CONFERENCE AGENDA
Disclaimer: “Athena” Crisis Management International Conferences are
open fora for exchange of knowledge and ideas in the area of Crisis
Management amongst experts from all over the world. Opinions expressed
during the Conference by lecturers or participants do not reflect official
position of the organizing country.
Wednesday 2 July 2008
● Conference Opening by the Greek Minister of National Defence, Mr EvagelosVassilios Meimarakis
● Welcome by the Hellenic National Defence General Staff Commander in Chief,
General Dimitrios Grapsas
 Key-Note Speaker: Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. Professor of International
Security Studies, Tufts University, President of the Institute for Foreign Policy
Analysis.
“Crisis Management. Looking back and looking ahead”.

Q&A period

Morning Session: “National Perspectives”
● “Athens Multinational Sealift Coordination Centre (AMSCC)”
LtCdr Ioannis Stamatogiannis, Head of NATO and EU issues Section AMSCC
● NATO Maritime Interdictions Operational Training Centre
(NMIOTC)”
Cpt. (N) Peppas Dimitrios, NMIOTC Director of Education and Training
● “Defendory defence exhibitions: their Contribution to National
Defence and Security”
Mrs Dimitropoulou Tina, President of Defendory
● “French Presidency of the EU in relation with the management of
crisis”
Brig Gen (AF) Laurent Jean-Marc, Deputy Responsible for Crisis Management,
Non-Proliferation and International Partnerships, Delegation aux Affaires
Strategiques (DAS)
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● “The Austrian Contribution to EUFOR TCHAD/RCA –Tentative
lessons in the Light of Six Month Participation”
Lt Col. Manfred Tascher – Lt Col. Lattacher Johann, Ministry of Defence,
Austria
● “The Complexities of Peace Operations today, Case Afganistan”
Mr Starcevic Ivan, Minister Plenipotentiary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Croatia
●“Security in the Black Sea region. Bulgaria’s perspective”
Col. Roumen Ivanov Kondev, Ministry of Defence, Bulgaria

Afternoon Session “The Role of Media in Crisis Management”
Moderator: Mr Livadas Panayiotis, Secretary General of Information
● “International Crises – International Politics and new
Communication Technology (the dialectic between the domestic and
the global)”
Dr Giallouridis Christodoulos, Professor of International Politics, Panteion
University - Member of the Scientific Board of Defence Analysis Institute
(I.A.A.)
● “Socio-political crisis as a crucial criterion for the relationship
between power and public opinion: a socio-psychological dimension
- theoretical approach”
Dr Papastamou Stamos, Professor of Experimental Social Psychology,
Panteion University
● “Socio-political crisis as a crucial criterion for the relationship
between power and public opinion: a socio-psychological dimension
- lessons learned”
Dr Prodromitis Gerasimos, Assistant Professor of Experimental Social
Psychology, Panteion University
● “Electronic Media in Crisis Management”
Mr Panagopoulos Christos, Chairman of the Board – Managing Director of
ERT
● “Foreign Policy and Media in Crisis Management”
Mr Koumoutsakos Georgios, 1st Councellor, Spokesman of the Hellenic
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Thursday 3 July 2008

Morning Session “Prospects and Challenges in the South East Europe
and the wider area”

Session A: “The Balkans ”
Moderator: Dr Arvanitopoulos Konstantinos, Associate Professor of International
Relations, Panteion University – Director General of Konstantinos Karamanlis
Institute for Democracy
● “Russia and Energy Security in Europe”
Mr Savva Michael Ivanovitch, Minister- Counsellor, Russian Embassy in
Greece
● “The fight for Serbia: is Europe the only way?”
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Dr Keridis Dimitris, Associate Professor of International Relations, University
of Macedonia
● “Russia’s re-engagement in the Balkans: Genuine or tactical?”
Dr Fillis Konstantinos, Head of Center for Russia and Eurasia (Institute for
International Relations) - Senior Associate Member (SAM) St Antony’s
College, Oxford University.
● “The Euro-Atlantic Prospects of the Western Balkans”
Dr Tziampiris Aristotelis, Assistant Professor of International Relations,
University of Piraeus, Member of the Scientific Board of Defence Analysis
Institute (I.A.A.)
 Q&A period

Session B “The Middle East”
Moderator: Dr Mazis Ioannis, Professor of Economic Geography/Geopolitics,
Ionian University, President of the Scientific Board of Defence Analysis
Institute (I.A.A.)
●“The Middle East, the Eastern Mediterranean: mutual implications,
regional super powers, dangerous instabilities”
Dr Nachmani Amikam, Associate Professor of Political Studies, Bar-Ilan
University
● “The changing geo-strategic environment in the Middle East and
World Politics”
Dr Koutsis Alexandros, Associate Professor on Middle East Politics, Panteion
University
● “Cyprus and the changing security environment of the Near East”
Dr Iakovou Christos, Research Director of Cyprus Research Center
(ΚΥ.ΚΕ.Μ.)
● “Global Terrorism and South-Eastern Mediterranean Intelligence
Cooperation”
Dr Nomikos Ioannis, Director of Research Institute of European and
American Studies (R.I.E.A.S)
 Q&A period
Friday 4 July 2008
 Morning Session “International Organizations and Crisis Management”
Moderator: Mr Andreas Kintis, Expert Counsellor, Hellenic Ministry of Foreign
Affairs
● “Crisis Management and Lessons learned from Afghanistan”
Lt Gen. Karl W. Eikenberry, Deputy Chairman of the NATO Military
Committee
● “Military Diplomacy in the 21rst Century, multiple future threats
and crises”
Lt Gen. James Soligan, Deputy Chief of Staff/SACT
● “Civil Emerging Planning in the context of Comprehensive
Approach”
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Major Gen. Hatzidakis Antonis, ΙΜΜ ΝΑΤΟ
● “NATO Perspectives on Crisis Management Exercising (Planning,
Conduct and Evaluation)”
Mr Ilay Ferrier, Head of Crisis Exercising and Management Systems,
Planning Directorate Operations Division of International Staff
●“EU Perspectives on Crisis Management Exercising (Planning,
Conduct and Evaluation)”
Mrs Vraila Marina, Head of Exercises Sector, Operation and Exercises Unit
– Defence Issues, EU Council General Secretariat

Q&A period
● “The OSCE’s Role in relations to Early Warning, Conflict
Prevention, Crisis Management and Post Conflict Rehabilitation”
Mr Pietrusiewicz Jaroslaw, Deputy Director for Operations Service of the
OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC)
● “ESDP-A real added value?”
Mrs Gramata Sofia, 1st Councellor, Head of Department for ESDP, Hellenic
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
● “Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: a Challenge for
Transatlantic Security”
Dr Dokos Thanos, Director General ELIAMEP
● “Writing Methodology of Geopolitical Analysis- structure,
concepts and terms”
Dr Mazis Ioannis, Professor of Economic Geography/Geopolitics, Ionian
University, President of the Scientific Board of Defence Analysis Institute
(I.A.A.)

Afternoon Session “Response to Disasters”
Moderator: Dr Tsapanos
University of Thessaloniki
Theodoros,
Professor
of
Seismology,
Aristotle
● “Emergency Planning – The role of the State”
Mr Mouzas Margaritis, Secretary General for Civil Protection
● “Contingency Plans and Crisis Management in case of a major
disaster or accident – International Cooperation”
Police Major Tsounakis Georgios, Hellenic Police –Crisis Management
Division
● “CBRN Crisis Management in urban environment”
Col (Dr) Galatas Ioannis, MD, MC (Army), Head of Department of
Asymmetric threats Joined Military Intelligence Directorate – HNDGS
● “The Hellenic Center of Health Operations and Crisis
Management”
Mr Spirou, Deputy Director of the Hellenic Center of Health Operations

Conclusions
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Conference opening by the Greek Minister of National Defense, Mr
Evangelos-Vassilios Meimarakis
Thank you very much. Ladies and Gentlemen, it is a great pleasure and
honor for me to welcome you to the Crisis Management International
Conference “Athena 2008”, which has become an institution.
With such initiatives, as today's conference, our country seeks to
promote information and the exchange of opinions, substantially
contributing to the necessary endeavor of creating successful prevention,
timely and proper crisis management in the complex current and rapidly
evolving international environment.
The new trends and challenges in the international environment impose a
more and more complex and interdependent crisis management system.
The complexity of the crises dictates the involvement of a wide range of
services, political and military, both on an international and a national
level, each of which develops specialized capabilities and manages
specific competencies in the framework of a very wide operation. This
multi-dimensional approach, or in other words, the comprehensive
approach requires coordination, cooperation at a very high level of
communication by the involved parties in order for it to function as
effectively as possible.
To the new challenges, on a geopolitical and geo-strategic level,
asymmetric threats, terrorism, which endanger the efforts of the global
community for peace, the Greek government and more specifically, the
Ministry of National Defense, respond with continuous efforts to prevent
conflicts,
reduce
tensions
and
to
promote
mutual
trust
and
understanding.
We sincerely seek to establish an environment of trust, mutual
understanding
and
cooperation
between
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countries
and
peoples,
especially in our wider area, our region aiming at their progress and
prosperity.
Therefore, with a series of initiatives and activities in the military and
technical sector, but also in sectors like responding to emergency
situations, we are creating a regional security system which we enhance
daily and in which we hope Greece will play a substantial role.
Ladies and Gentlemen, it is my pleasure to declare the opening of the
Crisis Management International Conference “Athena ‘08”. I wish that its
works will bear fruit and I am sure that during these works there will be an
extensive
exchange
of
opinions
concerning
crisis
management
mechanisms and the conclusions from the conduct of operations and
exercises on an international level will be evaluated.
The participation of military and political representatives of so many
countries and international organizations thus proves the interest of the
international community to study and deal with the challenges of our time.
I am certain that from this conference will derive fruitful conclusions.
I would like to welcome you once more and thank all participants for
honoring us with their presence and wish you an enjoyable stay in our
hospitable Greece.
Thank you very much.
Back to agenda
6
Welcome by the Hellenic National Defense General Staff
Commander in Chief, General Dimitrios Grapsas
Dear Minister, esteemed guests, Ladies and Gentlemen,
It is a great pleasure for me to welcome you to the Crisis Management
International Conference Athena 2008. I am glad that our country is today
hosting
representatives
from
over
forty
countries,
international
organizations and other bodies, as well as distinguished Greeks from the
political, diplomatic and military domains.
This conference, as you know, is organized by the National Defense
General Staff under the auspices of the Ministry of National Defense with
an aim to promote stability, security and good relations between states,
as well as the exchange of opinions and knowledge in the sensitive
sector of crisis management.
Today, we live in a world of interactions between states and we often
witness dozens of conflicts, civil wars and other extreme situations
created by national, financial, social and environmental reasons causing
instability in the international security environment. Our countries are
called upon to face a series of threats, deriving from tensions and
conflicts on a local, regional and global level as well as from the threat
deriving from international terrorism. These threats affect the national
security of our states, the stability, the prosperity of our citizens and the
protection of the environment.
In order to manage such threats it is necessary that there should be close
cooperation and effective efforts, especially through international
organizations, to maintain global stability, since it is the only safe path for
the protection of both our cultural heritage and our common values.
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The nature of the operations for the management of international crises
has changed in the last decade, not necessarily due to the increase of
their frequency, but mostly due to the complexity and the interaction of
states when dealing with them. Under these circumstances, no state
seems to be powerful enough to guarantee on its own international
security and development. However, no state is so unstable that it cannot
contribute to this sector.
Crisis management is more of an art than a science and it especially
depends on the knowledge as well as the qualitative value of the people
in charge. The pre-defined procedures of crisis management do not
necessarily constitute a solution, but they definitely lead those
participating in the crisis management to make the fewest possible
mistakes and omissions and to make the best possible decisions.
I believe that there are no specific recipes for crisis management. Each
crisis is unique and depends on the choices of the decision-makers and
those who are responsible for managing the crisis. We could say that it is
a composite, adaptive system, which consists of governmental and nongovernmental actors, organizational structures and procedures based on
high-tech systems and mainly on up-to-date and accurate information.
Multi-national organizations like the UN, NATO, the EU, but also states
themselves develop new ways and methods to effectively prevent crises.
The dominant issue of today’s complex crisis management environment
is the cooperation amongst ourselves in order to create a special,
understandable and realizable system, which will be able to function
rapidly, collectively and effectively. Greece, thanks to its geo-strategic
position, plays an important role and contributes greatly to the multidimensional issue of crises prevention. It participates actively in a series
of initiatives and collaborations betweens states with an aim to prevent
crises besides being present in peace support operations. The
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experience acquired from the participation of the Greek forces in the safe
conduct of the Athens Olympic Games, makes us confident that we are
able to deal with various possible crises and contribute in this sector to
the international community.
Finally, I would like to thank you again for being here with us today and I
wish you luck in your discussions.
Thank you.
Back to agenda
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10
Crisis Management: Looking Back and Looking Ahead
By
Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.
Presented at
The Crisis Management Conference: Athena 2008
Organized by
The Hellenic Ministry of National Defence
July 2, 2008
Crises occur in all dimensions of human existence: between individuals, groups large
and small, and, of course, nations. We also have crises between human beings and
nature in the form of tornados, as well as forest fires such as those that took place in
Greece in 2007. Crises may come about as a result of natural disasters such as floods,
hurricanes, earthquakes, and tsunamis.
To discuss the etymological origin of the word crisis, the term in English has Greek
origins. English language dictionary definitions of crisis offer several important
insights: Medically, a crisis is said to be the turning point for better or worse in the case
of a patient. The patient either takes a turn for the worse or begins to recover after
perhaps coming close to death. A crisis is an unstable or crucial time or state of affairs
whose outcome will make a decisive difference for better or worse. A crisis is an
emotionally significant event in a person’s life – such as a psychological crisis. There is
the Chinese Mandarin character for crisis, which includes danger and opportunity. This
idea is especially useful because it conveys the fact that we may create opportunities
out of a situation that threatens us. Think, for example, of the economic crisis that faced
Europe just after World War II. Out of this crisis came the Marshall Plan, NATO, and
the European Union and unprecedented peace and prosperity in Europe. Danger gave
way to opportunity. Effective crisis management consists of the ability to snatch victory
from the jaws of defeat – to be able to look ahead with strategies and policy choices
that enable us not only to surmount present threats and dangers, but also to build a
better future.
11
The definition of crisis put forward so far encompasses international relations and
domestic affairs, medicine and economics, crises between humans and efforts to cope
with the forces of nature. Therefore, the concept of crisis cuts across many fields,
academic disciplines, and human activities.
Nevertheless, the focus here is the political, and within the political, the international
crisis, although other types of crises are discussed below. Internationally, as the more
general definition suggests, the term crisis also refers to a turning point – between
peace and war. Some analysts have suggested that a crisis is a condition of neither
peace nor war, but containing the elements of both and having the potential for
transformation from peace to war. The crisis can escalate to war or it can be resolved or
defused and thus the crisis can be de-escalated to a modus vivendi or even a lasting
peace between former adversaries.
Because a crisis is a threat to vital or core interests or values, the survival of the person
or the group, the corporation or the nation is likely to be at stake. A crisis may arise
from a situation of intensifying tensions or conflict that leads one party to take action
against another party. Escalating tensions may eventually transform a political
relationship from one of peace to one of war. There are also crises in which one side
suddenly takes action to which the other must respond or confront defeat. We faced this
situation when North Korea invaded South Korea in June 1950 or when the Soviet
Union cut off the land access routes to West Berlin in 1948.
In this kind of crisis there is likely to be the element of surprise. Surprise may be either
“strategic” or “tactical”. We may be surprised in strategic terms about the event itself or
tactically, about when or where it will occur. Surprise comes about when the initiator of
the crisis conceals its planned action. There are many examples of such crisis surprise –
the 9/11 attack in 2001, the Pearl Harbor attack in 1941, the Gulf War in 1991 when
Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, and the North Korean attack against South Korea in
1950. Surprise gives the initiator a major short-term advantage if the victim is caught
off guard. Surprise characterizes many other types of crises as well. We are aware of
the possibility of hurricanes, earthquakes, and tsunamis. They are more prevalent
during some times of the year than others. However, the actual event may come very
suddenly or in the case of hurricanes we may have a warning time of even a few days,
although the storm may change course several times before releasing its devastation, as
12
we saw in Hurricane Katrina that devastated the city of New Orleans in early
September 2005. However, as we know, storms may also come with little or no
warning. Many thousands of people had no prior warning before the December 2004
tsunami struck in South Asia.
In addition to surprise, crises may be the result of a failure of imagination – our
inability to connect the dots properly. What is unlikely is therefore not the focus of our
preparatory efforts. The unfamiliar becomes the improbable. We discard bits of
information that would have enabled us to prepare for the crisis if only we had been
able to think “outside the box.” We lose or overlook clues that would have given us
advance warning. Even worse, we may deceive ourselves into believing that, for
example, because Arab states do not usually attack other Arab states, Saddam Hussein
would not attack Iraq or that Islamic fanatics would not commit suicide by flying
airplanes into buildings on 9/11 because previous hijackers had goals that did not
include the sacrifice of their own lives and the lives of the passengers. Therefore,
surprise and self deception are perhaps two sides of the same coin. Psychologists
remind us that we bring to decision-making the mindsets that draw on familiar patterns
and discard that which is discordant. We seek cognitive balance and shy away from
cognitive dissonance. Decision-making groups are prone to exclude information that
contradicts or does not fit familiar patterns and to engage in “groupthink “leading to
conformity and the failure to look at new evidence. Members of a decision-making unit
may reinforce rather than question each other’s assumptions, analyses, and
recommended courses of action that in retrospect may turn out to have been fatally
flawed.
A crisis is what political scientists have called a non-routine event – one of
extraordinary importance. Most of the decisions that we make as individuals or groups
are routine – what time to have lunch or when to go shopping or what kinds of military
equipment to procure or when to hold a major conference. We can generally take the
time needed to make such decisions. In sharp contrast, crises do not afford us this
luxury. By their very nature as threats to vital interests or core values, we must take
action sooner rather than later. Otherwise, we may not survive the crisis. Because of the
fact that crises pose threats to core interests or values, they invariably bring into play
the top decision makers – the President of the United States, the Prime Minister of
Greece, the defense minister, the foreign minister, the senior military leadership. In the
13
case of a business corporation it is invariably the top leadership. In a medical crisis, we
seek the leading medical specialists and treatments and wherever possible bring them
together to help us determine the best course of action out of the medical crisis.
The term crisis management had its origins in the Cold War, even though in fact we
have been dealing with crises throughout history. Our Cold War goal was to manage
crises with the Soviet Union so that they did not escalate to nuclear war. Crisis
management became both the means and the goal because all such crises had the
potential to get out of control, which of course we wanted to avoid because nuclear war
could have ended civilization as we know it. We had several defining Cold War crises,
none of which was more threatening than the Cuban Missile Crisis. Both sides had
nuclear weapons on alert that could have been used had the crisis escalated to a higher
level.
However, the term crisis management is not fully adequate to describe crisis decisionmaking. We need to draw the important distinction between crisis leadership and crisis
management. Crisis leaders decide what is to be done. Managers decide how it is to be
done. Crisis leaders set the course of action to be followed, operating at the strategic
level. Crisis managers have the operational and tactical-level tasks of making sure that
what has been decided at the highest level actually gets done. Of course, the distinction
between crisis leadership and crisis management can be blurred. The greatest and best
leaders may also be good managers. Crisis managers must also often take leadership
roles because they may have to take quick and bold action without the luxury of precise
instructions from their leaders. Crisis leadership is deciding what is to be done and
making sure that everyone down the chain of command is working from the same sheet
of music. Otherwise, we would have a decision-making process akin to a fine academic
seminar that results in excellent discussion, debate, and policy options – but no more –
if the results in the form of decisions are not communicated to the field where their
impact is to be felt as they are acted upon. Effective crisis management begins with a
process that produces the best decisions and then sees that they are followed down the
chain of command.
Crisis management is stressful because of the nature of crises as major threats to
nations, groups, or individuals – threats to the body politic or the human body – to the
state or the corporation. Crisis leaders and managers may face periods of fatigue and
14
exhaustion because they work under deadlines and the risks and dire consequences of
failure. Because the time available for decisive action may be short, they may have to
act with inadequate information. As time lapses after the event, we know more and
more about it. For example, there is probably no natural disaster or other crisis in which
initial estimates of casualties were not revised as we learned more about it. At the time
of 9/11 the initial reaction was that an aircraft had mistakenly flown into the World
Trade Center building. This is well described in the 9/11 Commission Report, which
makes fascinating reading on many of the issues of crisis management.
Just as intelligence indicators in advance of a crisis may be lacking or, if they even
exist, may be discarded or ignored, we are likely to have inadequate information
immediately after the crisis hits us. We can only react with what we know, and what we
know many not be sufficient but it is all that we have. This is an important point,
because we often look back on crises with the benefit of hindsight as well as
information and insights that were lacking at the time of the crisis.
Crisis management requires the ability to draw on a large number of capabilities
depending on the type of crisis. Crisis management brings into play a broad range of
people, organizations, capabilities, and perspectives that otherwise may be seen as
separate and unconnected with each other.
These capabilities may include medical personnel, military forces, firefighters, police,
airport security teams, and other resources for the protection of vital infrastructure,
among many others. Crisis management capabilities may consist of military forces
(armies, navies, air forces, and specialized units), diplomacy and diplomats, and
intelligence collection and analysis. The capabilities for response to a terrorist incident
are often the same ones that are needed for a natural disaster: transport for the
evacuation of casualties, as well as food, water, medical supplies, and warning systems
designed to alert people to get out of harm’s way. Therefore, our ability to cope with a
natural disaster may be indicative of our ability to respond effectively to a manmade
crisis such as a weapons-of-mass-destruction attack. Such response capabilities are
what we call consequence management.
Crises have certain timeless characteristics that can be discussed wherever or whenever
they occur. Crises are messy, unstructured affairs in which our ability to manage will
15
never be perfect because crisis leaders and crisis managers usually lack intelligence
information and, in the case of political crises, we face an enemy who usually seek to
deceive or confuse us. Therefore, to predict when, where, or how a crisis will erupt
remains more an art form than a science. We can best prepare for crises by having a
range of capabilities that will be needed in almost any crisis. This has been called
capabilities-based planning. We can also develop information and warning systems. We
can also engage in planning that brings together departments, offices, personnel,
agencies, and decision makers for simulations. Such exercises can be invaluable
planning tools. Actual plans or scenarios themselves may be useless when the event
occurs because seldom does the scenario fully resemble the real event. Nevertheless,
planning as a process is essential. Those who will have to act together in a future crisis
can gain valuable experience and expertise by crisis exercises that help them to get to
know and work effectively with their counterparts in other departments and agencies
and their opposite number in other countries.
As we look back, crises have been a part of the personal, domestic, and international
landscape from time immemorial, from the ancient world to the twenty-first century.
Thucydides described a crisis between Athens and Sparta that resulted in the
Peloponnesian War (431-404 BC). With the end of the Cold War we have faced a
variety of crises, for example, in Southeastern Europe and elsewhere in the 1990s and
into the first decade of this century. Most of the 1990s crises posed threats to our
values, leading us to seek international participation in peacekeeping, peace
enforcement, and other international interventions designed to end, prevent, or deescalate ethno-religious and other conflicts. We were unprepared to allow the continued
slaughter of civilians after we saw on our television screens these grisly events in
Bosnia and elsewhere. Here is an example of the power of the media shaping crisis
management.
With 9/11 and the twenty-first century we have entered another phase of crisis
management in which we find increased importance for non-state actors, including
terrorists who may gain access to weapons of mass destruction – the most dangerous
people in possession of the world’s most dangerous weapons. In anticipation, we have
made extensive preparations for consequence management – coping with the effects of
a terrorist incident, in which dealing with the consequences is itself crisis management.
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Looking ahead, we have a crisis landscape that contains unprecedented numbers of
actors in possession of unprecedented capabilities for creating crises. This includes
cyber attacks that could create disruptions in our vital infrastructure, producing cybercrises in the years ahead. We have already witnessed Russian efforts to engage in cyber
attacks against the advanced information infrastructure of neighboring Estonia and
Lithuania. There also remain numerous state-to-state crisis flashpoints, especially in
East Asia and the Middle East. Terrorist crises could come about in our cities as we
have seen in New York as well as Madrid and London in recent years. We have a
complex global crisis map. In some regions there remains not only great potential for
state-to-state crises, but also other types of crises between subnational and transnational
groups and terrorist organizations, perhaps with nuclear, biological, or chemical
weapons.
Finally, as we look ahead, it is appropriate to consider other key focal points for crisis
management:
● First – on the role of the media in crisis management, it is indispensable that as
part of crisis management we have a media strategy in an era of the 24-hour
news cycle and the Internet. The public must be kept informed, often on an
hourly basis, and by the leadership itself whenever possible. People want to be
reassured that those in charge know what they are doing and are prepared to
communicate information to a public that is hooked in as never before, thanks to
twenty-first-century communications. The media strategy must convey the
competence of crisis leaders and managers in addressing the crisis. Messages
must be consistent. Somehow we must tread the narrow line between providing
accurate, up-to-date information while not spreading alarm that leads to panic.
Without a media strategy, crisis management will fail.
● Second – the crisis map extends across the Balkans and the Middle East. We
should highlight not only lessons learned from the 1990s experience, but also
the extent to which Russia, as a state returning to the world stage, will reengage
in and near the region and what this may mean for future crises. Key questions
come to mind. For example, could we have altered the course of events had the
United States and its NATO allies, as well as the broader international
community, been prepared to intervene earlier and more forcefully in
17
Southeastern Europe in the 1990s? What do we need to do in the years ahead to
minimize the prospect for renewed crises in this volatile region?
● Third – an understanding of the Middle East will be incomplete without
reference to the potential for crisis from the development and deployment of an
Iranian nuclear capability that international efforts have not been able so far to
halt. There exists the ominous potential for an escalating crisis resulting in a
military strike against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. Moreover, the rearming of
Hamas and Hezbollah by Iran could produce another crisis with Israel. All of
the rockets used by Hezbollah against Israel in 2006 have been replaced with
more advanced and more numerous capabilities. In other words, there have been
both quantitative and qualitative improvements in such weapons. To this crisis
map should be added the vast Asia-Pacific area, including the Korean peninsula
and Taiwan-Mainland China, as well as India-Pakistan. The potential for
terrorist acquisition not only of weapons of mass destruction, but also seizing
power in a failed state such as happened in Afghanistan that becomes a base for
international terrorist operations, adds yet another troubling dimension to our
twenty-first-century crisis map. Therefore, no region of the world is out of
bounds for twenty-first-century crises.
International organizations have an important place in crisis management. Such
potential roles should be neither denigrated nor exaggerated. International organizations
can help to identify early warning indicators of impending crises. The International
Atomic Energy Agency has provided detailed information about Iran’s nuclear
program. International organizations can also play a key role in the de-escalatory phase
of a crisis by providing good offices and mediation but usually only if both sides seek
their help. Of course, international organizations such as the United Nations can and do
engage in planning for the use of international capabilities, including military units, in
humanitarian crises, helping to coordinate or helping to coordinate disaster response
efforts.
Last but not least, while the focus of crisis management is inevitably and invariably on
the government because it has as a basic duty and obligation the protection of its
citizens, the objects of attack nearly always include private sector infrastructure.
Furthermore, civilians outside of government are likely to be at much greater risk than
18
military personnel as we look ahead. Civilian casualties usually far exceed military
personnel losses in the wars of the last century. Civilians are the principal targets or
objects across a broad spectrum of crises as we saw in 9/11 and in the case of natural
disasters. The military invariably represent our first line of defense, along with other
first responders. First responders are likely to include military personnel as well as
civilians from government agencies and the private sector. Therefore, the ability not
only to work with nongovernmental organizations, but also to bring into greater focus
the private sector, including industry, medical personnel, and others, is essential to
twenty-first-century crisis management.
In the final analysis, we live in a crisis setting in which surprise will remain a defining
feature of crises and the only surprise about the future will be the absence of surprise.
Although there is much that we do not (and cannot) know, we can be certain that we
will face a broad spectrum of likely crises for which we will need to maintain core
capabilities that are agile, flexible, and adaptable if we are both to respond to future
crises and help shape the future – to turn danger into opportunity.
Back to agenda
19
Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. is President, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, and
Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of International Security Studies, The Fletcher School,
Tufts University. He has advised key administration officials on military strategy,
defense modernization, the future of the Atlantic Alliance, proliferation and
counterproliferation issues, and arms control policy. He has lectured widely at
government, industry, and academic forums in the United States and overseas. These
include the NATO Defense College, National Defense University, the Marine Corps
University, the Army War College, the Air University, the Naval War College, and the
Armed Forces Staff College. He currently serves on the International Security Advisory
Board (ISAB), U.S. State Department. Dr. Pfaltzgraff teaches courses and seminars and
designs and conducts simulations on crisis management.
Back to agenda
20
Q&A
Moderator:
Professor, thank you very much for your enlightened presentation. It was,
personally speaking, for me a lesson realizing the depth of the analysis
on crisis, crisis management, crisis leadership. I dare say that there are
concepts and ideas that need to be developed, evolved, put in as more
problematic - if you wish – more thinking in our midst. I understand that
there’s a lot of debate regarding crisis management, crisis leadership,
crisis consequences, the involvement of international organizations. I
understand that in a way you realized that role, I think you underlined that
they can indicate early warning indicators if I heard exactly what you said.
But of course to us, international organizations cooperation and also
mandates by international organizations in allowing us to participate as a
country to peace-keeping operations and crisis management operations
are very useful and pertinent elements in our thinking and decisionmaking.
I might have a question myself which, if I may refer to, is the ability
according to your concept, to your thinking of how crisis management,
crisis leadership and crisis consequences would be more effective and
helpful to the transatlantic link, because you do know that this term
sometimes or in the past has suffered some misunderstandings, some
debates on both sides of the Atlantic. So, if you think you could elaborate
on the essence and the role of the transatlantic link relating to crisis
management.
Dr Robert L. Pfaltzgraff:
I would be very happy to elaborate on that issue. Let me say that the idea
of crisis management and the transatlantic link go back to the very
foundation of the Transatlantic Alliance in the period almost 60 years
ago. And that the Transatlantic Alliance of course was founded in
21
response to a crisis that was unfolding with the deepening tensions
between East and West in the Cold War era, so that the Transatlantic
Alliance became central to our collective crisis management capabilities.
And with the end of the Cold War, the term crisis management not only
remained in NATO, but actually gained new currency.
I can recall going to NATO Headquarters as a scholar and as an analyst
– I was not an official – and going out to Mons, the NATO military
headquarters and hearing the then Supreme Allied Commander, Gen.
Galvin - who later became Dean of the Fletcher School, after he retired –
talking to me and to others about the role that NATO would have in the
1990s in crisis management and I kept thinking, “What was he really
talking about?” And then I started thinking some more about it and I
thought “Well, yes. What we now have in Europe is the eruption - and he
was thinking about this in the future, this was about 1991 and this was
yet to come - we will face, he said, in the 1990s in Southeastern Europe
a growing number of crises that are brought about by the breakup of
Yugoslavia. And we in NATO had better begin to prepare our thinking
about this: how we might work more fully together in this setting.”
So what I’m saying to you is that the Transatlantic relationship was
crucial to crisis management during the Cold War and it became very
important and crucially important to crisis management as we saw it in
the 1990s which had to do more, in the 1990s, with the ethno-religious
wars or the crises that led to wars, the turning point between peace and
war, how you prevent that, how you cope with it, how you de-escalate it,
what type of capabilities you need and you will see all of this laid out for
us as we think about the 1990s.
And then there’s a third period through which NATO has lived; and that is
now post 9/11. And it is the world from 2001 to – we’ll put a question
mark after it because it’s 2008, but we don't know what 2009 holds or the
rest of 2008 for that matter. And we know from this, that NATO has
22
become an extremely important part of the international landscape with
regard to this era. I could speak for example about the NATO military
operation in Afghanistan, which is an example of NATO’s adaptation to a
new crisis environment.
But there are many other examples. The only example of the invocation
of article 5 of the North-Atlantic Treaty that we have so far came
immediately after 9/11 and we had NATO aircraft in the form of early
warning aircraft patrolling the skies over the USA in that period. No one in
his or her right mind would have concluded that it would be on behalf of
the US, not Europe, that article 5 of the North-Atlantic Treaty would be
invoked. If any of us had stood up here 10 years ago and said that you
would have thought that we were taking leave of our senses to make
such a preposterous statement. Remember the only surprise about the
future will be the absence of surprise, I said a few moments ago; there's
an example - the unforeseen.
Now, there’s another part to be answered to this question. And it is
broader than NATO, but it is embedded in the Transatlantic relationship;
and that is the sharing of information and intelligence. This has
proceeded as many of you in this room may know better than I do
because I’m simply an outside observer; I’m not part of the decisionmaking process of my country and certainly not of NATO. But I do know
that there is unprecedented information-sharing on terrorism since 9/11
across the Atlantic. And that there was assistance during the Olympics
that Greece received from NATO on terrorist possibilities that you wanted
to make sure we prevented here in Athens in 2004.
I could go on and on with examples of this and that we have had an
amazing increase in cooperation across the Atlantic in intelligencesharing, intelligence interaction, because of the shared threats that we
face in this new security environment.
23
Now, another point - and then I will stop because I don’t want to give
another lecture here on this particular question – the issue of
humanitarian operations. This is an extremely important one, because a
large number of the problems that we face are international, have
international ramifications and we need international assistance. If we
have a tsunami or we have a major natural disaster of one kind or
another and what this requires then is the coordination that is provided by
the capabilities that NATO has. After all, NATO, over the years has
developed exercises, planning capabilities and infrastructure.
These are the kind of things that are needed in a capabilities-based
analysis. And I’m arguing here that if we don’t know what the threat will
be precisely, we do know that there will be a threat; and we know from
the experiences that we have had with similar threats in the past that
there are core capabilities I’m really repeating what I’ve said. And in
those core capabilities, the Alliance structure and infrastructure is
essential.
So for all of these reasons in these three periods that I’ve outlined for
you, it seems to me that the Alliance and the Transatlantic relationship
more broadly are essential. So I thank you for that question.
Major Gen. Hatzidakis, NATO Headquarters:
First of all, thank you very much for your very clear presentation. I have a
small remark and a question. With your presentation you gave us, let’s
say, the general concept of what is a crisis, you indicated us how to face
situations in a crisis and you gave some other examples of where the
crises are taking place for the moment. So, you talked about surprise, the
level of decision-making, capabilities-based planning, and so on. As you
know, at NATO Headquarters now we are planning on the so-called
comprehensive approach with special emphasis on the issue of effectsbased approach and operations. So the effects leads to the question,
“How do we go out of a crisis?” What is the exit strategy?” From your
24
lecture – maybe I misunderstood – but I didn’t hear a lot about, let’s say,
how do we go out of a crisis? What is the end state? How do we describe
this? Because we are becoming involved in a lot of crises but then we
realize that we cannot get out of them. I would appreciate some comment
on that.
Dr Pfaltgraff:
Yes, I did not talk about exit strategies - or to put it into simple language –
when to declare victory and go home. And it is very easy to state this in
theory, but much less easy to follow it in practice. There are several
points I would make however on this question. We could say that we end
the participation in a crisis when the objective has been achieved for
which we entered the crisis. And that may not give us a very good
understanding of what we need to have in the crisis to assure that we
achieve the objective.
But what we do need to have – it seems to me - are a set of criteria that
allow us to check off when we have achieved what we want to achieve.
That is to say we need to have a set of criteria which is the beginning of
an exit strategy. We have a reason for going into the crisis; if we are an
international organization for example, if we are NATO or the UN, we
have gone into the crisis because the members of the organization who
are going to be committing capabilities to the crisis have agreed upon a
set of objectives.
So we need first and foremost to have that set of objectives agreed.
Secondly, and this is extremely important, we need to make sure that we
are prepared to commit the capabilities and I underscore that word
“capabilities” that will be required to achieve the objectives upon which
we agree. And that if we do not commit those capabilities and are not
prepared to commit those capabilities there should be a very big question
mark about whether we are indeed going to go into the crisis. That is an
25
essential part of the exit strategy as well; criteria and capabilities. We
must have those two dimensions.
I would argue though, that the problem that also arises here is what we in
the US - and I don’t know if you use that word in NATO military circles as
well – call mission creep. In other words, you go in for one reason and
other events come up and you change the mission. You go in for
example to distribute humanitarian relief supplies – I’m talking about
Somalia in the US case in the 1992-1993 timeframe – but then you
decide that you must engage in nation-building, to use our terms. You
have a military force and a civilian capability that can do a very good job
of giving out relief supplies but not so good at re-establishing order.
So I think the first part of an exit strategy is to know more fully the
magnitude of the problem that you face when you get in there. And if
anyone has failed to do this – and I don’t like to criticize the US abroad –
but we have often failed to do this. And of course the Iraq experience is
one that leads us to understand that we need to know much more about
the local conditions in developing the exit strategy. It is far easier to get
into a crisis than it is to get out of a crisis. Those points come to mind.
So I would say clear-cut criteria for intervention; clear-cut criteria for
when we believe we have succeeded and can pull back; thirdly
capabilities that are commensurate with the objectives that we have
established; and fourthly a willingness on the part of participating
members in the Alliance, if it is a coalition of the willing in the case of
members of NATO or whatever it could be to sustain those capabilities.
Now, again, that may not be entirely possible because we are inevitably –
and I needn’t lecture this group and especially the Minister of Defense on
this because we know that we live in societies in which voters and public
opinion may change over time and what you have in the way of support
today may change tomorrow, so that it may be difficult for NATO to
26
sustain the support that it needs. But these are the types of issues that I
would address in thinking about the criteria for developing an exit
strategy.
Back to agenda
27
28
Session “The Role of Media in Crisis Management”
Moderator: Mr Livadas Panayiotis, Secretary General of Information
Ladies and Gentlemen, good morning. I would like to start by expressing
my warmest thanks for inviting me to participate in this panel regarding
the role of the Media in Crisis Management. I am sure that this
International Conference that is organized annually since 1996 by the
Hellenic National Defense General Staff will be both productive and
successful.
Ladies and Gentlemen, let me share with you some broader thoughts
about the role of media in crisis management and especially about the
role of the state in such extenuating circumstances.
First of all, we must keep in mind that in the new era of information
society in which we live, the field of communication has extremely
changed. The rapid flow of the ever-growing amount of information that
surround us, the plethora of new technological media and the tendency
for globalization create a rather unfamiliar as compared to the past
political and media environment. Under these circumstances the role of
the mass media is even more pronounced and crucial, while public
authorities and the state in general are called to present a constructive
and powerful communicative performance.
However, despite the fact that these new trends and communication
environments affect the mass media and the state, the two are governed
by inherently different logics. The media are today, in their majority,
private entities seeking to achieve viability in the terms of intense
competition between them. Especially the electronic media choose to
lean towards a narrating reality in a manner that triggers people’s
emotions rather than serve the public opinion’s pure rational judgment.
Although they do conform to the specific values of a society and express
29
the wider cultural demands, it is also true that there is legitimate tendency
to be critical against all forms of authority as they are obliged to be - and I
stress that not to be misunderstood – has evolved into a prevailing trend
that good news is no news.
The rationale of the state is different. Let me share with you some very
brief thoughts regarding the priorities of the state in the management of a
crisis
from
the
communications
perspective.
I
will
identify
epigrammatically three major pylons. Credibility is the most valued asset
and it has to be protected. It is built day-in and day-out in business as
usual circumstances and it must not be undermined under extenuating
circumstances.
Speed is essential. From the first moment after an incident the state must
show to an observing media community and an anxious public opinion
that providing accurate information in a transparent way to the public, is
one of her top priorities. The benefits are twofold. The media will be
convinced that the authorities provide credible solutions to what they
need the most; and that is information, while the state will have
unobstructed channels in order to inform the public. And I must note that
if the media and the journalists are not convinced, they will try to find
information elsewhere and chances are that they will find it in fragmented
and even distorted ways. The dangers for the quality of information that
will reach the public are – I believe- obvious.
By the same token the authorities are obliged to make certain that the
communicational aspects must not interfere with operational needs and
priorities. For example, we try our best to take into consideration the time
constraints of the media, but there should be no doubt that the
operational considerations in order to effectively, efficiently respond to a
crisis will have priority.
30
Coordination and cooperation between the various organizational
institutions which are involved in the management of a crisis is also very
crucial. It is true that all of us try our best to ensure that the organization
that we serve operates in the most efficient way. But perhaps you will
agree with me that problems and most importantly failures occur when
one organization has not comprehended the needs of its surrounding
ones, when each and everyone of us has not realized that our colleagues
of another institution depend on us in very specific ways in order for them
to be efficient and successful and vice versa.
And since no one can readily prepare for a crisis during a crisis, one must
prepare in advance. One must be in constant alertness to identify where
within his field of responsibility a crisis may arise, to also identify with
which other organization he must cooperate in order to successfully
overcome the challenge and regularly exercise so that the authorities as
a whole reach the necessary level of operation readiness. If we are
prepared
operationally,
then
we
can
efficiently
confront
the
communication challenges and most of all the authorities and the states
can speak with one voice and broadcast a unique message.
Back to agenda
31
32
"International
Crises
–
International
Politics
and
new
Communication Technology (the dialectic between the domestic
and the global)”
Dr Giallouridis Christodoulos, Professor of International Politics,
Panteion University - Member of the Scientific Board of Defense
Analysis Institute (I.A.A.)
Mr Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, it is a great pleasure for me to try
to analyze an issue that has to do not only with the overall international
politics, i.e. facts and developments, actions and interactions, peace and
war, conflicts and reconciliations, cooperations all over the world, but also
with the course of humanity itself with regard to the factor of power,
strength, political imposition and the role of society, public opinion,
publicity in an era where everything changes; and everything changes in
an inconceivably rapid way.
Recently, a great communication specialist, Nigred Liuman, wrote that
the image is devastating, i.e. the image of a dead person is tragic while
the image of one thousand dead people is a statistic and he mainly
referred to the contemporary wars, the so-called humanitarian wars.
During the American Independence War we all remember – that is we’ve
all read – that the belligerent British and Americans continued fighting for
four months after the end of the war, that is after a peace agreement had
been signed because at that time communication was realized through
transportation means, the message was sent by carriage and when it
arrived they either stopped fighting or they tried to come to an
understanding about what to do.
150 years later, at the Vietnam War, the American and foreign reporters
sent their dispatches after passing by the various military headquarters
so that the message could be checked and therefore when a message
was sent without being checked or censored it was news.
33
The same happened during the Falklands War, where reporters and their
war correspondents who were on the ships gave their dispatch to the
head of the information service of the flagship, etc, and all this military
system in order for the message, the dispatch to be checked and then
sent to the English newspapers or the world in general.
So, here we have what we, technologists, call the hegemonic model.
Until the development of the new technologies, the decline of the Soviet
Union and the development of the CNN effect – which I will mention later
on – we had a hegemonic syndrome which claimed that the relationship
between politics, society and the public opinion, i.e. the production of
politics, is at this point vertical, which means that politics influence the
media and the media influence the public opinion. Nowadays, this has
been reversed. The media influence the public opinion and the public
opinion influences politics.
I will attempt to present my short analysis in three stages. The first will be
a systemic approach regarding the relationship between politics and the
media; the second is the time – what is happening today with the
transmission of images, that there is no time, time has been obliterated,
the image is sent without any control or censorship by the reporters or at
some extent uncontrolled; and the third is the relationship between this
world divided between CNN and Al-Jazeera, what we call the CNN effect.
The systemic approach says that inside the nation, in the relationship
between politics and the media an interaction relationship is developing
according to which the more the political power is weakened, the more
the media’s power is enhanced; the media do not play political games.
When a party or the party system or politicians are weakened, then the
media are better able to impose their influence. When politics, the
government, the party in power are powerful, then the media follow the
hegemonic syndrome, because this leader, this internal example also
dominates internationally.
34
For example, during the Cold War, where the American critical factor was
powerful in its judgment as an interdisciplinary system, as an
international system, let’s say that the media functioned as a loudspeaker
to the system, i.e. they followed the values and politics system imposed
by the states and mainly the US in the West.
After the Cold War of course we had let’s say the period of great change,
of subversion where we had two - besides all other technological
developments and revolutions – we had the so-called in the ‘90s
humanitarian wars, which were the wars, let’s say, that developed in this
meantime and continue today in this era of fluidity in international politics
at certain moments and of course in the case of Somalia it dominated, it
was imposed and aided by the CNN effect, where the public opinion
followed – in Somalia but also partly in Kosovo and in other interventions
at times without being entirely convincing – the hegemonic example, that
is the leadership of this special world which we call Western system of
values and perceptions referred to by some international relations
experts as the global society and contrary to all other systems.
The 9/11 terrorist acts created exactly that; a syndrome, a very intense
hegemonic syndrome which at that moment reminded us of the Cold War
because the leader, the USA, the state imposed itself on the media which
followed it and created a public opinion which at least for a while followed
as well.
Today, we are facing an extremely crucial period in the course of
international politics precisely due to this big problem that new
technology means and new technologies have obliterated time; there is
no time in the transmission of the news and image, in the transmission of
facts so that politicians may have the time to think. There is time to
handle the crises because the international or national means are not
always functioning; we remember what happened in Imia, for example.
There is no time for them to think at the same time, i.e. to function at the
35
same time or to be entirely guided and that's why there is a problem to
control the developments in relation to the image.
When the image is transmitted from Baghdad or when the image is
transmitted from the Baghdad prison through new technological means
which is to say cell phones and photographing capabilities without any
control, when this image is transmitted, the international public opinion is
influenced i.e. by the media without there being any political control. The
same happened in Guantanamo, where images were transmitted despite
the very strict measures taken by the political authorities.
Meanwhile, we should not forget that the more the political leadership of
a state is weakened, the more the role of the media is enhanced. Lately
the US have been experiencing this phase, as in many other countries of
the world, where the weakening of politicians, the weakening of the
parties in power enhances the media's power which are already
enhanced thanks to the new technologies for the reason that the image
cannot be controlled and sometimes what we call international media are
backed by financial actors who also guide them, etc. This is a scenario
that cannot function at any time, i.e. the reporter who is in Tibet will not
call first to ask whether to send the picture or not and many times the
image is sent the way it is and it is transmitted and creates developments
which were not foreseen or could not be foreseen by the politicians in
charge of crisis management. Because crisis management means to
predict; you cannot deal with any situation if you do not predict several
scenarios.
Therefore, we have a legalizing or de-legalizing function of the media
with regard to the public opinion and that with regard to the global public
opinion which refers to exactly how powerful and how legitimate the state
or the political leadership is, how this can weaken or reduce the media’s
influence which are anyhow swiftly becoming uncontrollable in an
unprecedented way in the history of humanity, they are on a course that
36
we don’t know how much and to what extent will change the political
scene.
Al-Jazeera was created, if you want, to “offset” CNN; it is another
dimension or another world compared to CNN. Al-Jazeera accuses CNN
of serving nationalistic or state interests of the US and the West in
general, it is serving the so-called Western system of values, principles,
culture and politics, a kind of international society and Al-Jazeera
appears to be serving the interests of the rest of the world, the world of
Islam, the pan-Arab world in a kind of ethno-genesis; it functions in an
ethno-genetic capacity for those who are on the other side of the
mountain, the other side of the hill, i.e. the rest of the world – the world
beyond the Western system, which includes Japan, will gradually include
Russia when its democratization process is completed, includes the
Balkans and gradually parts of the word now belonging to the Western
political system.
The rest of the world, Islam and the Arab world appear through selections
made by Al-Jazeera which presents the facts interpreted in a different
way. And this world is precisely the world of conflict between today and
tomorrow, i.e. we have a conflict which is thought of by many as an
asymmetrical threat, a terrorist threat, which has true dimensions and
which embraces or unjustly includes hundreds of millions of people and
on the other hand we have the Western world which is unassisted,
helpless, unable to deal with this new form of conflict which includes
within its own interpretational framework and its own priorities, two global
systems - let's say - of information, propaganda and policy-making;
because this is what it’s all about.
The more this new technology evolves - and it is constantly evolving and the news image is transmitted to the households all over the world
and this image is interpreted in two different ways, this separation of the
world, this conflict dimension will have no end. And that is our fear for the
peace and coexistence of peoples in the next decades or centuries.
37
Thank you very much.
Back to agenda
38
“Socio-political crisis as a crucial criterion for the relationship
between
power
and
public
opinion:
a
socio-psychological
dimension – theoretical approach”
Dr
Papastamou
Stamos,
Professor
of
Experimental
Social
Psychology, Panteion University
Thank you, Mr Chairman. Ladies and Gentlemen, socio-political crises
are more and more on the agenda as symptoms or facts of the uni-polar
world, i.e. the situation in which the societies of the modern world in
which, according to Anthony Giddens, the dipole trust—risk is dominant.
And this concept of risk has an immediate semantic connection to what
we call crisis and which we can define as a situation of threat to or the
real loss of vital dimensions of the existence of a society.
These dimensions extend from the level of basic biological maintenance
requirements to the values connected to the quality of life in the broader
sense. The loss of these dimensions as a result of calculated use of
violence such as war and terrorism, a natural disaster or an extreme
malfunctioning of an administration system is synonymous with extreme
trials or the annulment of the safe predictable living framework and
simultaneously with the break-down of the trust relationship between
society and the public opinion.
The fact that it is important to examine the role of the mass
communications and information media in crisis management is due to
the vital importance attributed to them by the public opinion, “this new
divinity” - as it was named by Gabriel Tarde already at the beginning of
the 20th century – which constitutes the central pillar and the primary
source of legitimacy of urban democracy.
The truth is of course that during the gradual prevalence throughout the
20th century of the massive democratic pattern, the public opinion
acquired an ambiguous image and became the object of ambivalent
39
manipulation by the elites. A characteristic example is the fact that during
crisis management there is an effort to appease, to tame or even to
manipulate public opinion.
In any case, crisis management contains phenomena and procedures
that in social psychology are studied through their social influence, their
collective
polarization,
the
idiomatic
relations,
the
identification
procedures and the activation of representations and stereotypes.
In the time left, I will indicatively select some socio-psychological,
theoretical and experimental approaches which explain the phenomena
connected to crisis management and which indirectly but very clearly
demonstrate the effect of the media.
First of all, concerning the operation mode of the teams which are
charged with crisis management, the contemporary cognitive approaches
stress the obligation of these teams to manage a series of disparate and
controversial information under conditions of time constraints and high
levels of stress, aware that one wrong call could cost them their carrier or
have disastrous consequences for the interests of the overall society.
Experimental research but also field research and qualitative analysis
prove that the intensity of the emotional stimulation renders the
systematic processing of information more difficult and reduces the
connective and non-connective function resulting in the simplification,
and simultaneously the inflexibility of the thought.
These contemporary approaches confirm and bring back to the surface
the classic study by Irving Janis entitled “Victims of Groupthink” in which
the author when analyzing cases of wrong crisis management like the
attack on Pearl Harbor, the war in Korea, the crisis of the Bay of Pigs,
attributes the wrong decisions of the competent committees to their
collective nature thus proving that there are really crucial differences
40
between their individual and collective decisions. These differences are
due to the following reasons:
1) to the solid belief in the inherent moral of the team, which leads its
members not to take into account the moral consequences of their
decisions,
2) to the immediate pressure exercised upon each member of the team
who might express arguments contrary to the stereotypes, the illusions or
the obligations undertaken by the team,
3) to the self-censorship tendencies of those who deviate from the
superficial social consensus prevailing within the team and
4) to the illusion entertained by all the members of the team with regard
to the majority opinion. This illusion emanates partly from the selfcensorship of those who deviate but it is enhanced even more by the
prevailing belief according to which “whoever does not speak up is in
agreement”.
All of these reasons indicate that the behavior of the collective
instruments aims at the protection of the team from the danger of an
internal disagreement. Everyone attempts to maintain unanimity by
avoiding any conflict which could destroy it. On the other hand though,
this systematic avoidance of any rupture or conflict undermines greatly
the decision-making.
Beyond the internal functionings of the crisis management teams, what is
equally - if not more – important is the opinion of the public opinion, i.e.
the way the public opinion takes in and experiences a socio-political
crisis.
The socio-psychological research which is constantly increasing after the
9/11 attacks, examine the ideological and emotional processing of the
41
social subject emphasizing on four axes which I will mention
epigrammatically:
1) The emotional reactions in the face of extreme events such as a
terrorist attack, according to the theory of terror management, such facts
enhance the existential anxiety of the subject because they render his
mortality obvious (Mortality Salience). As a result, the subject needs to
re-confirm the existence of the validity of a safe framework of social
values and meanings which guarantees order and prediction.
The display of this need is expressed through an increased dedication to
the leader and the power system by being firmer and more aggressive
against those who threaten or seem to threaten this safe notional order
and with the enhancement at the same time of the positive systems for
the members of the sub-team.
2) The second axis is connected to the procedures of forming an identity
and processing emotions based on incorporation in the collectivity.
Experimental research in that direction has shown that the cultivation of
an identity which enhances the common group connection to the victims
of an attack, increases the emotion of fear but at the same time
enhances the tendency for a real display of solidarity towards the victims
as well as the tendency to support retaliation measures against the
attacker.
3) The third research axis directly refers to the way terrorist attacks are
covered by the media. Researches such as those of Keinan, Sadeh and
Rosen from the University of Tel Aviv examined the tendencies and
reactions of people with regard to the coverage by the media of terrorist
acts soon after a series of violent terrorist attacks in Israel. Their findings
show that although a great part of mass information consumers prefer a
more detailed coverage of the terrorist acts, when this coverage included
appalling details, their willingness to receive this detailed information
declined.
42
The results also prove that the exposure to such coverage by the media
is connected to symptoms similar to those of post-traumatic stress.
Finally, individual differences were found in tendencies and reactions in
connection with the gender of the participants, their political orientation
and the way of searching for information. Women for example, appeared
to be more sensitive to horror scenes, preferred channels less pluralistic
and
experienced
more
anxiety
symptoms
compared
to
men.
Furthermore, right-wing participants tend to watch more television after
terrorist attacks and resent the limited range of transmitted information.
4) And finally, a fourth axis of research in which we too are active refers
to the ideological organizational principles of percepting crisis situations
which arise from violent developments. Recent research and our
research show that the selective activation of a specific orientation of
ideological beliefs with regard to - for example - the prevention of
terrorism concerning the definition, the means of dealing with it,
explanations and interpretations of the phenomenon, interacts each time
with a certain illumination of particular dimensions of the facts which we
project on the subjects.
Such research approaches show that issues like:
a. The role of the authorities and more specifically its omissions or
the side-effects of counter-terrorist efforts and policies.
b. Social justice and more specifically its definition and advisable
ways of ensuring and restoring it and finally
c. The dimensions for the structuring of the political field, such as the
“right-left axis”
constitute key objectives to be constantly looked into which, placed
into an intercultural framework could possibly, beyond any self-evident
comparisons, contribute to the better understanding of the way in
which the social subjects experience, read, explain and interpret a
43
socio-political crisis like the ones caused by terrorism and generally by
exercising political violence.
Thank you for your attention.
Back to agenda
44
"Socio-political crisis as a crucial criterion for the relationship
between
power
and
public
opinion:
a
socio-psychological
dimension – lessons learned”
Dr Prodromitis Gerasimos, Assistant Professor of Experimental
Social Psychology, Panteion University
Thank you very much. Continuing what Mr Papastamos has developed, I
will present in a few words the problematic and the basic findings of an
empirical field research using a sample of students on how the social
thinking of the young in Greece received the war in Iraq.
The research was conducted from May till June 2003 in the midst – as
we all remember – of an intense global public dialogue relating to the
issue and very massive anti-war manifestations. Our research had as an
objective to examine issues of legality and legalization stakes concerning
the international use of violence, as they are taken in and assessed by
the social thought, by the social subject.
In order to perform a socio-psychological study of the social multidimensional involvement of the public opinion in such an overall – as
Emile Durcheim would say – global fact, one must try to approach the
determining factors of acceptance and legalization by the public opinion
of course, of the use of international armed violence and attempt to
disclose the interconnections of these factors with the broader meaningbearing function of social thought which is obliged to manage both on an
identity level and a values level an international reality in which either
legalized or plausible or even unacceptable and condemnable forms of
violence play a crucial role.
Therefore, in this direction, our research was structured around three
axes. First, we studied the assessment of the interviewed parties

