that 48 percent
outsourced warehousing functions.
A 1994 study conducted by the Olsten Corp. of 400 firms found that 45 percent outsourced payroll
management functions.
The experiences of individual companies further illustrate the prevalence of outsourcing in the private
sector. Canon guarantees photocopier replacement within 24 hours, but outsources the delivery of this
service. Avis operates one of the largest data processing systems in the world to handle rental car
reservations, but outsources the data processing of its payroll. Chrysler manufactures engines,
transmissions and exterior body skins internally, but outsources the remaining 70 percent of final product
content. Similar examples exist in every successful American industry.
Many state and local governments carry out effective programs to take advantage of the benefits of
competition. Chicago, Indianapolis, Los Angeles, Philadelphia and San Francisco, among others, have
used competition and outsourcing to improve services and lower costs.
Within the Department of Defense, experience demonstrates that competition and outsourcing have
yielded both significant savings and increased readiness for each of the military services. As a result of
cost comparisons conducted between 1978 and 1994 (under OMB [Ofrfice of Management and Budget]
Circular A-76, the federal guidance on performance of commercial activities), the department now saves
about $1.5 billion a year. On average, these competitions have reduced annual operating costs by 31
percent. (Private-sector entities won about half of these competitions; government activities won the
other half.) The consistency of these results highlights the potential benefits to the department from
opening up a significant portion of the operations and support budget to competition.
These benefits have accrued across the range of DoD support activities. In aggregate, DoD currently
outsources approximately 25 percent of base commercial activities, 28 percent of depot maintenance, 10
percent of finance and accounting, 70 percent of Army aviation training, 45 percent of surplus property
disposal and 33 percent of parts distribution, as well as substantial portions of other functions. Indeed,
virtually every support function that the department carries out is provided by the private sector at some
location.
The Defense Logistics Agency's Direct Vendor Delivery and Prime Vendor programs illustrate the
savings and improvements in readiness that DoD has achieved through business re-engineering and
outsourcing. Under these programs, suppliers deliver products directly to their DoD customers rather
than to a DoD warehouse for storage and subsequent distribution.
The programs have made a tangible contribution to readiness: Reducing the need for DoD's own
warehousing and transportation allows DLA to deliver supplies to warfighters cheaper and faster. In the
case of pharmaceuticals, for example, DoD customers now receive their requested goods 75 to 90
percent faster (within 24 hours) and 25 to 35 percent cheaper. These programs not only save resources,
but do the job better.
There are numerous other examples of outsourcing's beneficial results. The Air Force has successfully
outsourced all support functions at Vance Air Force Base [Okla.] and several bases overseas. The Air
Force also contracts for maintenance for the KC-10 and F-117 aircraft and for software in the B-1 and B-2
aircraft. The Army has created a government-industry team to upgrade the Paladin artillery system. The
Navy outsources a substantial amount of ship repair, including maintenance on its most advanced
surface combatants.
To maintain readiness and generate the resources required for modernization, the department must
continue on this path and, where appropriate, draw on the competitive forces found in the private sector.
We cannot afford in either economic or military terms to perform the myriad of support functions in the
absence of competition.
The department's review has focused to date on six areas: materiel management, base commercial
activities, depot maintenance, finance and accounting, education and training, and data centers.
Building on the successes demonstrated by the Defense Logistics Agency's Prime Vendor and Direct
Vendor Delivery programs, DoD has initiated a thorough review of materiel management which
encompasses the actions by which DoD manages its supply system. (Materiel management includes
functions such as provisioning, cataloging, requirements determination, asset management, distribution
and disposal.) Our review is focused primarily on three functions that account for a significant portion of
the materiel management budget: disposal operations, distribution depots and inventory control points.
Disposal Operations. DoD disposes of surplus or worn out equipment and other materiel -- valued at $24
billion last year -- through transfers to eligible users (e.g., state and local governments) or sales to the
public. We expect that the department's re-engineering efforts will permit placing many government
disposal services in the competitive marketplace.
In 1996 and 1997, for example, DoD plans to re-engineer and/or privatize the sales of excess trucks and
trailers, medical and dental equipment, and power distribution equipment, as well as various functions
supporting those disposal operations. Such actions are estimated to increase revenues from surplus
property sales by as much as 50 percent, decrease operating costs by more than 10 percent and
significantly reduce the need for new capital investment for property disposal functions.
Distribution Depots. In 1997, the department plans, on a pilot basis, to privatize all functions at the
distribution depots in Sacramento, Calif., and San Antonio, Texas.(Report of the 1995 Defense Base
Closure and Realignment Commission and the July 8, 1995, letter from its chairman to the deputy
secretary of defense.) In order to take advantage of recent improvements in the state-of-the-art physical
distribution technology, DoD will encourage contractors at both sites to re-engineer the distribution depot
business processes and evaluate the results for potential expansion to other distribution sites.
Inventory Control Points. Later this spring, the department will complete the initial business case
analyses for the armed services' inventory control points. This study will enable the department to identify
high pay-off/low risk functions.
Base commercial activities refer to those functions that are necessary to support, operate and maintain
DoD installations -- such as facilities maintenance, food services, local transportation and vehicle
maintenance. DoD currently outsources about 25 percent of this workload.
At the present time, DoD components are conducting cost comparisons -- studies that compare the cost
of the government's most efficient organization with the cost of performance by private contractors -encompassing about 150 functions at many different locations. Over the next two years, the department
expects to expand greatly the number of functions and locations being studied in search of opportunities
to lower costs and improve performance.
The department's depot maintenance policy focuses on maintaining core capabilities in organic facilities.
The core concept ensures that critical warfighting capabilities remain under the direct control of
warfighters. In the area of depot maintenance, core capabilities consist of the facilities, equipment and
skilled personnel necessary to ensure a ready and controlled source of technical competence to meet the
Joint Chiefs of Staff's contingency scenarios.
Subjecting noncore depot maintenance to the forces of competition will lower costs and improve
readiness. Reliance on the private sector in this manner complements, but does not replace, organic
capabilities. Further discussion of the department's core policy and details of how DoD calculates core
are provided in two accompanying reports submitted to the Congress. (Section 311 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 requires the two accompanying reports: one on
comprehensive maintenance policy and another on the depot maintenance workloads, including the
allocation of work between the department's own depots and the private sector. DoD is submitting
separately a report on depot maintenance personnel that is required by Section 312 of that act.)
DoD has initiated a robust campaign to increase use of the IMPAC (International Merchants Purchase
Authorization Card) purchasing card. The IMPAC is a VISA card issued by the Rocky Mountain Bank
Card System under a contract with the General Services Administration and used throughout the federal
government.
Greater use of the card (permitted by the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act) would dramatically
reduce acquisition cycle time and the paperwork associated with making and paying for procurement
actions, thus reducing costs and improving timeliness. One study of purchases below $25,000 within the
Defense Logistics Agency estimated that use of the IMPAC card instead of purchase orders would
reduce administrative expenses by over $70 million in a five-year period. In a second study, use of the
IMPAC card to purchase automated data processing equipment reduced procurement cycle time
(requisition to delivery) from an average of 29 days to less than five days.
The department needs to re-engineer some of its internal processes so that it can make maximum use of
the IMPAC card's potential for reducing costs. Expanding use of the IMPAC card requires improved
communication, coordination and business practices in DoD's financial, logistics and acquisition
communities.
The department has established two teams to identify barriers and propose solutions: an Integrated
Policy Team reporting to the deputy undersecretary of defense (acquisition reform), and a Purchase Card
Financial Management Team, reporting to the undersecretary of defense (comptroller). These groups will
complete their work this summer.
The department has announced A-76 cost comparisons in three finance and accounting areas: debt and
claims management; facilities, logistics and administrative support at Defense Finance and Accounting
Service sites; and bill paying for the Defense Commissary Agency. As required by the National Defense
Authorization Act for 1996, the department plans to carry out a pilot program for outsourcing
nonappropriated accounting and by Oct. 1, 1996, complete a plan for outsourcing civilian pay.
The department has also started to build an entirely new travel system using the best commercial
practices. This system will streamline and improve the efficiency of the travel process through greater
reliance on the private sector and commercial automation technologies. Opportunities for privatization
include increased use of full-service commercial travel offices, use of off-the-shelf software and the use
of a commercial travel card.
The Gulf War demonstrated the increasing role of technology in the art of war. Such technology demands
highly trained personnel in both operating and supporting roles, placing a premium on widespread and
cost effective training.
Technology has also changed teaching and training methodologies. Selected individual training
programs can now be delivered through the use of telecommunications at remote locations -- a process
termed distance learning. Increasing the use of these advanced learning technologies can reduce the
need for more expensive classroom training at centralized locations.
The department is evaluating how these new technologies affect training requirements and how private
sector providers can help the department in this area. The department has met with industry to determine
if it can adopt successful training management strategies from the private sector.
Over the last several years, DoD has achieved substantial economies and efficiencies in its data center
operations, Through the base realignment and closure process, the Defense Information Systems
Agency is consolidating from 59 data centers to 16 larger defense megacenters. DoD estimates that this
consolidation, scheduled to be completed late in 1996, will produce net savings of $474 million from FY
1994 through FY 1999, produce $208 million in annual steady state savings thereafter and eliminate
2,400 civilian positions.
As a result of these consolidations and associated process re-engineering actions, 57 percent of the
operating budget for DMCs in FY 1996 will be for contracted services. Further analysis of the
department's activities in this area will be submitted to Congress, as requested by the Conference Report
on HR 2126, the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1996.
The department is also assessing opportunities for achieving economies and efficiencies in data center
operations within the purview of the military departments. These actions will take place under Office of
Management and Budget Bulletin 96-02, "Consolidation of Agency Data Centers."
Increasing the level of competition could prove valuable for many other DoD commercial functions. DoD
will continue to evaluate opportunities for outsourcing.
In order for the department's initiative to be fully successful, DoD must make changes to its traditional
approach to contracting for services. Early investigation or market research of services that may be
available from the private sector is paramount. Frequently, the department has prepared statements of
work for bid before or without surveying the capabilities of the marketplace.
Similarly, well written, performance-based statements of work that contain output-oriented measures of
performance are essential. DoD's statements of work have traditionally focused on inputs or detailed
specifications and in many cases failed to provide a basis for evaluating contractor performance. These
changes in the department's approach to contracting for services are part of our ongoing effort to reform
the acquisition process and related training provided to DoD's acquisition workforce.
The Department of Defense employs the same superior talent in its civilian workforce as in the military;
indeed, DoD civilians consistently demonstrate impressive capabilities and dedication.
To the extent that activities are transferred outside the department, employees will face dislocation. The
department is committed to making the transition as humane as possible. DoD actions significantly eased
such transitions during the recent drawdown and BRAC rounds.
Procurement regulations [Federal Acquisition Regulation 7.305(c) and 52-207-3] include a right of first
refusal provision that is required for solicitations that may result in a conversion from in-house to contract
performance.
The department's well-established Priority Placement Program continues to find new positions for over
900 employees a month, thereby retaining valuable investments in human capital. Also, the Defense
Outplacement Referral System makes the resumes of DoD civilians and military available to over 18,000
private sector employers.
DoD makes very effective use of Voluntary Early Retirement Authority, which enables people to enter
retirement comfortably under a variety of situations. Also, the department created the Voluntary
Separation Incentive Payment, better known as the buyout. This congressionally approved program has
been used by over 78,000 employees, thereby avoiding a like number of layoffs. Between PPP and
buyouts, the department has been able to hold involuntary separations to less than 9 percent of the
positions eliminated over the past six years.
To make our employees affected by base realignments and closures more attractive job candidates, the
department sought and received congressional approval for the Nonfederal Hiring Incentive. Initiated last
fall, this program enables managers to provide funds for retraining and relocating DoD employees that
they keep on the payroll for at least a year. On other fronts, the department provides retraining to enable
people to qualify for licenses and certificates needed to do their current jobs when they transfer to the
private sector.
The FY 1996 National Defense Authorization Act [Sections 1033 through 1036] provided additional
flexibility by removing the 120-day limit on details at closing or realigning installations, permitting the
payment of severance amounts in a lump sum rather than biweekly, providing continuing health coverage
for employees facing a layoff and permitting individuals in similar occupations to volunteer to replace
others on reduction-in-force lists.
These initiatives are successful, but the department recognizes that further changes are needed to ease
the transition while promoting workplace stability. To that end, it is encouraging suggestions for such
changes from employee unions, professional associations and all of the components.
Outsourcing, privatization and competition are topics that spotlight sometimes conflicting goals among
DoD components, employees and contractors. To maintain an appropriate balance, the department
recognizes that all such efforts need to motivate employees to maintain readiness, retain sufficient talent
to complete future missions and recognize the factors that historically have drawn people to public
service.
From the beginning of its outsourcing initiative in August 1995, the department has actively sought input
from private industry. DoD recognizes that it can learn a great deal from industry's extensive outsourcing
experience.
In November 1995, the department commissioned a Defense Science Board task force to ascertain
which activities DoD is currently doing that could be performed by the private sector with greater
efficiency at lower cost with higher quality. Companies, outside analysts and numerous DoD
organizations have briefed the task force. The department expects the task force to issue its report in late
April 1996.
In addition, a coalition of 10 industry associations [Aerospace Industries Association, American Defense
Preparedness Association, American Electronics Association, American Shipbuilding Association,
Contract Services Association, Electronic Industries Association, National Security Industrial Association,
Professional Services Council, Shipbuilders Council of America and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce]
has provided the department with their views and analysis on outsourcing issues. The coalition has
offered valuable information on how industry:

Selects functions for outsourcing or retention in house;




Chooses external suppliers;
Writes appropriate contract terms;
Monitors supplier performance; and
Assesses the results in terms of cost savings, improved efficiency, enhanced capabilities and
other potential benefits.
DoD also met with numerous industry representatives and other experts to discuss their outsourcing
experiences and opportunities for further outsourcing by the department. In addition, the department has
discussed its outsourcing initiative with representatives from the Office of Management and Budget and
the General Accounting Office. We have also consulted with the United States Chamber of Commerce,
the National Association of Women Business Owners, the National Minority Supplier Development
Council, the National Industries for the Blind and other organizations. DoD will continue to work with
these and other organizations.
DoD has consulted and will continue to consult with federal employees at a variety of levels. Under the
federal government's commercial activities program, for example, DoD policy calls for employees and
their union representatives to be notified and involved during the development, preparation and review of
performance work statements and management studies.
At the department level, DoD has two avenues for consultation with unions. First, eight major unions
have national consultation rights with the department. DoD provides these unions with any revisions to its
policies affecting civilian employees and considers their views regarding such revisions. Second, seven
of these unions are Defense Partnership Council members. DoD officials have provided information to
DPC representatives on DoD's outsourcing and privatization initiatives. The department expects the DPC
to stay involved in these matters.
There are active labor-management partnerships at many activities throughout the department where
unions have bargaining rights. The partnerships are working together on various initiatives, such as those
concerning outsourcing and privatization.
For example, American Federation of Government Employee officials and Kelly Air Force Base [Texas]
managers formed a successful partnership recently, which was recognized with a National Partnership
Award Honorable Mention Citation presented by Vice President [Albert] Gore. Similarly, union and
management representatives at McClellan Air Force Base [Calif.] are members of the Mission McClellan
Executive Advisory Committee, which advises on matters related to the privatization and conversion of
the base.
Several statutes state a preference for private performance of commercial activities. Section 2462 of Title
10, United States Code, requires the department to obtain services from private firms when they can
provide them at lower cost. Section 357 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996
requires the secretary of defense to endeavor to obtain commercial products and services from private
sector sources.
Achieving the department's goal -- relying more on outsourcing, privatization and competition to generate
savings for modernization and improve readiness -- is hindered by several statutory and regulatory
provisions. Despite the clear policy statement in Section 2462, a variety of other laws, singly or in
combination, have complicated, delayed or discouraged outsourcing, privatization and competition.
DoD's depot maintenance policy is to conduct only the minimum workload at organic facilities that is
necessary to preserve core capabilities. For other depot work, DoD believes drawing on the capabilities
of the private sector could lead to more efficient operations. Balancing public and private sector depot
maintenance workload would minimize costs and ensure requisite readiness. Provisions of law that
impede achieving these benefits are:

Section 2466 of Title 10, United States Code -- the 60-40 rule.
The department has established a core depot maintenance policy based on maintenance capability
requirements that are calculated to meet the department's warfighting needs in the scenarios approved
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Necessary depot-level workloads are then identified to sustain those capability requirements. In this way,
the department can ensure that the personnel, equipment and facilities necessary to support essential
core requirements are being maintained. (A more detailed discussion of the department's core depot
maintenance policy is included in the accompanying report submitted pursuant to Section 311 of the FY
96 Defense Authorization Act.)
In contrast, Section 2466 establishes an arbitrary percentage (60 percent) of depot maintenance that
must be accomplished by federal employees. The 60-40 split limits the department's ability to manage
depot maintenance in an efficient and cost-effective manner.

Section 2464 of Title 10, United States Code -- core logistics functions.
Assuring victory at war demands minimizing risk for both operations and support. Therefore, the
department must determine which logistics capabilities are truly core to its warfighting mission and keep
those core capabilities under its direct control.
Sustaining core capabilities does not mean that all maintenance on mission-essential equipment must
take place in organic facilities. Maintenance of mission-essential equipment can be and is outsourced
successfully. Examples include various types of maintenance for the B-1, B-2, F-117, KC-10, U-2 aircraft
and numerous surface combatant ships.
Private firms should be considered to perform depot work when such work can be done at low or
acceptable risk to the warfighting mission and provide best value to the department. Introducing
competition among private firms for depot work that is not required to sustain core capabilities will reduce
cost and improve quality.
Core assessments need to be based on a consistent methodology involving assessments of both threats
and risks. It is department policy to review every two years core requirements and the workloads
necessary to sustain those capabilities.
Section 2464, by contrast, arbitrarily defines core in terms of workload performed at specified facilities.
This creates an artificial constraint that reduces the department's ability to manage effectively its depot
maintenance activities and facilities.

Section 2469 of Title 10, United States Code -- the $3 million rule.
Section 2469 requires public/private competitions before any depot workload in excess of $3 million can
be transferred to the private sector. The department believes that competitions normally should occur
only between private firms. DoD believes that government depots should compete against private firms
only when private sector competition is inadequate.

Section 2470 of Title 10, United States Code -- other federal work.
The department believes that it should not compete with private industry by performing any depot
maintenance work beyond that which is required for core capabilities. However, this provision
encourages government depots to maintain capacity over and above what is necessary to sustain core
capabilities in order to compete for additional workloads.
The department is seeking to introduce the benefits of outsourcing, privatization and competition
throughout our support establishment. Several provisions of law impose unnecessary constraints on this
process or preclude outright the ability to reduce costs, improve quality and maintain readiness:

Section 2461 of Title 10, United States Code -- general outsourcing.
The department recognizes the need for congressional oversight of its management of support
operations. However, DoD believes that Section 2461's requirement for four separate reports is
unnecessary. Moreover, the extensive how-to requirements create disincentives for DoD components to
pursue outsourcing.
As a result, these provisions make it difficult to meet the requirements of other statutes to complete any
cost comparison expeditiously. (Section 8037 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1996,
which is a recurring provision, restricts the use of appropriations for cost comparisons that are not
completed within 24 months (for single functions) or 48 months (for multiple functions).)

Section 2465 of Title 10, United States Code -- firefighters and security guards.
Firefighting and security guard functions must, by this provision, be performed by government personnel
-- even in those locations where such services could be performed more efficiently by local municipalities
or the private sector. Many military installations are next to or near local municipalities that could provide
such services.
This provision reduces management flexibility and, more significantly, diverts government personnel and
resources from mission-essential tasks. (In addition, this provision is a significant problem at installations
being closed or realigned where firefighting and security guard formerly provided by DoD personnel
ceases to be available.)

Section 8020 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1996 -- 10-employee threshold.
Experience demonstrates that studying more employees at one time produces proportionately greater
recurring annual savings and reduces the one-time study costs on a per-person basis. (See Marcus, Alan
J., Analysis of the Navy's Commercial Activities Program, Report CRM92-226.10, Alexandria, Va.:
Center for Naval Analyses, July 1993.) This provision, however, requires the department to go through a
comparably detailed analysis of a function involving 10 employees as it does for those involving 1,000 or
more. This is inefficient and unnecessary. A higher threshold would streamline decision-making
processes and ensure a greater return on taxpayer resources. Such thresholds are set by OMB Circular
A-76 and need not be included in law.

Section 317 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987 -- specific
installations.
DoD believes that it should be able to consider outsourcing at all installations unless there is a compelling
rationale for exempting particular ones. The department does not believe that there is such a rationale for
exempting Crane Army Ammunition Activity, Crane, Ind., and McAlester Army Ammunition Plant,
McAlester, Okla., from being evaluated for outsourcing, privatization and competition.
The federal government has published formal policies on government performance of commercial
activities since 1955. The current federal guidance is Office of Management and Budget Circular A-76.
The A-76 Circular is a straightforward statement of the executive branch's preference for obtaining
commercial services from private sources where it will achieve best value for the government.
A supplement to Circular A-76 sets forth detailed, how-to procedures for conducting cost comparisons to
determine whether commercial activities should be performed under contract or in-house. DoD fully
supports the requirement to perform cost comparisons before converting performance of a function from
in-house to contractor. This is standard practice in industry and makes sound business sense.
The Office of Management and Budget has recently revised the A-76 supplement, which it plans to
release shortly. The revised supplement represents an improvement over the earlier version.
Nevertheless, DoD remains concerned that the process is costly and time-consuming. DoD organizations
typically take up to 24 months to complete simple cost comparison, and 48 months for more complex
ones. In the private sector, by contrast, these same tasks require only about 12 months.
The long time lines for completing A-76 cost comparisons act as a strong disincentive to government
managers. Moreover, DoD managers may be reluctant to dedicate resources -- A-76 cost comparisons
can cost hundreds of thousands of dollars -- to the outsourcing decision-making process if the benefits of
the process will not be realized until years later. Such costs and time delays make it difficult for DoD to
achieve its objectives. DoD intends to take full advantage of the new flexibility and streamlined cost
comparison approaches offered by the new supplement.
DoD must continue to reduce its infrastructure and support costs to increase funding for modernization in
the coming years. Introducing the competitive forces of the private sector into DoD support activities will
reduce costs and improve performance.
Outsourcing is not a theory based on uncertain assumptions. Experience in DoD and the private sector
consistently and unambiguously demonstrates how the competitive forces of outsourcing can generate
cost savings and improve performance. One need only glimpse at the operations of our nation's most
successful companies to see the dramatic benefits that they realize through outsourcing and competition.
Through its outsourcing initiatives, DoD has begun a long-term effort to streamline its support functions
further. The success of the department's initiatives today will help determine how well it supports the
warfighters tomorrow.
Women Play Crucial Role in Nation's Defense
Executive summary of "Women in Defense -- DoD Leading the Way," a Defense Department report
released in March 1996.
The United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women developed actions to achieve women's
empowerment and reaffirm the human rights of women and the girl child. The report categorized the
objectives into 12 critical areas of concern. ...
DoD has initiated policy changes which parallel the actions from the U.N. Fourth World Conference on
Women. The all-volunteer force provides a vast pool of qualified military men and women. The total DoD
force includes DoD civilians, reservists and family members, including wives and children.
DoD is the nation's largest employer of women. There are over 500,000 women in defense. This includes
371,000 civilian employees and 195,000 active duty women. Women comprise a significant portion of the
defense force including:

12 percent of the active duty force;



14 percent of the reserve force;
37 percent of the DoD civilian labor force and
19 percent of civilian midlevel managers (GS-13 to 15).
The DoD force includes more than just the active duty military woman, reservists and DoD civilian
employees. DoD also considers 757,164 spouses (90 percent are women) of active duty military and
1,373,978 children (approximately 50 percent are girls) important stakeholders and integral to the DoD
force.
We provide for the education of 114,000 students worldwide in 135 schools in 14 countries. We are also
the nation's largest affordable employee-sponsored child care program. DoD provides care to over
200,000 children daily at 346 locations. Therefore, our programs and budget decisions incorporate the
needs of these constituencies.
The Clinton administration opened many nontraditional career fields in the armed forces to women.
Currently, there are 186 pilots and navigators flying combat aircraft with approximately 141 in training.
The Clinton administration appointed more women to the DoD than any past administration. For example,
the first woman head of a major branch of military service, Ms. Shelia Widnall, was appointed during this
administration.
Below is an overview of the DoD's actions consistent with the Beijing conference on women. ... DoD is
leading the way.

DoD Instruction 1344.12 assists wives in receiving involuntary allotments (garnishment) to
facilitate child support enforcement. DoD has published the names and addresses of points of
contact to facilitate child support enforcement. This effort is in compliance with Executive Order
12593 signed by the president.

DoD has 200 trained employment assistance managers worldwide to assist spouses (over 90
percent are women) develop skills and identify employment opportunities in the private sector.

DoD has initiated a major research effort to study the barriers which impact spouses (mostly
women) of military members who earn less than $25,000 per year (E-5 and below) with
employment.

The Navy has 137 women pilots and navigators flying combat aircraft. The Army has 38, and
the Air Force has 10. The Marine Corps has one pilot and 11 in training. The Navy has 87
women pilots in training and 40 naval flight officers in training. The Air Force has three women in
training.

DoD has special emphasis programs designed to enhance the employment and advancement
of minorities, women and people with disabilities.

The aid societies of the Air Force and Navy offer tuition assistance programs for spouses of
active duty members overseas. The program encourages the completion of degree or certificate
programs to increase occupational opportunities for spouses.

The Defense Women's Health Research Program established by the FY [fiscal year] 94
National Defense Authorization Act created a coordinating office for multidisciplinary and
multiinstitutional research within the DoD. The purpose of the office is to coordinate research
within the DoD on women's health issues as it relates to service in the armed forces. Research
will encompass active and reserve component women.

All active duty DoD women have pelvic exams during accession physicals. Active duty women
are required to have annual Pap smears and clinical breast examinations. During annual exams,
active duty women are routinely offered counseling on family planning and contraception
alternatives.

The Air Force Reproductive Hazards Initiative Group at Brooks Air Force Base, Texas, will
develop a technical report on guidelines for handling reproductive concerns in the workplace.
The report will recommend guidelines for women exposed to chemical or biological pollutants.

The DoD New Parent Support program provides prenatal support, counseling and home visits
after birth to both the mother and father for certain families at risk for family violence. Preliminary
evaluations indicate this program reduces the risk of spouse abuse and child abuse.

A senior level Pentagon task force, co-chaired by the secretary of the Air Force, Sheila Widnall,
identified strategies to eliminate sexual harassment and other forms of discrimination. The task
force also identified 48 ways to improve equal opportunity for women.

DoD collaborated with service family advocacy offices, Cornell University, Department of
Justice and the Department of Health and Human Services to publish a 1995 package to
increase awareness on domestic violence prevention.

DoD has made a significant commitment to peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina with its
deployment of forces to enforce the Dayton agreements. It cooperates with the effort to bring to
justice those guilty of war crimes, including allegations of widespread war crimes against
women and children.

Integration of women in the armed forces in a broad range of functions enhances sensitivity to
and treatment of women who suffer as a result of armed conflict. The recent repeal of combat
exclusion provided the following increased military services opportunities available to women:
91 percent of Army billets are now open to women; 96 percent of Navy billets now open to
women; 93 percent of Marine Corps billets are now open to women; 99 percent of Air Force
billets are now open to women.

DoD has the nation's largest affordable employee-sponsored child care program, which
provides care to over 200,000 children on a daily basis, with over 16,000 employees (mostly
military wives) at 346 locations worldwide.

The DoD acquisition process has an aggressive outreach component to target women-owned
businesses. To raise the level of awareness, DoD provides seminars and procurement
conferences to educate women on economic opportunities within the DoD acquisition program.
Women serve as senior-level leaders, assistant secretaries of defense and as senior executives in the
military departments. The Air Force has four women in the astronaut program. The Navy has one woman
in the astronaut program.
The secretary of the Air Force is a woman; the Army has five women general officers; the Navy has five
women admirals; the Air Force has six female generals, and the USMC [U. S. Marine Corps] has one
female general.

The secretary of defense memorandums on equal opportunity issued March 3, 1994, and on
prohibiting sexual harassment in DoD issued Aug. 22, 1994, exemplif[y] the United Nation[s]
objective that "Government responsibility for the advancement of women is vested in the
highest possible level of government."

The Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services was established 45 years ago to
evaluate and make recommendations on women's issues. This organization regularly reviews
policy decisions and garners field input in its analysis of women in the military.

The Army has instituted the Army Family Action Plan to improve family programs, benefits and
entitlements for the Army family at the grass roots level. Established by Army leadership in 1983,
it implements a partnership that exists between the Army and Army families.

The deputy secretary of defense published in May 1995 an action agenda for civilian equal
employment opportunity progress within the DoD.

DoD published a Department of Defense Human Goals charter. A vital part of the DoD public
affairs program is to present information about women as they are -- accomplished
professionals. Recent examples include:

"CBS This Morning" aired a multipart series on women recruits and drill instructors at Marine
Corps Recruit [Base], Parris Island, [S.C.].

The National Air and Space Museum interviewed women helicopter pilots for [the] 150th
anniversary of Smithsonian Institution television programs.

The Chicago Tribune covered a story on aviation training for women; Newsweek conducted
interviews of women cadets for gender integration at the U.S. Military Academy, Virginia Military
Institute and The Citadel.

The top environmental policy maker in DoD is a woman. Ms. Sherri Goodman is the deputy
undersecretary of defense for environmental security.

The DoD has executed a program that targets outreach, training and education opportunities for
women in communities surrounding military installations through the implementation of the
environmental justice executive order.

The Department of Defense Education Activity Strategic Plan targets narrowing the
achievement gap of girls in math and science by 50 percent by the year 2000.

DoD has an aggressive public awareness effort to disseminate knowledge about child
maltreatment. Additionally, DoD provides training and education on resources available for
parents, information on child development, disciplinary methods
Managing Danger: Prevent, Deter, Defeat
Introduction to the "Annual Report to the President and the Congress" by Secretary of Defense William J.
Perry, released March 4, 1996.
Contrary to the hopes of many and predictions of some, the end of the Cold War did not bring an end to
international conflict. The most daunting threats to our national security that we faced during the Cold
War have gone away, but they have been replaced with new dangers.
During the Cold War, we faced the threat of nuclear holocaust; today, we face the dangers attendant to
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Nuclear weapons in the hands of rogue nations or
terrorists are especially dangerous because unlike the nuclear powers during the Cold War, they might
not be deterred by the threat of retaliation.
During the Cold War, we faced the threat of Warsaw Pact forces charging through the Fulda Gap and
driving for the English Channel; today, we face the dangers attendant to the instability in Central and
Eastern Europe resulting from the painful transition to democracy and market economies now under way
there. This instability could lead to civil wars or even the re-emergence of totalitarian regimes hostile to
the West.
During the Cold War, we faced the threat of the Soviet Union using Third World nations as proxies in the
Cold War confrontation. Today we face the dangers arising from an explosion of local and regional
conflicts unrelated to Cold War ideology, but rooted in deep-seated ethnic and religious hatreds and
frequently resulting in horrible suffering. These conflicts do not directly threaten the survival of the United
States, but they can threaten our allies and our vital interests, particularly if the regional aggressors
possess weapons of mass destruction.
The new post-Cold War dangers make the task of protecting America's national security different and in
some ways more complex than it was during the Cold War. Our task of planning force structure is more
complex than when we had a single, overriding threat.
Previously, our force structure was planned to deter a global war with the Soviet Union, which we
considered a threat to our very survival as a nation. All other threats, including regional threats, were
considered lesser-but-included cases.
The forces we maintained to counter the Soviet threat were assumed to be capable of dealing with any of
these lesser challenges. Today, the threat of global conflict is greatly diminished, but the danger of
regional conflict is neither lesser nor included and has therefore required us to take this danger explicitly
into account in structuring our forces. These risks are especially worrisome because many of the likely
aggressor nations possess weapons of mass destruction. Additionally, our defense planning must
provide a hedge for the possibility of a re-emergence at some future time of the threat of global conflict.
Also, our task of building alliances and coalitions is more complex in the absence of a global threat. With
the collapse of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the raison d'etrre of NATO, for
example, had to be reconsidered from first principles in order to relate its missions to the new dangers.
Also, new coalitions and partnerships needed to be formed with the newly emerging democratic
countries.
In building such international coalitions, we understand that the United States is the only country with
truly global interests and a full range of global assets -- military, economic and political. Thus, we are the
natural leader of the international community. However, even the United States cannot achieve its goals
without the active assistance of other nations. No state can act unilaterally and expect to fully address
threats to its interests, particularly those that are transnational in character.
Thus the new post-Cold War security environment requires a significant evolution in our strategy for
managing conflict, and it requires new and innovative defense programs and management philosophies
to implement that strategy.
Today, our policy for managing post-Cold War dangers to our security rests on three basic lines of
defense. The first line of defense is to prevent threats from emerging, the second is to deter threats that
do emerge, and the third, if prevention and deterrence fail, is to defeat the threat to our security by using
military force. A renewed emphasis on the first line of defense -- preventive defense -- is appropriate in
dealing with the post-Cold War dangers and is a significant departure from our Cold War defense policies,
where the primary emphasis was on deterrence.
During World War II, all of America's defense resources were dedicated to defeating the threat posed by
Japan and Germany and their allies. That war ended with a demonstration of the incredibly destructive
power of atomic weapons. Thus, when the Cold War began, the fundamental predicate of our defense
strategy was that fighting a nuclear war was an unacceptable proposition -- unacceptable from a military
as well as a moral standpoint.
So we formulated a strategy of deterrence -- a logical response to the single overarching threat we faced
during that era: an expansionist Soviet Union heavily armed with nuclear and conventional weapons.
This strategy meant that the primary responsibility of previous secretaries of defense was making sure
that we had adequate forces, both nuclear and conventional, to provide unambiguous deterrence.
Today, we continue to deter potential adversaries by maintaining the best military forces in the world. But
in the post-Cold War era, the secretary of defense and the department also devote significant efforts to
working on preventive defense. Preventive defense seeks to keep potential dangers to our security from
becoming full-blown threats. It is perhaps our most important tool for protecting American interests from
the special dangers that characterize the post-Cold War era. When successful, preventive defense
precludes the need to deter or fight a war.
Preventive defense is nothing new. It has been a central idea of military strategists for over 2,000 years.
Indeed, it has been an important strand in United States defense policy that has been used before with
notable success.
After World War II, the United States and its allies undertook significant efforts to prevent a future war by
holding out a hand of reconciliation and economic assistance to our former enemies, Japan and
Germany. These efforts were an outstanding success, especially the Marshall Plan in Europe. The
economies of Japan and Western Europe rebounded, democracy grew deep roots, and our military
cooperation and strategic alliances flourished. But Joseph Stalin turned down the Marshall Plan for the
Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries that he dominated, and our preventive efforts with the
Soviet Union failed.
Instead, the Cold War ensued, and for more than 40 years the world faced the threat of global war and
even nuclear holocaust. Having failed to prevent the conditions for conflict, the United States
concentrated on the second line of defense -- deterrence.
Over the next 40-plus years, deterrence worked, and World War III was averted. Finally, largely as a
result of fundamental flaws in its political and economic system, the Soviet Union collapsed, and many of
the new independent states sought to establish democratic governments and free-market systems. The
outcome of that unprecedented transformation is still uncertain, but today the threat of worldwide nuclear
conflict has receded, former Warsaw Pact nations are seeking to join NATO, and Russia and the United
States are cooperating in both economic and security programs.
Clearly, deterrence and warfighting capability still have to remain central to America's post-Cold War
security strategy, but they cannot be our only approaches to dealing with the threats to our security.
Instead, the dangers facing us today point us towards a greater role for preventive defense measures.
Just as preventive defense measures helped shape our security environment following World War II,
preventive measures can help us deal with post-Cold War dangers. Indeed, the end of the Cold War
allows us to build on the types of preventive measures successfully introduced by George Marshall in
Western Europe and extend them to all of Europe and the Asia-Pacific region.
In addition to maintaining strong alliances with our traditional allies in NATO and the Asia-Pacific region,
our preventive defense approach consists of four core activities:

Working cooperatively with Russia, Ukraine, Kazakstan and Belarus to reduce the nuclear
legacy of the former Soviet Union and to improve the safety of residual weapons;


Establishing programs to limit the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;
Encouraging newly independent and newly democratic nations to restructure their defense
establishments to emphasize civilian control of their military, transparency in their defense
programs and confidence-building measures with their neighbors;

Establishing cooperative defense-to-defense relationships with nations that are neither
full-fledged allies nor adversaries, but who are nonetheless important to our security.
Investing in these programs today, which my predecessor Les Aspin aptly dubbed "defense by other
means," saves us both blood and treasure tomorrow.
Proliferation is a prime example. The possession of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction by a
potential aggressor not only increases the potential lethality of any regional conflict, but the mere
possession of the weapons by the potential aggressor increases the chances of conflict arising in the first
place.
In other words, it is not just that a nuclear-armed Iraq or North Korea would be a more deadly adversary
in a war, it is that with nuclear weapons they are likely to be harder to deter and more likely to coerce their
neighbors or start a war in the first place. The Framework Agreement with North Korea is a prime
example of our counterproliferation program at work. The dangerous North Korean nuclear program has
been frozen since October 1994, when the Framework Agreement was signed.
Another example of preventive defense is our Cooperative Threat Reduction, often referred to as the
Nunn-Lugar Program. Under this program, we have assisted the nuclear states of the former Soviet
Union to dismantle thousands of nuclear warheads and destroy hundreds of launchers and silos.
Reducing the nuclear threat to the United States and stopping proliferation are only the most dramatic
examples of why prevention is so important to our security. This annual defense report describes in detail
the programs we have initiated to strengthen our preventive defense, most notably the Partnership for
Peace.
No matter how hard we work on preventive defense, we cannot be sure that we will always be successful
in preventing new threats from developing. That is why we must deter threats to our security, should they
emerge.
The risk of global conflict today is greatly reduced from the time of the Cold War, but as long as nuclear
weapons still exist, some risk of global conflict remains. The United States therefore retains a small but
highly effective nuclear force as a deterrent. These forces (as well as those of Russia) have been
reduced significantly, consistent with the START I treaty, and will be further reduced when Russia ratifies
the START II treaty.
Similarly, to deter regional conflict we must maintain strong, ready, forward-deployed, conventionally
armed forces, make their presence felt and demonstrate the will to use them. While the diminished threat
of global conflict has allowed us to reduce U.S. force structure accordingly, the increased risk of regional
conflict places sharp limits on how far those reductions can go.
Today, the size and composition of American military forces, consistent with the Bottom-up Review
conducted in 1993, are based on the need to deter and, if necessary, fight and win, in concert with
regional allies, two major regional conflicts nearly simultaneously. The guiding principle is that the United
States will fight to win and to win decisively, quickly and with minimum casualties.
This principle requires us to maintain a force structure today of about 1.5 million active duty personnel
and 900,000 reserve personnel. These forces are organized into 10 active Army divisions and 15 Army
National Guard enhanced readiness brigades; 20 Air Force wings (including seven reserve wings); 360
Navy ships, including 12 aircraft carriers; and four Marine divisions (including one reserve division).
Equally important to the size of the force is the requirement to maintain a commanding overseas
presence, including 100,000 troops in Europe and about the same number in the Pacific, all in a high
state of readiness. Our overseas presence not only deters aggression, it also improves coalition
effectiveness in the event deterrence fails, demonstrates U.S. security commitments, provides initial
crisis response capability and underwrites regional stability.
Strong deterrence also requires us to maintain pre-positioned equipment in the Persian Gulf, the Indian
Ocean, Korea and Europe and carrier task forces and Marine expeditionary units afloat, able to move
quickly to any crisis point.
And finally, it requires that we keep our forces in the United States in a high state of readiness and that
we have the lift capability to transport them and their equipment rapidly to distant theaters. Having the
capability to deploy forces quickly to a crisis decreases the likelihood that they will actually have to be
used and increases their chances for success if force is necessary.
Our planning involves the extensive use of well-trained reserve component forces. Fifteen Army National
Guard brigades and many combat support reserve units will be maintained at a high readiness level to
allow their use at early stages in military operations. The rest are intended to be used as follow-on forces
available for later deployment in longer-term contingencies.
Those are the requirements that go with the ability to fight and win, in concert with regional allies, two
nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts. U.S. forces today meet these requirements.
While being able to fight and win is essential, that ability alone cannot deter conflict. Deterrence stems
from military capability coupled with political will, both real and perceived; credibility is as important to
deterrence as military capability. Deterrence of regional conflict failed, for example, in 1950 when North
Korea doubted American political will. Some World War II veterans had to turn around and return to the
Far East to reassert that political will at a very high price. Today, American forces in the region serve as a
visible reminder of our willingness and capability to help defend our South Korean allies.
In 1990, deterrence of regional conflict failed again when Iraq doubted our political will to defend Kuwait
and Saudi Arabia. We demonstrated that will through a costly but highly successful war to evict Iraqi
forces from Kuwait.
In contrast, deterrence succeeded in October 1994 when Iraq moved forces down to the Kuwaiti border a
second time. This time, the United States demonstrated political will by rapidly deploying additional U.S.
military forces to the Gulf.
Within a few days after the Iraqi forces had moved to the Kuwaiti border, we had deployed 200 fighter
aircraft, an armored brigade, a Marine expeditionary unit and a carrier battle group to the theater. These
forces created in a few days a presence that took many weeks to assemble in 1990.
Faced with that presence and the lessons of Operation Desert Storm, [Iraqi President] Saddam Hussein
sent his brigades back to their barracks. We achieved deterrence through the capability to rapidly build
up a highly capable force, coupled with the credible political will to use that force.
Deterrence can sometimes fail, however, particularly against an irrational or desperate adversary, so the
United States must be prepared to actually use military force. Use of force is the method of last resort for
defending our national interests and requires a careful balancing of those interests against the risks and
costs involved. The key criteria are whether the risks at stake are vital, important or humanitarian.
If prevention and deterrence fail, vital U.S. interests can be at risk when the United States or an ally is
threatened by conventional military force, by economic strangulation or by the threat of weapons of mass
destruction. These threats to vital interests are most likely to arise in a regional conflict and by definition,
may require military intervention.
In contrast, military intervention in ethnic conflicts or civil wars, where we have important, but rarely vital
interests at stake, requires the balancing of those interests against the risks and costs involved.
In general, any U.S. intervention will be undertaken only after thorough consideration of the following
critical factors: whether the intervention advances U.S. interests; whether the intervention is likely to
accomplish U.S. objectives; whether the risks and costs are commensurate with the U.S. interests at
stake; and whether all other means of achieving U.S. objectives have been exhausted.
The United States chose not to intervene as a ground combatant in the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina
because the risks and costs were too high when weighed against our interests. This decision was made
by two successive administrations for essentially the same reasons. However, after successful American
diplomacy and NATO military force reshaped the situation and the risks, we made the decision to
participate, not as a combatant, but in the NATO peace implementation force.
The bottom line is that the United States is a global power with global interests, and as President Clinton
has said, "Problems that start beyond our borders can quickly become problems within them." American
leadership, global presence and strong armed forces can help keep localized problems from becoming
our problems and protect us if they do.
At the same time, there are limits to what the United States and its forces can or must do about problems
around the globe. As the president said:
"America cannot and must not be the world's policeman. We cannot stop war for all time, but we can stop
some wars. We cannot save all women and children, but we can save many of them. We can't do
everything, but we must do what we can. There are times and places where our leadership can mean the
difference between peace and war, and where we can defend our fundamental values as a people and
serve our most basic, strategic interests."
Finally, in some instances, the United States may act out of humanitarian concern, even in the absence
of a direct threat to U.S. national interests. Agencies and programs other than the U.S. armed forces are
generally the best tools for addressing humanitarian crises, but military forces may be appropriate in
certain, specific situations, such as when:


A humanitarian crisis dwarfs the ability of civilian agencies to respond;
The need for relief is urgent, and only the military can jump-start a response;

The response requires resources unique to the military;

The risk to American service members is minimal.
A good case in point was America's humanitarian intervention in Rwanda in the summer of 1994 to stop
the cholera epidemic, which was killing 5,000 Rwandans a day. Only the U.S. military had the ability to
rapidly initiate the humanitarian effort to bring clean water, food and medicine to Hutu refugees who had
fled from Rwanda in the wake of a catastrophic tribal conflict, and U.S. forces carried out their mission
successfully, at little cost, with little risk, and then quickly withdrew.
Implementing our defense strategy involves literally hundreds of programs. Their details can be found in
the sections which follow this introduction. Highlighted below, however, are some of the key ways that we
are implementing our approach of prevent, deter and defeat.
During the Cold War, the Soviet nuclear physicist Andrei Sakharov said that preventing a nuclear
holocaust must be the "absolute priority" of mankind. This is still true.
Today, a primary means for accomplishing this goal is the continued dismantlement of nuclear warheads,
bombers and ballistic missile launchers. The touchstone of our preventive activities in this area is the
Cooperative Threat Reduction program, which helps expedite the START I treaty reductions in the states
of the former Soviet Union.
This program contributes to some remarkable accomplishments: over 4,000 nuclear warheads and more
than 700 bombers and ballistic missile launchers dismantled, a nuclear-free Kazakstan, a Ukraine and
Belarus on the way to becoming nuclear free and successful removal of nuclear material from Kazakstan
through Project Sapphire.
It is also vitally important that we prevent potential regional conflicts from assuming a nuclear aspect.
That is why we have worked hard to help implement the framework agreement which has frozen North
Korea's dangerous nuclear program and, when fully implemented, will eliminate the program altogether.
Efforts to reduce the nuclear threat also include sanctions on Iraq and Iran and the indefinite extension
without conditions of the historic nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Such diplomatic measures do not stand
in isolation. They are an integral and crucial part of the U.S. approach to preventing conflict.
Despite our best efforts to reduce the danger of weapons of mass destruction, it is still possible that
America and our forces and allies could again be threatened by these terrible weapons. That is why it is
important for the United States to maintain a small but effective nuclear force.
This deterrent hedge is not incompatible with significant reductions in American nuclear forces, nor is it
incompatible with American support for the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and a comprehensive ban on
nuclear testing. This nuclear hedge strategy is complemented by a program to develop a ballistic missile
defense system that could be deployed to protect the continental United States from limited attacks
should a strategic threat to our nation arise from intercontinental ballistic missiles in the hands of hostile
rogue states.
Another way we hedge against potential future threats is by maintaining selected critical and
irreplaceable elements of the defense industrial base, such as shipyards that build nuclear submarines.
With the end of the Cold War and the defense downsizing, the need for large numbers of major new
ships, aircraft and armored vehicles has declined significantly. Allowing these defense-unique production
facilities to shut down or disappear completely, however, would curtail the nation's ability to modernize or
prepare for new threats down the road. Therefore, the department will selectively procure certain major
systems, such as the Navy's Seawolf fast-attack submarine, in limited quantities to keep their production
capabilities warm, until we are ready to build the next-generation nuclear submarines.
Maintaining strong alliances with our traditional allies in Europe and the Asia-Pacific, maintaining
constructive relations with Russia and China, and reaching out to new democracies and friends are key
elements of our defense posture.
In Europe, NATO is the foundation of our security strategy, and we continue to play a leadership role
within NATO. There are those who allege that NATO is now obsolete, but in fact, NATO has provided a
zone of stability for Western Europe for 40 years, and all 16 members have reaffirmed the importance of
the alliance. Indeed, NATO has received requests from new nations wishing to join, to be a part of this
zone of stability.
NATO's Partnership for Peace program is already extending a zone of stability eastward across Europe
and Central Asia by promoting military cooperation among NATO countries, former members of the
Warsaw Pact and other countries in the region. This cooperation takes place at many levels, from
frequent meetings between defense ministers to officer exchanges at schools and planning
headquarters.
The highlight of PfP, though, is the joint exercise program, focusing on peacekeeping training. In August
1995, the United States hosted one of these exercises, Cooperative Nugget, at Fort Polk, La. Such
exercises have had a remarkable effect on European security by building confidence, promoting
transparency and reducing tensions among nations that have, in many cases, been at odds for long
periods of Europe's history. PfP is also the pathway to NATO membership for those partners that wish to
join the alliance.
In fact, the positive effects of PfP resonate far beyond the security sphere. Since political and economic
reforms are a prerequisite to participation in PfP or membership in NATO, many partner nations have
accelerated such changes. In addition, many partner nations are starting to see value in actual PfP
activities, irrespective of whether they lead to NATO membership. The lessons learned and values
fostered through the program are intrinsically useful.
PfP is one of the most significant institutions of the post-Cold War era. Like the Marshall Plan in the
1940s, PfP today is creating a network of people and institutions across all of Europe working together to
preserve freedom, promote democracy and free markets, and cooperate internationally -- all of which are
critical to expanding the zone of stability in Europe in our day.
It is critical that this zone of stability in Europe include Russia. Key to this is Russia's active membership
in PfP, NATO's development of a special security relationship with Russia and Russia's integral
involvement in broader European security issues, as in Bosnia and Herzegovina.Open, productive
security relations with Russia are an essential element of our approach to advancing security in Europe
and ultimately limiting the potential for conflict.
Recognizing that Russia remains a major world power with global interests and a large nuclear arsenal,
the United States seeks a pragmatic partnership with Russia whereby we pursue areas of agreement
and seek to reduce tensions and misunderstandings in areas where we disagree. Our successful efforts
to include a Russian brigade in the U.S. sector of the NATO-led peace implementation force in Bosnia
and Herzegovina readily reflect this partnership.
In addition to cooperative threat reduction efforts, such as the Nunn-Lugar program, we also seek to
foster greater openness in the Russian defense establishment and to encourage Russia to participate in
global nonproliferation activities and regional confidence-building measures by participating in the
U.S.-Russian Commission on Economic and Technological Cooperation.
The commission, established by Vice President [Al] Gore and Prime Minister [Viktor] Chernomyrdin in
1993, seeks to build confidence by forging a better economic relationship between the United States and
Russia. The Defense Department is part of an interagency effort sponsored by the commission focused
on finding, facilitating and helping finance investments in the region by American business enterprises,
targeting a wide range of opportunities from defense conversion to space exploration to prefabricated
housing. The commission's activities benefit Russia's attempts to achieve a market economy, benefit
American companies and benefit American security interests -- a triple win!
In the Pacific, the United States and Japan have entered into a new era in our regional relationship as
well as in our global partnership. A stronger U.S.-Japanese alliance will continue to provide a safe
environment for regional peace and prosperity. Our alliance with South Korea not only serves to deter
war on the peninsula, but also is key to stability in the region. These security alliances and the American
military presence in the Western Pacific preserve security in the region and are a principal factor in
dampening a regional arms race.
We are also fully participating in multilateral security dialogues, such as the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations Regional Forum, which help reduce tensions and build confidence so that tough problems
like the territorial dispute over the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea can be resolved peaceably.
Central to our efforts to prevent conflict in the Asia-Pacific region is our policy of comprehensive
engagement with China, a major power with a nuclear capability. The United States will not ignore
China's record on human rights, political repression or its sale and testing of dangerous weapons, but we
also will not try to isolate China over these issues.
We want to see China become a responsible, positive participant in the international arena, and the best
way to encourage this is to maintain a vigorous dialogue over a wide range of issues -- including security
issues -- so that we can pursue areas of common interests and reduce tensions.
In South Asia, the United States has restarted a bilateral security relationship with Pakistan and begun a
new security dialogue with India. These ongoing dialogues can help all three countries focus on areas of
common interest, such as international peacekeeping, and could in time provide the confidence
necessary to address more difficult problems, such as nuclear proliferation and the long-simmering
conflict over Kashmir.
In our own hemisphere, we are witnessing a new era of peace, stability and security. From Point Barrow
to Tierra del Fuego, all 34 nations except Cuba have chosen democracy, and economic and political
reforms are sweeping the region. This historic development paved the way for the first Defense
Ministerial of the Americas last summer, at which delegations from all 34 democracies gathered in
Williamsburg, Va., to consider ways to build more trust, confidence and cooperation on security issues
throughout the region. Following on the success and progress at Williamsburg, the nations of this
hemisphere already are planning for the second Defense Ministerial in Argentina in the fall of 1996.
Like the Partnership for Peace in Europe, the Defense Ministerial of the Americas provides an
opportunity to build a zone of stability in a region once destabilized by Cold War tensions.
In the Americas, as in Europe, the tools for building stability include joint training and education programs
that promote professional, civilian-controlled militaries as well as personal interactions; information
sharing on national military plans, policies and budgets; and confidence-building measures. In Europe,
these activities are led by the United States and NATO. In the Americas, they are emerging by
consensus and encouraged by the United States. But ultimately the result is the same: more democracy,
more cooperation, more peace and more security for the United States.
In each of the regions discussed, the United States has military-to-military relationships and is conducting
joint exercises with a much wider range of countries than ever before. These activities promote trust and
enable forces from different countries to operate together more effectively, which is essential given the
increasing prevalence of combined operations. In the Gulf War, for example, some 40 countries made
military contributions. Nearly three dozen countries are participating in the peacekeeping force in Bosnia
and Herzegovina, including many non-NATO countries.
Another important part of preventive defense is our effort to promote democratic civil-military relations.
One such program, conducted jointly with the State Department, is the International Military Education
and Training program, which has now trained half a million foreign officers in the fundamentals of
civil-military relations over the last several decades. Similarly, recently established regional training and
study centers like the Marshall Center in Germany and the Asia-Pacific Center for Security in Hawaii are
designed to promote contacts between regional military officers and civilian defense officials and to foster
the principles of civilian control of the military.
No security strategy is better than the forces that carry it out. Today, the United States has forces that are
well-trained, well-equipped and most of all, ready to fight, as their performance over the past year in the
Persian Gulf, Haiti and Bosnia and Herzegovina illustrates. The department has maintained this
readiness in spite of a drawdown of historic proportions.
Drawdowns create turbulence in the force, which historically has undermined readiness. Recognizing this
history, we have taken unprecedented steps to maintain readiness while reducing our forces in the wake
of the Cold War. By the end of 1996, the drawdown will be nearly complete, which means an end to the
turbulence.
In the meantime, though, the department continues to maintain near-term readiness at historically high
levels through robust funding of the operations and maintenance accounts. This remains the
department's top budget priority. Manifesting this priority, the department's FY [fiscal year] 1995 and FY
1996 budgets and the FY 1997 budget request are at historically high levels of O&M funding (normalized
to force size).
Medium-term readiness depends on attracting top-quality people and retaining them after they have
developed technical and leadership skills. To do so, we must offer not only challenging and rewarding
work, but also an appropriate quality of life, a term used to encompass the entire package of
compensation and benefits as well as the work and living environment for military service personnel.
Protecting quality of life is not only the right thing to do for the men and women who serve and sacrifice
for their country, it is also critical to preserving medium-term readiness.
Last year, President Clinton approved an increase in defense spending of $25 billion over six years
largely aimed at improving the quality of military life. This includes a commitment to ensure that military
personnel receive the full pay raise authorized by law through the end of the century. It is also directed at
extensive improvements in military quality of life programs, including housing, a key concern to service
families.
This past year, a distinguished panel led by former Army Secretary John Marsh looked beyond existing
DoD efforts to identify quality of life problems and suggest high-leverage, affordable solutions. The panel
concentrated on three major areas: housing, personnel tempo, and community and family services.
Action on the panel's recommendations is being incorporated into the department's overall effort to
preserve quality of life.
To ensure military readiness in the long term requires the department to modernize the armed forces with
new systems and upgrades to existing systems to maintain America's technological advantage on the
battlefield. For the past five years, the department has taken advantage of the drawdown and slowed
modernization in order to fully fund those expenditures that guarantee near-term readiness -- spare parts,
training and maintenance.
As a result, the modernization account in FY 1997 will be the lowest it has been in many years, about
one-third of what it was in FY 1985. At the same time, the average age of our military equipment has not
increased, because as the forces were drawn down, the older equipment was weeded out. But now that
the drawdown is nearly over, the modernization reprieve from aging is nearly over, too.
So beginning in FY 1997, the department is planning a modernization ramp-up, which will be critical to
the readiness of the forces in the next century. By the year 2001, funding to procure equipment to
modernize our forces will increase to $60.1 billion in current dollars -- over 40 percent higher than what it
is in the FY 1997 budget.
This five-year plan will focus on building a ready, flexible and responsive force for a changing security
environment. The force will continue to maintain our technological superiority on the battlefield by seizing
on the advances in information-age technology, such as advanced sensors, computers and
communication systems. At the same time, the modernization program will focus on bread and butter
needs, such as airlift and sealift, and the everyday equipment ground forces need in the field, such as
tactical communications gear, trucks and armored personnel carriers.
This five-year modernization plan is based on three assumptions. First, that the defense budget topline
will stop its decline in FY 1997 and begin to rise again (as proposed in the president's five-year budget).
Second, that the department will achieve significant savings from infrastructure reductions, most
importantly from base closings. The third assumption of our modernization program is that the
department will achieve significant savings by outsourcing many support activities and overhauling the
defense acquisition system.
The base realignment and closure process is directly linked to modernization and long-term readiness.
As we downsize the military force, we must also reduce our Cold War infrastructure. Our efforts to
manage this process have been aimed at saving money while ensuring that troops have the training and
equipment they need to be ready in the future. While the department has made significant progress in
base closings, many BRAC [base realignment and closure] recommendations have not yet been
implemented, and an imbalance between force structure and infrastructure remains.
Until we fully execute the BRAC process, money will be tied up in nonperforming real estate, draining
funds from our modernization efforts and other programs. While base closing initially costs money -- the
FY 1996 budget included $4 billion allocated to base closing costs -- there will be significant savings in
the future. In the FY 1999 budget, the department projects $6 billion in savings from closing the bases,
thus allowing a $10 billion swing in savings. These and future savings from base closing will be devoted
to modernization.
Completing the BRAC process quickly is not only key to saving money, it also is the right thing to do for
the communities involved. The department is helping these communities find imaginative ways to put the
excess defense property to productive use as quickly as possible.
When base closure is done right, it can leave communities better off, with a more diverse economy and
more jobs. The key is early community involvement and planning. For example, when Louisiana's
England Air Force Base was slated for closure, the Alexandria Chamber of Commerce worked with the
Air Force to develop a base reuse plan. Months before the base did close, small business enterprises
had already signed leases, resulting today in hundreds of new jobs for Alexandria.
Over the past two years, the department has undertaken the most revolutionary changes in its acquisition
system in 50 years and is looking for ways to further reform the system through privatization.
... The department discarded the system of military specifications, or milspecs, which spelled out how
contractors must design and produce military systems, supplies, and services. In its place, the
department will use commercial and performance standards. These will call for the highest quality
standards available in the commercial market or if there are no relevant commercial standards, will use
functional specifications which describe how the equipment is to perform -- and challenge suppliers to
meet that standard any way they want.
The second major change in the defense acquisition system began on Oct. 1, 1995, when the new
federal acquisition streamlining regulations were published. These regulations, in effect, will allow the
Defense Department to buy from the commercial marketplace more often and buy more like commercial
firms do.
Defense acquisition reform is important not only because it will help pay for the defense modernization
program, but also because of a phenomenon called "technology pull." This phrase describes the demand
for advanced technology to give the United States battlefield superiority.
Technology pull has its roots in the U.S. military experience in Operation Desert Storm. Before Operation
Desert Storm, many U.S. military commanders and outside experts were skeptical of advanced
technology applied to combat.
For example, they questioned the concept of the reconnaissance strike forces, developed in the 1970s
and deployed in the 1980s. This concept combined stealth aircraft, precision-guided munitions and
advanced surveillance technology to offset superior numbers of Soviet forces. But there was great
concern that such advanced technology was too delicate or that it would not work in the fog of war. But in
Operation Desert Storm, the same reconnaissance strike forces crushed the Iraqi military force with very
low U.S. losses.
Skeptics became believers. Advanced technology proved itself, and military commanders are finding
myriad uses for it -- not just smart weapons, but also smart logistics, smart intelligence and smart
communications. Military commanders are revising their doctrine and tactics to take advantage of this
technology, and they want to pull it faster into their war planning.
The key technology they want is information technology, and it is being developed at a breathtaking pace,
but not by the Defense Department. It is being developed by commercial computer and
telecommunications companies, dual-use (defense-commercial) technology firms, and small high-tech
businesses and universities. The department cannot pull this technology from these sources without
acquisition reform, because the current system limits access to these sources either directly by throwing
up regulatory barriers or indirectly by slowing the ability to purchase and employ new generations of
technology in a timely way.
The department not only needs to do more business with commercial industry, it also needs to act more
like commercial industry.
There are numerous examples of private sector companies turning to outside suppliers for a wide variety
of specific, noncore goods and services. By focusing on core competencies, they have reduced their
costs by lowering overhead and improved their performance.
Major opportunities exist for the department to operate more efficiently and effectively by turning over to
the private sector many noncore activities. For example, private-sector companies are already under
contract to perform some commercial activities on bases around the world. This type of outsourcing can
be expanded.
To implement this strategy, the department has been systematically examining opportunities for
privatizing, as well as reviewing both institutional and statutory obstacles to its full utilization. Early in
1996, work groups engaged in these efforts will provide reports on how privatization can be better used
to lower DoD costs while enhancing its effectiveness.
In the uncertainty that has followed the Cold War, the United States has not only the opportunity, but also
the responsibility to help ensure a safer world for generations of Americans. President Clinton has said:
"As the world's greatest power, we have an obligation to lead and, at times when our interests and our
values are sufficiently at stake, to act."
The Department of Defense is supporting American leadership in this new era. As the department
completes the transition to a post-Cold War military force, it has undertaken policies and programs to
prevent threats to our security from emerging and to maintain well-trained, ready forces able to deter or
respond quickly to a range of potential threats and seize opportunities.
The world has changed dramatically over the past few years, but one thing remains constant: A strong
military force made up of the finest American men and women is the nation's best insurance policy. Each
element of the defense program described in this report supports this fundamental, indisputable fact.
DoD-Sponsored R&D Centers Still Critical,
Worth Keeping
Prepared statement of Paul G. Kaminski, undersecretary of defense for acquisition and technology,
before the Research and Development Subcommittee, House National Security Committee, March 5,
1996.
Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee and staff: Thank you for the opportunity to appear before
you today to discuss the specifics of the department's initiatives to strengthen the management and focus
of our federally fund[ed] research and development centers and university affiliated research centers.
We are taking these actions to deal with concerns, both real and perceived, that these centers have not
been right-sized, that they are working in areas beyond the core interests of the department and that the
centers are using their special status to gain an unfair competitive advantage over commercial firms. The
department has scrutinized the operations of our FFRDCs and our university affiliated research centers
over the past year. We have conducted numerous independent studies and reviews,and we have now
introduced four major initiatives designed to manage these organizations more effectively, including:

Limiting the program content of these R&D [research and development] centers to core work;

Establishing stringent criteria for the acceptance of noncore work by an R&D center's parent
corporation;

Chartering an independent advisory committee to review the department's management and
oversight of FFRDCs and UARCS;

Developing a new set of guidelines to ensure that the management fee provided to FFRDCs is
based on justified need.
We believe these initiatives, along with the support of Congress, will effectively address concerns about
FFRDC and UARC management and are paving the way for continued use of the critical capabilities
provided by these centers. As the department downsizes, they have become increasingly important as
centers of independent technical expertise and support.
For nearly a half century, the department has invested heavily in the growth of a strong research and
development establishment within the United States to help sustain the technological supremacy of U.S.
forces. Today, the Department of Defense sponsors 12 not-for-profit, federally funded research and
development centers to accomplish the following:


Maintain long-term strategic relationships with their sponsoring DoD organizations;
Perform research, development and analytic tasks integral to the mission and operations of
sponsoring agencies within the DoD;

Maintain core competencies in areas important to the DoD sponsors and employ these
competencies to perform high-quality, objective work that cannot be carried out as effectively by
other organizations; and

Operate in the public interest, free from real or perceived conflicts of interest.
Three different types of FFRDCs have evolved over time to help the department accomplish its mission.
Seven studies and analyses centers provide DoD decision makers with objective evaluations of complex
issues. Two systems engineering and integration centers provide experienced engineering and technical
support to several DoD research and engineering centers. And finally, three research and development
centers execute key, leveraging basic research and advanced development programs in support of their
DoD sponsors' material development missions. ...
FFRDCs have played a key role in this nation's defense since World War II. For example, MIT's
[Massachusetts Institute of Technology] Lincoln Laboratory was originally formed in 1952 to build a
prototype air defense system against Soviet attack. By the late 1970s, Lincoln Laboratory's extensive
experience and core competencies in radar clutter phenomenology, measurement and data analysis
played a key role in the successful development of U.S. cruise missile systems capable of penetrating
Soviet air defenses. This expertise also provided a foundation of knowledge critical to establishing the
models and simulations needed for employment of low-observables systems such as the F-117.
Similar contributions have been made to this nation's defense over the years by each of the seven
studies and analysis FFRDCs. In 1956, the Institute for Defense Analyses was formed to help key
decision makers in the Office of the Secretary of Defense address important national security issues,
particularly those requiring scientific and technical expertise. Over the past year, IDA analysts have been
instrumental in providing independent, objective assessments of the department's heavy bomber force
needs, a comprehensive tactical utility analysis of the C-17 and nondevelopment airlift aircraft and an
ongoing study of deep attack weapon systems.
And finally, the Aerospace Corp. -- a system engineering and integration center -- was founded in 1960 to
provide the U.S. Air Force with the technical support needed to acquire and operate space systems,
including the related launch and ground systems. Over the past 10 years, the Aerospace Corp. has
conducted independent launch readiness verification assessments for over 94 space launches and
achieved a 98 percent launch success rate, compared with an 80 percent success rate for U.S.
commercial launches over the same period.
In addition to the FFRDCs, the DoD sponsors six not-for-profit, private and state university integrated
laboratories that:


Maintain long-term strategic relationships with their DoD sponsoring organizations;
Receive DoD sole-source funding in excess of $2 million annually to establish/maintain
essential research, development and engineering capabilities defined as core (contract funding
awarded under the authority 10 USC[United States Code] Section 2304(c)(3)(B), that allows the
use of noncompetitive procedures in order to establish or maintain an essential engineering,
research and/or development capability); and

Operate in the public interest, free from real or perceived conflicts of interests.
Each of the DoD sponsored university affiliated research centers, like the FFRDC research and
development centers, perform basic research, design and development activities in support of their DoD
sponsor's missions.
The UARCs have maintained a long-term relationship with their DoD sponsor and have contributed
greatly to the nation's defense needs. Johns Hopkins University APL [Applied Physics Laboratory] -- the
largest of the DoD-sponsored UARCs -- invented the concept of satellite navigation that has led to
modern global positioning capabilities.
Johns Hopkins also played a pivotal role in inventing, developing and prototyping the Navy's Cooperative
Engagement Capability, a technological and operational breakthrough that shares information between
battle groups in real time, so that an entire battle group can fight and respond to threats as a single,
integrated combat system.
Penn State University ARL [Applied Research Laboratory] is responsible for the design of 21 advanced
propulsors and hydrodynamics devices for Navy surface ships, submarines and torpedoes. PSU ARL
conceptualized and demonstrated the key enabling technologies and supporting research for advanced
ship self-defense decoys.
The University of Washington APL solved the torpedo influence exploder problems that had plagued
Navy torpedoes and is currently directing research at understanding the physics of ocean processes to
better predict the performance of underwater systems.
The University of Texas ARL developed the ground station equipment used to track TRANSIT
(navigation) satellites and is building the prototype of the MAXUS sonar which will replace mine
avoidance sonar on attack submarines.
Utah State University SDL [Space Dynamics Laboratory] designed and built the Midcourse Space
Experiment's Spirit III telescoped infrared sensor and functionally demonstrated the feasibility of a
Space-based Infrared low-earth-orbit surveillance concept, now in development as part of the Space
Missile Tracking System.
The Georgia Tech Research Institute designed and constructed the world's largest compact antenna test
range for the U.S. Army. The range has allowed the Army to map and test microwave antenna patters
installed on vehicles as large as the M-1 [Abrams] tank which greatly enhanced the ability to reduce
interference and maximize performance.
The core work that our centers perform is vitally important to our national security. Over the past year, the
department has carefully reviewed its relationships with FFRDCs and UARCs. I formed a senior-level
DoD advisory group to examine the issue and chartered an independent review by a Defense Science
Board task force of the department's FFRDC management and employee compensation practices. The
primary question I posed to both groups was, "Do we still need these organizations?" The answer was a
clear and emphatic "yes."
The Defense Science Board felt that "The FFRDCs should be retained on the strength of their quality and
the special relationships they have with their sponsors on matters which are of great importance to the
Department of Defense." Our internal advisory group reached a similar conclusion after reviewing
alternatives to FFRDCs and UARCs.
The bottom line is that we believe -- and this belief is held widely in the department, both by civilian and
military leaders -- that FFRDCs are doing high-quality, high-value technical and analytic work that could
not be provided as effectively by other means. Let me assure you that the people who complain about
FFRDCs are not the users of their services or the recipients of their products. FFRDCs and UARCs are
doing their jobs for DoD and doing them well.
The essence of their value to DoD lies in the qualities that I mentioned previously, starting with the
long-term strategic relationship FFRDCs and UARCs maintain with the department. I might note that this
is one area where DoD has been in front of the commercial sector in its acquisition practices. Successful
commercial firms are moving increasingly toward establishing long-term, strategic relationships with
trusted suppliers. They have found the result is often a higher-quality product at lower overall costs, in
contrast to the previous practice of changing suppliers based on low bids. DoD has long realized this
benefit from FFRDCs and UARCs.
I am not arguing that competition is inappropriate. The department uses competitive processes to obtain
the overwhelming majority of the goods and services it requires. But there are some circumstances and
some kinds of work for which the value provided by a strategic relationship outweighs the potential gains
of competition.
I also asked the DoD advisory group to assess the management of FFRDCs and UARCs, and as a result
of this review, I approved a DoD Management Action Plan to ensure the most effective and prudent use
of the centers while providing measures to guard against misuse. I forwarded that plan to Congress in
May 1995. Since that time, we have introduced a number of initiatives designed to manage these centers
more effectively. I will describe four that I believe to be the most important.
First, we have implemented a core work concept for managing the workload of the FFRDCs and UARCs.
This core concept is what I would describe as a "stick to your knitting" approach in terms of maintaining
the capabilities and competencies that are at the core of the strategic relationship. In doing this, each
FFRDC/UARC sponsor developed a statement defining what is core work for each center.
In addition, each sponsor developed and applied specific core criteria to ascertain whether a task is
within the scope of the core statement. These criteria were applied to all ongoing fiscal year 1995 work
and to each proposed task submitted for fiscal year 1996. As a result of the program assessment,
sponsors identified a total of about $43 million as noncore in the FFRDCs and about $26 million in the
UARCs. These noncore tasks have been, or will soon be, transitioned out of the centers in a logical way
and be offered to the non-FFRDC private sector, as applicable.
Second, we have established stringent criteria for the performance of non-FFRDC work by the center's
parent corporation. Basically, all non-FFRDC work is subject to sponsor review and/or approval and it
must not detract from the performance of FFRDC work; must be in the national interest; must not
undermine the independence, objectivity or credibility of FFRDC work; and may not be acquired by taking
advantage of access to or information available to the parent through its FFRDC/UARC.
Third, we have an independent advisory committee, with membership of highly respected people from
outside of the government, to review and advise on the department's management and oversight of its
centers. The IAC has already begun its work and is expected to submit the first report this summer.
Fourth, we developed a revised set of guidelines to ensure the management fees provided to our
FFRDCs are based on need and FFRDC-provided justification. The new fee guidelines will recognize
that FFRDCs, like other defense contractors, incur business expenses that are not allowable charges to
their contracts but are instrumental in providing FFRDCs the flexibility to remain centers of excellence
and sustain successful, high-quality operations. However, the new guidelines are expected to reduce the
amount of fee, through elimination from fee costs that are reimbursable and tighter controls of costs that
are nonreimbursable, but considered ordinary and necessary.
Together, FFRDCs and UARCs account for about 4.8 percent of the president's fiscal year 1996 RDT&E
[research, development, test and evaluation] budget request (about $1.7 billion of a total $34.9 billion).
Funding for our FFRDCs has come down since the peak levels in fiscal year 1991 at about twice the rate
of the overall decline in the department's RDT&E budget. Another 10 percent of the RDT&E budget goes
to in-house labs, and the remaining 86 percent goes to industry mostly via competitive processes.
At this point, it is important to underscore that FFRDCs cannot compete by governmentwide regulation
and UARCs are precluded by contract from competing for a majority of the 86 percent. It would be
inappropriate for organizations with the high level of access to information and close sponsor working
relationships maintained by FFRDCs and UARCs to compete with other firms that do not share this same
level of access.
Given the mission of the FFRDCs and UARCs, staff years of technical effort is the best measure for core
workload. For FFRDCs, the director, defense research and engineering will annually determine how
many staff years of technical effort are required by each center based on several factors, including
sponsor needs and the guidelines for determining workload for each category of FFRDC. These
guidelines, to be applied by the FFRDC sponsor in projecting workload and funding requirements for
each category, are:

Studies and analyses centers shall maintain a relatively stable annual level of effort in order to
support core competencies important to their sponsors and to avoid the loss of continuity and
expertise that arises from major changes in staff levels. Their core workload will focus on the
kinds of work that cannot be as effectively performed either in-house of by other private sector
resources.

