How to Assess the Value of the Transgenics Used in Agriculture
Hugh Lacey
Department of Philosophy
Swarthmore College
500 College Ave
Swarthmore, PA 19081, USA
hlacey1@swarthmore.edu
Abstract: Recent developments and implementations of transgenic plants in agricultural production will
be my focus. I summarize a common argument that transgenics are of universal value today. The key
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premise of this argument is that there are no alternative forms of agriculture available that make it
possible to produce sufficient food to feed the world. This premise is challenged by (e.g.) the proponents
of agroecology. I maintain that the empirical investigation of this premise is crucial to the entire ethical
discussion surrounding transgenics. If it is false (and I believe that available evidence suggests that it may
be) then it becomes a matter of considerable social as well as scientific importance that the material and
socio-economic conditions needed for its investigation be made available, and that the cultural conditions
(the practices and movements of small-scale farmers in the "third world") needed also be strengthened.
Finally, I point to some features of serious ethical reflection on the issues raised by transgenics.
Key words: transgenics, agroecology, science, values, ethics
TEXT:
1. Introduction.
The charge of "lack of ethics" has been levelled in recent years against large, multi-national agribusiness
corporations that are engaged in research and development of transgenics. Why "lack of ethics"? Because,
the critics maintain, agribusiness has put its interests in (e.g.) profit above any concern for the risks it may
occasion for human health, sustainability of the environment, preservation of biodiversity, the
requirements of democracy, and the needs of small farmers. Although some of this criticism may be
warranted, what is involved here is best viewed — I think — as a conflict between opposed moral visions.
These companies think of themselves as bearers of a progressive moral vision. True, it is a moral vision in
which self-interest (the prioritizing of individualist values) is valued, but where self-interest is articulated
as part of a conception of individual freedom balanced by recognition of the value of civil/political rights
and a democratic society. This moral vision should not be confused with its degenerate expressions
(unabashed self-interest and the cynicism that come with it, accompanied by corruption, violence and
ignoring of the law, and even by using the agents of the law-enforcing apparatus of the state to serve that
self-interest). Within it agribusiness sees itself as subject to appropriate ethical constraints. For it, not
agribusiness but its opponents lack proper ethical concern; since its spokespersons maintain that, within
any moral vision worthy of serious consideration, transgenics should be considered objects of high moral
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value — that not only is the development and implementation of transgenics legitimate so that rights to
using them should be respected,1 but also it is virtually obligatory2,3,4,5,6,7,8.
My goal in this article is limited principally to questioning this more extreme outlook. I will
identify six propositions that, I think, adequately represent key premises of arguments that developments
of transgenics have virtually universal value. I cannot deal with them comprehensively. Instead I will
raise some questions — not to challenge all uses of transgenics and certainly not to challenge all
biotechnological applications in agriculture, but to show that for important value-outlooks, held especially
among certain rural movements in "third world" countries, other forms of agriculture (e.g., agroecology)
are properly valued more highly. Then, I will draw some conclusions about what should characterize
serious ethical discussion of transgenics-intensive agriculture and its alternatives.
2. The alleged universal value of transgenics
Here are the six premises:
1. Technology, informed by modern scientific knowledge, provides the unique key to
solving major world problems like hunger and malnutrition.
2. Developments of transgenics are informed by biotechnological knowledge; thus
informed in an exemplary way by modern scientific knowledge.
3. That knowledge may be applied, in principle evenhandedly, to serve the interests and
to improve the practices of groups holding a wide variety of value-outlooks — including,
in principle, of all value-outlooks that can plausibly claim anyone's allegiance today.
4. There are great benefits to be had from the use of transgenics in agriculture now, and
they will be greatly expanded with future developments, which promise, e.g., transgenic
crops with enhanced nourishing qualities that may readily be grown by poor "third
world" farmers.
5. The transgenic crops that are currently being planted, harvested, processed and
consumed, and those anticipated, occasion no known or foreseeable risks to human health
and the environment, that cannot be adequately managed under responsibly designed
regulations.
6. Widespread use of transgenics in agriculture is necessary to ensure that the world's
expected population in the coming decades can be adequately fed and nourished; there
are no other ways that are informed by the soundly accepted results of scientific
investigation that can be counted on to produce (or even to play a significant role in
producing) the necessary food.