Power Point presentation available. Click here.
45
concerning their reception and assessment on the various reasons which
dictated the war, on various argumentations on which the war was based.
Then, we examined their evaluation concerning two superjacent entities,
the USA and the EU, the role of which in the Iraqi war was crucial, but for
another reason as well; because they are the two basic entities which
constitute the poles of what we call Western civilization. A third research
dimension had to do with tendencies and stands and tolerance or
acceptance by the interviewed subjects relating to general principles,
specific policies and specific practical measures to deal with terrorism.
This is the identity of the research…a focused student sample…and let’s
see some results from the various topics we studied, which indicate
crystallizations,
giving
meaning
and
fragmentations,
compartmentalizations of the public opinion concerning the way in which
they receive – if you wish—they reproduce the way in which an
international crisis, such as the war in Iraq, was presented by the media.
Let’s look at their evaluations on the justification of the war. With the
proper statistical analysis, we saw that almost 57% of the sample showed
great distrust towards the dominant reason, that the war wasn’t
conducted to liberate the Iraqi people from Saddam Hussein nor to
eliminate weapons of mass destruction etc. Only a small percentage,
14,5%, seems to accept this prevailing rhetoric and almost 28% (27,8%)
seems to accept what we called disaster rhetoric i.e. believes that the
war was conducted in Iraq for the destruction of weapons of mass
destruction.
Now, let’s take a look at the evaluation of how the public opinion views
these two entities – the US and the EU and primarily how it evaluates the
international say of the US. A very important percentage, 81%, clearly
expresses an anti-American stance. For example, they do not accept the
argument that the USA is the only Superpower and therefore has the
right to militarily intervene wherever it judges necessary. Only 19% of this
46
sample accepts, de facto, the global role and the self-protection right of
the US.
As for the role of the EU and its evaluation, we initially began our
evaluation with the positions of certain countries which gathered media
attention. For example, we can see that the position of France and
Germany, who were against an armed involvement, was received in a
positive way, while the English and Spanish positions were judged
negatively and concerning the role of Greece the evaluation was neutral,
which means there were both positive and negative observations.
Now, let’s see various dimensions on how they evaluated, what
stereotype they built of the overall European stance. With the proper
statistical analysis we found four dimensions concerning the evaluation of
the European stance, the stance of the EU. There was a stance of
compliance and is thought of as weak-spirited, hypocritical, compliant
and selfish; a stance of stability which is considered clean, honest and
united; a stance of caution; and a fourth dimension which concerns non
coherence and instability, a stance which is described as divided and
inconsistent.
Based on these facts we also search for the basic thought groups within
the public opinion and we find that 25,3 % for example expresses a
stance that we conventionally referred to as European self-preservation,
where people evaluate the position of Germany and France in a positive
way, but also Greece's stance which then held the presidency of the EU
and should have been more careful and at the same time judges the
overall European stance as stable and cautious.
38% of the population expresses an anti-American Euro-skepticism
according to which the stance of France and Germany are judged in a
positive way but not that of Greece and more emphasis is given to the
overall European stance describing it as compliant and instable.
47
A third group expresses general disapproval concerning the EU stance
and a fourth group, 16,7%, expresses what we conventionally called a
national self-preservation stance, less mediocre or in part inconsistent or
counter-balancing where the subjects agree with the French and German
stance as well as the Greek stance and at the same time they consider
Europe as coherent, stable and cautious.
Let’s now move on to some observations concerning counter-terrorism
measures and general principles. Initially we located two basic principles
which must govern international counter-terrorism. One axis concerns the
opposition to religious fundamentalism and the second one is the
opposite of the first one concerning the repression of national and
religious minorities emphasizing on the constraint and the weakening of
the minorities and the well-known clash of civilizations.
With regard to specific policies that Europe could undertake against
terrorism, we observe an agreement on a common European foreign
affairs policy, disagreement concerning the economic and military
blockade on countries suspected of terrorism and mild disagreement
concerning the establishment of a European army.
And now, let’s move on to specific compartmentalizations, the location of
specific thought groups within the overall public opinion based on the fact
that we just saw. One group, 21%, seems to put emphasis on the clash
of civilizations and mostly on the repression and the constraints of the
minorities. 28,5% expresses what we called – I repeat again that names
are conventional – offensive Euro-centrism, a logic where public opinion
is in favor of a common European foreign affairs policy, in favor of a
blockade against countries suspected of terrorism, in favor of a European
army and at the same time opposes itself to religious fundamentalism.
We have one last grouping of the sample based on the ratings
concerning the tolerance and the acceptance of certain specific
counterterrorist measures. In our researches since 2003 we find that the
48
majority of the public opinion is in favor of controlling the foreigners and
the immigration measures, in favor of simplifying the extradition of
suspects for terrorist acts, the abolition of the political asylum and of
course the implementation of an increased control at the entry points of a
country. 23,39% are against a generalized policing rejecting all measures
and 15,73% believe the opposite. This is a group in favor of adopting
extremely harsh measures in order to combat terrorism.
Now, let's attempt to put all of the pieces of the puzzle together those
arising from the compartmentalization of the public opinion concerning
their evaluations on specific issues with the proper statistical analysis.
Three thought groups can be formed. On the left of the diagram we see
that two groups of thought are formed on a common axis, an antiAmerican stance where one group of subjects is in favor of the European
self-preservation on counterterrorism, is in favor of border control, in
favor of an offensive Euro-centrism and a tougher stance concerning
counterterrorism
and
this
group
more
readily
accepts
the
“catastrophological rhetoric of war”, i.e. the thought that the war took
place to destroy weapons of mass destruction. We could describe this
way of thinking as a Europe-fortress.
At the bottom, we can see a rejecting stance, a little more criticizing
which has to do with the anti-American Euro-skepticism; this group is in
favor of an intercultural dialogue as a means of dealing with terrorism, it
expresses extreme distrust towards the dominant rhetoric of declaring
war and it is the group which opposes itself to extreme policing as a
counterterrorist measure.
On the right of the diagram, we have the ideologically opposite group of
thought, the national self-preservation group of thought concerning the
stance of Europe and Greece towards the war, acceptance of the
dominant rhetoric officially projected concerning the war, in favor of
generalized policing, in favor of the de facto acceptance of the US
international role and it is less a group of thought connected to the overall
49
rejection of the European stance and in favor of the extreme skepticism
of the clash of civilizations.
Last result: we can see that these groups of thought have a political
identity. The Europe-fortress way of thinking is the most popular for those
who find themselves in the center of the political system, while the more
criticizing stance belongs to the broader left. The more compliant stance
to the de facto structured international environment is more proper to the
rightist section of the public opinion.
I will not tire you any longer. Concluding, I would just like to note that
findings such as these indicate that the popular public opinion which
manages crises or must evaluate crises, being inconsistent and quite
pluralistic, may be formed by the media, but it also has its own
sensitivities and susceptibilities and can definitely not be approached
superficially, simplistically and in an overall manner. Thank you very
much.
Back to agenda
50
“Electronic Media in Crisis Management"
Mr Panagopoulos Christos, Chairman of the Board – Managing
Director of ERT
Thank you. Ladies and Gentlemen, I would not like to begin with
conceptual definitions. I believe that all of you participating here today in
one capacity or another know very well what crisis management is. What
I am called to cover today in my double capacity as a journalist and as
chairman of the public radio-television is the role of the media in crisis
management.
I think we all agree that the audiovisual means are for better or for worse,
the dominant vehicle of politics, social and cultural communication
nowadays. However, the rate of information and its intensely competitive
nature – I am mostly referring to electronic means – lead time and again
to uncontrollable dimensions. The selection and evaluation and projection
of facts constitute the basic core of operation of a communication means,
of the media in general.
However, especially in crisis periods, like wars, natural disasters, terrorist
acts or kidnappings, the question of which would be the right step for the
electronic media is controversial. Since the terrorist acts of 9/11 2001 but
even before that, TV has been the main media for the transmission of
bad news and the indication "Breaking news" or "special news bulletin" as we refer to it here in Greece – constitutes a pre-signal of a potential
crisis, small or big.
During the past seven years, reporters working for the electronic media
had to manage various kinds of crises whether these concerned terrorism
– Madrid, London, Iraqi War, Israel, Lebanon - or a natural disaster - a
tsunami, hurricane Katrina – and transform these dramatic, hard and
uncontrollable facts and phenomena into a TV reality which could be
understood by the average viewer.
51
However, this TV coverage of crises does not resolve problems and
dilemmas such as:

Where are the limits when transmitting terrorist attacks?

How can we treat in a fair way all the parties implicated in a
crisis?

Should we?

Can a war be transmitted live according to CNN standards?

Which sources can reporters trust in the internet and blog era?

And finally, how should television respond to the responsible
role it is supposed to play in general but even more during a
crisis?
In our recent history, in our country but also internationally, we all
experienced many moments and periods of crisis; The most crucial at
least on a national scale here in Greece was the Imia crisis, something
that started out as a funny story and almost ended in war with our
neighbor, Turkey, and also last year's national crisis brought about by the
disaster caused by the fires.
On an international scale of course there were naturally more armed
conflicts, natural disasters, large industrial accidents, epidemics, terrorist
acts – the most important of which was that of the Twin Towers in New
York – and many others. In all these disaster cases, in the broader
meaning of the word, or the crises, the great power of the electronic
media on the one hand and the irresponsible and sometimes dangerous
actions of some of them on the other, were revealed in the most
ostentatious and dramatic way. For example, in the Imia case, it was
clear that the political leadership of that time in Greece was set on
avoiding a war conflict with our neighbors. But it is also clear that contrary
to the wish of the political leadership, everyone who lived in Greece at
the time, remembers - I am mentioning this for the visitors – that in the
overall society a climate of escalation and preparation for war operations
52
was cultivated, to which the media from both countries and from both
sides contributed.
Another case: the riots in France. When, a few years ago, the riots by
some young people living in the suburbs of Paris began, a big debate
started concerning the need or not to censor the electronic media on the
grounds that a long coverage of such developments could in part create
– as in fact it did – imitators. It was presumed that the demonstrators
gathered through the TV image confirmation for their actions, which led
some TV channels in France at first not to mention the number of burned
cars. Gradually and as the phenomenon was growing, the TV media
stopped mentioning the areas in which the violent episodes took place.
Generally, it has been proven that a long coverage of such extreme facts
can increase the tension and act as a multiplier. The same could happen
with terrorist facts.
Other cases: Sorin Matei, in Greece. He is – for those of you who are not
Greek – a criminal who at some point took a girl as a hostage and held
her for hours and asked for various things to let her go. All this ended in a
tragedy. So, we have kidnapping cases: What happens it the cases
where there is live TV transmission with the crime scene? Many believe –
and we have experienced this – that the long and live transmission leads
to the heroification of the criminal, the reduction of the negotiating frame
for the police or the authorities and secondly, in the middle term, to
imitation. The tragic end of the Sorin Matei case led us in Greece, for
some time at least, to discuss the limits of the electronic media, its
transmissions and where this leads in crisis situations. Unfortunately, this
discussion ended without any measures being taken.
Fortunately, we had the opposite results in a recent case concerning the
kidnapping of a businessman from the North of Greece where the media
showed self-restraint and with unprecedented discretion for Greece, they
managed the case well which had as a result a fortunate ending and the
man returned to his family.
53
Of course there is the other side of the same coin. For example the
tsunami which caused great destruction in Southeastern Asia and
constitutes a particular case with regard to TV covering in 2004. The
emotionally charged coverage of this grand disaster that showed in big
and loud images all this destruction and misery, brought us as Greeks and I imagine the whole of Europe… because this is what I remember
happening at that time with the people being tested and this created an
unprecedented tendency to help these people. In Greece alone – I will
mention numbers from the telemarathon that we, the public state channel
had – 20 million euros were collected from donations, a fact
unprecedented in such an action, i.e. a telemarathon.
This is one another side of crisis management when it is handled
correctly. Taking into account the competition, the speed of the media
and the growing influence of the internet, we realize, based on these
examples which I presented as well – and I am not only talking about
Greece but also internationally, that the electronic media, which operate
in the same way in Greece and elsewhere, are very difficult to control by
an administration so that they may bring about the best possible results
every time.
Eric Hobsbawm in his book “Globalization, Democracy and Terrorism”
referring specifically to the matter of terrorism and the crises that
emanate from terrorist acts says amongst others: “In reality the greatest
danger from terrorism is not due to the immediate threat by some few
anonymous fanatics but to the irrational fear created by their acts and
which today encourage the media".
But if we move on a little, since I don’t agree with the logic of looking for a
scapegoat, we ought to admit that there are some media where the logic
of transmitting news in a responsible, substantial, sober and reliable way,
prevails. Such media, it is certain, could contribute and help in periods
and developments which necessitate crisis management. And for better
54
or for worse such an approach could exist and fortunately it does exist in
our country in the public media.
I believe that generally in Europe and the world there are some private
media which also treat crisis situation in a similar way. A key finding from
a research conducted by MRB HELLAS on behalf of the Association of
Greek Industries on the issue of the media in Greece was that,
concerning the evaluation of the media and the way they handle the
developments, private television got the lower satisfaction rate with a
negative 66%, which means that the public is not satisfied with the way
they handle crises, but also with their information in general compared to
the public television which got 65%, the highest rate of satisfaction.
To conclude, in the conscience of the citizens, private television at least
in Greece, appears to be responsible mainly concerning the creation of a
singular arena which is consumed on a daily basis by the consumer. It is
however absolutely obvious what they do in this arena and it is
condemned by its customers while they are consuming it.
From other researches in the past and from other market research
companies, we come to the conclusion that while television holds the first
place in the preference of the majority of the viewers for their information
as well as their entertainment, the percentage of those who state they are
dissatisfied by the quality of the information is increasing geometrically.
As Ignacio Ramone says, “Distrust is so powerful that more and more
people distance themselves from the media. In France, 48% of the
citizens do not believe any more that things happened the way they were
shown on TV. This caution on behalf of the citizens could be a
phenomenon of health for the democracy of the printed media, could at
least remove their comments and correct today's tendency toward
enthusiasm and spectacle which is the main characteristic of television.
However, the competition, the race for higher ratings and greater
55
newspaper sales, condemn journalism to the same mistakes and lead all
to the abyss.
Therefore, we cannot only blame the audiovisual media for everything
that happens; Their power and their damage would be much less if
reporters, not only those working for the electronic media, but all of them
as well as the intellectuals, would not be so eager to lend the electronic
media their prestige, bow to their logic and beg for their good graces as
Galimi says somewhere. This is a concept we agree on.
What is needed today and obviously society is pushing in that direction,
is that the terms should be reformulated, the tactics changed. We should
self-regulate in order to be able to meet as an electronic media our main
objective which is to provide valid, reliable, objective, colorful and
polyphonic information.
It isn’t an accident that one of the greatest state owned radio-TV stations
in the world, BBC, has instituted some basic TV coverage principles in
war cases, terrorism, kidnappings, national security and other similar
events. As an example, I would like to mention what has been regulated
by the BBC, which I think cannot function in an undemocratic country or
where civilization and democracy have not been taught. So, in a case of
war, terrorism and emergency situations, it must be mentioned whether
the story has been censored or controlled. A lot of importance is given to
the tone of the story, the voice, the sound, the drama which for them is as
important as the information provided in the story.
In case of a kidnapping or hijacking, we do not get, according to the BBC,
an interview from the perpetrator live on air – which is what I was saying
in the case of Sorin Matei. We also do not transmit live any videos or
voice messages provided by the perpetrator. We transmit with some time
delay images concerning sensitive issues, for example hostage situations
in schools or hijackings. This is extremely important in emergency
situations with an unpredictable outcome.
56
In case of manifestations and riots, before the transmission, we should
evaluate the possible risk of encouraging more such events through it –
as I mentioned in France – we cut the transmission if we suspect that we
are setting off situations through this coverage, i.e. live transmission of
manifestations or riots, or we transmit the event with some delay or we
process the really violent scenes, filter the image and the speech and
then present it in its correct dimensions.
If we try to put these into effect in the UK or Greece, there will be a small
revolution of our leftist conscience. Therefore, the role of the media may
be substantial and effective in times and concerning facts where crisis
management is required and comply with the basic principles which must
govern journalism.
We, at ERT, are proud because we are trying, most of the times I believe
successfully, to work in a real professional manner, to transmit the
developments soberly and not dehydrated, to dip into the essence of the
news offering the necessary breathing time to the viewer, a time much
needed to think, judge, decide, decrystalize his opinion. The constant,
rapid provision of new information completely disorientates the viewer; he
needs a few minutes to think and understand what is happening.
Quite recently, at the end of May, we gave a press conference during
which we presented research findings to see the news bulletins at least in
Greece and from another angle, not just the AGB numbers i.e. how many
viewers consume the product called news at some time. We used an
indicator which is very important on a global scale and is that of social
stir. This indicator, as we had mentioned during the press conference,
acquires a lot of importance especially for news bulletins, because it also
exists for all other TV programs.
Here, ERT is thought of as entirely reliable in comparison to other private
channels which have high ratings. However, according to AGB news
57
bulletins do not have any social acceptance. All the developments we
experience TV-wise are reversed. I will insist on these indicators.
It is not only important to operate in a decent way but also that this
behavior or any other behavior according to the rules is rewarded by the
audience. Therefore, ahead of us is an important bet; we have to
transcend from the window democracy – as we call it in Greece, because
in the private channels news bulletins we have a special feature: the
opinions and thoughts of specialists dominate every day for a long time
instead of the news being presented in a fertile and substantial
journalistic way - to another generalized approach of the news so that the
role of the media in our everyday life and mostly concerning
developments and crisis periods, be catalytic and to the benefit of our
people and our country. Thank you.
Back to agenda
58
“Foreign Policy and Media in Crisis Management”
Mr Koumoutsakos Georgios, 1st Coucellor, Spokesman of the
Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Thank you, Mr Chairman. Ladies and Gentlemen, addressing an
audience of accomplished professionals on such a broad and complex
subject is quite a challenge. But this challenge becomes a crisis when
there are only a few minutes on the clock.
So let me start by asking the first important question: what is the
fundamental element that characterizes a crisis situation in a state’s
international relations?
Question number two: how do the media conduct themselves during such
a crisis?
Question number three: what are the basic elements of communications
management during such a crisis?
In general a crisis is an event that occurs suddenly, often unexpectedly
and often demands a quick response. A crisis interferes with normal
routines and creates uncertainty and stress. In international relations, a
crisis is a brief period of time when one or more parties perceive an
imminent threat to its or their vital interests. A threat they have to react to
immediately.
International relations crises are quite sudden transformations of relations
between states that if they escalate can sharply increase the likelihood of
conflict and war.
Comparing these two definitions of a crisis we see that in final analysis
the fundamental characteristics of every crisis are pretty much the same.
59
At the end of the day every crisis implies a moment of crucial decision in
the context of an imminent and serious danger.
But there is at least one fundamental element that characterizes the
crises that states have to deal with in their international relations. A
fundamental element that differentiates crises in international relations
from other types of crises. And this is the fact that what is always at stake
in these crises is national interest. From the Swiss crisis to the Cuban
missiles crisis, from the Cyprus crisis and the Turkish invasion in 1974 to
the Imia crisis in 1996, national interest were at stake.
So, given that a crisis in international relations is one where a country’s
national interests are at stake, what is the perspective and the conduct of
the news media, local and foreign alike? Can those managing a crisis in
the government expect cooperation, understanding or even self-restrain
from the news media, especially when national interests are at stake? Or
do they have to develop their crisis management strategy on the
assumption that the news media will simply do their job according to their
own rules, their own priorities, their own needs?
This dilemma might have been worth considering some decades ago
when governments were still able to control the flow of information; when
foreign policy was dealt with by the news media with some willingness to
collaborate with governments rather than as just one more area for
journalistic investigation and criticism.
In fact it is often argued that the Vietnam war was lost first and foremost
in radio and television studios, in the print shops of the major newspapers
of the US. In the USA as well as in most countries throughout the world
this perception led government officials to become highly suspicious of, if
not outright hostile to the news media. Thus, relations between
government and the media took on the nature of a zero sum game,
60
where the government tries to keep secrets and the media wins by
revealing them.
In an environment of such intense competition and mutual distrust, when
official sources don’t disclose information, the media seek it elsewhere.
And believe me in this area supply greatly exceeds demand. So the
potential for misinterpretations or misunderstandings or even outright
distortion of the truth increases dramatically making the crisis even more
complicated, even more difficult to manage. It is precisely for this reason
that the defensive attitudes or the defensive rationale of hating or fearing
the press is counter-productive. It is a dead-end leading to results which
are opposite of those being pursued.
Many have proposed another attitude to relations with the media during
the management of a crisis. This attitude can be summed up as “stop
hating, start using”. Personally, I think that this attitude as well should be
avoided. There is a very simple reason for this and this is that when the
media suspect that the governments are trying to use them or even
worse to manipulate them even in the name of national interest, the
media react.
So, in very short time we can arrive at the same result, that is intense
competition and distrust between government and media. At a time when
the media are so powerful, when any and every citizen can log on and
block away, when the flow or better the floods of information is nothing
short of overwhelming and instantaneous, it is humorous to believe that
one can manipulate the news without getting dragged under by it.
What I believe is that the best way to approach communications in the
management of an international relations crisis is cooperation between
the government and the media. But on the understanding that the media
has to do what it has to do and so does the government. A working
relationship along these lines creates the necessary degree of both
61
credibility and trust. In a crisis the best course of action is to be
forthcoming and honest and trying to help and facilitate media coverage.
Based on this general rule of thumb we can arrive at certain basic rules
that should govern every crisis communications strategy.