Systems engineering and integration centers shall maintain a long-term, stable core
competency when the sponsor has determined that no in-house or other private sector
capability exists to perform the requirement as effectively. SE&I staffing levels will respond to
changes in workload and funding consistent with the trend in the most relevant portions of the
DoD budget (R&D and/or procurement) supporting the types of programs/systems within the
FFRDC mission area.

Research and development centers shall maintain the technical expertise and related core
competencies necessary to address those essential requirements, priorities and objectives of
the FFRDC sponsors, the applicable DoD advisory/oversight group and the DDR&E.
From the annual workload requirements provided by the sponsors, the DDR&E will allocate a dollar
funding level for each center and maintain a five-year projection for planning purposes. Requests for
deviations from or exceptions to established annual funding levels will be submitted for resolution by the
FFRDC sponsor, with appropriate justification to the DDR&E.
The process for UARCs is similar to the above, with its focus on ensuring that annual staff years of
technical effort at each UARC represents those essential engineering, research and/or development
capability defined in the core statement and awarded non-competitively per 10 USC 2304(c)(3)(B).
As I earlier mentioned, funding for our FFRDCs has been on the decline since fiscal year 1991. This
decline has been consistent with the overall trends in defense downsizing and outsourcing. Its consistent
with the trends in taking down the force structure as well as the overall budget. I believe we now have
reached steady state conditions and that further reductions beyond the core levels planned for fiscal year
1996 jeopardize the retention of essential core capabilities and therefore would be harmful to our national
security interests.
The department has responded to congressional direction from previous years. We are applying more
management attention to FFRDCs, and we intend to continue doing so in the future. Our management
processes involve senior leadership of FFRDC sponsoring offices ... with broad oversight provided by my
office. The independent advisory committee will provide the department with an independent assessment
of its management activities. The FFRDC program is now among the most intensely scrutinized and
overseen in the department.
In sum, the department has gotten the message. We have implemented management reforms, and it is
now time to restore the normal process for fiscal oversight of FFRDCs and UARCs. Accordingly, we are
requesting the four defense committees to discontinue the practice -- started a few years ago -- of
inserting special language in annual bills to limit DoD spending at FFRDCs and UARCs. Such measures
are no longer needed, and they constrain unnecessarily DoD's ability to use FFRDCs and UARCs for
appropriate work. Let me offer two examples.
First, Lincoln Laboratories -- one of our research FFRDCs -- must frequently buy advanced components
from industry for demonstrations and prototypes in support of defense programs. These technical
subcontracts are in addition to the funding required to support laboratory personnel and ongoing
research. Given the continuously decreasing fiscal ceilings provided by Congress, we could only fund
these technical subcontracts by reducing some other part of the laboratory program or by cutting another
FFRDC. Neither alternative is desirable.
Second, several FFRDCs are being called upon for technical assistance and analytic support for our
Bosnia deployment. These efforts were not planned at the beginning of the fiscal year, and to make room
within the fiscal ceilings, we would have to defer other needed FFRDC work. Again, this is not desirable,
and it is not good management practice.
As an interim measure for fiscal year 1996, I ask that the committee support an amendment to the
appropriations bill that exempts the following FFRDC expenditures from counting against the fiscal year
1996 FFRDC ceiling: major procurements from industry for demonstrations and prototypes, and technical
assistance and analytic support for our Bosnia deployment.
My general point is that no overall fiscal ceilings are imposed on any other class of DoD contractor. In all
other cases, the department is free to select the best mix of contractors to meet our changing needs,
consistent with program priorities and funding provided by the Congress. The additional constraints on
DoD FFRDCs and UARCs are not required. They inhibit the department's ability to allocate resources
flexibly to get the most efficient mix of technical and analytic support. I would appreciate the committee's
support in allowing DoD to manage its FFRDCs without externally imposed fiscal ceilings.
On a separate, but related issue of high interest, I want to reiterate the department's general support for
the MITRE Corp's. split into two separate, nonaffiliated companies, with no common trustees, officers or
staff . The MITRE Corp. will continue to operate its two existing FFRDCs (the C3I [command, control,
communications and intelligence] FFRDC for DoD and the Center for Advanced Aviation System
Development FFRDC for the FAA [Federal Aviation Administration]). The new entity will be a
not-for-profit corporation formed out of the two non-FFRDC divisions from the old MITRE.
The department believes that the split will focus the MITRE Corp. on its FFRDC operations and
neutralize any concern about the use of FFRDC status to gain unfair advantage over commercial firms.
The department did not specifically mandate the split, but it did establish firm new rules regarding
non-FFRDC activities, and the split was MITRE's response.
To summarize the department's initiatives to strengthen FFRDC and UARC management:

The work content and the operations of each of these centers have been closely scrutinized
over the past year. FFRDCs and UARCs are sized consistent with essential sponsor
requirements, defense acquisition reform initiatives, strategies and budgets.

We have strengthened our management controls, including managing the workload of our
centers to the core concept; transitioning ongoing work that is noncore out of the centers; and
developed consistent management fee guidelines.

We have established new stringent criteria for the performance of non-FFRDC work by the
parent corporation of an FFRDC.

The independent advisory group is operating as a source of judgment to help communicate to
the Congress and the public the adequacy of DoD management actions.
In closing, let me underscore my own sense and that of the entire team here. The FFRDCs and UARCs
are critically important national assets. They have provided key contributions in the past and will address
critical needs now and in the future. Proactive management on the part of the department will ensure the
sustainment of these contributions. These assets are the kind that take a long time to develop and their
long-term care is of the utmost importance to all of us -- we need the Congress' continued support.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to report on the DoD-sponsored FFRDCs and UARCs.
DoD's Ballistic Missile Defense Strategy
Prepared statement of Paul G. Kaminski, undersecretary of defense for acquisition and technology, to
the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 6, 1996.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee and staff, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
today to discuss the specifics of the department's ballistic missile defense strategy. For all of our adult
lives, most Americans have lived with a dark cloud hanging over our heads--the horrific threat of a
nuclear war that would end our way of life and civilization as we know it. Now, with the end of the Cold
War, that dark cloud is beginning to drift away. The whole world is breathing a little easier.
But that cloud is not yet gone. The world's nuclear powers still hold thousands of nuclear weapons, along
with many hundreds of missiles to deliver them. And many other countries, some of them rogue nations
to which the calculus of deterrence does not apply in the same way, are acquiring the means to deliver
weapons of mass destruction -- nuclear, biological and chemical. Many of these nations have obtained
ballistic missiles -- short-range ballistic missiles -- and some are in the process of acquiring longer-range
ballistic missiles.
The proliferation of short-range ballistic missiles in the world today poses a direct, immediate threat to
many of our allies and to some U.S. forces deployed abroad in defense of our national interests. Over
time, the proliferation of longer-range missiles will pose a greater threat to the U.S. itself.
For these reasons, active defenses are playing a central and vital role in U.S. defense planning well into
the next century. The resource-constrained environment of the '90s, together with the complex nature of
the security challenges facing us, necessitate that we deploy the right capabilities at the right time for
achieving the highest overall level of security for the United States.
To do so, we must consider the role of missile defense within the nation's broader national security
strategy. Active defenses can never be considered in and of themselves a panacea for countering the
proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. We have a broader strategy
encompassing a full range of tools in a national "kit" of options. Our strategy has three different
components: preventing and reducing the threat, deterring the threat and defending against the threat.
For example, we have adopted the Nonproliferation Treaty, the Framework Agreement with North Korea,
the INF [intermediate-range nuclear forces] treaty, the MTCR [missile technology control regime] and
export controls as ways of preventing or reducing the threat to our allies and U.S. forces deployed abroad.
The threat to the United States has been reduced significantly through the START [strategic arms
reduction talks] treaty, and it will be reduced even further through the START II treaty if Russia ratifies it.
Additionally, we have an extensive program for actually dismantling the warheads and the missiles that
had been directed against us in a Cooperative Threat Reduction program supported by Nunn-Lugar
funds. This is our first line of defense against ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction
--preventing and reducing that threat.
The second line of defense is deterrence. In the case of the long-range missile threat to the United States,
either from land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles or submarine-launched ballistic missiles, our
strategic nuclear forces have been a bulwark of deterrence for nearly a half-century. That will continue.
We have smaller nuclear forces now than we did a decade ago, but they are still very powerful and quite
capable of carrying out the strategic deterrence mission. In the case of deterring short-range missile
threats, our theater nuclear forces and very powerful conventional forces provide some level of
deterrence against limited nuclear attacks.
To the extent that these first two components, reducing the threat and deterring the threat, are not fully
successful, we have to be prepared to defend directly against a threat. In the case of the strategic threat
to the United States from rogue states or from accidental/unauthorized launch, the national missile
defense program is America's ultimate insurance policy. For our deployed forces, we are developing and
fielding both lower-tier and upper-tier theater missile defenses to counter regionally oriented missile
attacks.
The theater threat to our allies and U.S. forces deployed abroad is real and growing. We saw it
demonstrated in the Gulf War. Besides Iraq, we know there are many ballistic and cruise missiles in
many countries. Many thousands of short-range missiles are deployed today with hundreds of launchers
in as many as 30 different countries -- some of these countries are quite hostile to the United States. This
threat is here and now. It is widely dispersed, and it has to be taken very seriously.
In addition to the short-range missile threat, we see a medium-range threat emerging. Some nations are
developing their own medium-range missiles; in particular, North Korea is developing the No Dong
missile. Other nations, some of them rogue, are buying these missiles or trying to buy them. Iran is a
case in point.
In addition to missiles with conventional warheads, we have a threat today from missiles armed with
chemical and biological warheads. We now know what we suspected during Desert Storm -- Iraq had
chemical warheads that could have been put on Scud missiles. It is still an open question as to why Iraq
did not use them during that war. Our strategy for deterring the use of weapons of mass destruction
appears to have worked, possibly because they feared an overwhelming response from our conventional
forces or possibly a response with nuclear weapons. Whatever the reason, we do know that that
chemical threat existed and the Iraqis were deterred from using those weapons.
We believe that Iran, North Korea and Libya all have extensive chemical weapon programs. In addition,
we anticipate a nuclear threat being possible in the future. We know, in retrospect, that Iraq was very
close to a nuclear operational capability at the time they started the Gulf War -- fortunately, they were not
all the way there. We know that North Korea was close last year. But their program is now stopped by the
Framework Agreement. And we understand that Iran is working to achieve a nuclear weapons capability,
but we believe they are many years away. We will keep a close eye on the nuclear threat from so-called
rogue nations armed with theater ballistic missiles.
In the case of strategic missiles, Russia and China have a significant capability for delivering these
weapons with strategic weapon delivery systems -- land-based and submarine-launched missiles and
long-range aircraft. We do not see these systems as posing a threat to the United States in the
foreseeable future. That is, we do not see an intent that goes with the capability. Even should that
situation change, we will continue to field a significant U.S. deterrent force.
We do not see a near-term ballistic missile threat to U.S. territory from the so-called rogue nations, but
we cannot be complacent about this assessment. However, the threat of long-range missiles from rogue
nations could emerge in the future. The intelligence community estimates that this threat would take 15
years to develop, but could be accelerated if those nations acquired this capability from beyond their
borders. This is why our counterproliferation programs are important and why the role of missile defense
within this broader national strategy must be carefully integrated into U.S. defense planning.
Over the last year, the department's missile defense programs have been criticized from two different
directions. Some members of Congress have criticized the department for spending too much money on
missile defense; others believe we are not spending enough. Some have criticized the department
because we are moving the programs too quickly. Some think we are not moving the programs quickly
enough.
The Joint Requirements Oversight Council criticized the department's ballistic missile defense programs
from two different points of view. First, our BMD program was funded at a level too high compared to
other higher-priority, pressing modernization and recapitalization needs. Second, we were not focused
sharply enough on dealing with the here-and-now threat.
With all of this criticism, some of it appropriate, the secretary of defense decided we needed to look
intensively into the department's whole set of missile defense programs and look for a restructuring of the
program portfolio to produce a source of funds for othr modernization priorities. During the past several
months, we have identified what I believe is a more balanced missile defense program, one that is more
affordable, and one that has better prospects for successful execution. It is also better matched to the
missile threats we will be facing. This new plan makes use of all of the funds that were appropriated in
fiscal year 1996 for missile defense -- both the funds that were requested by the president as well as the
funds that were added by the Congress.
Our review reaffirmed the fundamental priorities in our missile defense program. The first priority is to
defend against theater ballistic missiles and cruise missiles. Within the theater missile defense mission
area, the review broke some new ground on defining the underlying subpriorities. The first subpriority is
to field systems to defend against the existing short- to medium-range missiles -- our lower-tier TMD
systems. The next subpriority is to proceed at a prudent pace to add wide area defenses and defenses
against the longer-range theater missiles as that threat emerges -- the upper-tier TMD systems.
Our second priority is to develop a capability to defend against intercontinental ballistic missiles -- our
national missile defense program -- and the cruise missiles which may threaten the United States in the
future.
Finally, our third priority is developing a robust technology base to underlie these two programs -- both
the TMD program and the NMD program -- to be able to develop and deploy more advanced missile
defense systems over time as the threat systems they must counter become more advanced.
We dealt with our No. 1 priority -- theater missile defense-- by first assessing the situation in the theater
today. Two systems are fielded -- the Marine Corps Hawk system and the Patriot Advanced Capability
2/Guidance Enhanced Missile system. The Hawk capability is very limited. The PAC-2/GEM system
contains a guidance upgrade that significantly improves the lethality and coverage of the basic PAC-2
system used in combat during Desert Storm.
Although the PAC-2/GEM system provides a more robust capability than that which we had fielded in
Desert Storm, it is still not sufficiently robust capability to deal with the threat. The program that emerged
from our review and that was incorporated in the fiscal year 1997 budget request reflects the
departmentÕs commitment to put Òrubber on the rampÓ for these TMD systems for which the threat has
already emerged.
Our first theater missile defense priority is to enhance the capability of our lower-tier systems beyond that
we now have deployed. Our intent is to strengthen our effort to field a capability to defeat short- to
medium-range theater ballistic missiles as soon as possible.
We will do this by building on existing infrastructure and prior investments in ongoing programs;
expanding the capability of Patriot and Aegis/Standard Missile systems; and improving our battle
management/command, control and communications capability. We are also beginning, in a cooperative
program with our allies, the project definition/validation phase of the Medium Extended Air Defense
System, a highly mobile system intended to provide our maneuvering forces with a 360-degree capability
against both ballistic and cruise missiles.
We have two systems, the PAC-3 and the Navy Area Defense system, in development to give us our
core lower-tier capability. Neither of these programs involves a significant technology risk at this point.
The risks ahead for these programs are related to program execution. Our task is to ensure that we have
a robust program to proceed with both systems and to field this capability as early as possible. The mix of
PAC-3 and Standard Missile-2 Block IVA interceptors eventually purchased to perform the lower-tier
mission will depend on their relative prices and performance, and the threat.
The first of the advanced lower-tier systems to be fielded is the PAC-3. It is a much more capable
derivative of the PAC-2/GEM system in terms of both coverage and lethality. The PAC-3, in fact, has a
new interceptor missile with a different kill mechanism -- rather than having an exploding warhead, it is a
hit-to-kill system. During the review, we found that the PAC-3 program had a high degree of risk for
completion. There were some fact of life slips in the schedule, and the program was not funded at a level
commensurate with our near-term priority to field a robust capability.
Even though a major objective of the review was to reduce the missile defense budget, we added about
$240 million for the PAC-3 through the Future Years Defense Program and established a realistic
schedule to lower the program execution risk by extending the engineering and manufacturing
development phase of the program by up to 10 months. System performance will be improved by
rephasing the missile and radar procurements, upgrading four launchers per battery with enhanced
launcher electronics systems and extending the battery's remote launch capability.
We also looked at fielding the PAC-3 system. We had originally planned to upgrade nine missile defense
battalions with the PAC-3 system. We decided, instead, to defer the upgrade of three battalions pending
availability of the Medium Extended Air Defense System. PAC-3 low-rate initial production will begin in
the first quarter of fiscal year 1998, and the first unit equipped date is planned for the fourth quarter of
fiscal year 1999.
The second of the lower-tier systems, the Navy Area Defense system, consists of Standard Missile-2
Block IVA interceptors deployed aboard Aegis ships. The capability provided by this system has the
advantage of being able to be brought into theater without having forces on land.
Although to a lesser degree than PAC-3, we found similar executability risks in this program. We will use
the $45 million added by Congress in the fiscal year 1996 appropriation to compensate for system
engineering and design efforts not fully funded in fiscal year 1995.
We also added about $120 million to this program through the FYDP to make the program fully
executable on a moderate risk profile. These funds will cover delays in risk reduction flights and adjusted
cost estimates for test targets and lethality efforts. This will allow us to proceed expeditiously with the
EMD program and LRIP missile procurement.
The program plans provide for fielding a User Operational Evaluation System capability in fiscal year
2000 and a first unit equipage in fiscal year 2002. Thereafter, operational units will use the legacy UOES
system for continued testing and as a contingency warfighting capability. This will maintain our baseline
development and procurement schedules for the program.
The last of the lower-tier systems is the Medium Extended Air Defense System, formerly the Corps SAM
[surface-to-air missile] program. This system will provide fundamental enhancements in flexibility,
mobility and deployability. For example, the PAC-3 system is oriented in a particular threat direction.
MEADS provides 360 degrees of coverage. It is a highly mobile system that is designed to be deployed
with our forward and maneuvering forces. It will be transportable on C-130 aircraft.
MEADS will provide advanced capabilities against theater ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and other
air-breathing threats. This system would replace Hawk and would ultimately replace Patriot. As
discussed above, we are holding equipage of three Patriot battalions in reserve pending a decision on
development and deployment of this MEADS system.
We are cooperating on this program with Germany, France and Italy, who together will provide 50
percent of the funds. I soon expect to sign a memorandum of understanding with our international
partners to begin the next phase of this program. We added about $80 million over the FYDP to fully fund
the U.S. share of the cooperative project definition/validation phase. This increase brings our funding to a
rate of about $30 million per year and fulfills our international commitments at this time. We will make a
decision to enter development in fiscal year 1998.
Our second theater missile defense priority is the upper-tier systems. These systems are necessary to
defeat longer-range ballistic missiles, to defend larger areas and to increase effectiveness against
weapons of mass destruction.
The department's plan for upper-tier systems contains the development of the Theater High-Altitude Area
Defense system for our ground forces. In addition, our upper-tier approach moves the Navy Theaterwide
system from the status of advanced capability exploration to system assessment and demonstration.
The THAAD system will provide extended coverage for a greater diversity and dispersion of forces and
the capability to protect population centers. But the principal additional capability provided by this system
is the ability to deal with our longer-range theater missile threats as they begin to evolve and emerge over
time. THAAD also reduces the number of missiles that the lower-tier systems must engage and provides
us with a shoot-look-shoot capability -- the ability to engage incoming missiles more efficiently.
THAAD is the most mature upper-tier system. We were funding this program at about $900 million per
year going into this review. We have made a significant adjustment to this program, keeping on track our
capability for early contingency deployment of the system, but making outyear adjustments to focus on
the nearer-term threat, reduce technical risk and lower the rate of investment.
We believe it was important to keep in place the UOES concept and schedule. This provides us with the
capability for a limited contingency deployment of the THAAD system in fiscal year 1998 to counter a
near-term threat. This would include about 40 missiles and two radars, which would be used for user
testing but which could be maintained in the theater if required.
We made a conscious decision to keep the UOES portion of the program on track, but we restructured
the rest of the program for the objective THAAD system, taking about $2 billion out of what was a $4.7
billion program through the FYDP. This restructured THAAD program is still funded at a level above the
"critical mass" required to maintain a productive contractor team.
The system to be initially developed and deployed will be with the UOES+, a better version of the UOES
system, in lieu of the previously planned full-capability objective system for the THAAD program. We
applied our cost-as-an-independent-variable approach to look at the enhancements for the objective
system, what they cost and what they bought us. We concluded that the UOES+ will meet the most
important THAAD requirements at a substantially reduced cost.
The UOES+ program will militarize the UOES design and upgrade certain components, such as the
infrared seeker, the radar and the BM/C3. This program delays the production ramp-up and first unit
equipage by a little over two years. We will begin LRIP in fiscal year 2002.
The Navy Theaterwide system is projected to add the same generic kind of terminal coverage capability
as the THAAD system, again providing longer-range coverage and protecting a wider area. This system
also offers ascent-phase intercept capability in cases where the Aegis ship can be positioned near the
launch point, and between the launch point and the target area.
The Navy Theaterwide system is less mature than the THAAD system. Prior to the review, we were
proposing funding this program in our fiscal year 1996 and 1997 budgets at a low level ($30 million per
year) to mature the key enabling technologies. The fiscal year 1996 appropriation added $170 million to
our request of $30 million.
We considered a number of approaches to the Navy Theaterwide system ranging from the program
proposed in fiscal year 1996 president's budget to a full commitment to a major new start with $200
million applied in fiscal year 1996. The recommended program begins technology demonstration and
concept definition starting in fiscal year 1996.
This recommendation was based on the lower priority of the upper-tier, lack of maturity of the technology
and the need to further develop the system concept to enhance robustness. There is also the opportunity
to apply technology being developed for national missile defense to the NTW system. Likely areas of
technology synergy include advanced sensors and seeker, propulsion, stabilization and the underlying
phenomenology.
We plan to apply the $170 million added in the fiscal year 1996 appropriation over a two-year period, as
well as adding about $570 million through the FYDP.
We considered several approaches for fielding a boost-phase intercept capability against theater ballistic
missiles. Obviously, it is desirable, if possible, to intercept an enemy missile while it is still boosting. The
fiscal year 1997 budget request funds two primary BPI approaches. The Air Force has funded an
airborne laser demonstration at about $775 million over the FYDP and expects to conduct several key
engineering tests in fiscal year 1998.
In parallel, the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization will fund concept definition studies to refine the
concept for an unmanned aerial vehicle with a kinetic energy interceptor at a rate of $10 million per year
in fiscal years 1997 and 1998. This level of investment is sufficient to refine the concept and support a
back-up path should problems develop with the airborne laser demonstration. A decision on the best
approach to fielding a BPI capability will be made in fiscal year 1998.
Interoperability in BM/C3 is essential for successful TMD operations. A capable, joint, interoperable
BM/C3 underlies the three pillars of TMD, improving the effectiveness of active defense, passive defense
and attack operations.
We are actively pursuing three avenues to ensure effective BM/C3. These are improving early warning
and dissemination, ensuring communications interoperabilityand upgrading command and control
centers for TMD functions. From the joint perspective, the BMDO oversees the various independent
weapon system developments and provides guidance, standards, equipment and system integration and
analysis to integrate the multitude of sensors, interceptors, and tactical command centers into a joint,
theater-wide TMD architecture. The BMDO also conducts tests and demonstrations with the
commanders in chiefs to verify this architecture meets the requirements and supports the warfighters'
needs.
These BM/C3 initiatives provide several benefits to active defense. Effective BM/C3 conserves the
number of interceptors required by improving weapon system fire distribution and coordination and
through sensor fusion. It provides multiple information paths between sensors, shooters and control
locations to combat sensor outages and jamming. BM/C3 weapon cueing information also increases
battlespace and depth of fire, improves defense against long-range threats and increases the defended
area. For attack operations, BM/C3 helps locate the threat and improve probability to shooting the
shooter first. BM/C3 also supports passive defense measures by providing greater early warning and
faster reaction times.
This integrated BM/C3 architecture also sets a foundation for other BM/C3 intensive initiatives, such as
cruise missile defense. Finally, the improvements to the architecture, procedures and interoperability pay
direct dividends in all warfighting areas.
The department plans to spend about $200 million per year on enhancements to the battle
management/command, control and communications capabilities of our theater missile defense forces.
This amount includes embedded funding in the Patriot and Aegis programs. It also covers the amount
required for the departmentÕs TMD C3 core programs, such as the ADA [air defense artillery] brigade
upgrades; JTIDS [joint tactical information distribution system] procurement and TBM platform integration;
datalink standards; combat information center upgrades; and TIBS [tactical information broadcast
service]/TDDS [tactical defense dissemination system] integration.
The department's second overall missile defense priority is national missile defense. Our intended
program is to position the United States to respond to a strategic missile threat as it emerges. Because
there is no threat that warrants it, we have made a decision not to commit to deploy a NMD system today.
But we are shifting our national missile defense emphasis from a technology readiness program to a
deployment readiness program.
Secretary [of Defense William J.] Perry in his testimony last year described a three plus three program
under consideration by the department at that time. By moving from a technology to a deployment
readiness posture, we have made the decision to proceed with the first three years of the three plus three
program that Secretary Perry described.
Under this approach, we plan to develop and begin testing elements of an initial NMD system and
preserve thereafter a capability to deploy within three years. If after three years we encounter a threat
situation that warrants a deployment, then an initial operational capability for a NMD system could be
achieved in another three years, by 2003.
To implement this approach, the department plans to spend the additional $375 million added by the
Congress in the fiscal year 1996 appropriation over two years to initiate the NMD deployment readiness
program. As a result, we will be spending more on NMD early in the 1996-2001 FYDP and less later. We
have increased our budget in NMD by about $100 million per year in both 1997 and 1998. We plan to
reduce our funding for NMD by a commensurate amount in the out years of the FYDP -- so the net
change for NMD funding over the 1997-2001 FYDP ends up being about zero. Once the NMD technology
base is built up over the next three years, the NMD deployment readiness posture can be sustained at a
reduced funding level.
This approach enhances the technological foundation of our NMD program in two ways: The
performance of the national missile defense we would deploy will be considerably improved over time;
and the timeliness of response to field an operational capability to counter an emerging threat will be
shortened from six years to three years.
If the decision is made to deploy an NMD system in the near term, then the system we could field in 2003
would provide a very limited capability. If we can avoid deploying a system in the near term, we will
continue to enhance the technology base and the commensurate capability of the NMD system that
could be fielded on a later deployment schedule.
The issue here is to be in a posture to be three years away from deployment, so that we can respond to
the emergence of a threat. It does not make sense to make a deployment decision in advance of the
threat, because we would be making investments prematurely, resulting in a system that would be less
capable when it is really needed. In the absence of a threat, it is more sensible to continue to enhance
the capability of the system that could be deployed when it is needed. This approach fields the most
cost-effective capability that is available at the time the threat emerges.
The development program that will be executed over the next three years will be a treaty compliant
program. The system components that are ultimately fielded, should a deployment decision be made
after three years, might comply with the current treaty or might require modification of the treaty,
depending on what the threat situation required. At this point, it is important to underscore that there is no
commitment today to deploy an NMD capability. The funds to deploy an NMD system are not in the
department's 1997-2001 FYDP.
The department plans to test a ground-based interceptor exoatmospheric kill vehicle in fiscal year 1998
and conduct the first integrated system flight test of a ground-based interceptor, prototype ground-based
radar, upgraded early warning radars and improved BM/C3 in fiscal year 1999. In addition, the Air Force
is funding and developing the Space and Missile Tracking System as part of the Space-based Infrared
System program. A low earth orbit SMTS would provide 360-degree over-the-horizon sensing throughout
the trajectory of an enemy missile.
Many TMD sensors, BM/C3 and weapons also have an effective capability to counter the growing
land-attack cruise missile threat. In particular, the lower-tier PAC-3, Navy Area Defense, and MEADS
systems operate in the same battlespace and will have capability against the cruise missile threat. In
addition, the NMD BM/C3 architecture will be designed to promote interoperability and evolution to a
common BM/C3 system for ballistic and cruise missile defense.
The department also has a number of initiatives outside the BMD program to improve the ability of U.S.
forces to detect and defeat cruise missiles in theater or launched against the United States. These
initiatives include advanced technology sensors to detect low observable cruise missiles, upgrades to
existing airborne platforms to improve beyond-the-horizon detection capability against cruise missiles, an
advanced concept technology demonstration of a new aerostat sensor platform and upgrades to existing
missile interceptor systems.
The last element of the department's ballistic missile defense program is the technology base. This
program underpins both the TMD and the NMD programs by continuing to advance our capability to
counter future and possibly more difficult threats. The BMD technology base allows us to provide block
upgrades to our baseline systems, to perform technology demonstrations for reducing risk and providing
a path to speed technology insertion and to advance some of our basic underlying technologies to
provide a hedge against future threats -- including research into advanced concepts, such as directed
energy systems capable of global coverage.
In summary, the department is committed to protecting the United States, including U.S. forces deployed
abroad, and our allies against ballistic missile, cruise missile and weapons of mass destruction threats.
We have a comprehensive national security strategy for countering such threats, including preventing
and reducing the threat, deterring the threat and defending against it. Active defense against ballistic
missile attack is an important component of that strategy.
Our BMD priorities remain as they were in the past and are reflected in the new budget that includes $2.8
billion in fiscal year 1997. Across fiscal years 1997 through 2001, the department has budgeted $13.5
billion for ballistic missile defense. This represents about a $3 billion reduction from the baseline
established by the presidentÕs fiscal year 1996 budget request in order to support even higher-priority
needs in other parts of the defense budget. Our first priority, theater missile defense, deals with the threat
that exists today. The second priority is national missile defense. And the third is to support the
underlying technology base.
I believe the changes adopted by the department during the BMD review respond to the threats, to the
priorities expressed by the Joint Staff, and also to fact-of-life changes in the program status. The TMD
program fully supports deployment of early operational capabilities for the high-priority lower-tier systems,
and provides the ability to deploy upper-tier systems in response to the threat and the availability of
funding for those systems.
Our NMD program shifts from a technology readiness posture to a deployment readiness posture. The
initial development portion of the program will comply with the Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty and enable the
United States to develop within three years elements of an initial NMD system that could be deployed
within three years of a deployment decision. This approach would preserve thereafter a capability to
deploy within three years, while allowing the United States to continue the advancement of technology,
add new elements to the system and reduce deployment timelines.
The NMD system would have the purpose of defending against rogue and accidental/unauthorized
threats. It would not be capable of defending against a heavy deliberate attack. Decisions about the
treaty compliance of potential NMD systems would be made by the Department of Defense (on advice of
the Compliance Review Group). The current program is proceeding, however, in the expectation that a
deployment of 100 GBI and one GBR at Grand Forks, N.D., would be treaty compliant.
The last element of the ballistic missile defense program is the technology base program. The
department will continue to advance the critical technologies to deal with future threats as they develop.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you for this opportunity to appear before the committee and shall be happy to
answer any questions you may have.
Defining Missions, Setting Deadlines
Prepared remarks of Anthony Lake, assistant to the president for national security affairs, George
Washington University, Washington, March 6, 1996.
I want to speak with you today about the most difficult issue any president has to face: the use of
American force abroad. This is a good time for this discussion. Six weeks from now, the last of more than
20,000 American troops assigned to the U.N. mission in Haiti will come home. About an equal number
are serving in Bosnia to help keep the hard-won peace there. Both missions reflect answers to difficult
questions about when to use force -- and especially how to use it.
Let me start by putting my thoughts in a larger context.
Halfway between the end of the Cold War and the start of a new century, we're living a moment of hope.
Our nation is secure. Our economy is strong. All around the world more people live free and at peace
than ever before.
But the promise of this moment is matched by its perils, as the desperate and despicable acts of the
enemies of peace in the Middle East so sadly remind us. Old threats like ethnic and religious violence
and aggression by rogue states have taken on new and dangerous dimensions, and no one is immune to
a host of equal opportunity destroyers: the spread of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, organized
crime, drug trafficking, environmental degradation. Individually, each could undermine our growing
security. Together, they have the potential to cause terrible chaos.
Faced with both the promise and the problem of our time, there are those on both the left and the right
and in both political parties who would have America retreat from its responsibilities.
Some proclaim that America must stay engaged, but then would deny us the tools and the resources to
match their rhetoric. These backdoor isolationists would stop us from working with others to share the
risks and the costs of engagement. They would gut our diplomatic readiness and cut our assistance to
those who take risks for peace. They fail to recognize that the global trend toward democracy and free
markets, and the opportunities it creates for our people, is neither inevitable nor irreversible. It needs our
support, our resources and our leadership.
Others, call them neo-know-nothings, argue that with the Cold War won, it's safe to withdraw behind a
Fortress America. It is not the American way to retreat or refuse to compete. We can't build a wall high
enough or dig a moat deep enough to keep out the threats to our well-being or to isolate ourselves from
the global economy. As President Clinton said in his State of the Union address this year, we must
confront these challenges now -- or pay a much higher price for our indifference later.
The history of our century makes this truth very clear. After World War I, America withdrew from the world,
a vacuum that was filled by the forces of hatred and tyranny. After World War II, we stayed involved, we
worked with others, and we led, patiently, persistently and pragmatically. And we helped create the
institutions that secured half a century of security and prosperity for the American people.
For the past three years, the Clinton administration has built upon this bipartisan legacy of leadership by
reducing the nuclear threat, supporting peacemakers, spreading democracy and opening markets. I'm
proud of the results, for our own people and for people around the world.
We stayed engaged with Russia and the other states of the former Soviet Union despite our differences
because it is in the interests of the American people that we do so. Now there are no Russian missiles
pointed at our cities and citizens. Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakstan are giving up the nuclear weapons left
on their land when the Soviet Union collapsed. We are safeguarding nuclear materials and destroying
nuclear weapons so they don't wind up in the wrong hands, and we have taken the lead in securing,
extending or promoting landmark arms control agreements: START [Strategic Arms Reduction Talks] I
and II, the [nuclear] Nonproliferation Treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the Chemical
Weapons Convention.
We applied steady, patient pressure to North Korea. Now it has frozen its dangerous nuclear weapons
program.
We're waging a tough counterterrorism campaign with stronger laws; increased funding, manpower and
training for law enforcement; sanctions against states that sponsor terrorism; and closer cooperation with
foreign governments. Now those responsible for the World Trade Center bombing are behind bars.
We've foiled attacks on New York City and on our airliners. We've tracked down terrorists and brought
them to justice around the world.
We sent our troops, ships and planes to the Persian Gulf when Saddam Hussein moved his forces
towards the Kuwaiti border. Now Kuwait remains safe and the world's energy supply secure.
We backed diplomacy with force in Haiti. Now the dictators are gone. Haiti has celebrated the first
democratic transfer of power in its history, and the flood of refugees to our shores has ended.
Our troops are standing up for peace in Bosnia. Now its playgrounds are no longer killing fields. A
dangerous fire at the very heart of Europe is not raging as it had been for four years. The Bosnian people
have their first real chance for peace.
We are standing with those taking risks for peace through good times and bad.
Now in Northern Ireland, the determination of [British] Prime Minister [John] Major and [Irish] Prime
Minister [John] Bruton is pushing the peace process back on track with a date certain for negotiations
and, we hope, a new cease-fire.
In the Middle East, we know that fanatics will stop at nothing to kill the hope for peace. As you know, the
president has ordered a series of steps to express our complete support for the peacemakers there as
they fight terrorism.
We must also not lose sight of the tremendous progress that has been made toward a comprehensive
settlement or the fact that the overwhelming majority of people want peace. We will not rest until that
desire becomes reality.
And we negotiated a better deal for America as we opened markets abroad. Now our exports are at an
all-time high, and hundreds of thousands more Americans have jobs at home. With Japan alone, this
administration has completed 20 separate trade agreements. The sectors covered by those agreements,
from auto parts to medical equipment, have seen their exports increase by 80 percent. That's almost
twice as much as exports from other sectors, which are also growing fast.
Not one of these achievements came about easily or automatically. They happened because we kept our
military strong while adapting our alliances to new demands; because we acted with others where we
could and alone where we had to; because we were patient enough to stick with diplomacy, but prepared
to use force; because we rejected isolationism, but recognized that we cannot be the world's policeman;
because in each and every instance, we brought together our interests and values, and we acted where
we could make a difference.
Some people, in a curious bit of nostalgia for the Cold War, complain that our policy lacks a single,
overarching principle --that it can't be summed up on a bumper sticker. But while we are operating in a
radically new international environment, America's fundamental mission endures. The same ideas that
were under attack by communism and before that by fascism remain under attack today. Now, as then,
we are defending an idea that has many names -- tolerance, liberty, civility, pluralism --but shows a
constant face: the face of the democratic society. Now, as then, our special role in the world is to defend,
enlarge and strengthen the community of democratic nations.
In pursuing this mission, our interests and ideals converge. We know from experience that democracies
rarely go to war with one another or abuse the rights of their people. They make for better trading
partners, and each one is a potential ally in the struggle against the forces of hatred and intolerance
whether those forces take the shape of rogue nations, ethnic and religious hatreds or terrorists trafficking
in weapons of mass destruction.
What we have left behind are the certitudes and simplifications of the past, and that's not necessarily a
bad thing. During the Cold War, policy makers could justify every act with one word: containment. We got
the big things right -- our policy of containment won the Cold War. But even the best policy can become
the worst straitjacket if it is pursued too rigidly and reflexively, as we saw in Vietnam.
Now we have the opportunity to think anew about the best ways to protect and promote America's
interests and ideals. Our tools of first resort remain diplomacy and the power of our example, but
sometimes we must rely on the example of our power. We face no more important questions than when
and how to use it. From our experience in countering traditional aggression, as in the Persian Gulf, and
contending with more novel crises, as in Haiti and in Bosnia, there are some principles on the use of
force that I would like to discuss with you.
First, let me cite one underlying and enduring principle: We will always be ready to use force to defend
our national interests. Until human nature changes, power and force will remain at the heart of
international relations.
This begs the question of just what those interests are. I would cite seven circumstances which, taken in
some combination or even alone, may call for the use of force or military forces;

To defend against direct attacks on the United States, its citizens and its allies;


To counter aggression;
To defend our key economic interests, which is where most Americans will see their most
immediate stake in our international engagement;

To preserve, promote and defend democracy, which enhances our security and the spread of
our values;

To prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism and international crime and
drug trafficking;

To maintain our reliability, because when our partnerships are strong and confidence in our
leadership is high, it is easier to get others to work with us; and

For humanitarian purposes, to combat famines, natural disasters and gross abuses of human
rights.
Not one of these interests by itself, with the obvious exception of an attack on our nation, people and
allies, should automatically lead to the use of force. But the greater the number and the weight of the
interests in play, the greater the likelihood that we will use force once all peaceful means have been tried
and failed, and once we have measured a mission's benefits against its costs in both human and financial
terms.
In Haiti, when we saw democracy stolen from its people, a reign of brutality take hold in our hemisphere,
a flood of refugees to our shores, international agreements consistently violated and efforts to resolve the
impasse through negotiations and sanctions fail, the case for intervention was compelling. In Bosnia, the
worst atrocities in Europe since World War II, a dangerous fire at the very heart of the Continent, our
commitments to our NATO allies and a peace agreement the parties were calling on us to secure
required us to act.
But more than the "when" of using force, Haiti, Bosnia and some other recent interventions highlight
principles that get at the "how" we should use force.
First, threatening to use force can achieve the same results as actually using it, but only if you're
prepared to carry through on that threat. The best trained, best equipped and best prepared fighting force
in the world has a unique ability to concentrate the minds of our adversaries without firing a shot.
In Haiti, when the military regime learned that the 82nd Airborne literally was on the way, it got out of the
way. In the Persian Gulf, as soon as President Clinton moved American forces in the region, Iraq moved
its troops away from Kuwait. And by backing diplomacy with the presence of U.S. forces to deter attack
on the South, we convinced North Korea to freeze its dangerous nuclear weapons program.
A second principle is that the selective but substantial use of force is sometimes more appropriate than
its massive use, provided that the force is adequate to the task, and then some. President Clinton
refused to engage our troops in a ground war in Bosnia because he knew that no outside power could
force peace on the parties. To do so would have risked a Vietnam-like quagmire. But this summer, the
combination of NATO's heavy and continuous air strikes, Bosnian and Croat gains on the ground and our
determined diplomacy convinced the Bosnian Serbs to stop making war and start making peace. Now
our troops are in Bosnia not to fight a war, but to secure a peace they produced through the deliberate,
calibrated use of force.
A final principle is this: Before we send our troops into a foreign country, we should know how and when
we're going to get them out. Sounds simple, even obvious, but carefully defined exit strategies for foreign
interventions have not been a hallmark of our foreign policy. Now they are, and that makes sense for
America and for the people we're trying to help.
I don't want to be doctrinaire in asserting an exit strategy doctrine. When it comes to deterring external
aggression, as in the Persian Gulf or the Korean Peninsula, or fighting wars in defense of our most vital
security interests, a more open-ended commitment is necessary. But increasingly, our interests require
that our military keep peace in the wake of internal conflicts. For these operations to succeed, tightly
tailored missions and sharp withdrawal deadlines must be the norm.
The first step is to give our armed forces a clear mission with achievable military goals, as President
Clinton did in both Haiti and Bosnia.
In Haiti, we asked our armed forces to return the elected government to power and restore a secure
climate so that civilians could train a police force, hold elections and begin reconciliation.
In Bosnia, our soldiers are overseeing the implementation of the military side of the Dayton accords -separating the armies, maintaining the cease-fire, securing transferred territory -- while civilian authorities
help the Bosnian people rebuild their lives and their land. In both places, our troops are highly trained and
heavily armed, with very clear rules of engagement. And the executive branch and Congress are united
in their commitment to our military's goals and success, as they were in Operation Desert Storm.
Contrast these operations with Vietnam, Lebanon and Somalia. There, clear and achievable missions for
our military were not defined. In Vietnam, our society blamed our soldiers for a defeat that was not theirs.
Because we neglected to ask the right questions and establish clear military goals from the start, the men
and women of our armed forces paid a terrible price both in Vietnam and on their return home. We must
never put them in that position again. Never.
The next step is to set deadlines for withdrawal based on the mission's goals. In Haiti, our military leaders
informed the president that our troops could complete their military tasks in a year and a half and in
Bosnia in about one year, and they will.
Here's why setting deadlines is so important: Neither we nor the international community has either the
responsibility or the means to do whatever it takes for as long as it takes to rebuild nations. There are
many reasons for this.
First, providing a security blanket without making clear it's on loan, and not for keeps, only gives those we
are helping the comfort to evade their own responsibilities. It creates unreasonable expectations that the
hard work will be done for them, not by them.
Second, assuming too much responsibility for a nation's future tends to undercut the very government
you are trying to help. In Vietnam, the more we assumed responsibility for a weak Saigon administration,
the more dependent it became and the more open to charges it was a puppet regime beholden to
foreigners. Unless you make clear that your mission is limited in scope and duration, you risk
delegitimating a government in the eyes of its own people.
Third, overstaying one's welcome ultimately breeds resentment of our presence and provides an easy
target for blame when things go wrong. That target will be us.
By carefully defining the mission and clearly setting a deadline, we serve notice that our only goal is to
give governments and people the breathing room they must have to tackle their own problems. This
"tough love" policy may sound harsh to some. It may strike others as a gamble, but consider the
alternative: self-defeating efforts to take on responsibilities that are not ours to create unsustainable
dependencies instead of giving nations a chance to make their way independently.
It is a dangerous hubris to believe we can build other nations. But where our own interests are engaged,
we can help nations build themselves and give them time to make a start.
I believe we can see the benefits of our exit strategy doctrine in Haiti and Bosnia.
Given the chance, the Haitian people quickly focused on the ballot, not the bullet; on trade, not terror; on
hope, not despair. In just a year and a half, with our civilian help, they have completed presidential
parliamentary and local government elections, trained a police force, dramatically improved the human
rights situation and begun to reverse the economic decline of the coup years.
Haiti remains the poorest nation in the Americas. There is no guarantee democracy will ever take hold or
the economy will prosper. But its people now have a real chance to build a better future for themselves
and their children. And for the U.S. forces who are leaving when we promised they would, we can say
"mission accomplished."
The same logic applies in Bosnia. Its people understand they have a window of opportunity that our
military opened to decide their future in peace: to freely choose their own leaders; to begin to rebuild their
roads and schools, their factories and their hospitals; to reunite children with their parents and families
with their homes. At the end of this year, when our troops leave, we can reasonably hope that the people
of Bosnia will have developed a greater stake in the peace than war, that peace will have taken on a life
and logic of its own.
But let me make one point absolutely clear: The breathing room our military is providing in Haiti and
Bosnia must be filled with the oxygen of reconstruction assistance. What we call civilian implementation
is the vital and necessary companion to any peacekeeping operation. Our allies agree. That's why they
are providing about 80 percent of the civilian assistance for Haiti and for Bosnia. The sooner people in
conflicted countries recover the blessings of a normal life, the surer the chances our troops will leave
behind them a legacy of peace and hope.
That's why Congress should unfreeze the modest amount of outstanding development assistance for
Haiti to fund primary education, child care and immunizations. Now. And that's why we are working with
Congress on our request for $200 million to assist civilian reconstruction in Bosnia -- money that will
support economic revitalization and reform, the deployment of international police monitors and our
demining efforts -- money that is needed now.
In both Haiti and Bosnia, our armed forces are doing everything we have asked of them and more. We
should live up to their example. Their missions will only succeed if the civilian side can do its part. Holding
back the dollars we need for relief and reconstruction doesn't serve our soldiers, it doesn't serve the
people we're trying to help, and it doesn't serve our nation's interests.
One of the great privileges of my job is to travel around the world and to see firsthand the respect our
nation enjoys. People look to us for leadership not only because of our size and our strength, but also
because of what we stand for and what we're willing to stand against. Now, perhaps more than any other
time in our history, America has a unique ability to make a difference for our own people and for people
around the world.
Our duty is to help use this power as wisely as possible, to steer by the stars of our interests and our
ideals. As President Clinton has said, we can't be everywhere. We can't do everything. But where those
interests and ideals demand it and where we can make a difference, we must not hesitate to lead. We
haven't, and we won't.
You must not hesitate, either. Many of you here today are embarking on careers in foreign policy.
Whether you do so as teachers or researchers, government officials or journalists, you will have an
opportunity to weigh in on the great foreign policy questions of our time. Weigh in with passion, weigh in
with argument, but above all, weigh in. America needs to hear your voices. It needs to feel your
enthusiasm.
Right now, no question is more fundamental and no outcome more important than America's role in the
world. We can succeed only if we continue to lead. That is the lesson of what has come to be called the
American Century. If we heed its call, we can remain a force for freedom and progress around the world
and for real security and prosperity at home. And the next century will be an American century, too.
Tying Together the Best Individual Intellectual
Efforts
Address by Emmett Paige Jr., assistant secretary of defense, command, control, communications and
intelligence, at the Software Technology Management Conference, Santa Barbara, Calif., March 6, 1996.
It is indeed a pleasure to be asked to speak with you this morning. Software technology management is a
field ripe with opportunities for improvement and advancement of the state of the art and the state of
practice.
I can think of nothing more important than improvement in software development today as we reach out
to exploit the electronics technology that the revolution continues to thrust into our hands. It challenges
us -- as no other field has ever before -- to tie together in a cohesive and coherent fashion the efforts of
the best individual intellectual efforts from around the world.
Your selection of speakers, except for me, and topics selected for this conference reflects these massive
and advanced efforts. What I would like to speak about are the expectations that DoD has of the software
industry as a whole, and I include academia as a vital partner with industry in this matter. Our
expectations are high, but I found out long ago that you should never lower your expectations to the level
that can readily be attained. It takes perseverance and ingenuity and a willingness to depart from
traditional ways.
An individual who exemplified high expectations was President Franklin D. Roosevelt. He challenged us
"to move forward to greater freedom, to greater security for average (folks) than (they) have ever known
before in the history of America." The financial safety net that he put into place has saved the lives of
many of our poor and our elderly. That was then, this is now.
It behooves us to move on with all due speed to put into place an information safety net to improve our
economy, advance the educational opportunities for individuals from all walks of life and keep our
citizens informed. Improving our software development and the reliability of that software will go a long
way in helping us to build and maintain a competitive advantage in the world market and continue to
provide a competitive advantage to our military forces.
The national information infrastructure efforts, led by Vice President [Al] Gore, are just the tip of the
iceberg when it comes to being able to share knowledge. All parts of our government must work together
with industry to make this dream a reality.
I am very pleased with the recent enactment of telecommunications reform. In his State of the Union
address this year, President Clinton urged Congress to pass this legislation. I was pleased when
Congress responded so positively.
The telecommunications act breaks down old, artificial barriers between information service providers.
The way we have been doing business has been based on laws that have been on the books for 62
years. The new law will open up information technologies as never before for consumers and business
customers -- and DoD is about the biggest single customer that American business will ever have.
We all know what comes from increased competition. It usually means improved service at lower cost,
and we in DoD can use more of both.
For the foreseeable future, we in DoD will be called upon to perform more numerous and varied missions.
And we will continue to face resource levels that are, at best, austere. And we will be called upon more
than ever before to enter into coalitions with other nations to achieve our goals, be they economic or
military. Our telecommunications and information infrastructure must be open and flexible enough to
meet these international requirements.
But we all know that it doesn't matter what the private sector can offer if DoD can't get to it. This has been
particularly frustrating when it comes to new information technologies.
Secretary [of Defense William J.] Perry has given reform of the acquisition process a high priority.
Unneeded military standards hopefully will soon become a thing of the past. We are not there yet, but I
am here to tell you that we are indeed serious to make it happen.
We need your help to make it happen. We need you, the people out on the line where the rubber meet
the road, to challenge military specifications and standards whenever you see them in any of our RFPs
[requests for proposal]. Together, we can decrease the cost of maintaining our military as the best
equipped, most modern, most potent fighting force in the history of mankind. President Clinton and Dr.
Perry are determined to maintain our fighting forces as the best equipped, best trained military force in
the world.
I am working with the undersecretary of defense for acquisition and technology and the director of
operational test and evaluation to streamline the DoD acquisition oversight process. And we are all
working with the Office of Management and Budget and Congress to get legal roadblocks removed.
The DoD Authorization Act for FY [fiscal year] 1996 is an example of what can be done when all parties
work together for the common good. Contained within the Defense Authorization Act is the Information
Technology Management Reform Act.
The reform act applies to all federal agencies, not just the Department of Defense. It repeals the Brooks
Act. It does away with the GSA [General Services Administration] Board of Contract Appeals. It allows for
modular acquisition and implementation of large information systems. It is long overdue.
This is not to say that anarchy will reign. For DoD, I can tell you that this will not be the case. We will not
replicate the oversight system that is being abolished. We will rather use common sense and a
departmentwide approach to information technology acquisitions.
Just to clarify the scope of what I'm talking about, we in DoD include development as part of acquisition.
So I anticipate that the new legislation will have great impact in the way that DoD buys and that vendors
provide software and hardware products and services.
There will be a learning curve on both sides. We will need to retrain our downsized government
acquisition work force, and vendors face a similar retraining task. This will not just be retraining on
procedures.
We all need to work towards the real cultural change of improving mutual trust. We absolutely must
encourage and foster increased communications between vendors or industry and our defense program
managers for all of the software and hardware systems that we acquire.
Each of [us] must work together and be practical visionaries -- to strive to do the best we can do, while
pushing and pressing toward common goals. In the case of DoD, our goal is to provide the best possible
support for our warfighters. We cannot ever lose sight of that goal, and I would like to talk about the role
of software in reaching that goal.
Within the realm of managing software efforts, we absolutely must have mature software development
processes. And we also need from industry a commitment to increased predictability concerning software
products. By that I mean that we need to get quality software deliverables on time, at reasonable costs,
with the required level of reliability.
Software systems development and life-cycle maintenance continue to be among the most costly and
difficult tasks that we have to cope with. It is not something that plagues DoD any more than it does the
commercial sector and other federal, state or local government agencies. We all suffer from the same
afflictions in software.
The development task always costs more money and takes more time than initially estimated, with rare
exceptions. The operations and maintenance phase of the life cycle always costs more than initially
estimated.
So it is very important that we continue to try and focus more management attention to software than we
have today and improving the process. There are no "silver bullets," or at least none have been found
yet.
What we would like to find are more commercial off-the-shelf software products that are secure and
reliable. Whenever DoD must acquire software, COTS software is always our first choice.
I maintain that our best posture is to insist that market- driven, commercial off-the-shelf software be used
by DoD whenever and wherever we can adapt it or adapt to it in terms of our operating or business
processes to do our jobs.
We must use it smartly so that we can continue to evolve as that commercial market driven application is
improved. We can then relieve ourselves of most of the life-cycle operations and maintenance costs.
However, when we must bear the expense of developing software applications and maintaining that code
over the life cycle of our systems, which are typically long, we should use ADA -- as we have found
nothing else that does a better job of reducing our operations and maintenance costs while improving the
overall quality and portability.
Quality includes security. We are placing higher priority on our information security initiatives, and this
increased emphasis is shown in our increases in funding levels for these programs for the immediate and
foreseeable future. Security, like quality, is something that must be designed and built into our systems. It
cannot be achieved at a reasonable cost as an afterthought.
Protection of information is a high priority, and so is harmonization. We have set into motion the
mechanism to establish a single, unifying DoD technical architecture that will become binding on all
future DoD C4I [command, control, communications, computers and intelligence] acquisitions and
development efforts.
We need to have systems that are born joint and interoperable. Achieving true jointness of our military
systems, which includes weapon systems and information systems, is a major hurdle in implementing
many of our national security strategies.
We in DoD expect that industry will increase the availability of reusable assets, and I am personally
convinced that we have not scratched the surface in terms of the possibilities for software reuse. This
includes software architectures, designs and code. Our software must be platform- independent.
As Secretary Perry has pointed out, our fighting forces in the field have enough on their hands with
military missions. They do not have the time or resources to handle learning how to use or repair
software packages that differ from military service to military service or from one machine line to another.
Our joint national security strategies include preventing wars as well as being prepared to win them, if
need be. Our road in DoD is the road to peace, but that road must be blazed and paved by warfighters.
Peace is only enforceable when backed by the clout of warfighting capability.
As you all know, we are using our warfighting capabilities to enforce the peace in Bosnia. Thanks to our
military strength and the cooperation of our longtime allies and others, the children of Bosnia can go back
to concerning themselves more with their homework and less with whether their home will be bombed.
Defense imagery data was instrumental in achieving the Dayton peace accords. The leaders of the three
rival factions were taken on computer-generated tours of the country. The lines of the peace accord
maps were drawn up after the negotiators had taken an almost-firsthand look at what the effects would
be.
In one instance, the negotiators thought that a two-mile- wide access corridor would be sufficient. But
after a 3-D tour of the area by way of computer simulation, they found that hilly terrain made a five-mile
corridor more suitable. This averted a potential flashpoint during implementation of the peace accords.
The peace in Bosnia is a fragile one. But then, all human life is fragile in the face of today's weapons.
I would like to leave you with some words that FDR [Franklin D. Roosevelt] never spoke, for he died the
day before he was to have delivered them. Among the words that he planned to leave us with were these:
"More than an end to war, we want an end to the beginnings of all wars."
He was right. Wars are often based on lack of understanding -- not just of initial intentions, but also what
the consequences might be.
Each of us here has the ability to add to the world's ability to exchange information, which will lead to
more knowledge, which will lead to mutual understanding. And understanding is a key to ending the
beginning of war. ...
Initiative Underwrites Private Sector Housing
Risks
Prepared statement of Robert E. Bayer, deputy assistant secretary of defense for installations, before the
Military Installations and Facilities Subcommittee, House National Security Committee, Washington,
March 7, 1996.
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the S.ubcommittee on Military Installations and Facilities, it
is a pleasure to appear before you today ... . The quality of life of our service members and their families
continues to be one of [Defense] Secretary [William J.] Perry's highest priorities. Today's service
members are a force of volunteers who joined the military for a career, not a two-year tour of duty. Over
the past three decades, the percentage of military members who are married and the percentage of time
they spend deployed away from home have steadily increased, whereas the quality of their housing -and associated support such as schools, recreation, day care, etc. -- has failed to keep pace.
Secretary Perry recognizes the importance of housing as a key element in the quality of life of our service
members and their families. He is determined to improve their living conditions to maintain high morale
and a ready force.
His quality of life budget increase last fall was a significant first step. Secretary Perry added $2.7 billion
over the Future-Years Defense Program for several areas of quality of life including quarters allowances,
housing maintenance and recapitalization. As an integral part of this initiative, he chartered the Defense
Science Board's Quality of Life Task Force -- the Marsh Task Force.
The task force members spent several months taking an independent look at the quality of life of service
members. Key to this effort was extensive travel and interviews with service members and their families.
In its October 1995 report, the task force confirmed disconcerting downward trends in perceived quality
of life. The panel warned that readiness and morale are in jeopardy. In the panel's view, continuing to
neglect these issues risks eroding the force because even the most dedicated service members may
leave the service.
The task force recommended several ways the department could improve the quality of life for our
service members. One of its top recommendations was to use private expertise and capital to accelerate
improvement of government-owned housing, unaccompanied and family housing, and encourage the
development of more affordable housing in local communities.
As the task force stated, "Well-equipped forces have the instruments to win war, and forces satisfied with
their quality of life are motivated to fight." It is our job to make sure our forces are satisfied with their
quality of life. We know that military deployments require service members' full attention in order to be
effective and safe. We want to minimize anxieties about their families during these stressful periods that
come all too often in today's world.
The department currently faces three significant housing problems. First is the condition of DoD-owned
family housing. Today's military families are living in yesterday's houses. DoD currently houses about
one-third of our families in over 300,000 government-owned family housing units located both on and off
base. About two-thirds of these units need to be renovated or replaced because over the past 30 years,
they have not been sufficiently maintained or modernized.
Using the traditional military construction approach, it would cost taxpayers nearly $20 billion to
accomplish this task and it would take 30 to 40 years to solve this problem. Neither the costs nor
timelines of the current system of housing construction and modernization meet the challenge we face.
We cannot afford a business-as-usual approach.
The second problem relates to the other two-thirds of our service families. They live in local communities
because of DoD's policy to rely first on the private sector to provide suitable family housing. We do not
intend to change this overall strategy. However, we recognize that the majority of service members living
in local communities are enlisted personnel whose compensation is at the lower end of the military pay
scale. Their income makes it difficult for them to find quality, affordable housing within a reasonable
commuting distance. Some of the communities around our installations simply do not have enough
affordable, quality rental housing to accommodate our service members.
Finally, our barracks are in desperate need of improvement. Renovation or replacement of barracks is
the largest single functional category within the MILCON [military construction], and the repair and
maintenance portion of the Operations and Maintenance budget. This resource commitment reflects
Secretary Perry's continuing five-year commitment to improving the quality of life for single military
members. Additional funding by Congress for FY [fiscal year] 96 increases both RPM (by $322 million)
and revitalization of barracks (by $212 million). We plan to track these expenditures to ensure that these
additional funds are used to improve barracks.
In November 1995, the department established the 1+1standard for new, permanent party barracks
construction. This standard prescribes an 11 square meters (118.4 square feet) standard, similar to the
design the Army has been using under a waiver for several years. These quarters include two individual
living/sleeping rooms with closets and a shared bath and kitchenette service area.
This module will normally house two E-1 to E-4 [enlisted] members or one member E-5 and above.
Exceptions are approved so a service can modify this arrangement where mission or overall conditions
dictate. This standard is optional for barracks outside the continental United States funded by other than
the United States or constrained by site conditions. The services will begin to phase in adoption of this
standard with the FY 96 program.
The department is extremely pleased with the broad new authorities provided in the National Defense
Authorization Act for fiscal year 1996. They will help us attract private capital to solve our housing
problems much more quickly. The new authorities in this Military Housing Privatization Initiative permit:

Guarantees, both for loans and rental occupancy;


Conveyance or lease of existing property and facilities;
Differential payments to supplement service members' BAQ/VHA[Basic Allowance for
Quarters/Variable Housing Allowance];

Investments, both limited partnerships and stock/bond ownership; and,

Direct loans.
These new authorities can be used individually or in combination. We believe they will allow us to attract
private capital and leverage military construction dollars by at least 3-to-1. Establishment of the Family
Housing Improvement Fund, with its initial appropriation of $22 million in fiscal year 1996 and transfer
authority, provides an effective mechanism to fund the selected projects. We have requested an
additional $20 million for this purpose in fiscal year 1997. As military construction projects are converted
to projects financed using the new authorities, we expect to use the MILCON savings to fund additional
projects. The notification and reporting requirements in the law provide congressional visibility, at key
steps, as we proceed.
There is no single magic bullet to efficiently and economically revitalize our housing stock or encourage
the private sector to meet DoD needs. In real estate, one size does not fit all. Each location, each project
and the terms of each deal will vary according to market conditions, market penetration, land cost and
availability, developer capabilities and our housing renovation or construction requirements. Approaches
that work in one location may fail dismally at another. Therefore, the department needed, and received
from you, a "kit bag" of tools and flexibility to take advantage of each installation's and civilian
community's unique circumstances.
I believe this new housing initiative is the beginning of a mutually beneficial relationship between the
Department of Defense and the private sector. For the department, it will result in faster construction of
more housing built to market standards. We expect to save substantially compared to the military
construction alternative process. Commercial construction and operation is not only faster and less costly
than military construction, but private sector funds will also significantly stretch and leverage the
department's limited housing resources -- achieving more improved housing from the same funding level.
There will also be significant investment opportunities in defense housing for developers and financiers in
the private sector. The initiative opens the military construction market to a greater number of
development firms. It stimulates the economy beyond traditional MILCON investments through increased
private sector building activity because we can build more and in some cases put more property on local
tax roles.
Because DoD wants the private sector to use more of its own funds to build or renovate housing and to
work with us in leveraging our scarce funds, we must plan, program, budget and execute projects more
like a private entity. That is precisely what we are in the process of doing. Based on these new authorities,
we are trying to think and act more like private developers.
Secretary Perry has given his complete support to this new initiative [1996 strategy]. In October 1995, in
anticipation of enactment of these authorities, he established a joint Housing Revitalization Support
Office, the HRSO, representing all services and augmented with consultant support. At his instruction,
the office is staffed with 13 full-time housing and real estate experts from each of the services and the
Office of the Secretary of Defense.
The HRSO serves as a catalyst for our housing modernization efforts and uses consultant assistance to
develop best practices and a common approach to analyzing private sector proposals. One of its
near-term goals is to test as many of the authorities as possible. The HRSO is the department's focal
point of knowledge and expertise necessary to implement this program. It will also manage the Housing
Improvement Fund.
All relevant information and resources are shared with each of the services. Together, the HRSO and
services evaluate each initial site; determine which authorities, singly or in combination, will benefit each
site; and jointly lead procurement teams that will ultimately negotiate commercial agreements. Ultimately,
the services will use their resources and contracting authority to execute these agreements. Lastly, we
plan to gradually incorporate the HRSO authorities into the services' housing acquisition process.
The HRSO has developed a site data collection protocol and a financial feasibility model to evaluate
proposals for all services, addressing all kinds of markets and requirements. It has worked with the
military departments to prioritize about 40 potential sites and together with the services has selected 14
for initial evaluation. Over the past months, members of our staff, along with service representatives and
DoD consultants, were in the field visiting 11 of these sites. They have accelerated this process, visiting
five additional sites in the last week. Our target is to have about 8-10 projects with up to 2,000 family
housing units awarded within the next year. These projects will serve as prototype sites to test the
authorities, validate approaches and, frankly, learn how we can take best advantage of these powerful
tools.
Two projects, one in Corpus Christi, Texas, and the other in Everett, Wash., have already gone out for
bid, and the contract awards are pending. As we learn how to efficiently contract with these new
authorities, we expect it will take about 21 months from the time a site is identified until families are able
to move into the new or renovated housing. This represents a vast improvement over our current military
construction process, which averages 36 to 48 months from project definition to beneficial occupancy.
At potential sites our teams visit with a variety of people to get a good portrait of the housing market and
opportunities. These people include military housing personnel, lenders, community development agency
staffs, state housing finance agency staffs who could issue bonds and implement publicly supported
housing programs, and staff of associations that represent real estate professionals, developers and
property managers. Specifically, these site investigations are used to:

Inform installation commanders about the new authorities and discuss opportunities to satisfy
military housing requirements;


Open lines of communication with local governments and the business community;
Gather and verify information about the local housing market and the installation housing
situation;