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Given these premises, is difficult to resist the conclusion that transgenics should be considered to
have virtually universal value.9 Premise 6 will be my principal concern in this paper but first, a few
comments on the other premises. I have discussed other aspects of the argument elsewhere.
The modern valuation of control
Premise 1 is intended to express a proposition vindicated by the historical record. It also reflects
what I call the modern valuation of control, a set of values that are at the heart of the moral vision that
motivates developments of transgenics and other techno-scientific products and that concern specifically
modern ways of valuing the control of natural objects. They have to do with the scope of control, its
centrality in daily life, and that its value is not systematically subordinated to other moral and social
values — so that, e.g., the kind of ecological and social disruption caused by many industrial innovations
becomes seen simply as the price of progress. They also concern the deep sense that control is the
characteristic human stance to be adopted towards natural objects; so that the expansion of advanced
technologies into more and more spheres of life and into becoming the means for solving more and more
problems is especially highly valued, where the problems that can be solved in this way include the health
and environmental ones occasioned by technological innovations themselves. I have elaborated these
values and their presuppositions elsewhere10,11.
Materialist strategies
Premise 2 expresses a widely-held view about the nature of scientific inquiry: in particular that in
exemplary scientific investigation research is conducted under what I call materialist strategies:(a) theories
are constrained so that things may be represented in relation to their underlying structures and their
components, processes and interactions, and the laws that govern them, and their possibilities may be
identified in terms of the generative power of the underlying order, in abstraction from any place they
may have in human experience and practical activity, from any links with social value and with the
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human, social and ecological possibilities that they might also admit.12 And so, e.g., in biotechnological
investigation seeds are effectively reducible to their genomes and to the biochemical expression of their
component genes; and their possibilities are encapsulated in terms of their generability from their
underlying molecular structures (and their possibilities for modification) and lawful biochemical
processes. Understanding seeds biologically in this way thus largely abstracts the realization of their
possibilities from their relations with social arrangements, with human lives and experience, with the
social and material conditions of the research and with extensive and long-term ecological impact — thus,
from any link with value.
Risks
Premise 5 has dominated recent controversies about transgenics. The case for it is straightforward: No creditable scientific evidence has been obtained that has actually identified any serious,
unmanageable, direct risks to human health and the environment from current, planned and foreseeable
uses of particular transgenics. This may well be true.13 But critics ask: Has adequate research been
conducted, or is the actual lack of evidence simply an artefact of failure to conduct the relevant
research?14,15,16 It has been objected that standard risk assessment procedures (e.g., as endorsed by the
National Research Council17) do not address such alleged threats as the possibility of adverse effects of
horizontal gene transfer that may be facilitated by genetic material from the Cauliflower Mosaic Virus
being used as a promoter in many transgenics,18 damage to the world's centers of biodiversity, destruction
of the conditions for other forms of farming, undermining "agroecological goals aimed at making
agriculture more socially just, economically viable, and ecologically sound,"19 taking resources away
from the poor, and adverse impact on tropical ecologies. 20 Others object that these procedures attend
only to the product of genetic modification and not to risks that may be incurred with the process, and
depend mainly on data provided by agribusiness not on independently acquired data21 or that the tests are
not sufficiently fine-grained.22 The critics maintain that relevant research has not been conducted, and
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thay often claim that this represents an ethical failure by agribusiness and government regulators: risking
serious harm to people and environment that could be avoided if we had the relevant knowledge.
The proponents say that enough research has been done on possible risks; the critics deny it.
What is "enough"? In dealing with questions of risk of these kinds there is bound to be a measure of
contestation that has an essential values component. What counts as sufficient evidence depends upon
how (ethically) serious the potential risks are and how (ethically) significant the expected gains — and on
the risks and benefits of alternatives. Some maintain that the risks of transgenics are so serious that
following the "Precautionary Principle" is obligatory.23 Others have countered that the benefits are so
significant, and the risks that have been actually demonstrated are not sufficiently serious (given
appropriate regulatory mechanisms), that it is appropriate to conduct risk assessment under the
assumption of "Substantial Equivalence" where the burden of proof is on the critics,24 especially (some
add) in view of potentially highly significant benefits for impoverished peoples (Premise 4), and the
dangers actually encountered in chemical-intensive "conventional" forms of agriculture.25 All these
arguments, in turn, depend in large part on whether Premise 6 is empirically well supported or not. If, in
fact, there are no serious alternatives available to the use of transgenics that will enable the world to be
fed and nourished, then surely greater risks can be (ethically) tolerated than if alternatives are available.