Before the crisis, maintain trustworthy, credible relationships
with the media all of the time. If you do, the media will be less
suspicious and more cooperative in the midst of the crisis.

When a crisis hits immediately get the word to the press,
otherwise the media will get their information through other
means.

Set up a 24 hour crisis and media center at a central place from
which news is released, rumors are dealt with, facts are
gathered and briefings are held.

Immediately go public with a trained spokesperson at the scene
to conduct press briefings.

Let the media and therefore the public know what you are
dealing with and that you are dealing with the situation.

Say what you know and only what you know; don’t speculate;
don’t be bullied into saying anything based on rumor. If you
don’t know something admit it; saying the matter is under
investigation may be the best response.

Get the government or agency leader and other top
management to the crisis center. Having top management in
front of the press during a crisis lends credibility and shows that
the organization is not treating the situation lightly.

Maintain a calm, gracious and helpful presence. Avoid
appearing flustered or overwhelmed.

Always return phone-calls. If you don’t, reporters will look
elsewhere for information. They will write a story with or without
your help. Being non-responsive takes the control of a story
away from you.
62

Monitor media reports and correct errors immediately.

After a crisis, when a crisis ends, evaluate the effectiveness of
the crisis plan and correct problems so that they don’t happen
again.
I think this last part of these basic rules and particularly the very last one,
that after a crisis one should go into a deep and thorough lessons
learned process is of crucial importance for a successful crisis
management in difficult international crisis situations. Thank you very
much for your attention.
Back to agenda
63
64
“Russia and Energy Security in Europe”
Mr Savva Michael Ivanovitch, Minister-
Counsellor, Russian
Embassy in Greece
Good morning, Ladies and Gentlemen, it’s my pleasure to join you in this
brainstorming. Russia is a major player on energy markets and I’m going
to provide you with an insight on Russian priorities in energy security.
Instead of an introduction, I prepared you a slide the full name of which
reads “The magic procedure of preparing an egg for breakfast”. The title
is the original one and the quality is really impressive. You can see the
egg in this part of the screen. It’s in a transparent bowl that we usually
use in the microwave stove. However, the focus of our deliberation is not
the egg itself but the energy source which warms up all this construction
and reminds us how much the energy affects our day to day business
and how important it is for us to succeed in our day to day life. It is mostly
for this reason that energy security has become relevant for the policy
makers and as a consequence for the military.
Energy security is a top issue in the agenda of our governments and it’s
being extensively referred to in various publications and reports. It’s
important therefore to have an adequate understanding of what this
wording finally means. That is exactly our point here. Energy security:
Was ist das? What is that finally? And if you hadn’t enough time to
investigate the matter you might feel quite comfortable because you have
lost nothing once the governments haven’t succeeded to agree on a
generally recognized definition on energy security so far.
However, you know very well, that life goes beyond any definition. And in
the absence of a common agreement each government is being guided
by its own priorities on the specific subjects. The major energy

Power Point presentation available. Click here.
65
consuming countries regard energy security primarily as the security of
supply. They insist that countries which are rich in natural resources shall
provide to global oil companies unconditional and unlimited access to oil
and gas fields and pipelines. Nothing in return is being offered to call the
things by their names.
On the other side, the countries rich in natural resources put the
emphasis on the security of demand. They understand by this notion the
availability on distribution market of such conditions and prices which
shall make possible for them to return their investments. And not simply
to return their investments but to have it with such profit margins which
will allow energy companies and the industry as a whole to remain
competitive against other sectors of economy both at a national and
global level.
The problem has been discussed intensively during the Russian
Chairmanship within the framework of the G8. As a result of these
negotiations a comprehensive document on global energy security has
been adopted at the G8 summit in St Petersburg. The document
stipulates that the security of supply shall go hand in hand with the
security of demand. Those are integral parts of one process
complementing each other.
The document specifically emphasizes that the global nature of these
challenges and the growing interdependence between producing,
consuming and transiting countries require strengthened partnerships
between all the stakeholders to enhance the global energy security. And
this theoretical concept has proven its value in practice. In all the cases
when the consuming, the transiting and the producing countries have
managed to merge their interests the result was totally positive. In this
region, a number of projects including Blue Stream, Gas interconnector
Greece-Turkey, Caspian Pipeline Consortium, oil pipeline Baku-TbilisiCeyhan and oil pipeline Odessa-Brody become successful projects
66
exactly for this reason that the evolved parties, the interested countries
have managed to find a common denominator of their own national
interests. And new projects are on the agenda of the region of the SouthEastern Europe and we believe that if countries follow the same recipe
they are bound to succeed in implementing those projects. And first of all,
the most important one is the construction of the oil pipeline BurgasAlexandroupolis, the building up of the oil pipeline Costanza-Trieste and
the construction of the gas interconnector between Greece and Italy as
well as the construction of a major gas pipeline meant to connect Europe
with the Caspian region under the name Nabucco and Russia is
promoting another major gas pipeline called South Stream.
We could investigate further the role of Russia in securing a reliable
supply of energy, of gas and oil for the European market and especially
the role that Russia plays in the production of hydrocarbons in the
Caspian region.
You can see here on the screen a map of the Russian oil transportation
system. It includes more than 100.000 km of high pressure pipelines. The
advantage of this network is that once this water is loaded into the
system then it can be delivered directly to the refineries in Central Europe
or at any export terminal on the coast of the Baltic Sea, the Barren Sea
and the Black Sea.
Over the last period, the Russian government has undertaken a number
of steps to facilitate the investments into the energy sector. These
measures resulted in a substantial growth of levels of production as well
as exports of gas and oil. We have considerably enlarged the export
transportation capacity both of gas pipelines and oil port terminals.
And we could get now closer to our region. You can see here on the
screen the major routes of transportation of oil from the Caspian to the
Black Sea. And on the Black Sea shore, the most important port for oil
67
transportation is the port of Novorossiysk. It has the capacity of shipping
49 million tons of oil per year. A second oil terminal has been built
recently by the Caspian Pipeline Consortium next to Novorossiysk with a
capacity of 31 million tons. And the terminal in Tuapse provides us the
possibility to load oil products and oil by average with a capacity of 5
million tons per year. Now the total capacity off Georgian ports Supsa
and Batumi is respectively 7 and 6 million tons. Exactly the same
capacity of 30 million tons is available at Ukrainian oil terminals of
Odessa and Yusni. That makes the total volume of oil transported from
the Black Sea ports to 111 million tons per year. From this number 11
million tons are supplied directly at the refineries at Burgas and
Costanza, while the rest 100 million tons are transported mostly to the
European market through the Black Sea Straights Bosporus and
Dardanelles.
In this context we attach priority attention to the construction of the
Burgas-Alexandroupoli oil pipeline. The project will contribute to the
enhancement of Europe’s energy security and to the reduction of
ecological risks related to the increasing load on traditional routes of
transportation of hydrocarbons in the region. Greece, Bulgaria and
Russia have committed themselves to accelerate the procedures related
to the implementation of this project and we welcome the determination
of all stakeholders involved to deliver on this commitment.
Thanks to this positive approach the key aspects of the project become
day by day more tangible which is an encouraging and promising
message.
Usually whenever we refer to the Caspian hydrocarbons we basically
mean oil production of Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. Oil exports of
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are negligible by their volumes, while Iran
is associated mostly with the Persian Gulf. We can see on the slide that
68
during the last 7 years both Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan made an
impressive progress by increasing twofold their oil production.
However, in order to assess the overall impact of Caspian oil on global
energy security it’s advisable that we find a more objective point of
reference. And for this purpose we could compare in the beginning the oil
production of Caspian states with Russia.
We see that in such a case the proportions look a little bit different. And
this slide is to help us understand not how big Russia is; but to provide us
one more an advice that there is no objective basis for a competition
between the countries and the regions in the oil field. The oil volumes
which come from the Caspian region are just supplementary to the oil
produced by leading countries in this field. No Caspian oil can afford a
comparison with the Middle East region, particularly with the oil
production in Saudi Arabia.
You can see that the levels of production in the Caspian region and the
levels of production of Saudi Arabia are totally different, while Russia is
catching up well with the levels of production of Saudi Arabia. We
presume that the absolute figures may change in the future but the
proportions will probably remain almost the same.
We’ll switch now to the gas production which has become the fuel of
choice of modern economies and first of all in Europe and the USA. The
successful development of gas fields in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan
acquire in this context a special importance. We can see that in 2007
Azerbaijan produced more than 11 billion m3 of gas. Kazakhstan
managed to increase its production up to 29 billion m 3. And the level of
production remains stable for the last three years.
But if we follow the previous tactics and place the relevant figures next to
the indexes of gas production in Russia we’ll get substantially the same
69
results. Turkmenistan is also included in the slide to have an integrated
picture of the region. It’s frequently mentioned as the gas superpower of
the Caspian region, but probably, given this comparison, the assessment
may need some better tuning. As you see on the screen, the differences
of gas production between Turkmenistan and Russia is exactly tenfold.
But those are the data for 2005.
So, let’s see even the years that followed this situation has changed and
we can see that in 2006 the proportions remained the same despite the
fact that both Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have slightly
increased their national production and even in 2007 things didn’t change
substantially.
And we see that even in this case, in 2007, the gas output of Azerbaijan
correlates to the gas production of Russia as 1:100 almost. In other
words the Caspian gas does not have the potential to replace the huge
volumes of Russian gas on the European market. To make the things
even clearer, I will tell you an open secret: the only real alternative to the
Russian gas in the region is the Iranian gas. The last year Iran produced
more than 90 billion m3 of gas which is as much as the production of
Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan together.
Despite that, it seems that geopolitical implications will further prevent the
European investors from getting access to Iranian resources at least in
the foreseeable future.
The next slide comes to prove once again this opinion. According to this
chart, at present three countries and specifically Russia, Iran and Qatar
hold more than 50% of proven gas resources in the world. I would also
like to refer in this aspect to the principle of diversification of supplies. It’s
an important theoretical principle still its value has been proven in
practice many times and it has become a must for the strategic planning.
70
Still the implementation of this principle in practice has some limits.
Those limits refer not only to the geopolitical constraints but also to the
simple geographical and geological factors. And we can see here, on this
slide, that the options of diversifying gas supply for Europe and other
regions of the world are very limited and in the case that we exclude
theoretically Iran from this list we can see that the option will be even less
than anticipated.
And another factor that also affects the possibility to diversify the gas
supply is the geographical factor. We can see here that in the structure of
gas imports to the USA, Canada plays a significant role. Of course we
have to acknowledge and point out the simple fact that the USA has its
own national production of gas and does not depend in its gas supply
from imports because all the volume of gas imported to the USA covers
not more than 15% of the total consumption. Still this slide tells us that
the efforts invested by the government of the country in order to diversify
the gas supply have produced so far very modest results.
We can see here a picture related to the structure of gas imports to
Greece. Russia plays a major role in supplying Greece with gas, but over
the period of the last 15 years, Greece has made significant progress in
diversifying its supply in gas terms. And we can see here that a big part
of gas relates to gas imports from Algeria as well as from Turkey and the
efforts of diversification of gas to Greece have very good perspectives.
Now on the screen we can see a picture related to the gas pipeline
system of Russia. As you see all these pipelines have as a final
destination the European countries. Russia is not a member of the
European Union, but you can understand from this map how much the
integration of energy infrastructure between Russia and the European
Union has advanced. This procuration proved to be a win-win solution. It
helped the European Union to reduce its dependency on the Middle East
oil, to enhance the competitiveness of its economy and to keep Europe
71
green, thus providing a new quality of life for its residents. In its turn the
Russian side has always honored its supply contracts. It has an
impressive proven record as a reliable supplier on the European market.
The latest project meant to enhance the energy security of the European
Union is the project proposed by the Russian side under the name South
Stream. It stipulates the possibility to enlarge the transportation capacity
from the Russian territory through the Black Sea region to Bulgaria and
further on through the territory of Greece to Italy. A second branch of this
pipeline is meant to connect Russia through the Bulgarian territory as
well, Serbia and Hungary and Austria to the European Union.
It’s high time now that we make some basic conclusions. The first one is
that Russia advocates a cooperative approach towards the issues of
global energy security. We intend to actively participate in the elaboration
of common rules in the energy sectors and to abide by rules developed
on equitable terms. And we have seen previously from the slides
provided that Caspian hydrocarbons can’t replace the high volumes of
Russian gas and oil on the world market, but they have a genuine
complementary and supportive effect much required and welcome by the
markets.
Russia will remain a major factor in the transportation of Caspian oil and
gas to the world market, while the construction of the South Stream
pipeline system will promote multiple transportation routes and enhance
the flexibility and reliability of gas supply to Europe.
And the last conclusion is that at this stage, Russia is in a position to offer
to its partners in Europe, and especially in this region, integrated,
feasible, low risk and mutually beneficiary solutions in oil and gas supply.
It’s very important that Russia has enough financial resources to support
the relevant project.
72
As a part of conclusions, I would like to refer to the system of priorities of
the states of this region in promoting cooperation in the sphere of energy.
Priority number 1 for the companies involved in the cooperation and
transportation and supply of energy is the implementation of projects that
generate the highest profit, the highest netback. It’s important for the
effectiveness of such projects to take advantage of the geographical
location of countries. For example, Greece has not the possibility to
import natural gas from Norway for example. But its proximity to Russian
territory provides it with an advantage in terms of getting on a short notice
significant volumes of gas. And it’s very important that the states of the
region have a stable framework for the implementation of large-scale
projects.
The attempts to ensure the energy security by military means and
specifically at the very beginning of this millennium have produced so far
mixed results. The victory and the surrender turned out to be temporary,
if not illusionary. In terms of preparing the ground for business activities
not so much progress has been done. In our opinion, cooperation
provides a more lasting and a more effective solution for the promotion of
such projects. And it’s important that in all the proposals for the
implementation of large-scale projects in terms of energy supply, Russia
is offering to its partners an equal basis cooperation. And specifically for
the implementation of the South Stream, Russia has proposed to the
Greek side to establish a joint company in which 50% of shares will
belong to the Russian government and 50% will belong to the Greek
side.
We are committed to the principle of cooperation. We believe that
cooperation is the most productive and most fruitful form of relation
between the states and we have assumed and we promote the end of
cooperating frankly and effectively specifically with the Greek side. Thank
you.
Back to agenda
73
“Russia’s re-engagement in the Balkans: Genuine or tactical?”
Dr Filis Konstantinos, Head of Center for Russia and Eurasia
(Institute for International Relations), Senior Associate Member
(SAM) St Antony’s College, Oxford University
Thank you. I will try to put Russian foreign policy within a Balkan context.
So over the past four years, Russia has significantly stepped up its
involvement in the Southeast Europe, mainly through a number of energy
and some economic deals that brought Moscow into direct cooperation,
particularly with Bulgaria, Greece and lately Serbia without excluding
other regional states.
Meanwhile however, the general gravitation of the countries in the
Balkans towards Euro-Atlantic institutions has pushed Kremlin to
establish its presence in the Balkans before Western influence becomes
even more consolidated, marginalizing Russia’s role in regional
development and by extension security issues.
I would like to look back to the 1990s just to put Russia’s presence in the
Balkans into a slightly broader context. Very briefly, conditions at that
time were not very favorable for active Russian involvement in the region.
This is because:
Number one, Moscow spent the greater part of the 1990s trying to
remedy the psychological hangover it had as a result of the break-up of
the Soviet Union while its attention was focused on growing domestic
problems. Add to this the problems with implementing reforms and a
collapsing economy.
Moscow also lacked a cohesive foreign policy – back at that time-, with
the conflicting currents of seeking cooperation with the West, while failing
sometimes to act constructively within the international system. Russia
74
was seen as an unreliable – if not disreputable - partner with nothing all
that alluring to offer prospective allies.
Meanwhile, the Balkans were in a state of transition, followed by a fluid
situation wherein each of the countries in the region sought strong,
effective allies to help them adapt to the new state of affairs.
Apart from Serbia, none of the other countries, many of which were
suspicious of Russia for reasons both psychological and very real, saw
any particular reason to deepen their relations with Moscow.
The result of all this was that Russia, back in the 1990s, with few
exceptions had a negligible economic presence in the Balkans.
Where did we stand in 2004? Here is a snapshot of how things stood in
2004.
It was clear to all observers – particularly following 9/11 – that for a
number of reasons the Balkans had been relegated to a back burner in
Russian foreign policy. The prevailing take on the situation – quite
justifiably, given the state of affairs in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan,
and the potential for ‘velvet’ revolutions in other former Soviet republics –
was that an alarmed Moscow was shifting the focus of Russian foreign
policy to the CIS, a region of vital interest to Russia – in other words the
post-Soviet space.
Moreover, the prospects that had been created for a substantial
rapprochement with the West had repercussions for the Kremlin’s Balkan
policy. Thus, Russia’s strategy became perceptibly more balanced: the
Kremlin acknowledged NATO’s say and role in the region and limited its
efforts to increasing its influence only in the energy sector.
75
Unquestionably,
the
West,
unlike
Russia,
had
made
extensive
commitments in the region, commitments that Russia could not
realistically match.
Therefore, the Kremlin recognized that the energy sector was the only
one in which it enjoyed a comparative advantage over the West, and thus
moved ahead on energy agreements with Croatia, Slovenia, Greece,
Bulgaria and the buyouts of Bulgarian and Romanian energy companies.
Back in late 2004, although Moscow had signed a number of trade
agreements, it failed to get involved economically before the states in the
region developed European perspectives, which implies that Brussels is
in a position to determine the rules of the trade and economy game, at
least to the extent that it will have to be reckoned with at the negotiating
table.
The years between 2005 and 2007 proved decisive for Moscow’s reengagement in the Balkans. So what was it that brought about Russia’s
significant involvement in the Balkans?
A confluence of a number of factors, including:
 Favorable circumstances arising from developments in the Kosovo
issue
 The potential for new southern transit routes for carrying Caspian
hydrocarbons to Western markets.
 Limited ‘political time’ for Russia due to increasing U.S. and EU
influence in the region
All these had the combined effect of bringing Russia out of its shell.
With Kosovo proclaiming its independence this past February, today’s
theme cannot be more topical. To be frank, Russia made optimum use
on the global political stage of an accomplished fact, a foregone
76
conclusion that, nevertheless, lingered on for years, unresolved,
perpetuating uncertainty in the Balkans.
The West lacked timing on this issue. Kosovo’s independence arrived
when the political momentum for a smooth transition and anything close
to universal, international recognition had longed fizzled out. Add to this
West two-dimensional policy. In the midst of the negotiations, it was
made clear that independence was inevitable. This raised the bar of
Albanian-Kosovar expectations and Serbia was offered nothing in
exchange for losing almost 20% of its territory and maintaining its prowestern orientation in recent years, which put Russia into the game.
In the Kosovo issue, Russia found an opportunity to appear as a bona
fide world power. A power that respects international law and institutions
does not attempt to impose solutions on states or peoples, does not
reject the path of negotiations or want the Security Council to evolve into
a tool for exerting influence and finally a state that continues to see the
UN as the only legitimate decision-making body.
For Kremlin, there were no vital interests at stake in Kosovo, but instead
Russia saw in Kosovo a unique opportunity to further erode the West’s
moral high ground, exposing US contempt for international law and
institutions, while, as things turned out, gaining a strong foothold in
Serbia.
But still, if Russian interests are to be served and Moscow is to maintain
its influence in the region via Serbia, the latter will have to be
incorporated into Europe achieving the consequent political stability and
steady economic growth that will render it a reliable and effective partner.
A Serbia in the European camp, rather than isolated, will clearly be of
greater use for Moscow. It is beyond doubt that a privileged bilateral
partnership with Moscow cannot solve the problem of Serbia’s isolation,
77
with Romania and Bulgaria already members of the EU and NATO, and
Croatia having started accession negotiations with Brussels, a path down
which Bosnia, Montenegro, Albania and the FYROM are already headed.
As demonstrated by the rekindling of Moscow-Sophia relations with the
signing of energy agreements, Russia is part of the equation but is no
substitute for full accession to Euro-Atlantic institutions. Consequently,
the absence of a viable alternative led the Serbs to opt for the difficult but
relatively safe route of prospective incorporation into Europe over the
uncertainty of isolation.
Let me now focus on the second factor, bearing on Russia’s
reappearance in the Balkan state that is energy. I will give a brief outline
of the states of affairs relevant to need to create new energy routes
through the Balkans. The higher cost in recent years of transit through
the Straits has made Russia seek reduced dependency.
In spite of the recent improvement in its obligations with Ankara, the
Kremlin would prevent to avoid dealing with Turkey that apart from being
a less than submissive partner, is the exclusive southern route for
conveying Caspian energy west, thus giving Ankara a negotiating
advantage over Moscow.
Moreover, Blue Stream and the straights give Turkey significant leverage
for using times and situations of crisis. Furthermore, Ankara’s inability to
fulfill its obligations – for example in the case of the Blue Stream – made
it a less preferable energy partner for Russia. Other parameters have
been:

Moscow's willingness to implement energy transport projects
that circumvent countries it considers unpredictable, favoring
alternative transit routes through partners that are more
predictable for Russian interests.
78
Following the recent crisis especially with Ukraine, the Kremlin is seeking
geopolitically secure positions that will guarantee the uninterrupted flow
of energy and avoid dependence in terms of absolute numbers, by
multiplying energy route options.

High oil prices is another factor that has given Russia
increased elbow room to move ahead and promote even
projects whose financial viability is questionable but that will
increase Russia’s influence.

Energy-rich Iran’s international isolation and infrastructure
deficiency that might well be exploited by Moscow though
delivering its energy resources to international markets as fast
as possible and before Iran emerges from its isolation.