Identify the nature of and reasons for the local housing shortage; and,

Determine which authorities, if any, are most relevant and potentially most effective for
providing quality, affordable housing for military families.
Site visits also determine major potential obstacles to the government in pursuing development, issues
such as financial, organizational or political risks; or community and neighborhood concerns. The visits
also identify how these risks might be mitigated or otherwise overcome to create a viable project. Finally,
the site evaluations result in a "go, no-go" recommendation and, if appropriate, provide the foundation for
initial solicitation plans.
Although the new authorities are flexible, no single authority is likely to be effective for every housing
requirement or market condition. We are working with the services to decide which authorities are likely
to best satisfy specific housing requirements so that solicitations can focus on the avenues likely to
achieve best value for the government. On-site visits by experts from the public and private sector will
determine the least costly tool or tools to best accomplish our goal. In some situations, there may not be
a better alternative than traditional MILCON.
For example, each authority has a different cost to the government. When we use the financial feasibility
model, we estimate the income that would be generated in the form of service members' rent and
determine whether this sum is enough to cover the cost of construction, maintenance and financing. We
will look at the reasons why the private sector has not met the needs of the military. Is it because the local
economy is too dependent on the base and that lenders are fearful of downsizing?
If service members' income is enough to cover the cost of the project, the only tool we may need to offer
might be a mortgage guarantee against risks associated with base closure. Therefore, we would use our
guarantee tool, rather than funding up to 45 percent of the development cost with our joint partnership
tool. In this particular example, the guarantee tool would save the taxpayers' money because the
guarantee would be scored as an outlay based upon an anticipated default rate, not on the amount of the
mortgage guarantee itself.
Ultimately, the HRSO approach requires a basic cultural change in our own business practices. DoD is
working diligently to find our way in this new culture. We are learning how to act more like a commercial
entity to take advantage of opportunities when they present themselves. Of course, this is not easy. We
are not accustomed to delegating authority and relying on consultants. However, we are beginning to do
so.
We can succeed, and when we do, the rewards can be enormous. With our new authorities, we are
working to remedy our housing deficiencies faster and less expensively than would ever be possible
under the traditional military construction process. We appreciate that this new approach has also called
for changes in your committee's oversight mechanisms. You have met us halfway, and we appreciate
that.
I have three points which I would like to address before I conclude my testimony.
First, we need to maintain at least the same level of military construction funding as we are currently
receiving. Our primary goal in establishing the Military Housing Privatization Initiative and in developing
our new authorities is to solve a 30-year problem in about 10 years within the resource levels currently
planned for housing during that 10-year period.
This goal is difficult, even with these new authorities, but the more quickly we act, the more quickly we
benefit. By acting quickly, we will improve the quality of life of our service members and their families, the
department will retain more of our quality service members, and that in turn will sustain a ready force
while reducing recruiting and training expenses.
We need our current level of funds in order to successfully implement these projects with the private
sector. If our current level of funding is not maintained, we will not speed the improvement of our housing.
Rather, we will more likely solve a 30-year problem in 30 years or longer because we will limit funds
available for the private sector to leverage. Key to service plans to solve their housing shortfalls is their
commitment to continue to program resources at about the fiscal year 1996 level of $784 million. The
fiscal year 1997 budget request totals $734 million.
Second, as you know, Secretary Perry intends that the privatization tools be applied to solving the
serious housing modernization needs of our unaccompanied personnel. While this may prove more
challenging, we want to use these authorities to improve our barracks. We are proposing a technical
modification to the appropriations committees that will allow us to carry out the intent of last year's
authorization act to apply the privatization authorities to unaccompanied as well as family housing.
Finally, the Marsh Panel recommended that the department seriously consider transferring its housing
operations to a military housing authority. At Secretary Perry's direction we are determining how we could
broaden our current housing privatization "kit bag" and improve our housing situation even more rapidly
by enabling each military department or service to create its own military housing corporation. We are
examining this option and hope to provide you a legislative proposal in this area in a few weeks. ...
Preserving Educational Benefits in the
All-volunteer Force
Prepared statements of Army Lt. Gen. Samuel E. Ebbesen, deputy assistant secretary of defense for
military personnel policy, and Al Bemis, deputy assistant secretary of defense for reserve manpower and
personnel, before the Education, Training, Employment and Housing Subcommittee, House Veterans
Affairs Committee, March 7, 1996.
Ebbsen. I am pleased to appear before you today in the first year of the second decade of the
Montgomery GI Bill to discuss this vital program. There is little doubt that the MGIB has met or exceeded
the expectations of its sponsors and has been a major contributor to the success of the all-volunteer
force.
The original GI Bill of Rights, created at the end of World War II, gave returning service members a
comprehensive package of benefits to compensate for opportunities lost while in the military and to ease
their transition back into civilian life. We recently celebrated the 50th anniversary of this legislation. The
noted economist Peter Drucker described the GI Bill by saying, "Future historians may consider it the
most important event of the 20th century." Perhaps the most far-reaching provision of the GI Bill was the
financial assistance it made available for veterans to attend college.
Today's MGIB traces its lineage directly to this milestone program, with one important change. While all
earlier GI Bill programs were designed to ease the transition to civilian life from a conscripted military
force, since 1973, we have defended this nation with volunteers.
Thus, the MGIB has as one of its purposes "to promote and assist the all-volunteer force program and
the Total Force concept of the armed forces by establishing a new program of educational assistance
based upon service on active duty or a combination of service on active duty and in the Selected Reserve
to aid in the recruitment and retention of highly qualified personnel for both the active and reserve
components of the armed forces."
So the MGIB is not only designed to aid in recruiting, but also for the first time recognizes the vital role of
the reserve components in our defense and extends educational benefits to these itizen-service
members." My testimony will cover the MGIB for active service. Mr. Al Bemis, deputy assistant secretary
of defense for reserve manpower and personnel, will discuss the MGIB for the Selected Reserve.
The department continues to be successful both in the number and quality of accessions. During FY
[fiscal year] 1995, all services met their recruiting objectives, accessing 168,010 first-time enlistees with
excellent recruit quality. Ninety-six percent of new recruits were high school diploma graduates,
compared with 93 percent in 1985, the first year of the MGIB.
Even more dramatic is the change in above-average aptitude recruits (Categories I-IIIA): 71 percent of
new recruits scored above average on the enlistment test in FY 1995, compared with 62 percent in 1985.
Moreover, in FY 1985, 7 percent of new recruits scored in the lowest acceptable aptitude category
(Category IV); in FY 1995, we accessed fewer than 1 percent in this category.
Through the first four months of FY 1996, the services met their numeric goals, and the quality of enlisted
accessions remained high. Ninety-five percent of new recruits were high school diploma graduates, while
68 percent scored above average on the enlistment test. Incentive programs, such as the Montgomery
GI Bill, are vital to our success in attracting bright and well educated people into the military.
The Montgomery GI Bill enrollment rates have continued to rise each year since its inception, with 95
percent of eligible recruits choosing to enroll in FY 1995. Enrollment in the active duty program has risen
from only 50 percent in the first year, 1985, to the current 95 percent. A total of 2 million men and women
from an eligible pool of 2.7 million have chosen to participate in the MGIB since July 1, 1985. Such
participation rates clearly demonstrate the attractiveness of the Montgomery GI Bill.
To ensure enlistees fully understand the structure and benefits of the program, and the requirement to
disenroll if electing not to participate, they are briefed at military entrance processing stations during
in-processing and again at recruit training. It is here, within two weeks after enlistment, that the final
decision is made whether to participate in the Montgomery GI Bill program. Finally, at separation, eligible
individuals again are briefed on the MGIB and encouraged to take advantage of the educational
opportunities it provides.
The 1990s saw America's armed forces facing a significant reduction in size as the Cold War ended.
Unfortunately, as with any major strength reduction, the lives and career expectations of many in the
work force became uncertain. However, unlike the last major drawdown of forces after Vietnam, we
wanted to ensure that all affected service members were treated with the respect, dignity and
appreciation they deserved. Your subcommittee was instrumental in this with the extension of MGIB
eligibility to those who either chose to leave service voluntarily or were involuntarily separated as a result
of the drawdown.
Those individuals participating in the Voluntary Separation Incentive and Special Separation Benefit
programs were offered the opportunity to participate in the Montgomery GI Bill if they had not previously
enrolled during their initial enlistment. In all, over 41,000 separating service members have taken
advantage of this opportunity. Over 18,000 service members separating under VSI or SSB enrolled in the
MGIB program, and over 11,000 of them have gone on to use their benefit. Of the service members
involuntarily separated since February 1991, over 23,000 have enrolled in the MGIB.
The following figure presents the percent of average four-year college costs offset for each of the years
the Montgomery GI Bill has been in effect. The offset declined from nearly 97 percent of the cost of tuition
and fees in school year 1985-86 to 70 percent by school year 1993-94, as average annual tuition and
fees for a four-year program rose by 43 percent. With the early 1990s increase in MGIB benefits from
$300 to $400 per month and the provision to annually adjust the benefit for inflation, the offset has
leveled after reaching a low in school year 1990-91.
Given our recent recruiting successes, current basic benefits appear to be adequate as an enlistment
incentive. However, if college costs, especially tuition and fees, continue to rise significantly above
inflation, the offset provided by the Montgomery GI Bill benefits will require close monitoring to keep the
program competitive. Recognizing the tight resource climate we all face, we welcome the opportunity to
work with your subcommittee to seek innovative ways to keep the existing MGIB stipend at satisfactory
levels both to attract new recruits and to help pay for a college education.
The department is making attempts to maximize existing educational programs, which are used during
service as an effort to give separating service members a "leg-up" on their educational goals. As part of
its off-duty voluntary education effort, the department operates a number of programs that allow service
members to receive academic credit without enrolling in traditional college and university courses. Two of
these programs, the Military Evaluations Program and the Examinations Program, produce college credit
at considerable cost savings to both the service member and the government.
Under the Military Evaluations Program, the American Council on Education, under contract with the
department, develops recommendations for the award of college credit based on its evaluation of military
training (formal courses and on-the-job training) and work experience. These recommendations are
published in the "Guide to the Evaluation of Educational Experiences in the Armed Forces," commonly
referred to as the ACE Guide.
Many colleges and universities award college credit based on these recommendations. For example, the
guide recommends three semester hours in supply management, three semester hours in clerical
procedures and one semester hour in interpersonal communication for a sailor attending the Navy's
eight-week storekeeper class-A course. For an Army information systems operator separating at the
completion of one term of service, the guide recommends three semester hours in introduction to
computers and computing and three semester hours in introduction to computer operations.
The Examinations Program provides service members with a means of earning college credit through
college placement testing. Through contracts with the College Board and the Educational Testing
Service, tests in more than 100 academic subjects are available to service members at no cost. Colleges
and universities grant academic credit based on acceptable scores on these tests. Credits earned
through testing cost considerably less than if earned in resident courses for which tuition would be paid.
For example, one $35 test could produce the same three credits that might otherwise cost $300 or more
in tuition.
The above programs effectively maximize the limited dollars available for helping service members
achieve academic advancement and earn college degrees. Service members are counseled to take full
advantage of these programs.
The continued success experienced with the Montgomery GI Bill is in large part the result of emphasis
placed on the program by service recruiters, to include military advertising, and recognition across the
nation that education plays a vital role in today's workplace. Montgomery GI Bill information continues to
be prominently featured in our direct mail recruiting literature.
Every 18-year-old male who registers with the Selective Service System receives a full-color information
brochure explaining the benefits of the MGIB program. Approximately 1.8 million young men are reached
in this manner each year. An expanded version of the brochure is distributed to the services for use at
recruiting stations and also is provided to high school guidance counselors.
Another important advertising initiative was a painting by Michael J. Deas, a now-prominent artist who is
best known for his rendition of Marilyn Monroe on a U.S. postage stamp. The painting, which has been
made into both a print advertisement and a poster to be displayed by recruiters in their stations, depicts
Uncle Sam with the tagline, "If You Can't Get Money For College From Your Parents, Get It From Your
Uncle".
We also produce and distribute a magazine for use by high school seniors and guidance counselors
which contains the new MGIB Uncle Sam print advertisement and individual ads from each of the
services. The magazine, called "Futures," is mailed to 3.3 million students and over 21,000 guidance
counselors every year.
In the past, this subcommittee has expressed concern about the timeliness and accuracy of automated
data flow between the services, the Defense Manpower Data Center and the Department of Veterans
Affairs. We recognize that data accuracy is a key objective of smooth payment to veterans.
Two years ago, when over 15 percent of the records in the MGIB data base did not contain sufficient
information to identify participants' eligibility, we told you we had established a goal of reducing the
"unknowns" rate to less than 5 percent. This was an ambitious goal, but as of January 1996, only 3.5
percent of MGIB records are coded "unknown."
Data exchanges, such as the one between DMDC and DVA are regulated by the various provisions of
the Privacy Act of 1974, including subsequent amendments dealing with computer matching. There is a
significant administrative burden associated with the need to frequently renegotiate matching
agreements between and among agencies for programs which are long-term and continuing. Increasing
the life of a matching agreement from 18 months with one 12-month renewal to perhaps a number of
12-month renewals would significantly decrease administrative burden for this and other similar
programs.
Before I conclude, I want to take the opportunity to pay tribute to Congressman G.V. (Sonny)
Montgomery, the man for whom the MGIB was named. With his pending retirement from Congress, this
may well be his last formal hearing on the MGIB, and I believe it imperative to let him know how grateful
we have been for his support. In July 1995, Secretary of Defense William J. Perry presented Mr.
Montgomery with the Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service in a ceremony
commemorating the 10th anniversary of the MGIB. I would like to read the citation from this award into
the record:
"The Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service is awarded to G.V. (Sonny)
Montgomery for exceptionally distinguished service to the Department of Defense and the military
services as the sponsor and proponent of the Montgomery GI Bill, from July 1985 through July 1995.
"Mr. Montgomery's commitment to this legislation grew from his recognition that the military services
faced enormous difficulty in recruiting during the early years of the all-volunteer force. He drafted,
sponsored and ensured passage of this sweeping educational program which was designed to enhance
the ability of the armed services to recruit and retain high-quality people, while at the same time assisting
in the readjustment of former service members to civilian life.
"The resultant program became the Department of Defense's most effective recruiting tool. Nearly 2
million active duty military personnel and 360,000 Selected Reservists have participated since enactment.
The quality of recruits entering active duty was exceptional. The proportion of recruits with
above-average aptitude who also held a high school diploma expanded from about half to nearly
two-thirds of the enlistees -- an extraordinary accomplishment that is substantially attributable to Mr.
Montgomery and the modern GI Bill he created.
"Mr. Montgomery's vision in conceiving this program, coupled with his tenacity in ensuring enactment,
represents the highest traditions of government and public service and reflects great credit upon himself,
the Department of Defense and the Congress of the United States. For these and his many other
contributions in support of America's armed forces, I take great pleasure in presenting G.V. (Sonny)
Montgomery the Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service."
Mr. Chairman, I thank you, our armed forces thank you, and America's youth thanks you.
Significant improvements have been made in military manpower over the past 10 years. Today, our
volunteer military stands ready, willing and able to defend our nation and its values and principles around
the world. Credit for success in attracting and retaining high quality personnel belongs in no small part to
Congress and this subcommittee for providing us with the MGIB program. Largely as a result of the MGIB,
we have been able to increase and then sustain recruit quality despite a shrinking pool of eligible youth in
a period of fiscal austerity.
Bemis. ... The Montgomery GI Bill-Selected Reserve is a noncontributory program that provides
educational assistance to Selected Reserve members who enlist, re-enlist or agree to serve in the
Selected Reserve for six years. To qualify for benefits, members must have completed requirements for
award of a high school diploma before completing their initial entry training.
To be eligible for educational assistance under the vocational or technical programs, the enlistment,
re-enlistment or agreement to serve must be on or after Oct. 1, 1990. Those who continue their service in
the Selected Reserve have up to 10 years within which to use the entitlement. Benefits are payable for as
long as 36 months of education at the rate of $197.90 per month for full-time pursuit.
Unlike previous GI Bill programs and the Montgomery GI Bill for the active components, the Montgomery
GI Bill-Selected Reserve provides for receipt of benefits before the qualifying military service is
completed. Also, unlike the previous GI Bill, the reserve program is a recruiting and retention tool.
Evidence of this program's effectiveness is reflected in high overall participation. During fiscal year 1995,
more than 97,000 Selected Reservists received Montgomery GI Bill educational benefits. Since the
inception of the program, 378,000 National Guard members and reservists have applied for educational
assistance.
Studies conducted by the Sixth Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation and the Rand Corp.
confirms that the MGIB-SR continues to be one of the most important recruiting and retention incentives
for the reserve components. It has been particularly important with respect to retention. Information
collected during the 1986 DoD Reserve Components Survey indicated that the Montgomery GI Bill was a
major or moderate contributing factor for remaining in the Guard and Reserves for 40.4 percent of the
service members. In the 1992 DoD Reserve Components Survey, that percentage had risen to 48.2.
Despite the expenditure and recipient growth, the value of the Montgomery GI Bill-Selected Reserve in
covering college tuition and fees has declined since it was first offered to our service members. In 1996
dollars, the percent of offset in total education costs has dropped from 23 percent in school year 1985-86
to 18 percent for school year 1993-94. The percentage for tuition and fees has decreased from 45
percent of a student's bill in school year 1985-86 to 33 percent of the cost in school year 1993-94.
While we are talking about the recruitment value of the MGIB-SR, I want to thank the Congress for
including the two "kicker" programs in the 1996 Defense Authorization Act. This legislation allows for
payment of a "kicker" up to $350 per month for Selected Reservists in addition to their MGIB-SR benefits
if they are serving in critical specialties or units as designated by the service secretaries. A "kicker" of up
to $350 was also authorized to be given in conjunction with the active duty Montgomery GI Bill to service
members who have separated from active service and have affiliated with the Selected Reserve in a
designated critical unit or specialty.
We have begun working with the services on an implementation plan for these "kickers." Important items
for this working group to address in the plan are establishment of critical units or specialties,
consideration of levels or bands for kicker payment amounts, and identification of funding for the service
budgets. We anticipate a trial period beginning in fiscal year 1997 with full implementation in fiscal year
1998.
To supplement the recruitment value of the MGIB-SR, the reserve components have been strong
supporters of nontraditional education programs. Because the Montgomery GI Bill-Selected Reserve
program does not meet the full costs of education, these programs have been very important in
stretching the Reservist's education dollar.
In May 1994, the assistant secretary of defense for reserve affairs, Ms. Deborah Lee, formed the
Reserve Component Education Panel. The panel's charter was to help focus program efforts that can be
most beneficial to the reserve components by enhancing awareness of Defense Activity for
Nontraditional Educational Support Activity educational opportunities and access to these opportunities.
The panel meets twice a year.
DANTES is a great friend of reservists. It has offered them support equal to that of active duty members.
The services and service members, through awareness programs generated by the RCEP, have realized
significant benefits through the voluntary education services such as DANTES credit by examination and
credit by evaluation. These time-saving programs are successful methods of cost avoidance through
accelerating a student's academic progress by awarding credit for what the student already knows.
In 1995, the Florida Pilot Testing Program was begun, which authorized all Selected Reservists in Florida
to take the DANTES Standard Subject Tests or the College Level Examination Program exams at
approximately 25 National Testing Centers at participating colleges and universities in that state. This
allowed reservists to drive to the nearest NTC instead of being forced to travel to a distant reserve
education center for the exams.
The service member is required to pay an $8 fee to the NTC, and DANTES pays for the exam. This test
program will extend through December 1996, when it will be evaluated to determine if it should be
continued or expanded. Use of NTC helps to maximize the educational assistance available to reservists,
but it still does not help the reservists keep up with the rapidly rising cost of education.
I would like to take this opportunity to thank the Congress for extending the deadline for the MGIB-SR
annual report. This will grant us more time to collect the end-of-year data needed for review and analysis.
The final result will be a better evaluation of the MGIB-SR program and the opportunity to provide you
and the services with a better report of the evaluation.
I thank you again for this opportunity to discuss this vital recruiting and retention tool for our reserve
components
Providing a Cost-Effective Health Care System
Prepared statement of Dr. Stephen Joseph, assistant secretary of defense for health affairs, to the House
National Security Committee, Washington, March 7, 1996.
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the committee: It is an honor for me to be here this afternoon
and to present to you an overview of military medicine, particularly our strategy for a cost-effective,
everyday health care delivery system and alternatives we are developing for our retired beneficiaries and
their families.
Military medicine exists to support the men and women in uniform, especially when they deploy in
response to our national security policy decisions. Today, our armed forces are serving the NATO
peacekeeping mission in Bosnia; military medicine is there. This mission, while peacekeeping in nature,
is fraught with dangers to the health and safety of our troops. The environmental health threats to our
force in Bosnia range from the severe cold weather, poor to nonexistent public works such as sanitation,
to endemic diseases and the presence of innumerable land mines.
The medical preparations we have taken with this deployed force are different from previous
deployments. These differences are a result of the progress we have made in placing tremendous
emphasis on our readiness posture and of implementing changes to improve our approaches to
deployment, many arising from our experience in the Gulf War.
Prior to deploying, we conducted medical screening of all personnel, we have pointedly informed our
troops regarding the environmental health risks they may encounter and offered information and training
on how to stay healthy. Plus, we are capturing demographic data for all those who deploy.
During this deployment, we have preventive medicine and combat stress teams to accompanying the
force. Other very specialized teams will deploy at the call of the commander in coordination with the U.S.
European Command surgeon to address specific potential hazards. Additionally, we have detailed a
preventive medicine officer to the staff of the U.S. European Command surgeon. The deployed
preventive medicine teams in Bosnia will assess all aspects of disease and environmental threats,
establish geographic-specific medical surveillance systems, investigate disease outbreaks, implement
preventive medicine measures and document environmental and combat exposures.
Prior to or shortly upon their return, service members will be screened for identified health concerns.
Once home, service members will receive information handouts, individual counseling and medical
referrals when indicated. Additionally, rosters of all deployed personnel will be stored in an accessible
data base to allow for future review and screening.
The medical contingent deployed in support of our peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia includes
hospitalization, dental, veterinary services, laboratory and medical evacuation assets. In Hungary we
have a larger hospital capability, and for further, more specialized care, patients will be medically
evacuated to the Army Medical Center at Landstuhl, Germany.
Most medical units in Bosnia deployed from Europe, notably the 30th Medical Group as the medical
command and control headquarters; the 212th Mobile Army Surgical Hospital, a 56-bed capability,
situated in Bosnia; and the 67th Combat Support Hospital, a 120-bed capability, located in Hungary. As
of March 4, our medical units had admitted 487 patients, performed 26 surgeries, seen 5,596 ambulatory
patients and evacuated 218 out of the theater of operations. Virtually all patients sought medical attention
for diseases or nonbattle injuries.
We are in the process of establishing a telemedicine network within Bosnia linking all of our medical units,
then linking these units to the hospitals in Hungary, Germany and here in the U.S. Additionally, we will
connect the USS George Washington in the Mediterranean Sea on this medical net. What telemedicine
means in Bosnia is that, real-time, very specialized health care in the form of diagnoses and consultation
can be projected forward to the patient. It means very high quality, sophisticated care for the patient,
often without having to transport the patient hundreds, even thousands of miles from his or her unit.
Our nation believes it is important to ensure the health of our men and women in uniform and to have
medical attention readily available in the event of injury or disease, anywhere, anytime. These
expectations mean the armed forces need a health care component that can do as they do; they need
Army medicine, Navy medicine, Air Force medicine.
Health care deployed in support of the armed forces, medical research, education, primary, specialized
and follow-up care, and prevention and health promotion are all elements of a strong military health care
delivery system that is responsive to the needs of the people it serves.
It is my responsibility to develop the policies and design the programs to enable the men and women of
the military health services system to do their jobs. It has been my practice to closely coordinate these
decisions with the surgeons general of the military services.
A perennial debate to which the MHSS is again joined concerns the appropriate size of the medical force
-- just how many physicians should be on active duty, what is the correct size of the MHSS itself, how
much more capability can be added or subtracted, based on cost-benefit analyses?
The current assessment, directed by the deputy secretary of defense, is a major update to the original
Section 733 study, "The Economics of Sizing the Military Medical Establishment." The Section 733 study
was directed in the FY [fiscal year] 1992 and FY 1993 National Defense Authorization Acts.
Mr. William Lynn, director of program analysis and evaluation, testified before this committee on April 19,
1994, on the results of that landmark study, which seriously questioned the size of the current MHSS to
support wartime requirements. This update was directed because of the controversy caused by the
original study; the subsequent renewed interest in the issue by this committee, Section 745 of FY 1996
National Defense Authorization Act; the recommendations of the Commission on the Roles and Missions
of the Armed Forces; and, the secretary's reply to Congress on the CORM recommendations.
Mr. William Lynn and I are co-chairing a senior level steering committee that is overseeing this update
study. We have three working groups reporting to the steering committee.

Working Group No. 1 -- Wartime Requirements -- will determine the number of medical
personnel needed to support the current planning scenarios involving two almost simultaneous
major regional conflicts.

Working Group No. 2 -- Sustainment and Training -- will determine the number of medical
personnel needed in the sustainment and training base to support the wartime and operational
requirements.

Working Group No. 3. -- TRICARE Cost Savings -- will analyze the full cost savings potential
from implementing utilization management, propose metrics to monitor the progress of the
department's TRICARE program and consider the proposal of a fourth option, such as access to
the FEHBP [Federal Employee Health Benefit Plan], for the TRICARE program.
The current schedule calls for our study to be completed by the end of this month. While it is still too early
for the final results, the deliberate approach being taken this time is designed to ensure that all interested
parties have an opportunity to participate and that all relevant issues are evaluated. I am confident this
effort will provide the department and ultimately this committee with an valuable new baseline for
evaluating the appropriate size of the MHSS.
It is not possible to maintain a trained and prepared medical force ready to deploy on short notice without
the MHSS. It is in the everyday operation of the MHSS -- caring for patients of all ages -- that our medical
personnel increase their skills as health care professionals. And very importantly, it is where our medics
and independent duty corpsmen receive the patient care training they need to do their most vital jobs.
An underlying strength of the MHSS is having practitioners who are themselves members of the U.S.
military. These health care professionals, like their military professional counterparts, need to maintain
their technical skills. Our health care personnel do this by practicing medicine in military medical facilities
every day. They also need to understand the military system, its plans, doctrine and operating systems.
To gain that understanding, they must use their health care skills in the military operational environment
of their service: field, transportable or shipboard medical facilities.
Participation in readiness training exercises is one means that offers military health care professionals an
opportunity to learn how field medical units or the medical facilities on board ship might operate during a
deployment. This training experience is essential in order that our military medical personnel are fully
prepared for military commitments which involve a force deployment.
Bosnia is today's deployment, and it is one cloaked in risk to the health of our men and women who are
there. We are committed to minimizing that risk and sustaining the health of our people.
TRICARE increases flexibility for the MHSS, which affords our military medical personnel the ability to
maintain their personal readiness while assigned to a base hospital or clinic. This flexibility is
demonstrated in the unprecedented collaboration among the military medical departments and in the
partnerships we are building with civilian health care companies. These initiatives, joint service sharing
and strong public-private partnerships, contribute to the survival of the MHSS.
Survival also means changing: improving operations, controlling costs, becoming more
beneficiary-friendly, enhancing the quality of the care provided and always continuing to support
readiness. The outcome of these changes are the goals of TRICARE.
Implementation of TRICARE across the country is very much on schedule. We began TRICARE Prime in
the Northwest Region, Region 11, in March of last year. Prime services began in Region 6, Oklahoma,
Arkansas, most of Texas and most of Louisiana, in November of 1995.
The contract has been awarded for Regions 9, 10 and 12, California and Hawaii, with services scheduled
to begin next month.
In the Southeastern United States, Regions 3 and 4, covering the states of Alabama, Florida, Georgia,
Mississippi, South Carolina, Tennessee, southeast Louisiana and a small part of Arkansas, we have
awarded the contract, and services will begin in July of this year.
We expect to award the contract for Regions 7 and 8, the North Central and Desert States regions,
shortly with services to begin by the end of this year. The contracts for the remaining Regions, 1, 2 and 5,
will be awarded by the end of this year.
So far, we have been successful in tackling a variety of difficulties and obstacles, from enrollment glitches
to contract award protests. While the protests are likely to continue with each new award, many of the
implementation difficulties are being minimized through the sharing of information among lead agents.
In the regions where Prime enrollment has begun, the trend is that anticipated numbers of enrollees have
been far exceeded very early, leading to slowdowns in the enrollment process and even backlogs.
Despite the bottlenecks, the message is clear that beneficiaries want to join Prime.
In Region 11, enrollment of retirees and family members began in March 1995, and, as of Feb. 20, their
numbers totaled 137,911. This more than doubles the estimated number of enrollments projected for the
whole first year. The experience is similar in Region 6, where, in the first four months of operation,
enrollment numbers of retirees and family members now total 132,315 (as of Feb. 20). This exceeds the
number projected for the entire first year.
Among the public-private partnerships contributing to the strength and flexibility of the MHSS and
TRICARE are the managed care support contracts. Through these contracts, military hospitals expand
their ability to offer the full range of health care services to beneficiaries depending on the MHSS for their
care. The managed care support contracts assist military medical facilities by establishing a network of
civilian providers to complement the military's capabilities, operating a health care finder service,
conducting beneficiary services, processing claims and more.
These partnerships also will afford us the opportunity to test the prospect of offering TRICARE Prime to
our active duty families assigned to locations far distant from military medical facilities, such as recruiters
and those in ROTC assignments. We are finalizing the details of this demonstration and hope to have it
begin in Region 11 this summer.
We have awarded three managed care support contracts covering Regions 6, 9, 10, 11 and 12 to
Foundation Health Federal Services, Inc. Humana Military Healthcare Services is the winning contractor
for Regions 3 and 4.
Last year, the Congress commended the department on its efforts in moving towards a nationwide
managed health care system for the military, TRICARE. Existing law at the time mandated that the
TRICARE program be fully implemented by Sept. 30, 1996. The Congress was concerned that the
department had accelerated the process in order to meet this statutory deadline and felt that there would
be great benefit from additional time in meeting the complex requirements of TRICARE. Therefore, they
extended the deadline for implementation of the TRICARE program by one year.
We have taken advantage of this new authority. We delayed the start of the procurement process for the
Region 1 and Regions 2 and 5 managed care support contracts. While we still plan to award these
contracts by the end of this calendar year, the delay has afforded us the opportunity to complete
development of the Composite Health Care System interoperability and to evaluate various alternative
financing methodologies to allow the military medical facilities to manage and be accountable for all
health care of its enrollees.
The new financial approach that we selected will significantly clarify military medical facility financial
responsibility for the Prime enrollees while retaining a partnership with the contractor. There will be a
continued sharing of risk for all CHAMPUS eligibles not enrolled with the military medical facility and
more frequent bid price adjustments to improve the real-time cost impact of management decisions by
the military medical facility commanders.
By clarifying the military medical facility's financial responsibility, we strengthen that facility's incentives to
manage utilization. Both of these enhancements are included in the requests for proposals for Region 1
and Regions 2 and 5.
One of the management initiatives that has afforded us the ability to make a significant philosophical
change in health care delivery is capitation financing. Medical treatment facility commanders have been
provided the information and incentive to manage all of the DoD resources expended within their areas of
influence, which is considered to be the user beneficiary population in their respective catchment (or
health service) areas.
For the past two fiscal years, the three military departments have provided their commanders with
specific information concerning the expenditure of CHAMPUS funds as well as the dollar value of the
military staff participating in patient care activities. By taking this integrated approach to health delivery
planning and execution, commanders and their staffs have realized significant improvements in utilization
patterns and better coordination of required services for our beneficiaries.
In short, our shift in external emphasis from process-oriented workload counts to healthy beneficiaries
has begun to enable clinicians to concentrate on developing strategies to encourage healthy lifestyles,
emphasize preventive measures and return sick and injured patients to full health and functionality as
efficiently and quickly as possible.
The development of our capitation model for determining resource requirements has revolutionized the
budgeting and programming for the Defense Health Program. With recent refinements such as
adjustments for differences in age/sex mix, we have a very dependable way to forecast our per capita
resource requirements. As a result, we are better able to identify real opportunities for improvements in
efficiency and effectiveness.
We continue to evolve TRICARE in our efforts to make it the best health care plan in the country. In doing
so, we must work within the constraints of our budget and to the extents of our legal authorities. By
congressional direction, TRICARE shall not increase the department's health care costs, and at the same
time the costs to our beneficiaries shall not increase.
This tug-of-war with dollars has caused many of our retirees to be unhappy with the enrollment fees
required of them and their families, should they elect to join TRICARE Prime. The FY 1996 Defense
Authorization Act, granting priority use of the military treatment facilities for enrollees, serves to alleviate
some of that unhappiness.
Still, there remains one very significant issue: care for our Medicare-eligible beneficiaries. This committee
was an advocate for legislation last year that would have allowed the Health Care Financing
Administration to reimburse DoD for care that military facilities provide for these dual-eligible
beneficiaries.
There are many options for resolving this issue. One alternative is to allow these patients to continue on a
space-available basis in our military medical facilities. However, space is becoming less and less
available as our military medical facilities are closed through the base realignment and closure process
and as the competition for military medical facility access increases. Gradually, if no other action is taken,
Medicare will probably be responsible for an increasing share. At present, DoD estimates that it provides
$1.4 billion in care to dual eligibles.
A second alternative is to have HCFA reimburse DoD for those dual eligibles who enroll in TRICARE
Prime. Historically, the CBO [Congressional Budget Office] has scored this alternative as increasing
entitlement dollars without an off-setting decrease.
In response to the 1995 Defense Authorization Act, we proposed to HCFA conducting a demonstration
whereby military medical treatment facilities may be reimbursed as providers under existing Medicare
health maintenance organizations.
Discussions are currently under way within the administration to determine the feasibility of a new
demonstration where DoD would maintain its current level of effort and would expend those funds first,
then turn to HCFA to cover additional dual-eligible beneficiaries who choose to enroll in TRICARE Prime.
We would like to see this demonstration begin as soon as technical and demographic specifications can
be agreed upon.
A third alternative would be for DoD to continue to pay for medical care for Medicare eligibles. We
currently budget to provide space available care to a growing number of our beneficiaries who are
Medicare-eligible. However, providing care under TRICARE for these beneficiaries could be excessively
costly to DoD.
Recently, it has come to our attention that the Congressional Budget Office has made cost analyses of
the concept of a Medicare reimbursement demonstration. It is our recommendation that the CBO analyze
specific authorization language.
Some of the associations which represent our beneficiary populations have examined a variety of health
care options and are seeking consideration for access to the Federal Employees Health Benefit Program
as an option to TRICARE. We are examining this alternative at the present time.
I strongly believe, as do each of the surgeons general, that any potential modification of the military
health benefit must be developed in close coordination with our committees of jurisdiction. In that regard,
we pledge to work with our committees to explore all reasonable possibilities, while ensuring the viability
of the Military Health Services System and our commitment to meeting our primary responsibility to care
for the armed forces when operationally deployed.
We are focusing our study on active duty families assigned to areas where TRICARE Prime is not
available rather than retirees, their family members and survivors. This is because DoD already assumes
the vast majority of health care cost for active duty families, whereas many CHAMPUS-eligible retirees
have other primary health insurance and are not reliant on DoD at present.
There is a risk that beneficiaries who are currently not reliant on the government for their health care
coverage could be induced to drop their non-government coverage, resulting in new costs to DoD,
estimated at up to $500 million. A parallel circumstance exists for Medicare-eligible DoD beneficiaries.
DoD provides space-available care in military facilities for many of these beneficiaries, but costs for
private-sector care [are] reimbursed by Medicare. Offering FEHBP coverage to DoD Medicare eligibles
would require additional, new funding for DoD, estimated at up to $1.9 billion.
In closing, Mr. Chairman, I want to stress to you the fact that our armed forces are participating in far
more operational deployments than just 10 years ago. These are not wars nor combat actions. They are
currently peacemaking and peacekeeping operations, humanitarian and disaster assistance efforts. It
means that we have our service members on the move frequently, temporarily living in makeshift
accommodations around the globe. It means we have a tremendous need for rapidly deployable, highly
qualified medical personnel to ensure the health and safety of these men and women. What we learned
from Desert Storm, the Sinai, Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, Macedonia, Guantanamo we are applying today in
Bosnia.
Being prepared for the next deployment demands an actively engaged, strong Military Health Services
System, one which constantly strives to find better, more effective ways to meet its myriad
responsibilities. I believe we are doing exactly that with TRICARE.
Making DoD's Temporary Duty Travel User
Friendly
Prepared statement of John J. Hamre, undersecretary of defense (comptroller), to the Oversight of
Government Management and the District of Columbia Subcommittee, Senate Government Affairs
Committee, March 8, 1996.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, it is my pleasure to be here once more to address you
concerning the status of the Defense Travel Re-engineering Initiative. Nearly one year ago, I came
before you to describe how the Department of Defense would begin to take apart our old, outdated
business travel system and build an entirely new one, employing the best business travel practices
available.
Our vision was a seamless, paperless system that meets the mission needs of travelers, commanders
and other travel resource managers; reduces the cost of travel; and provides superior customer service.
Today, I am happy to report to you that we are much farther along the path to that new travel system. We
have made great progress in many areas, ranging from fundamental cultural changes to cutting-edge
technological improvements. Although we have made major improvements in the travel system, the
journey, however, is not yet complete.
I then spoke to you about 10 guiding principles that we were to integrate throughout this change initiative.
Briefly those principles that are embodied in our concept of operations are:


Travelers and supervisors are honest and responsible;
Allow the supervisor to control his or her travel budget and approve vouchers;


Implement simple clear rules to govern travel;
Rely on one-stop shopping at a commercial travel office;

Consolidate the process into a single piece of paper;

Eliminate bureaucratic burdens on travelers;

Ensure prompt payment by government;

Minimize bookkeeping requirements;

Use best industry financial practices; and

Continuously reassess for improvements.
These principles can be categorized into these three major areas: simplify the rules, delegate authority
and use best industry practices. All of the improvements we have made are based upon the fundamental
premise that our travelers and supervisors are honest customers of the system.
In order to test these principles in an operational environment, the department has embarked upon a pilot
testing process at 28 different sites representing each of the services and several defense agencies. In
June 1995, we had a conference with all of the pilot test organizations to begin the test process by
providing them a general orientation to the new concept of operations as well as the specific guidance
they would employ in their tests.
In September 1995, we invited representatives from industry to demonstrate vendor capabilities for
personnel from the pilot test organizations. Personnel from the pilot organizations were able to examine
the available software enablers and begin to finalize their test plans. It was very clear that even the
private sector did not yet have all of the answers; we were clearly charting some unexplored territory. At
the conference, vendors developed new partnerships among themselves, consolidating their areas of
expertise, to be able to meet the needs of our new concept.
A third conference with pilot organizations was held in January 1996 to review their progress to date and
begin to resolve barriers they had encountered. Most of the pilots were actively engaged in testing key
travel system attributes such as the delegation of travel approval authority, reimbursement via electronic
fund transfers and random audit of vouchers.
Most of the pilots had selected one of five major commercial computation software programs to test. Pilot
organizations also reported that the seven commercial vendors currently providing travel arrangement
services would also be supporting their tests of the new concept.
The barriers most commonly reported by the pilots were electronic signature capability, receipt retention
by the traveler, the validation of software enablers and educating managers and travelers about their
responsibilities under the new travel system.
The value of the pilot testing process is that it will provide us with an accurate baseline of the current
travel process from which we will be able to assess the impact of the changes we want to implement
across DoD. In other words, the pilots will serve as the means by which we establish proof of concept.
Our performance measures are direct costs, indirect costs, accomplishment of mission needs and
customer satisfaction.
The department is establishing baseline data for the current travel process at each of the 28 pilot test
organizations. The measured process begins with the initiation of a travel order and travel arrangements,
and it ends with reconciliation and payment of a travel voucher.
Preliminary data collected and reported by several organizations suggests that the number of steps for
preparing and approving travel orders and for preparing, computing and reconciling vouchers varies
across organizations. The number of people, amount of time and associated cost to prepare and to
process travel orders and vouchers also vary.
Raw data reported by pilot organizations that are just beginning to implement travel reforms and software
solutions indicate the current process takes -- excluding the traveler's time -- an aggregate of roughly two
to five hours to complete with estimated labor costs of about $45 to $115. Reporting and verification of
baseline data for the current travel process should be completed by May 1996.
The total expected monetary investments in technology and training to achieve a fully automated and
integrated DoD-wide travel system have not been established. However, costs will be estimated as part
of the acquisition planning process. Although total monetary investments for the new defense travel
system have not been established, planned costs for the 28 pilot organizations to fully implement and test
the re-engineered TDY [temporary duty] travel concept are estimated at $4.1 million. This estimate
includes the costs to acquire hardware and software, and to train approximately 32,000 travelers and
users served by the pilot test organizations.
We intend to collect the best data possible for our current and our new processes before implementing
the new travel system.
Let me now discuss with you the progress we have made to date in each of the major areas described
above, the remaining barriers and the steps we have planned toward implementation.
Last year, ... you noted that waste most often occurs due to rigid rules and archaic procedures, not due to
ill motives. We have taken that advice to heart. I then provided you a copy of our simplified entitlements.
We have reduced a large, complex body of regulations down to those 17 pages of plain English that
focuses on mission, provides discretion and places accountability with a person we call the authorizing
official, who is the manager in the field responsible for the traveler's mission. The use of all of these
entitlements is currently authorized only for the 28 pilot organizations until the new defense travel system
becomes a reality. However, we have been able to implement some of these simplifications throughout
DoD beginning fiscal year 1996. These include:

75 percent M&IE [meals and incidental expenses] First and Last Day.
Rather than go through complex computations about time of departure and return on the first and last day
of travel, we now authorize 75 percent of the M&IE as the standard reimbursement. The traveler now
knows what to expect in terms of reimbursement, and we have simplified the computations.

$75 Receipt Threshold.
We no longer require the traveler to retain receipts for travel expenses less [than] $75 with the exception
of lodging receipts, thanks to the IRS [Internal Revenue Service] change in policy. This reduces the
burden of recordkeeping.

Paper Nonavailability Statement.
One of the most common frustrations of the DoD traveler has been the requirement to obtain a paper
nonavailability statement from installation billeting offices when not staying on post. It is a
time-consuming and bureaucratic process that is unnecessary in an age of electronic reservations. Last
fall, I approved a policy change which eliminates this requirement if the traveler cannot establish a
reservation with the billeting office prior to departure.

Per Diem Delivery System.
Closely related to the simplified entitlements that I have just discussed are the timely and accurate
posting of travel per diem rates throughout the federal government. This is a joint responsibility of the
Department of State, the General Services Administration and the Department of Defense.
Currently, the distribution of this important rate information is paper-based, time-consuming, error-prone,
and it will not support electronic updates of the automated computation systems we envision. We are
working with these federal agencies to be able to electronically process per diem rate information. This
new system will minimize errors due to the rekeying of data and ensure travelers are provided accurate
per diem entitlements in a much more timely manner governmentwide.
The current practice in many DoD organizations today is to control the funding authority for official TDY
travel centrally. Commanders who direct and authorize travel do not always have accurate management
information on funding availability and therefore cannot make informed choices on the use of those
resources for travel in support of mission requirements. Furthermore, missions directed by the Joint Staff
or other outside taskings resulted frequently in a two-step process with fund citations to support a mission
coming at a later time than the tasking. This disconnected procedure introduces last minute
administrative delays and paperwork foul-ups.
To overcome this problem, we issued a policy directive that henceforth the authority to obligate travel
funds will be delegated to the level consistent with the authority to approve travel in the department.
Authorizing officials will be given their own travel budgets to manage. For the first time, line managers will
have both the responsibility and the resources to actually manage the travel function.
To make this work, we are planning ... to provide timely and accurate management information on
funding availability status electronically to those supervisors who authorize and manage TDY travel.
Secondly, in the case of taskings from external organizations, funding guidance or a fund citation must
now be provided along with that direction. This will prevent a paperwork-intensive and time-consuming
reconciliation process after the fact. We believe that these initiatives will effectively enhance the
responsible use of travel resources and eliminate some of the burdens that infect the current travel
process.
Effective fiscal year 1996, we have also simplified the accounting practices associated with our travel
expenses. DoD replaced 30 different accounting codes with just one or two codes. This makes the
budget process more user friendly for authorizing officials and eliminates the complexity of our current
accounting procedures. This facilitates the delegation of budget authority to authorizing officials by not
requiring them to act as budget clerks in determining which object class code is appropriate for every
travel request approved.
In our survey of best industry practices it became clear that one-stop shopping for services with a
commercial travel office was the preferred approach. These services include the one-time entry of data;
the use of a single document used for both travel authorization and voucher approval; electronic or
paperless processing; and the automatic computation of both a "should cost" pre-travel estimate and
post-travel "did cost" voucher request.
We have two challenges here. The first is to produce an integrated travel system that provides for these
services. There are commercial software products or enablers available that with some modifications will
allow us to perform these functions.
The second challenge is to provide a single channel of information to travelers for all arrangements
including government lodging/messing facilities, per diem rate information and other
government-furnished information required to make travel arrangements. The pilots are helping us to
determine the extent of industry capabilities to perform these functions.
The emphasis is on obtaining those services that the commercial travel industry currently provides to its
best private sector customers, not on developing unique DoD system requirements. We want to remain
sufficiently flexible to take advantage of the new products and services being offered commercially,
rather than lock into requirements that do not evolve with industry innovations.
The best practices we studied in corporate America indicate the use of a corporate travel charge card is
essential. This gets the employer out of the business of maintaining an overhead structure to provide
travel advances to the traveler and ultimately a corporate card makes the travel process much easier for
the traveler.
We have issued policy to maximize the use of the government-sponsored travel card, currently the
American Express card, for all expenses associated with official business travel. DoD travelers will use
the card to obtain cash advances from ATM [automatic teller] machines as well as to charge their hotels,
rental cars, meals and other expenses.
This has been a significant cultural change for a population of travelers used to traveling with cash. We
have also developed and implemented a training program for all travel card holders to ensure they
understand the proper use of the card.
Best practices also demand we use to the greatest possible extent automated computation capabilities
with built-in policy compliance checks that ensure reimbursement of travelers. Prompt payment of
travelers will help ensure that the travel charge card vendor is paid on time. These initiatives are
designed to exploit the fullest potential of electronic transactions.

Electronic Funds Transfer. The Department of Defense now requires that travel
reimbursements be paid to the traveler by an electronic funds transfer to his or her financial
institution; just like their paychecks. EFT allows us to both reduce the costs associated with
reimbursements but also to speed up the reimbursement to the traveler. This policy was
effective Oct. 1, 1995, for DoD personnel.
Where systems are capable of paying by EFT, our percent to travel reimbursements have gone
up from 25 percent to 47 percent over fiscal year 1995. We anticipate this figure to increase to
90 percent by the end of this calendar year as system changes are made to accommodate EFT
transactions.

Split Disbursement. Much like EFT, split disbursement is where the traveler can elect to have
the finance office electronically pay the government travel card vendor directly for the charges
that are on his or her travel card, the balance of the reimbursement would be transferred
electronically to their personal financial institution. This will greatly simplify a process that
requires the traveler to wait for the reimbursement before sending a check to the travel card
company.
Our finance centers are developing implementation requirements for the testing of split
disbursements at our pilot sites. We have been working with the current vendor, American
Express, to ensure that financial data will be exchanged appropriately.

Third Party Pay.
A third and final electronic funds transfer initiative that we are testing concerns having a commercial
vendor make payments directly to the travel card company. DoD would then reimburse a single invoice.
This would cut yet another step from the payment process by relieving the government finance office of
making those payments.
Our finance centers have prepared the necessary test procedures. If this proves to be a viable course of
action, third party pay throughout DoD could result in privatized payment.
Another major improvement initiative was to establish procedures for the random examinations of travel
vouchers in lieu of examining 100 percent of the vouchers. Effective Oct. 1, 1995, disbursing offices
within the department began to move to random examinations. These quality assurance reviews,
together with other audits as needed for oversight and control, should yield stronger controls at a reduced
cost.
Achieving the accomplishments to date has been a collaborative effort across government. I must
commend to you the GAO [General Accounting Office], GSA [General Services Administration] and IRS
for their support and cooperation in overcoming regulatory barriers and adopting better business
practices.
Many of these barriers were built for the best of intentions at the time they were constructed. The
dismantling of them can run quickly into some plausible reasons for their continued existence. Reasoning
our way through the changes needed to bring them up to date can be a tortuous process for both the
regulators as well as those being regulated.
We still have some outstanding requests to IRS, GAO and the National Archives and Records
Administration that will enable us to support a paperless process and reduce bureaucratic burden.
However, the regulatory agencies on the whole have worked very hard with us to ensure the necessary
controls yet allow us the necessary flexibility to ensure the travel mission is conducted more efficiently. I
also commend the work of the Joint Financial Management Improvement Program in providing
governmentwide leadership to simplify and modernize travel management in government.
Now for the future: I am very happy to report that in order to move out on this initiative, DoD has
established a project management office headed by Col. Albert Arnold for the defense travel system.
This office will take all recommendations from the DoD Re-engineering Task Force and coupled with
lessons learned from the pilot sites, implement a DoD-wide solution that utilizes best industry practices.
A draft standard DoD solicitation was released on Dec. 7, 1995, that asked for industry comment to help
us refine our requirements in accordance with these best industry practices. We feel that the best way for
DoD to implement evolving travel management services is for us to take advantage of the wealth of
nongovernment experience.
The travel industry is evolving, and it makes good sense for DoD to capitalize on this evolution and build
a partnership with industry that will last well into the 21st century. In that light and because we have
received such an extensive amount of positive comments in response to our draft solicitation, we are
conducting a thorough review of our requirements and acquisition strategy.
It's too early for me to tell you the outcome, but I can assure you that we are listening to what industry has
to say. They are the experts. They are the ones who will provide us solutions for our travel management
challenges so DoD can put its streamlined resources to work in the appropriate areas.
It is clear that we have done much already. However, as I stated in the beginning, we are not there yet,
and some significant challenges remain. They fall within three major areas: legislative, technological and
cultural.
We have requested the amendment of the following statute that pertains to DoD civilian travelers: 10
United States Code, Section 1589.
We propose the repeal of statutory language that prohibits DoD from paying a lodging expense to a DoD
civilian employee who does not use adequate available government lodgings while on TDY. The
statutory language does not permit flexibility by the resource manager to determine on a case-by-case
basis the most efficient and cost-effective utilization of total travel dollars.
For example, it does not allow consideration of car rental costs between government lodging and the
TDY mission locations; it does not consider the total costs of providing government lodging, such as
building construction, maintenance and utilities. These costs are paid by other DoD appropriations that
are not visible either to the traveler or to the local resource manager.
I would also like to underscore that many of the reforms offered by the Joint Financial Management
Improvement Program initiative to provide broader or governmentwide improvements require legislation.
Electronic Signature. A seamless, paperless system is our vision. An essential element to accomplish
this vision is to ensure that the necessary data integrity is maintained since this system will result in
disbursement of public funds. Electronic signature technology appears to provide a method that can be
used to provide the necessary integrity and allow us to comply with requirements of the False Claims Act.
We are currently studying how we can achieve the necessary level of data integrity in a cost-effective
manner. In order to reduce development risks and costs, we are working closely with the General
Accounting Office, National Institute of Standards and Technology and the Department of Energy to
develop the necessary specifications for a standardized electronic signature system.
Although this system will be utilized for travel, it can also be used for a variety of other applications and is
based on the Digital Signature Standard. GAO has recognized that the issues surrounding data integrity
in an effort such as ours is complex and specific features needed will continue to evolve as more
experience is gained. In order to allow us to gain the information that we need to define the controls
necessary to achieve a paperless system, GAO has approved our testing of some commercially available
products.
Industry issues. Our pilot experience has underscored the need for a sophisticated understanding of the
capabilities and limitations of our communications and data processing infrastructure. Our future system
will have to provide service in a wide variety of operational environments.
Our tests have demonstrated that some of our communications and data processing infrastructure is not
adequate to utilize these modern techniques. One of our initiatives is to identify industry standards for
electronic commerce and apply them to our new DTS. As industry progresses towards greater reliance
upon electronic commerce methods, the department must likewise remain flexible enough to move with
it.
One of the unanticipated technical barriers encountered during the pilot phase has been the time
required to update the software modules with new entitlement rules and to ensure that those changes are
accepted for processing payments by our accounting systems. Since entitlement changes occur on a
regular basis, this is an issue that needs to be worked.
Additionally, travel industry conditions are changing so rapidly that it is taxing our ability to predict the
costs of future travel services. For example, the commission structure of the travel arrangements industry
is changing, with potentially significant implications for our future costs.
Beyond the specific legislative proposals and technological challenges that I have outlined, there are
some "cultural barriers" that hamper our ability to achieve our travel re-engineering goals. Perhaps
foremost among these barriers is the oversight mentality that would have the department spend $100 in
establishing rigorous internal controls to oversee a $10 problem. We need to emulate private sector
practice of systems control, random audit and supervisory accountability. We need to ensure that
requirements such as signatures add value to the process. Best practice in industry for filing vouchers
does not require -- or pay for -- fail-safe or multiple signatures as a condition for reimbursement.
Here is where congressional leadership can help to set the tone by applying cost/benefit analysis
principles and common sense to oversight and internal control requirements. By treating the DoD traveler
and his/her supervisor as honest customers, we have deliberately designed a system that is not oriented
around stopping the 2 percent "bottom feeders."
The costs and systems complexity required to target that population should not be allowed to drive the
features of the defense travel system. Here again, the pilots will help us to assess the strength and
viability of the internal control features of the new system. The lessons learned from their experience will
provide an invaluable tool with which we can develop rational and cost-effective control alternatives.
I would like to conclude my testimony today on a very positive note. The Department of Defense remains
highly committed to this important re-engineering effort. We have made significant progress in a very
short period of time. Given the scope and complexity of the operations in this department and the
changes underway in the travel industry itself, I would go even further to characterize the progress as
extraordinary! I will admit to you, however, that this change effort has been much harder than we had
anticipated. Change is always difficult, but the anticipated as well as those unanticipated barriers in the
areas of policy, technology, and culture have been challenging indeed.
I would ask for the continued support of this committee, and I count on the support of the other federal
agencies I have mentioned today as we come closer to the actual implementation of our new defense
travel system. I would be happy to now take any questions
Staying Prepared Against Ballistic Missiles
Prepared statement of Lt. Gen. Malcolm R. O'Neill, USA, director, Ballistic Missile Defense Organization,
to the House National Security Committee, March 7, 1996, and Strategic Forces Subcommittee, Senate
Armed Services Committee, March 25, 1996.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it is my privilege to appear before you today to present the
department's Ballistic Missile Defense program and budget for fiscal year 1997.
As you are aware, the department has recently completed the BMD program review, which was
conducted by Dr. Paul Kaminski, the undersecretary of defense for acquisition and technology. The
program review established specific guidance for the BMD program over the next several years.
The most significant result of the review was a reaffirmation of the department's fundamental priorities for
missile defense. The first priority remains defense against theater-class ballistic missiles, which
represent a threat that is here and now. This next priority is to develop the capability to defend against
longer-range ballistic missiles that could threaten the U.S. after the turn of the century. Finally,
technology base programs to support both TMD [theater missile defense] and NMD [national missile
defense] round out the department's BMD program.
The total fiscal year 1997 budget request for BMD is $2.798 billion. The department is requesting $1.794
billion for theater missile defense RDT&E [research, development, test and evaluation] and $268 million
for TMD procurement efforts. The National Missile Defense Deployment Readiness RDT&E program is
budgeted for $508 million. Support technologies budget request is for $226 million. ... Of the total BMD
budget request for fiscal year 1997, TMD accounts for roughly 74 percent, NMD 18 percent and
technology 8 percent.
As the committee is aware, BMDO [Ballistic Missile Defense Organization leads the Department of
Defense team that executes the BMD program. My staff and I work closely and cooperatively with the
services as we seek to develop and acquire BMD systems. In this regard, BMDO interacts with the CinCs
[commanders-in-chief] to ensure that as we develop BMD systems we respond to the specific needs of
the warfighter.
BMDO works closely with the service program executive officers to execute key BMD acquisition
programs and put real capability into the hands of our military forces. ... Using the total fiscal year 1997
dollars allocated to the services and BMDO for BMD programs, you can see that the Army executes
roughly 60 percent of the BMD programs, while BMDO executes 17 percent, the Navy 16 percent, the Air
Force 5 percent and other defense entities 2 percent.
The important lesson to draw from these percentages is that the BMD program is a joint program that
requires well-coordinated management and execution. We strongly benefit from the services' technical
and programmatic expertise. Meanwhile, BMDO ensures that BMD programs are advocated during
budget debates, prevents duplication of BMD program efforts across the services, sponsors joint
development of BMD systems, ensures focus on joint warfighter needs, and concentrates on near-term
acquisition programs while judiciously investing in far-term technologies.
Of special significance, BMDO is responsible for designing the appropriate battle management,
command, control and communications that will ensure BMD systems are fully integrated. I am pleased
to report that this approach to BMD program management has succeeded in combining the strengths of
the services and BMDO, which enable us to develop and acquire improved BMD systems and further
develop critical military technologies.
The TMD program continues to focus on three sequential efforts to bring increasingly capable defenses
to the warfighter.
First, we have completed our near-term improvements to existing air and missile defense systems to
allow them to defend against short-range tactical ballistic missiles. Prime examples of this activity are
deployments of Patriot PAC-2 Guidance Enhanced Missiles and U.S. Marine Corps Hawk upgrades.
Our tests have shown that a modified TPS-59 radar, combined with the Hawk missile system, is effective
against short-range ballistic missiles. Delivery of the upgraded systems to operational Marine Corps units
will continue during this fiscal year. This program delivers a real military capability against the short-range
missile threat for a modest investment.
Last year, we began producing the PAC-2 GEM system for the Army as the principal improvement to our
existing TMD capability until the PAC-3 system begins deployment in fiscal year 1999. The PAC-2 GEM
improvements increase the Patriot's defended area and improves its lethality over its capabilities during
Operation Desert Storm.
The GEM's improved seeker performance allows the interceptor to more precisely locate the target
missile. Meanwhile, a faster-reacting warhead fuze contributes to a more optimal dispersal of warhead
fragments on the target. Just as important, we have deployed significant improvements to our ability to
provide early warning information of ballistic missile launches to U.S. forces overseas.
Last year, the Air Force activated the Attack and Launch Early Reporting to Theater squadron with the
BMDO-developed Talon Shield system at Falcon Air Force Base, Colo.
The Joint Tactical Ground Station, also developed by BMDO, is a complementary tactical mobile DSP
[Defense Support Program] ground station for use in the theater. The Army has deployed two
prototypical units, one in Germany and one in South Korea, to support the warfighter. Five of these units
will be produced and fielded in fiscal years 1996 and 1997.
Following these and other near-term improvements, the department will continue efforts to develop and
acquire a set of core TMD programs. The department's program review established the TMD lower-tier
systems -- the PAC-3 [Patriot Advanced Capability-3] and Navy Area Defense programs -- as the first
priority to ensure we enhance our defensive capabilities against short- to medium-range ballistic missiles
as quickly as possible.
We will do this by building on existing infrastructure and prior investments in ongoing programs,
expanding the capabilities of the Patriot and Aegis/Standard Missile systems, adding funds to deal with
cost increases and development delays, exploring a concept for cooperative development with our allies
for a Medium Extended Air Defense System and improving our Battle Management, Command, Control
and Communicationscapability.
Neither the PAC-3 nor the Navy Area Defense programinvolves show-stopping technical challenges at
this point. Rather, they involve engineering challenges. Nonetheless, the key issue is a matter of
execution of the programs to complete the development and to field these two systems.
Our task is to ensure that we have a robust program to proceed with both these systems and to field this
important capability as early as possible. Therefore, the department increased the investment in PAC-3
and Navy Area Defense to ensure that they are adequately funded to guarantee timely delivery to the
warfighter.
The PAC-3 program was increased by $345 million and the Navy Area Defense program by $196 million
over the Future Years Defense Plan through 1997-2001. These increases will allow us to begin both
PAC-3 deployments and Navy Area Defense User Operational Evaluation System deployments in fiscal
year 1999. The mix of PAC-3 and Navy Area Defense interceptors eventually acquired to perform the
lower-tier mission will depend upon their relative prices, performance and the status of the missile threat.
The PAC-3 system will represent a significant upgrade to an existing air and missile defense system to
specifically handle stressing theater-class ballistic missile threats. The PAC-3 system, using hit-to-kill
interceptors, will be highly lethal against ballistic missiles including those with weapons of mass
destruction.
Improvements to the system will result in increased firepower and lethality, increased battlespace and
range, enhanced battlefield awareness, and improved discrimination performance. These critical
enhancements will be achieved by improvements to the missile as well as the radar and communications
systems. Operational improvements, such as remote launch operations, will also increase the
battlespace and range of the PAC-3 system. These enhancements will mark a substantial improvement
over our Patriot TMD capabilities during Operation Desert Storm.
The PAC-3 program is restructured to reduce program risk, adjust for schedule delays and improve
system performance by extending the engineering and manufacturing development phase of the
program by up to 10 months; rephasing the missile and radar procurement, upgrading four launchers per
battery with Enhanced Launcher Electronics Systems; and extending the battery's remote launch
capability.
The program review also visited the issue of the number of PAC-3 battalions to be fielded. The original
plan was to deploy nine battalions. However, the review decided to field six battalions, while deferring
fully upgrading the three additional battalions pending the completion of the MEADS program
definition/validation phase. PAC-3 low rate initial production will begin the first quarter fiscal year 1998,
with the First Unit Equipped (date planned for the fourth quarter of fiscal year 1999.
As the committee is aware, BMDO and the Navy have been working cooperatively to develop an
enhancement to the Aegis/Standard Missile air defense system to provide a tactical ballistic missile
defense capability from the sea that is comparable to the defense provided by PAC-3. This represents a
critical TMD capability that can take advantage of the strength and presence of our naval forces and build
upon the existing Aegis/Standard missile infrastructure.
Naval vessels that are routinely deployed worldwide are currently in potential threat areas or can be
rapidly redirected or repositioned. A naval TMD capability can be in place within a region of conflict to
provide TMD protection for land-based assets before hostilities erupt or before land-based defenses can
be transported into the theater. Our Navy Area Defense program focuses on modifications to enable
tactical ballistic missile detection, tracking and engagement with a modified Standard Missile 2, Block IV.
We will use the $45 million added by Congress in the fiscal year 1996 Defense Authorization and
Appropriations bills to compensate for system engineering and design efforts not fully funded in fiscal
year 1995. The program review added $186 million to Navy Area Defense through the FYDP in order to
make it fully executable on a moderate risk profile. These funds will cover delays in risk reduction flights
and adjusted cost estimates for test targets and lethality efforts. In turn,this will minimize the delays in the
EMD program and LRIP missile procurement.
Our plan is to field a UOES capability in fiscal year 1999 and an FUE in fiscal year 2001. Thereafter,
operational units will use the legacy UOES system for continued testing and as a contingency warfighting
capability.
Theater High-Altitude Area Defense is the more mature upper-tier system. During the program review,
the THAAD program was adjusted to maintain track on an early deployment of a UOES capability before
the end of the decade.
Prior to the program review, its funding profile was on the order of about $700 million per year. However,
it adjusted the program significantly, making outyear adjustments to our investment in the program.
The department decided to keep the UOES portion of the program on track, which will entail fielding
about 40 THAAD missiles and the GBR [ground based radar] by fiscal year 1999. However, the program
review restructured the rest of the program for the objective THAAD system, taking about $1.9 billion out
of the $4.7 billion that was programed through the FYDP.
The THAAD system is the only core TMD system capable of engaging the full spectrum of theater-class
ballistic missile threats. The THAAD system provides extended coverage for a greater diversity and
dispersion of forces or the capability to protect population centers. But the principal additional capability
provided by this important system is the ability to deal with longer-range theater missile threats as they
begin to evolve and emerge over time.
Using THAAD as an overlay also reduces the number of missiles that the lower-tier systems must
engage. The THAAD system will provide a unique capability for wide-area defense against tactical
ballistic missiles at higher altitudes and more attempted intercepts at longer ranges (a shoot-look-shoot
capability) with a lethal hit-to-kill interceptor. This is a mission the PAC-3 and Navy Area Defense
systems cannot perform, The THAAD system consists of the TMD Ground-based Radar surveillance and
tracking sensor, interceptors, launchers and BMC3.
The initial deployment will be with what the department calls a UOES plus system, essentially an
enhanced version of the UOES system, in lieu of the previously planned full capability objective system.
This improved UOES capability will meet the most critical THAAD requirements. It will concentrate on
militarizing the UOES design and upgrading certain components, such as the infrared seeker, radar
upgrades and BMC3 improvements. The resulting THAAD program delays the production ramp-up and
the FUE by over two years.
In fiscal year 1997, the THAAD program will conclude its demonstration/validation flight tests. These
tests are designed to resolve technical issues and demonstrate the system's capabilities. So far, BMDO
and the Army have conducted four flight tests. The next flight test, which will attempt an intercept of a
theater-class ballistic missile target, is scheduled to take place within the next few days.
The Navy Theaterwide system will bring a new, complementary capability to our other core programs by
providing ascent phase coverage where the mobility of Aegis ships allows such coverage. In addition, the
system will add the same kind of terminal coverage capability as the THAAD system, providing
long-range coverage and wide-area protection. As in the case with the lower-tier Navy Area Defense
system, the Navy Theaterwide system will operate free of sovereignty or host nation support issues, free
to be deployed instantly whenever our national interest requires.
The Navy Theaterwide system is the least mature of all our systems, not only of the upper-tier, but all the
TMD systems taken together. Prior to the department's review, we were proposing funding this program
in our fiscal year 1996 and 1997 budgets at a very low level to mature the key enabling technologies.
This was at a level of about $30 million per year. During the review, however, Congress authorized and
appropriated a substantial increase -- $170 million -- to this program.
The program review decided to spend all the appropriated funds for fiscal year 1996 over two years and
not begin a full commitment to the Navy Theaterwide program at this time. A more deliberate pace was
selected, which will allow us to proceed to a system-level intercept flight test using a combination of the
Aegis weapon system, the Standard missile and a kinetic kill intercept vehicle.
In parallel, the program is structured to conduct concept definition studies to determine what is the best
configuration with which to proceed. There is much synergism among the technologies needed for a
robust Navy Theaterwide system, including seeker technologies being developed in the National Missile
Defense program.
The program review determined that the posture for this program is to conduct a technology
demonstration, leveraging maturing technologies and complete a concept definition study to confirm the
interceptor configuration for the system. In order to accomplish this program approach, the department
made a substantial increase to the funding profile. While starting out at a slow pace, we will add about
$600 million through the FYDP to ramp up to a significant annual investment in Navy Theater-Wide.
We will continue developing the MEADS system during fiscal year 1997. This system is different from the
other lower-tier missile defense systems we are planning to deploy.
For example, while the PAC-3 system is oriented in a particular threat direction, MEADS provides 360
degrees of coverage. It will be a highly mobile system and designed to be deployed with our forward and
maneuvering forces. In this regard, MEADS is designed to respond to an important operational
requirement by providing protection for the combat maneuver force against shorter-range theater-class
ballistic missiles, advanced cruise missiles and other air-breathing threats as well.
This system will replace Hawk and also would ultimately replace the Patriot system. As I noted earlier,
the department is deferring fully upgrading three Patriot battalions pending a decision on development
and deployment of MEADS.
Later this month, the U.S., France, Germany and Italy will sign a memorandum of understanding to
proceed jointly to develop the MEADS system. MEADS consolidates and harmonizes the efforts of NATO
allies who had contemplated country-unique systems, such as the TLVS in Germany, Aster/Arabel in
France and Italy, and Corps SAM [surface-to-air missile] for the U.S.
The agreement to pursue MEADS represents not only a new path for trans-Atlantic armaments
cooperation, but also a growing recognition of the risks to alliance security posed by the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. The cost share for the MEADS program
throughout the Program Definition and Validation phase (the U.S. equivalent of demonstration/validation)
is 50/20/20/10 among the U.S., France, Germany, and Italy, respectively.
The department added $85 million over the FYDP to fund the U.S. share of the cooperative PDV phase,
which concludes in fiscal year 1999. This increase brings our funding to a rate of about $30 million per
year and fulfills our international commitments at this time. We must make a decision by fiscal year 1998
on the program's future direction.
Two U.S. companies, Lockheed Martin and a joint venture between Hughes Aircraft and Raytheon, have
joined with their European counterparts (Daimler-Benz Aerospace and Siemens from Germany,
Aerospatiale and Thompson from France, and Alenia from Italy) to form two international teams that will
execute the PDV phase of the program. A single international team will be chosen to pursue design and
development (EMD in the U.S.), with an in-service date scheduled for about 2005.
Joint TMD activities represent programs and tasks that are vital to the execution of joint BMD programs.
These activities have been grouped together because they provide direct support across BMD
acquisition programs which could not be executed without this important support. Therefore, we
introduce greater efficiency into the programs because they accomplish an effort once which otherwise
would have to be separately accomplished for each service element.
These activities include architecture development and battle management, command, control,
communications and intelligence; test and evaluation support, including the development and fabrication
of targets, threat analysis and support; model and simulation support; lethality and phenomenology
studies and analysis; and direct interface with the warfighter.
Unfortunately, we did not adequately explain the importance of this key program element last year and
sustained a significant and painful reduction to its budget. This significantly reduced our ability to support
the core TMD acquisition programs. In some instances, critical target development and lethality analysis
had to be funded by the core programs themselves. These unexpected expenditures contributed to some
of the executability issues identified by the BMD program review.
Therefore, I would like to outline just a few critical activities that are funded in the Joint TMD account.
Interoperability in BMC3I is essential for joint TMD operations. Accordingly, BMDO takes an aggressive
lead to establish an architecture that all the services can build upon and is actively pursuing three thrusts
to ensure an effective and joint BMC3I for TMD.
The three thrusts are improving early warning and dissemination, ensuring communications
interoperability and upgrading command and control centers for TMD functions. The primary goal is to
provide the warfighter with an integrated TMD capability by building in the interoperability and flexibility to
satisfy a wide range of threats and scenarios.
From its joint perspective, BMDO oversees the various independent weapon systems developments and
provides guidance, standards, equipment and system integration and analysis to integrate the multitude
of sensors, interceptors and tactical command centers into a joint theaterwide TMD architecture.
While this may not seem to be as exciting as building improved TMD interceptors, it is absolutely critical
to the success of the U.S. TMD system. It is the glue that holds the architecture together and will ensure
that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.
In addition to BMC3I, the other activities in this program element strongly support the TMD system and
key acquisition programs. For example, BMDO test and evaluation responsibilities include oversight of
major defense acquisition program testing, sponsoring and conducting TMD family of systems integration
and interoperability tests, development of common targets and providing for range and ground tests.
My organization sponsors and conducts system integration tests to ensure inter- and intraservice
operability and interoperability of the TMD family of systems with external systems. In addition, this
program element funds a critical series of interactions with the warfighting CinCs. The CinC's TMD
assessment program consists of operational exercises, wargames, and Warfare Analysis Laboratory
exercises. Our WALEX programs, for instance, allow senior military leadership insights into TMD
operational planning and employment.
The CinC TMD assessments program enhances two-way communication between BMDO as the
developer and the warfighting CinCs who are the users of TMD systems. These exercises allow the
CinCs to assess their TMD capabilities and shortfalls so they may refine and articulate their TMD
requirements, and improve their current and future TMD operational capabilities.
The program facilitates the development and refinement of TMD doctrine and concepts of operations as
part of the CinC's and Joint Staff's overall theater operations plans. We need to fully fund this important
program element if we are to deliver on our promise of improved TMD systems to the warfighter.
Israel has been involved in U.S. missile defense programs since 1987, when both countries signed a
memorandum of understanding on BMD participation. Israel's participation includes architecture studies,
technology development and experiments, examination of boost-phase intercept concepts and the
development of the Arrow interceptor missile.
As the secretary of defense has noted recently, the Arrow program advances our shared objective of
working together to develop effective ways to counter the threat posed by ballistic missiles in the Middle
East and elsewhere. An agreement with the Israeli Ministry of Defense to continue involvement in the
development of the Arrow weapon system will be ready for signature between both our countries in the
near future.
The Arrow Deployability Program, as it is called, involves a total commitment of $500 million over the
next five years, with $300 million contributed by Israel and $200 million from the United States. This will
allow for the integration of the jointly developed Arrow interceptor with the Israeli-developed fire control
radar, launch control center and battle management center. I am particularly pleased to report that on
Feb. 20, the Arrow II missile completed its second successful flight test, which will lead soon to the
intercept of a target tactical ballistic missile.
System integration efforts will lead to a UOES-like Arrow system projected for fielding in fiscal year 1998.
The U.S. continues to derive valuable data and experience through our participation in the Arrow
program. In particular, we are gaining important experience in establishing interoperability with U.S. TMD
systems and the Arrow weapon system.
The agreement we have on participation in the Arrow program will be revisited in three years to evaluate
the synergies between Arrow and U.S. TMD programs and to ensure that worthwhile benefits continue to
flow to the U.S. programs. It is important to note that this cooperative program is also funded within the
Joint TMD program element.
Many TMD sensors, BMC3 and weapons also have an effective capability to counter the growing
land-attack cruise missile threat. In particular, the lower-tier PAC-3, Navy Area Defense and MEADS
systems operate in the same battlespace and will have significant capability against the cruise missile
threat. In addition, the NMD BMC3 architecture will be designed to promote interoperability and evolution
to a common BMC3 system for ballistic and cruise missile defense.
The department also has a number of initiatives outside the BMD program to improve the ability of U.S.
forces to detect and defeat cruise missiles in theater or launched against the United States. These
initiatives include advanced technology sensors to detect low observable cruise missiles, upgrades to
existing airborne platforms to improve beyond the horizon detection capability against cruise missiles,
and upgrades to existing missile interceptor systems.
The department's NMD goal is to position the U.S. to effectively respond to a strategic ballistic missile
threat as it emerges. Based upon the program review, the NMD effort has been shifted from a technology
readiness to a deployment readiness program.
Following the 1993 Bottom-up Review, the NMD program focused on maturing the most challenging
technical elements -- often called the long poles -- of the NMD system. The department is sensitive to
congressional interest in a shift to a more system-oriented approach which would provide for the
balanced development of all elements necessary for the initial deployment. We are focusing our efforts
on a program that is referred to as "three-plus-three" -- a three-year development and planning phase,
which, if necessary, could be followed by a three-year system acquisition and deployment phase.
The department is committed to the development phase -- or the first three years -- of this
three-plus-three program. During this period, BMDO and the services will develop and begin testing the
elements of an initial NMD system. If at the end of those three years of NMD development efforts, the
ballistic missile threat to the United States warrants the deployment of an NMD system, then in another
three years that system could be deployed. Based on this program an initial operational capability could
be achieved in approximately six years, by the year 2003.
If, on the other hand, we reach 1999 and the threat does not warrant deployment of an NMD system, the
department's three-plus-three program is designed to preserve the capability to deploy an NMD system
within three years by continuing development of the system elements and conducting a series of
integrated tests. Over time, these efforts would allow us to enhance both the technology base and the
demonstrated systems performance. Therefore, we can make a more informed deployment decision and
when the threat materializes, be in a position to deploy a more capable NMD system.
The system capability would grow through three avenues: incorporating advanced technology, increasing
element performance and adding additional elements. We would continue to improve system
effectiveness by incorporating advanced technologies as they mature in our technology base program.
As we continue to test, we will identify and incorporate improved components to the system elements,
such as improving the kill vehicle, enhancing its lethality or refining the system software. When
appropriate, we will add additional elements to the defense. For example, the Space and Missile
Tracking System, which is being developed separately by the U.S. Air Force, would be integrated into our
proposed architecture as soon as it was available to enhance overam NMD performance.
As I testified last year, the SMTS system provides a vital role for both NMD and TMD systems. The
low-earth orbit SMTS is an integral part of a potential deployment of an objective NMD system. While we
are enhancing the NMD system's capability, we will address production and deployment lead time issues
to reduce the time required to field the system when a deployment decision is made.
Funding for NMD has been shifted forward in the FYDP with allocations of about an additional $100
million per year in fiscal years 1997 and 1998. This increase, coupled with the additional funds provided
by Congress for NMD in fiscal year 1996, will allow us to complete a reasonable, albeit high-risk,
development program leading to the demonstration of the NMD system in an Integrated System Test in
1999.
The NMD system we will demonstrate in 1999 includes four fundamental building blocks used by all of
the proposed NMD architectures: the interceptor; ground-based radar; upgraded early warning sensors;
and battle management, command, control and communications . Depending on the threat to which we
are responding when a deployment is required, these elements could be combined in a treaty-compliant
deployment or some other architecture. The ground-based interceptor is the weapon element of NMD. It
consists of an exoatmospheric kill vehicle (launched by a fixed, land-based booster. We have made
significant progress over the past few years to develop an EKV which can perform hit-to-kill intercepts of
strategic re-entry vehicles in the midcourse phase of their trajectory.
Rockwell and Hughes are under contract to develop and test competing EKV designs, which will be
evaluated in a series of flights starting later this year. Following intercept flights in 1998, a single
contractor will be selected for the initial system. The EKV flights, which start this year, will be conducted
using the payload launch vehicle as a surrogate for a dedicated booster. Several options are being
examined for the GBI booster, including Minuteman III and other modified, off-the-shelf boosters.
The NMD ground-based radar is an X-band, phased-array radar that leverages heavily off developments
achieved by the THAAD GBR program. By taking advantage of the work already completed in the TMD
arena, BMDO has been able to reduce the expected development cost of the GBR by approximately $70
million. In 1998, the GBR prototype, developed by Raytheon, will be fabricated at the U.S. Kwajalein Atoll
to begin testing to resolve critical issues related to discrimination, target object map, kill assessment and
electromechanical scan.
The Upgraded Early Warning Radar program is designed to answer fundamental questions concerning
how UEWRs can contribute to national missile defense while completing the initial development. We
have already completed two years of successful demonstrations, showing how software modifications
can increase the radars' detection range, sensitivity and accuracy. Our plan is to award a contract in early
1997 for the design and test of a software demonstrator. This tool will be used to prepare specifications
for the early warning radars' upgrades necessary if there is a decision to deploy an NMD system before
SMTS is available.
The National Missile Defense Battle Management, Command, Control and Communications program
provides the capability for the designated operational commander to plan, coordinate, direct and control
NMD weapons and sensors. The NMD
BMC3 development program uses an open system architecture and the best industry practices for
development of software that will have the capability to support NMD integrated ground and flight tests.
The BMC3 product, which will include cruise missile defense consideration, leverages off previous NMD
developments and the BMC3 systems being developed for the TMD program.
Over the FYDP, the department has budgeted those funds required for a deployment readiness effort, or
roughly $2.8 billion. Deployment of an initial system would cost approximately $5 billion more. Our
analysis shows that such a deployment would provide an effective defense against first-generation rogue
ballistic missile threats to the U.S. The intrinsic strength of our concept for an initial deployment is that the
architecture has been specifically designed for evolutionary development of a more robust and effective
NMD system over time; it can grow to counter an increasingly sophisticated threat, if required.
As I mentioned earlier, one of the significant enhancements to the NMD system will occur when the
SMTS becomes available. This system, funded and developed as part of the Space-based Infrared
System program, provides 360-degree over-the-horizon sensing throughout the threat trajectory, which
greatly increases the system performance against all of the potential threats.
The NMD development program we are planning will continue to comply with all treaty obligations. As the
three-plus-three NMD program progresses, we will study many different technologies and architectures.
We will review these options from every perspective including cost, operational effectiveness and
existing treaty obligations.
The three-plus-three concept I have described for NMD has its genesis in last year's efforts by the BMDO
Tiger Team, which investigated how we could accelerate the development and deployment of an NMD
system to respond to more rapidly emerging threats to the United States.
The Tiger Team, estimating time scales of approximately four years to deployment, described several
opportunities and the associated challenges to deploy an interim NMD capability to deal with rudimentary
Third World threats to U.S. territory. In this regard, the BMDO Tiger Team was an important and valuable
endeavor. Nonetheless, it is important to note that the opportunities they described are "off ramps" from
efforts to develop and deploy an objective and highly capable NMD system, and if not carefully evaluated,
could become technological cul de sacs.
Simply put, near-term options might not field an initial system that could be evolved to a more effective
defense. The tradeoff we must consider is between earlier deployment of a less capable system or later
deployments of increasingly effective defenses for the U.S. homeland. Our three-plus-three approach is
designed to provide an early deployment opportunity which can evolve robustly with the threat and
operational needs.
As I mentioned earlier and as a byproduct of the Tiger Team exercise, both the Air Force and Army
provided their recommendations on how to develop and deploy an NMD system. The Air Force and Army,
in particular, have proposed alternatives which are very similar to, and with immediate commitment to
deployment could allow earlier maturation than, the department's three-plus-three program.
In either case, a minimum of approximately four years to a capability was estimated. Consideration of
such alternatives to the three-plus-three program has strengthened the commitment to deployment
readiness within the department. When it literally could come down to the effective defense of the nation
against an accidental, unauthorized or limited ballistic missile attack, it is critical for us to fully assess all
the options before us. The Army, Navy and Air Force remain critical members of our team and are
vigorously and efficiently developing those portions of our three-plus-three architecture to which they are
assigned.
The Army and Air Force proposals are very similar to BMDO's plans in that they use the same
fundamental building blocks: ground-based interceptors, ground-based radars, upgraded early warning
radars and BMC3. The differences come in the specific design of these elements and the way they are
eventually combined architecturally.
The Air Force's proposal is based on the belief that significant benefits can be achieved by leveraging off
the deployed Minuteman III infrastructure. They propose using the Minuteman III booster to launch the
kill vehicle, which could be either the EKV already described or a somewhat simpler kill vehicle which
could be developed by the Air Force. The Minuteman III concept would allow the use of existing launch
silos and some of the existing BMC3 network, potentially reducing the total cost. To provide the
necessary sensor data, the Air Force proposes to augment the coverage provided by upgraded early
warning radars.
The Army suggests a commercial booster developed by combining existing off-the-shelf booster stages
to launch the EKV. These interceptors would be deployed in the existing silos of the old Safeguard
complex near Grand Forks, N.D. In order to enhance radar coverage, the Army proposes also to
augment early warning radars and recommends using technology from the GBR.
Each of these architectures has merit, but they also have potential shortcomings. Early deployment
options are capable of defending against only the most simple ballistic missile threats -- that is, a few
warheads atop first-generation ICBMs. BMDO and CinCSPACE [U.S. Space Command] are engaged in
the assessment of the existing and future threats, as defined in the National Intelligence Estimate and the
NMD Threat Assessment Report.
The joint endeavor with CinCSPACE includes an aggressive effort to specify the operational
requirements, including effectiveness and coverage, and evaluate them against architectural options and
system-level developmental requirements. Two major efforts for this evaluation include active command
and control simulations, which combine architectural options, specific threats and concepts of operations
in a simulated real-world environment; and a cooperative effort in the development of the battle
management and command, control and communications element. The NMD architecture will be
specifically tailored to meet the current and emerging threats.
In addition to such operational concerns, alternative architectures still need to be reviewed from the
perspective of our treaty obligations. For instance, the proposals call for the use of additional early
warning radars. One alternative also would use existing Minuteman III assets (including silos) as the
boosters for the NMD kill vehicles. This raises both ABM [anti-ballistic missile] and START [Strategic
Arms Reduction Talks] treaty issues.
I think it is important for the Congress to be aware of these and other potential architectures, including
both operational concepts and arms control impacts when considering these alternative architectures.
While I acknowledge that there are potential limitations, I still believe there is strong merit to considering
them.
If we identify an emerging ballistic missile threat to the U.S., I would like to have the best possible
deployment options available to the president and Congress. I want to reiterate when we address the
defense of the American people against even a rudimentary Third World ballistic missile threat, I want to
make sure we have every feasible opportunity to effectively defeat that threat as soon as possible.
I strongly endorse staying the course with the department's current NMD strategy, while continuing to
protect our earlier deployment options. I think it is the prudent course of action. Following three more
years of system development, we will reach the point where a low-risk decision could be made to deploy
an NMD system, if the threat warrants. If not, we will be prepared to continue development of a system
that could still be deployed quickly in response to a threat but would ensure a more effective defensive
system.
The three-plus-three program is designed with the flexibility to allow it to be accelerated if the threat
warrants and additional resources are applied. As it is currently structured, it provides the capability to
deploy with an IOC [initial operational capability] in 2003, the date Congress desired. At this time, the
specific deployment architecture is not an issue which must be decided. What is needed is program
stability.
Completing definition of a system of this complexity in three years is a challenge. We cannot afford to
keep starting over to develop something new. I urge you to accept our program and to provide mfficient
resources to complete the deployment readiness phase of the three-plus-three program. Then, if it is
necessary, we will be prepared to defend all of America against limited missile attacks by 2003.
As we move forward with our acquisition programs, the programmatic demands on our BMD resources
have continued and the number of congressional earmarks has risen. I am concerned that because of
this we have been forced to reduce our technology program. I would like to remind the committee that
today's acquisition programs are possible only because significant past investments in BMD technology
made them possible.
For instance, development of the hit-to-kill interceptor technology, now adopted by PAC-3 and THAAD,
evolved from the SDIO's [Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, BMDO's predecessor] Flexible
Lightweight Agile Guidance Experiment technology demonstration program in the mid-1980s.
Technologies making the infrared sensors and data processors possible for the upcoming SMTS satellite
system have been developed over the past decade through BMDO-sponsored research and
development. That includes infrared detectors, cryogenic coolers, optical hardware and
radiation-hardened microelectronics.
Just as these past technology investments helped enable current TMD acquisition programs, today's
technology investments will prepare us for evolving, proliferating threats. Evolving threats, based on
reasonable extrapolations of credible countermeasures, set the pace and direction of today's advanced
technology program. As a result, next generation TMD and NMD systems will be able to draw from a set
of readily available technology solutions.
We have organized the technology program to balance across several variables, including TMD and
NMD applications, and technology development and demonstrations. In this regard, we have identified
the most critical technology requirements for the program and are pursuing them within the constraints of
the funding available for the technology program. These unique technology requirements include:

Sensor and seeker component programs to improve the range and resolution of missile defense
sensor systems and interceptor seekers;

Interceptor component programs to develop faster, smarter, more capable interceptors;

BMC3 high-data and low-error advanced component technologies needed in automated
decision aids, data fusion, adaptive defense operations and secure communications;

Phenomenological research to determine how the threat, environment and defensive systems
will behave and interact during an engagement; and

Research into advanced concepts, such as directed energy systems, that are capable of global
coverage (i.e., accomplishing both national and multiple-theater missile defense missions) and
that can engage targets in the boost-phase.
I believe that proper development of technologies to meet these critical requirements is essential to
maintaining our program's technological edge. Nowhere else in the department are the basic or
component BMD technology programs funded.
Therefore, to ensure the continued flow of new solutions to meet evolving ballistic missile defense
requirements and technology needs, I encourage the Congress to consider the BMD advanced
technology program as a strategic investment. I will make sure the technology program maintains a clear
focus and that its products remain relevant to the BMD mission and are of high quality. I believe this
investment is critical to the continued success and viability of our BMD program.
The BMD program today is a focused, prudent response to the real world. We are aggressively working
to meet existing and emerging ballistic missile threats, first to our forces overseas, as well as our friends
and allies, and secondly, the emerging missile threat to the United States.
I am dedicated to ensuring that we field improved TMD systems as soon as possible to provide real
protection for our men and women as they go into battle to defend our national security interests. I
believe we have made strong progress in developing and acquiring these improved systems.
I am particularly proud that the lower-tier TMD systems will very soon be in the hands of the warfighter.
We have made this progress because of the strong and enduring executive-legislative consensus on
theater missile defenses. This consensus is directly responsible for ensuring consistent program
direction and the stable allocation of resources to get the job done. This support must continue if we are
to deliver on our collective promise to give the warfighter the protection he needs in a world with
proliferating missile threats.
As I have testified today, the department has structured a deployment readiness program for NMD that is
prudent and flexible. That program acknowledges that some potentially adversarial nations are interested
in developing longer range ballistic missiles which could strike the United States.
The three-plus-three program could deploy an effective nationwide NMD system against a
first-generation Third World threat by the year 2003. However, if that threat develops sooner, we have
options which could deploy an emergency NMD system at an earlier date.
Given the uncertainty of the ballistic missile threat to the U.S., it is prudent for the department to proceed
with the three-plus-three program. However, I think it is critical that we work closely together on a
bipartisan basis to form the consensus for NMD that the TMD program has long enjoyed. Such a course
is required if we are to succeed in maintaining program stability and coherence. The success of NMD
depends on our ability to reach this consensus. ...
Setting a Standard of Stewardship
Prepared remarks of John P. White, deputy secretary of defense, to the Restoration Advisory Board,
Naval Air Station Patuxent River, Md., March 11, 1996.
Good afternoon ladies and gentlemen. It's nice to be here on this beautiful day on this really pretty
base. ... It is also nice to be at a place where you are doing such a good job of BRAC [base realignment
and closure]. BRAC is a hard process for everyone involved. It causes a lot of disruption to communities,
to the people and their families. But it's something that's necessary given where we are in the department,
so I want to congratulate you on really managing what is always a difficult process and doing it with a
human touch.
The real reason I'm here, of course, is to recognize and pay tribute to you as a facility in terms of what
you've been doing with the environment. As you know, the administration -- the president and the
secretary -- are committed to making environmental improvements. We take what chance we can to
come to a place like this with a real success story so we can point out to people what really can be done
with the proper leadership and also with the proper cooperation between the military and the local
community, which I know here is terrific.
Three weeks ago, I signed the first-ever DoD directive for establishing a comprehensive policy on
environmental security. We did that to ensure that we would incorporate environmental factors into all our
decision-making processes to make sure that when we make decisions, which are obviously based on
national security interests, that we don't forget the environment. And the Pax River, of course, is a real
role model for other facilities in terms of recognizing the leadership that can be displayed in the
environment while satisfying your overall mission.
You are a DoD leader in terms of the Chesapeake Bay -- ... a great many projects under way here and ...
pages of awards going back to the early '80s, I think, or maybe the late '70s. And in 1995, you won the
Secretary of Defense National Resource Conservation Award. Of course, it's been on CBS News
because of your leadership in this area. So it is really quite a great example for the Navy and for other
Navy communities.
My major responsibility can be put into three different areas: readiness and most importantly readiness;
secondly, quality of life -- making sure that all of our folks in the military and civilian people committed to
the Department of Defense have what they need and have the opportunities that they deserve; and third,
equally important, is modernization. That is, making sure that going into the future we are providing the
capabilities that are needed and the resources that are needed in order to modernize our forces and be
assured that in the next century we continue to have a very strong military.
We do try to take care of these three fundamental, overarching efforts with the environment in mind, and I
think it's very important that we do so. With respect to readiness, for example, we are dedicated to the
principle that while we need the facilities that we have, and the land and sea and air that we use for our
training, that we, in fact, do so as a steward and complement our training in a way to make sure that it is
environmentally friendly.
The DoD has responsibility for some 25 million acres of diverse public land, and we need to make sure
as we use that land for training that in fact we take care of the environment at the same time....
When we were coming down and getting ready for this, we were talking about what it is we are doing, and
I was shown this piece of plastic -- this is from shipboard. As many of you know, in the old days aboard a
ship what you did is throw it over the side. We don't do that anymore. Things that are not degradable, we
bring back. This is a representation of items that are brought back, recycled, made into basic plastic and
then sold again and used for park benches or whatever, so that, in fact, we can reuse the plastic that we
used at sea. So, it's very, very important -- also very hard. So that's one example.
Let me give you another example of a different sort. We have to use sand to clean off paint -- off ships
and aircraft and so on. We now use plastic. This is plastic that can be used in order to take the paint off
and then can be scooped up and reused so that rather than have a runoff of a lot of sand and damage to
the environment, we've done something smart in terms of making sure that we have something that's
reusable. ... is cheaper and more efficient.
We're also substituting citrus-based cleaners for solvents -- lemon juice, I'm told, in that case. It makes
you think when you drink your orange juice in the morning whether or not you're getting a little extra
cleansing as well. We were worried about the same sorts of issues as we clean engine parts, for example,
to make sure that we separate the petroleum from the water so that it can be collected and not seep into
the ground.
We're using substitutes for the hard cleaners we used to use, to make sure that it's safer and cheaper.
And we're finding that through this resource management, of course, that, in fact, it does not impede our
readiness. In fact, in some ways it enhances our readiness and makes sure that we're being responsible
at the same time.
That's also true with respect to quality of life. Quality of life for us means making sure in the long run that
all our people have what they want. And we often talk about that in terms of direct compensation or in
terms of housing or in terms of medical support and so on. One critical part of that is making sure that our
people live in safe and hospitable environments, and that means we have to pay attention and do what
has to be done to see that is, in fact, the case. So there's another very important aspect of what it is we're
doing.
It's also reflected in the relationship we have to have with our communities. If we don't have a good
relationship with the communities -- in many dimensions -- then we are not successful in terms of our
overall mission. And in that case, ... we need to -- as we've shown here today with your Resource
Advisory Board -- ... have a working relationship with people from the community who are committed to
the environment; who recognize the military as a partner. And together we can improve what we're doing
and expand our capabilities.
In this regard, last week, the DoD became the first federal agency to release its annual toxics release
inventory. This provides ... us ... an identification of the toxic materials that we're using. It's part of the
program that was talked about earlier. It provides the community with information on what we're doing. It
has a certain standard in terms of making sure that we improve over time and are up-front in terms of
these issues. We, of course, also do substantial recycling.
Finally, with respect to the future, as we acquire new systems, we are also particularly sensitive to the
fact that we need to be environmentally responsible. We've adapted a commercial standard -- the
National Aerospace Standard 411 -- to reduce or eliminate hazardous waste.
There was no government standard, so we decided that we would step up and accept the commercial
standard. This gives contractors a framework for identifying, managing and minimizing or eliminating
hazardous waste materials as they develop our equipment and capabilities.
In the old days, for example, on a C-5, we would have used as many as 3,000 ozone-depleting chemicals.
On the new weapons system, the F-22, we used one. And so we've made great strides, and people are
very proud of that success. That example has been mentioned to me several times over the last year as
people have pointed out the kinds of activities that are important to us. In fact, one of our facilities in
Louisville (Ky.) won a national award -- of a joint project from the Ford Foundation and Harvard -- as an
innovator on just these kinds of ozone-depleting chemicals this last year, which was presented by Vice
President Gore.
So in summary, we think our environmental security program is part-in-parcel, hand-in-hand with our
overall efforts with respect to readiness, quality of life and force modernization. We're committed to
preventing pollution; to being innovative in the way we utilize technologies; to complying with all federal
laws and regulations; to conserving natural and cultural resources; to cleaning up toxic waste; to being a
good partner with our communities and, therefore, being a leader in terms of environmental issues on
into the future. ...
Quality People: Lifeblood of a Quality Force
Prepared statement of Fred Pang, assistant secretary of defense for force management policy, to the
Personnel Subcommittee, Senate Armed Services Committee, March 20, 1996.
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee. I welcome the opportunity to appear before you today
along with the personnel chiefs of the services to testify on issues relating to manpower, personnel and
compensation of our armed forces.
It is truly a privilege to be a member our national security team at this period in our history. It is hard to
think of a time when there was so much to be optimistic about in our business.


We have a high quality, experienced and diverse military force.
The senior civilian and military leadership have developed an excellent working relationship and
enjoy great mutual respect.

Our commander in chief has used diplomacy and the judicious use of military power to help
bring peace to many parts of the world and to raise America's influence and respect to new
highs.


Through careful attention, we have maintained superior readiness in the force.
We are nearing the conclusion of a remarkably successful drawdown of our forces, which two
administrations, the military leadership and the Congress worked so hard to achieve. Our
recruiting has remained strong through a difficult period, and signs for the future are hopeful.

And, Mr. Chairman, it seems everyone has come to know what this committee has known for a
long time: that people are the foundation of military readiness, and as a result, we have
embarked on an ambitious program to support the quality of life of our service members.
So while I recognize there are difficult problems to be solved, I come to you enthusiastic about where we
are today and optimistic about our ability to meet the challenges ahead of us.
I would like to talk to you now about the mission which Secretary [of Defense William J.] Perry has laid
out for the Defense Department.
He has set a four-part challenge for the coming year: Keep our forces ready; modernize to maintain
technological superiority; improve our ability to conduct joint operations; and improve the efficiency and
effectiveness of the way the department does business.
The secretary has further divided our readiness mission into three parts:

Near-term readiness, which requires adequate operation and maintenance funding and a robust
level of realistic training;

Medium-term readiness, which requires a stable force and support for military quality of life; and

Long-term readiness, which will depend on modernization and innovation in technologies,
operations and organization.
In force management policy, our focus is on meeting the challenge of medium-term readiness -- bringing
stability to the force and implementing the secretary's ambitious quality of life initiative.
Our downsizing of the active component is now over 90 percent complete. The reductions we are
implementing in fiscal year 1996 will essentially complete the drawdown of our active forces. I can report
that despite the unprecedented challenge of shrinking an all-volunteer force, we continue to meet or
exceed our national security objectives with respect to the size and capabilities of the armed forces.
Because the military leaders were skillful in executing this drawdown, our force today is more
experienced, of higher quality, more diverse and with the right mix of skills to meet current and future
challenges.
As the Department of Defense reaches the end of the drawdown, it has become increasingly important to
examine the factors necessary to sustain the quality and commitment of the men and women who will
make up the force of the future. The department must ensure it is positioned to provide for the basic
needs of service members and military families. This means attending to basics like compensation,
housing and health care, as well as providing opportunity for physical, mental and spiritual development.
The department has designed quality of life programs to meet future needs, as well as to address present
conditions.
For the 1.5 million men and women on active duty, this administration has established and funded an
extraordinary initiative, first outlined by Secretary Perry in 1994, to support them and their families. It
began with President Clinton and Secretary Perry's determination to spend the $7.7 billion necessary to
see that service members get the maximum pay raise allowed by law through the end of the decade -- an
unprecedented commitment.
Additionally, Secretary Perry's quality of life initiative committed $2.7 billion over fiscal years 1996-01 to
improve housing, expand child care, supplement the income of service members assigned to high-cost
areas in the United States, narrow the housing cost gap, improve morale and recreation services and
provide other benefits for the members and their families.
Mr. Chairman, our goal in everything we do is to maintain a ready fighting force, support service
members and make service in the armed forces an attractive and satisfying career. We are successful
when the force is ready and the soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines in the field and in the fleet feel that
we are keeping the promises we made to them when they signed on.
Now I would like to review the specifics of our plans and programs for fiscal year 1997.
Recruiting. A key component of readiness is a steady flow of high-quality recruits. Each service must
enlist enough people each year to provide a flow of qualified volunteers from which the seasoned leaders
of the future will be selected.
DoD must recruit about 200,000 young people annually to join the full-time, active duty armed forces and
approximately 150,000 for the Selected Reserve. We estimate that our goal for nonprior service
accessions for the active force will increase by more than 15 percent from current levels over the next
three years.
Because recruiting is vital to readiness, the senior panel on recruiting was established in April 1994 to
provide oversight of recruiting status at the highest levels of the department. The deputy secretary of
defense chairs this panel and convenes it on a regular basis. Membership includes the secretaries of the
military departments and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This group is able to deal quickly and
effectively with emerging problems.
In the last two years, DoD has done well in attracting high-quality recruits. For example, more than 95
percent of all active duty recruits held a high school diploma, while only about 75 percent of American
youth ages 18 to 23 have that credential.
In addition, over 70 percent of new recruits scored above average on the enlistment test, compared to 50
percent of the total youth population. Higher levels of recruit quality serve to reduce attrition while
increasing hands-on job performance -- and that means dedication and productivity, which are essential
to unit performance and readiness.
There is a clear relationship between the amount of money spent for recruiting and the quality of new
recruits. We will continue to monitor trends to ensure we have adequate resources to sustain a diverse,
high quality military force that is ready and able to respond to the nation's defense needs.
For the next several years, accession requirements appear to rise faster than programmed resources.
Therefore, the department has encouraged the services to reprogram, if necessary, to make sure that we
are able to meet recruit quantity and quality goals. Congress boosted recruiting resources by $89 million
in FY [fiscal year] 1995 and $31 million in FY 1996. The department is grateful for your continuing, strong
support in this vital area.
The department met its FY 1995 recruiting goals while maintaining excellent recruit quality. In fact, 1995
was a better year in terms of quality achievement than any year during the 1980s. In addition to meeting
quality goals, we also were successful in our numerical targets, enlisting 175,783 recruits -- 168,010
nonprior service enlistees and 7,773 prior service recruits.
All services exceeded the department's established recruit quality floors of 90 percent for high school
diploma graduates and 60 percent scoring above average in aptitude (AFQT [Armed Forces Qualification
Test]) categories I-IIIA. Departmentwide, 96 percent of new recruits were high school diploma graduates
and 71 percent scored in aptitude categories I-IIIA. The percentage of high quality recruits (those who
have both a high school diploma and also score in categories I-IIIA) was 67 percent. Finally, less than 1
percent of new recruits scored in the lowest acceptable category (AFQT Category IV).
Each year since 1975, the Department of Defense has conducted the Youth Attitude Tracking Study, a
computer-assisted telephone interview of a nationally representative sample of 10,000 young men and
women. This survey provides information on the propensity, attitudes and motivations of young people
toward military service.
Enlistment propensity is the percentage of youth who tell us they plan to "definitely" or "probably" enlist
over the next few years. Research has shown that such expressed intentions are strong predictors of the
overall enlistment behavior of American youth.
Over the past several years, enlistment propensity has declined as the services experienced serious cuts
in recruiting resources. In fiscal years 1995-96, recruitment advertising was increased by $89 million and
$31 million respectively; that investment, coupled with hard work by our recruiters, is providing results -1995 YATS results indicate that the decline in propensity may have abated. For example, in 1995, 28
percent of 16- to 21-year-old men expressed a positive propensity for at least one active duty service -up from 26 percent in 1994.
Continued investments in recruiting and advertising will be required, however, to ensure that the pool of
young men and women interested in the military will be sufficient to meet service personnel requirements
for the future.
Recruiter Stress. In recent surveys, recruiters have reported higher levels of stress and dissatisfaction,
with 60 percent of recruiters working 60-plus hour[s] weekly, and 20 percent reporting that goals may not
be achievable. The recruiters also reported a range of other quality of life concerns. Accordingly, the
department asked that the services review recruiting policies and practices to improve recruiter quality of
life and reduce pressures that might potentially lead to improprieties.
This joint study of recruiter quality of life issues currently is focusing on a number of potential
improvements, for example:

Health care.
A longstanding concern has been our ability to provide convenient quality health care to recruiters.
Toward this end, we have assessed the feasibility of providing TRICARE Prime to recruiters even though
they serve in areas outside the normal areas of coverage.
We will demonstrate this concept in the Northwest Region (Region 11) beginning this spring. The test is
scheduled to last approximately six months. If successful, it will be expanded to cover all regions.
Other initiatives include providing a health care management program, and providing recruiters with
medical debit cards that guarantee payment to health care providers.

Child care.
To address the child care needs of our recruiting force, we are looking at the feasibility of using child care
spaces in other government programs. This includes negotiating with the General Services
Administration to obtain spaces for military members at 102 government-owned and leased locations
nationwide.

Housing program.
We have found that many recruiters -- particularly those stationed in higher-cost areas -- are
experiencing very steep housing costs. Therefore, we are evaluating the feasibility of establishing a
leased family housing program that would help those recruiters and others. In response to a requirement
set forth in the fiscal year 1996 authorization act, we are working to refine our assessment of this issue.
We will provide the committee with our report and recommendations by the end of May.

Special pay.
The Congress recently authorized an increase in special duty assignment pay from $275 to $375 per
month. We are now implementing this needed and timely boost in the tangible recognition that we
provide to recruiters.
Also, as a follow-up to GAO [General Accounting Office] and defense management reviews, the
department initiated a joint-service study to evaluate the viability and cost-effectiveness of alternative
concepts for recruiting support, including the consolidation of recruiting support under a single
organization. We have evaluated several key functional areas, including recruiting facilities;
transportation, supply and equipment; automation and communications; market analysis and research;
advertising and promotional support; and quality of life for recruiters and their families.
The study found that many support functions are already performed jointly or on a cooperative basis. The
analysis also indicated that potential savings from consolidating the remaining support functions under a
single command may reduce their effectiveness. However, the study did identify ways to streamline
existing support activities and identified several quality of life initiatives.
Officer Programs. The department continues to balance its officer accessions program by using a mix of
sources:

Reserve Officers' Training Corps (36 percent of accessions) programs provide a varied
academic and geographical mix.

Officer candidate programs (20 percent) provide growth opportunities for many, including the
enlisted force.

The service academies (15 percent) provide an annual influx of officers who couple a deep
understanding of the military culture with important technical skills.

Finally, direct appointments (14 percent) and health professional programs (6 percent) provide
officers to the professional branches, with a variety of smaller programs accounting for the
remaining 9 percent.
We believe that this mix across commissioning sources provides appropriate balance and diversity with
regard to academic disciplines, demographics and military experience.
Drawdown. As I said at the outset, the end strength reductions planned for fiscal year 1996 will
essentially complete the drawdown of the active forces.
It is important to reiterate that we have achieved our drawdown objectives while treating people fairly,
whether they stayed in service or separated. Even though the number of active duty personnel already
has been reduced by more than 650,000, the number of service members who have been involuntarily
separated has been quite small. Much of the credit for our success is attributable to the strong support
and encouragement of the Congress, which provided the separation incentives and transition programs
needed to keep faith with those who serve in America's armed forces.
Our drawdown objectives are straightforward: take care of people -- both those who are leaving and
those who are staying -- while maintaining readiness to accomplish the missions that our military forces
are called upon to undertake. In accomplishing these objectives, we must carefully evaluate the ways in
which today's decisions will affect tomorrow's force. Our ability to achieve these objectives has improved
as a direct consequence of the tools we have been provided by the Congress to manage manpower
reductions fairly and effectively.
When the current reductions began, there were nearly 2.2 million men and women on active duty. By the
end of fiscal year 1996, we will have fewer than 1.5 million; and by the end of the drawdown in fiscal year
1999, we'll have approximately 1.45 million. Overall that's a reduction of about one-third of the active
force.
Beginning in fiscal year 1992, the Voluntary Separation Incentive and special Separation Benefit were
authorized and funded. Also, more flexible Selective Early Retirement Board authority removed some of
the statutory restrictions that limited the number and type of officers who could be considered for early
retirement; thus the services could manage the retirement-eligible portion of the force more vigorously.
The Temporary Early Retirement Authority, providing for a retirement after 15 years of service, was
enacted in fiscal year 1993.
The success of these voluntary separation authorities is demonstrated by an important fact -- about
150,000 career members will have departed voluntarily under these authorities by the end of this fiscal
year, and as a direct consequence, there have been fewer than 2,000 involuntary separations. This is an
extraordinary accomplishment.
An important accomplishment in our efforts to right-size the armed forces centers on the growth in quality,
experience and diversity -- all have increased substantially since the drawdown began. The high quality
is demonstrated by the fact that the proportion of active duty enlisted personnel in the above-average
aptitude group (AFQT Categories I-IIIA) has increased from 57 percent in 1987, when the drawdown
began, to 66 percent in 1995. Those in the lowest acceptable group (AFQT Category IV) dropped from
11 percent in 1987 to fewer than 6 percent in 1995.
At the same time, the active force has become richer in experience, as measured by age and length of
service. For example, the average age increased 1.4 years from 27.3 years in 1987 to 28.7 years in 1995,
and only 18 percent of our enlisted service members are under age 22 compared to 23 percent in 1987.
Finally, while we had some concerns that the drawdown might have a disproportionate impact on women
or minorities, this has not been the case. In fact, the percentage of women in active service has
increased from 10 percent to almost 13 percent. Total minority representation in the force has increased
from 27 percent to 30 percent. Minority officers showed a like increase -- from 11 percent of the total to
14 percent over the period.
Sharp reductions in end strength, coupled with adjustments in force structure, have caused the services
to review their officer requirements in two areas: one, the number of field grade officers and two, officer
billets that should be on the joint duty assignment list.
Officer and enlisted promotions remained stable throughout fiscal year 1995 with promotion opportunities
and pin-on points relatively consistent with those of previous years. However, it has become apparent
that adjustments must be made to the officer field grade strengths authorized in law. There has been a
growth in mid-grade requirements that come about as a consequence of fully implementing both the
Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act and the Defense Acquisition Work Force
Improvement Act.
At the same time, there is a falling number of field grade officers as a result of the drawdown (wherein
lower overall strength forces causes a decline in the number of field-grade officers.) As a result, a chronic
imbalance has emerged.
The services are unable to meet all of those requirements without jeopardizing critical, in-service needs;
and that imbalance could persist unless the statutory grade tables are revised. Without such relief, the
services will not have enough mid- and senior-grade officers to perform their missions while
simultaneously providing high-quality professionals for external requirements, such as joint duty
assignments, that also are critical to long-term readiness. Our proposal to enact permanent grade relief
will ensure that readiness is maintained today and in the future, and will give the services the flexibility
necessary to properly administer their officer career management programs.
The department has made considerable progress over the past 10 years in implementing the joint officer
management provisions of the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (Goldwater-Nichols).
Our most recent focus has centered on development of a better process for managing the joint duty
assignment list, ensuring that proper credit is given to officers who have completed a joint duty
assignment. The department is close to adopting a process that will do just that. That process calls for a
requirements-based assessment of all potential positions to determine which comply with law and policy
for inclusion on the JDAL. We estimate that the review can be completed within a year and that it will
result in a somewhat smaller, more operationally oriented list that better complies with the intent of
Goldwater-Nichols.
We also are continuing work with the Joint Staff and the military departments to reduce the dependence
on waivers of joint duty assignment qualifications for promotion to general officer and to make sure that
more top officers are assigned to joint duty.
Additionally, considerable effort is being applied to the identification of those positions requiring a joint
specialty officer and designation as critical JDAs. This will allow us to more accurately determine which
officers should be designated as joint specialty officers. Consistency in this area is also paramount to
developing the appropriate inventory of joint specialty officers and ensuring they are properly trained and
utilized.
We appreciate the support Congress has given us in the past, and the additional flexibility to manage
joint officer programs provided in the fiscal year 1996 defense authorization will help us to improve our
management of joint officers, consistent with the intent of Goldwater-Nichols. As we enter new territory
with the implementation of the department's first requirements-based JDAL, we will assess the need for
additional legislative change. We remain committed to achieving the goals of Goldwater-Nichols.
The department's initiative to remove unnecessary impediments to the assignment of women began in
October 1993. Since then, we have opened almost 260,000 positions in combat aviation, aboard
combatant naval vessels and finally, within ground units that can be filled by the best qualified person,
man or woman. However, with consideration of the advice from the Congress and senior military leaders,
we continue to exclude women from assignment to units below the brigade level with direct ground
combat missions, such as infantry, artillery and armor battalions.
Today, almost 80 percent of all jobs and over 90 percent of all career fields within the military are open to
both men and women. The department recognizes that this is a long-term effort and that there still are
some challenges to overcome; however, the policy is resulting in changes which will enhance the already
high state of personnel readiness of our smaller armed force.
As the drawdown is nearing its end, our attention has shifted from the selective encouragement of
departure to a broadly based focus on retention. The military services have done an extraordinary job in
maintaining readiness over the course of the drawdown and will continue to use the tools the Congress
has provided to retain the skills needed for current and future readiness. We will work with the Congress
to ensure that retention programs, such as re-enlistment bonuses, are funded at appropriate levels.
Sustaining Commitments. As we ask and expect more of our troops, we must ensure their pay is fair and
remains competitive. Our FY 1997 budget calls for a military pay raise of 3 percent for FY 1997, and we
continued to program for the full raises provided under law through the end of the century.
As you know, cost of living allowances are a critically important component of military retired pay. The
modest, lifetime, inflation-protected income provided through COLAs fulfill[s] a promise made to service
members and serve[s as] an important recruiting and retention tool.
The action of the Congress in the fiscal year 1996 authorization act to support the effective date for the
1996 COLA, consistent with the president's budget, is greatly appreciated. Resolving the disparity in
COLA payments between civilian and military retirees is a high priority.
The secretary has also been working to reduce service members' out-of-pocket housing costs. In fiscal
year 1996, he allocated additional funds for the Basic Allowance for Quarters rate increase that
accompanies annual pay raises. We greatly appreciate the Congress' interest in this area and the added
additional funds you provided. The 3 percent across-the-board pay raise for 1997 will further reduce the
out-of-pocket housing costs for our troops.
BAQ helps our members defray the cost of off-base housing. The intent has always been for members
living on the local economy to absorb 15 percent of their housing costs, with the remainder offset by
payment of BAQ and Variable Housing Allowance. These steps have moved us closer to that target and
are directly benefiting more than 700,000 service members and their families.
Within the continental United States, the department implemented a cost-of-living allowance during the
last quarter of fiscal year 1995. Secretary Perry stipulated that individuals would receive this new
allowance if the reside in areas where the local, nonhousing cost of living exceeds the national average
by more than 9 percent.
The amount of the allowance is determined by three things: the area's cost of living in relation to the
national average, the military member's spendable income and whether the member has dependents.
Approximately 27,000 members are now benefiting from this program.
In the summer of 1994, we established a task force to re-engineer our travel system. The task force
found the department's travel system was fragmented, expensive to administer and compliance- (not
mission-) oriented. The system was neither customer-oriented nor convenient to use.
In its January 1995 report, the task force recommended that DoD manage travel as mission support and
that travelers be treated as honest customers and commanders as responsible managers of the system.
The vision is of a seamless, paperless system that meets the needs of travelers, supervisors and process
owners; reduces costs; supports mission requirements; and provides superior customer service.
Our reformed system provides one-stop shopping for all travel arrangements through use of a
commercial travel office. We have cut red tape by requiring the use of best business practices.
We simplified our travel rules by changing the focus to the customer and mission, having an up-front
"should-cost estimate" of travel, giving the supervisor travel approval (one signature) and by streamlining
the rules.
Our new system will empower supervisors to obligate travel funds as well as direct the travel. Finally, it
will maximize the use of the government travel cards to eliminate the need for cash advances.
Our new travel regulations were issued last fall for use in a one-year test at 29 pilot locations.
Departmentwide implementation is projected for January 1997.
We envision a number of long-term compensation improvements and now are analyzing issues and
developing appropriate legislative proposals. For example, we hope to move toward a "pay for
performance"-oriented military pay system.
While we recognize that increased pay for experience is important, we believe that promotion and its
associated responsibilities should be the principal determinant of pay. Appropriate reforms to the pay
table can help us to achieve that goal.
We are also working to refine our housing allowances so that they will be able to provide the right amount
to every pay grade in each location where our members are stationed. This will help ensure that the
allowances are credible and sufficient to provide each and every service member with the ability to obtain
housing that meets a minimum adequacy standard.
Key to our long-range vision is the ongoing work of the 8th Quadrennial Review of Military
Compensation.
The 8th QRMC, which formally began its work in January 1995, gives us an additional opportunity to
review every aspect of our compensation program. This QRMC has looked to the future and is identifying
desirable components of a military compensation system capable of attracting, retaining and motivating a
diverse military force in the 21st century.
All of these adjustments to our compensation program are intended to further stimulate readiness and to
generate requisite retention levels while at the same time they must ensure that our pay programs are
responsive to present and future needs of the military and those in its service.
The department recently has taken steps to improve the scope and effectiveness of its annual legislative
program. In 1994, operating in close coordination with the military departments, the Office of
Management and Budget and the Coast Guard, the department fielded a process that twice a year brings
together the personnel, programming, budgeting and legislative communities to jointly establish the
legislative program and connect it with the defense budget. Prior to adoption, linkage between legislation
and budgets was not always strong, and this generated a frequent inability to advance promising
initiatives.
As a direct outcome of that greater teamwork within DoD and with OMB, the department was able to
propose for FY 1996 -- and the Congress subsequently authorized -- a range of improvements that
include improved pays for sailors assigned to sea tours, needed changes to the management of aviation
career incentive pay, an expanded incentive pay for air weapons controllers, family separation
allowances for geographical bachelors, dislocation allowances for moves associated with base closures,
improvements in evacuation allowances and a better program for Servicemen's Group Life Insurance.
Our legislative program for military personnel in FY 1997 builds upon that foundation. We seek the
committee's support in achieving improvements in quarters allowances for petty officers (pay grade E-5)
who are assigned to sea tours, permitting these NCOs to live off-ship at their home port. The department
also is requesting permanent adjustments to officer grade tables, as the Congress has encouraged.
In our accession programs, we ask your support in slightly relaxing age criteria by one to two years for
officer programs[;] ... this would permit those participating in certain faith-required sabbaticals to do so
without jeopardizing eligibility for ROTC scholarships. We also are seeking flexibility for the military
services to grant short extensions for those recruits in the delayed entry program, so that we need not
renegotiate contracts when people must delay entry on active duty for good reason.
Funding for all of these changes is provided in the president's budget, and we will work closely with the
Congress toward enactment.
Supporting Service Members Deploying to Bosnia. The planning and initiation of Operation Joint
Endeavor -- the deployment of 20,000 U.S. troops to the Republic of Bosnia [and] Herzegovina -- has
generated three central concerns for the personnel community: ensuring that operational readiness of
the troops is maintained; guaranteeing that deployed forces receive all the benefits to which they are
entitled; and helping military families left behind.
All deploying personnel in units departing the United States received up to seven days of intensive
preparation at one of three bases. Upon arrival in Germany, those troops received up-to-date situation
briefings prior to movement to their final locations. Units stationed in Germany underwent similar
preparation over several months. Deployed troops also participated in extensive training in the areas of
personal health care and medical risks associated with service in Bosnia.
With regard to benefits, deploying personnel continue to receive normal pay and allowances. In addition,
deployed troops are receiving imminent danger pay, family separation allowances and other special pays.
Thus, up to an additional $352 per month will go to deployed troops. The amount will vary for federal
civilian employees supporting the operation.
On Feb. 26, 1996, the administration introduced a tax relief bill for about 25,000 American military
personnel serving in Croatia, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina. This bill was announced by Secretary
Perry and Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin. The service members in these three countries would receive
all of the combat zone tax benefits of the Internal Revenue Code, such as an exclusion of military pay for
federal income tax purposes, over the period of time designated by the executive order.
Other tax benefits also would be available for these individuals and for deployed service members
supporting the mission outside of imminent danger pay areas. These benefits include additional time to
file returns upon return from the operation and waivers of interest and penalties on amounts owed. On
Feb. 28, the substantive provisions of this proposal were substituted into HR [U.S. House of
Representatives] 2778 along with language from a previous DoD proposal. It then received unanimous
approval in the House and Senate.
We are providing dynamic support systems for military families of those mobilized and deployed in
support of this mission. All military community and family support systems play a role, including those of
the United States National Guard and Reserve.
Additionally, civilian communities actively provide support around installations and Guard and Reserve
units from which service members deploy. Lessons learned from previous deployments show that
service members' and families' No. 1 issue is need for information. Accurate information flow and family
support systems help our families cope with daily challenges while service members are deployed.
Just a few examples of support initiatives are:

Family readiness training is provided throughout the entire deployment cycle to ensure
appropriate information and support for each phase including predeployment ongoing, and
postdeployment.

Five hotlines have been established in Germany to provide a point of contact for military families
in Baumholder, Bad Kreuznach, Heidelberg, Mannheim and Kaiserslautern.
A Bosnia home page is accessible through the Internet and contains up-to-date information about the
role of the U.S. military in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It also has articles on items to send to deployed
service members and information on how to send messages to those deployed.
Military family center computer interconnectivity is being established to link family centers worldwide and
to connect National Guard and Reserve family support programs to information available on nearby
installations.
Our dependent schools overseas are supporting children and youth of service members in Bosnia and
Herzegovina by implementing assistance groups with certified counselors, school psychologists and
social workers. These assistance groups provide supportive counseling to children to help them cope
while their military parents are away from home.
The department's morale, welfare and recreation programs provide numerous programs for families of
those deployed and are also providing on-site programs and services to deployed service members. The
following are being provided for the deployment in Bosnia: tactical field exchanges, recreation
deployment kits, four separate MWR [morale, welfare and recreation] centers, basic sports and game kits,
aerobic fitness machines, free/resistance weight sets, exercise bicycles, televisions and VCRs and
library kits.
Quality of Life. Secretary Perry has made quality of life one of his top priorities. We know that quality of
life is linked to the readiness of our armed forces in three distinct ways.
First, quality of life helps the department recruit good people by offering attractive incentives for
education, health care, career advancement, retirement and other benefits. Second, quality of life
programs provide assurances to service members that they will have a safety network of assistance
programs in times of need, a support system in place to assist their families when they deploy. Finally,
when we provide good quality of life for service members and military families, it helps us to retain the
people in whom we have invested so much.
Secretary Perry announced his plans to improve military quality of life in November 1994 adding $2.7
billion over six years to fund increases in allowances, better barracks and family housing and an
upgraded community environment. Secretary Perry recognized that the nature of our mission was rapidly
changing, we were reducing the size of our force, installations were closing or being realigned and we
were deploying differently than in the past.
The department's senior military leadership had raised concerns about personnel tempo, compensation,
health care, housing and community support activities. Service senior enlisted advisors, installation and
unit leaders, and service members and families throughout the department mirrored these concerns. It
was evident that we could not continue business as usual without doing something to address these
concerns.
Secretary Perry also took steps to see that the funds available are used to the best possible benefit of the
service members and the forces as a whole.
The secretary established a quality of life task force of outside experts to provide recommendations for
improving housing and the delivery of community and family services and to provide options for reducing
the time service members spend away from home for training and mission requirements.
At the same time, he chartered an internal quality of life executive committee to support and implement
task force recommendations. This committee has surfaced a number of low-cost, high payoff initiatives to
improve quality of life within the military community. We have implemented 18 of these improvements
over the past year, which range from developing program goals and measures to installing phones and
computer access in barracks rooms.
We are now embarking on initiatives emerging from this process. We have been working with each of the
services to establish priorities based on our review. Quality of life priorities remain fairly consistent
among services: compensation and benefits, safe and affordable housing, quality health care, balanced
optempo [operations tempo]/perstempo [personnel tempo], community and family support, retirement
benefits and educational opportunities. These are not listed in order of priority, as they all work in tandem
to ensure quality of life within military communities.
The department has long recognized the importance of an appropriate level of compensation in
sustaining a robust quality of life program. The military compensation package is made up of both pay
and nonpay benefits -- the components of a standard living.
The quality of life initiative addressed three elements of compensation. First, the administration funded
the maximum pay raise for military personnel authorized by law through FY 1999. This commitment of
$7.7 billion reflects the recognition that adequacy of military pay is essential to attract and retain high
quality personnel.
A second initiative was improved quarters allowances. Over two-thirds of military families reside in
civilian communities. These families receive housing allowances which were intended by Congress to
cover 85 percent of their housing costs. The department and Congress have funded an additional 2.8
percent increase in housing allowances for 1996, which will cover more than 80 percent of out-of-pocket
costs for the first time since 1985.
Third, the implementation of a continental United States cost of living allowance was funded in the quality
of life initiative. The department began compensating the 30,000 military families assigned to areas in the
continental United States in which payments for goods and services exceed 109 percent of the national
average in July 1995.
Housing. The secretary of defense has placed special emphasis on improving the overall quality of
housing for service families. To the extent that the department encourages or directly provides quality
housing for both unaccompanied and married service personnel, it will materially improve job
performance and satisfaction, improve the retention of quality individuals and, through these means,
sustain the high levels of force readiness needed to meet the department's national security missions.
Both the Defense Science Board's quality of life task force and the department's own quality of life
executive committee have focused on measures to redress longstanding problems in the living
conditions of too many service members, both on and off post.
Near-term goals, and in many cases accomplishments, include:

Development of a range of housing procurement tools that will make the department a more
efficient consumer of housing by acting more like a private sector company. These authorities
all have the effect of leveraging limited DoD resources in order to accelerate the acquisition,
replacement or renovation of bachelor or family housing, both on and off post. They include the
ability to enter into partnerships; guarantee loans, occupancy rates and rents; and take
advantage of commercial standards in both construction and housing management.
These authorities were provided in the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1996 and are being
implemented on a prototype basis by the services with the assistance of a joint housing revitalization
support office.

Review and elimination of policies and procedures that have tended to impair the effectiveness
of the department's housing delivery system. To the extent that these obstacles are statutorily
based, the department will pursue legislative relief.

Examination of additional tools that could help re-engineer the department's housing delivery
system in light of high costs, inability to provide affordable, quality housing options on or off post,
and the pressing need to solve this problem in the near term within the department's resource
limitations.
Approximately one-third of military families live in military family housing. Much of this housing is in
desperate need of repair or revitalization. But two-thirds of military families live off post. For many of
these families, housing allowances are not in line with commercial housing costs.
This imbalance can force these families to live in inadequate housing. The department has found that
housing problems, whether on or off post, have material effect on re-enlistment decisions. Our military
family housing budget for FY 1996 contained an increase of over $500 million to address these problems.
This sum included $22 million for private sector housing ventures. An additional $20 million for private
sector ventures has been included in our FY 1997 budget.
Housing for single military members is as important as for married members. About a half a million single
service members live in military quarters. The department wants to replace rundown, cramped buildings
with quality residential facilities. To initiate this process, the department has adopted a new construction
policy which increases the barracks/dormitory standard living space by over 31 percent, from 90 square
feet to 11 square meters of net living area per living/sleeping area room.
The barracks repair, maintenance and construction program budgets were increased in FY 1996 through
the secretary's QOL [quality of life] initiative. Congress then enlarged that budget further, for a total
increase of $673 million.
In FY 1997, the department will continue to improve its barracks. Its budget request for barracks
revitalization, construction and maintenance increases funding by about 20 percent above service
requests. This QOL initiative will improve approximately 7,000 additional barracks spaces above the
42,000 spaces previously programmed. Almost $2.5 billion has been programmed from FY 1996 through
FY 2001 for this important program.
Community and Family Support Programs. The department provides social service, recreational and
education programs wherever military families are stationed. These programs mirror those found in
civilian communities, while being tailored to unique challenges associated with the more mobile military
lifestyle.
The department is taking two new steps in relation to community and family support programs. First, we
have adopted goals and measures in 24 community and family support program areas that will provide a
road map for quality of life improvements within the department. We have also taken action to improve
the capability of tracking funds and improving consistency and accountability in programs and budgets.
Second, we are exploring efficiencies through partnerships with local communities and outsourcing
programs and services where it makes sense.
These two steps will move us toward greater equity across installations and services and ensure that our
programs are driven by the needs of our customers.
Additionally, we have established seven major priorities for community and family support programs:

Institute the secretary's community QOL agenda: implement program goals and measures;
itrack QOL funds; collect program data;

Secure the future of the resale system: reconfigure resale boards; implement cooperative efforts;
study resale delivery models;

Promote a departmentwide MWR agenda: appropriately fund MWR through the implementation
of the DoD MWR strategic plan; improve accountability, equity and DoD funding standards;
pursue a fitness initiative to improve facilities and programs;

Implement distance learning and improving adult education opportunities: Connect service
members to college and university distance learning opportunities; establish minimum
standards for tuition assistance;

Develop blueprints for new delivery systems for community and family support programs:
explore privatization and outsourcing, where appropriate and cost-effective; study
regionalization of community services;

Provide a model school system: continue to embrace the National Education Goals 2000;
integrate the president's educational technology initiative to improve staff and student
performance at all department dependent schools; and

Pursue a performance-based operation for the defense commissary system in line with the vice
president's reinvention's next steps: governing in a balanced budget world initiatives.
Child Development. Child care continues to be a critical quality of life program that serves the needs of
the increasing portion of service members with young children. The DoD child care program is by far the
largest and one of the most successful child development systems in the world.
Over 65 percent of military spouses are in the labor force, and many need access to reliable child care.
During March of 1995, the department reassessed the need for child care and documented that military
families had some 299,000 children ages birth through 12 who need some kind of child care.
The department is currently meeting about 52 percent of this need with military child development
programs. There are at present 155,391 child care spaces at 346 locations. These include 644 child
development centers, 9,981 family child care homes, and school-aged care located in youth facilities,
schools and other community support facilities.
The secretary added $38.1 million in fiscal years 95, 96 and in the fiscal year 97 budget to move child
care availability toward the department's short-term goal of an average of 65 percent of the
departmentwide demand. We will accomplish this by increasing child care spaces by about 39,000
additional children, with the bulk of these spaces in the school-aged care programs.
Our ultimate goal is to provide 80 percent of the departmentwide child care demand in the future. Fiscal
year 1997 funding requests continue these initiatives.
We are also conducting two evaluation tests regarding outsourcing child care, recognizing that the
department is nearing maximum potential to meet child care needs on base. The first of these tests
involves contracting with civilian child care centers in five locations to "buy down" the cost of spaces for
military families to make costs comparable to on-installation care. The second test focuses on
outsourcing the management of a defense-owned child care facility in Dayton, Ohio.
The Family Advocacy Program is now in its 11th year. It has been quite successful in helping prevent
child and spouse abuse. FAP's prevention efforts contribute to making the rate of substantiated child
abuse in military families less than half of the civilian rate. FAP has also been successful in protecting
victims when child or spouse abuse has occurred and in treating both the victims and the abusers.
During fiscal year 1997, FAP will increase its emphasis on prevention through greater outreach to
families residing off installations, especially to junior enlisted personnel who are first-time parents. Also in
fiscal year 1997, FAP programs will emphasize improved prevention and intervention efforts regarding
spouse abuse. This emphasis includes participation in the department's campaign that implements the
president's directive to reduce spouse abuse in the civilian work force.
Finally, FAP programs will continue to improve program quality and fully implement a new program area,
providing advocacy services to victims of child and spouse abuse.
Model Communities (youth initiative). Installation commanders and parents identified increases in youth
violence and gang activity on installations as major concerns. They said that a lack of programs to
address youth issues contributed to this increase.
As a result, DoD established a Model Communities Incentive Award Program to encourage installations
worldwide to take responsibility for the problems of youth and their families, and to provide youth with
positive alternatives and a sense of connection in their communities. Each participating installation
submitted proposals that defined their local needs, described a plan to meet those needs and indicated
how they will manage their solutions.
The 20 winning installations will serve as test projects for new ideas and as models for military bases
around the world. Installations around the world, representing all four services, submitted proposals. DoD
selected the 20 winning installations from 134 submissions.
The winners received up to $200,000 per year for a three-year period. Over the three years, DoD's
investment in developing these innovative youth programs will be $6.4 million.
Year-end reports indicate that the model communities projects make positive impacts in the lives of our
youth and families. Later this year, we plan to distribute a synopsis of all the 134 proposals received
DoD-wide and a progress report on those currently being funded.
The department's 291 family centers continue to be the focal point for our basic social services and
support networks for the military community. Family centers provide service members and military
families with a host of education, prevention and social programs. These centers also provide information
that helps service and family members navigate the unique challenges of military life and quickly
establish ties in each community in which they live.
Core family center programs include information and referral, deployment support, crisis response,
relocation assistance, personal financial management, family life education, volunteer programs, and
employment counseling and assistance for service members' spouses. Centers provide other special
emphasis programs if they are not offered elsewhere on the installations. These can range from
counseling programs, transition assistance and programs for exceptional family members -- those with
special emotional, physical or educational challenges or needs.
Special emphasis will be placed in fiscal year 1997 on personal financial health and spouse employment
assistance. Spouse employment is focusing on helping job seekers find civilian sector jobs as the federal
sector opportunities normally sought by military spouses dwindle. We have also initiated a readiness
outcome measures study to evaluate our core programs.
The defense appropriations act for fiscal year 1996 directed the department to report on phasing out our
relocation and transition assistance programs and provide what, if any, residual funding is required. This
report is being prepared. We understand that certain of the special incentive programs were aimed at
helping the department bridge the impact of reducing the force. We do not, however, view the basic
functions of either of these programs as temporary.
The relocation program provides education and assistance to the more than one-third of our force that
relocates each year. Many of these members and families are facing their first move and have limited
experience in how to plan for and accomplish the move without undergoing significant stress and
incurring unnecessary financial costs.
At the direction of Congress, we established this program and set up an automated Standard Installation
Topic Exchange Service, which provides service members with information about their new community.
Such information is essential in making informed decisions during the move process.
This automated information is available through family centers at every military installation. The
relocation assistance program has been and continues to be integral to our family center network and
provides benefits far beyond its annual $18 million cost. As long as we continue to move service
members and their families to new communities, often far from their family networks, we believe it
essential to provide the services offered through our relocation assistance program.
Equally important, transition assistance to the almost 300,000 service members who leave the military
each year remains a priority. These veterans represent a very talented resource pool for America, but
many have never sought a job in the civilian community and have no idea where to begin. Many are
serving at installations outside the United States and have no way or opportunity to find jobs in the United
States until they are discharged from the service.
These issues, coupled with trying to translate skills performed in the military to civilian job skills, make
transition assistance a vital service for departing personnel. We have formed tremendous partnerships
with Departments of Labor and Veterans Affairs, federal and state employment service agencies,
corporations and businesses in communities throughout the United States.
These partnerships are helping our veterans find jobs quickly and smoothly integrate back into the
civilian community. Our two automated systems have also proved extremely successful. The Defense
Outplacement Referral System is a resume data base referral system linking private sector employers to
departing service members and spouses.
In fiscal year 1995, there were over 69,000 personnel registered in DORS and 13,431 employers. The
Transition Bulletin Board allows employers to list actual job openings that service members at military
installations worldwide can see. In 1995, there were 47,343 job openings and business opportunities
listed in this automated system. Statistics we have gathered show that these programs help service
members find jobs more quickly, and account for a cost avoidance of $152 million annually that would
have to be spent for unemployment compensation.
These facts alone demonstrate that the loss that would be associated with the phase out these important
programs. However, we are certain that we can find economies without degrading the value of the
services provided through both programs. We are looking at strategies for making these programs more
affordable for the future.
The Department of Defense provides morale, welfare and recreation programs in order to help bring
some of the benefits of civilian life to our military communities. These programs are the cornerstone of
community quality of life, providing for fitness, recreation centers, libraries, sports and athletic programs,
youth centers and a variety of other recreational and social activities. MWR programs also include
revenue-generating activities such as bowling centers and golf courses, which not only provide
recreational opportunities, but generate profits used to improve other community MWR programs.
The department considers MWR critical to mission readiness and productivity. The programs and
activities offered at our installations worldwide contribute to physical fitness, esprit de corps, and aid in
the recruitment and retention of personnel.
In the course of the last two years, the department has taken action to improve and update MWR
programs. We have issued new policy guidance, incorporating requirements for short- and long-range
planning, specific service goals and standards and a periodic market analysis to ensure that our
programs are customer driven. We have also provided specific metrics to measure funding standards
and for nonappropriated fund financial assessment.
Beginning with fiscal year 1996, we increased funding to bring the military services to a more consistent
level of appropriated funding for these vital programs. These funds were targeted for improvements in
programs in the Marine Corps and the Army. For fiscal year 1997, the Navy has included resources in
their budget to improve fitness centers and libraries afloat, an action that will improve quality of life
aboard over 350 ships.
Our plans for next year will build on these initiatives. As a result of a finding from the quality of life task
force, we will be examining the programs and facilities we provide for physical fitness on our installations
and working with the military departments to build action plans to address any shortcomings.
We will continue to promote innovative solutions for program delivery, encourage partnerships,
public/private ventures and community agreements when it makes sense. We will also continue to
promote cooperative efforts among the military services and exchange programs as another avenue to
reduce overhead, increase service and reduce costs. Finally, we will monitor our joint execution of
program goals to increase consistency of service for our total force.
Off-duty Voluntary Education Programs. The department has historically spent about $220 million
annually to support its very popular off-duty continuing education programs. About one-third of the active
force participates in these programs, earning thousands of associate, bachelor's and master's degrees
from nationally accredited colleges and universities.
The services provide their members with about $135 million in tuition assistance annually. Typically,
courses are offered evenings and weekends at education centers located on military bases around the
world. However, service members may take courses off base, on board ships at sea or through
correspondence courses and other forms of independent study available via television or computer.
Members are also offered fully funded opportunities to enhance the basic academic skills, earn a high
school equivalency diploma or test for college credit. Tests for licensing, certification and college
admission are also fully funded.
Current initiatives include connecting all education centers to the Internet and expanding options for
service members to take courses and complete degrees using distance education opportunities.
DoD Education Activity. Our DoD Education Activity provides a world-class educational program that
prepares students in military communities for success in a dynamic global environment. In fiscal year
1997, we project that we will provide education to some 87,000 students in our DoD Dependents School
system overseas and 33,000 through our DoD domestic dependent elementary and secondary schools.
Additionally, we have oversight responsibilities and fiscal support of eight special contractual
arrangements with local education agencies in five states and Guam, serving an additional 6,000
students.
This past year, we have involved parents, staff and the military services in the development of an
aggressive strategic plan to support continued quality and integrate the president's national education
goals into our system.
Additionally, we have integrated a technology initiative aimed at improving staff and student performance
into the 21st century. This initiative fully supports the president's educational technology initiative. This
initiative moves toward providing greater access to modern computers in classrooms, connects schools
to the information superhighway, develops effective subject area curriculum software and develops
teacher competence to help students use and learn through technology. We have included $7.5 million in
our budget for these technology initiatives.
While we have been undergoing a tremendous amount of turbulence within our system over the past two
years, we have successfully minimized any adverse affects on children's education. Students at our
schools consistently scored eight to 19 percentile points above the national average in all comprehensive
test of basic skills and American college test areas over the past school year.
We project that we will complete most of our school closures and realignments in Europe and the Pacific
by the end of this year. We now have 177 schools overseas, 92 less than we had when we began our
drawdown.
Our budget request for fiscal year 1997 remains consistent with last year's request.
Commissaries and Exchanges. The commissary system is an important element of the military nonpay
compensation package and a critical aspect of quality of life. Secretary Perry remains firm that this
benefit must not be eroded.
Commissaries enhance income through a 20-25 percent savings on purchases of food and household
items for the military member and family. The importance of commissaries for those stationed overseas
cannot be understated -- they are often the only source of American products and in isolated or remote
areas, the only convenient source of groceries.
We continue to work toward greater efficiencies in these stores. The Defense Commissary Agency
recently received the Hammer Award [created by Vice President Al Gore to recognize government
agencies for their efforts in streamlining operations] for the accomplishments of the agency's operation
support center, specifically their new system for ordering and receiving products for overseas stores, and
for two other business practices -- resale ordering agreement and delivering ticket invoicing. These
innovations greatly improve overseas order/ship time, dramatically reduce the number of contracts the
agency has with vendors and boosts timely payments.
As of October 1995, there were 201 commissaries in the United States and 111 overseas.
Exchanges support service members and military families by providing goods and services to them at
affordable prices. The exchanges also generate revenues that fund recreational activities designed to
promote readiness, individual and community fitness, esprit de corps and the personal development of
those who serve their country.
During the past year, the department took a hard look at its policies that describe where and when we
can operate exchanges and commissaries. We did this in an attempt to balance our quality of life
initiatives with the hard realities of base closures and realignments.
We discovered that in many instances, active duty personnel were remaining on or in the immediate
vicinity of many of these installations. This past year, we began a new way of doing business and rewrote
department policy to maintain certain exchange operations and commissaries on those installations
where a significant number of active duty service members remained.
Recognizing, too, that members of the reserve component could lose their exchange or commissary as
installations closed or realigned, we opened up a new BXmart at Homestead Air Force Reserve base in
Florida.
The BXmart at Naval Air Station, Fort Worth, Texas, formerly Carswell Air Force Base, completed its
second year of operation. Although the BXmart was not financially viable as a stand-alone operation,
overall exchange operations were marginally profitable. Because of the marginal profitability of the Fort
Worth test, we are not yet able to endorse this as future policy of the department. We will continue to
evaluate our test sites for overall profitability and the overall impact on the MWR dividends. We will
establish future test BXmarts only where programs indicate a profitable outcome.
Civilian Personnel. Our civilian work force is a crucial link in our national defense. The Department of
Defense employs more than 800,000 civilians around the world and even with the drawdown, we remain
by far the largest federal employer.
Regular employment in the Department of Defense has fallen from 1.117 million at the end of fiscal year
1989 to 837,000 in November 1995. This cut represents 25 percent of our work force.
We continue to work hard to manage the drawdown of our civilian work force.
Through creative use of our transition programs we have been able to hold our involuntary separations,
that is, separations by reductions in force, to less than 9 percent. To achieve this remarkable rate, we
have applied a variety of transition assistance programs. The DoD Priority Placement Program has
placed 133,000 workers in its 30-year history and continues to find jobs for more than 900 surplus
employees per month. We are making good use of the voluntary early retirement authority to allow
employees to retire under reduced age and service requirements.
The Defense Outplacement Referral System has been available since FY 1992. Under this system, we
have referred about 18,000 employees to potential private sector employers. We are also using voluntary
separation incentive payments or buyouts. These are lump sum payments of up to $25,000 to encourage
employees in surplus occupations to resign or retire. Roughly 78,000 employees have left with VSIPs,
avoiding a like number of layoffs. Another new program is the nonfederal hiring incentive. Effective Aug.
25, 1995, this program offers nonfederal employers up to $10,000 to retrain or relocate a DoD employee
and keep the person employed for at least a year.
Despite the drawdown, we have been able to maintain work force balance. The cuts have affected men
and women in equal proportions. Female employees comprise 37 percent of the work force, the same
proportion they did in September 1989. And we have made progress in our higher-graded positions. In
grades GS-13 through SES [Senior Executive Service], women have increased their representation from
14 to 19 percent. Minority group members have increased from 10 to 12 percent of the work force.
We have managed our reductions by being true to our goals (reducing staff, avoiding involuntary
separations, assisting employees and achieving balance). We delegate authority to the lowest possible
levels and use our transition tools effectively. At the same time, we pay constant attention to work force
demographics and the results of downsizing while holding on to our mission and readiness requirements.
Even though we are working hard to make the downsizing go smoothly and humanely, we also are
concerned about the people and programs that remain. We are streamlining and automating our
personnel management systems to improve the service we provide to our managers and employees,
increase efficiency and reduce costs.
We are developing a standard DoD system to allow immediate access to current civilian personnel data,
provide on-line update of employee data, reduce training and operational costs and improve productivity.
To accelerate the process, we have selected a commercial off-the-shelf software package as a basis for
the modern data system. For interim improvement, we have completed or nearly completed 13 projects
to automate functions that account for at least half of the standard civilian personnel office workload. Our
target system should be deployed in fiscal year 1998.
To improve productivity and customer service while reducing costs, the military departments and defense
agencies are pulling functions from their installation civilian personnel offices into regional service
centers. We will have 23 regional centers to perform those functions that can be performed more
efficiently and effectively from a central operation.
The Army has opened three regional centers and is developing seven more sites. The Navy has opened
two centers with six additional sites planned. The Air Force will establish a single center. Four centers
serving the defense agencies will be operated by the Washington Headquarters Service, the Defense
Mapping Agency, the Defense Finance and Accounting Service and the Defense Logistics Agency. All
the centers will be operational by the end of fiscal year 1998.
To help support the field liaison offices we established last year at Department of Labor offices, we have
developed and deployed a comprehensive tracking and auditing system. This system facilitates the flow
of information to all of our DoD installations and helps us ensure that only valid claims are paid. The
system has already been installed in 67 personnel offices, and 150 more offices will receive the system
by the end of this year. Combined with home visits and case reviews, this system saved the department
$5.5 million in fiscal year 1995. This represents a potential lifetime savings of $110 million.
The Civilian Personnel Policy and Civilian Personnel Management Service staffs have undertaken
several initiatives to improve labor relations and partnerships within the department. We had a major role
in developing the National Partnership Council handbook and establishing an NPC partnership award.
The Defense Partnership Council continues to be an effective vehicle for providing assistance to labor
and management teams.
Extensive savings have been achieved through partnership. For example, at the San Antonio [Texas] Air
Logistics Center, an organization that had a history of labor-management problems, partnership
initiatives resulted in an 89 percent decrease in unfair labor practice filings from 1992 to 1995. Union
grievances fell by 82 percent, and employee grievances fell by 85 percent. At Rock Island [Ill.], a
negotiated alternate work schedule cut overtime costs by $250,000 in 1995. At the Trident Refit Facility,
the result of no formal ULPs in a year-and-a-half no arbitrations in two years has been a cost avoidance
of $300,000.
Following extensive discussions and coordination within the Department of Defense and with the
Department of State and our embassy in Lisbon, we were successful in framing an acceptable solution to
an impasse that was straining U.S.-Portuguese relations and our operations at Lajes Air Base in the
Azores. This settlement removed the remaining barrier to U.S.-Portugal execution of a new charter on
cooperation, a revised technical agreement and the understanding on labor.
When the complaints investigation offices of the military departments were consolidated into a single
defensewide Office of Complaints Investigations in fiscal year 1994, we inherited 33 site offices around
the world. We have cut the number of sites to 25 by the end of fiscal year 1995 and plan further
reductions.
Even with these consolidations and reductions in staff, the OCI staff has managed to reduce the case
backlog of 1,800 cases and now completes 90 percent of the cases in 120 days as opposed to the
180-day requirement. Through the use of alternative dispute resolution efforts (mediation and fact-finding)
we saved the department approximately $8 million in case processing costs in FY 1995. OCI
investigators completed over 4,000 cases during the fiscal year, of which 20 percent were resolved
through the use of ADR [alternative dispute resolution].
Equal opportunity. Effective equal opportunity policies provide the all-volunteer force access to the widest
possible pool of qualified men and women, allow the military to train and assign people according to the
needs of the service and guarantee service men and women that they will be judged by their
performance and will be protected from discrimination and harassment. These conditions are the context
in which the department's equal opportunity policies and programs are developed and implemented.
In a March 3, 1994, memorandum to all DoD components, Secretary Perry reiterated his unequivocal
commitment to equal opportunity. The secretary said, "Equal opportunity is not just the right thing to do, it
is also a military and economical necessity. Most importantly, all employees of this department have a
right to carry out their jobs without discrimination or harassment. ... Therefore, I will not tolerate
discrimination or harassment of or by any Department of Defense employee."
The secretary recognizes that discrimination and sexual harassment jeopardize organizational readiness
by weakening interpersonal bonds, eroding unit cohesion and threatening good order and discipline. By
comprehensively addressing human relations issues and by expeditiously investigating and resolving
discrimination complaints, the department supports readiness. Following the secretary's lead, senior DoD
civilian officials and military leaders strive to ensure that every individual in the department, military or
civilian, is free to contribute to his or her fullest potential in an atmosphere of respect and dignity.
In May 1995, the department transmitted to the Congress the report of the Defense Equal Opportunity
Council Task Force on Discrimination and Sexual Harassment as directed by Section 532 of Public Law
103-337. The report contained 48 recommendations for improvements in the military services'
discrimination and harassment prevention programs, including the establishment of departmentwide
standards for discrimination complaints processing. The report's 48 recommendations were put in place
with the issuance of DoD Directive 1350.2, "Department of Defense Military Equal Opportunity Program,"
in August 1995.
Our equal opportunity efforts contribute to building a military force which reflects the diversity of our
nation. Its composition is a resounding statement about what is possible in a multiracial, multiethnic
society. Most nations are multiracial, and many of them are riven along lines of race, religion or language.
When the U.S. military is deployed, whether for warfighting or peacekeeping, it displays the possibility of
overcoming those sources of division. It shows that diversity can be a source of strength.
The overview of the department's personnel programs that I have set out in this statement presents a
complex array of initiatives and activities. Our objective, by contrast, remains straightforward -- meeting
the challenge of medium-term readiness by bringing stability to the force and implementing Secretary
Perry's ambitious quality of life initiative.
At this point I believe we are in good shape. We have met the unprecedented challenge of downsizing an
all-volunteer force successfully. Today's armed forces are more experienced, of higher quality and more
diverse than ever before.
Our recruitment programs -- the lifeblood of a quality force -- have been successful in terms of meeting
numerical goals and in terms of quality. There are challenges ahead, but I am confident that with the
continuing support of the Congress and this committee, we can continue to achieve our readiness
objectives and provide the men and women in uniform who serve this nation and their families the quality
of life they so richly deserve.
Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before this committee today. I look forward to answering
any questions
Assuring Confidence in the U.S. Nuclear
Stockpile
Prepared statement of Harold P. Smith Jr., assistant to the secretary of defense for nuclear, chemical
and biological defense programs, to the Military Procurement Subcommittee, House National Security
Committee, Washington, March 12, 1996.
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I am honored to have this opportunity to appear before
you. I will begin by stating that today, the stockpile is safe, secure and reliable.
My remarks will focus on the shared responsibility between the Department of Defense and the
Department of Energy to assure high confidence in the nation's nuclear stockpile. This responsibility
presents a new challenge because the nuclear weapons in our stockpile will be retained well beyond their
intended design lifetimes without the benefit of underground nuclear testing.
The president recognized this challenge for the nuclear weapons program in his Aug. 11, 1995, speech
announcing the U.S. position on a zero-yield Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: "In order for this program
to succeed, both the administration and the Congress must provide sustained bipartisan support for the
stockpile stewardship program over the next decade and beyond. I am committed to working with the
Congress to ensure this support."
The president further directed a new annual certification to assure the safety and reliability of the nuclear
stockpile. Finally, he stated that he would be prepared to "exercise our supreme national interest rights
under the CTBT in order to conduct whatever testing might be required" if a high level of confidence in
the safety or reliability of a nuclear weapon type critical to our deterrent could no longer be certified. With
this challenge and commitment in mind, I will review some of the changes in the nuclear weapons
program and actions that are being taken to ensure that we -- and our potential enemies -- continue to
have high confidence in the stockpile.
The end of the Cold War has wrought significant changes in the nuclear weapons program. Over the last
decade, there has been an unprecedented shift in emphasis from design, development, fabrication and
testing of new warheads to refurbishment and life extension of existing warheads. Our stockpile has been
reduced in size and diversity of weapon types, and by the end of this fiscal year, the current inventory will
become the oldest in U.S. history.
Today, we do not have the capability to manufacture replacements for the nuclear warheads that
comprise our existing stockpile. We must comply with environmental requirements that are increasingly
challenging and litigious. The extended underground test moratorium has evolved into a U.S. position for
a zero-yield CTBT. Finally, without the traditional yardstick of underground testing, it will become ever
more difficult to replace the shrinking cadre of nuclear weapons experts.
These changes have forced a shift in strategy at the departments of Defense and Energy and were
addressed in the DoD's Nuclear Posture Review.
Approved by the president in September 1994, the Nuclear Posture Review continues to provide the DoD
policy guidance, force structure and stewardship obligations for the enduring nuclear weapons stockpile.
The NPR codified the national policy of lead and hedge as our approach to nuclear weapons and the
attendant technology infrastructures.
The policy of lead and hedge simply means that the U.S. will lead strategic arms control efforts toward
START [Strategic Arms Reduction Talks] II or smaller force levels, but retain the ability to hedge by
returning to START I levels. It is our policy as part of this strategy that until START II ratification and entry
into force, we will draw down and maintain our strategic forces at warhead levels consistent with START
I.
Although primarily a DoD document, the NPR contains infrastructure requirements for the Department of
Energy to ensure high confidence in the enduring stockpile, namely:

Maintain nuclear weapons capability without underground testing or the production of fissile
material;
o
o
Develop a stockpile surveillance engineering base;
Demonstrate the capability to refabricate and certify weapon types in the enduring
stockpile;
o
Maintain the capability to design, fabricate and certify new warheads;
o


Maintain a science and technology base;
Ensure tritium availability; and
Accomplish these tasks with no new-design nuclear warhead production.
To meet these requirements, we must provide an environment for the development of nuclear experts
who can meet tomorrow's ever-increasing challenges. The DoE, with assistance from the DoD, is
pursuing a Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program to meet NPR requirements.
As DoE continues to address NPR infrastructure requirements, the SSMP will provide a structured
approach to deal with the lack of underground testing and no new nuclear weapon production. In the past,
underground nuclear testing was the ultimate arbiter of the stockpile. Absent this arbiter, the DoE must
develop new approaches to ensure high confidence in our nuclear deterrent. The SSMP must include:
enhanced surveillance of the stockpile, expanded computational capability such as the Accelerated
Strategic Computing Initiative, above-ground experimental facilities, subcritical plutonium experiments at
the Nevada Test Site and the ability to return to underground testing, a limited capacity to remanufacture
warheads in the existing stockpile and an assured source for tritium.
The DoD is satisfied with the progress that is being made by the DoE to fulfill its responsibilities as
delineated in the NPR, but much remains to be done. For example, The Nuclear Weapons Council
endorses the DoE's dual-track approach of pursuing a commercial light water reactor and accelerator
produced tritium sources by 2005 and 2007 respectively, but both approaches must overcome technical
and institutional challenges.
In the case of warhead fabrication, we must first establish a baseline capacity to replace those warheads
routinely consumed by the quality assurance and reliability test program and be capable of expanding
this capacity to handle precipitous failures of a type of warhead.
We must be ever more vigilant in the stockpile surveillance program and demonstrate that systemic
failures can be anticipated with sufficient time to implement corrective actions. The two departments must
continue to certify high confidence in the stockpile without the benefit of underground nuclear testing.
In its effort to improve its corporate expertise in aging nuclear weapons, the DoD is becoming a more
active partner with the DoE as warheads and components are assessed and certified. At the individual
level, the DoD will increase the number of personnel assigned to the DoE weapon laboratories.
The DoD-chaired project officers groups will take a more active role in warhead assessment while
gaining a more detailed understanding of weapon life extension procedures. At the department level, the
joint DoD/DoE Nuclear Weapons Council will remain the official forum for resolving interdepartmental
issues between the DoD customer and the DoE supplier of nuclear weapons technology.
Additional information briefings will continue to be given to the NWC for review of critical issues involving
the health of the nuclear weapons stockpile.
As an example of interdepartmental cooperation, the DoD and DoE are currently formalizing a new
annual certification procedure directed by the president for stockpiled weapons. This challenging task is
being led by my office with the support and concurrence of representatives of the services, the Joint Staff,
[U.S.] Strategic Command, DoE and the DoE laboratories.
This new process will include an annual survey of the health of the entire stockpile. It will complement the
newly implemented dual revalidation process, which requires a detailed technical analysis of individual
warhead types over a two to three year period. These two new reporting processes will provide timely
information on warhead ,safety and reliability for the NWC.
The SSMP will require continuing support from the departments of Defense and Energy, the Congress,
the administration and the public. The DoD and DoE must jointly establish methods to measure success
of the SSMP at specific intervals. We cannot afford to wait 10 to 15 years to judge the success of the
program.
DoE must demonstrate the ability to produce tritium and to rebuild all weapons types in the stockpile.
Warheads consumed by the surveillance process must be replaced with certified warheads without the
benefit of underground nuclear testing, a major undertaking.
Most importantly, opportunities must exist to attract, train and retain world-class scientists and engineers
who will be the next generation of stockpile stewards. The safety and reliability of our nation's nuclear
stockpile demand an experienced cadre of our nation's best.
Since the Manhattan Project, the United States has invested heavily in the development, production,
deployment and maintenance of the national nuclear deterrent. Nuclear weapons, even at significantly
reduced levels, remain a core component of future national security strategy. Our DoD/DoE shared
responsibility is to ensure high confidence in our nuclear deterrent without underground nuclear testing.
This enduring responsibility must have the resources necessary to ensure that the stockpile remains safe
and reliable, today and in the future.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, absent nuclear testing, the potential for erosion in stockpile
confidence will undoubtedly increase with time. To maintain high confidence is a challenge that exceeds
those previously faced by our stockpile stewards, but I believe we are on the right track. The president
recognized this challenge in his Aug. 11, 1995, speech and remains committed to this challenge. The
people in this room and the agencies they represent must meet this daunting requirement. ...
America's Armed Forces: A Shared Commitment
Prepared statement of Edwin Dorn, undersecretary of defense for personnel and readiness, to the
Personnel Subcommittee, Senate Armed Services Committee, March 13, 1996.
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I am honored to appear before you today to present an
overview of Department of Defense personnel issues.
The United States military continues to be the best-trained and best-equipped fighting force in the world,
as its performance over the past year in the Persian Gulf, Haiti and Bosnia-Herzegovina illustrates.
During this period, our forces have also continued to manage the downsizing with skill and spirit. Our
forces are now smaller but fully ready to do what we ask of them. We must ensure they remain ready and
provide them the quality of life they and their families deserve. Secretary [of Defense William] Perry and I
look forward to working with this subcommittee to attain these ends.
In this statement I will discuss the manpower levels requested in the president's budget and then detail
the steps we are taking to maintain readiness and quality of life. ...
The president's budget request for active military, Selected Reserve and civilian manpower for FY [fiscal
year] 1997 continues the downsizing that began in the late 1980s. At the beginning of FY 1996, active
duty military strength was at 1.518 million; by the end of FY 1997, it will decrease to 1.457 million.
Selected Reserve strength will be reduced to 901,000. Civilian positions will decrease to 807,000 by the
end of FY 1997.
The drawdown of the active component to congressionally mandated permanent end strength levels is
now almost 90 percent complete and will be about 97 percent complete after the reductions planned for
FY 1997. Even though the number of active duty personnel already has been reduced by more than
655,000 since FY 1987, the number of service members who have been involuntarily separated has
been quite small. Much of the credit for our success is attributable to the strong support and
encouragement of Congress, which provided the separation incentives (Voluntary Separation Incentive,
Special Separation Benefit, Temporary Early Retirement Authority) and transition programs needed to
effect the drawdown in a sensible and sensitive manner.
Through the Reserve Component Transition Assistance Program, the department has successfully
reshaped and balanced the reserve forces. The transition program includes Special Separation Pay,
Early Qualification for Retired Pay, continued eligibility for commissaries and exchanges and extension of
Montgomery GI Bill educational assistance. This program will enable the department to complete almost
90 percent of its drawdown and restructuring plans by the end of FY 1996 and 97 percent by the end of
FY 1997.
The department began streamlining infrastructure and reducing its civilian work force before National
Performance Review reductions were proposed. Through creative use of our transition programs, we
have been able to hold our involuntary separations to less than 9 percent. The DoD Priority Placement
Program has placed over 136,000 workers in its 30-year history and continues to find jobs for an average
of over 900 displaced employees per month. We have been aggressively using downsizing tools
provided by the Congress.
Civilian reductions have amounted to 23 percent between 1987 and FY 1995. By September 1999, an
additional 104,000 positions will be eliminated, with further reductions anticipated. The reductions are
based on reinvention and streamlining of workload and missions, base closures and reduced fiscal
resources. Our goal is to maintain effectiveness while managing the reductions both efficiently and
humanely.
The department's first priority is maintaining readiness to execute the National Security Strategy. As last
reported to the Senior Readiness Oversight Council, U.S. forces are at a high state of readiness, as
exemplified by our current operations in Bosnia and throughout the world. The department anticipates
that we will be able to maintain this high state of readiness, assuming the timely reimbursement for
contingency operations. U.S. forces must be manned, equipped and trained to deal with the dangers to
U.S. national security, including response to major regional conflicts, overseas presence operations and
other key missions.
Personnel readiness results from three factors: quality people, quality training and quality of life. We
recruit those whose background and aptitudes indicate a high probability of completing their obligation
while performing well in their occupational fields. We manage people carefully, provide them with
rigorous and realistic training and ensure we assign well-qualified people to each job. Finally, we make a
genuine commitment to "people first" programs that recognize their service.
A steady flow of high-quality recruits is an important component of readiness. In spite of the fact that our
military forces are growing smaller, each service must enlist enough people each year to provide a flow
of seasoned leaders for the future. DoD must recruit about 200,000 young people annually for the active
duty armed forces and approximately 160,000 for the Selected Reserve.
In recent years, DoD has done well in attracting high-quality recruits. In FY 1995, 96 percent of all active
duty recruits held a high school diploma and 71 percent scored above average on the enlistment test.
Fewer than 1 percent of new recruits scored in the lowest acceptable category on the test. The
department also was successful in recruiting for the reserves, with 90 percent of reserve accessions
holding a high school diploma and more than two-thirds scoring above average on the enlistment test
and less than 2 percent scoring in the lowest acceptable category. Higher levels of recruit quality reduce
attrition while improving hands-on job performance, which is essential to unit performance and readiness.
Over the past several years, enlistment propensity had declined as the services experienced serious cuts
in recruiting resources. In FYs 1995 and 1996, recruitment advertising was increased by $89 million and
$31 million respectively. That investment, coupled with hard work by our recruiters, is paying off. Results
from the 1995 Youth Attitude Tracking Study indicate that the decline in propensity may have abated.
However, recent surveys indicate higher recruiter stress and dissatisfaction, along with a range of quality
of life concerns.
Accordingly, the department asked the services to review recruiting policies and practices with a goal of
reducing pressures that might lead to potential improprieties. A joint study of recruiter quality [of] life
issues is focusing on potential improvements in health care, child care and housing. The Congress
recently authorized an increase in Special Duty Assignment Pay from $275 to $375 per month. We are
now developing implementation plans, in coordination with the services.
Because recruiting is vital to readiness, then-Deputy Secretary John Deutch established the Senior
Panel on Recruiting in April 1994 to provide oversight at the highest levels of the department. This panel
deals quickly and effectively with any emerging problems. The department has also initiated a
joint-service study to evaluate the viability and cost-effectiveness of alternative concepts for recruiting
support.
We will continue to monitor trends to ensure we maintain high quality standards in enlisted recruitment.
With adequate resources and realistic recruit quality requirements, we can sustain a diverse, high-quality
military force that is ready and able to respond to the nation's defense needs.
The department continues to sustain balance in its officer accession program, with a mix of new officers
from a number of sources: Reserve Officers Training Corps (36 percent of officer accessions), which
provides a varied academic and geographical mix; officer candidate programs (20 percent) that provide
growth opportunities for the enlisted force; and service academies (15 percent), which provide officers
who couple a deep understanding of the military culture with important technical skills. Other officer
accession programs support the professional branches: direct appointment (14 percent) and health
professional programs (6 percent). We believe that this mix across commissioning sources provides
appropriate balance and diversity.
While recruiting is the crucial first step in creating a ready force, retaining and carefully managing
personnel during the course of their careers is just as important. As the drawdown nears its end, our
focus has shifted from selective departure to broad-based retention. Our retention incentive programs
are designed to maintain the high level of readiness needed to perform the missions we are called upon
to perform, and we will work with the Congress to ensure that retention programs, such as re-enlistment
bonuses, are funded at appropriate levels.
There is a common misconception that promotions have slowed because of the drawdown, but that is
simply not the case. The services have worked hard to provide reasonably consistent promotion
opportunities in order to meet requirements, ensure a balanced personnel force structure and provide a
meaningful opportunity for all service members. Promotions have remained generally steady during the
drawdown. Officer and enlisted promotions remained stable through FY 1995, with promotion
opportunities and pin-on points relatively consistent with those of previous years.
However, reductions in end strength, coupled with adjustments in force structure, have caused the
services to re-examine their officer requirements with regard to the number of field grade officers. We will
be proposing permanent grade relief to achieve the number of mid- and senior-grade officers needed to
perform Defense missions. Also, we are working with the Joint Staff on a number of projects designed to
improve joint officer management.
One such measure is a process to ensure those positions that fully meet the intent of the law are on the
joint duty assignment list. The department appreciates the support the Congress has given us in the past,
particularly the revised authorities reflected in the FY 1996 Defense Authorization Act, to improve our
management of joint officers. As we enter new territory with the implementation of the department's first
requirements-based JDAL, we look forward to improved utilization of officers who are trained and
experienced in joint matters.
The Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act, enacted with the FY 1995 Defense Authorization Act,
becomes effective on Oct. 1, 1996. Involving over 200 changes to existing law, ROPMA is the first
comprehensive overhaul of reserve officer personnel management statutes since the Reserve Officer
Personnel Act of 1954 and will affect approximately 250,000 officers not on the active duty list. It provides
flexibility in managing Guard and Reserve officers, provides career visibility to individuals and will help
maintain a cost-effective reserve component personnel structure. The department is actively updating
Guard and Reserve manpower and personnel policies in conformance with ROPMA.
In the area of civilian management, the military departments and defense agencies are pulling functions
from their installation civilian personnel offices into regional service centers to improve productivity and
customer service, while reducing costs. We plan for 23 regional centers to perform those functions that
can be performed more efficiently and effectively from a central operation. Thirteen projects to streamline
and automate functions that account for at least half of the standard civilian personnel office workload
have been completed or are nearing completion. We are also developing a standard DoD system to allow
immediate access to current civilian personnel data, provide on-line update of employee data, reduce
training and operational costs and improve productivity. A commercial off-the-shelf software package has
been selected as the basis for the modern data system. Our target system should be deployed in FY
1998.
We are encouraged by the successful implementation of policies that have opened more jobs to women
in uniform. Today, almost 80 percent of all jobs and over 90 percent of all career fields within the military
are open to both men and women. This means we are able to put the right person in the right job
unencumbered by unnecessary gender restrictions. There are still some challenges to overcome in this
area; however, we believe the changes will enhance the personnel readiness of our smaller armed force.
The secretary has been very firm and clear about the issue of fairness. Discrimination and sexual
harassment jeopardize organizational readiness by weakening interpersonal bonds, eroding unit
cohesion, and threatening good order and discipline. The department supports readiness by
comprehensively addressing human relations issues and by expeditiously investigating and resolving
discrimination complaints. DoD strives to ensure that it is an organization where every individual is free to
contribute to his or her fullest potential in an atmosphere of respect and dignity.
Rigorous and realistic training is the foundation of personnel readiness. This includes entry-level training,
specialized skill training and professional development courses. The department invests about $30,000
per recruit during basic and initial job training alone. We offer over 20,000 different courses -- an
investment of $15 billion -- that produce 1.15 million graduates annually. These programs ensure that we
develop well-qualified leaders.
Cost-effective training to promote effective reserve component integration into total force missions
means increasing opportunities for joint training missions with the active forces and making good use of
all the tools available, especially technology. During the coming year, we will continue to identify training
opportunities to involve reserve components in more peacetime operational missions and to promote
innovative training opportunities in U.S. communities. These measures will increase reserve readiness
as a result of meaningful involvement in peacetime missions, while also helping to reduce active
component personnel tempo (perstempo) and operating tempo(optempo).
This year, the department is launching a major effort to provide a more universal, comprehensive and
systematic program of civilian career and leader development. This effort has already led to the
establishment of a new civilian training philosophy. Called Growing the Gold, this program is creating a
cross-component system of civilian leadership development with policies and procedures more closely
aligned with those of the military.
The focus of Growing the Gold is a more DoD-team-based approach to the training, education,
assignment and promotion of DoD's civilian personnel. This comprehensive redesign in civilian career
and leader development responds to the president's call for greater and smarter investment in human
capital, as well as to recommendations from the Commission on Roles and Missions.
Competitive pay, realistic perstempo standards, health care and improved housing and community
support programs enhance the services' ability to keep and grow future leaders, gain a return on training
investment and reflect a commitment to service members and their families.
The secretary of defense has made quality of life one of his top priorities. In November 1994, we
embarked on an ambitious course to assess and improve quality of life. The president announced an
unprecedented initiative that added $25 billion to the defense spending plan to provide more funding for
readiness and improve quality of life programs.
As part of this initiative, the secretary allocated $2.7 billion to the Future Years Defense Program to
increase Basic Allowance for Quarters, initiate a new cost of living allowance for high-cost areas in the
United States, improve housing, expand child care, bolster recreation programs and enhance family
violence prevention.
He established a quality of life task force of outside experts to provide recommendations for improving
housing and the delivery of community and family services and to provide options for reducing the time
service members spend away from home for training and mission requirements. At the same time, he
chartered an internal quality of life executive committee to support and implement the task force
recommendations.
We are now analyzing these task force recommendations and have achieved numerous
accomplishments during the past year that are significantly improving quality of life. I am going to
highlight a few of our initiatives in the areas of compensation, health care, housing, support to families of
service members currently deployed, and community and family support programs.
Since 1994, the law regulating the annual increase in military pay has called for pay raises that trail the
increase in private sector pay. It is essential that military pay remain competitive. In order to lessen the
disparity with private sector raises, the president's budget funds a 3 percent military pay raise that
emphasizes the department's commitment to pay comparability. This commitment sends a very positive
message to uniformed personnel that their country values their services and recognizes the unique
hardships, obligations and dangers of military service.
In FY 1996, the secretary added $43 million to housing allowances in order to reduce the amount of
out-of-pocket housing expenses for the two-thirds of military families residing in civilian communities. We
have increased our FY 1997 budget to maintain housing allowances at current levels. Also in FY 1996,
the secretary added $17.2 million to provide cost of living allowances within the United States where
payments for goods and services exceed the national average by more than 9 percent. This CONUS
[continental United States] COLA increase improved living standards for 30,000 service members living
in high-cost areas. Our FY 1997 budget maintains the CONUS COLA at current levels.
For reservists, two legislative changes adopted in 1995 will contribute to personnel readiness and
improved quality of life: the establishment of mobilization income insurance for Selected Reservists and
the requirement to provide Selected Reservists with a low-cost dental insurance program. Both of these
changes will be implemented beginning in FY 1997.
Military personnel deploying to Bosnia-Herzegovina continue to receive normal pay and allowances. In
addition, deployed troops are receiving imminent danger pay, family separation allowances and other
special pays. Thus, up to an additional $352 per month will go to deployed troops. We also support tax
waivers and delays. The amount will vary for civilian counterparts.
The department continues to support military retirement pay as a critical element of the overall military
compensation package. Any changes to this system amount to broken promises and have a negative
impact on retention and morale of our service members. At the same time, the department strongly
supports cost of living allowances to military retirement pay in order to maintain a measure of income
security for those who complete military service careers.
We envision a number of long-term compensation improvements and now are analyzing issues and
developing appropriate legislative proposals. For example, we hope to move toward a pay for
performance-oriented military pay system. While we recognize that increased pay for experience is
important, we believe that promotion and its associated responsibilities should be the principal
determinant of pay; appropriate reforms to the pay table can help us to achieve that goal.
We also hope to refine our housing allowances so that they increasingly will be able to provide the right
amount to every pay grade, in each location where our members are stationed. We want to ensure that
the allowances are credible and sufficient to provide each and every service member with the ability to
obtain housing that meets minimum adequacy standards. Key to our long-range vision is the ongoing
work of the Eighth Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation.
As part of the quality of life review, the department looked at the demands made on personnel, especially
time away from home. The quality of life task force made several observations and recommendations
that will be reviewed for their potential to help reduce personnel tempo and turbulence. Additionally, the
department continues to support programs aimed at increasing the stability of families despite
requirements for service member deployments.
Our goal is to find a balance between mission and training requirements and service members' need to
be with their families. To accomplish this goal, the quality of life executive committee will fully evaluate
task force and internal recommendations, which include reviewing programmed training and deployment
schedules, expanding use of reserve components to reduce the personnel tempo for the active force and
increasing contractor support of certain functions.
Military medicine faces compelling challenges at this time of unprecedented change in the nation's health
care system. One priority is medical readiness -- the need to be prepared wherever and whenever
service members are deployed, with the highest quality of care. At the current pace of worldwide
operations, our high focus on medical readiness has never been more important. Another equally
important task is to supply accessible, high-quality health care to the active duty force, family members,
retirees and other beneficiaries not currently involved in operations.
More than 8.3 million people are eligible to receive health care from the military health services system.
Direct care is delivered worldwide in 120 hospitals and numerous clinics. Care is also purchased from the
civilian sector through the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services and TRICARE
support contracts. The medical portion of the president's FY 1997 budget is approximately $15.4 billion,
or 6.2 percent of the entire defense budget.
TRICARE is the DoD regional managed health care program for members of the uniformed services and
their families, and survivors and retired members and their families. TRICARE brings together the health
care delivery systems of each of the military services, as well as CHAMPUS, in a cooperative and
supportive effort to better serve military patients and to better use the resources available to military
medicine.
TRICARE introduces to beneficiaries three choices for their health care delivery: TRICARE Standard, a
fee-for-service option which is the same as standard CHAMPUS; TRICARE Extra, which offers a
preferred provider option with discounts; and TRICARE Prime, an enrolled health maintenance
organization option.
All active duty members will be enrolled in TRICARE Prime, and families of active duty personnel who
choose to enroll in TRICARE Prime will have no enrollment fees. All Medicare-eligible DoD beneficiaries,
and those CHAMPUS-eligible beneficiaries who elect not to enroll in TRICARE Prime will remain eligible
for care in military medical facilities on a space-available basis.
TRICARE will provide health care coverage to active duty personnel and their families, and retirees,
survivors and their families until the retirees reach age 65. At that point, retirees become eligible for
Medicare and lose their eligibility to use civilian health care providers under the TRICARE program.
However, Medicare-eligible retirees may continue to use the services of military treatment facilities as
they are entitled to under law.
The department spends about $1.4 billion per year on over-65 retirees yet receives no reimbursement
from the Health Care Financing Administration for that care. The department believes it has a moral
obligation to provide health care for its retirees in the TRICARE HMO program and has sought legislation
that would enable us to enroll over-65 retirees in the TRICARE HMO program and to seek
reimbursement from HCFA for their care.
The department is strongly committed to dealing with specific issues such as any adverse health effects
that may have resulted from service during Operations Desert Shield/Storm. We are conducting an
aggressive, comprehensive clinical diagnostic effort to determine, as far as possible, the causes of the
symptoms in Persian Gulf veterans as described by the National Institutes of Health technology
assessment workshop panel. All Persian Gulf veterans are being offered an intensive clinical
examination.
Results from evaluations of over 18,500 patients completing the Comprehensive Clinical Evaluation
Program show that the majority have a definitive diagnosis or diagnoses that span a broad range of
clinical entities for which they are receiving treatment and responding favorably. For those remaining,
who have less definitive diagnoses, the department has established specialized care centers where
patients requiring further attention will continue to be evaluated and treated.
For Operation Joint Endeavor, the department is implementing enhanced medical surveillance measures.
These measures involve conducting medical assessments and informing personnel regarding potential
health risks prior to deployment; collecting data to localize health problems, facilitate outbreak
investigations and assess hazardous exposures during the operation; and doing medical assessments,
evaluations and epidemiological studies, and maintaining rosters upon return of the forces.
In addition, the department is conducting a demonstration aimed at the families of reserve component
personnel who have been activated for Operation Joint Endeavor. This demonstration will allow the
families of reservists called for more than 30 days to use CHAMPUS without having to meet the annual
deductible. Families of reservists called for 179 days or more and who reside in an area where TRICARE
Prime is offered may enroll. Both of these measures are designed to alleviate potential hardships on the
families of men and women called to serve.
Last year, the department placed special emphasis on trying to redress the condition of military housing.
This was one of the cornerstones of the secretary's quality of life initiative. We have made progress in
both family and bachelor housing, but we have only begun.
Family housing, like other quality of life programs, is key to readiness and retention. We have found that
the number of personnel remaining in the military from bases with high-quality housing is about 15
percent higher than those stationed at places with lower-quality housing. This is a telling figure when
deferred maintenance and replacement have resulted in 64 percent of military family housing being
classified as "unsuitable" by the services. Our FY 1996 budget contained a $500 million increase over
that previously planned and programmed in FY 1996. This increase is allowing us to construct or repair
over 11,000 family units.
We found similar problems in our bachelor housing. The average age of a barracks is 40 years, and 62
percent of our military bachelor housing is considered substandard due to overcrowding and poor
conditions. We began to rectify this situation with an FY 1996 increase of $673 million for barracks
construction and maintenance. As a result, 71 projects are funded this year to increase availability and
improve conditions. Our FY 1997 budget reflects the secretary of defense increase of almost $201 million
for barracks repair, maintenance and construction. These funds continue improvements in privacy and
other amenities to another 5,000 bachelor living areas.
The final piece of our housing initiative is our exploration of private sector partnerships. We set aside $22
million in FY 1996 to stimulate partnerships with a goal of increasing affordable and quality housing.
These projects focus on funding homebuilding, with lease-back options via private sector housing
ventures/partnerships. We established a Housing Revitalization Services Office that is overseeing these
efforts and have programmed an additional $20 million in our FY 1997 budget to continue this program.
We are providing dynamic support systems for military families of those mobilized and deployed in
support of peace-keeping in Bosnia. All military community and family support systems play a role,
including those of the National Guard and Reserve.
Lessons learned from previous deployments show that the primary issue for service members and their
families is need for information. Accurate information flow and family support systems help our families
cope with daily challenges while service members are deployed.
We have fielded several initiatives to provide this kind of support. For example, family readiness training
is provided throughout the entire deployment cycle to ensure appropriate information and support for
each phase, including pre- and post-deployment. We have also established five hot lines in Germany and
a Bosnia home page on the Internet.
In addition, our dependent schools overseas are providing assistance groups with certified counselors,
school psychologists and social workers. These groups will provide counseling to children to help them
cope while their military parents are away from home.
Finally, the department's morale, welfare and recreation programs provide numerous programs for
families of those deployed and are also providing on-site programs and services to deployed service
members.
The department provides social service, recreational and education programs wherever military families
are stationed that mirror those found in civilian communities while being tailored to unique challenges
associated with the more mobile military lifestyle. The department is also preparing a range of initiatives
to maximize opportunities for reservists and their families to participate in military community life.
Our budget request continues funds for service member and family support programs; morale, welfare
and recreation programs; off-duty voluntary education opportunities; the DoD Education Activity; and the
Defense Commissary Agency and exchanges. Highlights from each of these areas follow.
Child Development. The DoD child care program is by far the largest and one of the most successful
child development systems in the world. Over 65 percent of military spouses are in the labor force, and
many require child care. The department recently reassessed the need for child care and documented
that military families had some 299,000 children who need some kind of child care.
We are currently meeting about 52 percent of this need. The secretary added $38.1 million in FYs 1995,
1996 and 1997 to move child care availability toward the department's short-term goal of 65 percent of
the departmentwide demand. We will accomplish this by increasing child care spaces by about 39,000
children, with most of these spaces in the school-aged care programs. Our ultimate goal is to provide 80
percent of the departmentwide child care demand in the future. Our FY 1997 budget requests funding to
continue this initiative. We are also conducting tests of outsourcing child care, recognizing that the
department is nearing maximum potential to meet child care needs on base.
Family Advocacy. The Family Advocacy Program, now in its 11th year, has contributed to making the
rate of substantiated child abuse in military families less than half of the civilian rate. FAP has also been
successful in protecting victims when child or spouse abuse has occurred and in treating both the victims
and the abusers. During FY 1997, FAP will emphasize prevention of spouse abuse and provide
advocacy services to victims of child and spouse abuse.
Model Communities (Youth Initiative). Installation commanders and parents have identified increases in
youth violence and gang activity on installations as major concerns. As a result, DoD established a model
communities incentive award program to encourage installations worldwide to take responsibility for the
problems of youth and provide them with positive alternatives and a sense of connection to their
communities.
Each participating installation submitted proposals defining their local needs and describing a plan to
meet them. The 20 winning installations will serve as test projects for new ideas and as models for
military bases around the world. The winners received up to $200,000 per year for a three-year period.
Over the three years, DoD's investment in developing innovative programs in this area will be $6.4
million.
Family Center Programs. The department's 291 family centers continue to be the focal point for our basic
social services and support networks for the military community, offering a host of education, prevention
and social programs. In FY 1997, special emphasis will be placed on personal financial health and
spouse employment assistance. The spouse employment programs will focus on helping job seekers find
civilian sector jobs as the federal sector opportunities normally sought by military spouses dwindle.
Relocation and Transition Assistance Programs. Congress has directed the department to report on
phasing out our relocation and transition assistance programs and on what, if any, residual funding is
required. This report is being prepared; however, we do not view the basic functions of either of these
programs as temporary.
The relocation program provides education and assistance to the more than one-third of our force that
relocates each year. It has been and continues to be integral to our family center network and provides
benefits far beyond its annual $18 million cost.
Equally as important, transition assistance to the almost 300,000 service members who leave the military
each year remains a priority. The Defense Outplacement Referral System, a resume data base referral
system linking private sector employers to departing service members and spouses, had over 69,000
personnel and 13,431 employers registered in 1995. The Transition Bulletin Board, an automated system
that allows employers to list actual job openings that service members at military installations worldwide
can see, had 47,343 job openings and business opportunities listed in 1995. These programs help
service members find jobs more quickly and account for a cost avoidance of $152 million annually that
would have to be spent for unemployment compensation.
While we cannot phase out our important relocation and transition programs, we are looking at innovative
strategies for making them more affordable in the future.
Morale, Welfare and Recreation Programs. The Department of Defense provides morale, welfare and
recreation programs -- recreation and youth centers, libraries, sports and athletic programs -- to provide a
wholesome community for our military members and their families. MWR programs also include
revenue-generating activities such as bowling centers and golf courses, which not only provide
recreational opportunities but also generate profits used to improve other community MWR programs.
The programs and activities offered at our installations worldwide contribute to physical fitness and esprit
de corps and aid in recruitment and retention of personnel.
During the last two years, the department has improved and updated MWR programs. Beginning in FY
1996, we increased funding to make service appropriations for these vital programs more consistent.
Funds were targeted for improvements in Marine Corps and Army programs.
For FY 1997, the Navy has budgeted funds to improve fitness centers and libraries afloat, an action that
will improve quality of life aboard over 350 ships. As a result of a finding from the quality of life task force,
we will be examining the programs and facilities we provide for physical fitness on our installations and
working with the military departments to address shortcomings.
Off-Duty Voluntary Education Programs. The department has historically spent about $220 million
annually to support its very popular off-duty continuing education programs. About one-third of the active
force participates in these programs, earning thousands of associate, bachelors and masters degrees
from nationally accredited colleges and universities. The services provide their members with about $135
million in tuition assistance annually. Current initiatives include connecting all education centers to the
Internet and expanding options for service members to take courses and complete degrees using
distance education opportunities.
DoD Education Activity. In FY 1997, we project that we will provide education to some 87,000 students in
our DoD Dependents' School System overseas and 33,000 through our DoD Domestic Dependent
Elementary and Secondary Schools stateside. Additionally, we have oversight responsibilities and fiscal
support of eight special contractual arrangements with local education agencies in five states and Guam,
serving an additional 6,000 students.
During the past year, we have developed an aggressive strategic plan to support continued quality and
integrate the President's National Education Goals into our system. We have also integrated a
technology initiative aimed at improving staff and student performance into the 21st century. We have
added $7.5 million to the DoD Education Activity technology plan to develop the president's technology
initiative, which moves toward providing greater access to computers in classrooms, connects schools to
the information superhighway, develops effective subject area curriculum software and develops teacher
ability to help students use and learn through technology.
While we have been undergoing a tremendous amount of turbulence within our system over the past two
years, we have successfully minimized any adverse effects on children's education. Students at our
schools consistently scored eight to 19 percentile points above the national average in all
Comprehensive Test of Basic Skills and American College Test areas over the past school year.
We project that we will complete most of our school closures and realignments in Europe and the Pacific
by the end of this year.
Commissaries and Exchanges. The department continues to support our commissary system as an
important element of the military nonpay compensation package and a critical aspect of quality of life.
Secretary Perry remains firm that this benefit not be eroded.
Commissaries enhance income through savings of about 20 to 25 percent on purchases of food and
household items for the military member and family. For those stationed overseas, commissaries are
often the only source of American products and, in isolated or remote areas, the only convenient source
of groceries. We continue to work toward greater efficiencies in these stores. The Defense Commissary
Agency recently received the Hammer Award, recognizing significant innovations. It has also been
selected as a candidate for the National Performance Review Performance-Based Organization status.
Exchanges continue to support our service members and their families by providing goods and services
to them at affordable prices. The exchanges also generate revenues that fund recreational activities.
During the past year, the department took a hard look at policies that describe where and when we can
operate exchanges and commissaries. As a result, we have begun to allow certain exchange operations
and commissaries on those installations affected by closure or realignment where a significant number of
active duty service members remain.
Recognizing that members of the reserve component could also lose their exchanges and commissaries
as installations closed or realigned, we opened up a new BXMart at Homestead Air Force Reserve Base
in Florida. We will establish future test BXMarts only where programs indicate a profitable outcome.
Advanced weapons give U.S. armed forces tremendous advantages, but our national security ultimately
relies on the quality and commitment of the men and women who serve in uniform and the civilian
employees who support them. As the backbone of U.S. national security strategy, America's armed
forces are ready today to carry out this strategy. To maintain that status, the Defense Department will
continue to place its emphasis on quality people, quality training and quality of life.
The programs I have detailed to you in this statement are aimed toward these three goals, and we ask
you to support them. With the continued assistance of this subcommittee and the Congress, we will
ensure that the U.S. armed forces remain the best in the world.
DoD's Fiscal 1997 Acquisition and Technology
Program
Prepared statement of Paul G. Kaminski, undersecretary of defense for acquisition and technology, to
the Acquisition and Technology Subcommittee, Senate Armed Services Committee, March 20, 1996.
Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee and staff, thank you for the opportunity to appear before
you today to discuss the Department of Defense Acquisition and Technology Program.
The United States has the best led, trained and equipped military force in the world today. Since World
War II, fielding technologically superior forces has been the cornerstone of our national military strategy.
This advantage has allowed our forces to deter, and when deterrence failed, prevail over numerically
large enemy forces. Our predecessors invested wisely in technology in the 1960s and 1970s. The result
was an overwhelming, swift, decisive victory in Desert Storm and a continuing deterrence of our potential
adversaries.
In today's post-Cold War world, our planning must cope with increased uncertainty. We are far less
certain about who our future adversaries will be or what technology we will face. In today's global
economy, everyone, including our potential adversaries, will gain increasing access to the same
commercial technology base. The military advantage will go to the nation which has the best cycle time to
capture technologies that are commercially available, incorporate them in weapon systems and field new
operational capabilities.
Mr. Chairman, the strategic focus of the defense acquisition and technology program is on fielding
superior operational capability and reducing weapon system life cycle costs. We have maintained this
focus since the Gulf War. As impressive as our military accomplishments were against Saddam Hussein,
our forces are qualitatively superior today. We received an inkling of what combat will look like in the 21st
century in our support of the NATO combat Operation Deliberate Force in Bosnia.
In Desert Storm, only 2 percent of the weapons expended during the air war were precision guided
munitions. During the NATO combat Operation Deliberate Force in Bosnia, PGMs accounted for over 90
percent of the ordnance expended by U.S. forces. We have employed these weapons with great
precision. The bomb damage assessment photographs in Bosnia bear no resemblance to BDA photos of
the past where the target, often undamaged, is surrounded by craters.
The Bosnia BDA photos show one crater where the target used to be and virtually no collateral damage.
We have moved to one target, two weapons, and are moving to a situation of one target, one weapon.
This has been the promise for the past 20 years, now it is becoming a reality.
Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to report that these capabilities are being fielded at less cost to the American
taxpayer. This would not have been possible without the help and support from the members of this
subcommittee. Working together, the Congress and the department have implemented sweeping
acquisition reforms that are reducing the life cycle costs of our weapon systems. We now have examples
of cost avoidance in the range of 15 to 50 percent. As these savings and cost avoidance opportunities
are identified, they are applied during the department's budget process. The president's FY [fiscal year]
1997 budget request includes the benefits of the department's ongoing program of acquisition reform.
Technology Strategy. One point that I made before the subcommittee last year, but one that always
needs emphasizing, is that stable, sustained investments in the technology base, technology "on ramps"
and advanced concept technology demonstrations are essential for military superiority. A long
commitment to this strategy is required over years and decades to achieve significant results; it is not
possible to wait until advanced technology is clearly needed in a system to begin investment; by then, it is
too late.
Today's leading edge systems were made possible through decades of investment in fundamental
science and exploratory development work. The technology base initiated in the 1960s and the
technology "on ramps" sustained in the 1970s gave us the stealth aircraft, precision guided munitions
and night vision systems that provided U.S. forces with a decisive combat edge during the 1991 Gulf War.
As I pointed out last year, the Air Force's F-117 stealth fighter, so effective in Desert Storm, can be traced
to a mathematical formulation for radar scattering from geometric shapes and the development of radar
absorbing materials that date back to the early 1960s.
The Basic Research, or 6.1, account within the RDT&E [research, development, test and evaluation]
appropriation is the source of new knowledge and understanding that ultimately forms the foundation for
future military capabilities. Over the 50 years since DoD founded its first basic research office, basic
research has sometimes paid immediate dividends, with a transition of technology directly from the
laboratory bench to defense systems in the field.
For example, last year researchers applied high-speed, experimental computational fluid dynamics
techniques to solve an operational problem encountered on the C-17 airlifter. During certain flight
regimes, paratroops deploying on each side of the C-17 would bump-and-tangle. CFD technology
enabled engineers to quickly define the combination of C-17 flight parameters (airspeed and angle of
attack) that allows paratroopers to safely and simultaneously exit from both sides of the aircraft.
In most cases though, the full benefits of the department's investment in basic research do not become
apparent until much later. It is only in hindsight that we are able to clearly discern the patterns of basic
research that spawned revolutionary military capabilities over the past several decades -- such as the
capabilities provided by the Global Positioning System, Arpanet, night vision, high-speed computer chips,
lasers and fiber optics.
The department's investment in basic research is focused on science and engineering areas with the
greatest long-term potential for defense application. Even though DoD's total 6.1 funding is less than 10
percent of the federal investment in basic research, the DoD provides almost two-thirds of total federal
support for basic research in electrical engineering, mechanical engineering and materials science.
The importance of these DoD investments to national security cannot be overstated, as evidenced by the
promise of several recent scientific accomplishments. DoD-sponsored basic research has produced a
way to make stable, high-temperature silicon carbide fibers that can be used to make the parts for a new
generation of high-performance, low-pollution aircraft engines. These engine parts will function at 2,000
degrees without degradation -- hundreds of degrees hotter than alternative materials.
Our fertile nanoscience program has produced experimental operating transistors with feature sizes of 30
billionths of a meter. Building on this success, we are beginning to control electronic properties on a scale
of less than 10 billionths of a meter. Circuits using such dimensions will have up to 1,000 times the
number of electronic components of today's computer chips -- a quantum leap in circuit technology.
The department benefits greatly from investment in basic research at universities, industry and in-house
laboratories. Universities carry out about 60 percent of the total 6.1 program -- basic research is a core
competency of the universities, and university research pays additional dividends through the associated
training of future scientists and engineers in disciplines important to national defense. Approximately
one-quarter of the 6.1 program is performed by DoD and other federal laboratories to focus on areas
where extramural capability is unavailable, and about 15 percent is performed by industry and nonprofit
institutions other than universities.
With respect to resources, the president's FY 1997 budget request maintains zero real growth in the 6.1
basic research account. This carefully considered request reflects the importance that the department
places on sustaining the long-term foundation for future military capabilities. I urge your support of the full
request.
The Exploratory Development, or 6.2, account within the RDT&E appropriation is the second component
of the department's technology base investment and is the mechanism for exploiting new knowledge and
understanding for future military capabilities. We are vigorously exploiting 10 technology areas: sensors
and electronics; information systems and technology; weapons; advanced materials and materials
processes; airborne platforms; nuclear, biological and chemical defense; human systems; ground
vehicles and watercraft; medical and biomedical; and space platforms.
One illustrative example of the military payoffs associated with sustained investment in 6.2 exploratory
development programs is the F-119 engine that powers the F-22 fighter. This engine, by virtue of its
ability to sustain supersonic flight without afterburning and its high thrust-to-weight ratio, dramatically
increases the capability of the aircraft as well as reducing the weight and cost penalties associated with
stealth. There are many critical technologies that have made this engine possible. In the area of materials
and processes alone, they include graphite polyimide fan components, hollow-bladed fans with an
integral rotor, thermal barrier coatings for high-temperature parts and various other processing
techniques. All of these technology developments and many more date back to the department's
investment in 6.2 exploratory development programs in the 1970s and 1980s. Most of these programs
were executed largely before the precise needs for the F-119 or the F-22 were identified.
Superior weapon systems like the Army's Big Five heroes of Desert Storm -- Apache, Black Hawk,
Patriot, Abrams and Bradley -- the Air Force's F-117 stealth fighter and the Navy's Tomahawk cruise
missiles are all products of well planned technology "on ramps." It is clear that technology base
investments, focused on specific technological objectives, must be made well in advance of specific
system requirements. Nonetheless, as system requirements begin to emerge, it is also necessary to
adjust science and technology efforts, particularly in the 6.3 advanced development arena, to ensure that
potential sources of technological risk are addressed. Technological risk is further reduced through
technology insertion roadmaps leading to system level demonstration and validation and/or engineering
and manufacturing development efforts.
An example that illustrates this point is the M-829A1 kinetic energy projectile, used very effectively as a
tank killer in the Gulf War. As with many other developments, its technological origins can be traced to
the 1960s, with fundamental efforts on energetic materials, mechanics of composite materials and
penetration mechanics. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, exploratory development efforts
addressed the more application-oriented areas of propulsion technology, aluminum and composite
materials, and target interactions.
These efforts, while focused on specific technological objectives that would improve kinetic energy
projectiles, were not focused on a specific requirement. In the mid-1980s, however, when the need for a
new projectile began to emerge, 6.3 advanced development efforts were initiated to focus on the
technological risk associated with the specific design aspects of the projectile: charge, sabot and
penetrator. These risk-reduction efforts enabled a short development program leading to an initial
operational capability in 1989.
The Joint Strike Fighter program is a technology "on ramp" for providing the U.S. Navy with a first day of
the war survivable aircraft, the U.S. Air Force with a 21st century replacement of its F-16 fleet and the
U.S. Marine Corps with an AV-8B replacement. Technology insertion roadmaps exist to reduce risk and
take advantage of technological advances in a more-electric airframe, shared radio-frequency apertures
and sensors, shared electro-optical apertures and sensors, advanced packaging and cooling techniques
for integrated avionics and many others.
A final example illustrating a technology "on ramp" for a specific application is in the air-to-air missile
technology arena. We have maintained a sustained annual technology base investment in core
technologies relevant to air-to-air missiles: advanced processing, fuzing, propulsion and the like.
However, when a specific application is identified, such as the AIM-9X, exploratory and advanced
development investments are made in technology areas specific to the application to reduce the
technological risk. Accordingly, we are currently making investments in areas such as high
angle-of-attack operation, airframe control, and infrared guidance and integrated fuzing to reduce the risk
associated with incorporation into the AIM-9X.
In many cases, the technology associated with a new system or piece of equipment is mature and the
technical risk is low, but the operational risk high. In order to gain acceptance in the field, the advanced
technology must be married with a suitable employment doctrine. This is one thing that I think has not
been given adequate emphasis in the past. We have traditionally underestimated the importance of
developing the appropriate doctrine, the tactics for employment, the training and the people who use
technologically advanced systems.
Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations are designed to rapidly transfer technology from the
developers to the users by focusing on concept -- not technology -- risk reduction. ACTDs are
user-oriented and even user-dominated. They are an integrated effort to assemble and demonstrate
significant, new and improved military capability that is based upon mature advanced technologies. Each
ACTD is based on actual military operations or demonstrations which are jointly developed and
implemented with the operational users and material development communities as key participants.
In FY 1995, Congress and the Department of Defense initiated the first 10 ACTDs. As originally
conceived, ACTDs are relatively short-term efforts to assess the potential and develop the doctrine,
concepts of operations and tactics for new technologies prior to committing to formal acquisition. ACTDs
are a critical precursor to formal acquisition. As such they can support both our operational needs and
our legitimate acquisition requirements and serve as a means to reduce both operational risk and
acquisition cycle times.
ACTDs are specifically intended to be completed within two to four years. Of the 10 initiated in FY 1995,
several have already achieved their initial objectives and are completed or very near completion. All of
these demonstrations have provided significant insight and added capability for operational forces. They
have afforded the appropriate commanders with an opportunity to evaluate new technologies and assess
the impact of this technology on their present and emerging military missions.
The most well known ACTD is the Predator medium altitude unmanned aerial vehicle. Predator
progressed from a concept to a three system operational capability in a period of less than 30 months.
Each system consists of three air vehicles, the appropriate ground stations and communications support.
Predator flew its first flight in July 1994 and deployed to the Bosnia theater in July 1995. On March 1 of
this year Predator again deployed as an ACTD to European Command to support Operation Joint
Endeavor. On July 1, 1996, we are planning to complete the ACTD and transfer the Predator to the Air
Force, which will provide the UAV operational support to our joint task force commanders. Both the
technical and operational lessons learned during the real world operational application of this ACTD are
facilitating our acquisition of the Predator UAV.
In January 1996, we completed the Cruise Missile Phase I Mountain Top ACTD. This ACTD involved
participation by the Navy, Army and Air Force and very successfully demonstrated the concept of
cooperative engagement, supported by airborne sensors, of low-flying cruise missiles. This is a critical
step in assessing our future needs and the technology applications which will be needed to address the
emerging cruise missile threat. The technical concept demonstrated during this ACTD provides us with
the ability to significantly leverage our present surface and airborne weapons systems.
The Joint Countermine ACTD, still in execution, is a cornerstone of the department's efforts to ensure
that the countermine efforts in all of our military services are coordinated and complementary. The ACTD
addresses the issue of providing a joint task force commander with a seamless countermine capability
which flows from the deep water, through the shallow water, surf zone and up on to the land. As such,
this ACTD involves significant participation by the Navy, Marine Corps, Army and our unified
commanders. This ACTD is addressing many technologies relevant to the countermine issues in Bosnia,
and we are continually assessing, in coordination with the Joint Staff, the maturity of these technologies
for possible deployment in support of Operation Joint Endeavor.
The ACTDs initiated in FY 1995 and the nine started in FY 1996 leverage approximately $1 billion in
military service and DoD agency technology programs. To ensure the ACTDs address the warfighters'
needs and requirements, they are coordinated closely with the Joint Staff through the Joint Requirement
Oversight Council and Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment groups. This coordination ensures that
we focus our present and future ACTDs on legitimate present and emerging joint warfighting issues. The
Joint Staff and JROC provides the critical link to the unified commanders-in-chief.
ACTDs are an effective, inexpensive means to evaluate the operational utility of mature technologies
emerging from the DoD Science and Technology Program and from investment by other government
agencies, industry or our allies. As indicated earlier, ACTDs are focused on the needs of the military user.
They provide us with the ability to quickly respond to unanticipated needs and take advantage of
technology advances before they proliferate or become obsolete.
Congress has provided the department with a powerful tool, which has been used in executing ACTDs.
Section 845 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1994 provided the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency authority to conduct technology demonstrations and prototype projects of
military systems using nonprocurement contracts.
Section 845 provides unparalleled flexibility in contracting. DARPA [Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency] is successfully using this authority to conduct several projects including the
high-altitude endurance unmanned aerial vehicle program, Tier II Plus (Global Hawk) and the stealthy
Tier III Minus (DarkStar). The Navy/DARPA program to apply commercial practices to the arsenal ship
will also utilize this approach.
With Section 845 authority, DARPA conducts experiments with the acquisition process and attempts to
tailor the process for each project to achieve optimum results. DARPA has encouraged teaming,
integrated product and process development, established performance goals rather then specifications
and introduced such innovations as having a single firm requirement, namely the price of production
versions of the prototype.
We have strengthened our requirements, technology assessment, technology development and
demonstration processes with initiatives like Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations and the
Joint Warfighting S&T Plan. The department has taken these steps to ensure the S&T program is
militarily relevant and technically sound.
Working with the Joint Staff and services, the director of defense research and engineering has
developed and currently has in coordination the Joint Warfighting S&T Plan. This plan supports the FY
1997 budget and is responsive to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff vision for the future
battlespace. It is directed towards exploiting the rapid pace of technology advances and gaining
information superiority to enable enhanced dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full-dimension
protection and focused logistics operational concepts. The department's future success in achieving this
vision will in large measure depend upon supporting the technology roadmaps that are essential to
achieving the joint warfighting capability objectives cited in the Joint Warfighting S&T Plan.
The Joint Warfighting S&T Plan complements the revised Defense Technology Area Plan and our first
Basic Research Plan. Another innovation this year is that in collaboration with the services and agencies,
we have developed 300 defense technology objectives and six strategic research objectives to help
focus and improve management of our S&T investment. These plans will be made available over the next
several months to support industry and university decisions about how to invest their research funding.
Dual-Use Strategy. The department's dual-use strategy remains one key to ensuring our military forces
will have affordable access to the world's best technology. Last year, I testified before this subcommittee
that commercial industry surpassed the DoD in R&D spending back in 1965 and that the disparity
between DoD and commercial sector investment in R&D has been growing wider ever since. Those
trends have continued over the past year. The bottom line for the department is that we have no choice
but to move from separate industrial sectors for defense needs and commercial markets to an integrated
national industrial base.
Leveraging the commercial sector, the essence of the dual-use strategy, gives us a tremendous
opportunity to field advanced weapons both more quickly and affordably. The department's dual-use
strategy consists of three pillars:

Invest in dual-use technologies critical to military applications;


Integrate military and commercial production;
Insert commercial components into military systems.
The first pillar means leveraging the commercial sector's base of research and technology to foster
militarily useful technology. The second involves leveraging the commercial sector's low-cost production
capabilities by manufacturing commercial and military items on the same production lines. The third pillar
requires creating the incentives and management approaches inside the DoD necessary to facilitate
using these dual-use, dual-produced items in military equipment.
Last year, I cited multichip modules as one example of the department's investment in dual use
technology. MCMs are semiconductor chips packaged together on a single substrate and integrated
together into a single package or module. Because MCMs have application in a multitude of defense
systems, where they can offer increased performance and reliability in a smaller package, DoD
jump-started this technology with early investments.
Our aim at the outset was to improve the state of the art of the technology and more importantly, lower
production costs so that MCMs became affordable for defense applications. The key to lower cost is
larger production volume, and larger volume production comes from increased use of MCMs in
commercial items.
I am pleased to report that the department still expects to see a factor of 10 decrease in costs as
production volume increases. We are starting to see results from our investment. In 1990, the Defense
Department was the only customer -- there was practically no commercial market. Last year, I was able
to tell you that commercial applications are using over half of total sales of MCMs. That trend is
continuing. Several of the companies that originally depended solely on the department's research and
development investment, such as nCHIP and MicroModule Systems, are now profitably producing
hundreds of thousands of modules for commercial computer workstations.
These MCM manufacturers have also successfully produced dozens of prototype modules for use in
military systems and can expect to receive volume production orders for future defense systems. Until
they do, they are being sustained through orders for their commercial products. The U.S. manufacturing
base for this important technology is robust but does not rely on DoD for its sole support. DoD gains
access to the most advanced technology, without paying to support the entire manufacturing base and
can take advantage of low-cost, volume production for its specialized needs.
Holographic data storage is another technology with both military and commercial applications. In this
case, the advancement of the technology is being accomplished with investments from DoD and from
industry. Holographic data storage forms the new frontier in storage technology. Information is stored in a
volume instead of on the surface of a disk. This makes possible the storage of 10s of gigabits of digital
data in a volume the size of a sugar cube. The data can be found and retrieved 10 to 100 times faster
than current storage devices and accessed at random.
The Photorefractive Information Storage Materials and the Holographic Data Storage System consortia
bring together prominent researchers from the universities, the aerospace industry, the computer
industry, the electronics and materials industry, as well as a telecommunications provider and two small
start-up companies. With equal funding contributions from industry and DARPA, these consortia carry
out coordinated research and development programs on advanced holographic mass data storage
technology leading to the development and demonstration of advanced storage platforms.
By leveraging each other's unique expertise, the consortia are able to perform an overall development
task that none of the participants was willing or capable of carrying out on their own. More importantly,
DoD does not have to bear the cost of this development task alone. Instead, government funding can
stimulate and supplement this very important research and development effort. In return, DoD has the
potential to gain storage devices of unequaled performance.
To date, the consortia have developed demonstration devices that store and retrieve vast amounts digital
video and audio clips. As the military improves its data collection capabilities, the ability to store and
access large amounts of data becomes paramount. The new data storage capability we expect from
holographic data storage will have a major impact in such areas as intelligence, information warfare,
target recognition and command and control operations. Commercial applications abound as well, for
efficient data retrieval from libraries and image repositories.
The FY 1997 president's budget contains $250 million to begin the Dual-Use Applications Program, a
joint program conducted by the three military departments, DARPA and DDR&E. The DUAP will
introduce dual-use R&D approaches into the military services as a new norm by developing dual use
technologies for the direct benefit of military users. Building on lessons from our past experience in this
area, the DUAP will embed this new way of doing business throughout the military services by building a
cadre of people who understand and accept it through real experience with it. The service acquisition
executives are committed to using DUAP to apply technology they need and leverage dual-use R&D
more effectively in their departments.
DUAP funds will create an opportunity for service program managers to fund new technology through a
dual-use approach. R&D projects will be solicited as government/industry partnerships, selected to meet
service needs and managed by the services using new authorities and methods. Each project will include,
up front, a clear path for the technology to be used in a military system. As a joint program, the DUAP will
be a unique forum for all the services to simultaneously refine and share what they learn about dual-use
R&D while working on technologies of joint interest. Without shared, joint learning in the right
environment, our progress in making dual use a new norm will be much, much slower. Think of the DUAP
as the joint dual-use battle lab.
The Commercial Technology Insertion Program, being initiated in FY 1997 at a level of $50 million, will
accelerate the insertion of commercial technologies into defense systems by working with the services to
identify opportunities and to provide the funds necessary to overcome barriers to insertion. Funds will be
used to qualify commercial technology for defense systems, to adapt commercial technologies to meet
military needs or to modify military systems to accept a commercial technology.
An ongoing success story, the insertion of active matrix liquid crystal displays in weapon system cockpits,
is being used as a model for the CTIP. This project is being funded by Title III of the Defense Production
Act and is providing funds to program offices to qualify and/or accelerate the purchase of AMLCDs into
weapon systems.
Seven AMLCD insertion efforts are under way. One of these efforts is the Army's AH-64D Longbow
Apache helicopter, which is in the middle of an upgrade program. The Apache Program Office wanted to
incorporate AMLCDs into the Longbow but lacked the funds required to qualify them and was planning to
use cathode ray tubes in their upgrade program. The insertion program is providing the funds required for
qualification, allowing AMLCD technology to be incorporated into the Longbow with no schedule slippage
and at a comparable acquisition cost. The results will be four new color displays per aircraft. These
displays will be smaller, lighter in weight and more reliable and capable than the previously planned
equipment complement.
Project selection for the Commercial Technology Insertion Program is scheduled for April 1996, which
will allow the defense subcommittees to preview precisely where we propose to invest the FY 1997 funds.
Selection will be based on the impact the technology will have on the defense system's life cycle costs
and performance, the pervasive impact the technology will have on a range of defense systems and the
commitment of the service to provide downstream funding needed for the acquisition of the technology.
Small Business Innovation Research Program. This program is executed by the services and defense
agencies. Its objective is to involve small business in federal R&D, to increase the commercialization of
technology developed by federal R&D and to increase the use of commercial technology in defense
systems. The program has been very successful and has resulted, for example, in development of
innovative fuel cell technology to produce electricity and water and lightweight head mounted displays.
Under the SBIR program, DoD will fund approximately $550 million in R&D projects at small technology
companies in FY 1997 -- projects that serve a DoD need and have commercial potential.
Small Business Technology Transfer Program. STTR is a three-year pilot program, initiated in 1993,
under which DoD will fund $30 million in FY 1997 in cooperative R&D projects between a small
technology company and a research institution (i.e., a university, federally funded R&D center or
nonprofit research institution).
The STTR program serves a different function than the one addressed by the SBIR program. It is a
complementary program that enables a researcher at a research institution to spin off a commercially
promising, dual-use idea with a small technology company. Thus, whereas SBIR exploits the ideas in our
small business sector, STTR taps into a vast new reservoir of dual-use ideas in our nation's research
institutions.
Government-Industry-University Research Initiative. In the U.S. today, universities are the principal
performers of long-term research. Industry has reduced the size of its in-house research laboratories,
and its investment is oriented more towards near-term applied research rather than long-term basic
research. Yet the DoD and other government agencies have mission-driven reasons to seek long-term
research advantages in relevant technologies.
The department must find a way to fund and execute long-term research and to leverage the strengths of
government, industry and the universities. This proposed new initiative calls for a three-way partnership
between the government, industry and universities. Funds would be provided by both the government
and industry to university centers. Government would ensure that research remained long-term in nature
and mission-relevant. Industry would ensure that the research had promise for delivering commercially
successful products.
This would provide a new mechanism to link universities (the long-term research performer) with industry
(the short-term product producer), doubling the level of industry investment in strategically directed
research focus areas.
A test case is currently under way at the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency in the area of
advanced lithography. We anticipate industry matching funds will be forthcoming. This effort
complements a National Science Foundation effort cofunded with industry.
NATO Cooperative R&D Program. In the post-Cold War world, the United States no longer faces a single
galvanizing threat such as the former Soviet Union. Instead, there is increased likelihood of our forces
being committed to limited regional military actions -- coalition operations -- in which allies are important
partners. In this climate, the United States seeks armaments cooperation with its friends and allies for
three reasons:

The first reason is political. These programs help strengthen the connective tissue -- the military and
industrial relationships -- that bind our nations in a strong security relationship.

The second reason is military. There is a need to deploy forces with interoperable equipment and
rationalized logistics in a coalition environment.