For this reason, making sound ethical judgments about the risks supposedly connected with the use of
transgenics must draw upon the evidence that supports Premise 6. This point is reinforced by reflections
on Premises 3 and 4.
Neutrality
Premise 3 conforms to the often-affirmed neutrality of science. 26 One might wonder about the
neutrality of the science (biotechnology) that informs transgenics. Of the two kinds of transgenics that
currently are most widely used, one utilize genes that confer resistance to proprietary herbicides (e.g.,
Monsanto's Roundup) and the other genes (from the bacterium Bt) that enable plants to release a toxin
that functions as a pesticide. These contribute profits to agribusiness and its clients, and that is why they
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have been introduced.27 This is not surprising. Most research on transgenics is sponsored by agribusiness;
and, by means of gaining Intellectual Property Rights (IPR: e.g., patents) agribusiness has gained control
not only over many transgenic plants themselves, but also over techniques of genetic engineering and
even over certain genes and plant characteristics. Moreover, the spread of transgenics-intensive
agriculture to "third world" countries, covered by the protections of IPR that are backed by the World
Trade Organization, is integral to current programs of "globalization." In this context, it seems, products
of biotechnological research, that explores the possibilities encapsulated in the (modified) genomes of
seeds, may have little utility outside of the spaces where market relations are all encompassing. If so, then
to engage in research on transgenics itself may also be simultaneously to contribute to the interests of
agribusiness and the market. It may also contribute to ease worries about large-scale "conventional"
farming; in the words of Thompson: "The tools and science that we know as food biotechnology can be
employed to increase agricultural productivity, reduce negative environmental impacts and to ensure and
improve food safety."28 Nevertheless, it may have little relevance to the projects of those farmers who are
attempting to improve productive, sustainable and biodiverse agroecosystems that use, e.g.,
agroecological methods.
This is not to deny that transgenics technology is informed by knowledge that is grounded
properly on reliable empirical evidence.29 That is important, but it does not mean that, on application,
this knowledge can serve various value-outlooks evenhandedly. It may especially favor one, in this case
that associated with agribusiness and those value-outlooks that include MVC, and (despite Premise 4)
have little relevance to meeting the food and nourishment needs of poor people or to informing the
agricultural practices of most small farmers in the "third world."
Premise 4, however, distinguishes between current and anticipated future developments of
transgenics. The future promise is enormous and open-ended, it is said, and with its redemption
transgenics will be able to be used to address many of the food and health needs of impoverished peoples,
and so to serve humanitarian values in important ways.
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3. Golden rice
"Golden rice" has become the centerpiece of the argument, rice that has been genetically
engineered to contain beta-carotene, a source of Vitamin A when ingested by human beings.30 Its
development is proposed as a contribution towards alleviating malnutrition and its terrible effects
especially on children in poor countries. To question the value of golden rice seems, to its developers, to
be preposterous and heartless (unethical), to reflect only "anti-science" and "anti-market" sentiments.31, 32
Perhaps, but keep in mind that the critics are not refusing to accept a "good" that is at hand. Golden rice
is not yet available for agricultural use, the first experimental plants only recently having been produced.