And finally, recent agreements closed by Russia with Caspian
states, mainly Turkmenistan but also Kazakhstan. These
agreements tighten the Kremlin’s grip on its neighbors'
reserves and given Azerbaijan’s short falling production which
has hobbled the ambitious energy plans of Washington and
Brussels, enable Moscow to determine to a great extent what
routes it will use to deliver the vast quantities of energy in
control at a time when black gold production has peaked in
Russia.
The emerging regional state of affairs served as another important factor
in Moscow’s becoming more active in the Balkans. While faltering in
other parts of the world, in the Balkans Western interests have been
bolstered by the accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the EU and
NATO as well as by general gravitation of other countries in the region
towards Euro-Atlantic institutions.
79
The strength of the West’s political, economic, commercial and military
foothold in the Balkans is prodigious. This has the Kremlin scrambling to
become active in the region before the advancement of its interests there
becomes unattainable. This created the need of the Kremlin to become
active in the region as fast as possible with political time running short
and the regional state of affairs negative for Russian interests taking
shape.
In the process of closing major energy deals in the Balkans, the Kremlin
realized that there was room to strengthen Russia’s ties with such
countries. Testing the reaction of the US and its ability to avert a
strengthening of Moscow’s relations – initially with Athens and Sophia the Russian leadership developed a model for cooperation, a model that
would at least at the outset supplement what they saw as the US-EU
model.
Moscow, beyond endeavoring to increase its influence in the region, is
sending a double message. To the West, and mainly Washington,
Moscow is saying that even places where you have consolidated your
position are not forbidden to us and we are now in a position to compete
effectively. And to states, viewing Russia through the sinister prison of
recent history, Moscow is saying it acknowledges and accepts the new
state of affairs and is prepared to show that there are sectors in which it
can be a more attractive choice than the US and the EU.
It is precisely for this reason that the Kremlin is willing to offer tangible
returns in order to show the states in the region that there is another path
to making gains. Given that these states have narrow margins in which to
maneuver as long as their Western partners take them for granted.
The aforementioned cooperation model that Moscow is implementing in
the Balkans is aimed, on the one hand, at subverting stereotypes
80
regarding Russia intentions, and on the other, at showing prospective or
reluctant partners that there is no reason to feel insecure when dealing
with Moscow. This would go some way towards debating arguments for
the need to expand NATO at Moscow’s periphery.
The Russian leadership hopes this might improve Moscow’s image in
given
locals,
facilitating
joint
business
ventures
and
political
concentrations. As a result and mainly through offering tangible monetary
incentives, Moscow is attempting to narrow the psychological rift left by
the Soviet era and the lapses of the Yeltsin years.
Initially, Moscow would like to operate in a friendlier environment
developing a mutual understanding of needs and pursuits and in the long
term it is seeking well disposed articulators of its position at the EU and
NATO courts.
However, Russia is in the position of having to treat at the soonest
possible time two problems that seriously impact the effectiveness with
which it can promote its interests in the Balkans. On the one hand there
is the fact that it cannot match Washington’s ability to play a mediating
role in the vital foreign policy issues being addressed by states in the
region. And on the other hand, there are clear repercussions Moscow’s
problematic relations with the West have for any deepening of relations
with countries in the region.
In other words any impetus will continue to be limited until Moscow is
seen as a more reliable, predictable partner by the West of the world
enabling regional states to move towards a deeper multidimensional
partnership with Moscow without fear of being caught particularly in USRussia crossfire.
And herein lies one of the Russian side’s greatest fears: that states of the
region may look to Russia primarily as a negotiating card that will
81
increase their leverage and stop their Western allies from taking them for
granted. But this does not automatically entail that they would like to
develop a more consolidated, clearer systematic framework relations with
Moscow, which for the Kremlin would be a conventional route to
developing a long-standing and strong foothold in Southeast Europe.
To conclude, I consider Russia’s growing involvement in the Balkans to
have its origins in opportunism: tactical moves made in reaction to given
states of affairs. But the large number of energy projects under way –
projects aimed not just at local markets, but at the European market as a
whole – as well as Russia’s growing, though still relatively limited,
economic and commercial involvement have laid the foundations for a
durable influence especially as in some cases it affects commitments on
political choices. This influence will give Russia a voice that the West will
find difficult to defy, at least outright. Russia’s involvement in the region
could, in specific circumstances, influence the course of events, tipping
the scales in Moscow’s favor and protecting and consolidating its
interests. However, all the countries in the region –with the possible
exception of Serbia – clearly place greater value on their relations with
Washington, and this cannot but restrict the potential in relations with
Moscow.
While the EU and NATO clearly have the upper hand in security matters,
Russia contributed to the energy security of the wider region.
Notwithstanding the issue of diversification of suppliers, Moscow’s
participation in various projects of European interest is helping certain
countries of the region to upgrade their geopolitical roles and to gain a
greater say in regional affairs.
There is no doubt that a responsible Russia will be able to make a
substantial contribution to security in Southeast Europe. However, in
spite of the footholds it has created recently, the Kremlin is not in a
82
position to avert stability threatening developments in what is in any case
a fluid regional environment.
Perhaps it should suffice for us that though certain Western states have
been involved in regime change through colored revolutions in the postSoviet space, Moscow does not encourage destabilizing activities in the
Balkans. Thank you very much for your patience.
Back to agenda
83
“The fight for Serbia: is Europe the only way?”
Dr Keridis Dimitris, Associate Professor of International Relations,
University of Macedonia
I would like to thank the Ministry and the organizers for the kind invitation
and my co-panel which is here this morning and the chairman,
Konstantinos Arvanitopoulos, an esteemed colleague and a dear friend. I
am an academic, I see a lot of flags in the room, I will try not to bother
you with official lines and official statements. As an academic I will fully
exercise and a little bit abuse the freedom of speech and try to be as
free-thinking, provocative, careless and undiplomatic as possible for the
sake of our discussion this morning.
I use this topic, I use Serbia for a number of reasons, but I’m not going to
stay only in Serbia and try to give you a little bit of an overview with
Serbia as the launching pad of the situation in the Balkans as I see it
today. The reasons I chose Serbia - and my speech comes to you in a
very timely fashion after you have heard two speakers, two wonderful
speakers talking to you about Russia – I think Serbia is kind of the apple
of discord; it has been the last few years in the Balkans between Europe
and Russia. So I couldn’t think of a better introduction to my subject and I
thank the two speakers that were before me.
Now, I chose Serbia for a number of reasons, because I think Serbia for
all its reduction the last twenty years remains central to the stability in
Southeastern Europe. It has been central to all the problems of security
in Southeastern Europe since the late 1980s and continues to play a vital
role, disproportionate in some ways to its size. Geographically it’s
situated at the very center of the peninsula, controlling the North-South
and East-West communication axis. It is still, despite the reduction,
double the size in population terms than all other former Yugoslav
countries, double the size of Croatia in population terms, double the size
of Bosnia, four times the size of Slovenia or the FYROM or Kosovo and
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many many times bigger than Montenegro in population terms. So it’s a
fairly big country by West Balkan standards, geographically very
important and thirdly it holds an influence beyond the Serbian border, as
we all know, in Bosnia through the Republica Serbska, in Kosovo still
with all the enclaves in Northern Kosovo and all issues pending, in
Montenegro in its vicinity.
So for all these reasons, Serbia is central, Serbia is important and Serbia
can provide us with an interesting launching pad, point of departure for
our discussion on Balkan stability today.
Now, unlike most of the rest of the former Eastern Europe - Eastern
Europe is no more, it went away together with the Cold War in one way
but nevertheless what used to be this Eastern Europe prior to 1989 –
unlike the rest of Eastern Europe, places like Poland, Hungary and even
Bulgaria and Romania, the European choice in Serbia remained debated
after the fall of communism in 1988-1991 and the dilemma and the
debate internally was re-invigorated more recently, surprisingly so in the
2000, the decade we are in now. That is, whereas for the rest of EastEuropeans the European choice seemed inevitable and undisputed more
or less, in Serbia where to look, look East, look West remained – and
even in the last elections, last May – an issue with a strong constituency
within the Republic claiming an anti-European if you want or a Euroskeptical path. I’ll talk about the elections and the recent developments
and the formation at last after so many weeks of this new government
and what it promises and what it signifies for Serbian and Balkan politics
in general.
So, Serbia is important for a number of reasons and in Serbia we have
seen a certain contest, if you want, between Russia and Europe for the
country.
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My third point - and I have seven for you this morning – has to do with the
developments after 2000. My argument here is that the revolution, the
glorious democratic revolution of September 24th 2000 that toppled – well
at 24th were the elections, October 5th, it was a Thursday, if I remember
correctly 2000 – that toppled Milosevic, remained at a minimum
incomplete, at a maximum failed (the revolution of 2000).
In a way Milosevic was defeated and ousted, but Milosevicism remained.
It reminds me of what the Yugoslavs use to say in the 1980s: “After Tito,
Tito”. This shows you the depth of the communist paranoia some times you know, Tito had died, but Tito remained in a sense in the 1980s. One
can say with certain adaptations similar things about Serbia in the 2000,
this decade of ours. “After Milosevic, Milosevic” if you want or at least
“after Milosevic, the Milosevic agenda” still dominating Serbian politics in
all sorts of ways, mainly through Kosovo, but not only because of
Kosovo. And the carrier of this Milosevic agenda, the carrier of this has
been since 2000, my argument goes, Kostunica.
Kostunica inherited both the constituencies and the politics and the
rhetoric, and to some extent the ideas, of course re-fabricated, readapted, re-modeled, of Milosevic and in that sense provided a strong
impediment for true deep-rooted reforms in Serbia with Kosovo as the
excuse.
Now, Kosovo is a very complicated problem and I know that Aristotelis
will be speaking to you about it in full depth. We have in Greece a
dominant opinion about Kosovo often more extreme than in Serbia, but
that has to do more with Greece than with Kosovo itself. No matter what
one thinks about Kosovo and Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of
independence, the truth of the matter is that it’s a very difficult, very
complicated political problem to which the Serbia nationalists and
Kostunica have never offered a solution. No matter what they claim – you
know, the easy rhetoric – there is no solution; and there is no solution
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because it is very difficult in the 21st century to preserve a neo-colonialist
project in the heart of Europe. That is to go against the overwhelming
wishes of the local population of 2 million and growing Albanians in the
country. Autonomy, bigger or smaller autonomy, the fact of the matter is
that if Kosovo remains within Serbia, Kosovars might be the largest
political party in Belgrade and have a determining say in Serbian politics
in ways that is unacceptable to Serbs and especially to Serbian
nationalists, making the whole situation and the whole compromise very
very difficult. But I will leave Kosovo aside because I don’t want to steal
of the many valuable remarks that Aristotelis will give you.
My fourth point is that Serbian politics have been volatile as the politics of
many East European countries. Now we see a certain normalization little
by little, it’s a very slow process and we see the emergence of two poles
which is healthy, a bipolar system, a center-left and center-right. In the
center-right, right, extreme right – call it whatever – nationalist right, you
have the merging potentially of Kostunica with the radicals - we have
already seen that in the post-election negotiations – and in the center-left
and an unlikable partnership that have formed the new government in
Serbia between the former Socialists of Milosevic and their biggest foes,
the Democrats of Tadic, the former Gigic, but the Socialists since then
have reformed, have Europeanized, have espoused more or less the
European agenda, and so we have the convergence of the Socialists, the
small Socialist party – what is left of the old Socialist party – with the
Democrats of Boris Tadic, the President forming the new government in
Serbia. So, we see the emergence of two poles – I will claim – if the
process continues, that can provide stable democratic politics for Serbia this is a hopeful sign – alternating in power like in any other wellfunctioning European country, including my own, Greece.
Now, we have an unfortunate development since we are taking about
Serbia and the Western Balkans and this has to do with Lisbon. We live
in an interconnected world - we often forget all those connections, we
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tend to focus on the narrow and forget the broader - but the defeat of the
Lisbon Treaty in Ireland has a direct impact on the Balkans and on
enlargement.
Now, on the inauguration of the French Presidency which took place in a
grandiose typically French fashion in Paris a few days ago, President
Sarkozy - beloved President Sarkozy these days in my country and in
many other parts of Europe, but not in France, by the way – President
Sarkozy declared boldly that enlargement is unthinkable without
institutional changes in Europe first. That is, without passing the Lisbon,
enlargement is no more. And so we already see that the victim of these
Irish voters assess the Irish vote as a whole.
But anyway, the abortion-hating, catholic, obsessed anti-globalization
Irish constituency that voted against the Lisbon Treaty, the first and
foremost victim of them is going to be the Western Balkans and
enlargement. There is no doubt in my mind. And this is very unfortunate
both because enlargement has been the single most success story in
Europe the last 20 years and because Europe is the single strongest
stabilizer in Eastern Europe and reform-driver in Eastern Europe and the
Balkans in particular. And the weaker Europe and the European project,
the weaker this reformers drive will be and positive changes in our region
will be and I think that this is something that we will come to regret.
Already we see a slowing of this reformist drive in much of the preaccession countries, we see it in a massive way, almost violent way,
mind-boggling way, this regression of reform in Turkey, for example,
these days. And I will say that the Turkish developments are both very
negative and alarming, what is going on there, it is connected to a great
extent – but not exclusively - with the slowing down of enlargement. It
obviously has to do with domestic politics in Turkey, but it shows the
difficulties that we are faced with all across Southeastern Europe today.
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A return to violence is not probable for sure, with a slight exception of
Turkey, where the possibility of civil war has increased in the last two
months, I would claim, but this is a whole other subject, if you want, but in
the rest of Southeastern Europe the return of violence is not probable, I
believe, but the slowing down of the reformist drive is already with us,
both in countries that have acceded like Bulgaria and Romania - a natural
process; whenever a country gets in, the first few years are always
difficult, they were difficult for Greece, they were difficult for many other
countries, they are difficult for Bulgaria and Romania – but also, and this
is the surprise, for the countries to accede, where they should be like
Serbia or the FYROM or Bosnia, where reforms should have progressed
much faster. The only exception, and I think it's a foregone conclusion, I
believe is Croatia which I believe is soon to become a member despite
this deterioration of the wider environment.
Where does my country stand, Greece? And I will conclude with a few
thoughts on that matter. No matter what one believes or thinks of the
disintegration of Yugoslavia, and the regrettable process of violent
disintegration of Yugoslavia - and the Greeks were all very negative and
felt very negatively about this disintegration – the disintegration of
Yugoslavia in geostrategic terms in the long-run has benefited Greece.
Let’s be clear about that. Because with the absence of Yugoslavia, the
Big Yugoslavia that dominated the Balkans, Greece’s role in the Balkans
has enlarged and Greece can play a leadership role that in the presence
of Yugoslavia could not play back in the Cold War and could not play
after the Cold War. Greece is investing, is trading, is playing a leadership
political role in ways that would have been unthinkable has Belgrade
been what it used to be.
Now, there has been a lot initially and there continues to be regional
instability produced by this disintegration and the Greek political elites,
media elite especially and other have often focused more on this
instability and the negative aspects rather than the opportunities arising
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from this development and in the past and more recently as well in a
sense, what I call, over-macedonizing the response to the developments
in the North.
I am one of those who believe that Greece has not fully exercised its
potential. It has the potential to play a very constructive role in places like
Kosovo between the Liberals in Belgrade and the Albanian leadership in
Kosovo and Brussels. It is the oldest EU member in the region, it has a
fully-functioning market and well developed and growing economy. It has
a number of assets that if, and they haven't yet been fully exploited, in
alliance with other EU countries like Austria or Italy with great interest in
the region, can make a big difference.
I feel that in Europe, European countries overall have been the victims of
what I call the Zapatero syndrome in Spain, that is, these countries that
used to be much more active abroad, recently have become more
introvert, domestically oriented, domestically consumed. And I think that
Spain is a very good example, Spain was very active in the 1980s and
the 1990s and is no longer, it no longer plays the role that it used to in
Europe these days. I think it would be regrettable if we were in Greece to
be affected by this Zapatero syndrome – regrettable for Greece and
regrettable for the region – and this is up for graps and my own
conclusion, my own judgment remains inconclusive and to be seen in the
future.
I will not bother you with more and I hope that there will be a few
questions to continue our conversation both in the room and maybe
outside and I turn to my chairman. Thank you.
Back to agenda
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“The Euro-Atlantic Prospects of the Western Balkans”
Dr Tziampiris Aristotelis, Assistant Professor of International
Relations University of Piraeus, Member of the Scientific Board of
Defense Analysis Institute (I.A.A.)
Let me first thank the organizers of the Conference for having me back
this year and I also have to say that I feel very honored and flattered to
be on this panel with this specific make-up, chaired by Professor
Arvanitopoulos.
Now, let me also explain that I was asked to talk about the Western
Balkans and the Western Balkans are full of controversies and
sensitivities, so let me be very clear, I am only expressing here my
personal opinions and furthermore what I’ll try to say is what I see
happening so this does not mean that I endorse these development or I
like these developments. As an academic I'm just going to try to make an
assessment of what I see happening. So let me be very clear-cut about
this.
Let me also stress that first and foremost for the countries of the Western
Balkans that EU membership is not a mere tactical goal. It is a strategic
goal of the highest possible significance. And it is a common strategic
goal, a goal shared by all Balkan states including - I think, I hope, I
predict – Serbia.
Now, is this realization, the realization of these strategic goals realistic?
There are some reasons - believe it or not – for optimism. First, the
Western Balkans are located in Europe. They are without any doubt part
of Europe. Debates raging about whether Turkey or the Ukraine are nonEuropean states, are simply non applicable to the Western Balkans. In
this sense the Western Balkans are lucky, they are fortunate, for they
have won a geopolitical lottery of sorts.
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Secondly, in terms of total population and economic size, the
incorporation of the Western Balkans into the EU would not alter any
existing balances within the Union. Unlike Turkey demographic, cultural
and economic realities would not be much affected.
Third the EU, the European Union, cannot claim with credibility to have or
aspire a global role, to have an influential global voice, the EU cannot
claim the right to address issues as is Iran, Iraq, North Korea, global
warming, etc, if it has failed to deal with the Balkans, if it has failed – so
to speak – to successfully take care of their own backyard.
So from an EU perspective a combination of moral obligations and
enlightened self-interest suggest a positive, optimistic scenario for the
accession of the Western Balkans into the Union. And this scenario may
well be eventually actualized. However, there are quite a few problems
and let me first say a few problems from the EU point of view.
There are emerging obstacles that are really threatening to block an
outcome and these obstacles are both humorous and formidable. Let’s
consider the institutional hurdles. First, France has legislated a
constitutional amendment requiring a referendum for every prospective
EU member and Austria has expressed a similar intent but based on
political statements and not on changes in law. The chances of a positive
vote on Turkey are probably small, I can understand that. But what is
interesting is one has to wonder whether French or Austrian citizens
down the road, how they might react to the thought of new Union
members such as Albania or tiny Montenegro. I’m not saying they will
vote “no”, but I’m saying they will vote in France. And so that’s a hurdle
that has to be overcome; it didn’t exist a few years ago.
The prospect of sharing political decision-making with 7 new Balkan
states is also sometimes viewed in a skeptical manner. In such a
scenario many small and weak countries will have VETO power and
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there might effectively two Albanian votes, for example, in the European
Council. Reaching agreement in the Council will thus inevitably become
more difficult and I'm not saying these are obstacles that cannot or
should not be surmounted, but I’ve talked to enough decision-makers
who know that this is a concern in some countries.
And the European Council has also been stressing the Union's
absorption capacity - there's a phase, this is not a new concept; it’s
actually part of the Copenhagen criteria, if you look at them – but
however singling out is significant not least because it emphasizes an illdefined and highly subjective element in the enlargement process.
And finally – well there’s one more point that Dimitris said – but there’s
also the specter of Turkey’s accession and that complicates everything.
The more the Western Balkans European perspective is linked to
Turkey’s, the worse the results will be for the region. Witness the
expected referenda that were probably designed to block Turkey, but will
affect all Western Balkan states, with the exception of Croatia.
Although there are undisputable advantages to Turkey’s European path,
in the final analysis, Turkey can survive and thrive without the European
Union; the Western Balkans cannot. And there’s now a new development
- and Dimitris mentioned it – and it’s the European Union before it moves
on to further enlargements, has to figure out it’s going to be governed
and now a shadow has been cast upon the Lisbon Treaty.
But there are also some significant problems within the Western Balkans.
It’s not just what the EU does. This is a game that has – let’s say – two
sides. One is what happens in the European Union or what I see
happening there and then developments in the Western Balkans.
Three issues that I highlighted to talk about here today: 1) Serbia – I’ll
say a few things because I was completely covered by Dimitris, 2) also
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Kosovo – I was hoping he would address Kosovo, but I will say a few
things and then I’ll also talk about the name dispute.
Now, Serbia – we heard an entire presentation so I’ll just say two things.
One is, it is impossible to envision stability in the Western Balkans
without a stable and prosperous Serbia. Serbia is simply too big, historic
and important a state to be ignored or by-passed in consideration of the
recent future.
A truly unfortunate development would entail Serbia’s permanently
turning against the EU as a result of Kosovo, but I don't see that
happening. It is as imperative that a wounded nation should not feel
further humiliated but assert its European identity in the future. Alas, as is
usually the case, most of the burden will probably fall on Serbia’s political
forces and societies.
And the second point that I would like to make is that in terms of…let me
put it this way: there is no country, group of countries or alliance that can
rival the European Union in what it can offer Serbia institutionally,
politically and economically. So, let me repeat this point because I fell
very strong about it: there is no country, set of countries or alliance that
can rival the European Union in what it can offer Serbia on three crucial
levels economically, institutionally and politically. And I think these are
points to keep in mind when we discuss Serbia.
Kosovo, it’s a big diplomatic problem and I’m stating the obvious, I’m not
doing anything more. And it has various dimensions. Kosovo has never
been an issue between just two groups, it's not an issue that is to be
dealt with, with just the Serbs and the Albanians. It has always been an
issue with significant regional and international ramifications. And it’s
because of that that it has been such an intractable problem to be solved
and it’s impossible to solve it here today.
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I just want to make out two points. One is, it’s surely affecting Serbia, it
has affected Serbia and this is something that is up to the Serbian people
to decide how they want to proceed with it. But the EU has also been
affected by Kosovo. And I think that there is a paradox going on. On the
one hand, the future of Kosovo is European and the European Union will
play a very significant role in what happens now in Kosovo – no doubt
about that. At the same time there is not a common EU position on the
recognition of Kosovo. Some countries have recognized it, some others
including Greece have not and some vow never to do so. And to me
again as an academic this perhaps highlights the Achilles heel of the
European Union which is the difficulty to speak with a united political
voice. I’m not saying…I understand all the reasons and there are some
very good reasons for countries not to recognize it, I know the debate, I
totally understand it. I’m just making the point. It’s sometimes difficult for
the European Union to have a collective voice, political voice even on
European issues. But having said that, let me stress yet again that what
happens in Kosovo in the future, the EU plays a central role. There’s no
doubt about that.
And finally, let me say a few things about this favorite topic here in
Greece, but very significant one and that is the name dispute. This
dispute is not just about a name. It goes much much deeper and it
involves issues of identity, first and foremost, and also issues of history
and symbols. And there’s an economic dimension as well. but if you
include identity, symbols, history, nothing can be more significant,
nothing can be more visceral. In this room, there are a lot of people
coming from the military. And people with a military background – I think
all of us here have served in the Greek military – they understand the
value of symbols. People often die for a flag, for example. And so this
dispute is not just about a name, it’s about identity, symbols, history and
culture. In this sense it’s often misunderstood abroad.
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It also pertains to a dramatic and traumatic historical record that is really
recent; it’s not ancient. And the key then being the Greek civil war and its
aftermath. More recently there have been numerous provocations – from
a Greek perspective – and this has made things even harder.
Now, why am I mentioning all this? Not to give a lecture on the name
dispute, but to stress, predict that the Greek VETO that was placed
essentially in Bucharest will also apply to the European Union unless
there is a satisfactory resolution of this dispute. Again this is my
prediction but I think this is how things are progressing.
And let me also stress that it’s in many ways unfortunate because right
now Greece has officially, publicly and with almost complete political
support changed its position accepting a compound name with a
geographical connotation. This is new. So, the Greek position on the
name dispute is that of a compromise and it’s a carrot and stick
approach; we have the VETO and we have a new position that is
conducive to a compromise. Alas, it has not been reciprocated.
But this issue is the only issue that has brought a million Greeks in the
streets in the past 20-25 years. We often here abroad people saying
“Well, we don’t understand this issue, we don’t care, it’s ridiculous”. The
truth of the matter is this has been the most sensitive issue here in
Greece the past 20-25 years. And, unless there’s a resolution, it’s a kind
of issue that might have real ramifications for the Euro-Atlantic progress
of at least one Western Balkan state. So, that has to be addressed and I
say that it’s really unfortunate when you have a real chance to see all
these provocations and we can pick this up in the discussion.
I’m not going to say much more and again Serbia, Kosovo, FYROM:
excellent topics for discussion and perhaps some heated discussion as
well.
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In conclusion then, let me stress that there’s not much room for mistakes.
With the Western Balkan states having to exhibit now consistent and
persistent reform efforts, advocates of regional enlargements will have to
realize that the “one size fits all” rhetoric is insufficient. And that they will
now have to present different arguments to different constituencies.
Hopes that enlargement will proceed because the EU has internalized a
moral imperative are futile, in my opinion. Nor will the Union be
blackmailed by arguments to the effect that unless the accession process
is completed the region will turn to war and crime. Such a line of thought
raises the precept that the Union will incorporate unwanted levels of
instability and uncertainty which will in fact block enlargement. This is not
the way to argue for enlargement.
We are now entering…in fact I think we have already entered a period
which could be called the long wait. The EU should make it much more
interesting for the countries hoping to accede and the Western Balkans
should get their act together as quickly as possible, resolve serious,
outstanding political issues and problems and let us hope that Turkey’s
European adventure will not spoil the more optimistic, but necessary
scenario that brings the Western Balkans into Euro-Atlantic structures.
Thank you very much.
Back to agenda
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99
Q&A
Barkin Kayaoglu (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs):
Thank you, Mr Chairman. I’m going to somewhat exploit Greek hospitality
and make a couple of comments, because my country’s name was
mentioned in more than one presentations. To remind participants I’m
Barkin Kayaoglu from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and while I’m
going to make this intervention, I’m wondering if it’s at all possible to
open the presentation of Mr Savva on the screen because there’s one
little thing that I want to show there.
First, what I would like to say to Professor Keridis. Well, sir, I know that
what happens in Turkey could be magnified and it’s followed with great
interest here in your country, but I would have to throw a bucket of cold
water as to what you just said about the potential of having a civil war in
Turkey. I think it's an over-usage of imagination in what is actually a
political and legal matter and we have to find the people who are able
and willing to kill each other for a civil war, if I’m not wrong. So, we will
probably have to import mercenaries for that.
Second, I would like to thank both Professor Filis and Mr Savva for their
well thought-out presentations. One point for Professor Filis, I really don't
know what our problem was with the Blue Stream. As far as I’m
concerned we have an excellent cooperation with Russia in the energy
field, but maybe Mr Savva could comment on that as well – whatever
problem there is.
About Mr Savva presentation, I would just kindly remind you that I
couldn’t see the slide so it’s probably not that easy to open it. I think it
was the third one from the end showing the map of Eurasian pipelines.
(Yes, that one. Thank you so much.) I need to see the South-East of
Turkey, but anyway…I have to remind you that there are also other
projects and still untapped potential as to Iraq and the Arab national gas
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pipeline project that will come from Egypt. I checked my numbers when I
came here and I understand that Egypt has a potential of almost 42
trillion m3 of national gas and Iraq has some 10 trillion. So, those are the
untapped potential that we still have into the game.
Last comment. Could we see Mr Savva last slide, please? And this will
bring me to what Mr Tziampiris said. This is a very nice slide and it
actually gave some ideas about our never-ending European journey. Mr
Savva kindly added our North-Western tip to EU, so maybe that’s going
to be our alternative, you know do it bit by bit.
I would like to thank you all for listening to me and…(Turkish)
Mr Savva:
Thank you so much for these comments. I would agree with most of the
comments produced previously on the subject. And the message of our
presentation was cooperation is the best form for the implementation of
specific projects and for the realization of endeavors of countries of the
region and of partners that are involved in various fields of cooperation in
the Southeastern Europe. I would like to point out that our cooperation
with Turkey and especially on the Blue Stream project is excellent and
very efficient. We have to take into account - that is not just to contravene
with the statements of Dr Filis, because I have the impression that we are
just complementing in various aspects and with various opinions and
various comments on the same subject. But I would say that we have to
take into account that projects of large scale which presume investments
of tens of billions of dollars have a long history to be implemented and
different stages. And of course we started from an idea and we now are
at the stage through the Blue Stream and thanks to this project we can
pump to the Turkish market about 16 billion m3 of gas. Of course the
capacity is not used at a full extent but that may depend on many factors.
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So the purpose in trading is not just to pump a commodity but to provide
it when there is a demand on a specific market. So, this may also affect
the rate of effectiveness of a specific project and we look forward to fully
using the capacity of Blue Stream and more than that: there is a proposal
suggested by the Russian side to further increase and even to double the
existing transport capacity of the Blue Stream. We hope that it will
become a reality on the basis of the cooperation with our friendly,
neighboring Turkey. Thank you.
Professor Keridis (civil war comment):
Thank you. I understand your discomfort with this. I spoke of a possibility.
I didn’t speak of a reality or a certainty; a possibility among others. And
it’s something that I don't consider very likely, but it is a possibility, I think.
Now, I would like to comment on your care-free attitude by reminding you
of the fact that Turkey has been through a civil war recently no matter
what you might say of mercenaries. I am a political scientist and an IR,
an International Relations theorist, and in my field, any violent conflict
with more than 1.000 people dead is considered a war and anything that
happens within the territory of a country is a civil war. With this definition
in mind, what went on in the Turkish South-East after 1984 can be
classified and has been classified in the international bibliography as a
civil war as that. Now, you may use any kind of political beautification you
may want, but there were several times that number of victims in the
South-East, Turkish citizens, of different ethnic origins – one might claim
– but nevertheless in the South-East. Now, we have a process today in
Turkey, very unfortunate and very risky, I believe, - and I speak as a
friend of Turkey – whereas not only the largest party of Turkey – 47% of
the vote in the recent elections - is ready to be banned by your
Constitutional Court, but also the main Kurdish party, the two of them
representing 85% of the votes in the last elections in the South-East - the
overwhelming majority of Turkey's South-East citizens-voters - are to be
banned by your Court. And that’s closing the political road, the political
expression to them. Now, as an outsider, I believe that the political paths
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are closed, non-political, extra-political, extra-parliamentary paths might
open and this is very dangerous, I believe. Now, many people in Europe,
sir, unfortunately might welcome this development. Many people in
Europe who are very skeptical of Turkey and have done everything
possible to destroy Turkey’s accession hopes, including President
Sarkozy, might celebrate and this is a proof of the undemocratic Eastern
Oriental - whatever you want – Asian, Asiatic nature of Turkey. I am not
one of them. And I believe that the recent crisis that keeps on escalating
is very dangerous, it’s full of risks and if we need to pour cold water,
buckets of cold water, it should not be in this room, but in Ankara. And I
am ready to help you pour as many of those buckets of water in Ankara
to the hot heads of Ankara as possible and I can join you in that effort if
you want. Thank you.
Dr Filis:
Concerning the Blue Stream, the initial agreement was for the
consumption of 16-17 billion m3 by Turkey a year. Three years after the
Blue Stream works at one third of its capacity. Turkey does not consume
from the Blue Stream more than 7-8 billion m3. So this is what I consider
to be a problem. Some of you might assess that this is too early after only
three years after its completion. But still, it is a fact that Turkey consumes
about one third of the full capacity which means that Blue Stream does
not operate in full capacity. This is number one and number two: there
were some thoughts on the Russian side that they should go ahead with
Blue Stream II. Instead, for the time being, they decided to go ahead with
South Stream. This implies something for me; I hope it implies something
for you too. Thanks.
Defense Attaché from the Republic of Serbia in Athens:
I would like to make some comments concerning the speech of Dr Keridis
about of course Kosovo. I can agree more or less with his observation
about what is going on in Kosovo, but one thing is not true. As you said
Kostunica didn’t offer anything during the negotiation process, I must say
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that we offered during this negotiation process a lot, but it was not a
negotiation process, because, as you know, from the beginning Kosovo
Albanian representatives held the same stance “No negotiations. We only
want independence, not more, not less." Our stance was constantly “Ok.
We are going to do and give you everything except changing borders and
sovereignty of Serbia.” This is the only point I want to stress About the
others, we can agree or not in many ways and probably what you said is
something very simple. There are no bad and good guys in Serbia now
and this simple picture with democratic, nationalism and Milosevic – as
you said – is in the past. Now, Serbia is a strictly democratic country. Of
course in this scope, in this composite it also consists of some parts of
nationalism, alike, for example, here in Greece and other countries.
Thank you very much.
Professor Keridis:
I agree with the basic thinking of your comment, about the negotiations,
etc. and I do believe that Serbia has a very strong legal position in the
Kosovo matter. It’s something that I have written about and have said it
time and again. There are many hypocrites and a lot of hypocrisies
surrounding Kosovo however; on all sides, everywhere. And because I
have been speaking with your leadership, the leadership in Belgrade for
quite a long time and I have come to know the place very very well and
have it close to my heart, whenever I ask people of the Kostunica camp,
Kostunica himself, of the implications of their proposals for Serbia in the
future, they don’t come up with an answer. This is what I meant. That is,
if Kosovo remains within Serbia, are these nationalists ready and willing
to accept an Albanian-speaking Prime Minister of Serbia? Because the
long-term implication is that you are going to have a large Albanian party
in the Serbian Parliament in Belgrade and that Albanian Kosovars will
have a say in the future of Serbia. This is the implication of keeping
Kosovo within Serbia. And this is what I mean “have we thought through
the political (implication)?” Because ultimately this is a political problem,
it’s not only legal. It’s first and foremost a political problem. The political
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implications of that, having Kosovo with a growing population, playing
such a dominant role in that Serbia.
Now, there are many alternatives. A Serbia that is not democratic: that
was the case in the past. Keep Kosovo, but not have democracy so
Kosovars will not have a say. This is no longer an option and I’m not in
favor of that, because I believe in a Serbia democratic and in Europe.
You may say that these Kosovars will not have a say in Belgrade. That
they will be a completely separate constituency. But then what is the
meaning of this autonomy within Serbia? I mean, are we playing with
words, are we playing with names? Either they are within and have a say
in Belgrade or they are outside and they don’t have a say in Belgrade.
But they cannot be inside and outside. All these are complicated matters
and I'm afraid that the debate in Serbia itself has not advanced to the
truths of the matters, because it’s such an emotional issue, it’s so
charged, it’s so politicized by all constituencies. We suffer the same
problems in other fields. I mean here in Greece and in other countries,
this is a very serious situation, I understand, and I understand how
democracies work. But nevertheless I am only saying that we have to be
truthful and see the long-term implications of the Kostunica position for
Serbia. That’s all I say. And see the risks and dangers for Serbia. Thank
you.
Back to agenda
105
"The Middle East, the Eastern Mediterranean: mutual implications,
regional super powers, dangerous instabilities”
Dr Nachmani Amikam, Associate Professor of Political Studies, BarIlan University
Thank you very much. Good morning. First of all, let me thank the
organizers for the invitation to be here. I am indebted.
I will use a lot the word dramatic, because I cannot describe in a better
way the changes taking place recently in the Eastern Mediterranean. My
thesis is rather simple. The more the official Turkey focuses on becoming
a member of the EU, the less Turkey is ready to play a major role - I
mean a role expected form its status and strength - in the Middle East
and Central Asia. The result: other actors attempt to become the Middle
East regional super powers.
And I will start with Turkey. The international situation of Turkey has
changed dramatically for the better during the last 10-15 years. Globally
speaking there are not many parallels to this betterment. Turkey now
enjoys, in my opinion, many parallels with the hay-days of Great Britain in
the 19th century, even with the better sides of the splendid isolation
enjoyed then by Great Britain.
To put it briefly, Turkey located at the frontier of the Middle East is not a
party to the region’s conflicts and wars. Instead it focuses on its official
aim to become an EU member. Great Britain in its relation with Europe in
the 19th century enjoyed a similar status and focus in enlarging its
empire.
My second comment relates to methodology. It is impossible to
understand the present without focusing on the history of the last 15-18
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years. Hence, my presentation will be divided almost half-half between
history and presence. I will begin with history.
One of the explanations given to the policies of Washington in many
places around the world is; as a young nation, the United States has no
sense of history. As far as the Americans are concerned the past began
in 1945. We mentioned this disadvantage of being young. You all
remember that a few years ago when the museums were robbed in
Baghdad, one of the explanations was that it could happen only under
American responsibility. The reason: Americans lack a sense of history.
Ok. I’m not going to refute or confirm this saying. True. America is a
young nation; probably among the youngest of nations, but probably with
the longest of memories. I think this long memory of the US has and will
have a lot to do with the Turkish decision not to grant of passage through
her territory to American troops on their way to Iraq.
And the war in Iraq in 2003. In March 2003, Turkey did not permit
American troops to invade Iraq via its territory. Instead the American
military has to circumvent Turkey and to attack Iraq from its Southern
border only instead of a planned simultaneous pincer-like attack from
North and South. Frustrated Americans argued that had Iraq been
invaded through Turkey, the Sunni remains of the defeated Iraqi army
who are now launching terror campaigns against the American military in
Iraq would have been neutralized.
Another result of the Turkish refusals was that one of the US divisions
intended for the invasion was forced to relocate and was unable to take
part in the operation until well in the war.
Yet the initial American attack on Iraq in March 2003 resulted in the death
of a relatively small number of American GIs and the number is 182
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soldiers in the period March-May 2003. The 1st of May was the day when
President Bush declared the end of major combat operations in Iraq.
This brought little criticism against Turkey. Later however, when the
Americans suffered heavy casualties, a different music was heard. Had
Turkey allowed us to attack Iraq via its territory, the results would have
been totally different.
Conversely, one hears in Ankara that it was the US that so heavily
destabilized the internal Iraqi order. It was the US that did not consult
with Turkey before invading Iraq. It was the US that acted in Iraq against
Turkey's specific requests and advice. It is the presence of the US in Iraq
- so say the Turks - and in Afghanistan that cause Iran to become
nuclear. More so, argue people in Turkey, Saddam Hussein managed to
curb Kurdish Iraqi nationalism. As long as Saddam was in power, the
autonomous Kurdish region in the North of Iraq was heavily dependent
on Turkey for supplies, medicines, food, energy, etc. The destruction of
the regime n Baghdad meant that the Kurds in the North of Iraq won
accessibility to energy and other sources and became less dependent on
Turkey.
Now, how does the Turkish design policy to become a member of the EU
affect Ankara’s interactions in the Middle East? Is there a contradiction
between Ankara’s aspirations in Europe and its relations and policies
towards the Middle East?
Statistics and figures show that for the foreseeable future EU-Turkey
relations will dominate Turkish economy and politics. Indeed the two
contract deep trade relationships. And the EU ranks by far as number
one in both Turkey’s imports and exports, while Turkey ranks 7 th in the
EU’s top imports and 5th in the export market.
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The overwhelming attention paid by Turkey towards the EU could be
learnt from events in 2007. Most scholars would agree that the year 2007
was a lost year as regards Turkey’s efforts towards accession. 2007 was
a year for EU reforms, lamented Turkey’s Foreign Minister Ali Babacan.
Among other reasons, Turkey's EU accession reforms slowed down last
year due to general elections in Turkey in July 2007 and its Parliament
resulting long recess. Yet in spite of this slow down nearly 213 meetings
on EU-Turkish issues have been held since last fall. 17 Turkish
delegations were sent to Brussels in the last five months. More than 40
visits were paid to EU countries at the level of Prime Minister and State
Minister and Prime Minister Erdogan visited five EU countries in the last
five months.
But the Turkish wish to become an EU member produces other policies
as well. The idea that Ankara should focus on Europe causes people in
Turkey to think that it would be senseless, futile, if not totally stupid – I
heard the word idiotic as well – for their country to become embroiled in
conflicts in other regions. Central Asia and the Middle East, places where
Turkey traditionally has special ethnic and economic interests witnessed
a different, probably a secondary level of Turkish interaction and
involvement.
Turkey’s influencing the Turkic Republics of Central Asia has often
collided with similar interests of Russia and Iran. With EU being the prime
aim of Turkey, Ankara prefers not to exacerbate their relations with
Moscow and Tehran over Central Asian markets and influence.
The Middle East where Turkey is the strongest actor practically feels a
lack from Turkish involvement. Ankara is ready to accommodate peace
negotiations, to intermediate, to be the courier, to deliver messages, to
promise investments, but only after peace will prevail or settlement will be
reached in the Middle East. Ankara is reluctant to act like a regional
super power, to be the region’s policeman, to send troops when needed,
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to help in policing the region; but most important to stipulate the
application of arrangements and settlements in the region by its consent
or VETO.
Such is the Turkey participation in the UNIFIL II mission in Lebanon. The
Turkish body of the force in UNIFIL is military engineers, not combat
troops that help with the civil reconstruction of Lebanon following the war
of 2006. A mere single Turkish boat participates in the naval element of
UNIFIL II. Even this limited participation evoked resistance at home, I
mean in Turkey.
If one looks for the precedent of a country that thrives to become the
region's sheriff, then the Iranian behavior is that of an actor that wishes to
become one.
The end result of Turkey focusing on Europe and the reluctance to take
risks in the Middle East, is that the strongest actor in the region i.e.
Turkey practically has a marginal influence on the present events and
future developments.
More so, when Turkey does not strive to become the regional super
power, the area is open for Iranian hegemony. You go from Iraq to Syria
to Lebanon to Gaza and you will understand what I mean by Iranian
hegemony. Presently Iran aspires to become the regional super power, in
particular after the possible disappearance, perhaps even disintegration
of Iraq as a result of the war in 2003 that lasts up to nowadays. That is to
say go and learn from Tehran what to do if you want to become the
regional super power.
How different is this situation from a scenario envisaged by the Times
magazine some years ago? The Times put an advertisement and the
advertisement goes like this: the title is “Help wanted” and it called for “I
need a nation to serve as a go-between for the Western World and the
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Middle East that would assist in turning suspicion into cooperation. The
candidate must be a firm US-European ally desiring closer ties yet,
Islamic in religion and culture, capable of serving as a role model of
secularized Western democracy for other Muslim states.” Having ethnic
links with some of those states, a booming free-market economy,
permitting some assistance to poorer brothers were also among the job
specifications.
The mission also had benefits: regional super power within few years and
possible major influence on wider world affairs. The magazine then
concluded "There is no need to look for such a country. Turkey fits every
specification. Moreover it wants the job." Turkey does not want the job.
In the year 1998, Syria and Turkey were on the verge of an open conflict
following the support that Damascus gave to the Kurdish PKK on their
ground. Since then the relations between Ankara and Syria changed with
an impressive increase in trade. Turkey is Syria’s largest sixth trade
partner, the mutual annual trade is close to $3 billion, mutual visits by
head of states and frequent meetings between high ranking military
echelons.
Syria’s
ambassador
in
Washington,
Imad
Mustafa
characterizes his country’s ties with Turkey as a honeymoon and the best
possible relations between any two neighboring countries in the world.
The Turkish stand on the issue is apparently simple and I quote “After
making peace with the Greeks, why should we fight with Syria and Iran?
What is the benefit of this fight? Of course these are relations which are
not very easy for Turkey at all. Our strategic ally, the US does not want
us to establish any relations with these countries and moreover it
demands that we sever these relations. This is one of the hardest issues
my government has to cope with.”
Now, a summation of Turkish-Syria relations by a Turkish analyst at the
US War College describes the complexity and the implications that this
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system bears for Turkish-American relations. “Syria is perceived as the
underdog against the US. So, the more the US says don’t talk to Syria,
the more it will become attractive for Turkish public opinion. And that may
be why Syrian President Bashar al-Assad got such a warm welcome on
the recent trip to Turkey.”
Now, a recipe for improvement of the relations in the East Mediterranean,
in fact anywhere in the world, was eventually found. As far back as 1996,
a meeting of the Turkish entrepreneurs convened in Smirni or Ismir. They
concluded that once the annual trade between two countries reached the
two billion dollar threshold, soldiers and politicians would be much less
eager and unable to orchestrate crises. Indeed, see the development in
the volume of trade between Turkey and Greece. This stood on $450
million in the year 1999 for a combined population then of more than 75
or close to 80 million people. It tripled itself and reached more than $1.3
billion in 2003. A year ago, it crossed the $4 billion line. In particular,
energy and tourism increased.
In fact, Athens and Ankara dealt systematically with most of the disputed
territorial, energy and sovereignty issues that for years marred and
despaired their relations. They even coordinated policies regarding major
foreign policy issues. Ankara’s views pertaining to Iraq, Iran, Syria and
the Palestinian-Israeli conflict resembled that of Athens; more precisely
that of the EU and not of the US.
Similarly a year ago the volume of trade between Turkey and Israel
crossed the $4 billion a year. This renders the Turkish-Israeli interaction
or the Turkish-Greek interaction more permanent as a structure whose
components have an interest of their survival over the length of time.
Middle classes and elites in the three countries have mutual trade
contacts, may as a result have a vested interest in the survival of the
trade and its development.
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Take the example of Israel and Turkey. More than between any two
Middle Eastern countries, the bilateral Turkish-Israeli civil trade, military
and tourism excluded - I emphasize civil trade – is the highest in the
Middle East. This non-military aspect of the relation gives a wide basis to
the pyramid, probably projecting longevity.
For comparison all other bilateral special relations of my country i.e.
Israel with France in the 1950s, Iran in 1970s, Ethiopia and South Africa
in the 1980s all crashed; and were principally of one dimension, the
military or governmental one and lacked the above civilian wits of the
pyramid.
Allow me to have a word on Cyprus. I will not bother you with the details
of the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan’s plan for a unified bi-zone loose
federal Cyprus. It is 1.200 pages, with the appendices it reached 9.000
pages, some say 12.000 pages. Now, Israel keeps a close eye on the
negotiations, as from May 1st 2004 the EU is 30 minutes from Rome, 30
minutes from Tel Aviv. It will become harder for the Israeli to dismiss the
EU, which is now closer to us, much closer than Washington and to
ignore the EU's interest in the Middle East.
Now, while in principle Turkey is against the Iranian plans to acquire
nuclear military capability, Ankara refuses to impose a trade boycott on
Iran or other sanctions and objects to a military solution to the crisis.
“Diplomacy produces better results”, Ankara contends. And Ankara
blamed the US for preventing the Turkish military from launching largescale attacks in Iraq against the Kurdish PKK underground.
The American rationale is understandable: Northern Iraq and the
autonomous Kurdish region there is the quietest part of that war-torn
country. However the Turkish underground, the PKK, took root in
Northern Iraq. From there it acts its activities against Turkey. Turkey
complains of vicious attacks that are launched from this region against its
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population and troops resulting in the recent killing of hundreds of Turkish
soldiers. “What would Washington do if hundreds of its soldiers were
killed by terrorists who come from Mexico?”, question the Turkish media.
Now, in this context, Israel is also a subject to Turkish criticism. In the
summer of 2006 it found itself a party to Turkish-American conflict. And
I’ll explain. Washington supported then the Israeli attack on Lebanon in
response to the killing of eight Israeli soldiers and the kidnapping of two
others by Lebanese Hezbollah militia. This started the second Lebanese
war.
Allegations of double standards were quick to surface in Ankara against
decision-makers in Washington and the US freedom it gives to Israel to
wage war on Lebanon and the American reluctance to give Turkey the
same in Northern Iraq.
Now, the summation of all the above is a perception in Washington that
the US cannot take Turkey for granted as an ally. The conclusion in
Ankara is no different. Our relations with Washington are tense. Often
Americans ignore Turkish interests. Hence, Turkey cannot be sure that
Washington or NATO will be of assistance during a crisis.
And I want to conclude my short presentation by having a one-sentence
poem of a person who is probably not extremely liked in this country. But
you’ll listen to the poem and understand.
“It is only in a foreign land that you can understand that Greeks are your
long-lost brothers.” Bülent Ecevit, Turkish Prime Minister
Thank you very much.
Back to agenda
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115
“The changing geo-strategic environment in the Middle East and
World Politics”
Dr Koutsis Alexandros, Associate Professor on Middle East Politics,
Panteion University
Thank you, Mr Chairman. Ladies and Gentlemen, my usual practice is to
introduce my presentation with a joke. And I have a joke that befits the
situation in the Middle East today. It concerns a man who was frying fish
and something went wrong and the hot oil fell on his face. The surgeon at
the hospital told him that he has a third degree burn and that the only
thing they could do is have a transplant. But he said to him “My friend,
you are so skinny, where are we going to find the skin to carry out the
transplant?” So, his wife offered herself; to take skin from her and
transplant it on her husband's face. The doctor said No, my lady. I don't
think it is advisable, because the skin I need should be firm, rosy and the
only place it can come from is your backside.” The lady thought for a
moment and said “It’s alright. I’ll sacrifice this for my husband.” So, the
operation went ahead and a week later they removed the bandages and wow – the guy was more beautiful than he was before. Beautiful cheeks,
firm, rosy. Everybody who walked into the room was congratulating him.
After a few days he said to his wife “My dear Maria, I’m sorry but with all
this excitement I forgot to thank you for the sacrifice you have
undertaken. In fact I enjoy seeing myself in the mirror.” And his wife
replied “My darling, you cannot imagine what pleasure I derive every time
I see your mother kiss you on the cheek.”
Ladies and Gentlemen, there is a lot of cheek kissing going on in the
Middle East today.
And with that note, let me pinpoint what sort of changes have happened
in the geopolitical environment in the Middle East. We can all agree that
after the war in Iraq and the invasion of Lebanon, the situation in the
Middle East has changed radically. Usually I start from international
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repercussions and work down to domestic repercussions. Today I will
inverse the process. I will begin with domestic repercussions of these two
wars on the Middle Eastern states. Of course I’m taking the important
repercussions.
The first thing that one can note here is that what we see is the erosion of
the Arab states as a state. We know that modern states derive their
legitimacy from having a monopoly of power and they use this power to
impose peace and defend their territorial integrity and sovereignty. Well,
the war in Iraq and Lebanon has shown that the Arab states – most of the
Arab states – do not have the capability to defend themselves against
external invasion.
On the contrary the guerrilla movements in Iraq and the resistance of
Hezbollah in Lebanon have shown that some effective paramilitary
organizations, like these organizations, can create havoc on an invading
army. So, what we note is the rise, the emergence of a role, a political
role of such groups in the Arab states, but a role that is also demanding
participation in the decision-making process. And we see this with the
Hezbollah in Lebanon. And we see it also with the Sunni groups in Iraq.
And not only that but these groups are also challenging domestic regimes
as far as decision-making and the defense of the country are concerned.
So, we see here the erosion of the Arab states.
What is important is that this conflict between the domestic regimes and
these non-state actors is leading to a new inter-Arab Cold War where the
moderate states - usually friendly to the United States, Saudi Arabia,
Jordan, Egypt, the Gulf States - are allied on one side against the radical
groups in the Arab world which is Syria, Hamas and Hezbollah. So this is
something we are going to deal with in future.
The second important repercussion in the Middle East is on Israel itself.
The Lebanon war was the first instance in Israeli history where Israel had
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to fight – I use the word “fight” between quotation marks – a war on its
territory instead of its traditional military doctrine of fighting a war in
another country’s territory. It was receiving missiles form Hezbollah. It
was getting a lot of damage done within its territory.
And not only that, it had to witness for the first time in its history a serious
refugee problem, where citizens of Israel in the Northern part migrated to
safer places in the South. This has had an impact on Israeli thinking. And
one can discern within Israel the crystallization of two schools of thought.
One such school represents the extreme right and its allies in Israel who
argue that the Israeli government should adopt a tougher policy towards
the Palestinians, that it should forget any idea of unilateral withdrawal
from the West Bank because this would only allow Iran to arm the
Palestinian Hamas in the West Bank as well and that any such moves
will give the impression that Israel has become weak and will only
provoke additional confrontations in future.
The second school of thought is the one that thinks “Well, we have
reached a point where barriers don’t guarantee our security, military
might alone does not guarantee our security and that the best thing we
could do is to move quickly to a settlement of the issues that divide us
with the Arab countries and this means we do not move into a unilateral
withdrawal from the West Bank without an agreement, Like we did in
Gaza.
It seems to me that three conditions prevailing in Israel after the Lebanon
war are reflected in the policies today. First of all the political turmoil that
was generated then, exists today; secondly, tougher policies towards
Gaza are in operation; and thirdly steps have already been taken to
initiate negotiations with Syria and of course the Palestinian Authority.
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So, what we are seeing here is a change, a combination if you wish, of
the factors in Israeli policy in dealing with the area.
The third element I need to mention is the effect that this has on the
Palestinians themselves. First of all the prospect that Israel will adopt
tougher policies towards Gaza has mobilized the Gaza population around
the Hamas government despite the embargo, the effects of the embargo
and everything else. And it has made the Hamas government more
reluctant to accept the conditions set by the Quartet about recognizing
the right of Israel to exist and about allowing Israel to live within secure
borders plus accepting the agreements and of course denouncing
terrorism.
So, we find the Hamas group becoming more radical in terms of dealing
in negotiations and insisting that any negotiations between the
Palestinian Authority and Israel will be subject to their final confirmation.
So, we have somehow a deadlock but at the same time a prospect that
we might get somewhere.
Regional repercussions
First of all, the war in Lebanon has destroyed, I think, for good the idea
that Israel is invincible. And that military power itself is not sufficient to
guarantee its security. But it also led to another effect: it downgraded the
movement that existed among the Arab states since the Gulf War in 1991
to move slowly towards some recognition of the state of Israel. The
Lebanon war stopped that dead-end.
The second important consequence is the bankruptcy of the Arab
League. The inability of the members of the Arab League to overcome
their rivalries for over a month during the Lebanon war so as to adopt a
position which would bring that war to an end convinced the Arab public
that this League would have to be revised, reorganized, if it is to play any
role in Arab security. And we have seen the weaknesses of the League in
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its inability to move the parties in Lebanon towards a reconciliation,
towards forming a government, electing a president and the inability of
the League to move Hamas and the Palestinian Authority towards the
formation of a new national unity government.
So the Arab League has become bankrupt. And when you keep in mind
that there is already a division between the moderate, pro-American
states and the radical Syria, Hamas states, then you can imagine that the
Arab League has already been divided along these lines and it is almost
impossible for it to act effectively in the region.
The third element is that the inability of Israel to impose a total victory on
Hezbollah has given the impression in the Arab public opinion that
resistance movements can play an important role in the final outcome. In
what sense? In the sense that Hezbollah’s resistance has delayed any
victory for Israel and has forced the United Nations to amend the original
proposal made by France and the US, to amend its proposal in the
Security Council and to make it more acceptable to Hezbollah and the
Arab states. So, if resistance can bring about such a change in the
Security Council, then maybe resistance is a weapon that should be
used. This is Arab thinking, not mine.
So, we find therefore, these non-state actors, paramilitary organization
protecting themselves as the defenders of Arab interests far better than
the Arab governments themselves.
The fourth consequence is the return of Syria to the spotlight. Until then,
as you recall, Syria was isolated, it was forced out of Lebanon, there was
a movement to indict Syrian officials for the assassination of Hariri and all
of a sudden after Lebanon, Syria emerges as a player in the peace
process. And of course this thing is attributed to the fact that Syria has
founded and supported both Hezbollah and Hamas and that if she
continues this policy she can create problems in the area.
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And American policy began to change that one way to get Syria to
abandon this practice is to get Syria into the negotiating table. And this
has facilitated the process that we now see both through Turkey and
through other persons like Sarkozy to get Syria into the negotiating
process.
Turkey is beginning to play a very important role in the Middle East. I
disagree a little with my friend Nachmani in the sense that Turkey cannot
afford to let the Eastern Mediterranean, especially the Gulf of
Alexandretta become a hostile area because that would affect its
terminals at Ceyhan. And Turkey would like to make sure, just like in the
Ottoman period, that the security of Syria guarantees the security of
Turkey.
So, Turkey is emerging as a very important player in the Middle East first
of all because it doesn’t want to leave the area to Iran, to the hegemony
of Iran, and secondly because it wants to make sure that its
neighborhood is a safe neighborhood.
International repercussions
The Lebanon war will affect countries even beyond the Middle East. The
first consequence is the end of the American doctrine enunciated by Perl
and Wolfowitz under the name of Clean Break. As you will recall very
briefly that doctrine was that the United States will promote democracy in
the area so that the world is safe for the United States. This doctrine has
collapsed, because in Iraq it failed to promote democracy, in the Gaza
Hamas won the elections and all of a sudden the United States realized
that democracy may not be in their interests, otherwise they will have to
go to war against any country that chooses somebody they don’t like. So,
the whole policy enunciated by the neo-conservatives has gone down the
drain.
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Another effect in the area was that the inability of Israel to defeat
Hezbollah – militarily they did, diplomatically they did not – bankrupt
another principle of the neo-conservatives: that Israel must play the role
of the strategic ally of the United States in the Middle East. Well, as it
happened, instead of Israel cleaning up the board as a proxy of the
United States in Lebanon, the United States had to intervene to save
Israel from the fiasco it has gotten itself into.
So, strategic alliance with Israel cannot be guaranteed. A new
arrangement has to be found. And the new arrangement is something
that will have to be worked out and is already being worked out in
cooperation with what I call the moderate Arab states.
The second important consequence is the decline of the American
influence in the Middle East. The war in Iraq, the detainment of prisoners
in Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib and all the other things associated with that
unpleasant experience has confirmed in Arab public opinion that the
focus and aim of American diplomacy is to preserve Israel even at the
expense of Arab humiliation and suffering. So public opinion in the Arab
world for the United States has – and I think the Muslim world in general
– has gone down significantly. And I will give you a few figures just as a
comparison.
Turkey from 52% being favorably disposed to the United States five
years ago, today only 12% are favorably disposed. In Indonesia the
percentage has gone down from 61% to 30%. In Nigeria from 72% to
32%. Even in Lebanon where the population was 84% favorable to the
United States that has gone down considerably.
For your interest, world public organization DotOrg has just published a
report on recent polls dated 1st July 2008. What views are held in the
Arab and Muslim world with regard to the United States and other
countries in the world? Consult it and you’ll be surprised.
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So influence has decreased which means that the United States can no
longer play the role of an effective mediator of conflicts in the area. And
it’s no surprise that local states are beginning to solve their problems
themselves without the participation of the United States.
Now, the Americans have a response to this – the Bush administration
has a response to this. They argue that what we can do is mobilize the
moderates against the radicals. Those of us who have studied the Middle
East closely know that there are five negative forces that affect
radicalization and polarization in the Middle East. First is the home-grown
emotional mass movements; secondly, irresponsible and often criminal
national governments; thirdly, stressful economic and social conditions;
fourthly, brutal Israeli policies in occupied territories; and fifth, intrusive
Western militaries: Today, the United States; previously the European
powers.
Now, all of these factors are present in the Middle East today. And if we
are going to start dividing and exploiting the moderates against the
radicals, we will only exacerbate the situation even worse.
Another effect of the Iraq and Lebanon wars is the decline of European
Union standing in the Middle East. This is especially true with regard to
Lebanon. The European Union did not move immediately to stop the war
giving the impression to the Arab public that they agreed with the Israeli
position and the American position. The G8 in fact came out with a
statement, if you recall, supporting the initial proposal at the Security
Council. This was seen by the Arab states as double standards and they
have somehow lost confidence in the Middle East. And this has been
added to the experience that Arab states have noticed since 2005.
Now, before 2005 the EU seemed to follow a middle course with regard
to the Middle East. Since then its policy has changed either supporting
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Bush or giving the impression of supporting Bush. And this has created in
Arab thinking that the EU cannot be trusted so much as before. So, one
victim of the event in Lebanon has been European credibility in Arab
thinking.
And of course the United Nations has not escaped the consequences.
The fact that it was unable to prevent one of its members from becoming
a victim of a war, its inability to quickly lead to a resolution for a ceasefire
has made the UN look to the Arab people in the Middle East as an
ineffective organization, one that you cannot depend on for your security
and maybe you will have to resort to paramilitary organizations like
Hamas or Hezbollah to defend your interests.
So, where does this all leave us? It may seem pessimistic; it is. But
where does it all leave us? It may be interesting to note here that the
international environment is not helpful either. The era of uni-polarity,
American uni-polarity is gone. We had the bipolar system, we had the
uni-polar system and we hope that somehow we’ll move into a multi-polar
system, but as it looks to me, we are moving into a non-polar system.
What do I mean by this? I mean that you will have many diffused centers
of power. And these centers of power need not be states only but
international organizations, OPEC, regional organizations, Organization
of Arab Unity, Organization of African Unity, Arab League maybe if it’s
reorganized, European Union as a regional organization, NGOs, Human
Rights Watch exercise influence using mass media and other ways to get
their points across and influence decision-making at an international
level.
And does this mean that the United States is not the most powerful
country in the world? It is the most powerful country in the world. And it
will remain for some time because no challenger seems to be arising on
the horizon. Why? China is a wealthy country but it will need all its
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sources to deal with the population and the demands of the population
that is arising. The European Union does not have a unified fashion in
foreign policy; it cannot become a challenger to the United States. Japan
lacks the political culture to take the role of a great power. Russia is still
groping around with an agricultural economy before moving into a super
power economy. So, there are no challenges.
But this also means that however strong the United States is, it cannot
carry the load of imposing peace on the world. Why? Because the
organizations that I mentioned – NGOs, OPEC, even corporate
organizations, BP, Shell and what have you and of course within the
Greek environment Siemens – are growing just like the states; they have
stability, they have organization, they have growth, they have power and
they are there to play an important role in decision-making. The war in
Iraq and Afghanistan has overextended American power. The American
power today cannot fight on another front.
And not only that but what the 11th of September has taught us is that
you cannot measure military power with military spending. The people,
the terrorist group that attacked in New York did not need billions of
dollars. The estimates I read at that time is 500.000 dollars; this is all they
needed to carry this much damage. So, sophisticated weapons are not
enough to solve your problems.
So, today we are dealing with a very loose situation that needs to be
addressed. And because we have some of NATO people in the room
maybe I should say a few words about NATO and it’s all.
Now, the lessons learnt from September 11th suggest that none of
today’s conflicts can be mastered by military means alone. I think NATO
has learnt this. But at this stage NATO means are solely military. So,
what you need is a future strategy that will have to include the
development and application of other means. It should seek to prevent
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conflicts by eliminating the reasons for these conflicts. Obviously this
needs to be done by applying primarily non-military means in a pro-active
not defensive way.
The new strategy that NATO will have to adopt will have to apply
escalation and de-escalation of power n a flexible manner and avail itself
of all instruments of politics and power – soft and hard politics. It has to
use a modular approach to alliances by integrating the capabilities of
different international organizations as well as countries that are not
members of NATO.
Given that military means no longer suffice, NATO must find ways to
avail itself of the instruments and resources that other international
organizations have at their disposal. To this end cooperation between
NATO and the European Union in particular must be improved. And the
UN must also continue to play an important role since it is the only body
that can legalize interventions – be they military or non-military.
In other words NATO has to move away from a purely military role and
will have to deal with the world that has many poles, many forms of
influence - be they economic, social or otherwise - in order to prevent
conflict which is an easier way than solving once the conflict breaks out.
Thank you, ladies and gentlemen.
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Paper
Crisis Management International Conference
ATHENA ΄08
Athens, 2-5 July 2008
Cyprus and the Changing Security Environment of the
Near East
By Christos Iacovou
Cyprus Research Center
This analysis looks at certain on-going developments in the Near East that are likely to
endure and that will influence the course of Cyprus’ security environment in the first
half of the 21st century. Such developments include demographic explosion and
struggles over resources.
In the last half of the twentieth century, Near East was a region of interstate wars and
internal upheaval. Now, in the first decade of the twenty-first century, what can we say
about the future of the Near East? Will it continue to be a region of war and violence?
Demographic Explosion
In the 21st century, within the Near East, which is largely Muslim, demography is likely
to cause one of history's great transformations. In 1980 Muslims constituted perhaps 18
percent of the world's population. By the end of the first quarter of the 21st century, they
are expected to constitute more than 30 percent. In the Middle East itself, this rapid rate
of growth is expected to continue. Thus, Egypt is expected to climb from a population
level of less than 74 million people today to nearly 120 million by the middle of this
century. Saudi Arabia is expected to nearly triple in size from 23 million to 61 million.
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Syria will become a major demographic power with nearly 50 million people by 2050.
Next door, Iran will swell to more than 150 million people, or larger than Russia today.
These are major demographic shifts that are certain to alter the history of the region.
In many Western countries, people tend to equate the Middle East with political
violence. For this reason it is instructive to look at the changing demographic picture of
Muslim states as a whole. In many of these states a distinguishing feature of the
population has been the swelling numbers of young people, who in their impatience,
place severe demands on any political system. Over the past three decades, those
Muslim countries in which the group of persons between 15 and 24 years of age
constituted roughly 20 percent of the total population, or more, included such countries
as Bosnia and Iran in the 1970s, Albania, Syria and Turkey in the 1980s, and Algeria,
Indonesia, Iran, and Jordan in the 1990s. Is it an accident then that some of the most
violent societies in the world in the last several years have been Albania, Algeria,
Bosnia, Iran, and Turkey? Can we explain this violence by bad leadership alone, or was
there a degree of demographic pressure that no government could handle effectively
whether the state was to be found in the Middle East or in Europe?
Struggle over Resources
Meanwhile, another path to influence and power has opened up. Developments in
China during the last two decades have shown that governments can acquire great
influence not through external expansion but through internal development. This
powerful example will pose an awkward challenge to Near Eastern states in the coming
century. The Near East remains one of the few areas of the world where the struggle
over resources-oil and water-continues, and where, therefore, war still pays. It also
remains one of the few areas of the world where leaders believe they will gain wealth
and influence through war rather than internal development.
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In the Middle East, it will still be true that war will pay in a way that it will not in most
other regions. Victory may bring land that offers more resources-either water or oil.
Had Iraq won the Gulf War, it would have had more oil.
According to the Department of Energy, world oil consumption is expected to increase
from 77.8 million barrels a day (mbd) in 1995 to 104.6 mbd in 2015. The Gulf
countries will have to nearly double their production, or the increase in demand will not
be met. Much of the new demand will come from Asia, which will almost certainly take
a much greater interest in the affairs of the Gulf in the future than it has in the past.
China's oil requirements are expected to more than double between 1995 and 2015.
Where will China secure that oil? In the case of Japan, which is dependent on Middle
East oil, Tokyo has been content to see the United States guard the oil lanes. China is
unlikely to be satisfied with American guardianship. That is undoubtedly why it is
developing a blue water navy. In the next century, one can expect conflicts between the
United States and China over the Near East.
As early as the 1980s, intelligence experts within the US government began identifying
areas in the world where conflict might break out over the issue of water. Most of these
were in the Near East. Israel is estimated to be currently using its water resources at
roughly 20 percent beyond their natural replenishment rate, and Israel's population is
expected to increase by three million people by 2050. Jordan, with a scarcity of water
already, expects its population to grow from 6.4 million in 2000 to nearly 17 million in
2050.
Oil is one of the few resources left over which nations lacking it may fight. Water is
perhaps the only resource over which any country facing severe shortages will fight.
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Here the conjuncture of the Near East's population growth and its largely desert climate
suggests a very turbulent future.
In the 21st century, most of the states of the Near East will face, some challenges that
others do not. However, they may not be content merely to accept their fate. We have to
hope that they will not. We must hope that they will press for reform. In that case,
neighbouring states, and especially the European Union should help them. It is in no
one's interest for this great region to remain a cauldron of discontent. It is the right
moment for the EU to rethink its Europemediaterranean Policy.
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131
“Global Terrorism and South-Eastern Mediterranean Intelligence
Cooperation”
Dr Nomikos Ioannis, Director of Research Institute of European and
American Studies (R.I.E.A.S.)
Thank you very much, Mr Chairman. It’s my pleasure to be here with you
to such a distinguished conference.
Ladies and Gentlemen, the era of the Cold War was characterized by a
high degree of uncertainty in the international system regarding the main
actors and the basic security interests. Each of the major powers could
be counted upon to act according to its survival interests and to influence
its moral allies accordingly. As the world is slowly coming to terms with
the changes in the international system brought about by the demise of
the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, early intrusion of the age
of peace dissipate in the face of numerous conflicts and upheaval in
many parts of the globe.
The Cold War realization comes back, that despite extensive debate, the
9/11 terrorist act in New York in the United States as well as on March
11th 2003 in Spain and 7th July 2005 in the United Kingdom by Al-Qaeda
proved that the Western World failed to develop any new conflict
prevention mechanism in the post-Cold War period.
The reliance of the Mediterranean, insecurity and intelligence which is
based and growing in role in the strategic calculus of the United States,
the European Union member-states and the Middle East states, the
combination of internal political change and the continuing effects of the
loss of the Cold War will have significant consequences for the strategic
environment around the South-Eastern Mediterranean region.
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The environment in the South is less benign with multiple choice of
insecurity. Society across the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean
shores are experiencing rapid and uneven economic change.
Virtually all of these societies face political challenges capable of altering
the longer term internal and foreign policy orientation. For the
foreseeable future, security agenda in the Southern Mediterranean will be
driven to a considerable extent by internal security concerns. NATO will
have a stake in the politico-military consequences of this risk that no
South dialogue can contribute to understand it and ameliorate them.
Ladies and Gentlemen, in the past several Mediterranean intelligence airwars have taken place among the states in the region by exchanging
intelligence information in order to confront the increase of terrorist acts
in their home-states.
Allow me to describe you the most important intelligence networks such
as the Trident intelligence network, the Kilowatt and Megaton intelligence
network, the Trevi group and the Brener club.
What is the Trident intelligence network? The Trident intelligence network
was initiated in 1958 by the intelligence services of Israel, Turkey and
Iran and was later joined by Ethiopia. Although not formally a European
group, practically each of the Trident members were supported by
European and American intelligence services which were the driving
force behind each operation. The aim of the Trident intelligence network
was to provide intelligence cooperation against the rising tide of Arab
nationalism. The Trident network was also supported by the French
intelligence services which at the time were embroiled in the civil war in
Algeria since Algerian rebels were supplied and trained by Egypt and
other Arab states.
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Although its level of intensity fluctuated, intelligence cooperation under
Trident intelligence network was maintained until the 1979 revolution in
Iran and made a distinct contribution towards close security relations
between the participating countries in the Eastern Mediterranean.
The second intelligence networks were the Kilowatt and Megaton
networks. The war against international terrorism in the 1970s brought
about two more institutionalized multilateral cooperation frameworks. The
Kilowatt, as I said, and the Megaton intelligence network.
Kilowatt was a code name for the multilateral cooperation effort among
European and Mediterranean states aiming at expanding the exchange
of information in the fight against international terrorism. In addition,
Kilowatt was the first truly European intelligence forum comprised of
representatives from intelligence services from the United Kingdom,
France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland,
Denmark, Ireland, Norway and Israel.
Kilowatt intelligence main purpose was to provide an exchange of
information on the activities of international terrorism. Kilowatt was also
an effective tool in reducing the level of terrorist activities in Western
Europe in the late 1970s.
Furthermore, Megaton intelligence network was sponsored by French
intelligence services and aimed mainly at countering the threat of Islamic
Algerian terrorism in the European mainland, activities that escalated in
the early 1990s.
The third intelligence network is the Brener group which was formed in
the 1970s as a forum for the security services of six European memberstates. Today, it includes all 27 European member-states. The Brener
group served as the principal point of contact for the head of national
security services who meet regularly under its auspices.
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The most important point - and here I would like to have your attention –
about the Brener group is that the Brener group has established working
groups on terrorism and organized crime, and in 2001 it created the
counter-terrorist group, in which the European Union member-states as
well as the United States produce common threat assessment that are
shared among the member-states and with some Union committees.
Recently efforts to prevent and defend against terrorist actions in the
Mediterranean fall into two main areas. Number one: focus on
intelligence sharing and surveillance to detect preparation. As we all
know in this room, international terrorism cannot be confronted by
unilateral actions; but only with international intelligence sharing. This is
something the terrorists know. Unilateral actions do not lead anywhere. If
we don’t understand how important it is to adapt and understand
international intelligence sharing, we have lost the game on international
terrorism.
Fortunately, NATO has engaged in both activities primarily through the
operation "Active Endeavor" which expanded to cover the entire
Mediterranean in 2003. NATO operation "Active Endeavor" mission has
devoted much attention to expanding its intelligence sharing activities
including efforts to develop a network for tracking merchant shipping
throughout the Mediterranean and improving means to share this
intelligence with relevant governments.
This should assist to address not only terrorist concern but also the
necessary efforts to prevent drug smuggling and of course the most, you
know, serious threats in the future about the spread of weapons of mass
destruction.
The United States values the operation “Active Endeavor” because it
facilitates intelligence sharing and because it is an alliance-wide activity.
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Operation “Active Endeavor” is NATO's most prominent defense and
intelligence activity and efforts to include more Mediterranean countries
and designs also to improve intelligence sharing and cooperation among
non-NATO members within the alliance.
Ladies and Gentlemen, finally, it was not until the Madrid attacks in
March 2004 which deeply shocked the Europeans and served as a
terrible reminder of the threat posed by terrorism that, much like its
American counterpart, the European approach to understanding Islamic
terrorism ascribe not to a failure of intelligence or even imagination but a
failure of education.
I would like to complete my analysis with a statement made by Richard
Folkerat, former advisor of USA homeland security and today he is also
an analyst at the Brooke Institution in Washington D.C. who stated:
"There is no question that for Al-Qaeda and its affiliates, deploying
another operative team into the United States is a more daunting
proposition than deploying one into continental Europe.”
It has been clear in the last three years that Europe is a more active
terrorist environment than is the United States. Finally, as illustrated by
Al-Qaeda parallel expansion in both, Europe, the United States, the
Middle East and of course North Africa, Al-Qaeda’s strategy is to exploit
democratic loopholes in Europe and to target weak states around the
world.
Last but not least, a regional intelligence cooperation in the Southern
Mediterranean intelligence community including the volatile North Africa
and the Balkan states, as I emphasized in my analysis, will be more than
necessary in order to prevent prospective Islamic terrorist acts in the 21st
century. Thank you very much for your patience.
Back to agenda
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Q&A
Representative from Libya:
Thank you very much for your interesting presentation. Unless the
Palestinian issue is solved in a fair way, the Middle East will not enjoy
peace and stability. The Arabs offered a peace initiative called “el Saudi
initiative” a few years ago at the Arab League summit in Lebanon asking
for an end of Israel occupation of Arab lands and returning of refugees.
And in return a full relation normalization with Israel. In fact they asked for
the implementation of UN resolutions. But Israel ignored the initiative.
The two-state solution which is on the table nowadays is difficult to be
realized because there are some issues on which it is difficult to reach a
compromise, for example Jerusalem and refugees issues. If a two-state
solution is almost impossible to be realized why doesn’t the international
community think of the other solution? A solution proposed by my
country, by the leader Kadhafi; a solution of one state for the two nations.
A democratic state with the constitution there to guarantee the rights of
the two nations and doesn’t allow the domination of one nation over the
other. Arab countries have no problems with the Jews. The Jews lived in
peace in Arab countries in the past. And even today there are a lot of
Jewish people living in some Arab countries. Regardless of what is going
on in Palestine nowadays. My question is don’t you think that one state
for the two nations is more realizable and realistic? Thank you. (The
question is for all of you)
Iranian Defence Attachee:
I have a question for Dr Koutsis about his presentation. First, I must say
thank you for a good presentation and then I have a question about your
measure about dividing the countries in the Middle East in two groups,
about the radicalism and moderate countries and groups. What is your
opinion abut the problem in the Middle East that you gave us this
assessment about the groups and countries? Do you think that the
problem in the Middle East in the recognition of the Zionist regime as a
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state or not is the occupation of territories or the Palestinian refugees or
other things? Thank you very much.
Mr Harris Tambakakis:
I want to thank all four speakers for their excellent presentations. My
name is Harris Tambakakis, I work with the Hellenic National Defense
General Staff. I have a question for all of you gentlemen regarding the
unresolved Palestinian conflict with Israel. My question is how
interrelated and how interdependent this issue is with the ongoing war in
Iraq and Afghanistan? And how does the situation in Palestine affect the
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq? Thank you.
Dr Koutsis:
Yes, well I’ll try and answer all three questions in one go. I am not a
believer of the Bush administration view that the Palestinian is not at the
cracks of the Middle East crisis. I think that the Palestinian issue is the
most important issue that is having all this ripple effect in the area. I also
do not share the Bush administration’s view that first you impose
democracy and then you resolve the Palestinian issue because then you
deal with democratic governments who sign agreements and what have
you. I embrace the European point of view that first you have to solve the
Palestinian issue so that you can have political stability, and only when
you have political stability, can you have peace. So, I believe that the
Palestinian issue is the most important issue in the Middle East. Its
solution is the first condition for settlement of peace in the Middle East.
I do not subscribe to the idea of a one-state, even a bi-national state in
Palestine. I think that the problems it would generate in terms of cultural
adjustments and other adjustments are far greater than the problems that
would be faced by creating a two-state solution. I think that the Saudi
initiative that was drawn up in 2002 in Beirut and which was reconfirmed
about a year or two ago is the best proposal on the table. It conforms to
international law by implementing resolutions of the Security Council. It
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agrees to a two-state solution based on the 1967 borders with minor
adjustments and normalization of relations between Israel and all Arab
states.
So, I think that is the way to go. The problem is not that we don’t have a
solution. We still don’t have a government in Washington that believes in
this solution. And we still don’t have the proper political environment both
in Israel and the Palestinian camp which will go ahead and accept this
solution. So, the solution is there and what is missing is the will to put it
into effect.
Does the Palestinian issue influence the war in Iraq and Afghanistan? If
you mean is it one of the reasons for going to war against Iraq, I would
say not really. I think that the war in Iraq was there on the table long
before George W. Bush took the oath of office. All those who have read
the archives and the documents of the New American Century will find in
there enough documents before 2001 to show that it was the policy of the
neo-cons to go to war against Iraq. So, I don’t think the Palestinian issue
influenced the decision to go to war there. It may have had behind it the
philosophy that if we weaken the Eastern front, then maybe it will be
easier for us to have a peace treaty which will be to the liking of Israel.
But that’s another issue. It was the philosophy that we establish in the
Middle East democracies and then with these democracies we can deal.
This philosophy has gone bankrupt and I don’t think they will come back
with it again.
Is the war in Iraq influencing the Palestinian issue? In my view, yes.
Because let’s not have any illusions. American forces will stay in Iraq for
many, many decades to come. And so long as they are there, there's
going to be insecurity for Iran, and Iran is going to be taking all the
necessary steps to make the people both in Iraq and in Israel feel
uncomfortable. So the Iraq issue is influencing the settlement of the
Palestinian issue. Thank you very much.
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Professor Nachmani:
Yes, thank you. Concerning… (by the way we have a name; we are not
called the Zionist entity or the Zionist regime).
Second, whether a two-state solution would work. A two-state solution
has been offered and tried and attempted since the early 1920s by the
British, during the 1930s, during the 1940s and all forces and elements
and bodies got to the conclusion that no united state would be able to be
created in Palestine at that very time. A united bi-national state would not
be able to be created. It wouldn’t be a viable state, conflicting forces
would work one against the other, etc. And I’m not sure that a one-state
Isratine (Israel and Palestine) would survive more than a very short time.
You know ethnically and nationally living nowadays in probably the peak
times of nationalism and ethnicity. Take Yugoslavia, one state turned into
seven or eight independent states so the combination now between
ethnicity and nationalism i.e. that every ethnic group would like to have its
own state. I don't understand why not have this solution either to the
Israelis or to the Palestinians. One thing.
Now, concerning a solution to the Palestinian problem, I’m the last
person that can offer this audience how to solve the Palestinian problem
or the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. But I think that Professor Koutsis failed
to mention two points that has something to do with a solution to the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict. One of the major lessons taken from the war
of 2006 in Lebanon was that probably territorial question is not the whole
conflict between us and our neighbors. The UN more than once probably
three times confirmed that Israel withdrew up to the last centimeter from
the border, from what it held within Lebanon.
Israel withdrew in 2005 from the Gaza Strip. Now, I am the last person
not to see that this is only part to the solution to the Palestinian problem,
etc. But I just want to ask one question; for the first time in their history in
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2005 the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip are independent. Neither under
the Ottomans, nor under the British nor under the Egyptians nor under
the Jordanians or under the Israelis. For the first time in their history they
are independent. Now, imagine that in 2005 another scenario would have
been built in the Gaza Strip. That is to say a peaceful place - I'm not
referring and I’m not ignoring that there are also other sides to this
question - but a peaceful place that would open the borders to Israelis to
eat at the restaurants along the Gaza seashore, there would be
economic relations, that would encourage a lot of Israelis to continue and
to do something in the West Bank. Instead the same thing happened in
the Gaza Strip and in Lebanon. That is to say, every area and every
region that we withdraw from is becoming a platform against you.
Now, every side has its own right and correct and justified excuses and
justifications and explanations. No doubt about it. I am an academic and
I’m the last person not to see the other side and how justified are the
interests of the other side. I’m just saying imagine that in 2005 another
scenario would have been built in the Gaza Strip. That’s all thank you.
Dr Koutsis:
May I make one clarification? This is what I mentioned before about the
two schools of thought. One is arguing that security is above peace and
the other school is arguing that peace comes first and then security. I am
a follower of the famous Yitzhak Rabin who decided that for the sake of
Israel to exist it has to withdraw from the occupied territories. But this
withdrawal should not be unilateral and that was the mistake with Gaza. It
should be a withdrawal based on a negotiated settlement. There would
be no problem imposing a demilitarized zone on the Palestinian territories
for 50 years like we did with Austria after the World War II. There would
be no problem supervising and monitoring the military base of this
territory. But to say that Gaza was independent, I think is stretching it too
much. I would put it differently: Why don’t we give Gaza the status that
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Israel has and give Israel the status that Gaza has? And then you can
decide who is independent and who is not.
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Session: “International Organizations and Crisis Management”
Moderator, Mr Andreas Kintis, Expert Counselor, Hellenic Ministry
of Foreign Affairs
This specific session is going to focus on crisis management and
International Organizations namely the European Union, NATO and the
OSCE. Allow me to try to set the scene for our discussions.
In my view the transatlantic security agenda is defined by four specific
features: First of all, the conduct of new wars. There’s a shift in patterns
of warfare from international wars to internal conflicts that nevertheless
have significant regional and international consequences.
Second feature is proliferation. There is a prospect that a growing range
of actors and potentially non-state actors, in particular terrorist groups
may obtain nuclear, biological and chemical weapons of mass
destruction.
Third specific feature is the rise of so-called new terrorism. The
emergence of radical terrorist groups engaged in a global struggle willing
to use violence on a scale not seen previously have pushed terrorism to
the top of the transatlantic security agenda.
The fourth and final feature is an increasing recognition that non-military
problems such as poverty, economic instability, global warming, mass
population movements, transnational crime and the protection of critical
economic and technological infrastructures pose central challenges to
security and therefore cannot be separated from the more traditional
security problems of warfare and military security.
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In my opinion while there is a loose consensus that the combination of
new wars, proliferation, terrorism and soft security constitute a new
transatlantic security agenda, there is little international agreement on the
priority and hierarchy that should be attached to different crises and even
less on how we should respond to and deal with these crises. Typically
pro-active crisis management activities include forecasting potential
crises and planning how to deal with them. Crisis management in the
face of an evolving crisis includes identifying the real nature of the crisis,
intervening to minimize damage and recovering from the crisis.
Hopefully, international organizations have time and resources to
complete a crisis management plan before they experience a crisis. To
talk to us about whether this is the case with respect to the European
Union, NATO, the OSCE, we have a group of distinguished speakers, the
first of whom is going to be Lt Gen. James Soligan. Gen. Soligan is the
Deputy Chief of Staff of Transformation and he acts as the Supreme
Allied Commander Transformation Director for guidance and coordination
of the activities of his Directorate Transformation. Before I give the floor
to Gen. Soligan, let me remind our speakers that their allotted time is 1520 minutes. Gen. Soligan, you have the floor.
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“Crisis Management and lessons learned form Afghanistan”
Lt Gen Karl W. Eikenberry, Deputy Chairman of the NATO Military
Committee
Well, first I’d like to thank the Hellenic Ministry of Defense and the
National Defense General Staff for the invitation to participate in “Athena
'08” and I wanted to congratulate the organizers for this year having
chosen a very important topic that is of great relevance to all the nations
represented here and to the international organizations and the bodies
that are here – NATO, EU, UN and so forth.
I think that the way we’ve got the speakers being sequenced this morning
actually worked out quite well whether by design or by accident that with
James Soligan starting off and talking about the future and Tony following
up and talking about planning and then we had to excellent presentations
on NATO and the EU about training and exercising and then I’m following
on or cleaning up here. I’m talking about a very specific kind of on-going
operation, Afghanistan, and I was asked to talk about lessons learned
which I’ll do.
What I’d like to do is talk in three parts here very briefly. The first two
parts to give you a bit of context in stock-taking. How is NATO doing
inside of Afghanistan with our mission, where are the challenges that we
are facing and then I’ll get to the third part about some lessons learned
that we might draw at this point in time and looking ahead at what
remains to be done.
First of all, in terms of accomplishments, it's important to remember with
NATO inside of Afghanistan today of what is the baseline for operations
there. Our baseline of operations for Afghanistan is that we went in early,
we went in 2003 under UN mandate and at that point in time had a very
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Power Point presentation available. Click here
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limited mission which was to provide security around the Kabul area,
assume the UN mission of international security assistance force; but
even at that point in time in 2003 as we went to Afghanistan, as Tony had
pointed out in his remarks, this was the first time that NATO had ever in
its history really been out of its sector – well, we can say that in the mid
‘90s when it went into the Balkans it was out of area but now in
Afghanistan in 2003 the alliance for the first time in its history started
operating at what we would call strategic distance, thousands of
kilometers away from Europe, in a very harsh environment, truly an
expeditionary kind of operation.
Not only that – that was a huge shift for the alliance in 2003 – but then in
very rapid order we went as an alliance from UN mission Kabul area to
UN mission all of Afghanistan in 2004; in the fall we went North. In 2005,
in the spring we went to the West. In 2006, in the summer we went south.
In 2006, in the fall we went east. Very rapid transition. It wouldn’t be a
rapid transition if it were – let’s say – the US led coalition that had tried to
perform this and expand the mission, but for the NATO alliance at 26,
that was a remarkably rapid transition that we went through.
Now with that then, what accomplishments can we say that we’ve had?
What are we bringing to bear inside of Afghanistan? Let me point to five
very quickly. First of all, there is no question that NATO again under UN
mandate is providing a framework for all security operations to take
place, ours and increasingly the Afghan national security forces but more
importantly a framework for the government of Afghanistan to slowly
continue to extend its grip throughout the entire country and then thirdly
under that framework for reconstruction and development operations to
take place. And that being Afghan and very importantly assisted by
various NGOs, assisted by international organizations.
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Today now we have over 50.000 NATO forces on the ground and we
provide
a
coherent
framework
for
these
various
tasks
to
be
accomplished.
The second point is with regard to the presence that NATO provides for
international military forces and the presence we provide then for the
building of Afghan national security forces. Let me give one quick
example of the expansion of the presence of NATO forces on the ground
in a relatively short period of time. If we look at this area of Afghanistan that would be Hellman province – in the 2005-2006 period of time, before
NATO had expanded into Southern Afghanistan and in that province, one
of the most troubled provinces in Afghanistan today, up until that time
when NATO expanded we had approximately 150 US special forces and
US civil-military experts operating in that entire province. Today we have
a very capable British-led task force which includes Danish forces, other
NATO forces, all inside of NATO Hellman province numbers over 500.
So, presence has increased dramatically with NATO’s expansion of the
mission inside of Afghanistan.
Third point would be with reconstruction and development. James
Soligan, Tony have both mentioned the comprehensive approach. Well,
part of the comprehensive approach is delivering on non-military aspects
of development in these conflict zones and what you find with NATO at
26 with 14 partner countries is that any commander on the ground in
Afghanistan will quickly size up the situation in the area that he or she is
deployed and will say that one of the best weapons that they can have
made available to them is non-military reconstruction and development
funding. And so we’re finding non-militaries of the 26 plus 14 partners
going back to their ministries of defense and having dialogues with
development organizations. What the alliance represents is 26 pretty
wealthy countries and we’ve got pretty wealthy partners with us so it’s a
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way then of encouraging more investment in Afghanistan in the nonmilitary domain, which has been very helpful.
The fourth point has to do with the image war. We are in Afghanistan
under a UN mandate, we are a real military alliance, it’s not a coalition of
the willing, it’s a military alliance. I point out that of the 26 countries of the
alliance one is a predominantly Muslim country. Next year we expect to
have the accession of yet another country predominantly Muslim,
Albania, and we have within our 14 partner countries several other
predominantly Muslim countries.
Inside of Afghanistan we are fighting an image war against a global
network, an extremist, violent, terrorist grouping of Islamist global
Jihadists and the fact that we have a UN mandated international security
force with NATO leading that international security force helps us
tremendously in that image war that we fight.
The fifth and final point and I’ll come back again to what Jim talked about
the futures that we face collectively, certainly what NATO faces, what all
of our nations face, the uncertainty of our future as we look ahead, the
capabilities that we're developing, the experiences that we're developing
inside of Afghanistan as an alliance with our partners. I think you can
make an argument that not only do we need to move on and continue to
get better inside of Afghanistan in order to prevail, but those same set up
capabilities that we develop over time will almost certainly serve each of
our nations well, and the alliance well as we look to the uncertain futures.
The same kind of capabilities that are applicable to prevailing inside of
Afghanistan more than likely are going to be relevant to other conflicts
that we may face in the future.
Now some talk about challenges and here are very briefly three of them.
First of all, all of the people in this audience are aware that we have sets
of requirements that are very much needed in Afghanistan. Here I’ll talk
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more narrowly about military requirements that are needed inside of
Afghanistan that were not fulfilling. I’ll come back to this in a moment
when I talk about lessons learned.
The second is that various nations who are committing troops, forces to
Afghanistan are placing operational restrictions on those forces that are
then diminishing the effectiveness of the forces that are collectively on
the ground. This is something that nations need to continue to address.
Nations and NATO have done better over the last several years in
starting to reduce the amount of restrictions that are being placed by
capitals on forces that are being sent but we’ve not come far enough
along yet.
And third and finally is that the alliance is self-limiting itself in terms of the
array of admissions that it’s willing to assign to its forces and to its force
on the ground inside of Afghanistan. Let me give you an example. We
have very correctly for the NATO force in Afghanistan given them
explicitly the mission, the lead mission of helping to train and build the
Afghan national army. The same guidance has not been provided to the
NATO force for the building of the police. That’s a self-limitation for the
forces on the ground that I think are at odds with really what common
sense would tell you is needed in order to prevail. And I will come back to
this as well when I talk about lessons learned.
Let me talk about the lessons learned and I have seven of them. I’ll try to
be brief and then perhaps during questions and answers if you’d like to
get into any of these, we certainly can. With regard to the lessons
learned, first of all, and this comes back to the presentation that was
given on NATO crisis management exercises, something that was -I’ll
talk about here- that was addressed during crisis management exercises
that we most recently had at NATO headquarters that evident from
Afghanistan is the need to think through as political authorities look at a
particular emerging crisis and make a decision and try to make a
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determination then whether to launch mobilized forces and capability and
to actually take on a particular mission to deal with the crisis is the need
to interactively iteratively sit with the military authorities to develop a
concept, develop what our goals and objectives, develop then the
necessary capabilities and ways and means that we’re going to move
forward in order to realize our goals and objectives very importantly to
ensure before we commit that we are going to be able to generate and
mobilize sufficient capability in order to perform the mission. That’s a very
important piece right now that is still missing within the NATO alliance.
We can commit to a mission but we do not have the guarantee that we
are necessarily going to be able to generate sufficient capacity. You have
two courses of action if you cannot develop sufficient capacity then, in
order to move forward you are either going to have to change your goals
and objectives -lower them- you’ll have to change your concept or you’re
going to have to make a decision or not at the end of the day to mount
that particular operation.
The second lesson learned form Afghanistan would be in terms of
funding. NATO as a military alliance has a funding principle in which we
use common funding for infrastructure and headquarters, and then we
use what we say as the principle of cost “will lie where they fall” for
operations. Now, during the Cold War era that might have been a very
good concept, but as Tony has talked about, an alliance that’s moving
now towards more continuing operations – we’re inside of Kosovo today,
we’re inside of Afghanistan today and we’re going to be there for a good
many years. Is the concept that we’re using right now, that cost will lie
where they fall for operations, does that really make sense? Nations are
being penalized in that sense for offering more to commit to on-going
operations whereas the infrastructure of NATO is not being used for the
on-going operations. So, do we need to have an open debate within the
alliance on this matter of how do we fund our operations.
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The third point would be with terms of building security forces. You know
that critical to success in Afghanistan of course is the building of robust
capable Afghan national security forces. We need to ensure that as an
alliance and I think internationally this is equally applicable to the
European Union, to the United Nations, to any body that takes on lead for
what we would traditionally call security assistance – helping to build
security forces. We need to make sure that, as we say in English, the
aperture is sufficiently wide. Traditionally each of our militaries is
comfortable with the idea of building army forces, of building armed
forces; what we are not capable of doing necessarily and well-suited for
is building police forces, is building comprehensive intelligence
architectures within countries, is building comprehensive national security
systems within countries. I would argue for a country like Afghanistan
which has in certain parts of the country is fighting its own insurgency,
other parts of the country is still very much trying to extend the control of
the government into far reaches and is still plagued by its inability then to
move against local power-brokers. The first line of defense, the first
capability is really the police capability that’s needed.
I can also argue that in terms of building a security architecture for a
country, I mentioned intelligence systems are important, but we need to
think vertically, we need to think horizontally as we build security forces.
Clearly a lesson learned inside of Afghanistan today.
The fourth would be in the area of what we call security sector reform.
Everyone here is familiar with the term “security sector reform”. Going
from talking about security forces, now taking a bit of a wider perspective:
Security Sector Reform, let me take the example of the police. I said
police are critical, but in the absence of the police being built within a
wider rule of law framework, that endeavor is also doomed to failure. A
good police force not nested within a justice system will only be a
temporary security force that will not be sustainable unless they’re nested
within a larger judicial framework. The Americans have got an expression
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about what we call the three Cs of a justice system: we say cops, which
is our nickname for police, correctional institutes, prisons, and courts.
Those three, then sitting on a foundation of accountable transparent
government that makes a justice system; not the police by itself. But then
how do we as a NATO military alliance or how does any military force
that goes into a conflict zone like Afghanistan then have the wherewithal
to put together a rule of law system.
They will not do it by themselves which gets us to the fifth point about the
comprehensive approach. This has been spoken about by all of our panel
members today, so I won’t dwell on the comprehensive approach. But
from a military perspective one way of looking at the comprehensive
approach and trying to think through what is the military trying to
accomplish there is that we have three lines that all of us are moving
upon as we go into a conflict zone like Afghanistan. You have a security
line, very much military; you have a governance rule of law line; and you
have economic reconstruction and development line. How do you pull all
three of these together? That’s the comprehensive approach.
From a military perspective, what we’re seeking then is to try and find
ways to harness our military power and harmonize our military power in
ways then that achieve synergy with those other two lines. I would say
that inside of Afghanistan what we found is that in many places of
Afghanistan at the local level, provincial level – let’s say, district level with
various degrees of success we’ve had some pretty good outcomes on
the comprehensive approach, the provincial reconstruction teams
innovation. Sometimes outcomes very dependent upon a particular
national approach within a provincial reconstruction team in Afghanistan,
how well does the aid team, the ministry of Foreign Affairs team, the
police team, the military team come together. But in general we’ve seen
pretty good results at the retail level.
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What I would argue is what our Gen. John Craddock has said before “it’s
more at the wholesale level.” That is at the Afghan national level and truly
at the international level that we need the most work to be done right
now. The development of doctoring – once again Jim’s talked about that
– very importantly at the international level and the national level of
capability. We can talk about harmonizing and harnessing military power
to support the other arms but I would tell you quite frankly, in certain
areas especially in the rule of law governance programs that sometimes
the military is accused of not coordinating. Many times the military will
look around and ask the question “who to coordinate with”, “where are
our partners for rule of law?”, “where are our partners for the
development of robust national judicial systems?” This is very much a
question of national capabilities; this is very much a question of
international organization capabilities.
The sixth point: regional dimension. I’ll be brief here. When we talk about
Afghanistan, clearly success in Afghanistan is going to be dependent
upon regional outcomes. It’s very dependent right now on developments
in the security environment in Pakistan. It has to do with the regional
outcomes around Afghanistan’s border. So in lessons learned, as now
NATO has moved forward inside of Afghanistan, and we’re working in an
environment in which outcomes are in part going to be dependent upon
regional setting, what are the diplomatic ways and means that an alliance
has collectively to work through these various regional issues?
And seven and finally, and I’ll stop here, has to do with strategic
communications and lessons learned. What I would tell you here is that
we have two challenges with the NATO military alliance very aware of
these challenges right now trying to deal with them. One is in terms of
capabilities. this is a national problems where surprisingly we talk about
our inability as an alliance to still effectively communicate in the
international media and you look then within the 26 countries of NATO
and only about five or six of these countries of NATO have formal public
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affairs training programs for their military officers, for their military
personnel. We’ve had a very good innovation recently in NATO, where
we finally developed a video capability that’s starting to pay dividends
now inside of Kabul. I’m giving specific examples right now.
Of course, we’ve got 100 different kinds of capabilities that we need to
develop over the longer term. Those must be addressed in a serious way
and then secondly with regard to strategic communications is the
question of doctrine within strategic communications. Each nation has
very different doctrines, very different concerns, very different legacies,
then inform those concerns with regard to strategic communications, but
for NATO an operation in Afghanistan unprecedented in terms of the
challenges of strategic communications and the need for NATO to
continue to develop doctrine.
You know, on this final point about strategic communications, I would
highlight though this has been very high and very prominent on the
NATO agenda. There’s a recognition of the problem, as indeed within all
of these areas. There’s recognition of challenges that we’re facing but in
particular in strategic communications some work has been done, there’s
been some developments, but frankly again we have a long way to go.
With that I’ll conclude my remarks then.
Back to agenda
155
“Military Diplomacy in the 21st century, multiple future threats and
crises”
Lt Gen. James Soligan, Deputy Chief of Staff/ SACT
As all of us know, most of the focus has been really on day to day
business in Afghanistan. In ACT and the NATO we have been looking to
the future beyond Afghanistan and trying to assess what are the potential
challenges we have for the future, how does the world change, what
does that mean. For a number of months we have been doing work and
what I’m going to show you today is a work in progress; it is not an
answer; it is not saying “this is where ACT is” – as a matter of fact, next
week the military committee will be coming down and will be building on
this work that you see here and as I take you through this, I have adapted
the work that has been going on inside ACT with work that has been
going on amongst about 20 or 30 other groups of international actors,
military, non-military, civil.
So, we have a great body of work and the goal here was to determine
inside our body of work what does the future hold as a threat to the
security of the population, both military and non-military – some of the
points that I just brought out. Secondly, what does that mean from a
consequence perspective? What are the likely impacts of those threats?
And then third what does that mean for NATO? What kinds of capability
should we develop in the future?
And so as we look at this, we have seen that, as all of us know, one of
the core principles of NATO is conflict prevention and crisis management.
And so as we look at this world as it's continuing to evolve faster than we
have seen in the past we have come to this process that we are calling
multiple futures.