And the third is economic. Our defense budgets and those of our allies are shrinking -- what we
cannot afford individually may be affordable with a common effort.
To promote new cooperative arrangements, the FY 1997 budget request contains funding for NATO
cooperative R&D programs. These programs have fielded significant new capabilities for U.S. and allied
forces. For example, a NATO R&D cooperative effort transitioned into the F-16 mid-life update, which
resulted in increased U.S.-European F-16 interoperability and $2 billion in international codevelopment.
In another case, a $17 million investment in a NATO cooperative R&D program led to the successful
integration of a new fire-control radar into the AV-8 Harrier for the Marine Corps and $900 million in
foreign sales for U.S. industry.
We have restructured the NATO R&D program for FY 1997 to better meet the current challenges facing
the U.S. and its allies and to improve the management of this important program. Resources for the
international programs have been integrated into the defense planning and budgeting process of the
military departments. Funds are now requested in four program elements, one for defensewide
applications or new starts, and a separate program element for efforts transitioned to each military
department.
Selection decisions for new projects will be made with the coordination of the responsible service
acquisition executive. important new projects envisioned for FY 1997 are combat identification to reduce
likelihood of friendly fire casualties, and international command and control systems to enhance
battlefield awareness. Both projects are directed towards improving the effectiveness of coalition
operations with our allies. Finally, the CinCs are being consulted in the identification and approval of new
cooperative projects.
The Foreign Comparative Testing Program allows the department to evaluate whether the defense
equipment developed by our allies and other reliable foreign sources can satisfy DoD requirements or
correct mission area shortcomings. In cases where U.S. requirements are met, the department is able to
avoid development costs to meet a validated requirement. For example, a $10.5 million FCT evaluation
of the Israeli-developed Have Nap missile allowed the United States to save $165 million in development
costs and six years in development schedule.
The FCT program has been an unqualified success. Since its inception, the United States has procured
over $3 billion worth of nondevelopmental items through the FCT program. By the end of FY 1995, 341
FCT projects and 77 procurements were completed. In the process, the United States avoided the costs
of new start developmental programs, realized cost savings due to foreign competition, fielded
equipment rapidly and created international industrial teaming opportunities for U.S. industry.
The department has been reducing its extensive RDT&E infrastructure, including the defense
laboratories, through the base realignment and closure process. Significant consolidations of defense
laboratory functions have already been made by the department as a result of the base closures and
realignments made in 1988 and the three implementation years of 1991, 1993 and 1995 associated with
the base realignment and closure law of 1990. More consolidation is necessary and planned over the
department's Future Years Defense Program.
In May 1996, the department will report on the development of a comprehensive plan for its laboratories
and test and evaluation centers in the 21st century. This plan will take about 18 months to develop and
will be fully implemented, as required by the FY 1996 Defense Authorization Act, by Oct. 1, 2005. It will
provide an affordable, balanced blueprint for structuring our RDT&E organizations and sizing our RDT&E
infrastructure to respond to the needs of the warfighter in a dynamic technological environment.
The department's vision for the defense laboratories will be based on three pillars: reduction,
restructuring (to include cross-servicing) and reinvestment (for infrastructure modernization). The
five-year plan will lay out the department's ongoing process to look for new opportunities to tailor our
laboratories to tomorrow's mission challenges.
The plan will build upon the previous reductions achieved through the BRAC process. It will be fully
responsive to the provisions of the FY 1996 defense authorization bill, Section 277, as well as to the
president's NSTC guidance, doing so in an integrated way and as an element of the overall vision. The
plan will seek congressional bipartisan support for the DoD RDT&E Infrastructure Vision 21 through
passage of new enabling legislation.
The Defense Advanced Research Project Agency FY 1997 budget request is $2.178 billion. This is 17
percent below the FY 1996 request in nominal terms and represents almost a 5 percent decline in real
dollars from the FY 1996 appropriated level. It is a real decline of about 20 percent from the FY 1994
budget. This is an appropriate level of funding for the agency.
DARPA's strategic investment is guided by the needs of the military warfighters overlayed by a
technological vision. The unified commanders, the chairman and the Joint Staff must focus on their
immediate needs. The technologist, however, should take those needs and match them with
technological capabilities to derive a vision for the military 20 years in the future. DARPA's investments
are guided by such visions in each of several militarily important areas. The agency funds
demonstrations of systems and component technologies and the underlying, long-term technology
development necessary to make the visions a reality.
The objective is to provide the warfighter with the tools he needs to confront the uncertainties of the
future battlefield and to dominate that battlefield. Among DARPA's top military priorities, areas where
technology can make a difference to the warfighter, are biological warfare defense, improved operations
of small military units and battlefield dominance.
To expand a bit, biological warfare defense is unfortunately an area in which our nation is deficient. It is
also an area that is easy for adversaries to exploit. DARPA plans a major effort to focus on those
technological solutions that complement efforts ongoing elsewhere in the department, particularly in the
Army, concentrating on the high-risk end of advanced detectors, countermeasures and improved
treatment options.
The warfighters, particularly the Marine Corps with their Sea Dragon concept and to a lesser extent the
Army with Force XXI, are pursuing concepts of operations that are ahead of technology in the area of
small unit operations. This operational concept can exploit the technological strengths of the U.S. by
using technology to provide the superior situational awareness, covert communications, precise
navigation and efficient logistics support that will enable small, dispersed forces to operate cohesively
against much larger forces. DARPA is working closely with the services, especially the Marine Corps, in
this effort. The FY 1997 budget request for DARPA includes $52.7 million for this effort.
In a separate thrust, DARPA has refocused its activities to assist the warfighter in achieving the
battlefield dominance so necessary for current and future joint warfare. This includes technologies and
systems leading to comprehensive battlefield awareness, which is the ability to know where everything is
and what it is doing; and information integration, particularly near-real-time command, control,
communications, planning and replanning, to get data where it is needed and use it for real-time
planning.
This investment area includes ACTDs with direct warfighter participation and development programs in
data collection, exploitation and dissemination, dynamic sensor management, C3 for the joint task force
commander, air campaign planning and execution, and the communications infrastructure and shared
data bases that support all of these tasks. These very significant efforts in support of the warfighters' total
$184.9 million and represent one of the major thrusts to exploit information technologies for military
capabilities.
Also included in this battlefield dominance thrust is DARPA's continued investment in advanced
distributed synthetic environments. These technologies are improving the military's ability to conduct
realistic, cost-effective training of forces and joint task force commanders, allowing them to exercise their
new battlefield dominance capabilities. We saw the fruits of this in Atlantic Resolve Ô94, and we are
moving towards further demonstrations under Synthetic Theater of War 97.
One key part of the battlefield dominance equation is surveillance and data collection. DARPA and the
Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office are working together on the high-altitude endurance
unmanned air vehicle system, which consists of two complementary air vehicles. One, the Tier III Minus
DarkStar, will soon fly for the first time. The other, Tier II Plus (Global Hawk), will finalize its design this
spring, and first flight is scheduled for December 1996. DARPA's budget request includes $14.7 million
for Tier III Minus; additional Tier III Minus and Tier II Plus funding is included in the DARO FY 1997
request.
In the area of naval warfare, DARPA is refocusing its programs to concentrate on advanced submarine
technologies and on technologies for the Navy's exciting new arsenal ship concept, with a request of
$16.4 million for the latter. DARPA and the Navy will work together on this effort to provide a new
paradigm for Navy shipbuilding and to achieve lower costs and greatly reduced manning levels.
DARPA has been active in the area of microelectromechanical systems for four years, and plans to
continue its investment in this area, requesting $54.8 million for FY 1997 efforts. MEMS holds exciting
possibilities for revolutionizing a myriad of military systems ranging from miniature inertial measurement
units for munitions and personal navigation, distributed unattended sensors, noninvasive biomedical
sensors and distributed aerodynamic control. The department's investment in this technology will position
the military to take advantage of new applications as they become known.
A second interesting enabling technology that warrants increased investment is the area of high
energy-density power sources such as small, highly efficient batteries, self-sustaining fuel cells and
miniturbine engines. These technologies are particularly applicable to tomorrow's highly mobile,
information-intense environment. In addition, the combination of miniturbine engines and MEMS devices
hold promise for a variety of futuristic, tiny systems, such as microunmanned air vehicles and
human-portable cooling systems.
DARPA continues to support long-term funding in those critical technologies underpining the 20-year
military visions. Information technologies are obviously key to many of the capabilities needed by the
future warfighter, especially technologies for robust, massive, mobile information networks applicable to
the military in the field and technology to make information systems easier to use and more useful. In FY
1997 and future years, DARPA plans to expand its emphasis on the difficult problem of information
survivability.
The department has strengthened its management of federally funded research and development
centers and university-affiliated research centers to ensure the most effective and prudent use of the
centers while providing measures to guard against abuse. The work content and the operations of each
of these centers have been closely scrutinized over the past year. FFRDCs and UARCs are sized
consistent with essential sponsor requirements, acquisition reform initiatives and defense strategies and
budgets.
We have strengthened our management controls, including managing the workload of our centers to the
core concept, transitioning ongoing work that is noncore out of the centers, and establishing consistent
management fee guidelines. We have established new, stringent criteria for the performance of
non-FFRDC work by the parent corporation of an FFRDC. And finally, we have established an
independent advisory group of highly respected people from outside the government to independently
assess the adequacy of ongoing DoD management actions.
In summary, the department has responded to the legitimate concerns of the Congress. We have
implemented needed management reforms, and it is now time to restore the normal process for fiscal
oversight of FFRDCs and UARCs. Accordingly, we are requesting the four defense oversight committees
to discontinue the practice started a few years ago of inserting special language in annual authorization
and appropriation bills to limit DoD spending at FFRDCs. Such measures are no longer needed, and they
unnecessarily constrain DoD's ability to effectively and efficiently use FFRDCs for appropriate national
security tasks.
The department's test and evaluation infrastructure contains some of the most technically advanced and
complex facilities in the world and provides critical support to our weapons system development
programs. Our major facilities are managed under a departmentwide major range and test facility base
directive to satisfy the needs of all the military services and defense agencies -- not just the service or
component that operates the facilities. This structure provides a basis for minimizing unnecessary
redundancy.
In FY 1997, the institutional funding for operating the MRTFB facilities amounts to about $1 billion, or
about 3 percent of the department's RDT&E budget and about 1.5 percent of the total funding for DoD
infrastructure. The military and civilian work force at these facilities account for slightly more than 1
percent of the department's military and civilian work force. At some MRTFB centers, government
personnel comprise only a small fraction of the work force, but on the average, they comprise a little less
than 60 percent of the work force at the RDT&E-funded MRTFB activities. The remaining 43 percent of
the work force is composed of contractor personnel.
The funding and work force for the department's T&E centers have been on a downward slope since
about 1987. This downsizing trend has lagged overall changes in the defense budget, but has been
tracking with the needs of our major weapons development programs as they enter their test and
evaluation phases.
Some examples of our major consolidation actions include the closure of Jefferson Proving Ground [Ind.]
and consolidation of its workload to Yuma Proving Ground [Ariz.]; relocation of the 4950th Test Wing at
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base [Ohio] to the Air Force Flight Test Center [Edwards Air Force Base,
Calif.]; and the closing of the Navy's Turbine Engine test facilities at Trenton, N.J., and consolidation of all
aircraft engine altitude testing capability at the Arnold Engineering Development Center in Tennessee.
From 1990 to 1997, the department has reduced the test center work force by more than 9,000 people.
While the marginal workload at the test centers has remained high, primarily due to the progression of
major weapon system development efforts into their test and evaluation phase, the institutional
(open-the-door) work force and funding have declined significantly since 1990. From 1990 to 1997, the
institutional work force will decline 27 percent with an additional decline of 12 percent programed by FY
2001. The work force associated with user funded workload is expected to decline 20 percent from 1990
to 1997 and another 8 percent by FY 2001.
Acquisition Process Improvements. A big assumption in our defense planning is that we will get
significant savings by overhauling our defense acquisition system. The idea here is to be more efficient in
what we buy, how we buy it and how we oversee that buying process. As I look at the defense acquisition
system in detail, what I find is that the system is not broken -- it fields equipment that is second to none in
the world. But I believe that the system can and must operate much more efficiently.
Although the new federal acquisition streamlining regulations will help the department use commercial
procurement procedures, we know that the principal problems are not statutory or regulatory. There is
considerable freedom in our acquisition statutes and regulations. The issue is really cultural. We have
become so risk-averse that it seems like we end up spending billions to make sure we do not lose
millions. We have set up a structure that discourages risk taking -- it settles for very, very conservative
performance at all levels. We are moving now to try to adjust that culture. To make a cultural change, we
need the appropriate incentives to adjust the behavior of our acquisition work force.
On Feb. 9, 1994, Secretary [of Defense William] Perry provided the then-House Armed Services
Committee, and on Feb. 24, 1994, both the Senate Armed Services and Governmental Affairs
committees his plan for acquisition reform within the Department of Defense entitled, "Acquisition Reform:
A Mandate for Change." On March 15, 1994, Secretary Perry issued a policy memorandum
implementing "A Mandate for Change" within the department. Today, I am pleased to provide a status
report on the progress we have made in implementing the reforms identified in "A Mandate for
Change." ...
Implementation of Legislative Reforms. One of the major efforts identified in the "Mandate for Change"
was leveraging the recommendations of the Section 800 Panel. As a result of a true bipartisan
partnership, the Congress enacted two landmark pieces of legislation, the Federal Acquisition
Streamlining Act of 1994 and the Federal Acquisition Reform Act of 1996. DoD, working with the
administrator of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy and other federal agencies, is in varying stages
of implementing both pieces of legislation.
Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act. FASA provided the department with much needed relief in a
number of key areas. First, it provided streamlining in the area of low-dollar, relatively low-risk
procurements by setting the simplified acquisition threshold, or SAT, at $100,000 and by exempting
purchases at or below the SAT from 13 statutes. This legislation also provided us with flexibility in the
purchase of commercial items, exempting them from the application of a number of statutes which
prevented us in many cases from buying those items in the commercial marketplace.
Equally important was the relief FASA provided from the application of the Truth in Negotiations Act.
FASA gave the department the flexibility to obtain cost or pricing data where the risk associated with the
procurement merits, while at the same time clearly setting forth the circumstances where cost or pricing
data is not normally required. Last, and certainly not least, was the authority to implement five pilot
programs.
The vast majority of FASA provisions were implemented prior to Oct. 1, 1995. Between December 1994
and October 1995, the department supported publication of 23 rules, which changed 1,328 pages, or 71
percent, of the Federal Acquisition Regulation. This was accomplished using multifunctional teams drawn
from throughout the federal government. As a result of the public comments received thus far, we are in
the process of looking at a number of issues including the reorganization of FAR Part 13, whether our
new commercial rule in FAR Part 12 can be used for construction, and how to amend existing contracts
to take advantage of FASA changes.
There are also a few difficult issues associated with the implementation [of] FASA which we have not
been able to resolve. Those issues are the rule on travel costs, implementation of multiyear provisions,
and small, disadvantaged business coverage. These issues have proved to be very difficult for a number
of reasons. In the case of small disadvantaged business coverage, a major factor has been the impact of
the Supreme Court's decision in Adarand. The department is working closely with the administrator of the
OFPP to resolve these outstanding issues.
Federal Acquisition Reform Act. FARA provides the department with very important statutory relief as
well. The consolidation of the review of protests at the General Accounting Office was a major step in
establishing a single standard of review for protests. Similarly, the decentralization of procurement
authority for information technology provides the opportunity to purchase information technology in a way
which is more efficient and more closely meets the department's requirements. It also provides additional
authority in the area of buying commercial products through use of simplified acquisition procedures for
commercial items purchases up to $5 million and through more clearly defining what constitutes a
commercial item.
FARA implementation has just begun. One of the issues we are reviewing is how best to involve industry
in the implementation process. During FASA implementation, industry participation and guidance on
rules implementation was solicited through a series of public meetings. For the record, I would like to take
this opportunity to thank the industry associations which participated with us in the FASA implementation
effort. Industry has encouraged us, and we are exploring ways, to further improve the process in which
the department involves industry in the development of FARA implementation policy.
Streamlined Acquisition Oversight. We are beginning to achieve real success in implementing a bold,
new, re-engineered oversight and review process that will better serve our warfighters and conserve
public funds. Our approach is to shift from after-the-fact oversight to early-and-continuous insight. A new
Overarching and Working-Level Integrated Product Team process, the foundation of our newly revised
DoD Instruction 5000.2, is focused on developing program strategies and plans that are affordable and
executable.
This oversight process facilitates identifying and resolving issues in a more timely manner, keeping
programs on track and providing the warfighter what he needs, when he needs it and at an affordable
cost. While this process is relatively new, there are visible signs of success. For example, the cycle time
for acquisition decision memorandums, which averaged 23 days in 1994, was down to two days in 1995.
More importantly, 18 of 26 scheduled Defense Acquisition Board reviews in 1995 were not held,
"paper-DABs" sufficed in these cases because all the major issues were resolved without the need for a
formal DAB meeting.
Paperless Contracting. The department has made great strides towards implementing a paperless
contracting environment over the past year. Our approach included identifying the 240 contracting offices
which execute 80 percent of the contract actions initiated by the department annually. Over the past year,
the department has developed and begun implementing a plan to fully automate these high-volume
offices, and to date, over half of these offices have been fully automated. Our future plans include
expanding a paperless automation environment to all facets of the acquisition process. The goal is to link
the customer, the logistics systems, the procurement system and the financial system in a seamless
web.
Military Specifications Reform. We have effectively turned our procurement system on its head with
respect to military specifications and standards. A program manager in the past had to get a waiver in
order to use commercial and performance standards. Now the reverse is true. If a program manager
wants to use military specifications, then he has to get a waiver in order to justify the extra cost entailed in
military specifications.
As part of our effort to maximize utilization of both commercial products and practices, Secretary Perry
issued guidance in June 1994 that changed the focus on the way in which we describe our requirements
and reduced the number of occasions in which design-specific military specifications and standards are
to be used. Our focus is to describe our requirements in terms of the performance needed, thus providing
greater reliance on commercial and dual use technologies.
We have reviewed all of our 30,000 specifications and standards, eliminating 2,600 of them to date. We
are continuing to implement the decisions on these documents. It is important to note that our policy is
not one of zero tolerance. Military specifications will continue to be used in some cases, such as to define
interfaces and ensure safety. In these cases, however, we still want to make sure that the documents are
current and include current technology.
Single Process Initiative. The Single Process Initiative is one of our newest reform initiatives. It
implements the "A Mandate for Change" guidance to adopt commercial practices where we can on
existing contracts. This initiative addresses a very real problem. Currently in many of our contractor's
facilities, there are different processes imposed to manufacture similar product lines. For example, a
contractor has one manufacturing process for his commercial customers and a different one imposed by
the Defense Department.
In just one factory, a defense contractor was forced to use eight different soldering specifications -- five
for the government and three for commercial clients purchasing similar types of products. This meant the
workers had to be trained on all eight soldering and inspection techniques. It also meant that the
contractor had to maintain eight different types of production documentation. This cost him more. In turn,
he passed those costs on to us. That is fair, but it is expensive. It is expensive for the department and the
taxpayer.
With this initiative -- starting on existing contracts -- we will reduce the number of processes used. We are
seeking to modify the contracts as a "block," not simply contract by contract. For most contracts that we
have in place, there will be bilateral cost avoidance -- that is, the savings will be passed directly to the
government; and, in the end, to the taxpayer. This occurs on cost-reimbursable contracts and cases
where we have priced options that can be renegotiated.
In the case of longer-term, fixed-price contracts, there is a possibility of what I would describe as
unilateral cost avoidance -- savings would be realized by the contractor but the contract's fixed-price
structure has no mechanism to automatically pass along these savings to the government. In these
unilateral cases, we would seek consideration and make adjustments to the contract prices.
This initiative is being implemented on a expedited basis. We will not spend months having detailed cost
proposals prepared, audited and negotiated unless the initial review by an administrative contracting
officer indicates that the possibility exists for substantial unilateral savings after the contractor transition
costs and the government administration costs are considered. We expect the number of these unilateral
savings cases to be few. This initiative has been embraced by industry. The Defense Contract
Management Command has received over two dozen concept papers and several hundred inquiries.
Defense Acquisition Pilot Programs. The department has recently reported significant progress by the
Defense Acquisition Pilot Programs in implementing regulatory and statutory acquisition reform and in
achieving significant cost and schedule benefits from 15 [percent] to 50 percent. The five programs,
which were nominated as pilots by DoD in December 1994 and designated under the provisions of the
Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994, are the Joint Direct Attack Munitions, Fire Support
Combined Arms Tactical Trainer, Joint Primary Aircraft Training Systems, Commercial Derivative Engine
and the Nondevelopmental Airlift Aircraft.
The DoD Pilot Program Consulting Group was tasked to assist the DAPPs in evaluating the benefits of
approved regulatory and statutory relief, through the development of focused metrics and appropriate
baselines. In its 1995 report, the PPCG reported significant gains in efficiencies as a result of reductions
in the use of military standards, contract data requirements, solicitation length and complexity and source
selection cycle time.
The JDAM program, for example, projects a 34 percent reduction in development time and a unit cost
savings of over 50 percent with an associated total production cost avoidance of $2.9 billion. The JDAM
program office attributes these dramatic savings to the commercial-style environment created by FASA.
The JDAM program manager capitalized on the commercial environment to procure proven technology
with reduced oversight (an average 85 percent reduction in in-plant oversight) and streamlined
procurement documentation (29 data requirements and a two-page statement of work with only interface
specifications and no military standards).
The Army's FSCATT program manager also reports significant cost and schedule benefits. Streamlined
procurement efforts completely eliminated unique military standards while reducing data requirements
from 56 to seven. In-house source selection hours were slashed by 30 percent. Development time and
costs were reduced by 33 and 34 percent respectively. In addition, the innovative use of
commercial-style milestone billing on this program is expected to significantly reduce contract
administration costs.
JPATS acquisition reform initiatives enabled a 50 percent reduction in military standards and a 60
percent reduction in contract data requirements. These efforts resulted in a reported 12 percent reduction
in development time and a 50 percent savings in program office staffing.
McDonnell Douglas quickly responded to the NDAA competition (and DoD should-cost efforts) by
aggressively attacking cost drivers, resulting in a 25 percent reduction in projected C-17 costs. The
recent milestone decision to purchase 80 additional C-17s, in lieu of the NDAA, reflects the benefits of
the commercial-style NDAA competition. In addition, a further $896 million savings is anticipated as a
result of a proposed C-17 multiyear procurement.
Acquisition Work Force. The department's acquisition work force peaked in FY 1989. In the six-year
period from June of 1989 to June 1995, the department reduced the number of personnel employed in
acquisition organizations by 30 percent, or 187,012 people. Our projections, using estimates contained in
the president's FY 1997 budget request, indicate the department will reduce the number of personnel in
these organizations another 67,173 by FY 2001. This carefully managed and controlled drawdown will
yield an overall 40 percent personnel reduction in FY 2001 when compared to the FY 1989 level and a 30
percent reduction over the FY 1980 level.
FY 1997 Budget Request. We have made very tough choices because of the need to balance the federal
budget and the resultant budget top line for defense. The president's FY 1997 budget request contains
$34.7 billion for RDT&E and $38.9 billion for procurement. FY 1997 represents a transition year as we
continue a modest reduction of RDT&E towards more sustainable levels. We continue to emphasize
science and technology funding to assure future warfighting superiority.
Mr. Chairman, every weapon system in the U.S. inventory today required decades of direct investment in
critical enabling technologies. These systems exist because of the technologies and concepts developed
by teams of dedicated researchers at our universities, defense laboratories, test centers and industrial
contractors.
The DoD is committed to maintaining a legacy of technological supremacy at an affordable cost. The
department's FY 1997 budget submission contains a prudent and relevant mix of defense technology
investments.
This program is needed to produce a robust set of innovative technology options for tomorrow's weapon
systems. It secures the department's long-term modernization strategy, meets the national security
needs of the nation and preserves a legacy of technological superiority for U.S. forces in the 21st
century. ...
U.S. Strategic Command: Peace Is Still Our
Profession
Prepared statement of Gen. Eugene E. Habiger, USAF, commander in chief, U.S. Strategic Command,
to the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 21, 1996.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it is a distinct pleasure to be here today to testify on the
direction of the United States Strategic Command.
Ours is a vital, young command. Although I've only been in place a short time, it is clear to me that the
command is headed in the right direction. I intend to build upon our current solid foundation in looking to
the future.
Our task takes place against a backdrop of great and continuing change. The end of the Cold War saw
the lessening of one form of threat to America's security, but recent years have continued to reveal new
challenges. America's goals of security and stability are being achieved.
If we are to continue to meet those goals in an uncertain world, America must remain strong so that its
forces can deter threats to our vital interests. At U.S. Strategic Command, peace is still our profession,
and the strength of our deterrent forces remains the backbone of that peace.
In meeting this task, I plan to focus on four key areas: keeping an effective and credible deterrent,
actively shaping a solid and stable foundation for implementation of arms control agreements, ensuring a
safe and reliable nuclear weapons stockpile and taking care of our people.
As the 1994 Nuclear Posture Review acknowledged, nuclear weapons play a reduced role in America's
security policy, but they remain a critical element in ensuring that potential aggressors do not
miscalculate in threatening America's vital interests. Although the Cold War is over, nuclear weapons
continue to pose a threat to the United States and to our allies. Moreover, we remain concerned about
the proliferation of all forms of weapons of mass destruction which can threaten not only the United
States but also allies and interests in regional contexts.
Our primary job, therefore, is to maintain ready, flexible and safe strategic nuclear forces and to bring our
operational, planning and intelligence capabilities to bear in ensuring that National Command Authorities
and combatant commanders have a full range of options.
Both the National Command Authorities and theater commanders require increased planning support
across a widening range of force applications. We are improving our ability to meet those requirements in
two ways: developing tools that increase our planning speed and flexibility, and ensuring the excellent
capabilities of the Strategic Joint Intelligence Center are applied as broadly as possible. Both of these
must interface seamlessly with the systems used by our regional warfighters. Current and planned
system upgrades have us on track and must be continued.
We continue to test our forces and our skills with demanding, reinvigorated exercises to ensure we are
ready for a full spectrum of contingencies. Our forces are well trained and ready to perform their
missions.
Strategic Nuclear Forces. The Nuclear Posture Review reaffirmed two fundamental principles: the
importance of the role of nuclear weapons in providing an effective deterrent and the continued relevance
of the Triad. These principles are central to our vision of strengthening our deterrent in a changing world.
Ballistic missile submarines, land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles and strategic bombers
complement each other in providing a stable deterrent at lower force levels.
ICBMs. ICBMs provide a reliable, relatively low-cost weapons system with a high alert rate. On a
day-to-day basis, our Peacekeeper and Minuteman III ICBMs give the United States a prompt response
capability and complicate any potential aggressor's targeting.
SSBNs. Our ballistic missile submarines continue to be the backbone of the nation's deterrent force.
Stealthy and survivable, they pose a credible and powerful retaliatory capability to any potential
adversary. Backfit of submarines carrying the older C-4 missile so that they can carry the newer and
more effective D-5 missile is necessary to ensure that we have viable systems over the long term. Your
continued support for the D-5 backfit program is essential in convincing potential aggressors that the U.S.
intends to retain a strong deterrent.
Bombers. Bombers provide flexibility and visible posturing capability. The programed B-2 and B-52 force
is adequate to accomplish our mission, provided that a minimum of 16 B-2s and 56 B-52Hs are
maintained as primary aircraft authorized. We look forward to bringing the B-2 into our operational forces
so that the B-1 can assume its planned role as a conventional-only heavy bomber.
Strategic Reconnaissance. RC-135 and U-2 strategic aerial reconnaissance aircraft are an integral part
of our war plans. We need continued support in this area to ensure the continued viability of airborne
reconnaissance platforms in the future.
C4I: Command, control, communications, computers and intelligence are increasingly critical to strategic
force readiness. We must ensure our systems support combatant commanders across the full range of
operational environments we might encounter. This is not only a STRATCOM issue. Effective and
survivable C4I is important to all combatant CinCs [commanders in chief] across the spectrum of conflict
to ensure we get full measure of the information age technology on which we all depend.
All our armed forces are investing heavily in technology, designing new systems to ensure tomorrow's
forces support national policies and objectives. However, there are currently no new strategic systems in
design. The only strategic platforms in production -- the B-2 and Trident SSBN -- are projected to
complete their production runs by the end of the decade.
Without any new design or production, it is all the more important that we sustain our current forces for
the long haul. We are already engaged in sustainment programs such as Minuteman III ICBM guidance
and propulsion, and SLBM modernization programs such as D-5 backfit. Other sustainment and
modernization programs in each leg of the Triad will be needed to preserve our technological edge over
the next 30 years. We must ensure our industrial base has the technical and physical capabilities needed
to sustain today's systems and develop follow-on systems, especially in key areas such as propulsion,
guidance and re-entry vehicle design and production.
A stable strategic relationship with Russia remains a crucial element of America's security and has a
direct relationship with our requirements for an effective deterrent. We have made good progress in the
past year in building our relationship with Russia.
USSTRATCOM has been active in efforts to establish greater rapport between Russian and American
military officers. This effort started several years ago with an exchange of visits by senior leaders from
the Russian strategic rocket forces and USSTRATCOM. Last year, the commander of the Russian navy
visited a Trident SSBN, and more junior U.S. and Russian missile officers made reciprocal visits to ICBM
facilities in each country. We look forward to continuing and expanding this dialogue in the future.
Arms control treaties provide the framework for mutual force downsizing. Since START I [Strategic Arms
Reduction Talks I treaty] entered into force in December 1994, the U.S. and Russia have moved well
down the road toward the accountable limit of 6,000 deployed strategic nuclear weapons. Together the
U.S. and Russia have destroyed over 600 missile silos, 40 ballistic missile submarines and 250 heavy
bombers -- more than two-thirds of the required launcher reductions under START I. As of April 1995,
Kazakstan became a nonnuclear state. We expect that Belarus and Ukraine will meet that same goal in
1996.
If implemented, START II will deepen cuts in Russian and American accountable strategic nuclear
launchers and further our goal of stability with each nation limited to 3,500 deployed strategic nuclear
warheads. We hope that the Duma will ratify that treaty in the near future. However, we need to maintain
a nuclear force hedge if they do not. As recently directed by the president, we will maintain this hedge by
not making any unilateral reductions beyond those required by START I. Unilateral reductions would be
the clearest signal to Russia that they no longer need to engage in meaningful and verifiable arms control
efforts with us to reduce American nuclear forces.
The president has declared that the safety and reliability of our nuclear weapons stockpile is in the
supreme national interest. With extensive participation by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and
USSTRATCOM, the Department of Energy has developed a comprehensive stockpile stewardship and
management plan designed to ensure the continued safety and reliability of the stockpile in the absence
of any nuclear testing.
Science-based stockpile stewardship and management of the nuclear weapons complex are extensive
undertakings, replete with technical and political risks as well as hurdles such as environmental impact
assessments and funding uncertainties. Publication of the Department of Energy's plan does not mean
that the effort is complete. Clearly, we will need to work together to overcome these hurdles and achieve
a workable program.
At the same time, I am fully cognizant of my responsibilities under the president's safeguards to advise
on my confidence in the safety and reliability of our nuclear weapons. We have been actively working
within the Department of Defense and with the Department of Energy to develop procedures so that I can
carry out those responsibilities.
People are our most important asset, and we should ensure that we take care of our military and civilian
personnel in the manner that they deserve. The long deployments, separation from family and friends,
and similar sacrifices our personnel make for their country demand that we keep faith with them and be
attentive to their needs. Four fundamental elements -- adequate pay, a stable retirement system, safe
and affordable housing and accessible medical benefits -- underpin our obligation to our troops.
The United States faces new challenges of world leadership in a rapidly changing world. In some
measure, we can look to technology to provide leverage, but there can never be a substitute for the
human spirit and its willingness to sacrifice in defense of a free society. This is America's greatest
strength, and we must be good stewards of that precious resource.
Industry Looks to DoD's Grocers for Solutions
Prepared statement of Army Maj. Gen. Richard E. Beale Jr., director, Defense Commissary Agency, to
the Morale, Welfare and Recreation Panel, House National Security Committee, March 27, 1996.
Mr. Chairman and members of the panel, it has been an exciting and busy year at the Defense
Commissary Agency. We have reduced operating costs to a new low and increased patron savings to an
all-time high. When I came to DeCA three years ago, we talked of benchmarking on industry. Today, we
are a leader, and our industry trading partners look to DeCA for solutions.
But as I have promised in the past, DeCA has not and will not stop. The men and women of DeCA are
committed to achieving more. While this will be my last report to you as the agency's director, I leave
assured in the knowledge that acceptance of the vice president's nomination of DeCA to be a
performance-based organization will safeguard the commissary's important contribution to the total
compensation package for the soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines who have and who continue to
deserve our nation's support.
DeCA's re-engineering and streamlining efforts are showing dividends for the taxpayer. From a high of
$1,272 million in FY [fiscal year] 1993, DeCA will have reduced its operating costs to $939 million by the
end of FY 1997. To accomplish this, we have reorganized to achieve greater efficiencies and cost
reductions by eliminating duplication and centralizing such functions as contracting, category
management, buying, merchandising and distribution.
In addition, we will have achieved one-time inventory savings totaling $161 million in resale stocks with
the implementation of our stateside frequent delivery system and a recently implemented system to order
and receive goods for overseas stores. The inventory savings are compared to stockage levels
capitalized in October 1991. These combined reductions vastly exceed the predictions of the Jones
Commission, which targeted savings of $90 million in the first four years of operation. And we will deliver
this in spite of the lack of a business management information system.
We have recently awarded the contracts for the modernization of our business systems, and we will
begin deployment before the end of this calendar year. I anticipate these systems will present many
further opportunities for savings. Examples of a few of the labor and other savings we expect from these
automation modernization programs include computer-assisted ordering, automated coupon processing
and electronic shelf labels.
Computer-assisted ordering will allow over 90 percent of the merchandise to be ordered by computer. It
will determine the amount of goods needed to replace those sold as measured by the scanner at the front
of the store rather than the current labor-intensive requirement of personnel physically walking the aisles
and entering an order manually.
Our new system will also allow coupons to be scanned into the system so they can be electronically
processed for reimbursement from the manufacturers. A significant labor-intensive task will be eliminated
when the electronic shelf labels are installed. In the future, we'll be able to update the prices at a push of
a button, replacing the current practice of printing shelf labels, manually searching the shelves for the
correct product and posting the new price label. When the deployment of our new business systems is
complete, we anticipate even further savings with the efficiencies they will deliver.
Last year, I told this panel that with all the challenges DeCA faced, we had not yet had time to
concentrate our merchandising efforts to realize the full potential savings available for our patrons. We
recently completed the 1996 formal market basket price comparison study to determine differences
between commissary and private sector supermarket prices and the savings to patrons. I am delighted
with the results!
Our customers have experienced a significant rise in savings. The study, which conformed to the
methodology recommended by the DoD inspector general, disclosed an average savings of 29.7 percent
to the commissary patron. That's 6.3 percent more than the 23.4 percent savings in the last market
basket price comparison study conducted in 1992. This means that the typical E-4 with over four years of
service with a family of four who does all their grocery shopping at the commissary saves $1,581 per year.
The commissary savings amount to 6.8 percent of their total income, which is money available to this
typical military family for other living expenses.
This is what your predecessors designed the commissary to do -- put pay in the service member's pocket!
Furthermore, with a low operating gross margin and tremendous savings for the patron, I believe no one
can deliver this portion of the service member's total compensation package better than DeCA!
We continue to maintain the trust of our employees. On Feb. 20, 1996, DeCA signed a labor agreement
with the National Association of Government Employees. Even though there are 26 separate local store
units and one region headquarters unit represented by NAGE, a single labor agreement was negotiated
to apply to all of those employees. This was a major first for DeCA.
In addition, DeCA is currently negotiating an agreement with the American Federation of Government
Employees to cover all AFGE units nationwide. The National Federation of Federal Employees has also
requested a nationwide agreement.
These nationwide agreements are unusual in that local bargaining units agreed to abide by the terms of
collective bargaining agreements negotiated by a team of managers and unit employees. Nationwide
agreements ensure consistency in commissaries and save time and effort at the bargaining table on the
part of management and the unions. We think that these efforts are directly in line with the cooperative
relationship envisioned by the president and the National Performance Review.
We also continue to maintain the respect of our trading partners. One of the greatest labor-savings
initiatives implemented by DeCA and industry has been the delivery ticket invoicing. DTI is a payment
method whereby the delivery ticket or receipt accompanying each commissary delivery also serves as
the commissary supplier's invoice or demand for payments.
In fiscal year 1995, commissary suppliers were paid $1.6 billion using DTI. This represented 34 percent
of the dollars we paid them. Some companies told us they were receiving payment before they could
establish their accounts receivable -- but they quickly added they were very happy to get paid that
quickly.
Commissary bill-paying performance exceeded the DoD average in fiscal year 1995, with 98 percent of
its invoices paid on time. This all-time high was due largely to DTI.
We expect our DTI payments will approach $3.6 billion in fiscal year 1996. When we started DTI, it was to
prevent the bill-paying problems of the past. We did not realize that DTI would become the financial
concept industry would adopt as its benchmark. Those in industry who have tried it agree that electronic
commerce truly makes doing business with the government easier and cheaper.
As an undisputed leader in electronic commerce, by partnering with industry, DeCA has become a
forerunner in other areas as well. The most significant of those is category management.
Stated simply, category management seeks to put the right product at the right price in the right place in
the right amount on the shelf to meet the patron's needs. This is accomplished when our category
managers make decisions on all similar items in a category instead of focusing on a single product
traditionally followed in the grocery industry.
All of the products carried in our stores are divided into distinctly manageable groups, for example,
ready-to-eat cereal. Instead of just buying the lowest-priced items, our buyers seek the largest savings
for the highest-volume sellers in a category. This practice has not only improved our buying practices and
reduced our industry partner's costs, but also played a significant role in achieving the tremendous
savings reported in our 1996 market basket survey. Both industry and DeCA are excited about the further
potential of category management, which seeks to drive excess costs out of both the manufacturer's and
the retailers business.
Can we do more? The answer is a resounding yes! I believe the vehicle to deliver further efficiencies lies
in the March 4, 1996, announcement by the vice president that DeCA is a candidate to become a
performance-based organization. While we have not worked out the details as of yet, the concept is
exciting and we expect to gain many efficiencies in all aspects of DeCA's operations.
I believe that becoming a performance-based organization will provide further opportunities for reducing
the commissary system's dependence on appropriated funds. I believe becoming a performance-based
organization will allow DeCA to maintain a high level of customer satisfaction in an environment of
downsizing and reduced resources. I believe becoming a performance-based organization will afford
DeCA greater operational flexibility and increased opportunities for cost efficiencies while holding the
agency accountable for its performance.
While stressing his continued commitment to preserving the commissary benefit for service members
while looking for ways to save appropriated funds and streamline operations, the secretary of defense
showed great faith in nominating DeCA to be a performance based organization. With your support, we
will not disappoint him!
In closing, I would like to take this opportunity to you for your support during my tour at DeCA. The
legislative initiatives you enacted earlier this year will allow DeCA to further reduce operating costs. Your
early release of the fiscal year 1996 construction program will help provide much needed facilities
upgrade for our service members and our work force.
While DeCA has faced many challenges during my tenure, the support and confidence of the panel made
our job easier. As always, I will leave my post as the director of the Defense Commissary Agency with
mixed feelings. I leave knowing the commissary is in good shape for the immediate future, but I also
leave knowing the excitement has just begun!
Modernization Hinges on Fiscal Reality,
Responsibility
Prepared remarks by Deputy Secretary of Defense John P. White to the Navy League Sea-Air-Space
Exposition, Washington, April 4, 1996.
I appreciate the opportunity to talk with you today, because we share a commitment to a strong and
capable Navy. How we maintain a strong and capable military force takes up most of my waking thoughts
right now. Next week, I will be testifying before Congress on our defense program for the rest of this
century.
Budget season is a critical time for the department. As Mark Twain once said, "It is the will of God that we
have congressmen, and we must bear the burden." More importantly, budget season is a time to take
some navigational readings on our national security -- where we are and where we are going. That's what
I plan to do in my testimony, and I want to give you a preview.
The best way to measure where our Navy is today is to go down to the waterfront and take a look at our
ships and sailors and Marines. And every time I do that, I see why [Defense Secretary] Bill Perry says
that "America has the best damn Navy in the world." We do.
For example, I saw how we have the best power-projection in the world when I helo'd out to the USS
Wasp off of Norfolk [Va.] last summer. Today, our amphibious ships do a lot more than they did when I
was in the Marines. These ships bristle with advanced technology, highly trained professionals who know
how to use it and Marines who can quickly take charge of any situation, wherever we land them.
I have also seen how our country has the best force presence in the world when I visited the
guided-missile frigate USS Samuel B. Roberts last December and watched part of its workups for
deployment to the Persian Gulf. I was just in the gulf last week, and that's where the Roberts is today,
serving with the [USS] George Washington carrier battle group.
With the flexibility and jointness of our forces today, you don't need to go down to the waterfront to see
the Navy in action. I saw the Navy making a difference in landlocked Bosnia. It was the Seabees who
arrived early and built the base camp for the American 1st Brigade [1st Armored Division] and others.
That's where we are with the Navy, and it's the same throughout the force. Today, in spite of the
drawdown and all the turbulence that goes with it, our forces are well-trained, well-equipped and ready.
You see it whenever and wherever we have deployed them.
In Bosnia, where our forces are giving peace a chance to endure. In Haiti, where our forces have given
democracy a chance to take hold. On the Korean Peninsula and in the Persian Gulf, where we employ
strong diplomacy and a strong show of force to deter aggressors without firing a shot.
And in the Far East, where the Navy presence provided comfort to Taiwan and caution to China. As the
administration looked at the potential crisis across the Taiwan Strait and our options to respond to the
situation, it was certainly nice to know that our carrier task forces were available, ready and capable of
doing whatever we sent them to do.
This year's defense program was put together to keep this force ready and capable for whatever the
future brings. Let me share with you some of the key themes that guided us as we put together this
program.
Two years ago, critics charged that our forces weren't ready. You don't hear that anymore. You don't
hear it because as the Clinton administration completed the post-Cold War drawdown, we maintained
robust funding for training, operations and maintenance. We closely watched the readiness indicators for
problems, and we took actions early when they occurred. Meanwhile, the president sought and received
the funds and authorities necessary to maintain and improve quality of life in the military, including the
maximum pay increases, better housing, health care and family support initiatives.
All of this has paid off in readiness indicators that are at -- or even above -- historically high levels. And
high recruitment and re-enlistment rates -- indeed, FY [fiscal year] 94 was our third best recruiting year in
the history of the all-volunteer force, and FY 95 nearly matched it.
I do not take this good news for granted. Having first worked on the concept of the all-volunteer force
back in the late '60s and seen it come to fruition, I know what a remarkable accomplishment it is.
So the drawdown is practically complete, and the FY 97 defense plan continues to protect readiness and
quality of life, to maintain the quality force we have today. But that takes us to the future. Where are we
going? How do we ensure America has the best forces in the 21st century?
The Clinton administration answers this question with a force modernization plan that launches a robust
procurement ramp-up for the next century. Over the last two administrations, the Defense Department
was able to maintain modern equipment despite relatively low procurement levels by weeding out the
older equipment as we drew down the force. But with the end of the drawdown, that modernization
reprieve is over.
This year, we have submitted a procurement program that starts at nearly $39 billion in FY 97 and will
increase steadily over the five-year defense plan -- a 40 percent increase after inflation. As a result, over
the next five years, we will invest more than $250 billion in new equipment for the warfighters.
But it's not just how much we spend -- it's how we spend it that counts. Our modernization plan is
designed to maintain our land, sea and air dominance. We do this through four technology strategies.
First, we are emphasizing leap-ahead technology to give us new warfighting capabilities. Leap-ahead
technology is the very heart and soul of our major new systems such as the Joint Strike Fighter, the new
attack submarine, the Commanche helicopter -- and two systems I saw in action at Patuxent Naval Air
Station [Md.], the F/A-1 8 E and F and the V-22 Osprey. If you've ever seen the V-22 take off, you know
what I mean by leap-ahead technology.
Second, we are accelerating upgrades to existing systems where they are cost effective. That includes
adding new advanced technology components to workhorses such as the Bradley fighting vehicle, the
F-14 aircraft, the Apache helicopter. We are even extending the service of tactical trucks. The Abrams
tank upgrade will not only add 120mm guns and better armor, it will incorporate digitization and position
navigation equipment, making it the most effective tank in history.
Adding new technology sometimes creates whole new weapons. For example, our Joint Direct Attack
Munitions program, or JDAM, is turning all of our 1,000-pound "dumb" bombs into "smart" bombs by
fitting them with little receivers that will allow us to guide them with global positioning satellites.
Third, we are investing in power-projection systems, which are critical to our power-projection strategy.
We are focusing primarily on improving lift capabilities. Major priorities include multiyear procurement of
the C-17 aircraft; improved lift through the LPD-17 class amphibious assault ships, which Congress
accelerated; rapid sealift and pre-positioning ships; and Aegis guided missile cruisers.
Finally, we are investing in technology to enhance battlefield situation awareness. This includes
satellites,
unmanned drones and airborne radars that can locate targets precisely; and communications and
navigation systems that can synthesize all that collected information into one big picture of the battlefield.
Battlefield awareness was the key to battlefield dominance in Desert Storm, and it will remain the key.
That's our modernization plan in a nutshell: smart weapons and smart choices. And if you look closely at
our plan, I think you will agree. There are some in Congress who claim that $252 billion for modernization
over five years is too little. I believe they are ignoring both the fiscal reality and the fiscal responsibility of
our modernization plan.
Let's face fiscal reality. Gone are the days when anybody could seriously propose to increase defense
spending, cut taxes and balance the budget -- all at the same time. Today, deficit reduction has taken
precedence, and the administration and Congress have agreed to balance the budget in seven years. I
myself have developed a series of balanced budget plans for Ross Perot and the Concord Coalition. And
I can see from my professional experience that President Clinton has taken great pains to reach a
balanced budget while protecting national security. The Clinton budget is built on both fiscal reality and
national security reality.
Our defense modernization plan also takes fiscal responsibility into account. Rather than simply asking
for more money, we are spending our money more efficiently and effectively -- and passing the savings
onto modernization.
We have significantly reduced the department's civilian work force, and these reductions are now about
90 percent complete. We have completed hundreds of base closings and realignments, about 50 percent
of the total approved by the four BRAC [base closure and realignment] commissions. This year, for the
first time, the savings from base closings will exceed the costs, and in the year 2000, we will have
savings of about $17 billion.
We also expect to realize substantial savings from reforming the defense acquisition system, from buying
more like the commercial sector and more from the commercial sector. We cannot pocket those
economies yet, but we are seeing measurable savings in trial programs.
For example, we used the new buying practices in the JDAM program, the one that's turning "dumb"
bombs into "smart" bombs. We saved about $28,000 per bomb. Since we're converting more than
100,000 bombs, that means about $3 billion more for other modernization programs. And that's just the
savings from one system. Indeed, acquisition reform is changing the whole equation when it comes to
defense procurement dollars -- by cutting our buying overhead, we're getting more modernization for
each dollar we spend.
Finally, we are cutting overhead and saving money by emulating the private sector's practice of
outsourcing -- that is, transferring functions previously performed in-house to an outside provider.
Numerous companies have turned to other service providers for information technology services,
distribution, telecommunications and more. We need to do the same. In fact, outsourcing is not new to
DoD. Many functions are already outsourced to some extent.
But we can do more. If done correctly, outsourcing will not only save us money, it will help us build the
kind of organization we want DoD to be -- an organization that thrives on competition, innovation,
responsiveness to changing needs, efficiency and reliability. So outsourcing is one of my highest
priorities. To encourage the Navy and the other services to look for outsourcing and privatization
opportunities, I recently signed a memorandum stipulating that they can keep the savings they achieve -savings they can spend on readiness and modernization.
You might have gotten the impression from reading the newspapers that the service chiefs disagree with
our modernization plan -- that our ramp-up trajectory should be steeper. But this so-called disagreement
is a classic case of a headline in search of a story.
The fact is, the service chiefs understand the resource constraints that the department, the government
and the country are under. When pushed by members of Congress, the chiefs may say, yes, they would
like more money sooner. I would like more money sooner, too. I would also like a fat-free ice cream that
tastes like Ben and Jerry's.
Wishful thinking aside, the chiefs have all participated fully in developing the administration's FY 97
budget and the five-year defense plan. The defense plan incorporates many of their recommendations
and concerns, and they support it. Most importantly, they support the priorities I have described here
today that are reflected in our defense program. Any disagreement about the content and shape of the
program is between the administration and the Congress -- not between the military and civilian
leadership.
I believe in this defense plan. It maintains the readiness of the force and the quality of life of the troops. It
provides for a modernization investments that will maintain our air, sea and land dominance. And built
into the plan are savings and efficiencies that will allow us to afford our modernization investment. We
have a strong program and the right priorities that will ensure the defense and security of our nation into
the next century. I look forward to defending our defense plan, and I hope I can count on your support.
The Force Is as Lean as Risk Allows
Prepared statement of Gen. John M. Shalikashvili, USA, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the
House on National Security Committee, March 6, 1996.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. It is a great pleasure and a great honor to be here today
representing America's men and women in uniform. It seems that each time I've come before you for
these hearings, I've begun my testimony with a description of how very busy the past year has been for
our forces and how very well they've performed. Today will be no different.
During the last year, our forces have remained engaged in a sizable number of simultaneous operations
spread across the globe. Today, there are approximately 54,000 of our men and women in uniform and
around 1,300 defense civilians committed to overseas contingencies.
For those who've been deployed for these missions and for their families, it has been often stressful,
arduous and demanding. Yet they have, and they continue to, perform superbly.
We owe them our gratitude, for despite an extremely high operations tempo, the readiness of our units
and the morale and enthusiasm of the troops have stayed very high. They make it impossible to look
back at this year without feeling an enormous sense of pride.
Among the past year's efforts, there were two particularly notable milestones. Two months ago, I
attended the formal closing ceremony for Joint Task Force 160 -- the same unit that for the previous 20
months handled the refugees that poured out of the dictatorships in Haiti and Cuba; that plucked over
60,000 men, women and children out of the dangerous Caribbean waters; that built 15 huge camps to
house, feed and care for them; and that provided safe and humane conditions until the refugees were
either allowed to enter the United States or returned to their homelands.
I could not be more proud of the way our men and women performed this long and uniquely difficult
mission. They handled these many thousands of refugees with compassion and understanding while
administering to their needs with unequaled efficiency. Today, their mission completed, the camps have
been closed, and the men and women of the task force have returned home.
The other milestone occurred this past month, when for the first time in history, the second democratically
elected president of Haiti took office and shortly thereafter we began the redeployment of our forces -right on schedule. We entered Haiti in September 1994 with a sound military plan, we followed that plan,
and we accomplished all that was asked of us.
The rapid introduction of American military forces stopped the cycle of violence, halted the flow of
refugees and created a secure and stable environment which made possible the legislative and
presidential election process. By March 31, 1995, the recruitment and training of a new police force had
so stabilized the situation that American forces could be greatly reduced, and the Haitian operation was
turned over to the United Nations.
Despite some initial problems, legislative and presidential elections were conducted and, on Feb. 7, for
the first time in Haiti's history, an elected president turned over his office to another freely elected
president. While a small United Nations presence will remain in Haiti a while longer, American units will
continue to return home and will be out of Haiti by April 15 of this year. All that will remain will be small,
periodic, engineer exercises like those we conduct with a number of our other southern neighbors.
Starting in December, we became actively engaged in the NATO operation in Bosnia. Over the course of
two months, we deployed nearly 20,000 active and reserve military personnel into Bosnia to join a
coalition of some 30 other countries to help carry out the military aspects of the Dayton peace accord.
Additionally, nearly 8,000 support forces were deployed to the countries around Bosnia.
Now, nearly 80 days into the operation, our presence has been pivotal in forging the coalition that is
helping to manage the peace and in brokering the on-the-ground implementation of the accord:
withdrawal of the warring factions from the zones of separation, the release of prisoners of war, the
separation of military forces and the withdrawal from territory to be transferred. While there are still
problems to be overcome, such as small, remaining pockets of banned foreign forces and occasional
intransigence by Bosnian Serbs, overall compliance has been relatively good.
As I have witnessed on each of my three trips to Bosnia, our troops are performing extremely well, and
morale is high. Much of this is due to outstanding leadership, diligent preparation and the impressive
strides being made in the quality of life for our forces through extensive base camp preparation, the
opening of AAFES [Army and Air Force Exchange Service] outlets, and routine mail and "[The] Stars and
Stripes" deliveries.
From the beginning, we correctly perceived that mines, the lone sniper and severe weather and road
conditions would be our major enemies. We were correct, and the combination of smart precautions and
good training have gone a long way to minimizing the numbers of casualties that could have resulted.
Our forces operating in Bosnia were very well prepared and rehearsed before they were allowed to
deploy. Their mission and rules of engagement have been properly prescribed, and they have
established a strong, controlling presence between the former warring parties.
More than that, they have also been instrumental in forging [a] historic coalition. Just a few years ago,
few would have imagined that it would have been possible to cobble together a force including NATO
nations, Central Europeans and Russians, striving to achieve a common purpose. Here again, sound
preparation on the part of our forces has paid off well.
Our challenge now is to remember that we still have over nine months to go and that we must ensure that
our force is as ready, alert and resolute on the last day of this mission as it was on the first. That is the
greatest guarantee for success of the mission and the safety of the force.
But these have not been the only operations involving our forces. We have over 23,000 servicemen and
women deployed in the Arabian Gulf region to preserve regional peace and stability, to enforce
U.N.-ordered sanctions against Iraq and to deter further Iraqi aggression. We have added pre-positioned
equipment to the region to support brigade-sized units; we have periodically deployed an Army
mechanized task force for training, and for the first time ever, we conducted a no-notice deployment into
the region of an air expeditionary force.
We are maintaining a very active joint and multinational exercise program, which includes participation
from carrier battle groups, special forces and amphibious ready groups operating in the region. Farther
north in Turkey, we continue to work with our coalition partners to enforce the no-fly zone and to oversee
the humanitarian aid program in northern Iraq.
In addition to this, the Army continued to provide forces in support of the 11-nation Multinational Force
and Observers on the Sinai Peninsula, as specified in the Camp David Accord. Currently, nearly 1,000
U.S. service members are deployed as part of the infantry battalion task force or logistics support
element. Of note, the last infantry battalion rotation for 1995 was formed, for the first time, as a composite
unit of active duty and reserve component personnel. This initiative proved highly successful and will be
considered for future rotations.
In Korea, some 36,000 U.S. forces remain ready as political, cultural and economic conditions continue
to deteriorate in the North. The increasing instability in North Korea, fueled by severe food and energy
problems, requires constant vigilance and further complicates our indications and warning capability.
Force modernization efforts continue to focus on increasing interoperability between ROK [Republic of
Korea] and U.S. forces and increasing the theater's counterbattery-fire capability. As well, all armored
elements of the Korean pre-positioning brigade set are in. My recent visits to Seoul and the DMZ
[demilitarized zone] have shown me that our efforts of the last two years to strengthen our defensive
posture have been timely and most effective.
In the Southern Hemisphere, U.S. forces were engaged in defusing one conflict while simultaneously
supporting efforts to reduce the traffic of drugs. Hostilities erupted in January 1995 in the region along the
Peruvian-Ecuadorian border and in March 1995, four countries -- Argentina, Brazil, Chile and the U.S. -responded to a request to provide military observers to assist in the monitoring of a cease-fire and the
withdrawal of forces. We presently have 61 U.S. military personnel and four helicopters participating in
this mission. There have been no cease-fire violations since September 1995, while Peru and Ecuador
continue to pursue a diplomatic solution to the border dispute. While the Peru-Ecuador dispute was
ongoing, USSOUTHCOM [U.S. Southern Command] organized and initiated the most extensive
counterdrug surge operation ever aimed against the narcotraffickers' air bridge between Peru and
Colombia. In cooperation with allied nations and law enforcement agencies, we focused our detection
and monitoring assets on disrupting and hindering drug trafficking air operations.
The results were impressive. Overall air activity decreased significantly, and cooperation between allied
nations as well as the interagency improved noticeably. The successes were significant enough to
warrant USSOUTHCOM to plan a follow-on operation aimed simultaneously at riverine, maritime, land,
as well as air drug traffickers.
Our success in these many recent military operations is a testament to the readiness of our forces. When
I became chairman, I asked to make and keep readiness our No. 1 priority. This has been done, and the
benefits have been and remain evident in every one of these operations. That said, I ask that you
continue your support for the readiness of the force, even as the chiefs and I are redoubling our efforts to
ensure that potential lapses in readiness are detected before they become problems.
We have added a new way of looking at readiness. It includes the traditional measures that ensure
individual battalions and squadrons and ships are manned, trained and equipped for mission success.
But in addition to that, we have added a critical link to how we look at joint readiness -- the theater
commanders' ability to integrate and synchronize their forces and capabilities into an effective and
cohesive fighting team.
The system by which we look at unit and joint readiness centers on a monthly report by services, unified
commands and Department of Defense combat support agencies. We ask them to assess their
readiness to conduct day-to-day operations as well as the most demanding aspects of executing our
national military strategy. Participants also forecast their readiness over the next 12 months. In addition
to looking at specific units, we assess broad functional areas like mobility, intelligence, communications
and logistics.
This Joint Monthly Readiness Review has been up and running for a little over a year. To complement
this, I have directed the development of a comprehensive readiness information management system to
integrate the existing and developing readiness tools of the services and CinCs [commanders in chief]. It
will provide easily accessible and timely information for all users over the newly activated Global
Command and Control System.
Our joint exercise and training program continues to be a readiness multiplier. Joint simulation efforts are
providing innovative opportunities to stress our battle staffs while enhancing the overall utility of joint
exercises for every participant.
I am continuing to work with the CinCs to further focus our joint training efforts on key readiness
challenges, while taking advantage of opportunities to leverage technology to conserve our training
resources. This emphasis on readiness helps ensure that the men and women who have dedicated their
lives to our nation's defense have the resources and training they need to do the job. It also ensures that
their commanders can raise red flags and take quick action when called for.
We are also continuing to enhance our long-term readiness through our education system. Joint
education now starts before officers are commissioned and continues throughout their careers.
Increased emphasis on joint doctrine, multinational operations and systems integration provides the
CinCs a more capable, adaptive force.
Finally, the new reporting systems provide us the vital readiness information needed to make timely
decisions on resource allocation and force commitment. All these efforts and others have helped keep
readiness at ... consistently high levels ... .
Although readiness trends remain strong, we must maintain a vigilant watch. A major challenge to
near-term readiness is how to use the unique capabilities of the armed forces to advance our national
interests in peacetime while maintaining our readiness to fight and win this nation's wars. We are getting
much smarter at this and at anticipating areas of stress before they become readiness problems.
To that end, we are incorporating better the significant capabilities that reside in our reserve forces. We
are continually looking for ways to conduct wartime mission training even while our forces are deployed
to real-world operations. We are closely managing those low density, high leverage capabilities -including intelligence, mobility and support assets -- needed to execute the full range of our military
missions.
I must point out, however, that readiness is a fragile commodity. Once the intricate processes of manning
with quality personnel, and equipping and training units are disrupted, recovery often requires significant
time and resources. That is why maintaining readiness is critically dependent on timely and full
reimbursement of costs associated with unplanned contingency operations.
Thanks to your support and the unyielding care and concern and support of the American people, I can
report to you that ours is the most ready force in the world today. Which leads to the true source of our
successes over the past year -- great people and our strong and continued commitment to them and their
families. Readiness is inextricably tied to the quality of life we provide for these outstanding men and
women in uniform and their families.
With regard to quality of life, the Joint Chiefs, CinCs and I have revalidated the central importance of our
Top Four priorities in support of our people ... . Adequate and fair compensation, a stable retirement
system, steady and dependable level of medical benefits and adequate housing, especially outside
CONUS [continental United States], each require special attention. The recent trend of full funding for the
maximum allowable pay raises has minimized the growth of the pay gap.
The secretary's decision to increase funding for military housing, including efforts to increase barracks
support, pursue housing privatization initiatives and boost Basic Allowance for Quarters, when coupled
with other policies in support of our Top Four, are helping to maintain the quality of life of our personnel
and their families.
As we continue to adjust our military medical infrastructure and personnel, we must ensure that we
preserve affordable, accessible health benefits with no surcharge for active duty members and their
families. We must also keep faith with our military retirees, and so I urge you to help bring about
Medicare subvention, which would allow many retirees to remain in the military medical care system by
reimbursing DoD for the treatment of Medicare-eligible military retirees.
The quality of recruits in our four services remains high. Last year, 96 percent of our recruits were high
school graduates. We must continue to keep this high standard even as we face increasing recruitment
challenges in the years ahead; thus, your support of the services' recruiting budgets is essential. It goes
without saying that protecting the Top Four quality of life priorities also greatly enhances our recruiting
and retention efforts. ...
The drawdown which has been ongoing since the end of the Cold War is nearly complete. The manner in
which this drawdown has been managed and executed is a real success story. We've stayed on a steady,
controlled glide path, adjusting where we had to, and ensured that those measures most critical to the
health of our force were properly protected. Every important indicator of military excellence remains
strong -- readiness is high, the quality of our people and their morale remains superb, and our force
structure, despite deep cuts, has been reduced with minimum instability and turbulence.
We have broken the cycle of military decline that has followed every conflict in this century. Making this
success all the more impressive is that we accomplished this drawdown without missing a beat, while at
the same time engaging in a wide range of contingencies and operations.
The experience of these past few years has fortified our confidence that the force structure we will have
at the end of the drawdown will be what we will continue to require during the remainder of this decade
and into the next century. Our enduring force structure requirements are based primarily on our tasks: to
prevent threats to our interests from arising, to deter those threats that do emerge and to defeat those
threats by military force, should deterrence fail.
The United States is a global power, with far-flung, vital security interests in Europe, Asia, the Middle
East and Persian Gulf, and important interests on nearly every continent. Day-to-day military
engagement with our friends and allies through a combination of forward-deployed and overseas-based
U.S. forces in exercises, exchanges, visits and force presence worldwide will remain an essential
element of our national military strategy.
Ultimately, protecting our interests will remain dependent on preserving sufficiently strong deterrent
capabilities to handle both today's known, near-term threats and those that could materialize from a more
uncertain and rapidly changing world than we have known for many decades. Managing that uncertainty
has led us to discard our Cold War approach of maintaining a threat-based force towards a
capability-based approach that ensures we protect the balance to handle today's real threats as well as
tomorrow's equally real possibilities.
First and foremost, that means we must preserve a modern, well-maintained, robust triad of nuclear
forces -- the backbone of deterrence. Currently, our nuclear forces are within START I [Strategic Arms
Reduction Talks treaty] limits, but we have planned our future nuclear force to achieve START II limits in
the event the treaty is ratified and implemented by the Russians.
The shape of the remainder of our forces [is] based on the need to fight and win two nearly simultaneous
regional conflicts. Just looking back at the past few years, when we have several times nearly found
ourselves in conflicts with North Korea and Iraq, our need to preserve this capability could not have been
more clearly shown.
But it would be a mistake to think of this capability as contingent on contemporary threats alone. It is
based instead on a longer-range calculation of our extensive global interests and the corresponding
necessity to ensure that we never find ourselves in the vicarious predicament of committing our forces to
one conflict, knowing that we will expose our other vital interests as a result. If we were to discard half of
this two MRC [major regional contingency] capability or allow it to decay, it would take many years to
rebuild a force of comparable excellence.
In today's turbulent international environment, where the future posture of so many powerful nations
remains precarious, we could find ourselves with too little, too late. As long as we remain a global power
with vital international interests and allies whom we are committed to help defend, we must preserve our
capability to fight and win two nearly simultaneous regional conflicts.
The force structure we have designed for this purpose is as lean as the calculus of risk will afford. This is
the force structure we must retain.
While the '97 budget protects the quality of life for our people, our force structure and readiness, I am
concerned that we are not procuring equipment and weapon systems at the rate necessary to
recapitalize the force. Accordingly, we must turn our attention in earnest to this challenge or risk the
future combat readiness of the U.S. military. Procurement has continued to pay the bill for readiness and
force structure over the past decade and now hovers at a post-World War II low of about $40 billion.
For the past two years, I have testified that we could sustain this procurement hiatus temporarily, but not
indefinitely. It was the proper course of action at a time when because we were reducing our forces,
through a combination of discarding our oldest equipment and preserving and redistributing only our
newest and most modern equipment, the average age of our remaining arsenal was younger than any
time in recent decades.
With downsizing coming to an end, we must now increase our procurement accounts. For if we fail to do
that, we may well wear out our weapons systems and equipment before they can be modernized or
replaced.
To recapitalize this force, we must face head-on some rather difficult decisions. I firmly believe that we
must commit ourselves to the adequate recapitalization of our force structure -- that will require a
procurement goal of approximately $60 billion annually. It will take tough management decisions,
innovation and even revolutionary approaches, as well as your support, to adequately recapitalize our
force within our current budget top-line projections.
One answer lies in aggressively pursuing institutional and business opportunities. We must continue to
pursue with all energy acquisition reforms, commercial off-the-shelf opportunities, privatization,
outsourcing of noncore activities, and further reductions of our infrastructure. The sum of all of these
initiatives must be reinvested into our procurement accounts. Just as important, we must strive to gain
greater efficiencies in warfighting, and we have already started this process through the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council.
Over the past two years, the Joint Chiefs, the CinCs and I have built a new process to better assess our
joint warfighting needs and provide sound, joint programmatic advice. As you know, before the passage
of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, the programmatic influence, role and responsibilities of the chairman
were by design narrow and tightly circumscribed. We've worked to institutionalize the spirit of
Goldwater-Nichols to create new joint mechanisms and systems so we can provide the secretary of
defense, the president and the Congress with a joint view on programmatic and budgetary issues.
As the engine for this process, the responsibilities of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council have
been expanded to produce this joint view. Although the JROC has been in existence for over a decade,
the vice chairman and I have broadened its mandate and made it a focal point for addressing our joint
warfighting needs and making specific programmatic recommendations that will lead to an increased
joint warfighting capability, increased interoperability between systems and a reduction in unnecessary
redundancies and marginally effective systems, all within existing budget levels. Those of you who
remember the very limited and constrained influence that jointness suffered in the way business was
done in the past will recognize the sea change presented by this new charter.
I appreciate the support of Congress for recently including the JROC in Title 10 and codifying both its
membership and its charter. This body has already proven itself, and its value will only increase further
over time.
To provide the analyses needed to support this effort, we've also created the Joint Warfighting
Capabilities Assessment process as detailed above. This is our primary vehicle for obtaining a
capabilities-based assessment of broad mission areas across service and defense agency lines.
JWCA teams, each sponsored by a Joint Staff directorate, examine key relationships and interactions
among joint warfighting capabilities and identify opportunities for improved effectiveness. The
assessments are continuous and lend insight into issues involving requirements, readiness and plans for
recapitalizing joint military capabilities. The JROC oversees the JWCA process and provides its findings
to the CinCs and the JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff].
One of the more important provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation was the requirement for me to
submit to the secretary of defense an annual Chairman's Program Assessment, a document that
independently assesses the joint adequacy of programs, which I provide to the SECDEF [secretary of
defense] for his consideration during his budgetary deliberations. I have found the JWCA process
extraordinarily helpful in providing me the analysis and insights to craft the recommendations I offer in the
CPA. As this process has evolved, we have also found it useful to use the JWCA products in developing
a front-end recommendation, the Chairman's Program Recommendations. The CPR is provided to the
SECDEF for his use in developing the Defense Planning Guidance, the key document that guides the
services in the development of their budgets.
The difficult choices to be made require strong processes, but they also require a strategic vision, a
template to provide a common direction for our services in developing their unique capabilities. To meet
this need, I will approve for release this month a document entitled "Joint Vision 2010."
"Joint Vision 2010" provides an operationally based framework for the further development of the U.S.
armed forces. It recognizes as the basis for our future the significant institutional achievements and the
outstanding men and women of our armed forces which have brought us today's high quality force. Then,
examining the strategic environment, the missions we face and the implications of modern technology, it
develops new joint operational concepts from which our future military requirements can be derived.
The objective of this vision is to achieve what we term Full-Spectrum Dominance -- the capability of our
armed forces to dominate any opponent across the range of military operations. We can achieve this
objective by leveraging today's high-quality forces and force structure with leading-edge technology to
attain better command, control and intelligence and to implement new operational concepts -- dominant
maneuver, precision strike, full-dimensional protection and focused logistics. It is these new joint
operational concepts, and the improved command, control and intelligence which will make them
possible, that will focus the strengths of each of our services and guide the evolution of joint doctrine,
education, and training to bring us Full-Spectrum Dominance.
This past year the men and women of our armed forces have given us any number of reasons to be
proud. We have called on them often to go and perform difficult missions, from Korea to Bosnia, from
Haiti to Kuwait. They are performing at levels of excellence unsurpassed by any other time in our
country's history. Wherever we send them, they go with pride and determination.
Americans are rightfully proud of the men and women who serve our country so ably and well. For me, it
is a great honor to represent them and to come before you today. On their behalf, I thank you for your
unwavering support.
Raising Awareness of the Year 2000 Computer
Problem
Prepared statement of Emmett Paige Jr., assistant secretary of defense for command, control,
communications and intelligence, to the Government Management, Information and Technology
Subcommittee, House Government Reform and Oversight Committee, April 16, 1996.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it is a pleasure to testify on behalf of the Department of
Defense before your committee on the ability of public sector computer systems to properly process
dates in the year 2000. The Department of Defense is very much aware of this serious problem, and we
are treating it much as we would a computer virus.
In the Department of Defense, we are dramatically raising the awareness of the year 2000 problem
across the board -- from the department's senior leadership to its systems personnel and its suppliers in
the commercial sector.
We have set in motion a campaign to find and fix the problem in our weapon systems and automated
business information systems. We are also working with other federal agencies and private industry to
increase awareness and solve this ubiquitous problem.
I will limit my remarks to what we in the Department of Defense believe is the magnitude of the year 2000
problem and the urgency with which we must fix this problem.
Once identified within a system, the year 2000 problem is usually trivial to solve, technically. However, it
is an enormous management problem. The department has an inventory of thousands of systems and
hundreds of millions of lines of computer code.
Finding, fixing and testing date-related processing in our systems will require significant resources -resources that generally have not been planned or programed for this purpose. We face a firm deadline,
and there is no "silver bullet" product in the marketplace to find, fix and test all the changes required.
The impact of taking no action on the year 2000 problem is that we risk the high probability of severely
hampering, in some cases, many defense activities. Some of those activities will involve military
operations. Does this place some of these operations at risk? I believe that it does.
As a society, we in this country have become dependent on computers. We have fundamentally
restructured our institutions over many years to exploit computing and telecommunications technologies.
The Department of Defense reflects these institutional changes. We are dependent on our computer and
telecommunication systems.
If a particular system fails, we have generally learned how to work around an individual failure. However,
if a problem that happens to be common in most of our systems were to cause failures in all of those
systems at the same instant, the consequences might be catastrophic. The year 2000 problem has these
characteristics.
If our personnel and payroll systems process dates incorrectly, current employees, members of the
armed services and our annuitants cannot be properly paid. If our logistics and transportation systems
process dates incorrectly, people and equipment cannot be delivered to the correct place at the correct
time. This, of course, could have catastrophic consequences should it happen during a time when our
fighting forces are being called upon to react to national security crisis or lend emergency assistance.
Some of our weapons systems would not function properly. Our data bases would be greatly corrupted.
Inaction is simply unacceptable; coordinated and collaborative action is imperative. We have taken action
to address the year 2000 issue, and we will continue to take action.
We are placing particular emphasis on our weapons systems and on systems related to safety.
Fortunately, weapons systems are, for the most part, much less date-intensive than most business
information systems, so there are fewer year 2000 fixes which need to be made in them. Nevertheless,
we still have to check all weapon systems for the year 2000 problem. When we are dealing with weapons
and their delivery systems, we must leave nothing to chance.
We are implementing year 2000 solutions in each of the military departments and defense agencies. The
military departments and defense agencies are assessing the impact of the year 2000 problem and
prioritizing the needed work on the systems for which they are responsible.
My office is working to facilitate the sharing of year 2000 information, such as lessons learned, best
practices and status of activities. We must avoid duplication of effort as much as possible.
Each of the three military departments and our two largest defense agencies have established year 2000
home pages on the Worldwide Web. These home pages are "hot-linked" to one another. We are adding
year 2000 information to our systems inventory data base so that we can better manage the interface
changes that will occur related to the year 2000.
The defense information technology community is very much aware of the year 2000 date problems. We
are continuing to raise the level of awareness of our customers, who are senior leaders in the functional
areas within DoD, such as logistics, personnel and procurement, and the entire warfighting community.
The Department of Defense has some relatively unique year 2000 problems. Our software inventory
includes software written in computer languages, such as the language Jovial, that are not widely used
elsewhere. This is a legacy of past policies that permitted the proliferation of different computer
languages and dialects.
While we are working aggressively toward correcting the language problem, we must also deal with the
consequences of having so many computer languages to deal with. This means that we will need a wider
array of software tools to help reduce the time to find and fix year 2000 problems and to validate the
solutions through testing.
Commercial off-the-shelf software tools are available only for some of the more commonly used
computer programming languages, such as COBOL, C and, of course, ADA. For many computer
languages, no commercial tools are available.
Another problem is that we may find the year 2000 date problem in computer chips used only by the
Department of Defense. Those chips may no longer be in production. Some of these chips are because
of special military requirements, such as in a missile. Others of these are part of the legacy of past
policies that allowed broad use of military-unique specifications rather than encouraging the use of
commercial, nondevelopmental items.
Secretary [of Defense William J.] Perry and Deputy Secretary [of Defense John] White are firm in their
support of the use of commercial products, but DoD must still deal with its inventory of DoD-unique
computer hardware components.
Although there is as yet no governmentwide year 2000 computer policy, the Department of Defense has
been actively participating in the Federal Interagency Year 2000 Committee. We have made several
recommendations that are being acted upon to help the federal sector address year 2000 problems.
We are encouraged by the work of the Office of Management and Budget in dealing aggressively with the
private sector to urge them to make their products capable of properly processing dates in the year 2000
and acknowledging which products will not be able to process dates in the year 2000. Central leadership
and coordination by OMB will relieve federal agencies of potentially duplicating effort in dealing with the
commercial hardware and software vendors. Addressing this problem will drain plenty enough resources
without having it magnified by duplication of efforts.
We have implemented year 2000 solutions in some of our systems already. In other systems, we are
planning the work as part of the normal operations and maintenance cycle. As far as what is possible or
should be possible, solutions are being found by the DoD's central design activities as a normal part of
their O&M activities.
The services and defense agencies must prioritize their work efforts to get the most critical things done
within the resources available. For example, the Defense Finance and Accounting Service has been
working this problem for a number of years (1991). However, for the majority of the Department of
Defense systems, we are still assessing where year 2000 problems exist and determining the resources
required to solve those problems.
We believe we will have to expend significant funds to complete the task. We are working diligently to
quickly refine our assessments across the department. However, it is becoming clear that tradeoffs will
be required. In some cases, there will be an adverse impact on planned system improvements. The
implementation of many business process re-engineering initiatives may need to be delayed, since many
of these are reliant upon the use of information technologies.
With resources for the federal government becoming increasingly scarce, DoD will continue to examine
its priorities carefully when considering funding for information technology investments, including those
for the services and defense agencies to fix or remedy the year 2000 problem. We must work within the
constraints of overall budget realities.
The resource requirements to implement year 2000 solutions extends beyond application software and
DoD-unique hardware. The Department of Defense and other federal agencies have not anticipated the
requirement to purchase year 2000-compliant hardware and software. Much hardware and systems
software must be replaced or upgraded, including hundreds of thousands of personal computers.
I am increasingly concerned about the effect of the year 2000 problem within our personal computers and
workstations. In this arena, we, along with the rest of the nation, are operating within the control of
hardware and software industries.
In many ways, I am more concerned about the "bugs" I am not able to fix or help to fix. If some significant
percentage of our off-the-shelf inventory of small computers and their software should fail, we will have
an enormous, costly and potentially perilous situation on our hands. This problem needs to be worked
immediately.
The management aspects associated with the year 2000 are a real concern. With our global economy
and the vast electronic exchange of information among our systems and data bases, the timing of
coordinated changes in date formats is critical.
Much dialogue will need to occur in order to prevent a "fix" in one system from causing another system to
"crash." If a system fails to properly process information, the result could be the corruption of other data
bases, extending perhaps to databases in other government agencies or countries. Again, inaction is
simply unacceptable; coordinated action is imperative.
In summary, there is much work to be done and much needed coordination among those doing the work.
We have limited resources and an immovable deadline. There can be no schedule delays. Significant
resources will likely be required to find, fix and test date-related processing in our thousands of systems
and hundreds of millions of lines of code.
We must establish priorities for our efforts. We need to get on with isolating year 2000 problems and
fixing those problems, now. We cannot spend an inordinate amount of time analyzing and assessing the
problem; we do not have the time.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you for the opportunity to present the department's views on this important issue.
Protecting the Nation Through Ballistic Missile
Defense
Prepared Remarks of Defense Secretary William J. Perry at George Washington University, Washington,
April 25, 1996.
This past January, I did something that previous secretaries of defense could only dream of doing. I
stood on a windswept field at the Pervomaysk nuclear missile facility in Ukraine with the Russian and
Ukrainian ministers of defense. The three of us joined together to turn a special launch control key that
instead of launching a missile, ignited explosives that blew up the silo. The Pervomaysk missile field was
once the crown jewel of the Soviet nuclear missile arsenal. It had 80 intercontinental ballistic missiles and
700 nuclear warheads, all aimed at targets in the United States. By this June, every last missile and
warhead will be gone from Pervomaysk -- and that missile field will be converted to a wheat field.
My generation spent nearly all of our adult lives with the threat of nuclear holocaust hanging over our
heads like a dark cloud, threatening the extinction of all mankind. The most fearsome weapon in the
nuclear arsenal was the intercontinental ballistic missile. For decades, both the U.S. and the Soviet
Union sought to build ICBMs that were bigger, more powerful, more accurate and more survivable -each believing at various times that they faced a "missile gap." With the end of the Cold War, the missile
race has ended, and all the world breathes easier. We are now pursuing a strategy with Russia based not
on competition and buildup of weapons, but on cooperation and builddown.
But while the Cold War is over, the missile threat has not gone away. Indeed, another missile threat is
emerging. It is the threat of missile technology in the hands of rogue nations hostile to the United States
or our allies. The real danger is that those missiles can be coupled with nuclear, biological or chemical
weapons and that they will be used to attack our troops in battle theaters, to attack or terrorize our allies
or even in the future to threaten our country.
To protect our nation, our troops and our allies from the threat of missiles of mass destruction today, we
maintain three basic lines of defense. Our first line of defense is to prevent the spread of weapons and
missile technology through a range of arms control and nonproliferation treaties, export controls and
sanctions. Our second line of defense is to deter the use of these weapons by maintaining strong
conventional and nuclear forces and the willingness to retaliate. But we must also have a third line of
defense -- a program to deploy systems to defeat the threat by shooting down missiles of mass
destruction.
I want to focus today on that third line of defense -- ballistic missile defense -- because there is great
debate over this issue, and I want to clarify what the debate is about -- and what it is not about.
The Defense Department spends almost $3 billion a year to research, develop and build systems that
can seek out, target and shoot down ballistic missiles. Our ballistic missile defense program starts with a
sober and clear-eyed look at the missile threat, and it responds with a balanced program that
emphasizes the current threat and stays well ahead of future threats.
So what is the threat? First, there is the here-and-now threat from short-range theater ballistic missiles -Scud-type missiles. Second, there is an emerging threat from longer-range theater missiles. And third,
there is a future threat that undeterrable rogue states will obtain ICBMs that can reach the United States.
Each threat is different, so our response to each threat is different.
The first threat we are concerned about is that Scud-type missiles will be used to attack our troops
deployed overseas in battle theaters, or to terrorize our allies. This is not a hypothetical threat -- it is real.
Desert Storm was a wake-up call. [Iraqi President] Saddam Hussein had Scuds, and he used them
against our forces. He also used them in a terrorist mode, by firing Scuds at population centers in Israel,
which was not even a participant in the war.
We do not know what Saddam would have done if his nuclear program had succeeded in producing
nuclear weapons by then. We do know that he had chemical and biological warheads for the Scuds, but
chose not to use them. Certainly, he had very strong warning of the retaliation he would suffer if he did
use chemical weapons.
Today, about 30 nations have Scud missiles. Some of these nations also currently have chemical and
biological weapons. Defending our troops against these theater missiles of mass destruction is a high
priority of our military commanders. It is a high priority of the president, and it is a high priority of
Congress. Indeed, Congress fully supports our defense program against this threat.
We already have theater missile defense systems deployed to a number of hot spots, such as the Middle
East and the Korean Peninsula. These defenses include upgraded Patriot missiles. But this technology is
not good enough. Therefore, we have shifted additional funds to building and fielding better theater
missile defense systems.
For the '97 fiscal year, one-third of our overall budget for ballistic missile defenses is focused on defenses
against this here-and-now missile threat. A new generation of more advanced Patriots and Navy missile
defenses will soon be tested, and they are scheduled for delivery to Army units and Navy ships beginning
in 1999. These new systems will seek and hit incoming missiles with more deadly aim, and they will have
a much more effective kill mechanism that will minimize the dispersal of nuclear, chemical or biological
agents on the ground.
But as we improve our defenses against the here-and-now missile threat, we must also gear up to defend
against the second missile threat that is emerging on the horizon. Rogue nations evidently are beginning
to develop more advanced theater ballistic missiles, which will pose a greater threat to our troops and
allies than Scud-type missiles.
North Korea, for example, is developing a ballistic missile for its own military and for export markets such
as the Middle East and North Africa. With a range of 1,000 kilometers, this missile will be able to fly
farther than the Scud. It would allow North Korea, for example, to strike Tokyo. It would also allow Libya
to strike our allies in Europe. By the time these longer-range theater ballistic missiles hit the global
market, more nations may have biological and chemical weapons -- and some may have nuclear
weapons. This threat is not here and now, but it is emerging, and we view it seriously.
Our response to this emerging threat is to develop the next generation of theater ballistic missile
defenses. These systems will be able to protect areas over 10 times larger than the theater missile
defenses we are building now, allowing us to protect an entire Army division or a metropolitan area.
As we develop these systems, however, there are two sets of decisions we are going to need to grapple
with. The first decision involves priorities -- how much and how fast. Some in Congress want us to speed
up and spend more on defenses against future missile threats. In a world where financial priorities must
be set, we believe the highest priority should be given to developing and deploying defenses against the
missile threat that is here today.
The second set of decisions we need to grapple with as we develop broader theater missile defenses
involves the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty between the United States and Russia. The ABM treaty prohibits
each of us from building anti-ballistic missile systems to shield our nations from each other's nuclear
arsenals. Through the years, this treaty has maintained stability by discouraging a race to build larger
and better nuclear arsenals to overcome each other's defenses. In fact, the treaty has encouraged
reductions in our nuclear arsenals.
The ABM treaty does not prohibit America and Russia from building defenses to shield our troops from
theater missiles. But the language of the treaty is not explicit about what is permitted. Therefore, we are
working closely with Russia on an agreement to more clearly differentiate between theater missile
defenses and those missile defenses prohibited by the ABM treaty.
But our bottom line is, we will not give up the right to defend our troops or our allies from attack by theater
ballistic missiles.
As we field better systems to protect our troops and allies against theater ballistic missile attack, we must
also prepare to protect our nation from the third missile threat. It is the prospect that rogue states will
someday obtain strategic ballistic missiles -- ICBMs -- that can reach our shores. To defend our nation
against this potential threat, we need to be ready to deploy a national missile defense. Today, we do not
need a national missile defense system, because our nation is not now threatened by missiles of mass
destruction. No rogue nation has ICBMs.
Only the established nuclear powers have ICBMs. And if these powers should ever pose a threat, our
ability to retaliate with an overwhelming nuclear response will serve as a deterrent. Deterrence has
protected us from the established nuclear arsenals for decades, and it will continue to protect us.
But while the United States is safe today from strategic missile attack, this picture could change in two
ways -- first, if rogue nations were to develop their own ICBMs. According to the U.S. intelligence
community, this threat is more than a decade away. However, it could come sooner if rogue nations get
help from other nations in developing ICBMs. No nation seems so inclined, and we will continue to
discourage such help -- but we must be alert to this possibility. The second scenario is if an unauthorized
or accidental launch of an ICBM occurs in Russia or China. Our intelligence considers this probability
remote, and we are working to make it more remote through arms control and diplomacy.
Because of these two scenarios, we have a hedge strategy: to develop a national missile defense system
that we could deploy if an ICBM threat to our country were to appear on the horizon. This national missile
defense system under development would not be comparable to the system that was under development
in the Strategic Defense Initiative -- that is, it would not be capable of defending against thousands of
warheads being launched at the United States. On the other hand, our system would be quite capable of
defending against the much smaller and relatively unsophisticated ICBM threat that a rogue nation or a
terrorist could mount any time in the foreseeable future. And it would be capable of shooting down an
unauthorized or accidentally launched missile.
The system we are developing would include sensors in space to identify and track incoming missiles,
and interceptor missiles and radars on the ground. Our plan is to develop elements of this system over
the next three years. Then, at that point, if we were to see a rogue threat emerging, we could construct
this system and have it on site in another three years -- that is, by the year 2003. If, as we expect, we see
no such threat emerging, we will continue developing and improving the technologies, all the while
retaining the capability to have the system up and running within three years of a decision to deploy. That
way, we will be ready and able to field the most advanced system possible to counter missile threats to
our nation as fast as they can emerge.
How we defend the nation from ballistic missiles was the subject of great debate during the Cold War.
The debate has begun again today. Critics of our program in Congress are supporting a bill sponsored by
Senate Majority Leader [Robert] Dole and House [of Representatives] Speaker [Newt] Gingrich. The
Dole-Gingrich bill would replace our national missile defense plan with a plan of its own.
In many critical areas, our two plans see eye-to-eye. Both recognize the need to be capable of defending
our nation against a potential rogue missile threat. And both would make it possible to deploy a system
by 2003. The critical difference between our plans is timing.
The Dole-Gingrich bill says we must choose a system now and begin deploying it in three years,
independent of how our threat assessment evolves. Our plan says, let's develop a system, assess the
threat in three years and make our deployment decision accordingly. Our choice between these two
plans could be quite significant. Everyone should know what is at stake in the choice.
The first issue at stake is the chance to further reduce Cold War nuclear arsenals. Committing now to
deploy a national missile defense system, as called for in the Dole-Gingrich bill, would almost certainly
put at risk Russia's full implementation of the START [Strategic Arms Reductions Talks] I treaty, and
ratification and implementation of the START II treaty. In other words, the Dole-Gingrich bill could
jeopardize the elimination of an additional 3,200 former Soviet nuclear warheads. No ballistic missile
defense offers our country better protection than the elimination of 3,200 nuclear warheads. In this case,
the choice is between defending against a threat that does not exist vs. eliminating a threat that does
exist.
Additionally, committing right now to deploy a system could require the United States to amend or
abrogate the ABM treaty with Russia. This is unnecessary without a real threat on the horizon. Only if and
when we decide to deploy a national missile defense would we need to decide whether we need
amendments to the ABM treaty.
The second issue at stake is the effectiveness of the national defense system we deploy. Choosing a
system now will limit our options to build a better system that is better matched to the threat. In this case,
the choice is between building an advanced system to defeat an actual threat vs. a less capable system
to defeat a hypothetical threat.
Think of this problem in terms of buying a personal computer for college. If you ordered your computer as
a high school sophomore, it would have been obsolete by the time you started college, it would lack the
capabilities you now need and would be impossible or prohibitively expensive to upgrade. On the other
hand, if you ordered your computer just before you started college, you would have gotten the latest
technology, and it would more closely match what you actually needed for school.
In the world of Pentium computers, we don't want to be stuck with a 286. In the world of national missile
defense, we want the latest technology, closely matched to what we actually need to defend our country.
The choices we make in missile defense have far-reaching implications. I believe this administration has
made the right choices to protect us in the post-Cold War nuclear age. We work to prevent threats from
endangering us. We maintain strong forces and the strong will to use force, to deter attack.
We maintain missile defenses that can defeat a missile attack against our deployed troops. We are
focused on getting better theater missile defenses into the field as soon as possible. And we have a
robust and flexible program to develop a national missile defense against a rogue ICBM threat to our
nation, if such a threat emerges in the future. Overall, our ballistic missile defense program strikes the
right balance, with an emphasis on the threat that is here and now.
[Former British Prime Minister] Winston Churchill once said about Americans: "The bigger the idea, the
more wholeheartedly and obstinately do they throw themselves into making it a success. That is an
admirable characteristic -- provided the idea is good." As our country throws itself wholeheartedly and
obstinately into our ballistic missile defense program, we have an obligation to our troops, to our allies, to
our taxpayers and to our children to make sure that it is the right program.
European Command's Strategy of Engagement
and Preparedness
Prepared statement of Gen. George A. Joulwan, USA, commander-in-chief, U.S. European Command,
to the Appropriations Subcommittee, House National Security Committee, March 19, 1996.
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, I am privileged to appear before you today
to discuss the United States European Command. Once again, I welcome the opportunity to share my
perspective on what has continued to be a theater in transition and conflict. While Europe has changed
dramatically with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of communism, those changes are not
complete and continue to evolve. In the USEUCOM area of responsibility, where totalitarianism once
ruled, democratic governments are gaining strength and maturity.
The Cold War is over. But the U.S. and NATO missions did not end with the collapse of a wall or the
defeat of an ideology. A stable and secure Europe remains a vital interest to America. The need for a
strong and flexible NATO with U.S. involvement remains because there is still a great deal of uncertainty
and instability.
In countries impoverished by communism, fragile democracies struggle to maintain stability within their
borders. Although Russia retains thousands of nuclear weapons, all but a handful have been returned
from the other republics of the former Soviet Union. Thanks in part to the Nunn-Lugar Program, these
remaining weapons should be safely shipped to Russia in the near future. Even more immediate is the
ethnic and religious conflict that has laid waste to large areas of the former Yugoslavia. Said another way,
USEUCOM continues to be a theater in transition.
Throughout this transition, United States leadership in the region, demonstrated by our national strategy
of peacetime engagement and military preparedness, provided the guiding principles upon which
emerging democratic nations could focus. A few short years ago, no one could have envisioned that
today the U.S., as part of NATO, would be working side by side with Russia and other former adversaries
in out-of-area peace enforcement operations.
While I reported impressive accomplishments in Europe last year, over the last 12 months our efforts
have borne fruit of historic proportions, as today the men and women of U.S. European Command are
engaged in the largest, most complex operational movement of military forces in Europe since World War
II. Operation Joint Endeavor in Bosnia-Herzegovina illustrates the success we can achieve through
America's National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement. As the United States, NATO and
the international community mission continues, we will have shown our resolve and provided Bosnia with
an opportunity to take hold of their own future and break the cycle of violence.
Our success in operation Joint Endeavor is not by chance. It is the product of focused effort over the last
two years by USEUCOM and NATO. USEUCOM's strategy of engagement and preparedness, based on
the objectives in the National Security Strategy and NATO's Partnership for Peace Program are the
center pieces of this effort.
Together we developed an operational concept to exercise with our new partners in order to train to
common standards, procedures and doctrine, and to be prepared to operate under NATO command.
Two years later, we are doing just that in Bosnia under the auspices of Operation Joint Endeavor. Many
of our partner nations' forces who trained in the PfP program have joined us in Joint Endeavor.
Our continued leadership in NATO and engagement throughout the region made possible the
deployment of the Bosnia implementation force. We have met our goal of closing and setting the force at
D+60. In total, there have been over 2,500 flights, 350 trains with 6,800 rail cars and 50 ships supporting
IFOR's deployment.
Joint Endeavor now has 30 maneuver battalions within the three multinational divisions backed up by
artillery, aviation, engineers, military police, combat support and combat service support assets. This
would not have been possible without the relationships nurtured through years of engagement. Over 30
nations, including non-NATO partners such as Russia, Poland, Sweden, Slovakia, the Czech Republic,
Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Hungary, have deployed forces, provided basing rights and transit
agreements or promised economic aid to this historic peace support operation.
Forward presence and available infrastructure in the theater provide a platform from which the U.S. can
execute regional operations. Readiness of these forward-based forces was the linchpin that allowed the
rapid deployment of the U.S. airborne battalion combat team from its base in Italy to Bosnia-Herzegovina.
That deployment demonstrated the flexibility and responsiveness that a forward-based force provides.
In addition, the lst Armored Division's deployment was primarily by rail and truck convoy from its bases in
Germany. This cut days off the deployment time and was significantly less costly than it would have been
for a similarly equipped CONUS-based [continental United States-based] unit requiring strategic airlift
and sealift.
Additionally, the Mediterranean Amphibious Ready Group and Marine expeditionary unit maintained a
continual forward-based presence off the coast of Bosnia-Herzegovina as part of the U.S. contribution to
the IFOR reserve. Peacetime engagement and military preparedness coupled with the military
capabilities inherent in forward-based forces were key elements to meeting our U.S. objectives.
This truly unique moment in history, this new security paradigm, was made possible because you, our
elected leaders, support our forward-looking strategy of engagement and preparedness. Congress
provided USEUCOM the resources to accomplish our mission and ensured our forces were properly
equipped and trained. We must continue to build on these successes.
With that overview, I would like to focus my remarks on three main themes. First, I must emphasize that
our success is largely a result of the forward-based, overseas presence directed by the president's
National Security Strategy. This forward-based presence reaps the substantial benefits obtained through
engagement with the region's nations. America's continued presence in this theater helped create a new
security environment based on international cooperation and will provide the opportunity to extend
stability to all of Europe.
Secondly, while USEUCOM's forward-based force is the primary tool with which we pursue our regional
objectives, they cannot do it alone. The reserve components and select units from other unified
commands are the special teams that provide critical augmentation support, allowing USEUCOM to
execute a reasonable personnel tempo and sustain an adequate quality of life. USEUCOM's theater
strategy is a total force strategy.
Finally, our forward basing requires resources to maintain preparedness, infrastructure and quality of life
while also continuing our force modernization. The nation's past investment in the USEUCOM theater
made Joint Endeavor possible. At this critical point in the history of our nation and Europe's, we cannot
afford to back away from these vital commitments.
The National Security Strategy of the United States provides the framework from which we derived the
USEUCOM theater strategy. From its three primary objectives -- enhance our security, promote
prosperity at home and promote democracy -- come the military objectives of the National Military
Strategy and the USEUCOM theater strategy of engagement and preparedness -- promoting stability and
thwarting aggression.
The National Security Strategy goes on to define the importance of permanently stationed forces and
pre-positioned equipment, deployments and combined exercises, port calls and other force visits, as well
as military-to-military contacts in achieving these objectives. These forward-based forces:


Promote an international security environment of trust, cooperation, peace and stability;
Facilitate regional integration, since nations that may not be willing to work together in our
absence may be willing to coalesce around us in a crisis;

Enhance the effectiveness of coalition operations, including peace operations, by improving our
ability to operate with other nations;

Allow the United States to use its position of trust to prevent the development of power vacuums
and dangerous arms races, thereby underwriting regional stability by precluding threats to
regional security;

Demonstrate our determination to defend U.S. and allied interest in critical regions, deterring
hostile nations from acting contrary to those interests;

Provide forward elements for rapid response in crises as well as the bases, ports and other
infrastructure essential for deployment of U.S.-based forces by air, sea and land;

Give form and substance to our bilateral and multilateral security commitments.
These themes will surface repeatedly as I discuss the USEUCOM theater in terms of our strategy of
engagement and preparedness.
USEUCOM's forward-based forces promote trust, cooperation, peace and stability through a number of
avenues. U.S. leadership of NATO is absolutely essential to promoting a viable security environment.
Numerous U.S. and NATO initiatives such as Partnership for Peace, the USEUCOM Joint Contact Team
Program and the Reserve Component State Partnership Program facilitate regional integration and
enhance the effectiveness of coalition operations. The George C. Marshall European Center for Security
Studies [in Garmisch, Germany] also promotes an international security environment of trust and
cooperation. Finally, security assistance programs provide form and substance to our bilateral and
multilateral security commitments.
Through its leadership of NATO, America promotes a collective security environment based on trust and
cooperation, a relationship that fosters peace and stability. This is fundamental to the vitality of
developing democracies and free-market economies. Forward presence reinforces our strong
commitment to the trans-Atlantic link and makes us a European power, but one that is uniquely
unencumbered by historical anxieties and territorial ambitions.
USEUCOM uses its position of trust to prevent the development of power vacuums and dangerous arms
races, thereby precluding threats to regional security. This leadership is especially important as NATO
grows from a solely defensive alliance to a regional security organization.
USEUCOM builds regional cooperation and security through Partnership for Peace and bilateral
exercises that facilitate integration throughout the region. On Nov. 13, 1995, the former republic of
Macedonia became the 27th partnership country. Eighteen nations now have full-time representatives
assigned to the Partnership Coordination Cell at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe. Our
forces have participated in over 36 NATO- or U.S.-sponsored exercises, including two with Russia. By
working and exercising with each other, these nations develop common procedures through PfP that will
enhance interoperability and help overcome ancient animosities and distrust. These initiatives enhance
the effectiveness of coalition operations, including peace operations, by improving our ability to operate
with other nations.
The Joint Contact Team Program is a uniquely American program successful beyond all expectations.
JCTP's in-country military liaison teams help host nations to implement human rights guarantees, military
legal codes based on the rights of the citizen-soldier, professionalization of noncommissioned officer and
chaplain corps, and governmental structures that ensure militaries remain subordinate to civilian control.
The teams provide information on how we Americans handle a whole range of challenges in nonlethal
subjects associated with military organizations in a democratic society. As evidence of JCTP's success,
host-nation requests for JCTP events have increased sixfold in the last two years.
No other nation possesses our unique capability to conduct the JCTP. To begin with, despite our
significant military power, we are welcome in Central Europe because we carry no historical baggage
and clearly have no territorial aspirations on the Continent. In addition, because we are a nation of
federated states, we understand the advantages and the challenges of diverse governments working
together. Finally, coming from a nation rich in ethnic diversity, we have demonstrated this diversity can be
a strength rather than a weakness. The United States brings unique qualities to the JCTP.
Our American reserve components are an essential and unique part of the Joint Contact Team Program,
conducting one-fifth of the JCTP events. These citizen-soldiers embody America's democratic ideals and
reinforce the concept of a military subordinate to civilian authority. By drawing on soldiers from specific
states, USEUCOM has been able to set the stage for enduring long-term relationships.
In addition to the 13 JCTP countries, state National Guards have "adopted" eight other regional countries
under the State Partnership Program. This program establishes close relations with a total of 21 nations,
including countries of the former Soviet Union. This further encourages the development of long-term
institutional and personal relationships between military and civic leaders and allows more Americans to
become involved directly in helping countries transition to democracy.
As the state partnership relationships mature, they are able to contribute effectively in many ways.
Exercise Uje Kristal illustrates how many of the engagement programs can successfully come together in
a single exercise. This exercise, which upgraded an Albanian regional hospital and offered Albanians
clean water and improved sanitation, was a joint-combined interoperability exercise conducted in the
spirit of PfP, with active component Seabees and reserve components participating through the State
Partnership Program: South Carolina Army National Guard and Marine Corps Reserves from Illinois,
Kentucky, Maryland, Ohio and Pennsylvania. The low-cost, high payoff results of this exercise included
valuable training, improved interoperabililty and enhanced relationships with the people of Albania.
Together, Americans and Albanians satisfied an urgent need while simultaneously helping to build the
foundation for the future security architecture of Europe.
The George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies contributes to regional stability by
educating foreign government officials, specifically Central Europeans, in democratic processes and
ideals. Its mission is to help educate future leaders in security affairs and defense management
principles that are harmonious with democracy and civilian oversight of the military.
Established in June 1993, it has gained an exemplary reputation among PfP countries and established
itself as a unique institution focused on fostering and teaching democratic ideals. In December, the
Marshall Center graduated its third class of 75 mid- to senior-level officers and civilians from 23 Central
and East European nations. This brings the total number of graduates to 233. The center also holds
conferences and sponsors research on defense procedures and organizations appropriate to democratic
states with free market economies. This is a very cost-effective means of influencing future generations
of regional defense leaders and for promoting a course of development that reduces future threats.
Security assistance programs continue to facilitate regional integration, enhance the effectiveness of
coalition operations and give form and substance to our bilateral and multilateral security commitments.
They also demonstrate our determination to defend U.S. and allied interests in critical regions. Foreign
Military Financing, Foreign Military Sales, Direct Commercial Sales and International Military Education
and Training enable selected friends and allies to improve their defense capabilities. While all of these
programs are important, the IMET program is worth particular note.
IMET, a premier component of the Security Assistance Program, promotes military-to-military relations
and exposes international military and civilian officials to U.S. values and democratic processes. In 1995,
IMET sent 985 international students from the USEUCOM theater to schools in the United States. IMET
also paid for 11 English language laboratories for eight Central European countries to assist their efforts
to establish a solid foundation in English -- all this at a cost of only $14 million. In 1996, 27 African nations
and 23 Central European countries will participate in the U.S. IMET program, and IMET will continue to
fund English language laboratories throughout Central Europe and countries of the Former Soviet Union.
IMET has a direct impact on most countries in this theater. Nearly all countries have sent members to
America for professional military training. As an example, the IMET program trained 20 percent of all flag
officers in Turkey, 80 percent of the senior leadership in Portugal and more than 500 senior civilian and
military leaders throughout the USEUCOM theater. IMET provides these nations familiarity with U.S.
ideology, doctrine and equipment. It leads to closer military-to-military relationships, favorable basing
negotiations and repeat equipment orders. Simply put, IMET serves as the centerpiece of security
assistance.
USEUCOM faces all the challenges outlined in the National Military Strategy: regional instability, dangers
to democracy and reform, weapons of mass destruction and transnational dangers that threaten the
emerging democracies. It is a theater in transition, as the economic, political, judicial and military
institutions that make democracy work continue to evolve in the former communist nations of Europe and
in many former autocratic regimes in Africa.
Still, USEUCOM must remain prepared to protect and defend U.S. interests. The high state of readiness
of USEUCOM forces serves to deter aggression that might threaten U.S. national interests in Europe.
USEUCOM forces provide forward elements for rapid response in crises as well as the bases, ports and
other infrastructure essential for deployment of U.S.-based forces. Combined exercises with regional
nations not only contribute to engagement and foster an atmosphere of regional cooperation, but ensure
that our forces are prepared for potential security challenges.
Joint and combined exercises, including PfP and in the spirit of PfP events, help us maintain the
preparedness necessary to help preserve the peace. Despite the rigorous demands of IFOR, we have
been able, through careful planning, to sustain a robust training schedule for 1996, with 71 planned
USEUCOM exercises. This ensures that forces not deploying to Joint Endeavor will remain ready to fulfill
national tasking.
Our preparedness also allows the United States to use its position of trust to prevent the development of
power vacuums and dangerous arms races, thereby precluding threats to regional security. By backing
our commitments with ready forces positioned forward, the United States sends a clear warning of
deterrence to nations that are inclined to pursue their aims through the destructive use of force. We also
assure nations that might otherwise seek weapons of mass destruction that their security is better
safeguarded through collective and cooperative mechanisms.
U.S. leadership, manifested through USEUCOM's engagement and preparedness, paved the way for
dramatic successes in improved security and cooperation. Joint Endeavor, Deny Flight, Sharp Guard and
Provide Promise were possible only because of our long history of positive engagement with our
traditional allies, which yielded the requisite support opportunities.
Nontraditional allies have also recently supported our efforts. Albania provided basing for our Predator
unmanned aerial reconnaissance flights. In addition to providing bases for U.S. forces at Kaposvar and
Taszar, Hungary permitted USAF [U.S. Air Force] AWACS [Airborne Warning and Control System
aircraft] overflight in support of Operation Deny Flight. Our peacetime engagement, and the resultant
trust and cooperative spirit it engenders, built regional cooperation and helped guarantee these
successes.
U.S. forces in NATO also benefit from this strong relationship in that many nations equitably share the
risks and burdens of protecting common interests. NATO proved that it can adapt to the new security
environment and remain cost effective by sharing responsibilities across a broad spectrum of operations.
The new NATO, born out of the 1991 Rome Declaration's new Alliance Strategic Concept, not only
provides an organization capable of defending the territory of its member states, but also fosters the
emergence of a safer and more stable Europe. Last year, when the Bosnian Serbs ignored our demarche
by shelling Sarajevo, NATO executed Operation Deliberate Force. This precise, robust use of airpower
clearly fulfilled our political objectives and led directly to the successful Dayton peace negotiations and
Operation Joint Endeavor.
The burden of these operations did not fall upon any single nation, but were instead spread across the
entire alliance and beyond. Operation Joint Endeavor quickly evolved well beyond a U.S.-led NATO
operation. U.S. leadership, made possible through active engagement, pulled virtually all the nations of
the region together to achieve a common security goal. This facilitated rapid access to lines of
communication, permission for basing and flexible transit agreements. Thirty nations now contribute
ground troops, basing rights, transit agreements and economic aid to the war-torn Balkan countries.
Nearly half these nations are not NATO members, but are members of Partnership for Peace.
In addition to IFOR, we have had other strategic successes, brought about by our active engagement
and sustained readiness. On Jan. 9, the air bridge to Sarajevo under Operation Provide Promise
concluded. The United States led five coalition nations in this 3 1/2-year humanitarian airlift operation.
Operation Provide Promise lasted almost three times as long as the Berlin Airlift of 1948 and at times
provided 95 percent of Sarajevo's sustenance requirements: nearly 13,000 sorties -- over 4,500 of them
flown by the U.S. Air Force -- and delivered over 165,000 tons of supplies to Sarajevo residents. Task
Force Able Sentry, which deployed from Germany to Macedonia, has also been a major stabilizing
influence in the region, helping prevent the spread of the Balkan conflict.
Our relationship with Turkey provides another excellent illustration. U.S. engagement encouraged Turkey
to enforce domestically expensive economic sanctions against Iraq. Because of our close military
relations, the Turkish general staff has supported Operation Provide Promise. This multinational
operation in southern Turkey and northern Iraq enters its sixth year in April.
A recent operational assessment concluded that Provide Comfort is fulfilling all of its objectives:
preventing suffering in northern Iraq, preventing further repression, weakening Saddam Hussein's regime
and preserving the territorial integrity of northern Iraq. Furthermore, the multinational coordination
procedures that developed from this operation, such as the combined joint task force concept, and other
lessons learned from Operation Provide Comfort, will serve us well in IFOR and future coalition
operations.
American engagement in Turkey also ensures ready access to bases that are critical for executing our
Major Regional Conflict-East contingency plans. It is significant that Turkey, one of the few modern,
secular, Moslem democracies, placed first priority on deploying and serving in the U.S. area of
responsibility in Operation Joint Endeavor.
Furthermore, for the first time since World War II, Russian and U.S. forces are working together in a
military operation. Our relations with Russia's military grow closer and more cooperative each day. As the
operators work side by side in Bosnia, there is a clear demonstration of U.S. capability and goodwill.
Col. Gen. L.P. Shevtsov, commander of the Russian forces in Bosnia, has his office in the IFOR
Coordination at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe. This practical collocation offers great
possibilities and a concrete example of security cooperation. It represents an opportunity to remove
some of the Russian suspicion toward the West while building confidence in our good intentions. I believe
PfP has been our most valuable tool in remaining engaged with Russia and in consolidating democratic
gains.
Arms control illustrates success in another area of engagement. Significant reductions in weapons have
yielded corresponding reductions in tensions. For the past nine years, USEUCOM has been actively
involved in arms control efforts. Nowhere in the world does the level or spectrum of activity in arms
control match what is taking place in the USEUCOM theater of operations.
Our daily efforts supporting compliance with the protocols and confidence-building measures of the
Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty, Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty and Vienna
Document 1994 set the highest example for the international community on how to responsibly
participate in the international security process. These arms control examples have implications far
beyond the boundaries of USEUCOM's area of responsibility. Nations in the Middle East, Asia and South
America, have looked to the United States, and hence USEUCOM, as a role model for how to
responsibly implement arms control regimes.
I intend to remain fully engaged and supportive of arms control initiatives before us today and on the
future horizon, including START I [Strategic Arms Reduction Talks] and START II, the Chemical
Weapons Convention, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone and
entry-into-force of the Open Skies Treaty. I will continue to monitor these developments closely and
carefully examine their effect on the capabilities of my command.
USEUCOM remains engaged in several critical operations that enhance national security. Our successes
are made possible through sustained overseas presence. U.S. leadership and NATO provide a regional
security structure that fosters cooperation and coordination. That structure pools the resources of many
nations and has established forward-based infrastructure and materiel that enable us to respond quickly
to protect U.S. interests in this region. The result has been increased security for our citizens.
U.S. forces in Europe now have a higher operational tempo than during the Cold War. The absence of a
major regional conflict does not mean USEUCOM forces are not actively engaged. On the contrary,
USEUCOM-assigned forces from all services are involved in major operations in the Balkans (Joint
Endeavor), northern Iraq and Turkey (Provide Promise) and the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia
(Task Force Able Sentry).
In addition to these major operations, USEUCOM-assigned forces participate in numerous smaller
operations on a daily basis and are prepared to execute potential missions throughout the theater. As a
result, forward-based USEUCOM forces work in concert with augmentation forces from other unified
commands, the reserve components and allied forces. We must maintain overseas presence and the
Bottom-up Review force levels to ensure successful engagement and preparedness.
The current USEUCOM force structure provides the essential elements necessary to support our efforts.
Downsizing from Cold War levels in our area of responsibility is complete.
The current force structure of approximately 100,000 makes it possible for us to fulfill our commitments to
the National Command Authority, to meet NATO requirements, to train at the international level and to be
reinforced quickly. This structure provides inherent flexibility and responsiveness necessary for regional
missions. It also provides critical in-theater capabilities not readily available from the United States, such
as intelligence and surveillance, communications, theater missile defense and other vital capabilities.
However, its relatively small size places great demands on our service members.
The key to reducing USEUCOM's personnel tempo to reasonable levels lies in the Total Force Concept.
USEUCOM relies on reservists and guardsmen, along with forces from other unified commands, to
support operations such as Provide Comfort and Deny Flight.
Reserve components perform highly specialized and critical functions throughout this theater. Virtually all
the Army's water production specialists, helicopter heavy lift units, chemical brigades and civil affairs
specialists are in the Army reserve component, making augmentation a prerequisite for many
contingencies.
As the chairman of the Reserve Forces Policy Board observed during a recent visit, USEUCOM is
already using the reserve components in a way that matches his vision for the future. The Total Force
Concept is a way of life in USEUCOM.
Our allies also fully contribute to regional security. The U.S.-NATO relationship can be best characterized
as responsibility sharing. But in the past few years, well-intentioned burdensharing legislation initiatives
have threatened to undermine American overseas presence and put at risk U.S. regional objectives.
The apparent appeal to fiscal considerations understates NATO's contribution to European security,
masks the threat to U.S. interests in the USEUCOM area of responsibility, potentially degrades U.S.
leadership, marginalizes U.S. influence and reduces America's access to the pooled resources of other
nations. We must avoid the temptation to underestimate the European contribution to our common
security.
I remain concerned about the depth in Army forces. We must not go below 10 well-equipped, manned
and trained active divisions. To do so would subject the U.S. to unacceptable risks. We must remember
that it is service members on the ground executing the flexible engagement strategy overseas that
actively mold the future security environment and prevent conflict.
We need to guard against a purely CONUS-based projection force. For the third time this century,
America could find itself in another extended conflict that might have been averted had we remained
engaged through overseas presence.
Adequate force structure is the bedrock upon which rests the preservation of America's regional interest.
We have completed the post-Cold War downsizing and are now at a force level that permits us to
implement the theater strategy. This reduced force level requires us to use our forces efficiently,
employing active duty and reserve augmentation forces to fill critical operational needs, enabling theater
forces to fulfill operational requirements. We must also ensure we continue our successful efforts to fully
leverage the contributions made by our allies.
For engagement and preparedness to remain successful and to ensure we are prepared for present and
future missions, we must balance near-term readiness with infrastructure, quality of life and
modernization.
First, readiness requires proper resourcing. Joint and combined training exercises are the basis for
promoting stability and thwarting aggression. Through these, we ensure our people -- soldiers, sailors,
airmen, Marines and civilians -- are trained and ready to support immediate deployment to crisis
situations in our area of responsibility or anywhere in the world to meet national security objectives -- as
we did when we deployed approximately 25,000 personnel in support of Operation Joint Endeavor.
Secondly, infrastructure in our theater must support the full range of our operational requirements while
also providing military members and their families facilities in which to live and work. The NATO Security
Investment Program has fully transitioned to the new security environment. It provides America access to
infrastructure and other resources at a dramatically reduced cost by allowing us to leverage the pooled
contributions of 15 other nations.
Finally, modernization is the key to our future capability. We must ensure that we maintain short-term
readiness while preserving the modernization required for long-term readiness.
We must preserve readiness to be able to execute missions concurrently while supporting ongoing
operations. Throughout last year, USEUCOM forces were continually engaged in contingency operations
such as Joint Endeavor, Deliberate Force, Provide Promise, Deny Flight, Able Sentry and Provide
Comfort.
In the past, these operations would have seriously threatened readiness and training. However, this
year's line-item funding for Operation Provide Comfort sets an extremely important precedent for
warfighting CinCs [commanders in chief]. Along with Congress' timely supplemental appropriation last
year, these measures helped USEUCOM maintain the high operational tempo while minimizing the fiscal
impact on operations and maintenance readiness accounts.
Operations and maintenance dollars maintain readiness by funding training and exercises for our forces,
and sustain our busy pace of operations. This funding allowed us to continue joint and combined training
in important exercises such as Trailblazer, 48 Hours, Poised Eagle, Atlantic Resolve and African Eagle.
These exercises train forces to exploit the synergistic effect of employing air, land and sea forces in a
coordinated effort.
Without funding for contingency operations, we would be forced to pay for operations with our scarce
training dollars. Your initiatives helped preserve readiness by providing funds that in the past were
siphoned away from operation and maintenance accounts to pay for unscheduled contingency
operations.
Infrastructure throughout the theater supports our people and our ability to perform the assigned mission.
Our facilities drawdown is virtually complete and leaves USEUCOM at less than half of its Cold War
infrastructure level. While the drawdown has forced us to make tough choices on which facilities would
remain open, we believe we have retained the capability to meet all requirements and allow for future
consolidation and flexibility.
This does not mean, however, that we have escaped the responsibility and requirement to continue
facility upgrades and some new construction. We must continue to invest in our military installations both
to maintain quality of life and ensure infrastructure is in place to support our national interests. Fewer
facilities make those that remain even more important to our continued mission readiness.
Our European infrastructure and bases provide the U.S. with access to this area of responsibility and
nearby regions that are vital to our influence abroad. It is central to sustaining supply lines and the ability
to reinforce forward-deployed forces. Given the age and condition of our facilities, it is imperative that we
continue to maintain, and in some cases upgrade, the remaining infrastructure to ensure it can meet
increased demands.
I want to stress the importance of the NATO Security Investment Program in supporting U.S. interests.
As a revitalized program, NSIP supports more than just construction. It supports our regional
engagement by providing explicit mission capabilities. Our allies fund 72 percent of this vital program;
about 28 cents of U.S. investment buys one dollar's worth of infrastructure.
The return we receive on this investment is impressive. Over the last five years, U.S. industries have
received more than $1.7 billion in high-tech contracts, including more than $100 million in military
construction contracts within the continental United States. Recent projects include $12.4 million for
runway overlay projects at Lakenheath Air Base, England, and $25.6 million for parallel taxiway projects
at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey. With the recent approval of the Aviano AB [Air Base], Italy, capabilities
package, NSIP will provide $215 million (U.S. share approximately $69 million) for construction of
beddown facilities for two U.S. F-16 squadrons. NSIP is also expected to fund the $30 million Army War
Reserve Package South warehouse construction in Livorno, Italy. This facility will store pre-positioned,
ready-to-use materiel for U.S. forces.
However, funding shortfalls for the U.S. contribution to NATO resulting from the fiscal year 95 rescission
and a $18 million reduction in the fiscal year 96 appropriation have delayed funding for U.S. embarkation
projects in CONUS and other needed projects that support power projection to the European Theater. I
appreciate the support in Congress for the fiscal year 96 funding at $161 million, but I need your
assistance to prevent rescissions that will erode our warfighting capability and U.S. credibility.
I place a high priority on five quality of life issues. Military construction is one of the key factors in
maintaining an acceptable quality of life for our people. Affordable and suitable housing for personnel
overseas is especially problematic. Last year, you approved all quality of life military construction in
USEUCOM. This helped our commanders provide the troops and their families with the living conditions
necessary to sustain our high operational tempo. We must maintain our commitment to our people by
investing in the infrastructure necessary to meet our mission and quality of life needs.
Second, our military and civilian personnel deserve adequate and fair compensation that keeps pace with
the private sector. Related to compensation is the third issue, retirement. We must preserve a stable
retirement system that does not break faith with our people by seeking fiscal savings through the
retirement system. This would constitute a betrayal of our people's trust and may risk serious damage to
our force structure.
Next, we must provide our personnel a steady and dependable level of medical benefits. This is
particularly challenging in the overseas environment where significant language and cultural differences
exist.
Finally, overseas service members and their families deserve the same quality education their
counterparts receive in the U.S. Fully funded service tuition assistance programs are required for a
professional force. Department of Defense Dependent Schools schools are also essential to USEUCOM
as it is unique in terms of needs and requirements. In this theater, DoDDS provides logistical support for
123 DoDDS schools and 48,000 students. Some of our small schools are more costly to operate, but are
essential to our readiness posture. We must continue to support our overseas schools with both
operating funds and construction money.
We must also continue to modernize our forces to meet the diverse requirements of this complex
environment, but only within the context of a viable national and theater strategy. As a warfighting CinC, I
rely on the services to provide modern equipment. I make my equipment modernization needs and their
significance to my area of responsibility known to the services, Joint Staff and the Joint Requirements
Oversight Council.
Mobility is a high priority, vital to supporting our engagement strategy. It is even more significant
considering the drawdown in Europe. Strategic lift, combined with pre-positioned materiel, is critical to
fighting or supporting any major regional conflict or contingency operation in or near the USEUCOM area
of responsibility.
I fully support the secretary of defense's decision to buy 120 C-17s. The C-17 delivers critically important
outsized equipment directly to the battle front and has already proven itself in Operation Joint Endeavor.
We are also improving our strategic sealift capability to provide heavy reinforcement and sustain theater
logistics. We require sufficient amphibious lift to support a forced-entry capability and a medium-lift
replacement helicopter for the Marines and special operations forces.
Capabilities derived from C4I [command, control, communications, computers and intelligence]
improvements will increase operational effectiveness through digitization of the battlefield, thereby
improving commanders' situational awareness. The Joint Tactical Information Distribution System will
improve combat identification, reduce fratricide and increase operational efficiency. But we should not
acquire enhanced C4I with the expectation that it will enable us to reduce overseas presence. Only
forward-based forces are capable of promoting stability, thwarting aggression and providing regional
stability, thereby preventing possible conflicts. However, modernized information flow will enable joint
task force commanders to optimize highly mobile future systems such as the V-22 Osprey, RAH-66
Comanche, F-22, F-18E/F, DDG-51, the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle and the next generation
of armored vehicles, tactical trucks and helicopter fleets. JSTARS [Joint Surveillance and Targeting
Attack Radar System aircraft], for instance, has already proven both its capability and deterrent value in
Joint Endeavor.
Air superiority plays a crucial role in sustaining USEUCOM's warfighting credibility and its ability to
project influence and power, when and where required. Control of the air is vital as an essential element
of the fighting force and when responding to crisis situations, providing the flexibility to restore order. The
F-22 and Joint Strike Fighter are critical investments in our future warfighting and peacekeeping
capability. We must also continue to upgrade the multimission aircraft that filled the gap left by our retiring
specialized systems such as EF-111, RF-4 and F-4G aircraft.
In USEUCOM, we face a challenging theater missile threat, particularly in the southern region. Presently,
our theater missile defense systems are limited in protection capability and force deployability. Just over
the horizon are several new systems in the final stages of development that address the theater missile
defense threat. We must work with and leverage our allies toward common systems, such as Medium
Extended Air Defense System, to field these systems in the near future.
We must continue to make wise choices that preserve current readiness, maintain infrastructure and
modernize our forces. Because of increased peace support operations and crisis response contingencies,
I conduct many operations that cannot be foreseen. Contingency operations are often funded at the
expense of readiness and training, but I am optimistic about recent initiatives that specifically fund these
types of operations.
Infrastructure is something we must continue to maintain and also provides an example of the successes
we can achieve by leveraging the pooled resources of many nations. Finally, modernization affects the
long-term readiness of our forces, and I am concerned that in many cases we are paying for readiness
and force structure with funds which were originally earmarked for modernization. Funding for
modernization of key weapon systems ensures we can achieve our long-term strategic objectives.
The U.S. European Command is on the cutting edge of America's national security policy today and in
the future. The U.S. forward-deployed and stationed force of about 100,000 has demonstrated its
importance in actual operations from the Balkans to Beirut and from northern Iraq to Rwanda. The U.S.
troops in Europe are well-trained, well-equipped and well-led. Although operations tempo is high,
readiness of the force is also at a high level.
The high professionalism of the force plus USEUCOM's policy of engagement and preparedness have
paid off. The engagement strategy with former Warsaw Pact nations is creating stability in Europe as well
as developing mutual trust and confidence between former adversaries and now new partners. Russia
has joined NATO and the United States in Bosnia and is effectively integrated into the command
structure and operations.
Twenty-seven nations have joined NATO's Partnership for Peace Program, and the USEUCOM-run
George C. Marshall Center is actively engaged in educating future leaders of former communist countries.
Already many of its graduates are assuming positions of responsibility in the military establishments of
their nations.
The NATO alliance has demonstrated a new vigor and vitality in planning, organizing and executing
operation Joint Endeavor -- an operation to bring peace to the people of Bosnia who have suffered so
much through four years of war. And it is USEUCOM that is providing the important support to the
Bosnian operation -- not only in troops but also intelligence, communications, logistics and strategic lift.
By the forward deployment of U.S. troops in Europe, we are leveraging our allies to do more in their own
defense and creating more stable conditions in an area of the world that has known two world wars in this
century and which remains critical to our national security.
As a result of steady and sure U.S. engagement in Europe, the world is indeed a safer place. Peace has
come to Bosnia. The Palestine Liberation Organization, Jordan and Israel are moving toward a peaceful
settlement of their decades long struggle, and Syria may soon join them. NATO has made overtures for
cooperation with Middle East countries and several in North Africa. Clearly NATO's engagement strategy
is consistent with the United States foreign policy and national interest. And clearly, USEUCOM's
strategy of engagement and preparedness is absolutely on track with U.S. policy and vision.
In 1996 and through the remainder of this century, the United States, as the leader of NATO, has the
historic opportunity to help create, from the Atlantic to the Urals, a Europe whole and free, democratic,
stable and prosperous, with justice and respect for the rights of individual citizens. We have an
opportunity to promote fundamental ideals and values as fragile democracies emerge. We not only can
deter war but also preserve the peace. To do so is in the vital interests of the United States. To do so
requires a focused, engaged, active, forward-deployed and stationed U.S. military force of 100,000
troops called USEUCOM. That force now exists.
USEUCOM has adapted to the challenges of the new Europe. We must keep it trained and ready and
provide adequate quality of life for the troops and their families. I am extremely grateful for the support of
the Congress in the past, and I know you will continue
Sustaining Flight Through Knowledge
Remarks of Paul G. Kaminski, undersecretary of defense for acquisition and technology, at the Ira C.
Eaker Distinguished Lecture on National Defense Policy, U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs,
Colo., May 2, 1996.
In June of 1960, nearly 36 years ago, I made my first trip to the Air Force Academy to enter with the Class
of 1964. That trip led to an incredible set of experiences that continue today. It is always great to return
here, but truly special for me to have the opportunity to meet with you -- the leaders of today and
tomorrow.
So much has changed since I graduated from the Air Force Academy in 1964. In 1964, with a college
degree and a few years of experience, one could reasonably expect to have one career, maybe 1 1/2
careers. But even for my generation, our expectations have had to change: I am already in my third
career.
I spent the first 20 years of my professional life as an Air Force officer. In my Air Force career, I
experienced a diversity of interesting, challenging and out-of-the-ordinary assignments. I spent the next
10 years as a founding partner and eventually as CEO [chief executive officer] of an investment banking
and consulting firm and the last 20 months as a presidential appointee in government.
Today's Air Force Academy graduates will face far more dramatic changes than I did. The Air Force itself
is going through dramatic changes. One enduring principle that I have found to be a foundation in the
midst of these continuing changes, something I first embraced during my doolie [freshman] year at the
academy, is the inscription on the eagle and fledging statue outside Mitchell Hall: "Man's Flight Through
Life Is Sustained by the Power of His Knowledge."
This afternoon I want to talk to you about how the power of knowledge will sustain today's graduates and
America's armed forces in this time of accelerating change.
Today's graduates have to anticipate a lifetime of keeping pace with change. Just think of the scope of
change in my lifetime -- it is truly astonishing. We have gone from slide rules and French curves to
pentiums and autoCAD [computer aided design].
From CNN to jet airplanes, much of the nation's progress is driven by the information revolution and
advances in semiconductor integrated circuits. The general trend we have seen since the 1970s has
been about a 10,000-fold improvement in integrated circuit capability at nearly the same cost.
These advances have been made by increasing the number of gates per chip by decreasing the
minimum feature size of a chip device at a rate described by Moore's Law. This empirical relationship
says that chips get twice as powerful every 18 months. The same $2,500 that bought the original
Macintosh in 1984, a machine with 128K [kilobytes] of random access memory and the Motorola 68000
processor, now buys a color Performa with eight megabytes of RAM, a heavy-duty 601 RISC chip and a
quad-speed CD-ROM drive.
We project another thousandfold improvement over the next 15 years at the rate of advance predicted by
Moore's Law. At that point, we may run into the practical limit as feature sizes approach the size of a few
hundred silicon atoms and quantum effects come into play. But this type of limit has been 10 to 15 years
away for the past 15 years, and we have continued to move forward. Think about another thousandfold
improvement -- this is what will continue to drive the information revolution.
The information revolution is having a dramatic impact on how today's graduates prepare for their
careers and how alumni sustain theirs. I recently saw a study of course descriptions for college
engineering classes. The study found that the half-life for the material covered in these courses is about
five to 10 years. And engineering library reference documents tend to have an even shorter useful
half-life -- only one to two years.
Our knowledge base is expanding at a staggering rate. While there were roughly 100 scientific journals in
1800, there are almost 100,000 today. This knowledge explosion has not been limited to just the scientific
and technical fields. It is said that mankind's knowledge has doubled between 1965 and 1990 and it will
double again at the turn of the century. The president of World Trends Research claims that "If you were
to read the entire Sunday New York Times, you would be exposed to more information in that one
reading than was absorbed in a lifetime by the average person living in Thomas Jefferson's day."
You must develop an approach to constantly enhance your knowledge base just to keep up. In a sense,
graduation now signifies only the beginning of an education, not the end. The trends support this
observation: The number of students 25 or older in U.S. colleges and universities has nearly tripled, from
2.4 million in 1970 to 6.3 million in 1993. Those students now make up nearly half the college population.
During the same time, the number of people 35 or older who have returned to college has more than
tripled. And not only are people going to have to constantly re-educate themselves to deal with a
knowledge base that is turning over faster, we are going to have more time to do it -- the average
American life span has increased by about 25 years in this century.
Longer life spans and the rapid turnover in knowledge imply that today's graduates must be prepared to
change careers many times. The power of knowledge through some form of continuing education will
provide the fuel to allow them to do so.
As you prepare for change in your own personal and professional lives, you also must prepare for a
changing Air Force. America's armed forces are going through a dramatic transformation -- everything
from objectives and strategy to weapons and force structure to doctrine and tactics. The world is
changing, and just like the larger civilian society that we protect and serve, so too must we adapt to the
changes driven by the information revolution.
At the time I was born, the country had one overriding national security objective: to win the Big War. We
did that. In 1964, our objective was to deter a bigger war. We have done that too. Now our objective is to
deter smaller wars and the use of weapons of mass destruction, the so-called NBC weapons -- nuclear,
biological and chemical.
One of the moments that I want to share with you -- one that helps in understanding the fundamental
change in our approach to national security -- was a trip that I made last year with Secretary of Defense
Bill Perry to four of the former Soviet republics -- Russia, Ukraine, Kazakstan and Uzbekistan.
We visited a missile silo near the city of Pervomaysk in the Ukraine. I think I had seen that silo before, but
from a different orientation. On that day, an SS-19 missile, one previously targeted against six American
cities, was being withdrawn from the silo and decommissioned. This was a stirring event for both
Secretary Perry and I. Both of us spent the early part of our careers developing ballistic missiles. We are
now developing the new skills needed to dismantle strategic nuclear forces.
On the same trip, we toured Russia's Engels Air Force Base, where former Soviet bombers were being
dismantled with American equipment provided through the Nunn-Lugar program. The use of Nunn-Lugar
funds to support weapons dismantlement and defense conversion in the republics of the former Soviet
Union is part of our new strategy of "preventive defense," or defense by "other means." Through such
preventive measures as the Nunn-Lugar program, the United States is seeking to identify and mitigate
potential threats to our security before they can emerge. In truth, preventive defense is nothing new -- the
Marshall Plan is one famous past use of this sort of program -- but the emphasis on preventive defense
measures is new. And pursuing a preventive defense strategy requires new knowledge and skills.
In the post-Cold War world, the United States no longer faces a single galvanizing threat such as the
former Soviet Union. Instead, there is increased likelihood of our forces being committed to limited
regional military actions -- coalition operations -- in which allies are important partners.
Deploying forces in coalition operations with the forces of other countries places a high premium on
interoperability --that is, ensuring that U.S. and allied systems are compatible and can be sustained
through a common logistics support structure. The heightened emphasis on coalition operations, to
include operations other than war, is especially important because it comes during a period of declining
defense budgets not only in the United States, but around the globe as well.
In this environment, it is clear to me that we will have to leverage the technology and industrial base of all
our nations to modernize the equipment of our defense forces at an affordable. The United States and its
allies are being challenged to do more with fewer resources. In many areas, the U.S. no longer has the
luxury of going it alone.
In addition to the economic and military reasons I have just cited, the United States seeks cooperation
with its friends and allies for political reasons as well: These programs help strengthen the connective
tissue, the military and industrial relationships that bind our nations in a strong security relationship. The
political dimension of armaments cooperation is becoming increasingly important. In June of 1995, the
United States hosted -- here in Colorado Springs -- the first-ever offsite meeting of the NATO national
armaments directors. In November 1995, we held the first-ever meeting of the national armaments
directors from the NATO and Partnership for Peace countries -- a combined total of 33 countries were
represented.
I would sum up our current national security environment in statistical terms by saying that the mean
value of our single greatest threat is considerably reduced. But the irony of the situation is that the
variance of the collective threat that we must deal with and plan for, and must counter is up.
This gives us some pause in trying to plan intelligently. In response to reduced mean value of the threat,
the United States has cut end strength by about a third from 1985 levels. But at the same time, the
increase in variance has caused deployments of U.S. forces to go up by a third. In the defense
acquisition and technology program, this means we are focusing on fielding superior operational
capability and reducing weapon system life cycle costs.
And we are succeeding in this effort by exploiting the opportunities made possible by the information
revolution. As impressive as our military accomplishments were against Saddam Hussein, our forces are
qualitatively superior today. The NATO combat operation in Bosnia, Operation Deliberate Force, showed
that and gave us a hint of what combat will look like in the 21st century.
In Desert Storm, only 2 percent of all weapons expended during the air war were precision guided
munitions, or PGMs. In Bosnia, they accounted for over 90 percent of all ordnance expended by U.S.
forces during Operation Deliberate Force. The bomb damage assessment photographs in Bosnia bear
no resemblance to photos of the past, where the target, often undamaged, is surrounded by craters. The
photos from Bosnia usually showed one crater where the target used to be, with virtually no collateral
damage.
We are moving closer to a situation known as "one target, one weapon." It was actually more than one
--but less than two -- weapons per target in Operation Deliberate Force. This has been the promise for
the past 20 years; now it is becoming a reality. Our weapons focus now is to preserve accuracy while
reducing cost, increasing standoff range and providing all-weather capability. These are the major
imperatives behind our development of systems like the all-weather Joint Direct Attack Munitions, the
Joint Standoff Weapon and the Joint Advanced Standoff Strike Missile.
A chess analogy is useful for explaining what this means for the changing nature of warfare. Today,
precision weapons have now made it possible to take any piece on any square of the chessboard with no
collateral damage to adjacent squares. Given this one target, one weapon capability, commanders now
need to know where all one's forces are and where all the targets are on a 100 x 200 kilometer battlefield .
This is analogous to seeing all the pieces on the chessboard -- something we take for granted when
playing chess. Imagine how fast you would win the game if you could see all the pieces on the board, but
your opponent could see only his major pieces plus a few of your pawns. This is what it means to have
"dominant battlefield awareness."
A number of new systems are helping us see all the pieces -- JSTARS [Joint Surveillance and Target
Attack Radar System] and unmanned aerial vehicles like the Predator, for example. From the outside,
JSTARS looks like an ordinary Boeing 707 -- one you might expect to find in some commercial air cargo
fleets. But inside, the jet is packed with an advanced moving target indicator and synthetic aperture radar
and advanced computer processing and communications systems.
The jet is an airborne platform for a powerful surveillance, targeting and battle management system, and
we've used these capabilities to great advantage in Bosnia. For example, JSTARS has flown 51 missions
in Bosnia, covering a total area of 747 million square kilometers, or about 75 times the land area of the
United States. On a typical mission, JSTARS spends an average of 8 1/2 hours on station, fills up the 60
Gbytes [gigabytes, or billions of bytes] of mass storage on board and acquires 100 radar images at
three-meter resolution. There have been 38 million total detections and 26,000 total revisits. Over the 51
missions, 6,950 radar service requests were met.
To secure an overwhelming advantage, commanders will need C3 [command, control and
communications] and planning tools to achieve something I call "dominant battle cycle time" -- or the
ability to act before an adversary can react. Back to the chess analogy, dominant battle cycle time would
be, well, gaining an unfair advantage by breaking the rules. It means to keep moving your pieces without
giving your opponent a chance to move his. To do this on the battlefield, one must have superb
command and control systems like JSTARS, fast transportation and highly mobile maneuver forces.
To support IFOR [implementation force] forces in Bosnia, I recently approved spending about $80 million
on an information-communications initiative to be sure we have superb command, control and
communications systems for Operation Joint Endeavor. The impetus for this initiative came from a 1994
Defense Science Board summer study co-chaired by Gen. Jim McCarthy.
This initiative is improving our communications capabilities in two ways: first, by using commercial TV
satellite technology to provide a direct broadcast communications capability; and secondly, by fielding a
wide bandwidth, secure tactical Internet connection through fiber and commercial satellite transponders.
These communications allow war planners and logisticians on the ground in Bosnia, in the European
Command headquarters in Germany and back in the Pentagon to have access to the same data at the
same time. This access is available to virtually anyone with a 20-inch receive antenna, cryptologic
equipment and authentication codes. We've designed the system in such a way that we are giving local
commanders a 5,000-mile remote control to select the programming that they receive over their 24
megabits-per-second downlinks from direct broadcast satellites.
There are many striking aspects to this Bosnia info-comm [information-communications] initiative. First,
we're pushing hard to get the most advanced information capabilities to our forces, and we are
succeeding. We've accomplished in four months what it normally takes 10 years to do for a new system.
Second, we are demonstrating our willingness to use -- even to lease -- commercial systems. And third,
we are proving the need to possess system engineering and system integration skills. This expertise is
crucial to developing the multiple application layer architectures needed to tailor information systems for
defense needs.
If I compare and contrast today's major Air Force acquisition programs with those that existed 30 years
ago, I am led to the conclusion that we are now paying much more attention than we have in the past
towards enhancing the performance of our combat platforms with offboard information. In 1966, our focus
was on the combat platforms -- ships, tanks and planes. The weapons, more often than not, were
inertially guided. Today, we have clearly shifted our emphasis towards working with system-of-systems
architectures involving sensor, communication, and command and control systems.
In 1966, I had been working on the seeker for the Maverick missile -- when TV video tape recorders were
invented. The Maverick, being a TV-guided bomb, benefited greatly from this commercial development
because we were able to preserve the television images from flight tests for subsequent analysis and
evaluation.
In this way, commercial TV video tape recorders helped improved the Maverick missile -- one of our first
precision guide[d] munitions. It came about because of commercial sector investment in R&D [research
and development]. It is also an early example of a what I would call a "dual-use" technology ... that is, a
technology that has both commercial and military applications.
In aggregate terms, commercial industry surpassed the DoD in R&D spending back in 1965. The
disparity between defense and commercial sector investment in R&D has been growing wider ever since.
This difference means that this nation's technological momentum is driven to a greater extent by
commercial market forces.
Today's global economy allows everyone, including our potential adversaries, to gain increasing access
to the same commercial technology base. To the extent that commercial technology can enhance military
capability, the military advantage will go to the nation who has the best cycle time to capture technologies
that are commercially available, incorporate them in weapon systems, and field new operational
capabilities first.
In this environment, we have no choice but to move from separate industrial sectors for defense and
commercial products to an integrated national industrial base. Leveraging commercial technological
advances to create military advantage is critical to ensuring that our equipment remains affordable and
the most advanced in the world.
In summary, the fabric of our society is changing. The information revolution is behind many of these
changes, and it is having a profound affect on warfare. The possibilities are dazzling, but we must not
lose sight of the fact that all this progress depends on a fundamental truth: Our military, no matter how
technologically sophisticated, is only as good as the people operating the equipment and formulating the
strategies -- in short, the people who fight our battles. The competitive military advantage really depends
on a competitive human advantage.
We are surrounded by change. The world is moving fast, information is moving fast, information
technologies are moving fast. Just as mass production-based manufacturing replaced agriculture in the
19th century, the information age promises to reward the best integrator of knowledge, men and
machines in the 21st century. The nation's ability to keep ahead of these changes will depend, in part, on
the abilities of everyone in this room.
Expect your career to be at least as diverse as mine. You must be prepared to do more. During my Air
Force career, I was afforded the opportunity to recharge my knowledge base at least four times.
Early in my career, I improved my understanding of guidance systems in support of assignments to the
Minuteman and Maverick missile programs. Next, I learned about developing and fielding space systems,
then synthetic aperture radars and finally, late in my Air Force career, stealth technologies. To prepare
for my second career, I learned about investment banking, business financing and commercial
technologies. Now, I am developing a whole new set of skills in international relations and running
multiservice programs.
So the next time you walk by the eagle and fledglings, don't think of it as just another memorial with just
another inscription. Stop and take the time to reflect upon the enduring truth. Think of it as a personal
challenge -- because your flight through life will most certainly be sustained by the power of your
knowledge and your ability to continue recharging that knowledge.
Thank you all.
Stewards of Space
Remarks prepared for delivery by Sheila E. Widnall, secretary of the Air Force, to the Space
Transportation Association, Washington, May 8, 1996.
Thanks for inviting me here this morning. It gives me a chance to do two of my favorite things - talk about
space and get out of the Pentagon.
Over the last few weeks, I've seen a few [news] ... articles discussing why the Cape [Canaveral, Fla.] and
Vandenberg AFB [Air Force Base, Calif.] should be contractor operations and why we should eventually
rely totally on commercial launch providers to put DoD satellites into space.
Apparently this same subject was discussed at a recent space symposium here in town. Now, normally I
enjoy a good academic discussion which views both sides of an issue, but I believe the debate has been
a bit simplistic. To me, it's not a question of turning the entire operation over to a commercial enterprise,
but rather how much commercialization is feasible and prudent. I think we'll get a good handle on that
question through the EELV [evolved expendable launch vehicle] competition.
As a rocket scientist, space launch is a subject that I've been working with Gen. Tom Moorman [Air Force
vice chief of staff] since the day I walked through the door at the Pentagon. I can only speculate that
those who would advocate total commercialization don't really understand AF [Air Force] stewardship of
space. Maybe we need to tell the story a little better. So let me try.
Let's pretend for a minute. Let's say the reason I came over here this morning was to announce the Air
Force is getting out of the space launch business. We've decided to rely completely on commercial
launch sites, commercial boosters and commercial operators. That's it, we're leaving, we're closing
Patrick [Air Force Base, Cape Canaveral] and Vandenberg, we're going to outsource space launch, and
we're going to buy satellites on orbit.
Now it's your turn to pretend. Many of you here this morning are contractors. For the next few minutes,
think about how you would bid your next job, whether you are a satellite builder or a launch services
provider. What should you include in your bid?
For starters, if you're a launch services provider, you'll need to invest the $2 billion the Air Force planned
to invest over the next 10 years developing EELV boosters, because if you can't get the cost of space
launch down, no one will use your launch site. And failure to develop this next-generation capability will
be a missed opportunity for America to regain market share in the global launch services competition.
Additionally, you'll need to take over and fund key range modernization programs. For example, over the
next 10 years, we were planning to invest $750 million for range improvements. You'll also have to bid
annual operating costs of the ranges. To put you in the ballpark, we spend $160 million to run Cape
Canaveral, $75 million to run Vandenberg and $30 million for Atlas and Delta operations and
maintenance each year.
And don't forget to include those "little things" the Air Force typically delivers for free or at marginal cost to
you, like weather, down-range radar support, electricity, security, visitor control, safety, maintaining the
roads and cutting the grass.
And don't forget people. We are using almost 5,300 Air Force-funded men and women on these two
launch bases to assure U.S. access to space. They represent the American brain trust in access to
space and are themselves a national asset. But we'll be taking those folks with us, so you'll have to find
and train some new ones.
I'll even give you a big break on your bid. I'll sell you the launch sites at cost. We spent over a quarter of a
billion dollars modifying a launch pad at Vandenberg to launch Atlas IIs. And if a quarter of a billion is the
going rate for a launch pad and you consider commercial operators use four launch pads in Florida and
one at Vandenberg, you only owe me $1.25 billion. These launch sites are national assets. We take great
pride in maintaining them, and you can bet a key source selection criteri[on] will be how well you plan to
maintain them.
So let's review the bidding. You'll need to include people, boosters, launch pads, modernization and
maintenance. I think you get the picture. Your bid will be a big number.
If you're a satellite maker, you'll need cost-efficient assured access to space and undoubtedly you hope
that the commercial market will organize itself to provide this capability.
Let's stop pretending. I used this illustration to give you an idea of the breadth of Air Force commitment to
this nation's spacefaring status. I want everyone to understand the Air Force has been and will always be
an excellent steward of America's access to space. We're also the senior partner in space launch. If the
Air Force wasn't operating our launch sites, it would certainly make it harder and a lot more expensive for
you commercial guys to do business.
Let me give you another example of an inaccuracy I've seen in the press. One of the trades recently
quoted someone as saying "Space launch is my favorite bad news story." Now this is very old news.
Maybe this was the case in 1992, but this is one area we fixed. With a lot of help from Tom Moorman,
[Gen.] Joe Ashy [commander in chief, U.S. Space Command] and experts from your companies, I've
worked the space launch problem hard over the last three years.
Just look at current statistics:

12 Atlas launches in 12 months;



Four Titan launches this year;
We're about to launch the second Titan within a month;

21 commercial Atlas launches to date;

16 commercial Delta launches to date;
A $2 billion EELV program with a requirement to save 25 percent over the current cost, an
objective to save 50 percent;