That it will become available for the use of small farmers is a promise that confronts many obstacles,
whose redemption lies (if at all) some years off in the future. Meanwhile, as field tests and risk
assessments are carried out, it is intended to develop golden rice, crossed with varieties currently grown
by small farmers in "third world" countries, so that it can be used by them. It will be given without charge
to them by the institutions that are developing it. Thus we have, in the words of its creator, an instance of
"the purely altruistic use of genetic engineering technology [that] has potentially solved an urgent and
previously intractable health problem for the poor of the developing world."33
The developers of golden rice emphasize the "humanitarian" value of their projects. This seems to
support at least a measure of neutrality of research on transgenics (humanitarian value, as well as value
for agribusiness and its clients); and perhaps its universal value. The spokespersons of agribusiness
emphasize the universality. Given the humanitarian value of some of its applications, they suggest, it
follows that the development of transgenics in general is desirable and so in particular is that carried out
by agribusiness — the ethical value of the whole project of transgenics is held to be vindicated by the
humanitarian value of golden rice and a few similar cases. Agribusiness, of course, aims for profit; but at
the same time it cooperates with humanitarian projects that have nothing to do with profit — by licensing,
without charge, use of their patented material for developments of seeds used in these projects.34 So,
although the immediate innovations of agribusiness are not designed to meet the food and nutrition needs
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of the world's poor, the research that underlies them is essential for, and part of, projects that are so
designed. In this way the humanitarian value of innovations like golden rice is taken to support the value
of transgenic technology in general. The "humanitarians" sometimes question the propriety of particular
emphases of agribusiness,35 but not the policy of increasing the profile of transgenics-intensive
agriculture furthered through the mechanisms associated with IPR — for the their own developments are
dependent on the products (and "charity") of those made by agribusiness. Thus the projects of the
"humanitarians" have a subordinate and dependent place in the process of market-oriented
"globalization," of which agribusiness is a leader.
This conclusion seems to clash with the claim of the developers of golden rice that it can be
grown from year to year from seed saved from the previous harvest; the one-time gift of the seed from the
humanitarian research institutes would thus enable farming to continue productively without further
dependence on outside institutions. Critics (e.g., Ho36) are skeptical of this claim, counter-claiming: a) the
likely instability of golden rice across several generations; b) in view of the unlikelihood of golden rice
becoming part of sustainable agroecosystems, the likely regular dependence on the research institutes for
new seeds in order to cope with pest and other problems; c) the "need" (if transgenics are to contribute to
solve major health problems) for a regular stream of new seeds from the research institutes for crops that
are responsive to other nutritional deficiences (e.g., iron deficiency); and d) that sustainability is not built
on dependence on "charity" from agribusiness. They see a recipe for growing dependence on agribusiness
or for creating conditions that will facilitate the extension of agribusiness' control over food production.
Moreover, some critics maintain that this is a dependence that is accompanied by all the risks
mentioned in Section 2, but accompanied neither by the assurance that the vitamin A produced in the
body from ingestion of golden rice will be enough to make a nutritional difference, nor by the assurance
of the presence of other factors (e.g., certain fats or a generally well nourished body) that allegedly are
needed along with beta carotene for the body to produce vitamin A.37 Others claim that golden rice has
been proposed as a solution to a problem, vitamin A deficiency among large numbers of children in
impoverished countries, without careful empirical inquiry having been engaged in on the causal history of
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the currency and extent of the deficiency or the causes of its actual continuance.38 This is important, for a
problem of this kind cannot be solved without the elimination of the factors that cause its maintenance.
But, in golden rice research, the problem has been characterized in a way that a priori makes it tractable
to "scientific" (in this case, deriving solely from biotechnology) solution; then the cause of vitamin A
deficiency a priori will be represented as insufficient beta carotene in food ingested — as if the reason
people are suffering from vitamin A deficiency is the absence of the relevant technology to produce the
right kind of rice. "Science" can then hope to deliver a solution by engineering beta-carotene into the
staple food. But if poverty is the cause and the problem is malnutrition, of which vitamin A deficiency is
just one component, solving vitamin A deficiency in the "scientific" way may at the same time further
poverty and thence malnutrition in general. That would happen if research and development and then
practical implementation of golden rice were integral parts of the socio-economic system that causes the
kind of poverty (and its attendant sufferings) experienced actually by many people in impoverished
countries.
I regard none of the claims discussed in the previous two paragraphs as conclusive, but they call
out urgently for further investigation and analysis. They suffice, however, to conclude that it has not been
well established that the advent of golden rice furthers the case that transgenics have significant value
outside of the socio-economic context in which market relations are encompassing. This would not be
important, of course, if there were no alternatives. Once again Premise 6 is playing a role in the
argument.