Power Point presentation available. Click here.
156
I’ll walk you through a little bit of our process and some of our insights
and secondly the main factor is represented inside this room and that is
that there is no one actor in that space that has a solution to these
problems and collectively we all need to work together to be able to
address both conflict prevention and crisis management.
As you know there have been over time a number of changes moving
from agricultural revolution to the industrial revolution and as we move
into the information revolution, I think all of us should recognize that we
are riding this current of a new way that the world operates. And just as it
would be futile to resist the industrial revolution, my view personally, is
that it would be futile to resist the information revolution and the impacts
that it will have across society and across the way that impacts all the
business that we do.
And the result of that largely is shown here by the fact that you see that
things have changed; the clear lines that we had at the end of the Cold
War, during the Cold War, have now become blurred lines and in fact the
borders of what was public before – in some cases the private sector is in
what used to be state powers and state authorities in many cases have
shifted over to individuals – the authorities of governments have moved
out to industry and to NGOs, etc.
And so there are many dynamics going on in the world. What I'm
showing you are pieces of work that has been done across the British,
the French - this is some piece by someone named Tom Ries who’s up in
Sweden – and so we’re bringing lots of pieces together to take the best
practices and the best ideas form across the Community. The impact that
that has on the folks inside this room obviously is that in a globalized
world what you see is things moving much faster, moving transnational in
ways that are very uncomfortable for folks in organizations and nations
who are used to having clear boundaries as we move through this
process.
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And so if you look at the bottom here, where we talk about transnational
flows rather than only state ways of doing business, it puts a greater
burden and a greater pressure on organizations like the EU and NATO in
industry as they cross borders and they end up in the information age
and move forward in the acceleration and migration of people across
borders as we move through that process.
Our Secretary General has looked at this problem and he has made this
quote about the security environment as it has evolved – and then I’ll talk
a little bit more about this as we go through this – “We need to be clear
inside NATO both about what the implications are and what the limits
are”. And so this effort is really about trying to describe and stimulate and
frame the discussion for the political leaders in Brussels to be able to
build a consensus within the nations on NATO’s role and the capabilities
NATO needs to adapt to the changing environment.
Again we’ll go through these three steps and what I’m showing you now
is not finished work but work in progress and during the questions &
answers we’ll take some of your inputs and actually roll those into the
effort as well.
This is a slide that comes from the British concept development folks,
and basically what it shows you is that if you start here and look to the
future there are things that everyone will say are probable to happen and
then there are some elements on the edges that move out and tell you
that there are some shocks like 9/11 or some other elements out there
that are less predictable, less likely but are all part of shaping the future
as you move through it. It’s just a graphic way of being able to show that
there are some things that are more likely than others but we need to
take all that into account as we look to the future and move through.
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The work that has been ongoing has had a number of researches, you
can see, from the UK to Netherlands to Germany including the EU,
including partners, including non-military folks and trying to bring folks
together describe what are the big drivers that are changing the way the
world is moving as we go though the future. The trends as they’ve
narrowed down can be categorized in a lot of different ways, as I’ve just
shown you. Here are six of them in key points here from a demographic
perspective as the world grows from 6.1 billion to 7.7, what you see is
most of that growth is in underdeveloped areas or developing areas and
a large increase in youth under 20, mostly in non-European countries, in
Africa, in the Middle East and that kind of opportunity in that kind of
places that are not as developed as in Europe will create expectations of
those young folks.
Certainly global warming, as we move through this process, the
globalization creates perhaps a greater rift on the haves and have-nots,
terrorism speaks for itself, the technology interestingly enough works in
two directions; as it accelerates it both makes the individual far more
capable of influencing things that in the past only states could do.
Computer network attacks are a good example of that kind of work or the
availability on the Web of finding out technology for improvised explosive
devices and in some cases perhaps even weapons of mass destruction.
And of course the area here of global governance is an issue that has
said the states will still be powerful, but in fact the power has shifted
away from states and you see transnational kinds of trends.
So, a lot of this is not particularly new, there are lots of studies out there
talking about how the world is changing; our impact, our objective is to sit
down and say how does that impact the people in this room, the peoples,
the nations in NATO and what are the potential capabilities we would
need to address to do that.
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On the left side here you see eleven kinds of security challenges that that
poses and then those mapped out in some cases to where those
challenges pose and when you see one, two, three of those in the same
place, clearly there is much greater potential for disruption and turmoil.
This is another way to look at it that probably pertains closer to the folks
in this room as you would look at political, ecological and in some cases
military kinds of challenges -and I’ll come back to this kind of picture a
little bit later- but the basic area is they all overlap so what happens in
your area for crisis management quickly flows into the other areas
whether it’s ecological whether it’s migration whether it’s a technology, it
has an impact across all of these different areas of security.
It’s a little bit hard to see -basically the approach here is to tell you that if
we look at the peaks there are certain areas that everybody agrees are
real challenges, some areas like terrorism. OK? Then there are areas
that there’s a broad consensus, different levels of consensus about what
else could be out there and then there are these valleys, what you would
call the black swans, the 9/11 that happens because perhaps people
weren’t paying attention or didn’t anticipate that kind of change. But when
that kind of change happens it impacts everybody in this room
economically, politically, socially as we move through the process.
And so the work that we’re doing now is to try to build this map. So the
work that I will show you next is not an answer, but in fact are points of
discussion along this map that will continue to robust and we’ll have to
see in Brussels, hopefully by Christmas of this year. Our estimate is that
it will be a broad framework for discussion.
So from the mission perspective this is some work that was done by that
Swedish individual Tom Ries again and it’s not ACT, it’s not NATO’s
position, but outside independent people who are looking at the world
and all the pressures and saying what kind of challenges would be out
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there in this highly globalized world. And so, again I apologize because
he uses some abbreviations up here for High Intensity Conflicts and High
Intensity Conflicts and boots as you move through this, but in his
briefings and his works he sees resource nations that are not fully
integrated into the world in the way it is today and so you may in fact see
competition over resources that would go state to state again. So I’m not
saying when you look at this that this is ACT or NATO’s position but to
show you what others are thinking in the kinds of areas that we would
have for challenges that impact everybody in this room.
Then again there’s the kind of discussion that he has that says “Ok, what
does that mean from a military prospective?” and again the idea of
projection and graduated work and how that impacts the political
business as we move through. So, lots of implications for the military as
you move through this in some areas that are politically correct to talk
about, in some areas that nations with a long history look to their
neighbors and still worry about article 5, and that will be part of the
overall debate in trying to determine the role and the future of NATO as
we move through this process.
Again, some of the missions that might be out there whether they contain
policing missions, security and access to resources or as the French
have talked about down here, protecting the society. So, I’m showing you
the array of work that’s part of that landscape, that three-dimensional
landscape that we talked about looking most likely at contingency options
and trying to determine what that means for the alliance.
Now, in the near, mid and long-term, what we have found is that in the
near term when we look at Afghanistan, we identify that we have both
capabilities to do some of the missions and shortfalls in some areas, and
as we’ve done our defense planning we’ve looked at about ten years and
we’ve seen again some of those same kind of problems in the future
whether it’s civil-military interface, whether it’s the ability to respond
161
quickly
in
deployed
areas
and
sustain
forces,
whether
it's
accommodating technology.
The work that we are doing out here into the long-term is to be able to
project that and what we’ve noticed is that there are a couple of important
issues in here, and what it really means to us is that a lot the decisions
we’re making in the near-term will have impact for the next 15 or 20 years
for capability purposes. If we moved back 20 years to 1988 and we ask
ourselves prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall, who would have guessed that
NATO would be in Kosovo in 1998 and would have been right here or in
Afghanistan here.” So, if you’re in Kosovo or now you’re in Afghanistan,
which ten years out and if this is where you are today, what does 20
years out here mean?
But the equipment, the forces, the training, the organization we have
inside NATO and inside the military has a legacy that goes along with the
equipment and the people that we already have in the military and trained
and that carries through and we have to use that more effectively as we
move to the future.
So bottom-line what this really means is that NATO needs, as we
continue to look into the future, to take that full array of discussions that
we have and put them out on the table. I’ve shown you some that are
ACT work, I’ve shown you some that are done by the Swiss, by the
French, by the UK; we are meeting with lots of different folks to gather
this information, have this discussion, frame it in a way for the political
folks and the military folks in Brussels to be able to reach an agreement
on the challenges and what it means to NATO.
The reality is that everybody in this room is going to be operating in the
same space in this crisis management. There’s a continuum of the
capabilities that you have that will carry to the future and of what NATO
has and as we address issues in Afghanistan they need to be able to
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carry ahead into the future challenges and that our way ahead is to
continue to work on this multiple future effort, gain agreement inside
Brussels and then focus on developing the capabilities we need that give
you that full range of capabilities at the most probable as well as some of
the dangerous kinds of challenges that face the alliance. On that note I’d
like to terminate. Thank you very much.
Back to agenda
163
“Civil Emergency Planning in the context of Comprehensive
Approach”
Major Gen. Chatzidakis Antonis, IMM NATO
Thank you, Mr Chairman. Let me first convey, I’d say, a very warm
congratulations to US citizens in this room for their National Day. It’s a
great day for a great democracy.
So, Ladies and Gentlemen, “kalimera”.
As you see on the screen, I am the Director of Logistics and Resources
and Armaments in the International Military Staff. During the next 15-20
minutes I will provide you with an overview of the NATO way-head on the
comprehensive approach and the NATO military authorities’ role. I also
intend to look briefly at civil emergency planning and how it fits into the
comprehensive approach.
First, let me emphasize that the comprehensive approach is not easy to
define. I see two main very broad dimensions to it: an external one,
concerning NATO's relationship with international actors and the other
internal, focusing on coherent use of military and non-military tools to
ensure efficient and effective planning and implementation of operations.
Here is the outline of my presentation, which covers several areas, the
new strategic concept, NATO’s comprehensive approach, effect base
approach to operation and civil emergency planning.
NATO’s purpose should be genuine commitment to ensuring the safety
and security of member-states geo-strategic and geographic interests at
home and abroad. A new strategic concept would allow NATO to lay out