An EELV program which could save $5 [billion to]$10 billion through 2020.
Does this sound like a bad news story to you? If this is bad news, I'm in for some easy days at the
Pentagon.
And another piece of old news I've heard is that there are "inefficiencies and duplication between AF and
NRO [National Reconnaissance Office]." Perhaps this was the case five years ago, but today, it's simply
overstated. The top leadership of the Department of Defense spent an incredible amount of time two
years ago working the space management issue. We established the JSMB [Joint Space Management
Board] and the Space Architect.
In my opinion, we currently enjoy an unprecedented degree of cooperation between AF and NRO space
efforts. Clearly there needs to be more work done on joint AF and NRO architectures, but I am confident
that with the management and architectural mechanisms we've established, we are making good
progress. The separation that existed between the different space sectors is disappearing, and we're
becoming much more interdependent.
The SBIRS [Space-based Infrared System] program is a shining example of this interagency efficiency.
Titan is another, with the AF buying boosters for the NRO. We also share TT&C [telemetry, tracking and
command] resources and mission data. We fly payloads on each other's satellites. Does this sound
inefficient to you? Of course not, and we see even more opportunities for cooperation in the future. But
rather than focus on this old news, let me concentrate on current news. I'd like to talk about three topics:
What we do in space launch, why we do it, how we do it?
First, what we do. You have to remember that one of the AF's core competencies is space. Because of
that, we currently take care of the majority of the tasks you would have to include in your bid to take over
our work at the launch sites. We are DoD's executive agent for the space business, and we put our
money where our mouth is. In an era of scarce resources, the AF annually devotes a significant portion of
its funding toward preserving America's access to space.
I already mentioned our $2 billion investment in EELV. We're not just building a military booster, we're
building an American booster. We're doing our part to reduce the costly access to space. Just as industry
currently benefits from past AF investments in the Atlas and Delta programs, industry will also benefit
from the EELV program. After the AF develops the EELV, affordable boosters will be available to the
commercial market at marginal cost. This represents a $2 billion cost avoidance for industry. If the AF
had not stepped up, could industry afford this?
I've recently traveled to the French and Japanese launch complexes. Japan, France and other foreign
countries entering the launch business have found access to space requires a huge commitment in
infrastructure. Their governments have stepped up to develop this infrastructure. As you can see, the Air
Force has already made this commitment for our country in both people and dollars. If we weren't here,
would commercial industry step up? Could they afford to?
And perhaps more important to you, through our boosters and infrastructure, we provide the basis for the
current and future commercial launch industry.
Which brings me to my second point, why we do it. There are two fundamental motivations for our deep
commitment to space launch. One is assured access to space. The second is national security.
Assured access to space: Contrary to popular belief, assured access to space is not an American
birthright. In fact it wasn't very long ago we lost it for a while.
Most of you in this room were associated with the space business in the late '70s, early '80s. This is the
historical period Pete Aldridge [former Air Force secretary] refers to as the era of a tragic policy decision.
The tragedy, of course, was the policy direction to put all our launch eggs in one basket in order to justify
the cost of the shuttle program. The federal government was on its way out of the expendable launch
business, relying almost exclusively on the shuttle. And you'll probably also recall the numbing feeling 10
years ago following the Challenger accident and the second Titan failure. America stood with no access
to space -- not a good feeling.
Unfortunately, it was this same era which saw the American share of commercial space launch drop from
almost 100 percent to around 30 percent -- also not a good feeling, and you guys have felt this drop in
dollars, personnel losses and prestige. I'm sure that situation a decade ago shaped our current national
space transportation strategy - with NASA responsible for the shuttle and reusable launch vehicles, and
the Air Force pursuing expendables. History has shown this is a smart path to assured access to space.
And if you remember our perilous situation back in April 1986, you must also recall that the idea of totally
commercial space launch is not new. Remember the Complimentary Expendable Launch Vehicle
Program? We were going to buy commercial boosters from industry. We called for contractors to pay for
the development costs of this commercial booster.
However, no one was sold on this approach, particularly industry! We weren't exactly trampled by
commercial launch providers fighting to develop new boosters and take over the soon-to-be-abandoned
ELV [expendable launch vehicle] infrastructure at our two launch bases. In fact, I'm sure the Air Force
folks manning the commercial launch provider office felt a lot like the Maytag repairman. The first
commercial launch did occur in 1989, but only after the AF re-entered the ELV business in afterburner,
after we had awarded significant Atlas and Delta contracts and after commercial launch providers could
use the AF business base to build and launch at marginal cost.
National Security: But while assured access to space has a national flavor to it, our second reason why
we launch has a military flavor -- national security. Space launch is one of the missions assigned by
President Clinton to Gen. Joe Ashy in his capacity as CinCSpace. And the president, through national
policy, designated the DoD as the executive agent for expendable launch vehicles. And this executive
agency is delegated to the AF.
So the AF is assigned a vital, national defense mission of assured access to space for our satellites,
which are fundamental to national security. This is not only a military mission, but a warfighting mission.
And for this reason alone, we must own the means to execute it.
Just consider the air analogy. Air superiority is also an AF core competence and a warfighting mission.
We own the planes, airfields and maintenance personnel to accomplish this mission. No one has ever
questioned ownership in that department. Space launch is an AF core competence, a warfighting mission,
and we will continue to own the boosters, satellites, launch bases and personnel to accomplish this
warfighting mission.
Sure, we'll contract out many launch base activities. The fact of the matter is we already do! Just as
we've privatized most of the base operations at our Air Education and Training Command bases, we also
contract out the running of Cape Canaveral Air Force Station. In fact, we currently contract out well over
$100 million per year at the cape. And there's no doubt in my mind commercial companies will launch
commercial satellites out of spaceports in California and Florida. But will we give up ownership of the
AF's presidentially directed warfighting mission? I don't think so.
So now that we've covered the what and why, let me sum up how we do it in one word -- cooperation. We
cooperate with NASA, the NRO and industry in virtually every aspect of space launch. This cooperation is
not limited to space launch, but is present in virtually every aspect of the Air Force's space effort.
For example, we've fostered an unprecedented degree of cooperation with NASA. Dan Goldin [NASA
administrator] and I recently identified seven specific areas of mutual cooperation from sharing TT&C
resources to consolidating base support services at some of the places we share real estate.
And the Air Force is leaning forward to help the commercial space launch industry off the ground. We've
awarded space launch grants and favorable lease arrangements on both coasts and offer range services
to these new launch service providers at marginal cost. We are extremely excited at the prospects of a
rapidly growing commercial space business. An expanding space business will surely translate into
future cost savings for the Air Force.
The Air Force has deep historical roots in the space business. We've been the lead service since the
1950s. We have tremendous expertise in the men and women in the Air Force who work our space
acquisition and operations. Thirty-thousand-strong, these Air Force personnel account for over 90
percent of the total DoD space work force.
And the Air Force invests $5 billion per year on space programs, over 80 percent of all DoD dollars spent
on space. I don't feel like I'm out on a limb when I say if it wasn't for the AF, there may not be American
commercial launch providers launching American boosters from American soil.
So let me sum this up. Space, and particularly space launch, is a shining example of cooperation
between the Air Force, the NRO, NASA and industry. This cooperation has developed not only a military
core competence for the Air Force, but a national competitive advantage for the nation.
National security dictates that the Air Force will be stewards of our nation's access to space. Air Force
personnel and financial investments in space launch dictate we will be good stewards of this capability.
I'm sure there will always be those who want focus on old news. I, for one, can't imagine removing blue
suiters from our launch bases. Will there be an increase in the number of commercial operators on our
launch bases? I sure hope so, because that would mean the commercial space business was really
taking off.
But it's clear to me the commercial space business needs the Air Force operating our launch sites. It is
the synergism of the military and commercial efforts that will allow America to retain a competitive
advantage in space. So I guess my advice to those on the other side of the public vs. private debate is,
be careful what you ask for!
The future defense of this nation depends on space -- the future economic prosperity of this nation
depends on space. It certainly doesn't take a rocket scientist to figure out the common denominator is
low-cost access to space. However, it's obvious to this rocket scientist that the way ahead involves every
one in this room working together! ...
The DoD-CARE Humanitarian Connection
Prepared remarks of Gen. John M. Shalikashvili, USA, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at the CARE
50th Anniversary Symposium, Washington, May 10, 1996.
Thank you ... for that kind introduction. I am honored that you would ask me to speak at your 50th
anniversary symposium. I am also delighted to be here because although CARE and the U.S. armed
forces are not exactly in the same business, we are partners -- partners in operations and partners in the
search for peace and stability.
In the past, our Marines were proud to claim that they were the first to fight. Today, in the war against
inhumanity and instability, that title belongs every bit as much to humanitarian organizations like CARE.
You are not only there before the troops land, but you remain behind after the armed forces leave, trying
to rebuild and to help countries put conflict behind them.
The activities of CARE and its sister organizations in a way remind me of the old children's rhyme about
Humpty Dumpty. "After the great fall," CARE and its sister organizations must accomplish what "all the
king's horses and all the king's men" tried but failed to do: And that is to put the broken nations, the
fractured societies and the victims of nature's wrath, to put them back together again.
And all over the world, every day, you work your miracles diligently, methodically and persistently, one
human being, one disaster, one nation at a time. In so doing, you have become the living embodiment of
voluntarism and of the American spirit. You have also become an important complement to our
leadership-oriented foreign policy.
CARE's mission, the protection and affirmation of the dignity and worth of individuals in the poorest
countries, is surely a noble one. As many of you know, since 1945, CARE has touched over a billion
people, in nearly every country on Earth.
As all of you know as well, CARE began with a world in ruins. The United States was the only intact,
prosperous democracy. Europe was destroyed. Frost, famine, disease and despair knocked at the door.
The specter of communism hung over the continent.
No one will ever forget what America did for Europe and the postwar world in those days. Harry Truman
said it best: "The Marshall Plan was one of America's greatest contributions to the peace of the world."
And he, of course, was right. With the Berlin Airlift, with the Marshall Plan, with NATO and, yes, with
CARE, U.S. policy, together with hard work by the Europeans, closed the door to communism, ended
famine, conquered disease and restored hope to Western Europe.
But assistance from the United States government and private volunteer organizations for me is not just
an abstract notion or a set of statistics. My family and I, as refugees in war-torn Europe, were helped
more than you will ever know by the generous donations of the people of the United States.
One of the first CARE packages sent to Europe in the summer of 1946 gave this young refugee his first
taste of peanut butter, his first mouthful of that exotic fruit, raisins, and most importantly, his first glass of
powdered milk. What terrific memories! For years afterward, even to today, CARE packages have been
"America" to me and millions like me. No one form of humanitarian assistance has ever had such a public
recognition before or after as the CARE package.
And today, CARE's great work continues in the Balkans, in Somalia, in Rwanda, in Haiti -- all over the
world -- to help people, to heal societies, to help rehabilitate failed states to contribute to the peace of the
world. In 1995 alone, CARE's 500 projects touched almost 54 million people in 66 countries. CARE has,
in its very own fashion, outdone "all the king's horses and all the king's men." In the years since the Cold
War, I have watched with great admiration the extraordinarily dedicated employees and volunteers of
CARE, who move from one tragedy to the next at great risk to themselves to bring, literally, the miracle of
life to so many.
Before this morning's panel, where you will hear from the real experts on rehabilitating states after
conflicts, I thought I would give you my views on how this partnership between CARE and the armed
forces looks from my perspective. My perspective is, of course, that of someone whose principal task is
to ensure that our armed forces are ready, today and tomorrow, to fight and win our nation's wars. But my
perspective is also that of someone who understands that peace operations and humanitarian assistance
operations, and thus the partnership between nongovernmental organizations and the armed forces, are
a permanent feature of today's strategic landscape.
If I may, let me briefly discuss three changes: changes in the security environment, changes in our forces
and changes in why and how our nation uses its armed forces in the pursuit of our interests. At the end,
let me offer a few random thoughts on postconflict rehabilitation.
To begin, while we are safer today than we were during the Cold War, our world is awash in turbulence.
The end of the Cold War liberated repressed nationalism's, overstressed weak states and tempted
regional aggressors.
Today, some three dozen ethnic, tribal or religious-based conflicts dot the globe. Our hopes for a new
world order have been drowned in a seemingly endless disorder. Far from being the end of history, the
end of the Cold War marked the rebirth of instability in many countries. This instability, in turn, has bred
calamity, and calamity, in turn, has bred human tragedy. Consequently, the demands on CARE have, I
am sure, increased dramatically.
A second set of changes flowed from the changing security environment. Without the threat of
superpower conflict, we are safer. The safety of this post-Cold War world, as unstable as it is, has
enabled the U.S. to cut its forces, but that instability has also reminded us to keep our forces ready and
capable of meeting the basic requirement of handling two nearly simultaneous major conflicts as well as
the many peace operations and humanitarian operations that have come our way.
We in the United States can be proud of how we managed the drawdown of our armed forces after the
Cold War. For the first time after a war, we have been able to manage deep cuts without destroying the
capabilities or the readiness of our armed forces.
At the same time, we have kept the armed forces ready, and it's a good thing we did. Because of the
instabilities that I mentioned, our small force has been a very busy force indeed. It has been a force
caught between the requirements to deter or prepare for war and the need to engage in peace
operations.
Since Desert Storm, we have conducted nearly 40 operations. Today, we have 11 operations ongoing,
directly involving nearly 50,000 of our military personnel. Typically, in more than half of these operations,
our forces are in sight of our nongovernmental organization partners, like CARE.
And this brings us to the third major change in the post-Cold War era: changes in why and how we can
use the armed forces to secure our interests.
During the Cold War, it was almost inconceivable that we would use force in a major way unless it
involved a vital national interest. Any major use of force on our part could have triggered opposition from
Soviet-backed forces. Moreover, we had to be concerned about small conflicts escalating to major wars
between the superpowers, each backed by its own alliance system. Finally, sending a large force to
pursue a nonvital interest could jeopardize the reinforcement of a more important theater, like Europe,
where NATO and the Warsaw Pact had massed forces standing toe to toe.
After the Cold War, both Presidents Bush and Clinton could more easily and with less risk use American
forces to secure not just vital interests, but also less important interests. They also more readily used
military forces to achieve humanitarian interests in places like northern Iraq or in Rwanda, where the
humanitarian crises were so enormous that they overwhelmed regular humanitarian organizations.
There are no ironclad rules that govern the employment of forces or the use of force. However, let me
offer a few guidelines that are based on lessons that we have learned over the last five or six years.
First, when employing force for important interests, we, the U.S. and our allies or coalition partners, must
be prudent and selective. Doing everything, everywhere, all the time will lead to disaster. On the other
hand, doing nothing may risk harm to our interests and keep us from using our power for legitimate and
good purposes. Woodrow Wilson reminded us that "America cannot be an ostrich with its head in the
sand." I am sure that he would also agree that we cannot have our head in the clouds.
Second, before we use force, we must have exhausted other means to solve the problem. In every case,
legitimacy and perceived legitimacy will weigh heavily in our decisions to use our forces and, if necessary,
to employ force. We must be right. Indeed, the American people demand it! We must also act in
accordance with international law and, in most cases, with the support of international organizations and
coalition partners.
On this point, it is important to differentiate between force and forces. While using force may be a last
resort, we will often find ourselves using forces to deter or to prevent conflicts. Using forces is a lesser
means than using force, and we should use different standards to evaluate it.
Third, as always, the gravity of the interest will determine the amount of resources that we can put
against any operation, as well as its duration. We will, of course, always put enough forces against any
mission to achieve success decisively and in a timely manner.
Fourth, for humanitarian interests, we must be even more selective. We must have a situation where
humanitarian organizations are overwhelmed and where the magnitude of the situation suggests that a
major effort is warranted, and Fifth, in every case, before we use force, we must be sure that the armed
forces can, in fact, make an appropriate contribution to solving the problem in a reasonable amount of
time. This means that the military must be able to fashion clear, distinct operational objectives that will
contribute to the accomplishment of the goals of the overall mission.
Coincident with these goals, we must ensure that the command and control arrangements for our forces
match the risks and complexity of the situation. In general, the more risk and the more U.S. forces
dominate in an operation, the more likely it will be that the U.S. will insist on operational control of the
mission. And certainly, the higher the likelihood of combat, the more likely the U.S. will insist on
operational control.
Let me briefly address a few of the cases which reflect the learning process that is inherent in these
guidelines.
Operation Provide Comfort, our effort to rescue the Kurds, is a good example of a focused humanitarian
operation. Provide Comfort was a vivid example of the partnership between the military, the NGOs
[nongovernmental organizations] and selected U.N. agencies.
Hundreds of thousands of Kurds had been attacked by [Iraqi leader] Saddam Hussein's troops and
brutally driven into the snow-covered mountains of northern Iraq and eastern Turkey. Everything had
happened so quickly and the number of refugees was so vast that it overwhelmed the humanitarian
organizations that were trying to cope with it. Several thousand Kurds were dying every day. Our mission
was clear: Stop the misery and the dying, and return the Kurds to their homeland in northern Iraq.
U.S. and allied military forces with the help of 11 nations worked closely with U.N. officials and NGOs like
CARE. With massive air and land resupply operations and a tough deterrent posture, we did in fact stop
the dying and the misery and within a few months returned all the Kurds back home. It took a marriage
between military muscle and NGO know-how to do this. And it worked very, very well.
Rwanda provides another example. Hundreds of thousands of refugees, victims of tribal warfare, were
dying, and once again humanitarian organizations were being overwhelmed. The U.S. armed forces
were called upon to use their vast capabilities to quickly find a way to produce fresh water to stop the
cholera epidemic and to establish a transportation network so that help could be brought to those
thousands upon thousands in need. All told, we delivered some 15,000 tons of supplies to the crisis area.
But as soon as that narrow mission had been accomplished, our forces were withdrawn.
Somalia is a more mixed example. On the humanitarian side, we did a great job and saved hundreds of
thousands of Somalis. However, our armed forces and our U.N. partners got caught up in mission creep.
In the end, lives were lost and public support was forfeited. Many argue that the operation in Somalia
provided us a very good lesson: Keep the military mission clear and "doable," and then leave when it is
done. In any case, today, the specter of Somalia hangs over our involvement in peace operations.
And that brings me finally to some random thoughts on the central issue of this symposium: rehabilitation
and assisting nations after conflicts.
From my perspective, there are two equally wrong positions on this issue: The first, the head in the sand
position, is that the U.S. armed forces have absolutely no role to play in rehabilitation after conflicts or
complex emergencies. And the other position, the head in the clouds position, is that the U.S. armed
forces should very proactively get into the business of postconflict nation building, even to the point
where we develop military units for that unmilitary purpose.
To bring us to the middle ground, let me try to suggest some things that make sense concerning
humanitarian assistance operations in general and rehabilitating nations after conflicts in particular.
To begin, we must remember that the armed forces out of necessity must remain focused on warfighting.
Our basic purpose is to deter our enemies and if necessary, fight and win our nation's wars. Our ability to
be useful in humanitarian actions flows from our capabilities to accomplish that first purpose and in turn,
is limited by it. Because of our basic mission, time spent in any particular humanitarian operation must be
limited to the minimum amount needed to accomplish our mission.
This is, I know, a sore point for many humanitarian organizations. However, it is clear that we must limit
ourselves to the "doable," and it is equally clear that postcrisis rehabilitation is a long-term process.
Moreover, rehabilitation must, in the main, be accomplished by the local people. Also, neither NGOs nor
the military should get in the way of market forces, if they can help it.
The armed forces cannot afford to stay beyond the time called for by their mission. To do so inevitably
invites mission creep. Staying on too long will also keep our mobile forces from being available to be
employed elsewhere.
As [National Security Adviser] Tony Lake observed: "By carefully defining the mission and clearly setting
a deadline, we serve notice that our only goal is to give governments and peoples the breathing room
they must have to tackle their own problems. ... It is dangerous hubris to believe we can build other
nations. But where our own interests are engaged, we can help nations build themselves -- and give
them time to make a start."
Rather than a dysfunctional competition between the NGOs and the armed forces, our joint task must be
to create a bond between the partners based on each other's unique strengths.
We have spent a lot of time in the field and in the Pentagon thinking about how we can work together and
be more efficient. This has been for us almost a wave of new thinking because we had to think outside
the box we have been in for 50 years. Accordingly, we now routinely hold training exercises with NGOs.
We have even created new joint manuals, authoritative guidance for the services and the commands in
the field, on how to work better with our new partners, the U.N. agencies and NGOs, as well as our allies
and the full panoply of U.S. government actors.
I have brought with me today some copies of two such manuals. One is our "Handbook for Peace
Operations" and the other is our new volume on "Military Operations Other Than War."
The essence of our joint doctrine is better coordination and information sharing among the U.N. agencies,
the NGOs and the military, with each doing what they do best. Bosnia is a good example. IFOR, the
30-nation peace implementation force, has a civil-military operations center with more than 400 military
personnel and thousands of U.N., NGO and local personnel coordinating their activities through it.
While IFOR's military component focuses on providing a secure environment, it is also active in helping
the U.N., the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] and the NGOs to accomplish
many tasks, including rebuilding Bosnia's damaged infrastructure, organizing elections, supporting the
war crimes and refugee affairs elements and helping the International Police Task Force.
All of these activities are being coordinated on a day-to-day basis in the civil-military operations center. In
humanitarian assistance or peace operations, these centers where the military and the NGOs interface
are so important that in missions like the one in Bosnia, they have become the centerpiece of our
operations in place of the combat or the fire-support operations centers.
And that brings me to one final observation: Postconflict rehabilitation efforts must be international efforts.
Going it alone for the United States means being less effective in the short run and going broke in the
long run. We need to keep other states and the United Nations, even with its limitations, involved to the
greatest extent possible. However, it is similarly clear that no amount of international support can lessen
for America the burden of leadership nor our responsibility for our own forces, now or in the future.
My time is almost up, and I want to leave you with one final thought: Dag Hammarskjold [U.N. secretary
general, 1953-1961] once said that "Peacekeeping is not a soldier's job, but only a soldier can do it."
That may have been true in his day, but today, in a larger sense, keeping the peace and helping nations
after conflicts must be a partnership, a partnership of diplomats, multinational military forces,
international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations.
In that regard, the partnership between the U.S. armed forces and CARE, once unique, has become a
model for the future. This future, alongside the need to prepare to fight and win our nation's wars,
promises the armed forces more operations on the cusp between peace and war, and more operations
where humanitarian affairs and peacekeeping are not an afterthought, but the main effort. Helping people
will continue to be the focus of our partnership.
Having been one of those people who benefited greatly 50 years ago from CARE's generosity, it is an
honor today to be here with you to celebrate 50 years of that partnership. It is, of course, a privilege to be
able to work daily to make that partnership an even more fruitful one in the years to come.
Thank you for listening and thanks to CARE for your great work.
Fulfilling the Role of Preventive Defense
Prepared remarks of Defense Secretary William J. Perry to the John F. Kennedy School of Government,
Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., May 13, 1996.
In a famous 1837 lecture at Harvard, Ralph Waldo Emerson asked his audience, "If there is any period
one would desire to be born in, is it not the age of Revolution, when the old and the new stand side by
side, when the energies of all men are searched by fear and by hope, when the historic glories of the old
can be compensated by the rich possibilities of the new?"
Like Emerson, we, too, live in an age of revolution: in politics, with the ending of the Cold War; in
economics, with the dramatic growth in global trade; and in technology, with the continuing explosion of
information systems. Today, we are living Emerson's desire in a revolutionary era of "rich possibilities,"
an era when our energies are "searched by fear and by hope."
Our hope is symbolized by the success of democracy around the globe, by the growth of new global
trade relationships, by the expansion of global communications and by the explosion of information.
Indeed, in this revolutionary new era, the term "closed society" is rapidly becoming obsolete. Even those
states that still desire isolation find it increasingly difficult to achieve. Indeed, it is impossible to achieve if
they want to reap the benefits of the global economy, as China discovered during the Tiananmen Square
crackdown, when they could not control the fax machines and modems.
But along with this hope, our energies in this revolutionary era are also "searched by fear": fear of the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, fear of ethnic hatreds ripping asunder existing states, fear
of terrorism by extremist groups, and fear of aggression by rogue nations freed from the constraints of
their former Cold War alliances. For many, this revolutionary new era has meant a decreased sense of
personal safety, symbolized by pictures of the bodies being carried from the federal building in Oklahoma
or of the gassed passengers rushing from a Tokyo subway.
The stark contrast between our hopes and our fears makes clear that this revolutionary new era is
characterized by the increased capacity of humankind for good and for evil. It also makes clear that in
addition to revolutions in politics, economics and technology, there must also be a revolution in our
thinking about security strategy.
The security of the United States continues to require us to maintain strong military forces to deter and, if
necessary, to defeat those who threaten our vital national interests -- and we do. But today, the United
States also has a unique historical opportunity, the opportunity to prevent the conditions for conflict and
to help create the conditions for peace. Today, I want to talk to you about how America's security policy in
the post-Cold War era requires us to take advantage of that opportunity -- to make preventive defense
the first line of defense of America, with deterrence the second line of defense and with military conflict
the third and last resort.
Preventive defense may be thought of as analogous to preventive medicine. Preventive medicine creates
the conditions which support health, making disease less likely and surgery unnecessary. Preventive
defense creates the conditions which support peace, making war less likely and deterrence unnecessary.
Twice before in this century, America has had similar opportunities to prevent the conditions for conflict.
After World War I, the United States had the opportunity to help prevent conflict by joining the League of
Nations and engaging the world. Instead, we chose to isolate ourselves from the world.
That strategy of isolationism, coupled with the Europeans' strategy of reparations and revenge, utterly
failed to prevent the conditions for future conflict. In fact, it helped create them. And over 300,000
Americans paid with their lives in a second World War.
After World War II, America was determined to learn from that costly lesson. This time we chose the path
of engagement. We sought to prevent conflict from recurring. Through our engagement in the United
Nations and by our leadership, we promoted a postwar program of reconciliation and reconstruction, in
sharp contrast to the reparation and revenge practiced after World War I. Our most dramatic national
effort to prevent future conflict was announced at Harvard's 1947 commencement by George C. Marshall.
It came to be called the Marshall Plan.
Marshall acted at a pivotal moment in this century. Like Emerson, Marshall saw America in a world
standing between two eras, a period Marshall described as "between a war that is over and a peace that
is not yet secure." At this pivotal moment, Marshall set forth a strategy of preventive defense. The soldier
in Marshall wanted desperately to prevent war from recurring -- the statesman in Marshall found a way.
His vision was of a Europe -- from the Atlantic to the Urals -- united in peace, freedom and democracy.
His tool for realizing his vision was a plan for rebuilding a European continent that had been physically,
economically and spiritually shattered by war.
The Marshall Plan rested on three premises: that what happens in Europe affects America, that
economic reconstruction in Europe was critical to preventing another war and that economic
reconstruction of Europe would not happen without U.S. leadership. Acting on these premises, Marshall
and his generation rebuilt Europe, and they led America to assume the mantle of world leadership. Their
preventive defense program was successful in creating the conditions of peace and stability wherever
applied.
In the end, however, Marshall's vision was only half realized, because [Soviet Union leader] Joseph
Stalin slammed the door on Marshall's offer of assistance. Within a matter of years, the world was divided
into two armed camps, and deterrence, not prevention, became the overarching security strategy of the
Cold War. While geopolitics doomed Marshall's efforts at preventive security for Europe, the technology
of nuclear weapons made a global war too terrible to contemplate -- so deterrence worked. Now, after
more than 40 dangerous years of the nuclear balance of terror, the Cold War is over.
Today, we are at another pivotal moment in history, a point between two centuries -- a point between a
Cold War that is over and a peace that is not yet secure. Today, the world does not need another
Marshall Plan. But to ensure that it is our hopes and not our fears that will be realized in this revolutionary
age, we do need to build on Marshall's core belief that the United States must remain a global power and
that our best security policy is one which prevents conflict.
Just as the Marshall Plan was based on a set of premises, so today our program of preventive defense
rests on its own set of premises: first, that fewer weapons of mass destruction in fewer hands makes
America and the world safer; second, that more democracy in more nations means less chance of
conflict in the world; and third, that defense establishments have an important role to play in building
democracy, trust and understanding in and among nations.
From these premises follows the conclusion that for the post-Cold War world to be one of peace and not
conflict, America must lead the world in preventing the conditions for conflict and in creating the
conditions for peace. In short, we must lead with a policy of preventive defense. So we have created an
innovative set of programs in the Defense Department to do just that -- some national, some international.
They include the Cooperative Threat Reduction program to reduce the nuclear weapon complex of the
nuclear nations of the former Soviet Union, the counter-proliferation program to deal with the threat of the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the Framework Agreement to eliminate the nuclear
weapons program of North Korea and the Partnership for Peace to begin the integration of 27 nations of
Eastern and Central Europe and Central Asia into the European security structure. I will describe the
progress in some of these programs and how they are, in fact, creating conditions which prevent conflict.
Nowhere is preventive defense more important than in countering the spread of nuclear, chemical and
biological weapons. During the Cold War, the world lived with the nightmare prospect of global nuclear
holocaust, and the United States and the Soviet Union relied on deterrence, a balance of terror known as
Mutual Assured Destruction, or MAD.
Today, the threat of global nuclear holocaust is vastly reduced, but we face the new danger that weapons
of mass destruction will fall into the hands of terrorist groups or rogue states. The threat of retaliation may
not matter much to a terrorist group or a rogue nation -- deterrence may not work with them. This new
class of undeterrables may be madder than MAD.
The aspiration of these rogue nations to obtain weapons of mass destruction is set against the backdrop
of the disintegration of the former Soviet Union. This disintegration meant that instead of one nuclear
empire, we were left with four new states, each with nuclear weapons on their soil: Russia, Kazakstan,
Ukraine and Belarus. The depressed economies of these nations created a buyer's market for weapons
of mass destruction, including the materials, infrastructure and work force, and the unsettled political
conditions made it potentially harder to protect those weapons and materials.
The increase in demand for nuclear weapons and the potential increase in supply of weapons, material
and know-how have required us to augment our Cold War strategy of deterrence with a post-Cold War
strategy of prevention. The most effective way to prevent proliferation is to dismantle the arsenals that
already exist.
Fortunately, through our Cooperative Threat Reduction program with Russia and the other nuclear states
of the former Soviet Union, we have the dismantlement well started. Through a defense program created
by Sens. Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar, we have helped Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakstan
dismantle thousands of nuclear warheads and destroy hundreds of missiles, bombers and silos.
This January, I personally detonated an SS-19 silo at Pervomaysk [Ukraine], which once had 700 nuclear
warheads aimed at targets in the United States. By the end of the month, this missile field will have been
converted to a wheat field. By the end of the year, Kazakstan, Ukraine and Belarus will be entirely free of
nuclear weapons.
We are also using Nunn-Lugar funds to help these nations safeguard and secure the weapons and
materials to keep them out of the global marketplace. Under Project Sapphire, for example, we bought
600 kg [kilograms] of highly enriched uranium from Kazakstan to ensure that it did not fall into the hands
of nuclear smugglers.
But preventing proliferation means more than just dismantling the Cold War nuclear arsenals. It also
means leading the world in the right direction, as we did last year in gaining a consensus for the indefinite
extension of the nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. It means working to strengthen the Biological Weapons
Convention and ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention. It means taking the lead in a range of
international export controls to limit the flow of goods and technologies that could be used to make
weapons of mass destruction.
During the Cold War, for example, we had the COCOM [Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export
Control] regime of export controls, designed to prevent the spread of dangerous technologies to the
Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc. Today, we are creating the Wassenaar Regime, set up in cooperation
with Russia, updated to fit today's technology and designed to prevent the spread of dangerous
technologies to potential proliferators and rogue regimes.
Preventing proliferation also means leading the international community in opposing rogue nations with
nuclear and/or chemical weapon aspirations, such as Iran and Libya. Economic sanctions and export
controls have helped prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, and they have significantly slowed
Libya's efforts to put a chemical weapons production plant into operation.
Sometimes preventing proliferation means employing "coercive diplomacy" -- a combination of diplomacy
and defense measures. In North Korea, for example, we used such a combination to stop that nation's
nuclear weapons program. The diplomacy came from the threat by the United States and other nations in
the region to impose economic sanctions if North Korea did not stop their program and the promise of
assistance in the production of commercial power if they did. The defense came from our simultaneous
beefing up of our military forces in the region. The result is that today, while North Korea continues to
pose a conventional military threat on the peninsula, it is not mounting a nuclear threat.
Overall, the United States has been instrumental in eliminating or reversing nuclear weapon programs in
six states since 1991: Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakstan, Iraq, North Korea and South Africa. These efforts
have made both America and the world safer, and the gains to our national security have been dramatic,
direct and tangible. I can think of few more satisfying moments in my life than when I turned the key to
blow up that missile silo in Pervomaysk.
But the story of preventive defense is not merely one of preventing threats from weapons of mass
destruction. It is also the story of engaging military and defense establishments around the world to
further the spread of democracy and to further trust and understanding among nations. Here, the results
may be less immediately tangible, but they are no less significant.
America has long understood that the spread of democracy to more nations is good for America's
national security. It has been heartening this past decade to see so many nations around the world come
to agree with us that democracy is the best system of government. But as the nations of the world
attempt to act on this consensus, we are seeing that there are important steps between a worldwide
consensus and a worldwide reality. Democracy is learned behavior. Many nations today have
democracies that exist on paper, but in fact are extremely fragile. Elections are a necessary but
insufficient condition for a free society. It is also necessary to embed democratic values in the key
institutions of nations.
The Defense Department has a key role to play in this effort. It is a simple fact that virtually every country
in the world has a military. In virtually every new democracy -- in Russia, in the newly free nations of the
former Soviet Union, in Central and Eastern Europe, in South America, in the "Asian Tigers" -- the
military represents a major force. In many cases, it is the most cohesive institution. It often contains a
large percentage of the educated elite and controls key resources. In short, it is an institution that can
help support democracy or subvert it.
We must recognize that each society moving from totalitarianism to democracy will be tested at some
point by a crisis. It could be an economic crisis, a backslide on human fights and freedoms, or a border or
ethnic dispute with a neighboring country. When such a crisis occurs, we want the military to play a
positive role in resolving the crisis, not a negative role by fanning the flames of the crisis -- or even using
the crisis as a pretext for a military coup.
In these new democracies, we can choose to ignore this important institution or we can try to exert a
positive influence. We do have the ability to influence; indeed, every military in the world looks to the U.S.
armed forces as the model to be emulated. That is a valuable bit of leverage that we can put to use
creatively in our preventive defense strategy.
In addition, if we can build trust and understanding between the militaries of two neighboring nations, we
build trust and understanding between the two nations themselves. Some have said that war is too
important to be left solely to the generals. Preventive defense says peace is too important to be left solely
to the politicians.
In this effort, preventive defense uses a variety of tools, such as educating foreign officers at our military
staff and command colleges, where they learn how to operate in a democratic society and how to operate
under civilian control and with legislative oversight. Over 200 officers from the former Soviet Union and
Warsaw Pact countries are right now studying at U.S. institutions, and another 60 are about to complete
a special course we have set up at the Marshall Center in [Garmisch] Germany.
Another tool is sending out teams of American military officers and civilians to help nations build modern,
professional military establishments under strong civilian defense leadership. Since 1992, these teams
have had thousands of contacts with dozens of newly free nations. These contacts have led Hungary, for
example, to enact new laws placing the Hungarian military under civilian, democratic control. They have
helped Romania develop a new code of conduct for their military forces based on the American military's
Uniform Code of Military Justice. They have helped Lithuania, Kazakstan and Uzbekistan to improve their
training for noncommissioned officers.
We also use tools such as joint training exercises in peacekeeping, disaster relief and search and rescue
operations. We have held four such training exercises in the last year with Russian troops -- two in
Russia and two in the U.S. We also held a joint peacekeeping exercise in Louisiana last July, involving
troops from 14 nations with whom we had never had security relations, including Albania and Romania,
Slovakia and Slovenia, Uzbekistan and Kazakstan and all three Baltic nations. Next month, I will meet up
with the ministers of defense from Ukraine, Russia, Poland and other nations for the opening ceremonies
of an exercise in Lviv, Ukraine.
Confidence-building measures are another important tool, particularly in building trust between countries.
One of the most important confidence building measures is developing openness about military budgets,
plans and policies.
Openness is an unusual concept when it comes to defense. The art of war, after all, involves secrecy and
surprise, but the art of peace involves exactly the opposite -- openness and trust. That's why when I
travel to newly democratic states, I try to set an example by handing out copies of my annual report to
Congress, which details our defense budget and our security policies. I also talk about legislative
oversight and our budget process. These concepts seem elementary to you and me, but to military
officers and defense officials who grew up under totalitarianism, they are positively revolutionary.
In Europe and Central Asia, these tools of preventive defense come together in a NATO program known
as Partnership for Peace, or PfP. The name Partnership for Peace was coined by Joe Kruzel, a former
fellow at the Center for Science and International Affairs we honor today, who died while working for
peace in Bosnia last August.
Through Partnership for Peace, NATO is reaching out to the nations of Eastern and Central Europe,
Russia and the newly independent states, and truly integrating them into the security architecture of
Europe. It used to be when the secretary of defense went to meetings at NATO headquarters in Belgium,
he sat next to his counterpart from the United Kingdom. Today, when I go to meetings in Belgium, I sit
with my counterpart from Uzbekistan on one side and the ministers from the United Kingdom and Ukraine
on the other.
Just as the Marshall Plan had an impact well beyond the economies of Western Europe, PfP is echoing
beyond the security realm in partner nations and into the political and economic realms. PfP members
are working to uphold democracy, tolerate diversity, respect the rights of minorities and freedom of
expression. They are working to build market economies. They are working hard to develop democratic
control of their military forces, to be good neighbors and to respect the sovereign rights of bordering
countries. They are working hard to make their military forces compatible with NATO.
For those partner countries that are embracing PfP as a path to NATO membership, these actions are a
key to opening that door. For many of these nations, aspiration to NATO membership has become the
rock on which all major political parties base their platforms. It is providing an overlapping consensus on
a unifying goal, making compromise and reconciliation on other issues possible. To lock in the gains of
reform, NATO must ensure that the ties we are creating in PfP continue to deepen and that we actually
proceed with the gradual and deliberate, but steady process of outreach and enlargement to the East.
Ultimately, PfP is doing more than just building the basis for NATO enlargement. It is, in fact, creating a
new zone of security and stability throughout Europe, Russia and the NIS [newly independent states]. By
forging networks of people and institutions working together to preserve freedom, promote democracy
and build free markets, PfP today is a catalyst for transforming Central and Eastern Europe, much as the
Marshall Plan transformed Western Europe in the '40s and '50s. In short, PfP is not just defense by other
means, it is democracy by other means. It is helping prevent the realization of our fears for the post-Cold
War era and taking us closer to realizing our hopes.
One of these hopes is that Russia will participate in a positive way in the new security architecture of
Europe. Russia has been a key part of the European security picture for over 300 years. It will remain a
key player in the coming decades, for better or worse. The job for the United States, NATO and Russia is
to make it for the better. Unlike with the Marshall Plan 50 years ago, Russia today has chosen to
participate in Partnership for Peace. We welcome Russia's participation and hope that over time it will
take on a leading role in PfP commensurate with its importance as a great power.
NATO's efforts to build cooperative ties with Russia complement the bilateral efforts of the United States
and Russia to build what we call a pragmatic partnership -- another piece of preventive defense. The
pragmatic partnership involves working with Russia in important areas where our interests overlap, such
as Nunn-Lugar while trying to build trust and cooperation through such things as military exchanges and
joint exercises.
The immediate payoff for our joint training with the PfP nations and our efforts to build a cooperative
relationship with Russia has come, ironically, in Bosnia. Up until late last year, to say that the future
history of Europe is being written in Bosnia would have been a profoundly pessimistic statement. Today,
however, this statement qualifies as guarded optimism not only because there is satisfactory compliance
with the Dayton peace agreement, but because of the way IFOR [the implementation force] has been put
together and because of the way it is performing.
IFOR is not a peacekeeping exercise, it is the real thing. Fourteen partner nations have joined NATO
nations in shouldering the responsibility in IFOR. A Russian brigade is operating as part of an American
division in IFOR -- the top Russian commander in Bosnia, Gen.[-Col. Leontiy] Shevtsov, visited your
Center for Science and International Affairs just last week. NATO itself has a renewed sense of purpose
and sense of its own ability to put together a force for a post-Cold War military mission. This is all positive
history, and it shows why I believe that Bosnia is turning out to be the crucible for the creation of
Marshall's Europe.
We are also seeking to use the tools of preventive defense to prevent the occurrence of future Bosnias.
Last month, I attended a conference of ministers of defense in Tirana, Albania, directed to the specific
military cooperation and confidence-building measures that would be most effective in building peace
and stability in the South Balkans. The enthusiasm of these leaders for the tools of preventive defense
made me very hopeful that we can be effective in preventing future conflict in this famously troubled
region.
Our hopes for democracy and regional understanding and our opportunities to support them through the
tools of preventive defense are not confined to Europe. We have these same hopes and opportunities
here in our own hemisphere.
Ten years ago, Latin America was made up mostly of dictatorships, but today, 34 nations in our
hemisphere -- all the nations save one -- are democracies. I have tried to seize this opportunity by
opening relationships with the defense ministries of these countries.
Our efforts came to a climax last summer when I invited the defense ministers from the other 33
hemispheric democracies to join me at Williamsburg, Va. , to discuss confidence-building measures and
defense cooperation designed to minimize the risk of conflict in the hemisphere. The conference was a
resounding success.
As a result, today we are not only seeing increased cooperation between the U.S. and Latin American
militaries, we are also seeing cooperation between and among the Latin American militaries themselves
-- with renewed efforts to resolve outstanding disputes peacefully and create new levels of confidence. A
second hemispheric ministerial meeting is scheduled to be held in Argentina this fall.
Preventive defense also has a role in our effort to manage our relationship with China. We are using
some of these same tools to build cooperative security ties between the United States and China. We do
this not because China is a new democracy -- it obviously is not. Rather, we do it because China is a
major world power with whom we share important interests, with whom we have strong disagreements
and which has a powerful military that has significant influence on the policies that China follows. We do it,
ultimately, because we believe when it comes to strategic intentions, engagement is almost always better
than ignorance.
That is why we have sent teams to China to present our strategic thinking and have invited the Chinese
to reciprocate. It is why we are encouraging exchanges between academic institutions within our military
structures. And it is why we have conducted reciprocal ship visits and tours by senior officers.
In the best case, engaging China's military will allow us to have a positive influence on this important
player in Chinese politics, opening the way for Chinese cooperation on proliferation and regional security
issues. At the very least, engagement between our two military establishments will improve our
understanding of each other, thus lowering the chances for miscalculation and conflict.
What makes preventive defense work -- whether it is in Russia, Europe, the Balkans, Latin America or
China -- is American leadership. There is no other country in the world with the ability to reach out to so
many comers of the globe. There is no other country in the world whose efforts to do so are so respected.
At the same time, no one should think that preventive defense is a philanthropic venture -- it is not. It's
about hard work and ingenuity today so that we don't have to expend blood and treasure tomorrow.
While preventive defense holds great promise for preventing conflict, we must appreciate that it is a
strategy for influencing the world -- not compelling it to our will. We must frankly and soberly
acknowledge that preventive defense will not always work. That is why as secretary of defense, my top
priority is still maintaining strong, ready forces and the will to use them to deter and defeat threats to our
interests.
We still maintain a smaller but still highly effective nuclear arsenal. We have a robust, threat-based
ballistic missile defense program. We maintain the best conventional forces in the world, many of which
are forward deployed in both Europe and the Asia-Pacific, and we continue to maximize our
technological advantage over any potential foe, giving us dominance on any battlefield in the world.
These forces and capabilities, coupled with the political will to use them, allow the United States to be
very effective at deterring conflict around the world. These same capabilities and forces mean that if we
cannot prevent or deter conflict, we can defeat aggression quickly and with a minimum of casualties.
The converse is also true. If we can prevent the conditions for conflict, we reduce the risk of having to
send our forces into harm's way to deter or defeat aggression.
The pivotal role of preventive defense, however, is not widely known to the public. Indeed, it is not well
understood even by national security experts. The same was true, in fact, about the Marshall Plan in its
early days.
The Marshall Plan did not arise full-grown like Venus from the shell. Indeed, George Marshall often
maintained that when he gave his speech at Harvard in 1947, he did not present a "Marshall Plan." He
said, instead, that it was a proposal, but he did not simply offer his proposal and go home.
Marshall the statesman was a visionary man, but Marshall the soldier was also a practical man. As a
practical man, he recognized that in a democracy, no national proposal, especially one involving U.S.
engagement in the world, becomes a reality unless you can win public support. The Marshall proposal
became the Marshall Plan because George Marshall spent the next year going directly to the public and
seeking its support.
Today, I am not issuing a proposal for preventive defense, but rather a report on how it is already shaping
our world and the world of future generations in a positive way. But in order for preventive defense to
succeed as an approach to national security, we, too, need to convince the American people. We need to
convince America that at this pivotal point in history, as we seek to realize our fondest hopes for the
revolutionary era in which we live, our engagement with the world and the programs supporting
preventive defense are critical to our security.
I have chosen the Kennedy School to present my thoughts on preventive defense because as scholars,
the students and faculty here are uniquely equipped to understand what is at stake when we talk about
preventive defense. As leaders and future policy makers, you are also uniquely equipped to explain the
benefits of preventive defense to the American public and to take the concepts I have talked about today
and expand upon them in your own careers. I urge you to do so.
Affordable Radar Technology: The Defense
Perspective
Prepared remarks of Paul G. Kaminski, undersecretary of defense for acquisition and technology, to the
1996 Institute for Electrical and Electronics Engineers National Radar Conference, Ann Arbor, Mich.,
May 14, 1996.
It is a great pleasure to be with you tonight and share a defense perspective on radar technology. In a
word, radar systems have become, and will continue to be, indispensable to modern military forces. Our
challenge is to keep radar systems affordable through concepts of operations that make sense, system
architectures that make equal sense, and acquisition practices that make greater sense than they have in
the past.
When I think about how important radar technologies have become, I am reminded of novelist Graham
Green's observation that "there are moments in history when a door opens and lets the future in." For me,
such a moment came about two months ago when two JSTARS E-8 aircraft -- the airborne component of
the Joint Surveillance [and] Targeting Attack Radar System -- returned home to the United States from a
deployment to the European Command in support of NATO forces in Bosnia.
At that time, I had the opportunity to review some of the accomplishments of the ACTD [advanced
concept technology demonstration] deployment in support of Operation Joint Endeavor. And I was struck
by just how indispensable that the continuous surveillance coverage provided by the JSTARS' Moving
Target Indicator and Synthetic Aperture Radar radars were to the initial deployment of the NATO
Implementation Force -- IFOR.
During the early stages of Operation Joint Endeavor, the JSTARS aircraft flew 51 missions in the
Bosnian theater, covering a total area of 747 million square kilometers. To put this in perspective, that is
about 75 times the land area of the United States.
On a typical mission, the JSTARS aircraft spent an average of 8 1/2 hours on station; filled up the 60
gigabytes of mass storage onboard; and acquired about 100 radar images at three-meter resolution.
There were 38 million total detections and 26,000 total revisits. Over the 51 missions, 6,950 radar service
requests were met. The use of JSTARS aircraft, and now Predator unmanned aerial vehicles, signal that
"the door has now opened and the future is truly here."
It is a future in which United States forces have an overwhelming ability to take and hold the initiative,
increase operational tempo, concentrate firepower at times and places of our choosing, and conclude
operations within an opponent's decision cycle time. Precision strike weapons, continuous, all-weather,
day-and-night surveillance systems, and advanced command, control and communications systems are
the elements of this future vision.
Many of you in the audience recall that the current peace implementation operation was preceded by and
made possible by a NATO combat operation. Last summer, this operation, called Operation Deliberate
Force, gave us a hint of what combat will look like in the 21st century, when precision strike systems are
used in conjunction with continuous surveillance and advanced command and control systems. In Desert
Storm, only 2 percent of all weapons expended during the air war were precision guided munitions, or
PGMs. In Operation Deliberate Force, they accounted for over 90 percent of all ordnance expended by
U.S. forces.
The bomb damage assessment photographs taken last summer in Bosnia bear no resemblance to
photos of the past where the target, often undamaged, is surrounded by craters. The photos from Bosnia
usually showed one crater where the target used to be, with virtually no collateral damage. We are
moving closer to a situation known as "one target, one weapon." It was actually more than one, but less
than two, weapons per target in Operation Deliberate Force. This has been the promise for the past 20
years, now it is becoming a reality.
Our precision strike weapon development focus now is to preserve that accuracy while reducing cost,
increasing standoff range and providing all-weather capability. These are the major imperatives behind
our development of systems like the all-weather Joint Direct Attack Munition, the Joint Standoff Weapon
and the Joint Advanced Standoff Strike Missile.
A chess analogy is useful for explaining what this means for the changing nature of warfare—the
so-called revolution in military affairs. Today, precision weapons have now made it possible to take any
piece on any square of the chessboard with no collateral damage to adjacent squares.
Given this one-target, one-weapon capability, commanders now need to know where all one's forces are
and where all the targets are on a 100-by-200-kilometer battlefield. This is analogous to seeing all the
pieces on the chessboard -- something we take for granted when playing chess. Imagine how fast you
would win the game if you could see all the pieces on the board, but your opponent could see only his
major pieces plus a few of your pawns. This is what it means to have "dominant battlefield awareness."
And having a dominant radar surveillance capability will play a central role.
To secure an overwhelming advantage, commanders will also need command, control and
communications and advanced planning tools to achieve something I call "dominant battle cycle time," or
the ability to act before an adversary can react. Back to the chess analogy, dominant battle cycle time
would be, well, gaining an unfair advantage by breaking the rules. It means to keep moving your pieces
without giving your opponent a chance to move his. To do this on the battlefield, one must have superb
command, control and communications systems to disseminate knowledge, make decisions and take
action.
To support IFOR [Implementation Force] forces in Bosnia, I recently approved spending about $80
million on an information-communications initiative to be sure we have such capabilities for Operation
Joint Endeavor. This initiative is improving our communications capabilities in two ways: first, by using
commercial TV satellite technology to provide a direct broadcast communications capability; and
secondly, by fielding a wide bandwidth, secure tactical internet connection through fiber and commercial
satellite transponders.
These communications allow war planners and logisticians, on the ground in Bosnia, in the European
Command headquarters in Germany and back in the Pentagon to have access to the same data at the
same time. This access is available to virtually anyone with a 20-inch receive antenna, cryptologic
equipment and authentication codes. We've designed the system in such a way that we are giving local
commanders a 5,000-mile remote control to select the programming that they receive over their 24
megabits-per-second downlinks from direct broadcast satellites.
There are many striking aspects to this Bosnia Info-Comm [information and communications] initiative.
First, we're pushing hard to get the most advanced information capabilities and an effective concept of
operations to our forces, and we are succeeding. We've accomplished in four months what it normally
takes 10 years to do for a new system. Second, we are proving the need to possess system engineering
and system integration skills. And third, we are demonstrating our willingness to use -- even to lease -commercial systems.
I believe each of these three major observations -- the need for an effective concept of operations,
compatible system architectures, and acquisition approaches that leverage the commercial industrial
base -- are three of the keys to affordable radar technology systems.
If we look first at the concept of operations -- the CONOPS -- for exploitation of the product from
wide-area sensors, I think you will find that the marriage technology and employment doctrine is one
thing that has not been given adequate emphasis in the past. We have traditionally underestimated the
importance of developing the appropriate doctrine, the tactics for employment, the training, and the
people using these technologically advanced systems.
We really have two CONOPS-related affordability problems. The first is that our ability to collect a flood of
imagery -- radar-based and otherwise -- will place an increasing insurmountable workload burden on
image analysts if we continue to use the current exploitation approach. Our second CONOPS problem is
that we have not yet developed an efficient process for managing the collection of imagery from a
distributed network of sensors and processors.
Turning to the first problem -- the ability of image analysts to deal with a "flood" of collected imagery. We
have to reduce the image analyst's workload burden if we expect to have continuous, near-real time
surveillance of the battlefield. Part of the solution will be the development use automated and
semi-automated target recognition tools. More importantly, we will need to develop the operational target
cueing techniques and procedures to aid the analyst in using an integrated approach for detecting,
discriminating, classifying and tracking both stationary and moving targets.
The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency is running an advanced concept technology
demonstration, an ACTD, called semi-automated IMINT [imagery intelligence] processing. This
demonstration seeks to reduce the image analyst's workload for stationary target exploitation by a factor
of a thousand. A similar ACTD is planned to wring out operational implementation of a moving target
exploitation system. The end objective will be to synergistically exploit synthetic aperture and moving
target indicator radar capabilities in a single, integrated concept of operations.
Turning to our second CONOPS problem, managing the collection of imagery, our exploitation goal is to
assess the battlefield situation, nominate targets and manage collection resources by efficiently
correlating, tracking and cross-cueing all collection assets. You can think of this concept in terms of
selecting the right spectral frequencies over the right area and resolution and doing this over the right
period of time.
We are now planning to make tenfold improvements in multispectral sampling, through combinations of
radar, infrared and electro-optical wavelengths, while at the same time, making a tenfold increase in the
area of resolution of collection systems, and then on top of this, making a tenfold improvement in the
continuity of coverage, moving towards around-the-clock day-and-night coverage under all weather
conditions.
The problem is that if we make all these improvements simultaneously, we are looking at a 10 times 10
times 10, or thousandfold increases in the data to be analyzed and processed for the user. That is
probably not something we can deal with. Neither could we probably afford the full combination of
collection systems.
So the idea is not to apply, in an operational context, all the improvements simultaneously. The concept
is to be able to operate sequentially, to do some sampling, with technologies that may in a sensible way
pick the appropriate path in the appropriate spectral frequency band over the area of interest at the
proper resolution and at the right time interval to produce information that can be suitably digested and
acted upon.
In addition to operations concepts that make sense, we must implement system architectures that make
sense as well. The overall affordability of radar systems will, in part, depend on the architectural tradeoffs
we make in areas like high-resolution sensors and digital image processing.
For example, if I wish to detect a target like an M-48 tank at a given radar line of sight, I can invest in a
sensor that gives me one-meter resolution or a more expensive one that gives me half-meter resolution.
The more expensive half-meter resolution sensor will produce an image that increases the probability of
target detection with a much lower false alarm generation rate.
But if I use lower-cost high-definition scalar-imaging techniques -- super-resolution digital processing -- to
enhance the image, I can improve my target recognition performance. In some cases, high-definition
scalar-image processing of one-meter data can approximate conventionally processed half-meter data.
In cases where I am trying to detect transporter-erector-launcher targets -- relatively long-length targets -at a rate of three false alarms per square kilometer, typical automatic target recognition performance is
pretty good -- about 99 percent -- for conventional image formation with one-meter resolution data.
But if I wish to lower my false alarm rate by two orders of magnitude, my probability of detection drops off
to below 55 percent for conventionally processed one-meter data. For conventionally processed
half-meter data, the probability of detection is still quite good -- a little over 95 percent.
If I pursue a less expensive architectural option -- one in which I employ high-definition scalar-image
processing of one-meter data, my probability of detection is roughly equivalent -- a little under 95 percent
-- at the same low rate of false alarms per square kilometer.
High-definition scalar-image processing improves the automatic target recognition of smaller tactical
targets -- cases where there will be less pixels on target for a given level of resolution. If I incorporate
group reasoning techniques in my exploitation architecture, I can dramatically improve my probability of
detection at lower rates of false alarms per square kilometer.
Group reasoning improves performance using knowledge about an adversary's deployment patterns. For
example, if I know from force structure analysis that an adversary typically deploys a company of 10
tanks in a standard defensive or attack pattern, then I can use this information to pick out all 10 tanks
even when only eight are positively identified along with several false alarms.
Without a doubt, we can help develop affordable system architectures by applying our systems
engineering and integration skills to substitute low-cost solutions in place of high-cost "brute force"
approaches.
In addition, we need to think in terms of modular components and open standards when architecting
system solutions. Distributed and open architectures will preserve competition and reduce the cost of
transition to more modern technologies. For these reasons, the department is firmly committed to "plug
and play" architectures in which a variety of collection systems can play together in a compatible way.
In addition to the need for effective concepts of operations and compatible system architectures, the third
key to affordable radar systems is the need to pursue acquisition approaches that leverage the broadest
possible commercial industrial base. One of the principal objectives of our acquisition reform program is
to open the defense market to commercial companies and technology -- not only the primes, but sub-tier
suppliers as well.
A tighter linkage with commercial markets can shorten the cycle time for weapon system development
and reduce the cost of inserting technological improvements into DoD weapon systems. The
department's costs are reduced by leveraging the commercial sector's investment in the underlying radar
technology base as well as on-going production lines for modular components and sub-assemblies.
Knocking down the barriers to commercial products eliminates the cost associated with government
imposed regulations and standards. A recent Coopers and Lybrand [accounting firm] study estimated
that the DoD-imposed regulatory cost premium to be on the order of 15 to 20 percent of total cost.
It is also clear to me that we will have to leverage the industrial base of our allies and reliable friends as
well to modernize our forces at an affordable cost. In particular, I believe we will need to avoid the
inclination to duplicate each other's capabilities. Instead, we need to think in terms of building on
developed capability where possible.
To do this, we need to harmonize requirements from the start and increase the incentives for teaming of
our industry—including removing the barriers to international teaming and barriers to commercial industry
as well. We need to start doing this much earlier in the initial stages for our new programs.
We are attempting to apply these principles in pursuit of a cooperative international program to provide
NATO with alliance ground surveillance. In March 1993, the Conference of National Armaments
Directors -- the CNAD -- began exploring possibilities for a common alliance approach to an effective
ground surveillance capability. In June 1995, the United States hosted -- in Colorado Springs [Colo.] -the first-ever offsite meeting of the NATO national armaments directors. By the end of 1995, an initial
project structure, consisting of a steering committee and an embryonic program office, had been
established.
We looked at three ownership options over the past year:


Interoperable national systems;
A common alliance ground station architecture; and

A NATO-owned, jointly operated system.
The CNAD has approved a variation of this last option, choosing "a minimum essential NATO-owned and
operated core capability supplemented by interoperable national assets."
Securing an agreement on a common approach to developing such a system of systems has been
difficult, but I see a path ahead -- actually a dual track -- one in which we nail down the system of systems
requirement and its urgency while preserving a path to plan for system selection in the fall of 1997.
In summary, radar technology and systems remain indispensable to modern combat and peace
implementation operations. Radar systems will be providing mission planners in Bosnia with products
ranging from elevation terrain data to real time indication of moving targets.
Our challenge is to provide these products at an affordable cost. I believe there are three keys to
developing and fielding affordable radar systems. The first is an effective concept of operations -- to
accomplish the wide -- area surveillance mission, we must look at operational concepts for synergistic
exploitation and sequential tasking of distributed collection assets.
The second key is a sensible system architecture -- we must avoid architectures containing "brute force"
and proprietary approaches to achieve our system performance goals. We will provide commanders with
a fused picture of the battlefield when we effectively integrate complementary "plug and play" sensors in
an overarching system-of-systems architecture -- one containing a central nervous system. And finally,
the third key is to adopt acquisition practices that leverage the broadest possible commercial and
international industrial base.
The department is taking action on all three fronts to ensure that U.S. forces in the 21st century have
continued access to leading edge radar technologies and systems.
New U.S. Land Mine Policy
Statement by President Bill Clinton, followed by a press briefing by Secretary of State Warren
Christopher, Secretary of Defense William Perry, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Madeleine
Albright and Gen. Joseph Ralston, USAF, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Old Executive Office
Building, Washington, May 16, 1996.
Thank you very much. ... Today I am launching an international effort to ban anti-personnel land mines.
For decades, the world has been struck with horror at the devastations that land mines cause. Boys and
girls at play, farmers tending their fields, ordinary travelers -- in all, more than 25,000 people a year are
maimed or killed by mines left behind when wars ended. We must act so that the children of the world
can walk without fear on the earth beneath them.
To end this carnage, the United States will seek a worldwide agreement as soon as possible to end the
use of all anti-personnel land mines. The United States will lead a global effort to eliminate these terrible
weapons and to stop the enormous loss of human life. The steps I announced today build on the work we
have done to clear mines in 14 nations, from Bosnia to Afghanistan, from Cambodia to Namibia. They
build as well on the export moratorium on land mines we have observed for four years -- an effort that,
thankfully, 32 other nations have joined.
To pursue our goal of a worldwide ban, today I order several unilateral actions. First, I am directing that
effective immediately, our armed forces discontinue the use of all so-called "dumb" anti-personnel mines,
those which remain active until detonated or cleared. The only exception will be for those mines required
to defend our American troops and our allies from aggression on the Korean Peninsula and those
needed for training purposes. The rest of these mines, more than 4 million in all, will be removed from our
arsenals and destroyed by 1999.
Just as the world has a responsibility to see to it that a child in Cambodia can walk to school in safety, as
commander in chief, my responsibility is also to safeguard the safety, the lives of our men and women in
uniform. Because of the continued and unique threat of aggression in the Korean Peninsula, I have
therefore decided that in any negotiations on a ban, the United States will and must protect our rights to
use the mines there. We will do so until the threat is ended or until alternatives to land mines become
available.
Until an international ban takes effect, the United States will reserve the right to use so-called "smart
mines," or self-destructing mines, as necessary, because there may be battlefield situations in which
these will save lives of our soldiers.
Let me emphasize: These smart mines are not the hidden killers that have caused so much suffering
around the world. They meet standards set by international agreement. They destroy themselves within
days, and they pose virtually no threat to civilian life once a battle is over. But under the comprehensive
international ban we seek, use of even these smart anti-personnel mines would also be ended.
We're determined that lands around the world will never again be sown with terror. That is why I will
propose a resolution at the 51st United Nations General Assembly this fall urging the nations of the world
to support a worldwide ban on land mines. I have instructed Ambassador Albright to begin work now on
this resolution.
Third, while the exceptions I have mentioned are necessary to protect American lives, I am determined to
end our reliance on these weapons completely. Therefore, I am directing the secretary of defense to
begin work immediately on research and development of alternative technologies that will not pose new
dangers to civilians.
Fourth, as we move forward to prevent the mine fields of the future, we must also strengthen the efforts
to clear those that still exist today. At this moment, unbelievably, some 100 million mines still lie just
beneath the earth in Europe, in Asia, in Africa and in Central America.
To help end the anguish they cause, the Department of Defense will expand its efforts to develop better
mine detection and mine-clearing technology for use in the many countries that are still plagued by mines.
We will also strengthen our programs for training and assisting other nations as they strive to rid their
territory of these devices. For these efforts, as well as those to develop alternatives to anti-personnel
mines, we will assure sufficient funding. I will personally work with Congress on this issue.
Many have worked to bring us to this moment. I especially want to say a word of thanks to Sen. Patrick
Leahy of Vermont. Although I know he has differences with our approach, his dedication and his moral
leadership on this issue have played a vital role in alerting the conscience of our nation to the suffering
that land mines cause. I also want to thank the many nongovernmental organizations that have worked
so hard to put this issue at the top of the international agenda.
As we turn to the task of achieving a worldwide ban, we must work together, and we will be successful.
Let me say, again, I greatly appreciate the time and the energy that Gen. [John] Shalikashvili [chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff] and the Joint Chiefs have devoted to this important issue over the last few
months. It may take years before all the peoples of the world feel safe as they tread upon the earth, but
we are speeding the arrival of that day with the decisions announced today. I will do everything I can to
implement them all -- including the international agreement to ban all anti-personnel mines -- as quickly
as possible.
Now, I think it is important to turn the microphone over, first to Secretary Christopher and then Secretary
Perry to finish the presentation.
Christopher. You have just heard the president announce an important decision that will strengthen
American leadership around the globe. This decision reflects our determination to eliminate these deadly
instruments of terror, which claim some 500 innocent lives every week.
The decision also, though, reflects America's global responsibilities and the concern that each of us has
for the safety of our soldiers and the people that they protect. The land mine crisis has commanded this
administration's attention from the very start. In 1993, the United States extended for three years our
unilateral moratorium on land mine exports. In 1994, we spearheaded a successful resolution that the
United Nations ban exports of the most dangerous kinds of land mines.
We've provided training, equipment and funds to help those nations most threatened by mines, and
today's decision will expand that assistance.
In 1994, the president also dedicated our nation to the goal of eventually eliminating all anti-personnel
land mines. Today, we have a road map for achieving that objective. The president has asked me and his
foreign policy team to move forward on that road map as rapidly as possible. As the president said, we
will propose a resolution at the 51st General Assembly this fall calling for an international agreement to
ban all forms of anti-personnel mines. We will begin to consult immediately with our allies on the best way
to achieve this.
One possible approach would be to proceed through the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. That's
where we succeeded in negotiating a chemical weapons convention, and that is where we're moving
forward toward agreement this year on a comprehensive nuclear test ban.
I am personally determined to follow through on this commitment as soon as possible, mindful of some of
the things I've seen and experiences that I've had. I saw the devastation that land mines can cause when
I visited Cambodia last year. That is a nation where our demining program is saving many thousands of
lives; indeed, I was proud to present to our demining team an award in Phnom Penh. In February of this
year, this problem was also brought home to me in Bosnia, where land mines pose an ever-present
danger to our soldiers and other servicemen who are there.
Bosnia makes it clear that these weapons do not cease to kill when peace treaties are signed and the
guns of war fall silent. These anti-personnel land mines do not distinguish between civilians and
combatants; indeed, they probably kill more children than soldiers. They frustrate our foreign policy goals
because they make it so much harder for nations to move from conflict to reconstruction and growth. It's
very clear to me that an international ban on land mines cannot happen without American leadership,
which of course is so true of many issues in the world today.
Today, the president has put America firmly behind a responsible program to rid the world of these
hidden killers once and for all. And with today's announcement, I am more confident than ever that this
important goal can be achieved.
Thank you. Secretary Perry.
Perry. ...
Let me talk about the anti-personnel land mines. I and all of the chiefs strongly support the president's
new policy. Indeed, we recommended it to him. We are all appalled by the carnage caused each year by
the millions of anti-personnel land mines that are a residue of civil wars and regional conflicts. And
therefore, we seek to find a way to end this scourge.
But we also are responsible for preparing and executing our nation's war plans with maximum
effectiveness and minimum casualties to the U.S. forces. This objective to eliminate anti-personnel land
mines, therefore, is partially in conflict with one of our most critical war plans, namely, the war plan to
defend Korea against a mass assault.
North Koreans have more than a million infantry troops amassed just north of the DMZ -- the
demilitarized zone. Many of these are within 50 to 100 miles of Seoul. The metropolitan area of Seoul has
a population in excess of 10 million inhabitants. And therefore, our contingency war plan is designed to
stop a North Korea attack before it gets to Seoul.
Today, in order to execute that war plan, it requires the use of anti-personnel mines -- indeed, almost a
million of them. These are necessary to delay and to disrupt the mass infantry attack long enough for our
air power to get in and be fully effective. If we simply remove those anti-personnel land mines, it is likely
that North Korea could overrun Seoul before we could finally turn the invasion around. Overrunning
Seoul would entail the loss of tens of thousands of soldiers and perhaps hundreds of thousands of
civilians. And therefore, we see this as an unacceptable risk.
The proposed plan, therefore, that we made to the president protects the right to use anti-personnel land
mines in Korea until first, the possibility that the threat of a mass infantry attack is removed or we are able
to achieve alternative ways to affect our tactics of delaying and disrupting that attack.
I should emphasize that we, myself and the chiefs, are all anxious to remove this exception. And we will
move vigorously on both parallel paths that I have described to you so that we can remove that exception
as soon as possible.
I'd like to take the opportunity now to introduce Gen. David Jones, former chief of the staff of the Air
Force and former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Dave, could you stand up for a moment so they
can see you? Thank you.
As you know, Gen. Jones expressed his support for the elimination of anti-personnel land mines, and we
consulted very closely with Dave as we developed our new policy. And he has supported the approach
that we have taken. I've invited him to come today so that he would be available to answer your questions
along with myself, Secretary Christopher and the chiefs.
And with that, then, I'd like to open the floor so we can entertain a few questions.
Q. Sir, what is the response of the administration to the assertions by nongovernmental organizations,
humanitarian groups, other member states of the U.N. that the policy is still troublesome because ...
whether it be dumb mines or smart mines, you still would not be able to distinguish between a combatant
and a civilian and that smart mines will not address that issue?
Perry. It does address that issue. One has to look not only at the way the mines operate, but the way they
are employed. The dumb mines are traditionally laid in the ground and left there for weeks or months or
years. And it's after the war battles are over that they do their damage to civilians.
Smart mines not only are self-destructing after a few hours or a few days -- depending on the nature,
depending on how it's set. But even more importantly, they are not spread around indiscriminately just as
a sort of general stopping of assault. They are only spread specifically to stop a particular advance that's
coming. So the way of using the smart mines and their self-destruct feature dramatically changed the
situation.
Nevertheless, let me emphasize what the president has said. Even with that, we are prepared to give up
the smart mines as part of an international agreement. And we believe that may be necessary to get the
international agreement, which is a major step forward.
Q. Secretary Perry, could you give us an idea of the types of technologies or operational changes that
could substitute for the use of mines and barrier operations and channeling?
Perry. There are three different categories of technology which we are working on now. The first of them,
which is a bit of a digression from your question, is the technology to detect and destroy mines -- very
critical. We have a major program under way in the United States, centered at Fort Belvoir [Va.], for
developing new technology for doing that. That has been under way for some time.
There are a dozen different techniques, some of which are in very advanced states of development. We
are introducing those to our own forces. What the president has asked us to do is to also make these
widely available in the international community so we get behind an effort to help eliminate and get rid of
the mines -- these millions and millions of mines that are already planted.
The technologies for substituting the mines, which is the question you asked, fall in two categories. The
generic ways of shaping the battlefield differently than you shape it with mines. As was described, the
principal purpose of the anti-personnel mines is to delay and disrupt, slow down massed infantry events.
There are other ways of doing that, too, that have to do with tactics, techniques and other weapons.
That broad approach involves changes across the board in the way we fight battles -- in tactics and
doctrine as well as in systems. More specifically, we can look for devices that do the specific job that
anti-personnel mines do without the residual and very undesirable side effects, and the most promising
techniques in that area fall in the category of nonlethal technologies -- technologies which slow and
disrupt an infantry advance without killing. For a variety of reasons, we have R&D [research and
development] under way in that field, and we'll continue -- under this program, we will accelerate that
technology.
Q. Secretary Christopher, your announcement today includes a pledge to try to persuade other nations to
forswear their use of mines. But isn't our own position in that regard undercut by our reserving the right to
use them not only in Korea, but wherever else we consider it in our supreme national interest?
Christopher. Not at all. I think that what the president has done today is to give us a destination and a
road map, give us an opportunity for the United States to lead. This is a balanced approach, taking into
account our responsibility to get rid of land mines, but also our responsibilities for the defense in Korea.
Korea is an international operation, I remind you, a United Nations commitment. It's probably the most
dangerous border in the world, a unique situation. So I don't think our leadership is going to be
handicapped by this balanced approach that the president has given us. It enables the United States to
lead in the confidence that we can get something done.
Canada has scheduled a meeting this fall, a conference this fall in which we'll be consulting with them,
and then we'll, as I said in my statement, be considering other possible fora to move this forward,
particularly the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. But I think the fact that the United States is
prepared to take the lead here, to try to organize it internationally, will in the long run make the difference.
Perry. I would only add to that, that we do seek