4. Alternatives to transgenics
That there are (potentially) other ways is the key critical contention: Other ways without the risks that
may be occasioned by transgenics, that utilize agricultural methods (I will focus on agroecology) that are
informed by sound scientific knowledge and that are of special relevance to small farmers in the "third
world;" other ways that address problems like malnutrition as a whole instead of as discrete issues each
awaiting its individual solution — in a context that does not separate proposed solutions from detailed
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analysis of the causal history of the problem, and that looks for solutions that are ecologically sustainable
and supportative of the well-being and enhanced agency of members of the local community. If there are
serious alternatives, then it is not enough just to work towards the hoped for redemption of the promise of
golden rice (and related crops). The important issue becomes: What are the options now, and which ones
are the most promising? The critics contend that the other ways they favor (at least as candidates for
further investigation) can deal with vitamin A deficiency as one source of malnutrition among many; for
these ways involve farming in diverse agroecosystems that include a variety of greens, vegetables and oilproducing plants that are sources of many minerals needed for human nourishment — and they are well
known and the plants locally available. Their implementation could begin immediately with relatively
little costly research and development compared to what is required to develop golden rice.39, 40
Agroecology
Agroecology refers not only to a kind of farming but also to a scientific approach to investigating
agroecosystems.41 As farming, its central focus is on sustainability: where "sustainability" is defined by
Altieri to involve at least four attributes: Productive capacity: "Maintenance of the productive capacity of
the ecosystem;" Ecological integrity: "Preservation of the natural resource base and functional
biodiversity;" Social health: "Social organization and reduction of poverty"; Cultural identity:
"Empowerment of local communities, maintenance of tradition, and popular participation in the
development process".42 Agroecology is farming for the sake of sustainability.
As a field of scientific investigation, it deploys strategies, that I call agroecological strategies,
under which one may aim to confirm generalizations concerning the tendencies, capacities, functioning
and possibilities of agroecosystems, their constituents, and relations and interactions among them. These
include generalizations in which (e.g.) "mineral cycles, energy transformations, biological processes and
socioeconomic relationships" are considered in relationship to the whole system; generalizations
concerned not with "maximizing production of a particular system, but rather with optimizing the
agroecosystem as a whole" and so with "complex interactions among and between people, crops, soil and
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livestock."43 Agroecology cannot be pursued with a sharp distinction between the researcher and the
farmer; the farmer's observations are essential to the conduct of the research. As one agroecologist puts it:
" … seeds have multiple characteristics that cannot be captured by a single yield measure, as important as
this measure may be, and farmers have multiple site-specific requirements for their seeds, not just
controlled condition high-yields. … … the inescapable conclusion is that a different approach,
participatory breeding by organized farmers themselves, which takes into account the multiple
characteristics of both seed varieties and farmers, is essential."44 Relevant empirical data in
agroecological research are often obtained from the study of farming systems in which traditional
methods informed by local knowledge are used.45 These systems can, with adaptations suggested by
research findings, be enhanced with respect to all four of the characteristics of "sustainability"; and they
are often uniquely appropriate for the activities of poor small farmers. The methods used in these systems
have been tested empirically in practice, and have been particularly effective over the centuries in
"selecting seed varieties for specific environments"46 — these are often the original source of the seed
varieties from which transgenics are engineered.47
Agroecological research has been fruitful, and recent research in related approaches is worth
noting. E.g., research conducted by Zhu et al. on rice crops in China demonstrated that "a simple,
ecological approach to disease control can be used effectively at large spatial scale to attain
environmentally sound disease control" without loss of productivity (compared to chemically-intensive
farming based in monocultures).48 Wolfe commenting on this result, after observing that long ago Darwin
was aware that mixed cropping (of wheat) is more productive than monocultures, asked: "Why is the
mixed approach not widely used?" He answered with the rhetorical question: "Is it just too simple, not
making enough use of high technology?"49 He continued: "Variety mixtures may not provide all the
answers to the problems of controlling diseases and producing stable yields in modern agriculture. But
their performance so far in experimental situations merits their wider uptake. More research is needed to
find the best packages for different purposes and to breed varieties specifically for use in mixtures. …
mixtures of species provide another layer of crop diversity, with half-forgotten advantages waiting to be
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exploited in contemporary approaches." Tilman provides further examples, e.g., "greater diversity [with
the "right" components of diversity] leads to greater productivity in plant communities, greater nutrient