Power Point presentation available. Click here.
164
its vision of where it wants to be in the next decade both geographically
and metaphorically.
The long-term commitment to ensure security and stability in Europe will
obviously remain a key principle of the alliance. A new strategic concept
should therefore seek to find the right balance between NATO’s
European obligations and its expeditionary focus. The multi-faced
Kosovo mission and its daily interaction with multiple international
partners provide a positive model of how NATO will probably operate in
future endeavors.
The Afghanistan mission, which is the first out of area, certainly
represents a future direction, both geographically and in terms of NATO’s
fundamental tasks. Therefore, the alliance’s ability to undertake out of
area missions followed by coordinated civil and political reconstruction,
interacting with multiple partners must be a major principle. It is important
then that NATO’s global partnerships both with organizations and with
non-NATO member-states be determined in a more systematic fashion.
Its ability to work closely and comprehensively with the UN, the EU, the
G8, NGOs and the private sector is becoming incredibly important. The
interface between civilian and military instruments of power is a critical
element of today’s new security environment and may ultimately
determine the alliance’s success or maybe failure.
It is then widely recognized that NATO is working within a new strategic
environment. As I have already mentioned, experiences in Afghanistan
and the Balkans have also demonstrated that not only NATO but the
international community needs to work more closely together and fully
comprehensively address the security challenges of today and tomorrow.
Heads of states and governments at the Riga Summit in November ’06
commissioned a work on the comprehensive approach. Since then this
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concept was considered as an important element that will have a direct
impact on alliance current and future operations. Then NATO has been
working to develop a realistic concept to improve the cohesive application
of NATO’s crisis management elements as well as practical cooperation
at all levels with partners and other relevant international organizations
and bodies in developing modalities for better cooperation.
From the alliance’s perspective, there are essentially three aspects;
these aspects underpin the comprehensive approach. First of all,
improving the coherent application of the alliance on crisis management
instruments, including its military and political planning processes.
Second, improving the alliance practical cooperation at all levels with
partners – the UN and other relevant organizations as I mentioned before
– in the planning and conduct of operations and enhancing NATO’s
ability to
bring
military support
to
stabilization
operations
and
reconstruction efforts in all phases of the conflict.
Therefore, implementation of the comprehensive approach will require
that the effects on the local population, reconstruction and development
will have to be factored into military planning which calls for broad and
timely political and military estimates.
In developing pragmatic proposals, NATO will be engaged at the
following three levels: NATO headquarters should focus on building
confidence and mutual understanding between international actors
including developing ways and means for better cooperation. At the
operational level the priority to cooperate with other international actors in
the overall planning for complex operations in which a large degree of
civil-military interaction will be required. At the theatre level, NATO force
commanders must be empowered to undertake effective cooperation and
coordination with the local authorities and in theatre principles from other
international organizations in the execution of their mission. All three
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levels must function in a comprehensively and complementary manner to
achieve success.
To better support the launching of an operation NATO will adjust its
planning procedures to reflect the requirements of the comprehensive
approach. That will require: liaising with local and international actors,
taking into account non-military expertise, agreed nation commitment and
improved political-military cooperation in theatre.
Secondly, conducting adequate and regular joint training of civilian and
military personnel to enhance better understanding, mutual trust, respect
and confidence between NATO, its partners, other local or international
actors and support of better interaction and coordination on the ground
as the need for operations arises. All this training is taking place making
effective use of lessons learned in this process.
In addition, while respecting the autonomy of decision-making of each
organization, coherence in operations necessitates extensive civil-military
interaction and continuous engagement with all the relevant parties and
levels. And finally – and maybe most importantly – we must ensure that
our public message of commitment to working together is well-known and
is reinforced with systematic and well-designed information strategy
using well-trained experts and multi-media advanced technology.
I also want to say a few words about the effect-base approach to
operations which is actually the military side of the comprehensive
approach. NATO’s military authorities have developed and agreed their
concept of an effect-based approach to operations, which aims at a more
coherent and comprehensive application of all NATO instruments and
better coordination with non-NATO actors when NATO is engaged or
engaging in operations and so dovetails neatly with the comprehensive
approach. It focuses on the results of actions, on how they contribute to
the end-state of any operation. Thus, an effects-based approach to
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operations has the potential to describe the military involvement in the
comprehensive approach to the planning and the conduct of the
operation at the operational theater level.
The strategic commands continue to work on this aspect and in particular
the practical element of such a concept. The previous speaker is the
champion actually of this endeavor.
Civil emergency planning
The civil emergency planning aim is to coordinate national planning
activity to ensure the most effective use of civil resources in collective
support of Alliance strategic objectives. Civil emergency planning is a
national responsibility and civil assets remain under national control at all
times. However, national intentions and capabilities are harmonized to
ensure that jointly developed plans and procedures will work and the
necessary assets are timely available.
The main role of civil emergency planning is in NATO reflect the
fundamental security tasks of the Alliance of civil support for military
under article 5 and non-article 5 crisis response operations, support for
national authorities in civil emergencies and the protection of civilian
populations. Beneath these very broad headings civil emergency
planning has a role to play in managing the availability of civil assets and
facilities and the maintenance of normal life during emergency situations.
As NATO adapted itself to the requirements of the changing security
environment in Europe, it became clear that the role played by civil
emergency planning within the Alliance overall strategic concept would
also need to be reexamined. The principle task resulting from this review
can be identified as supporting Alliance comprehensive approach to
operations.
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Given the potential diversity of NATO current and future operations, the
comprehensive approach is bound to develop and adapt in the future.
The area where I see things happening already is that of cooperation
between civil emergency planning bodies and the NATO military
authorities. I feel that in this area we are increasingly addressing some of
the issues identified within the comprehensive approach and it shows
some interesting relevant examples of a broader approach to some
operations.
From the bullets here I would like to focus on the top: support to the
NATO military authorities. Civil support to the NATO military authorities
can occur in the areas of ongoing operations, military planning and policy
and concept development. To implement this, NATO has a civil expertise
catalogue which lists a range of experts in various fields, mainly in the
political reconstruction and stabilization and logistics domains and these
experts can be called upon for support by NATO and we have used and
continue to use this expertise on various occasions and we practice this
process in all of our major exercises.
The catalogue of experts is updated on a rolling basis as necessary or as
new requirements are recognized and we are currently in the process of
advertising it within the new command structure and defining procedures
how to request assistance.
An interesting and important aspect of the civil emergency planning role
is that it already has a mandate to establish and may take contact with
international organizations. When we combine this military engagement
with civil expertise, that I just outlined, then you can see that we already
have the new place of a more comprehensive approach to operations
and this is certainly an area which can – and I’m sure will – develop with
time.
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Ladies and Gentlemen, concluding my briefing, I would like to summarize
with two basic messages. Comprehensive approach is a new concept
and might be the solution - we don’t know yet; as an idea it’s perfect –
under which crisis management and operations should be considered.
Secondly, civil emergency planning is now getting a new role beyond
logistics and covering traditionally operation areas for planning and
execution of operations.
Ladies and Gentlemen, that completes my presentation. Thank you for
your attention and I’m ready if you have any questions. Mr Chairman,
thank you.
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171
“NATO Perspectives on Crisis Management Exercising (Planning,
Conduct and Evaluation)”
Mr Ilay Ferrier, Head of Crisis Exercising and Management Systems,
Planning Directorate Operations Division of International Staff
Thank you very much indeed, Mr Chairman.
Good morning Ladies and Gentlemen and if I may also congratulate the
USA on its day today. I’ve been invited to say a few words to you over
the next fifteen or so minutes regarding crisis management exercising in
NATO. And my plan basically is to ask a number of questions and try to
give you an idea of how we approach these questions dealing with what
are crisis management exercises, why do we conduct them, who’s
involved, who participates, on what basis, on what focus these exercises
derive and from what disciplines our CMS is constructed and finally some
benefits that we’ve had in very general terms of exercising at this level.
Let me put these exercises quickly into context. You realize of course
that an organization like NATO conducts all kinds of exercises and I’ve
put the three general styles of exercises on the screen. At the top, the
politico-military grand strategic level exercises - the crisis management
exercises. Grand strategic is not an official term, it’s a word that’s coming
into use and is often used to describe the inter-governmental level, which
of course the North-Atlantic Organization represents. There’s of course a
full range of military exercises covering everything from live troop
maneuver type exercises through to seminars, table-top and workshops.
And as we’ve just been hearing, civil emergency exercises again dealing
with crisis response from a civil emergency point of view, support to the
military, but also covering involvement in the coordination of disaster
response.