retention in ecosystems and greater ecosystem stability."50,51
Premise 6 and the empirical record
Does the empirical record support Premise 6? Or does agroecology provide an alternative that can play a
significant role in producing the food that the world needs? The fruitfulness that can be expected from
agroecology is much contested. I have spoken with agronomists in Brazil who argue that agroecology is
necessary for the small producer, and therefore indispensable for actually feeding everyone, but who
doubt the capability of its methods to produce sufficient food to feed large concentrated urban
populations. Others see that the main potential for agroecology is connected with "organic farming" that
serves affluent minorities; it can serve a niche but not a mass market.52 Clearly empirical questions are
involved here - and they should be addressed with well-planned investigations. Zhu's study speaks to both
of these opinions, though one study (it is the only one I know of that has been conducted on a large scale)
cannot be decisive.53 One may wonder what the empirical record would be like if agroecological research
had been supported with comparable resources to those made available for research on the production of
golden rice. In any case here we find clashing opinions based in the practical experience of serious
researchers. In this context, Tilman's words strike me as wise: "Research is needed that pursues all
reasonable approaches to this problem. The apparent distrust between conventional and 'ecological'
schools of agricultural thought must not blind either side to novel insights, nor slow the development of
solutions to a global problem".54 We just do not know what the bounds of the potential of agroecology
are, nor do we know that the promise of transgenics like golden rice can be fulfilled. Nevertheless, the
evidence supports that agroecology can meet the needs of large numbers of small farmers and their
communities who tend to be by-passed in mainstream "development" projects and to be displaced by the
practices endorsed by agribusiness. And the potential of agroecology is much greater that what has been
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realized to date. Premise 6, thus, lacks the empirical credentials needed to support its use in legitimating
the universal value of transgenics or in questioning the value of agroecology.
Those who make use of Premise 6 will be wary of this argument. They might use a "burden of
proof" counter-argument: Agroecology has not sufficiently demonstrated its greater potential; or they
might dismiss its claims as ideologically motivated.55 Why? Because, in the first place, questioning of
Premise 6 may lead to questioning of Premise 1. In the second place, commitment to the modern
valuation of control, further reinforced by contemporary global-market institutions and policies that
highly embody these values, I suggest, largely explain confidence in the possibilities of transgenics to
solve major problems of the poor.56 Paraphrasing Wolfe: "Agroecology it just too simple, not making
enough use of high technology!" Consider the two questions: "How can we genetically engineer plants
that are herbicide resistant?" and "How can we engage in farming so that the sustainability of
agroecosystems is enhanced?" On my account, both are scientific questions, open to systematic empirical
inquiry, but only the first is implicated in high technology. Strongly held beliefs in Premises 1 and 6 are
explained, not by their accord with available evidence, but by reference to their role as presuppositions of
the modern valuation of control.
5. The challenge of agroecology
Agroecology's challenge to the rapid and widespread utilization of transgenics has four components.
First, it offers an alternative form of agriculture that is productive and sustainable, and that is
relatively free from direct risks to human health and the environment.
Second, agroecology is concretely rooted in contemporary practices, linked with movements
which embody values (e.g., of "popular participation") that conflict with the moral vision outlined at the
outset of this article — values of: solidarity and compassion rather than individualism; social goods
balancing private property and profits; sustainability (as defined in Section 4) as subordinating the control
of natural objects; non-violence to the extent that it does not involve the toleration of injustice; the wellbeing of all persons rather than the primacy of the market and property; strengthening a plurality of values
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rather than expanded commodification; human liberation as encompassing and qualifying individual
liberty and economic efficiency; truthfulness that aspires for comprehensive understanding of the place of
our lives in the world, that seeks to identify the liberating possibilities hidden within the predominant
order, and that does not identify what is possible with the principal tendencies of this order; preparedness
to submit to criticism and investigation the legitimating presuppositions of one's practices rather to place
them among "certitudes" that are seen to be beyond investigation; the rights of the poor prioritized over
the interests of the rich; participatory as encompassing formal democracy; and civil and political rights in
dialectical relation with social, economic and cultural rights. (This list represents my articulation of the
values that are involved in the notion of "popular participation" that is used widely among Latin
American social movements, and that recently was adopted by the World Social Forum that met in Porto
Alegre, Brazil, February 2002).57 Note that a challenge drawing from this second component, but without
the first is simply ideology. Motivation to engage in agroecology may derive from the second, but any
value (beyond narrowly local value) agroecology has depends on the first component.
Third, it suggests that perhaps the main risk posed by implementations of transgenics is the
destruction of alternative forms of farming, those which have the potential to feed and nourish the rural
poor.
Fourth, it challenges the notion of "science" or "modern scientific knowledge" that is present in
Premises 1 and 6 — not from an "anti-science" perspective, but from one that denies that science should
be restricted to inquiry conducted under materialist strategies, inquiry that aims to represent phenomena
and their possibilities in terms of the generative power of underlying structure and law, in abstraction
from ecological, human and social dimensions. Agroecology presents itself as an alternative, an
alternative well informed by scientific knowledge, knowledge derived under agroecological strategies.
This is investigation — not bound, like biotechnological research, by the strictures of materialist
strategies — in which the biology and social science are inseparably intertwined, and where the latest and
most sophisticated technology are not always pertinent. (While not denying that transgenics are a product
of sound scientific knowledge, it questions the claim of Premise 2 that this kind of scientific knowledge is
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all inclusive.) It is only when science is conceived in such an expanded way, as a practice that can be
conducted under a plurality of strategies of which materialist strategies are just one (albeit of importance
and with some subordinate role in all strategies), that all the premises of the argument can themselves be
subject to scientific investigation.58 In particular, Premise 6 cannot be adequately submitted to empirical
testing unless inquiry under a variety of strategies, including agroecological ones, is conducted.
6. Conditions for serious ethical discussion of transgenics
Appeal to Premise 6 does not ground a compelling argument for the universal value of transgenics. On
the contrary, since the rapid and widespread introduction of transgenics is incompatible with the sustained
development of agroecology, it may undermine the conditions necessary for testing Premise 6; it may
obliterate alternative forms of agriculture and the movements that want to develop them. That would be a
great moral tragedy; and it represents the greatest risk of the introduction of transgenics (a risk that is not
conceptualized in standard risk-assessment studies). My first conclusion is that Premise 6 needs serious
empirical scrutiny, and this requires (at present) that conditions be made available for appraising the
productive potential of agroecology. In the absence of such empirical scrutiny, ethical discussion of
transgenics will degenerate into posturing — with the proponents appealing to Premise 6 because it
"legitimates" their projects and does not challenge their power, and the opponents denying it in a show of
ethical "bravado."
Ethical discourse, for its authenticity, must draw upon the results of scientific inquiry - and,
where the relevant results are not at hand, it must urge that the research be conducted.59 In practice, the
force of this point is obscured by acceptance of Premise 2, the common identification of "science" with
"research conducted under materialist strategies, and the knowledge gained in that research." This makes
the terms of ethical discourse even more difficult. Once one accepts that science is not limited to inquiry
conducted under materialist strategies, it becomes apparent that, when science is restricted to the play of
these strategies, it is not because of the requirements of science (systematic empirical inquiry) per se, but
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because science has been linked with the modern valuation of control. Values are there, at the outset, in
biotechnological research: values do not determine what are the possibilities open to genetic engineering,
but they do account for the overwhelming emphasis on exploring systematically these kinds of
possibilities. It is not sufficient, therefore, to limit the ethical appraisal of scientific research only to its
applications; it must also address the strategic priorities of scientific research. Biotechnology is, from the
outset, linked with the modern valuation of control (and consequently today with the values of the
market-oriented global economy).60 Within this moral vision, agribusiness is generally prepared to
consider seriously ethical questions especially those connected with risks to health and environment. But,
for critics, the matter of contention may be holding the modern valuation of control itself, and its
legitimating the obliteration of alternative forms of agriculture.
Both biotechnology and agroecology provide scientific knowledge — knowledge that,
respectively, informs different projects linked with different moral visions, among which there are vast
inequalities of power. My second conclusion — generalizing the first — is that ethical discourse should
not abstract from the moral visions that lie behind it and that may prevent serious engagement with the
issues; and that the legitimating presuppositions of moral visions should be submitted to empirical inquiry
to the fullest extent possible. The moral vision, that proposes the universal value of transgenics, maintains
that they contribute to meeting the world's food needs and to serving human well-being generally. But the
institutions that produce them have a major role in socio-economic structures within which vast numbers
of people are not fed, although enough food is produced globally so that there is enough food currently
available to feed everyone. And the expansion of the use of transgenics can be expected to drive more
small farmers from their lands, and thus to exacerbate problems of hunger and social dislocation. Of
course, if Premise 6 is true, there may be no possibilities outside of these institutions — then the focus
would have to turn seriously to prioritize the question of distribution. Thus, the authenticity of
maintaining this moral vision requires investigation of this premise, and thus (at least temporarily)
granting space for development of agroecology. Self-interest may lead one (or a corporation or a
government) to ignore this, but it remains a condition of authenticity — even more so, since this moral
17
vision emphasizes the rationality of acting in accordance with the best results of properly conducted
scientific inquiry.
The moral vision that endorses agroecology should be held to similar standards. The value of
solidarity with popular movements of poor people, or affirming the values of popular participation, does
not remove the necessity for empirical scrutiny of the possibilities of agroecological production. Certainly
not enough is known today to maintain with confidence that transgenics will not be necessary, so that
empirical investigation of the risks of transgenics remains important. But, as already pointed out, the
significance of risks is less or greater depending on whether there are viable alternative forms of
agriculture. Agroecology shows great promise. Exploring that promise should be a high priority, but it
cannot be explored without the development of rural movements committed to the values like those of
popular participation, and supporting those already in existence. My third conclusion is that putting
resources into supporting rural movements that are committed to popular participation is required, not
only for attending to the needs of the rural poor now, but also in order to test empirically Premise 6, and
thus to become placed to make more decisive ethical appraisals of transgenics-intensive agriculture.
Meanwhile, it is ethically legitimate to proceed with research and development of transgenics,
subject to careful, wide-ranging and theoretically well-informed studies of risks, and to introduce the
practical use of transgenics step by step — after adequate risk assessment has been conducted, and subject
to careful ongoing monitoring; and recognizing that adequate risk-assessment needs to take into account
important differences in the environments where transgenics may be used. Agribusiness companies,
however, may have no interest in the small- scale introduction of transgenics. Even so, now, large-scale
transgenics-intensive agriculture cannot be ethically legitimated as a "global" policy before Premise 6 is
thoroughly empirically tested — and that can be done only if non-market-driven modes of production,
like those of agroecology, gain the opportunity to be developed more fully. Unless this is recognized, the
prospects of strengthening democracy in many of the world's impoverished countries will remain remote.
18
Acknowledgements: This paper was presented at a panel (with Raymond Spier, Rachelle Hollander and
Paul Thompson), “Ethics and values in agricultural biotechnology” at the Eleventh Annual meeting of the
Association for Practical and Professional Ethics, Cincinnati, March 1, 2002. Earlier versions were
presented at the International Ethics and politics Seminar, organized by Serviço Social do Comércio, São
Paulo, October 17, 2001 and at a seminar (with Jean-Pierre Berlan and Marcos Barbosa de Oliveira),
“Tecno-ciência, ecologia e capitalismo” at the World Social Forum, Porto Alegre, February 3, 2002. It is
based on work partly supported by NSF (SES-9905945) and by a Small Grant from the NSF/American
Philosophical Association program, "Philosophical Explorations of Science, Technology and Diversity."
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Footnote
(a)
I have argued in detail in Is Science Value Free that in "modern science" research has been conducted
virtually exclusively under materialist strategies because not only has it been remarkably fruitful but also
because there are mutually reinforcing relations between this research and the modern valuation of
control. According to my analysis, materialist strategies are just one of (in principle) many strategies
(agroecological strategies, see below, are another) that may be adopted in scientific research. The key
roles of a strategy are to constrain the kinds of theories that may be entertained — and thus to specify the
kinds of possibilities that may be explored in the course of the inquiry — and to select the kinds of
empirical data that acceptable theories should fit. Without adopting a strategy we cannot address
coherently and systematically: what questions to pose, what puzzles to resolve, what classes of
possibilities to attempt to identify, what kinds of explanations to explore, what phenomena to observe,
measure and experiment upon, what procedures to use?
22