Power Point presentation available. Click here.
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So let’s ask the first question: what are CMXs? These exercises are
grand strategic politico-military exercises. They are designed to cover the
political, the military and also the civil domains but at the level of the
North-Atlantic Council and therefore at the level of ministries and capitals.
We’re looking at exercises where teams within the capitals themselves
engage in advising their delegations in a consultative manner to produce
the decision-making that is required for the crisis that has been
portrayed. And of course that has to be supported by the strategic
commands and of course the international staffs.
The top level, as Professor Pfaltzgraff mentioned, I think on the first day,
is the crisis leadership element: the executive, the nations. And therefore
these exercises are owned of course by the allies themselves, and
therefore – which adds its complications – have to be constructive and
planned as well as conducted under the consensus decision-making
process. These exercises are designed to test both existing procedures
but also and most importantly evolving new procedures and concepts,
such as comprehensive approach that are coming on-line.
Obviously again the allied nations need to agree, and obviously concepts
that aren’t going to be tested although they may not yet be approved, of
course have to be mature enough to be exercised. And this element
covers perhaps again, quoting the Professor, the crisis management
element of these exercises which should highlight challenges and
opportunities for improvement and from which of course lessons derive.
Crisis management exercises are not actually designed necessarily as a
staff training vehicle; however of course they have a considerable sidebenefit of providing that sort of benefit.
Why do we do them? NATO is a political as well as military organization
and
it
is
also
of
course
operationally engaged.
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The
general
understanding is that it is necessary to periodically exercise such an
organization as is fairly obvious, in part to complement the stars of
exercises in the military and civil emergency domains, but also to
address the various issues on the screen in white. We have a complex
consultation and decision-making process; any alliance, any organization
of a multi-national dimension of course has that complexity.
There are a lot of misconceptions within NATO itself as well as from
outside on how NATO works. It is of course key and perhaps the only
vehicle at this level to be able to consider some of the grand strategic
issues out of the box regarding potential challenges and at times nontraditional aspects of crisis management.
We set out to exercise with a wide variety of non-NATO countries. Most
of the nations that are represented in this room today, many of them are
partnerships for peace and most of them have been engaged in previous
and current exercising. And we believe that exercises of this nature
should and can provide an opportunity to cooperatively engage to mutual
advantage with other international actors, be those UN and its agencies,
OSCE, EU, Red Cross, etc. Obviously, another reason for doing these
exercises does pick up these staff training and orientation benefits.
So, who participates? As I mentioned, a number of the entities that I’ve
already talked about, primarily of course the allied capitals all
represented in NATO headquarters by the North-Atlantic Council and its
committees, the executive component of the alliance.
The two strategic commands in their various capacities either
operationally in the case of the allied command for operations and from a
transformation point of view, as we’ve just been hearing, with the allied
command transformation. And that staffs, and primarily the operational
one of course get very much involved in providing strategic advice and
planning capability.
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And the third component, the international staffs of NATO headquarters,
those bodies of people who have no decision-making authority at all but
facilitate and hope to support the workings of the alliance, who come
from the political, military, operational, public affairs, civil emergency
planning, intelligence and other domains both in the civil but also in the
military field.
Most importantly of course again, as I mentioned before, we also involve
partnership countries, various types. I'm seeking to improve to use these
exercises in interrelations with international actors. That includes of
course joint exercises with the European Union.
When do we hold these exercises? In fact there is currently an annual
program - being reviewed I have to say, but it is annual at the present
moment – which has to be de-conflicted and harmonized with on the one
hand, for example EU programs and also within NATO, the military and
civil emergency planning programs.
What do they focus on? These exercises seek to cover all potential
challenges over a period of time. We don’t try to do everything in one day
of course, but the idea is to set a program to look at exercising in a
variety of domains on a variety of different issues. Sometimes with
partners, sometimes not, sometimes just the alliance; but primarily most
of the time we seek now to do it with partners. It requires imagination to
design scenarios, what crises are for the future, to consider the unfamiliar
and actions that have never been done before, and of course to try to
avoid inevitably sensitivities between the various plain partnerships and
also even allied nations.
We derive scenarios the best we can covering collective defense
obviously from a NATO point of view, but also peace keeping in its
various forms and types, including low and high intensity problems,
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consequence management, conventional asymmetric threat, cyber
defense, the maritime domain, energy security, all of these features as
part of the exercise scenario-building process.
You can’t capture everything in every exercise and therefore you need to
be selective and the aim is to cover these different domains over a period
of time. Future scenarios will also seek to provide a vehicle to implement,
as we mentioned this morning already, the comprehensive approach to a
crisis and to operations. We need to define aims, legal issues, civil and
military operational planning components and political, military and civil
reaction to incidents but also look at the whole business of doing this
potentially with international actors themselves and the aim in due course
is to try and get them involved as part of the game plan. This should be
quite a challenge. There are differing decision-making autonomies in a
variety of different organizations; organizations operate differently where
member-states are actually the executives within NATO for example. If
you go into the UN domain, the department of peace-keeping operations
secretariats operate actually with effective autonomy themselves. So
there are different asymmetric relationships that need to be thought
through as well.
The question I think that Dr Koutsis mentioned yesterday, can we use
such exercising to improve interaction between international actors and
demonstrate the issue and try to focus on the problem that we can’t do
things militarily alone.
Equally also and of course the most important factor, as one of our media
speakers mentioned a couple of days ago, is to identify lessons and
implement a proper lessons learnt process from which to improve our
ability and hopefully in cooperation with others everybody’s ability to
interact together.
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Some of the objectives: again I won’t discuss this for very long but I’ll give
you an insight as to the sort of issues that might come up within the
construction of these scenarios. Everything from political, intelligence,
public affairs are extremely important, comprehensive approach – we
mentioned before – joint operations and logistics. These cover of course
a wide range of domains and cover a variety of differing staffs and
differing components, entities within the alliance and equally outside with
other partnerships, other actors.
And finally some of the benefits. These exercises, any exercise needs to
produce of course an outcome and benefits even at the risk of actually
failing which produces of course its own lesson. And one of the
advantages of these lessons you can do this in a benign environment
where mistakes are made and problems arise and there isn’t an impact
out in the real world and the real field.
They provide an opportunity to consider current and evolving concepts in
that benign environment. And exercises also enhance familiarity,
networking and transparency between staffs within our organization, all of
whom of course change both in capitals, NATO headquarters, the
strategic commands and elsewhere as well as in the participating entities,
be those partnership countries or international actors, staffs as well.
Extremely useful of course to be able to identify which department, how it
works, what they do and even their personality, so when the real problem
arises, you know who to talk to and how it works, and how they need and
how they will approach the problem.
It also provides an opportunity for all participants, including within NATO,
to see as it were, how NATO works and perhaps even on occasion when
it doesn’t. And because the whole process is conducted in a time-limited
environment, with the results the participants can experience first hand
the whole interacting relationship between capitals, their representatives,
the command structure, the civil emergency and equally partnerships and
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international actors. There’s a huge benefit in being able to see the whole
panoply of international relations, potentially as part of those exercise
games. You may not necessarily see that in the normal conduct of
routine business; and by routine I mean even where NATO is running a
comprehensive campaign in ISAF, in Afghanistan. It is equally still not
that obvious how these different components necessarily work together.
In an exercise you can replicate that in a better way and produce that
learning process.
It also provides, of course, for our partners a useful opportunity for them
to work up their own capital’s organization and to improve their ability to
work within themselves and equally with other nations as well. And when
I say partnerships I mean those that I think as one of our own allies seek
to improve their own intergovernmental machinery as well to best effect.
Gentlemen, I will conclude there, but I hope this has given you an insight
as to what we do at the grand strategic level in the NATO alliance on
crisis management exercising and some indications of where we are
trying to move into the future. Thank you very much.
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179
“EU Perspectives on Crisis Management Exercising (Planning,
Conduct and Evaluation)”
Mrs Vraila Marina, Head of Exercises Sector, Operation and
Exercises Unit – Defense Issues, EU Council General Secretariat
Firstly, many thanks to the organizers, as usual, for the invitation. Also,
the program is arranged in such a way that my job is being made much
easier, because I will be - like my predecessor, Ilay - able to refer to
previous speakers - in this case very often himself. In addition to these
thanks, congratulations also to the US on their national day.
I will be very brief, because indeed Ilay Ferrier has provided in a very
succinct way much on the reasons why and the usefulness of exercises
in a benign environment. Obviously there are a number of differences
between NATO and the EU, but much of what he said in terms of the
whole construction, etc. are quite valid so there’s no reason to actually
mention them again and that’s very useful.
As you know ESDP started forming formerly part from an institutional
perspective as one of the instruments in 2001 and clearly from its very
inception ESDP has been seen, something that has both civilian and
military dimensions. And indeed this is part – I suppose—of the added
value of the European Union’s contribution in crisis management. It
needs to tie in aspects like the European Commission which bring in the
economic elements, all the way down to headquarters and so forth.
So, there’s quite a big challenge because all of these actors have of
course different hierarchical structures, they are based on different parts
of the pillars, as we call them in the European Union and what makes
exercising quite interesting is having to bring these various actors
together.
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Additionally, there is no permanent military headquarters. We have
instead seven headquarters that can be used and of course this means
that all these need to be exercised and we started as of 2002 with our
first crisis management exercises bringing in the core planning team, as I
mentioned, the various actors involved both on the military, civilian and
also political side and we are now in 2008 at our second generation of
crisis management exercises. The first one went through a series of the
decision-making process, because the interesting challenge was that at
the same time as the exercises we were also developing the various
procedures. Let me remind you that ESDP was pretty young even though
there has been a very substantive number of operations, both on the
military and civilian field and now one can call sort of more combined
operations. And so the first exercises were really very much also
procedures setting.
For reasons given that the exercises take place over a very short time
space one clearly needs to focus on a certain number of elements, so
therefore it is useful to have these CMEs, which are crisis management
exercises with both civilian and military components. MILEXs which focus
more on the military aspects of crisis management although they focus
more on the OHQ-FHQ interaction and the collaborative, parallel etc
planning in the development of the CONOPS and the OPLAN rather than
going all the way down to LIVE-EXs which is not something we are
working on in the military field at the moment. And then we also have our
civilian exercises which take sort of focus on particular civilian questions
and activities.
So, I think what I would also need to emphasize is that for us it’s also
important to involve in our exercises third partners and international
organizations with which we cooperate regularly and in that context of
course, we try and involve wherever possible in all relevant exercises the
non-EU, European NATO allies and other countries which are candidates
for accession to the EU, Canada, Ukraine, Russia, United States, more
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and more and other countries, our Mediterranean partners also are
regularly informed on EU exercises.
As Ilay mentioned it’s important to try and hold regular exercises between
EU and NATO, whenever we can. We’ve also had one with the United
Nations and it’s also important to stress that we also had a seminar with
Mediterranean partners. So what we are trying to do is to involve with all
those countries which we have a dialogue. And of course each exercise
is focused differently in order to take as much advantage of the key
questions that we want to ask as possible.
How do we do it in the EU? Again I won’t go into all the details. Ilay very
clearly highlighted the planning, conduct, evaluation and reporting
aspects of exercises and mentioned the importance of lessons learnt
throughout the whole process. The only thing that I will perhaps mention
at this stage is that in the EU it’s a particular challenge because various
committees deal with different issues. It is not just ESDP. If you want for
example to consider certain aspects related to financing you have to
involve a completely different set of experts than if you want to focus on
military planning.
Similarly, civilian aspects can be dealt with in one or another committee
so what is always a challenge is to ask the right questions, try to be
focused, because as Ilay mentioned, exercising takes place over a week
or at the most ten days, so you can't solve everything under the sun. And
what is important is that both the actors that you are focusing on, as well
then as the means with which you will try and support this exercising, for
example CIS is becoming more and more important in trying to make the
most out of this are key decisions that you have to make early on in order
to be able to do so successfully.
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I think that I will leave it at that because it all fits in the overall
presentations and leave therefore also some time for the last speaker.
Thank you very much.
Back to agenda
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Q&A
Representative from Libya:
Thank you very much for your interesting presentation. It has been seven
years since the campaign against Afghanistan started. Today the Afghan
government with the support of coalition forces is still unable to control
the country. Taliban attacks are increasing, civilians are suffering. The
idea of describing your enemy as terrorist and refusing any dialogue with
it is considered by many people an unwise idea. Don’t you think that the
coalition should change its policy and some real dialogue with the
Talibans should be initiated to reach some sort of mutual understanding
and acceptance and to engage them in the political process? It seems
this war can’t be won by bombs and it seems likely to last for a long time.
Thank you.
Moderator:
Your question is addressed to Gen Eikenberry, I guess? I suggest that
we take a couple of more questions. Yes, please.
Mr Harry Tambakakis:
Good morning, General. Thank you for your articulate comprehension.
I’m Harry Tambakakis. I am working with the Hellenic Defense
Intelligence. I represent Greece in several NATO fora and I have a
question for you sir. You mentioned that the Afghan environment is a
very complex environment. You have also recognized that we in the
alliance need to follow a specific approach identifying a security line, an
economic line of approach - and if I captured your words correctly - a
reconstruction line of approach. My question is: has the military
committee ever tried to consider another line which according to my
understanding is essential for us to achieve a goal. The line that I would
like to ask you, is the cultural line of approach, the cultural way that we
need to apply in this complex environment to achieve what we want,
stability I suppose. Thank you.
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Brig. Gen. Manolas, ACOS J5 in the HNDGS:
I would like to address my question to Gen Soligan and then to Gen
Eikenberry. Sir, could you elaborate please with view to the
comprehensive approach to the extensive experimentation that ACT is
currently undergoing? And I’m referring to the civil-military overview
experiment. And the question for Gen Eikenberry is again with regard to
the comprehensive approach and our interaction with international
organizations and NGOs, don’t you think sir, that the existing NATO
security policy which stems back to 2002 sets certain impediments in the
exchange of information with IOs and NGOs? And what are we trying to
do with it and how will we cope with this? Thank you.
Lt Gen. Soligan:
Thank you. I have the easiest question of the three, but I’d also like to
touch a little bit on the points made and asked for Gen Eikenberry as
well.
ACT, Allied Command Transformation has been focused on both
describing and working through ways of implementing the military support
for comprehensive approach for several years. One of the initiatives that
is ongoing is this initiative called the Civil-Military Overview which to the
user is basically a webpage that they have access to, that provides them
information no matter which organization they are: civil, NGO, IO. It’s
plugged into the military common operating picture, so that everyone
would have a common basis of understanding and knowledge. When you
peel back the webpage what you really have is a group of subject-matter
experts that are from the international community, that are available to
connect in a networked way to their resident organization and others to
answer specific questions in a reach back approach so the subject-matter
experts are for the most part in the rear and they work across the
international community to maintain current information and answer
specific questions. It is being tested, utilized, refined and improved in
Afghanistan and it started last January and it has two people forward and
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five people from he international community plus others that are in the
rear doing this connection. There have been more than 700 requests
made by the different users.
My view, having reflected now on about 4-5 months of work is that the
military is beginning to understand the potential value of having
information on refugees, displaced persons, what the international
community is planning on doing and I think it has benefited the military a
great deal. From the civilian side it provides them protection from being
too closely aligned to the military which in some cases undermines their
sense of neutrality or their perception of neutrality. But the negative side
is that the military culture and the military rules that you spoke about in
the second part of your question often limit the information that’s made
available to the non-military folks. And as a result we’re seeing a potential
failure of the system because the non-military folks are saying “this is a
one-way street, not a two-way street.”
And so we have been working – as a matter of fact I spoke about it
yesterday to SACEUR and his Staff – we’re working with the Commander
of ISAF, we’re working with the Provision and Reconstruction Teams to
get as much unclassified information available to the international
organizations and NGOs. Part of that are the rules for false protection
purposes, but most of that is about culture and about a mindset that says
“I want to make this information available so that others can use it”;
whether it's roads being opened, whether it's safe to go to specific
locations at a certain day. There’s plenty of information that’s available on
the military side that the civilians want to know. So, I would just touch
that.
A second area that we are working on in the comprehensive approach is
something called a Civilian Advisor, which would be an international
organization representative much like our political advisors but connected
to the civilian international organization world and NGO world to build the
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networks connections and relationships to be able to plan together, train
together and operate together more effectively. So I’ll stop here because
you have three questions, but hopefully you can see that there is
tremendous work that’s going on. Most of it happens at the tactical level;
we need to embed that at the Joint Force Command Staffs, at the FC
Staffs and incorporate it into the NATO Headquarter Staffs as well.
Lt Gen. Eikenberry:
Let me just follow up on what James said and then I’ll come up on the
other two questions. Just to supplement what Jams just laid out for you,
clearly there is a much better understanding right now within NATO than
say when we first started up operations in Afghanistan in 2003 about the
need to have extensive coordination with relevant international
organizations or at least information exchange with them and this being
critical to the delivery of the comprehensive approach, manifestations I
think are examples of how we are much more aware than we were
several years ago and indeed making progress.
If you look at the NATO Heads of states and governments at the Summit
that took place at Bucharest in April of this year, just several months ago,
you’ll note there that the UN Secretary General was represented, from
the European Union Mr Solana was represented, the World Bank was
represented; that was not by accident, that was very much robust
dialogue with those organizations and a recognition by all that we need
be able to pull together in conflict zones like Afghanistan and have
success.
The UN and NATO are reaching a point where we should be signing in
the days, weeks or months ahead, a memorandum of understanding
between us. Our Joint Forces Command branch which has the
responsibility for the operational aspects of Afghanistan is periodically
now having conferences where they bring in NGOs, the UN, the key
Afghan actors at their Headquarters for planning purposes. And then
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really the spirit of NATO on the ground I know everywhere, at every level
of command is an open door with regard to information-sharing with all
the relevant NGOs in the area. And sensitivities that James had indicated
with NGOs those have to be respected but a philosophy of an open door
for the sharing of information which sometimes uniquely we have given
our security missions.
The second question was about whether there should be a cultural line of
operations. An interesting concept – I would say that in a theater like
Afghanistan a better understanding of the cultural aspects can certainly
help that clarity to understanding the fault lines that exist in terms of the
security situation on the ground. Not every problem, not every act of
violence is attributable to, as an example, Taliban. There could be tribal
fighting that's going on; there can be criminal fighting that’s going on. So,
yes, the cultural aspect is critically important.
Against that, I would say though that we have to be clear as a military
alliance that’s engaged in Afghanistan and will never be Afghan, will
never have a good command of the Pashtu language, never will
understand the Dari language well across our forces and given the
situation in which the Afghan people more than anything else right now
wish to take control of their own sovereignty. So, where the real level of
effort has to be or where the focus has to be in an operation like
Afghanistan is to help build a government of Afghanistan, which
ultimately will understand the cultural aspects far more than we can ever
dream of, and to help the Afghan people build a government which is
concerned with attending to their needs and to winning their own hearts
and minds.
The final point about Taliban. Let me take issue with the way the question
was framed and then I’ll come back to the answer. The way the question
was framed, the Afghan people are suffering. Indeed the Afghan people
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are suffering in places of Afghanistan right now and NATO forces are
taking casualties and they, too, are suffering. Let me make a point here.
Let’s go back. I talked about NATO and baselines inside of Afghanistan
in 2003. If I had time I would put a slide up on the screen that would show
a picture of a woman who’s on her knees wearing a burka with a Taliban
thug, a Taliban criminal behind her with a riffle that’s about to pull the
trigger and to put a bullet through her brain. Not shown in that picture is
that watching that are 30.000 Afghans gathered at the soccer stadium
one mile from where the Presidential Palace is located inside of Kabul
today.
That picture was taken in 2001 before operation “Enduring Freedom”
began. We don’t see that picture anywhere in Afghanistan today. What
we do see is picture of 6 million children going to school. Two million of
those are girls. Under Taliban rule, we had less than a million children in
school, and by the way all of those were boys, and by the way the
curriculum did not include mathematics or science or liberal arts.
We find that 80% of the Afghan people today have access to healthcare.
We find that the Afghan economy has tripled albeit struggling in certain
areas. We find Afghan household income has on the main tripled since
2001. I could go on.
So, let’s be careful when we use terms like suffering is going on out
there. Let's be clear on a second point as well: that in 2001, when this all
began or this late consideration for the Afghan people began, there was
no government of Afghanistan, there was no Afghan national army, there
was no Afghan national police force, there was nothing. There was
nothing except rubble that had accumulated through three decades of
Soviet occupation, through three decades of civil war, through three
decades of brutal Taliban occupation. We had nothing there.
189
So, it’s not a classic insurgency in which we have an existing government
that is now being attacked by an insurgent group. We had nothing. And
we started with the Afghans to build a government and security forces
and there were voids that existed out there, there were empty areas and
against that we had contested areas where Taliban has been, where
narco-traffickers have been, where criminals have been.
But the idea that in seven years nothing’s been accomplished is
absolutely wrong and I will dismiss that categorically. Now, back to what
was the question though "Should there be discussions with Taliban?” At
the end of the day, that’s for the Afghan government to decide, that’s for
the Afghan people to decide. It’s for them to have reconciliation. And
there active dialogue that’s going on with the Afghan government trying
to find the right group to be talking to and there’s a lively debate in
Parliament and by the way, NATO helps to facilitate when asked by the
Afghan government to facilitate the process however we can. Not by
politically interjecting ourselves but by ways and means that we have
available to us. Thank you.
Moderator:
Thank you very much. We just have time for one or two brief questions.
Commander Tsiantoulas:
I am Commander Tsiantoulas and I represent the Hellenic National
Defense General Staff in CME and CMX planning and my question is
addressed to Mrs Vraila and Mr Ferrier and has to do with the joint crisis
management exercising of NATO and EU. Given that a number of such
joint exercises have been canceled in the past for various reasons, what
are the intentions and plans of the two organizations to finally achieve the
conduct of such an activity in the future? Thank you.
Mr Alex Raptis:
190
Thank you. My name is Alex Raptis and I am a military historian and I’ve
got one question related to the drug trade or rather the drug production.
In 2001 the Taliban regime managed to stop the drug production without
having to spend a single dime. Now, in 2004-5, the British forces went
into Hellman territory with one of their primary objectives to stop the
production of opium. Now after a thousand dead British soldiers and quite
a lot of money spent, the drug production appears to be getting bigger
and bigger every year. What is the reason? If Gen. Eikenberry can give
me an answer. Thank you.
Lt. Gen. Menagias:
First of all, I would like to thank all the speakers for the very articulate and
eloquent presentation they gave us. I’ll try to make some comments and
make a more general question.
First of all, we have to admit that as an international community we’ve
been caught by the engagement of NATO and the European Union in
crisis management and wider and extensive long endurance operations.
Secondly, we have experienced a lot of lessons from our engagement in
such a type of operations and all these lessons have to be elaborated
more. We have started to do it in such a way in both organizations which
are present today, the European Union as well as NATO. Of course I
would like to highlight the importance of having the future multiple
initiatives launched by the ACT which will provide a springboard I would
say for the military committee and the nations to decide about the future
and the posture of the Alliance and the international community as well.
I don’t want to be very boring, so I’ll come straight to the point now. Of
course, as Gen. Eikenberry has pointed out, NATO is also one of the
actors of the comprehensive approach. What is missing today - of course
we can see that we cooperate with the UN, we cooperate with the EU, we
cooperate with the G8, we cooperate with the OSCE, etc. We have the
maximum results? No. We have some results, but we can increase them.
191
How can we define this common - I would say – dividend in order to
make the cooperation more touchable?
This is a strategic question that should be resolved by our politicians.
Just this question in general if you want to comment on it. Nothing else.
Thank you very much.
Moderator:
Thank you Gen. Managias. We have three questions. The first one is
addressed to Mr Ferrier on the NATO and the EU exercises and maybe
Mrs Vraila would like to jump in and make a comment as well. The
second one on opium production, I guess, also goes to Gen. Eikenberry
and the third one on ways of enhancing cooperation between NATO and
other international organizations on the field, feel free anyone of you, if
you want to make a comment.
Mr Ferrier:
Thank you very much indeed. The question was related to joint
exercising NATO with the EU. If I may by way of initial comment and then
I’ll hand over to Marina to my right. There have ever only been two joint
exercises in history. One was NATO with the Western European Union in
2000 and then subsequently the first NATO and EU exercise in 2003. We
are taking about the exercises that I talked about, the crisis management
level exercises. One was unfortunately canceled a few years ago, but
only one.
There is mutual agreement between both institutions to try and run joint
exercising at this level on a three year cycle. That is an agreed policy in
both organizations. There is of course constant staff dialogue as to the
way ahead programming, etc which goes on all the time. But exercising
of course is related inevitably to the real environment. It is not a standalone activity. You can’t just go and do an exercise certainly at this level
just as a game without taking into consideration the real environment and
192
of course there are some concerns, some difficulties which we’re all
familiar with with regard to this real relationship.
And therefore, all I can say really is that the intent is there, the policy is
there, the dialogue between the staffs continues on the wheres and hows
and the whens, and obviously we will have to come up with some
proposals in due course. We're not due for one immediately now, but no
doubt one hopes in the not-too-distant future. But that will of course rely
to a great extent on the real world circumstances that prevail in the
coming years. And that is all we can say at the present moment. I don’t
know whether, Marina, you wish to add to that.
Mrs Vraila:
As usual I can agree with – I mean in this case, since the question was
put to both of us – I can agree to everything that Ilay has said. The only
thing I can add, every six months there is a policy of coming up with
European Union conclusions at the end of each presidency. And yet
again there you will find the commitment and the interest of all the next
joint exercises with the participation of course of all EU member-states.
But I would like to just sort of get back a little bit because, as Ilay says,
only one was canceled; it’s not that it’s the only one that can be canceled
– you know, other exercises can get canceled, too. What we should, as
the exercise planners and programmers, also be aware of is that real life
always has to take precedence. And there are cases where, for various
reasons, an exercise has to be canceled. I’m trying to undermine this
particular one, but there can be other reasons for canceling an exercise,
so one shouldn’t do too much on this particular one.
Obviously, I tried to focus as much as I can in the wider framework of the
presentations, but I would, if I may, also like to say something now about
cooperation with the international organizations. I faithfully stayed within
my brief, but given the subject, I feel, if I may - it won’t take too long – it’s
193
something that again from the very beginning forms part of the ESDP. In
that context, we developed very much - obviously – our relations with
NATO, there is “Berlin plus”, there is the strategic partnership, there’s
also, in relation with the UN for example, a series of joint declarations
with agreed work programs both on the military and the civilian
dimension. And then in relation to that, there are also a number of
underpinning elements including for example the security agreement
which enables the exchange. As was mentioned, it's a very important fact
to be able to exchange to the extent possible classified information up to
a certain level.
What is important I think also to strongly stress here is that sometimes if
you look at things too theoretically, they may present more difficulty to be
implemented than when you look at them in practice. For example, again
in the context of “Berlin plus”, it has worked quite well, it is also working in
Bosnia. I understand that cooperation in the field is going quite well.
Thank you.
Lt Gen. Eikenberry:
On the question of counter-narcotics and puppy production – a very
important question regarding the implications for future success in
Afghanistan. The problem of narco-trafficking is massive; it has gotten
progressively worse. We are not certain what the outcome will be this
year. It might be at a slightly higher level, maybe at about the level of last
year. But the degree to which that involves efforts to try to establish good
governance and more dangerously the prospects from the profiteering
that comes from narco-trafficking going back into the hands of the
criminals but international networks is something of great concern.
Four points then. First of all, I think the person’s question said 2004 is
when the British went into Hellman; to be correct, 2006 in the springsummer when they went into Hellman. Two years later than you had
indicated.
194
The second point was that Taliban miraculously ended puppy production
in the year – I think you said 2000 – it’s actually 1999-2000, but although
the production went down dramatically, we still don’t know today whether
it was an economic decision on their part to drive the prices higher.
Clearly though, we projected the year 2008 where the Taliban
ideologically is telling the people “Plant puppy, it’s not at all against Islam,
it’s being used and consumed on the streets of the infidels, so continue
on”. This gives me no confidence that had the Taliban remained in power
that they would have continued with the idea of trying to eradicate puppy
for religious or ethical reasons; quite the contrary.
So, that would be the second point. The third point would be with regard
to counter-narcotics. What we have seen inside of Afghanistan where we
have
reasonably
good
governance
and
reasonably
good
law
enforcement taking place is that the people within those areas where
they benefit from this will generally on their own turn to alternative
agricultural production. So, it gets back to the point of needing to
continue to re-enforce the building of governance inside of Afghanistan,
rule of law and developing their security forces.
The fourth and final point I’ll make though is this: Afghanistan remains
one of the poorest countries in the world. It does indeed produce now
over 90% of the world’s puppy. About 90% of opium and derivatives are
coming outside of Afghanistan. Over 90%. It is however, as I said, one of
the poorest countries of the world and far less than 1% of that production
is being consumed inside of Afghanistan. So very frankly as we talk
about this massive problem, at some point in time the wealthier countries
of the world should probably be holding a mirror to their face and say that
we also have a demand problem that needs to be addressed. Thank you.
Lt Gen. Soligan:
195
The third question was about how to make the comprehensive approach
more effective. I think that it's a fundamental question that we need to
come to grips with as we move through this. I’d like to relate it a little bit
to the point that Karl just made.
Two things. First of all, he wrote me a note that the puppy problem was
an ACT problem and I told him that if I had a bigger budget and more
people, then I would be able to fix it. But when we talk comprehensive
approach we have a tendency to think international organizations and
NGOs but also comprehensive approach includes the whole government,
it includes all the different elements of government working together. And
when I was the J5 in US Southern Command, I led the team that wrote a
document called “Planet Columbia” which was about the whole of
government approach in Columbia where they put the whole government
together to deal with the drug issue which takes alternative crops, takes
medical security, rule of law, governance, all the ways you go through
this economic development, relocation of people is necessary in order to
deal with this problem. It is not a military problem. The military can
provide security, which is a fundamental basis of everything else that
happens, but in fact it is a whole of government and very much a
comprehensive approach problem.
So, how do you make the comprehensive approach work more
effectively? I think there are really two aspects to this. One is culturally
and the second one is process-wise. My experience has been that
comprehensive approach is only effective when there’s trust and
confidence between all the different actors that are involved. And that
trust and confidence results from constant and frequent interacting and
working together that builds relationships and allows an understanding of
what everybody brings to the table and as we talked about earlier
respecting the autonomy of decision-making but working together to bring
the strength and the power of each organization to the solution.
196
I had just been in a conference last week and the person I was sitting
next to was an NGO I had been working with now for fifteen years who
has been focused on how to bring NGO elements together. It’s that kind
of relationship – she’s now part of the Civil-Military Overview, we brought
that organization into that – and cultural building as we move through it
that I think is largely missing in the way that we have become stovepiped, in the way that we organize ourselves.
The second piece of this is really about process. I’m a C135 and when I
woke up in the morning I knew that I was in the air-force but I did
everything around my mission. And then I went to the Air Staff and I knew
I was supposed to be joint but I woke up in the morning and I worried
about the air-force. And then I was in the Joint Staff and I knew that I was
supposed to be part of an alliance but I really worried about the US. And
then I’m now in NATO and I know I’m supposed to be part of a
comprehensive approach but when I wake up in the morning, I think
about NATO. And to really fix this problem requires to have all the parties
sitting around the table working together every day and then everyone’s
voice is integrated on a daily routine basis into the solution set. We can't
have partners who are participating in ISAF, sitting out in another place
not part of our day-to-day business. We can't have international
organizations and NGOs and whole of government being part of an
answer, unless they are part of the day-to-day interaction as we go
through it.
My personal belief is that we could quickly break down most of the
barriers procedurally and culturally by simply having members of NATO
who are working together alongside – it doesn’t have to be in the same
building, they just need to have a separate cell to be able to work
together on planning for activities and/ or capability development, where
they wake up in the morning thinking about “How do we all make this
solution work?” rather than “How do I make my piece of the solution
work?”
197
So, culturally trust and confidence and I believe working together around
the same table we'll work through most of those issues. Would you like to
add anything to that?
Maj. Gen. Chatzidakis:
Just a little to clarify something. When we talk about comprehensive
approach we are not talking about the framework that the organizations
are working, let’s say, between them in general. When we say
comprehensive approach, it means comprehensive approach for
operations. But as the General said before, the more we improve our
mutual relationships with the organizations and NGOs, the more we have
the chance to have a better comprehensive approach on operations as
well. So it’s a very much culturally related issue and I think that there is a
good will between the organizations to work together now, it’s well
understood by everybody, and good results are expected very soon, I
think. Thank you, Mr Chairman.
Back to agenda
198
199
“The OSCE’s Role in relations to Early Warning, Conflict Prevention,
Crisis Management and Post Conflict Rehabilitation”
Mr Pietrusiewicz of the OSCE Conflict Prevention Center (CPC)
Thank you very much, Mr Moderator.
Actually, before coming here I was thinking quite a long time what should
be the focus of my presentation and given the fact that I’m the only
representative of the OSCE here and that the activities of South security
organizations are generally speaking not very well known, I decided to
give a rather general overview of the activities of my organization. Trying
to be very brief, let’s see whether I will manage and to leave time for
general discussion later on when I’ll be very happy to address any
specific questions or comments which would come from the floor.
Let me start by making a rather obvious remark, that the OSCE’s
capacity to play an important role in the European security affairs is
always a function of the developments outside the organization. As you
might remember the foundations for the organization were laid down over
30 years ago, but at that particular point in time the organization was a
forum for de-conflicting the opposing interests of two major blocks, as
they existed at that point in time.
There was not much room for crisis management activities then simply
because there were no needs for this sort of activities in Europe. The
situation changed dramatically after the fall of the Berlin wall when the
block to block confrontation became less important in international
relations but when the new risk and challenges to security came to the
fore, suddenly – and that was related mainly to the break-up of the Soviet
Union and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia – Europe was plagued
with original conflicts. And there were no structures, no institutions in
Europe which were able to address the problem.
200
NATO was not even thinking about out-of-area operations, the EU – or
the European Community, I should say – didn’t have its tools as they
have at the moment, CSFP, ESDP, and suddenly everybody was turning
to the OSCE which at that point in time was a small talking shop dealing
with abstract matters and in the matters of months OSCE became an
operational organization with most of its resources spent in the field
actually; at present almost 80% of our budget is spent in the field.
Then, towards the end of the ‘90s the situation in international relations
changed again pretty dramatically. First the EU and NATO started
developing their own operations in Europe and thus the necessity for the
OSCE’s operations became less apparent. Then the honeymoon in the
European security affairs was over; there were more confrontational
policies that could be observed at the end of the ‘90s, the beginning of
2000 and thus the OSCE’s role started to become less important.
Now, we have another change and that is related with the crisis of the
arms controls regime in Europe. You might be aware of the problems
with the application of the CFE Treaty; that might actually lead again to a
steep change in the OSCE's role. Actually, I came here directly from our
annual security review conference where discussion on new sets of
confidence-building measures and on new negotiations on arms control
regimes in Europe took place and it cannot be excluded that the role of
the organization will be much more important again.
Then let me say that the strength of the organization lies in the
combination of several qualities. One of those is that the OSCE has been
recognized by the UN as the regional arrangement in the sense of
chapter 8 of the UN Charter. That helps a lot due to the fact that a
number of states are always very reluctant to allow involvement of
international organizations in highly sensitive areas unless they have a
clear mandate from the UN. We have it for years and usually whenever
there’s a discussion which organization should get involved, the usual
201
conclusion is the OSCE. So, that makes us rather vulnerable in a sense if
you will.
Then, another thing which I would like to mention is that the OSCE is a
truly all-inclusive Pan-European framework spanning transatlantic and
Eurasian spaces. We have at the moment 56 participating states which
include of course European states, but also Canada and the USA, the
role of which in the European security for instance is difficult to overestimate, but also Central Asian states and I would add the partners –
one of those is Afghanistan and actually the inclusion of Afghanistan into
the partnership program opened a possibility for the OSCE to start
activities for the benefit of Afghanistan. Actually, very recently we
produced a comprehensive set of proposals on activities supporting
Afghanistan in areas such as border management, police and customs.
And hopefully this will lead to some quick implementation of this program
already this year hopefully.
Let me also say that OSCE is still a rather non-bureaucratic structure
which makes it easy for us to adapt to new challenges, new risks. The
decision-making process is relatively easy, although based on the
consensus principle, but still somehow the OSCE managed whenever
necessary to create new tools or to create new mechanism procedures to
deal with developing crisis.
Let me also say a few words about what the toolbox of the OSCE is. First
of all, there’s the political dialogue but there’s nothing really original in it; I
guess all the international organizations have it. But we also have rather
sophisticated sets of procedures and mechanisms for early warning in
crisis management and risk reduction. These mechanisms were
developed in the first half of the 1990s, they were used to a certain extent
at that point in time and then they became dormant, almost forgotten.
And suddenly this year they started to be triggered again and that is
related to one of the developing crises you might have heard about, the
202
incident which took place on the 20th of April in the zone of Georgia
Abkhaz conflict. Abkhaz is a part of Georgia which is out of the control of
Tbilisi. And suddenly Georgia but also the Russian Federation started to
trigger some of these mechanisms to promote their security and dialogue
within the OSCE.
Again at the annual security review conference which took place this
week, there was a whole session devoted to what the organization
should do regarding the revitalization of these mechanisms and actually
very interesting proposals were made so if you’re interested I’ll be very
happy to describe those later on in the Q&A session.
Finally, I would like to refer to our cooperation with other international
actors. Right from its inception the OSCE based all of its activities on the
assumption that we are not able to deal with all the developing crises on
the European space. That's why we need a very close cooperation with
the
others.
Hence,
we
already
developed
30
years
ago
the
comprehensive approach to security. It is not as sophisticated perhaps as
the concept that was discussed this morning but it contains all the basic
element that were referred to you by my distinguished predecessors.
We have a pretty active interaction with NATO, with the European Union,
the Council of Europe. Now we are developing our cooperation with the
CSTO and the CIS. It is much more active at a headquarters level - I
have to admit - but we also put the main stress on the need to interact
with our partners on the field. Sometimes it is very successful in some of
the mission areas, sometimes not.
One important tool which I forgot to mention actually is our – some
people refer to it as the “Jewel in the OSCE's crown" - field operations.
So far we developed or deployed since 1992 over 30 field operations.
some of them were closed down...at the moment we have 19 in four
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regions of the wider European world - these are the Balkans, Eastern
Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia.
Actually, the mandates and the character of these operations vary from
case to case, but they are based on one common characteristic: they are
cooperative in nature. In other words we need for their activities the
cooperation of the host nations. We don’t have coercive measures;
actually we don’t want to apply those. One may say that this is a
weakness of the organization and actually there are merits in this opinion.
But on the other hand we believe that this is our strength.
There are other organizations in the European security landscape which
can apply this sort of measures. Sometimes the situation requires a bit
more delicate approach if you will, and certainly the OSCE is able to
provide this. I think I will stop at that. I spoke already for 15 minutes and I
will be happy to answer any questions. Thank you very much.
Back to agenda
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205
“ESPD—A real added value?”
Mrs Grammata Sofia, 1st Councellor, Head of Department for ESDP,
Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Good morning Ladies and Gentlemen, I am very happy to be here today
and to participate in this event.
From the first day the discussions began concerning the establishment of
European crisis management capabilities, Greece has been amongst the
countries which supported the establishment of such capabilities,
because we believe that the crisis management arm, the so-called
European Foreign and Security Policy, is a necessary operational arm to
complete the Common European Policy, the Common Foreign and
Security Policy.
Greece participates with one of the five European Commands located in
member-states; the European command, the operation center is in
Brussels. It participates with the establishment of a battle group under
Greek Command, but Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania participate as well;
and we also participate in many other European operations and
considering that we are also a very good member of the Alliance, the
NATO Alliance, it becomes obvious that sometimes we are, as most
members of these two organizations, over-stretched, that is we contribute
to these operations beyond our powers.
The European Foreign and Security Policy was created with the
declaration of the European Council of Cologne in June 1999 and has so
far proven very dynamic. Ten operations are now in progress, another
one is being planned for Guinea-Bissau and another nine have ended
successfully. These operations are conducted on three continents. We
also have police and generally rule of law operations, but also outright
military operations, both in the Balkans as well as the Middle East, Asia
and Africa.
206
The crisis management operations that can be undertaken by the Union
according to the European Union Treaty are the so-called Petersburg
operations, that is humanitarian missions and rescue, peace and peacekeeping operations deploying armed forces. Such an operation
conducted using NATO means and capabilities is the Althea military
operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, since there is a close cooperation with
NATO based on arrangements completed from 2000 to 2003, which
provide the European Union with the possibility of appealing to NATO
means and capabilities for its military operations.
Another large-scale operation which is ongoing at this time in the Chad
region and the Central African Union where 4.000 men from the
European Union are deployed, does not use the means of another
organization; on the contrary it is meant to support the efforts of the UN in
close cooperation with the operation that is ongoing in the area.
The instruments for the conduct of this European Foreign and Security
Policy can be divided into instruments in which the member-states
participate – first and foremost the council of ministers, the foreign policy
and security committee as well as the military committee and the
committee for non-military crisis management - and community
instruments, so to say, instruments of the Union itself – the High
Representative and General Secretary, Mr Solana, at this post since
1999, the directorates of the General Secretary of the Council, the
EUMS, that is the Military Staff of the European Union and the recently
created unit for non-military crisis management.
In this framework, as you may have already established, there is an effort
for a balanced – as much as possible – development of the military and
non-military capabilities of the Union. The non-military capabilities have
been developed both through the conduct of police operations as well as
the participation of judges and any actors that can contribute to the
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establishment of democratic institutions and the establishment of what
we would call better rule of law structures and the creation of rapid
response units called CRTs - Crisis Response Teams - which were
recently created. The military battle-groups in the military domain are
similar rapid response units and I have already mentioned one under
Greek command. However, apart from Greece, many other memberstates have already contributed to the creation of such units.
A crucial parameter which would constitute the so-called added value of
the European Union concerning crisis management is inter-pillar
cooperation. Beyond the capabilities obtained by its political intervention
in some regions for which it has a common position, special
representatives, a common voice before the local population and with
relation to the international developments, the European Union also has
the possibility of appealing to the crisis management capabilities where
European programs, that is Commission programs, are already ongoing.
Such regions are mainly the Balkans, where the efforts of the
Commission also include a wider European perspective of these
countries – most of you may know the stabilization και association
agreements that some of the countries of the region have concluded and
the fact that most of the rest of the Western Balkan countries are already
candidates to accession.
In the framework of the European Neighborhood Policy, where the
possibility is given to expand the four freedoms which characterize the
European space, free movement of persons, goods, services and
capitals, we are also active with crisis management operations and it is
obvious that the overall environment of the European Neighborhood
Policy encourages such EU initiatives. However, some basic principles
beyond the autonomy to act of all international organizations are also our
cooperation with other international actors – I have already mentioned
our cooperation with NATO; and there is also a close cooperation, as we
have already mentioned, with the UN in Africa and so on.
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In Africa we cooperated very closely for a successful operation
conducted in Congo to support the conduct of democratic elections and
this operation ended in November 2006. We are now cooperating in the
operation I mentioned in the Chad region and the Central African Union.
We have a very close cooperation on a partnership level, strategic
partnership, with the Central African Union concerning Darfur and in the
framework of the cooperation of the European Commission with the
African Union, at the headquarters of the African Union in Ethiopia.
I would also like to mention that a basic parameter that governs are
activities in Africa, but elsewhere as well, is the local ownership principle,
the principle that the European Union can only act in a supporting way, it
considers that the responsibility for the developments in the region
belongs primarily to the peoples of the region and of course this goes for
every region where the European Union is active.
Our cooperation with international organizations includes not only
international actors but also actors with a wide range of crisis
management activities, like the US with which we are now cooperating
closely in the Middle East and will soon cooperate in Kosovo. In the
Middle East we are cooperating with Canada, Norway, Egypt and Turkey,
mostly concerning one of the two operations we are conducting, EU
cooperates in an advisory capacity aiming at the reform of the Palestinian
police. We have been cooperating very successfully up to now with all
our European allies that are not members of the European Union, with
candidate countries as well as with countries belonging to what we would
call the Seville Framework that is Russia, Ukraine, Switzerland and
Canada.
I would like to make a more precise reference – if I have the time – to two
operations that I am certain will interest you. One is the European
operation we will undertake in Kosovo; this is a non-military operation
209
which will focus on the establishment of rule of law structures in a region
which of course interests the European Union, but primarily interests our
country, Greece.
We still have some institutional matters to resolve with the UN and we
expect a close cooperation with the OSCE. We believe that this operation
under Resolution 1244 of the Security Council will contribute to the
creation of stability in the latest security vacuum thus far existing in the
Western Balkans region. We expect to cooperate with the Serbs and the
Kosovars. In close collaboration with Belgrade and Russia we want
everyone to accept our European actions and contribute to them. We
expect a close cooperation with the countries that have already declared
their intention of participating and whose participation in the European
operation has been accepted. We consider that they can contribute
effectively both in the achievement of its political and its operational
objectives and we also want, naturally, a close cooperation with KFOR,
the NATO operation, which is a large-scale operation with 17.000 men on
the field, and to which Greece contributes significantly.
Therefore, we would like to have the same perfect cooperation enjoyed
until now by KFOR and the UN operation, UNMIC. The UN operation is
already gradually undergoing a so-called reconfiguration phase. We
would like it to remain there for the timeframe necessary for the smooth
transition to the European operation; we do not want to cause any
reactions from the local population.
As I mentioned before, the basic principle governing European actions is
the acceptance by the concerned parties. Beyond that, one thing that of
course interests the European Union in all of its operations is the clear
command structure and its autonomy to act; we wish the same in
Kosovo.
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In Chad, which is also an important operation and which I have
mentioned a lot, we expect that the UN will take over at such a time to
enable the timely retreat of the European Union and gradually undertake
the responsibility of the big problem, i.e. Darfur, which has led to many
refugees and displaced people that we are called upon to protect and
help with the provision of humanitarian help. Therefore, we seek the
undertaking of action by the African Union and the local population,
because we believe that this is again the only way to effectively resolve
crises.
In Bosnia-Herzegovina - I won't tire you any longer – which is the latest
example showing that the European Union has an inter-pillar concept
concerning crisis management, we have a non-military operation which
was until recently a large-scale military operation. Our military operation
is reducing in size, de-escalating, as we ascertain that the situation in the
region is more and more stable thus allowing some of the duties of this
operation to be undertaken by non-military actions without compromising
the security of the region.
Thank you very much.
Back to agenda
211
“Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: a Challenge for
Transatlantic Security"
Dr Dokos Thanos, Director General ELIAMEP
I will talk about a very contemporary issue which is the Iranian nuclear
program and the challenges that it poses for international security. But let
me first say how pleased I am to be here. I was one of the speakers in
the first “Athena” seminars approximately ten years ago and I don’t think
that I’ve missed more than one or two since. And it’s important to notice
the steady improvement of the seminars over the past few years.
Now, my presentation will focus on nuclear weapons, not necessarily on
the whole range of weapons of mass destruction. Having faced problems
with conservatives in the past, let me say that I do not necessarily
endorse all the positions and information presented in that map. But it's a
very useful one; it shows the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
on the globe.
Now when it comes to nuclear weapons however, there is no – and one
might get that impression reading some studies and analyses especially
from American think-tank and academics – there is no unstoppable wave
of countries trying to cross the nuclear threshold. As you can see on that
map, there are only two problem countries right now. So the good news
is we can devise country-specific strategies; the bad news is that this
may not hold for too long and we may be faced with a domino effect but
we’ll talk about this later.
Now, I will focus on Iran and will only mention about North Korea that it is
currently out of the picture hopefully on a permanent basis. And I’m
saying this because as you may very well know, the international
community had an agreement with North Korea in the past, in the 90s,
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Power Point presentation available. Click here.
212
which North Korea did not actually honor so we had to continue the
negotiations. Hopefully this is the end of the story, but one has to wait
and see.
Now, talking about Iran, the first question is why. Why would a country
like Iran be interested in developing a nuclear weapons program? Now,
I’m saying nuclear weapons program because despite the denials of the
Iranian government, all the secrecy surrounding its nuclear program,
leads to the conclusion that there is a military dimension to that program.
Now, what are the motives? Well, first of all it’s not an Ayatollah program.
It dates back to the period of the Shah, Iran, Persia has been an empire
in the past, it has great power aspirations, and it is also looking for
tangible evidence of scientific progress.
The second reason has more to do with security perceptions and the
Iranian leadership was concerned about regime survival in the early
2000s at the time of the “acts of evil” and they may have drawn some
interesting conclusions from the fate of Saddam Hussein and the
negotiations with the North Koreans. In the first case Saddam did not
have nuclear weapons and he was hanged. The North Koreans
developed a small number of nuclear weapons and what they got in
return was negotiations, economic and other benefits. So they might
have reached the conclusion that to deal with the US in the post Cold
War era you need nuclear weapons even only as a negotiating tool.
And one should not underestimate the sensitivities resulting from the use
of chemical weapons by Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s when
the international community failed to even condemn the Iraqi action. So
perhaps that explains the why.
Now the critical question is: “Does the development of nuclear weapons
constitute a threat to a) its Arab neighbors, b) to the West, c) to Israel?
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Well, as far as the neighbors are concerned there’s a long history of
antagonisms and rivalry between the Arab countries and Iran and some
of its neighbors may feel concerned enough to launch their own nuclear
weapon programs.
Now, about the West. A nuclear and hostile and possibly more
interventionist Iran should not be perceived as a threat to regional
security and Western American interests, necessarily. It might be, but I
think it is still an open question. Possession of nuclear weapons might
embolden Iran in foreign policy matters, in question of Iraq, Lebanon and
other regional issues, but would not necessarily constitute a physical
threat to the West.
Regarding Israel. Well, there’s no indication so far that Iran’s leadership
is not rational or leaderships, because Iran is definitely not a monolithic
country. There are various centers of power in that country and so far
there’s a balance which all of us hope is a stable one. So there is no
indication that the leaderships are not rational and cannot be deterred.
And as long as Israel maintains a secure second-strike capability, Iran
would not dare use its nuclear weapons.
Now, President Ahmadinejad’s inflammatory statements and rhetoric is
extremely unpleasant and damaging but he cannot fortunately back his
statements with capabilities. Now, would Iran decide to transfer its
nuclear weapons to terrorist organizations? Well, there’s no record or
proof so far of any nuclear weapon state transferring, providing nuclear
weapons to non-state actors. Now, if we accept that Iran is basically a
rational actor it is quite unlikely that its leadership will do so, but of course
there are no absolute certainties.
Am I basically saying that the development, the acquisition of nuclear
weapons by Iraq will not be a problem for regional and international
security? No. There will be two possible problems. One is what I
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mentioned a couple of minutes ago: the domino effect; that other
countries may feel sufficiently threatened and concerned and may
develop their own nuclear weapons and we may have a cascade effect.
And that will also be a significant damage to the international nonproliferation regime. Now, Iran has signed the nuclear non-proliferation
treaty. And it has violated its commitments; which is by the way the basic
difference with Israel. Very often we hear the argument that if Israel has
the right to develop nuclear weapons, then why not Iran? Because Israel
never signed the non-proliferation treaty. So, this will constitute a heavy
blow to the international non-proliferation regime which is not in its best
period ever. In the last few years it has suffered other damages as well.
And some analysts are taking the issue even further. They’re saying that
we may be reaching what they call a tipping point. There may be a
change in the international perceptions that nuclear weapons are not
necessary to protect a number of important countries. And they go as far
as predicting that countries like Japan, Brazil, Argentina, they even go as
far as saying Germany – but I don’t find that very convincing – might
reconsider their position about the acquisition of nuclear weapons. So
that’s one of the problems.
The second: there’s also a school of thought saying that maybe in 5-10
years time we will witness a significant change in domestic Iranian
politics; that this will be the end of the theocratic era of government in
Iran and they will be replaced by secular leaders. And during that
transition phase, as it usually is the case in transition phases, no center
of power and decision-making will be strong enough to steer the country
into a different direction. And that opens the possibility that one of the
less responsible centers of power might be able make an irrational
decision and actually implement it.
So, there are reasons to be concerned. The question is what can we do?
“We” meaning the European Union, the West, the international
community.
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I’m sorry, I need to take a step back and make a brief reference to
terrorism, nuclear terrorism and one of the options which is developing
ballistic missile defense and the argument here is that a country like Iran
or one of the other rogue states in the world will eventually develop
ballistic missiles with sufficient range, will arm them with weapons of
mass destruction, war heads, and will launch an attack against the US or
Europe. And that ignores of course all the possible consequences, the
guaranteed retaliation.
There was a joke, well not exactly a joke, one cannot make fun of such
important issues, but back in 1980 they used to ask in Washington "what
is flat, and glows at night?" and the answer was "Iran after Reagan
becomes president." That was during the Iranian hostage crisis. Now it is
clear that the American retaliation would be a hundredfold of the initial
attack so I don’t find the argument very convincing; that someone will
ignore the consequences and for some reason will decide to launch an
attack against the United States. Which is why I think the whole
controversy with Russia over the deployment of radars and interceptors
in Poland and the Czech Republic is unnecessary.
So, unless one is thinking about the Russian and Chinese nuclear
arsenal - which is an entirely different story - in my mind the real threat,
when it comes to weapons of mass destruction is terrorism. And what
you can see in that diagram is four criteria actually to answer the
question who might decide to use nuclear weapons, which terrorist
organization.
Well, the first circle, organizations that have a motive to attack the US or
the West and there’s a long list. But the second is technical and financial
capabilities and the list of course grows shorter. The third one, no
population of physical base to retaliate against and the list grows even
shorter. The fourth one is no moral restrains on committing mass murder.
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And then the list becomes very short. So, in the intersection of the four
circles you might find a very small number of organizations. Maybe AlQaeda; a handful of other groups, but I think this is the real threat. And
we should, through intelligence cooperation and other means, devote our
attention to that.
Now, let me go back to the question "What can we do about the Iranian
program?" Well, first of all we have to continue to apply political and
economic pressure, but we also offer some kind of carrot: recognition of
Iran’s regional role, not a hegemonic one, because the Arab countries
would object to that. But I think we need to assist to the development of a
new security system in the Gulf region which will take into consideration
Iranian, Iraqi concerns. And to achieve this, I think that the Atlantic
alliance must come up with a new game plan involving Russia and China.
Now, of course ultimately the key to a peaceful resolution of the Iranian
nuclear crisis is the full normalization of US-Iranian relations, which by
the way would also facilitate greatly the stabilization of Iraq. Now, to
achieve this of course it takes two to tango. The European Union is not
one of them, but perhaps we can assist with the music.
With the American elections coming and none of the candidates taking
an open position and taking criticism and float about an open full scale
dialogue with Iran, one can be slightly more optimistic.
When it comes to Western policies – and that’s going to be my last point
– on the issue of non-proliferation, leaving Iran aside, I talked about
country-specific strategies, but we also need to think about strengthening
the international non-proliferation regime. Well, we can do that by
accelerating disarmament, but of course there’s a limit to what we can
do. No nuclear state is willing to go to zero nuclear weapons for the next
several years, for the foreseeable future, so the grievances of nonnuclear states about double standards and privileged and non-privileged
217
members of the NPT regime will remain - there is little we can do about
this. But coming to a couple of practical ideas I think can offer permissive
action links and other technical safeguards to new nuclear powers, to
avoid the possibility of accidental use of nuclear weapons – well, yes,
that legally constitutes a violation of the NPT –but security I think is more
important than the various legal points and technicalities.
The US could help or limit the damage they have already done on the
regime by not deploying or not developing new types of nuclear weapons
– the so-called bunker busters. And the US and the other nuclear states
could offer a clear no first use guarantee against non nuclear weapon
states under any circumstances. Now, in this context of course
developments like the India agreement, I’m still ambivalent about this. It
has positive dimensions but also negative impact as well. It’s perhaps a
bit early to make an assessment of that.
My very last point: we need an active engagement by Russia and China.
Proliferation is a concern not only for the US and the West, but for all of
us. We need to act early to avoid a collapse of the non-proliferation
regime. At the end of the day I think that the old argument by Kenneth
Waltz, one of the great thinkers of international relations, who developed
back in the ‘80s a theory called “more may be better”, basically saying
that if countries in the third world develop nuclear weapons, then we’ll
have a replication of the US-Soviet system of deterrence. That will be a
stable system, no conventional wars or other types of wars would be
fought between let’s say Israel and its Arab neighbors, India and Pakistan
and we would all be better off.
I think this is not a valid argument. The answer to that school of thought
was given by an English – Kenneth Waltz is American – academic,
Hedley Bull, who said “Well, that’s a great idea. So let’s put a small
amount of nitroglycerin to the bumper of every car, so that we will avoid
the terrible loss of life on a daily basis from car accidents.” But of course
218
machines can break down and people make mistakes, so at the end of
the day we may not be better off, quite the opposite. I think that all of us
will feel better the fewer the numbers of the nuclear buttons. The
question is how far we should go to prevent that.
I didn’t make any reference to the possibility of a military strike against
Iran by either he US or Israel, but I would be happy to discuss that during
the Q&A period. Thank you.
Back to agenda
219
“Writing Methodology of Geopolitical Analysis – structure, concepts
and terms”
Dr Mazis Ioannis, Professor of Economic Geography/ Geopolitics,
Ionian University, President of the Scientific Board of Defense
Analysis Institute (I.A.A.)
Thank you very much, Chairman.
This time I will be very theoretical and you can be quite without fear. I
won’t resent maps, only texts and I would like to talk about the
methodology of the geopolitical analysis and especially to present the
structure, the concepts and the terms of this analysis.
This presentation puts forward a systemic methodology for geopolitical
analysis. It can be employed by researchers that make use of this
geographical analytical scientific tool to research international political
events, international relationships, crisis and the associated redistribution
of power (defensive, economic, political and cultural) on the whole
system of the national state formations in our planet (nation-state and
ethnic formations), the phenomena as well as the entities which influence
the make-up, the structure and the interaction of power among these
formations.
The key-words we must see are those you see right now on the screen.
And we must start by the title of a subject and its interpretation. The title
of the subject of a geopolitical analysis study defines the facts and the
objectives of our problem. In particular it defines:
1) The boundaries of the Geographical Complex, which constitutes
the geographical area to be analyzed.
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Presentation in .pdf format available. Click here.
220
2) The (internal or external) area of the Complex, i.e. the area of
interest as a field of distribution or redistribution of power due to the
impact of a specific geopolitical factor.
3) The above geopolitical factor, the impact of which is possible to
affect the distribution of power in the internal or the external area of the
given Geographical Complex.
Let’s give an example. The title of our study could be «Geopolitics of the
Islamist movement in the Wider Middle East».
The analysis of the title:
1) The boundaries of the Geographical Complex are defined by the
term “Wider Middle East”.
2) The area of the Complex under study is the “internal” of the
geographical complex in the Wider Middle East, illustrated by the
word “in” meaning “within the boundaries of the…”.
3) The designated geopolitical factor is the “Islamist movement”.
Analysis: 1st stage
In this stage, we establish the boundaries of the geopolitical systems,
within which the action or the actions of the geopolitical factor stated in
the title of the subject matter, are to be examined.
There are three System scales deriving from the range of the
geographical area to which they refer:
1) Sub-systems, which constitute subgroups of the systems.
2) Systems, i.e. the main Geographical Complex under study.
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3) Supra-systems, which contain, as a sub-system, the main System
under study along with other ones that are not involved in the
present study.
We must pay attention because in order to define the above mentioned
systems in terms of geographical range, a qualitative element is required,
which, by its very existence, its forms, its action, and the extent to which
it
influences
the
System,
will
identify
the
geographical
areas
encompassed in the above mentioned Systems. Without this qualitative
element and its individual parts, the definition of the three above
mentioned System scales is not only impossible but also meaningless.
How to define the Systems. Another example:
In the above mentioned subject matter the boundaries of the Systemic
scales are defined as follows:
1) System: The Wider Middle East Geographical Complex, not only
because it is stated in the title, which is already a fundamental
criterion, but also because the “geopolitical factor”, i.e. the “Islamist
movement” exists, acts and affects the whole geographical area of
the Complex.
2) Sub-systems:
i)
The “Islamist Movement in Maghreb” constitutes a Subsystem due to the unique character of the cultural, economic,
political and organizational aspects of Islam in this geographical
area.
ii)
The “Islamist Movement in Middle East” for the same
reasons stated above.
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“The Afghan-Pakistan and the important salafist Islamist
iii)
Movement” can be included.
2) The Supra-system is in this case:
The International Daar al-Islam (House of Islam) can be
designated a Supra-system, i.e. the Geographical Complex
encompassing the land of Islam at the international level, where
Islamic peoples live, and further the Daar al-Sulh (House of
Treaty), where the Islamic Diaspora lives, more or less
theologically, undisturbed, e.g. Europe, the USA or Australia.
2nd stage
After defining the three System scales, the next step is to specify the
fields under study which are influenced by the “geopolitical factor” of the
title. That is, we should determine for which combination of the four fields
(geopolitical pillars) we will examine the impact of the “geopolitical factor”,
always within the framework of the chosen Systemic scale, for example,
at the “System” level, the medium level.
We will examine the impacts of the Islamist movement on the three
above mentioned Sub-systems, in particular Defense, Economy and
Politics or Culture and Economy or Culture, Politics and Defense or with
regard to all four pillars of power, that means: i) Defense, ii) Economy, iii)
Politics and iv) Culture / Information.
In this stage we will determine the geopolitical trends – dynamics for
each one of the sub-systems under study. The trends, defined solely in
terms of “power”, inform as to:
1st) The pillars to which the “geopolitical factor” under study belongs (in
our example the geopolitical factor is the Islamist movement – we
remember) and as a consequence already defines or may define their
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actions within the framework of each Sub-system. This form of
conclusion is defined as “positive sub-systemic component trend of
power” of the “geopolitical factor” in the “Internal of the System”.
2nd) The pillars which act as shock-absorbers for the “geopolitical factor’s”
impact thus not affecting the whole sub-system. This form of conclusion
is designated “zero sub-systemic component trend of power” of the
“geopolitical factor” in the “Internal of the System”.
Synthesis
The term synthesis refers to the procedure through which we can find the
Resultant Trend of Power of the given geopolitical factor on a final
systemic scale. When we have found and defined the individual power
components (of the geopolitical factor) at the sub-system level and the
objective is the component at a System level systemic scale, then the
synthesis stage begins at the System level. If the desired component is at
the Supra-system level, then the synthesis stage begins after the
components of the System have been analyzed.
And we finish with conclusions.
The last stage of the study is dedicated to the “Conclusions”, of course.
Here, we are called to describe the geopolitical dynamics, as well as how
the “component of power” of the “geopolitical factor” under study affects
the behavior of the System under study within the framework of the
Supra-system.
It must be noted that in this stage of the study, as in any other stage of a
geopolitical analysis, we make no proposals. We discover and describe
the structures, actions, functions, impacts, forms, and dynamics of a
geopolitical factor as well as how the System behaves because of them.
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Proposals do not form part of a Geopolitical Analysis. They form part of a
Geo-strategic approach which may be carried out if asked and by taking
advantage of the results of a geopolitical analysis that has been
conducted beforehand. Thank you very much.
Back to agenda
225
“Emergency Planning – The role of the State”
Mr Mouzas Margaritis, Secretary General for Civil Protection
Thank you, Chairman.
First of all I would like to thank the Ministry of National Defense and the
National Defense General Staff for the invitation. This gives us the
opportunity to explain what Civil Protection means, when it talks about
emergency situations and crisis management. I am also very happy
because I see that the effort made for this Athena seminar is bearing
fruit, the contribution and the extent of the seminar is constantly
increasing and I also see the interest of other countries, friends, to
participate in it.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
In the next 20 minutes, I will refer to planning in order to deal with
emergency situations and more specifically to the role of the state and
the administration in this procedure. In order for everything mentioned to
be absolutely clear to everyone, I will begin by stating some definitions
which will delimit the framework of my speech although most of the
participants are familiar with most of these terms.
What is defined as an emergency situation? I am referring to the Greek
institutional framework, i.e. Law 3013/2002. In this institutional framework
the concept of an “emergency situation” is sometimes described as a
phase or the scale of a disaster and sometimes as the mobilization and
escalation of the state’s reaction renamed as civil protection emergency
situation. In general, an emergency situation is every “abnormal situation
which disrupts the usual daily processes and requires immediate action
and intervention”.
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Presentation in .pdf format available. Click here
226
What does the term “planning” stand for? Planning, in general, is the
method by which people define beforehand the way to achieve a goal or
to solve a problem. By extension, emergency planning is a continuous
cyclical process which consists in:

the drawing up of plans,

the training of the personnel involved in the implementation of
the plans,

exercises in order to test and control these plans and the
practice of the personnel and finally

the revision and the update of these plans.
This planning is realized during all the phases of the continuous
emergency management circle, i.e.
 mitigation of consequences,
 preparation,
 coping and
 rehabilitation.
In fact however, by nature, the emergency planning process tends to be
identified temporally and conceptually to a great extent with the
preparation phase, that is the timeframe before the disaster, during which
the drafting of a plan, the training of the personnel for the implementation
of this plan and the exercise in order to control that it is comprehensive
and correct take place. Furthermore, it is important to clarify that in fact
the scope of the emergency plan includes, mostly time-wise, the coping
phase, but also part of the rehabilitation phase, especially what we call
short-term rehabilitation.
Despite the fact that the planning procedure has already been defined as
a continuous cyclical process, it does, however, have a clear starting
point. This point is risk analysis. The risk analysis process begins with the
identification and mapping of the hazards, continues with the measuring
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of the human and infrastructure exposure level to these hazards and
ends in the assessment of the potential direct and indirect cost of the
consequences.
There are various approaches concerning risk analysis methodology,
both qualitative and quantitative as well as various algorithms, mainly for
the risk assessment of natural disasters, which are used mostly by the
USA and Japan. The following steps form the common “body” of all these
methodologies.
The first step, which is defined as “hazard identification and labeling",
includes actions which answer to questions such as:
 What disasters have occurred in the research area in the past?
 What were their characteristics (scale, intensity, duration, etc)?
 What were the consequences?
 Did these disasters breed any other phenomena?
The second step, which is defined as the “assessment of the frequency
and intensity of a hazard”, includes actions which answer questions such
as:
 What are the chances that a potentially disastrous hazard may
occur?
 Which factors increase or reduce the probability of occurrence?
 Which factors increase or reduce the intensity of the potential
hazard?
 How do we estimate the intensity of the hazard?
The third step, which is defined as the “vulnerability assessment”,
includes actions which answer questions such as:
 How “exposed” are people, the environment, infrastructure and
networks, cultural heritage sites, in the face of disasters?
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 What is the coping capacity of the disaster management
mechanism in the face of disasters?
The last step is defined as “risk assessment” and includes the potential
social and economic consequences of a disaster. These consequences
include the cost for the repair and reconstruction of houses, infrastructure
and networks, the cost for the disruption of commercial and business
activities, the cost to agricultural economy, income losses, the cost for
the relocation and displacement of the population, the cost of rent
subventions, etc.
Now, let’s move on to the more practical part concerning the operation of
the civil protection in our country, Greece. The General Secretariat for
Civil Protection, aiming at the establishment of the foundations for a
modern and united methodological risk assessment framework in the
whole country, announced in 2007 a tender for the “Study of the National
Emergency Management System”. This project, which is in progress,
also includes a sub-project entitled “Definition of technical specifications
and risk mapping and hazard assessment studies”. The same study
includes other sub-projects which are not mentioned. We aspire that the
end product of this project will be an original tender volume, which will be
approved by the scientific and technical community and will then
constitute the basis for the announcement of other similar studies all over
the country, which will be financed to some extent by the 4th EU(CSF)
plan.
Risk
assessment
is
the
first
step
towards
the
planning
and
implementation of a comprehensive policy for civil protection, which as a
duty is described quite satisfactorily in the existing documents, under the
title “Annual National Civil Protection Planning”. However, since the
perspective of a medium-term and long-term planning cannot be encaged
in an annual budget, the modification of the institutional framework as
well as the development and institution of a methodology for the drafting
of a National Civil Protection Plan is already the object of another study,
229
in the medium and long-term, in the context of drawing up the National
Strategic Reference Framework (ESPA), i.e. while actions are being
planned on a one-year level in the framework of the existing budget, we
are going to institutionalize the medium-term and long-term planning in
order for the implementation of the policy within our budget capabilities to
remain stable and not to vary depending on the existing credit.
What does the preparation phase represent? Simply, the situation where
a body or civil protection mechanism is prepared to cope with a disaster.
No body with disaster management competencies can cope with a
disaster if it has not attended beforehand to the planning, training and
exercising of the officials and the population. It is probably the phase
during which there is more intense effort on the part of the civil protection
mechanism and especially the General Secretariat for Civil Protection to
cope with a disaster successfully.
More specifically, a lot of weight has been placed on the plan
development process in order to cope with disasters according to the
“General Civil Protection Plan under the code name XENOKRATIS”.
The “Xenokratis” plan, supplemented by the Special Human Losses
Management Plan, which resulted from the experience we acquired from
the accident that was described a while ago with the aircraft "Helios",
constitutes the base for the planning and actions on behalf of the state
mechanism concerning the management of emergency situations
occurring from any kind of disasters at all administration levels. This is a
planning framework which provides general planning instructions, as well
as a template for the submission and approval of plans. The planning
framework defines the kinds of disasters and designs competent services
for planning at a ministerial level only.
The further special definition, based on the institutional framework in
effect, the operational role of various Directorates of various Ministries
and their connection to Civil Protection actions, which they will be called
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upon to materialize in order to manage emergency situations, the rules
for their involvement as well as issues of an administrative nature, should
be realized through the Special Plans which the competent Ministries for
each disaster, each hazard are obliged to centrally draw up.
In this context, the General Secretariat for Civil Protection has seen to
the formation of work groups in the Ministries which are referred to as
responsible for planning, having as a project the drafting of special plans
for each disaster, based on the 25 main planning requirements and the
11 coordination instructions mentioned in the “XENOKRATIS” plan. The
final objective is to draw up a General Plan for each disaster, which will
emanate from the synthesis and harmonization of the special plans for
each disaster drawn up by the Ministries.
The Ministries responding to this demand have proceeded to the
formation of work groups and the appointment of planning managers.
The General Secretariat for Civil Protection, in an attempt to help them in
their work, has issued the instruction manual for the drafting and
harmonization of the Special Plans for each disaster at a ministerial level
or the level of another central authority - I repeat, central authority. The
objective of the manual is to define the structure and describe the content
of the Special and General Emergency Plans, in order for them to be
standardized and harmonized with what is defined in the “XENOKRATIS”
plan. (I repeated that this applies only at a ministerial level because
special instructions are already being issued for the drafting of the
relevant plans on a regional, prefecture or municipality level.)
The main disadvantage of the existing “XENOKRATIS” plan is the fact
that
the
competent
authorities
with
a
primary
and
secondary
responsibility for the drafting of the plans for each disaster are not clearly
defined, resulting in the diffusion of the planning responsibility to more
than one services and the delay of the drafting procedure of these plans.
Another important disadvantage is the anachronistic planning philosophy,
for each kind of disaster, which requires the drawing up of a relevantly
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large number of plans, which essentially answer the same questions,
without any special additional value. It is known that the multi-hazard
model is often applied, i.e. one structure to cope with all hazards. This is
an approach studied mostly by the General Secretariat for Civil
Protection and it will probably be adopted because it is more practical.
Aiming at the support of the planning process which presents some
difficulties mostly due to the lack of relevant training, instructions are
issued by the General Secretariat for Civil Protection which clarify the
regulatory framework and the involvement rules for authorities when
coping with a disaster. These instructions are drawn up annually and
mainly concern disasters such as forest fires as well as those which
occur from intense weather conditions – we mostly refer to instructions
which cover “acts of God”, like heavy rainfalls and floods, frost and big
snowstorms.
At the same time, “XENOKRATIS” is gradually being supplemented with
other plans, such as those for Massive Losses, for coping with Chemical,
Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Hazards and Events, while collective
bodies are being instituted and organized, such as the Support Team for
the Management of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear
Hazards and Events as well as the Teams for the Identification of
Disaster Victims.
The main readiness enhancement tool of the state mechanism with
regard to forest fire hazards is the daily issue of the Fire Hazard Map
during the entire fire period.
Furthermore, aiming at the production of a new generation of civil
protection officials with modern perceptions and a targeted education, the
second cycle of production of specialized civil protection officials within
the functioning of the National Local Administration School is completed
and the first graduates – in total 30 officials - last year have already been
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assigned to the Regions and some Prefectures. At this moment the
second educational cycle is in progress and the third is beginning.
In addition, an effort to draw up a framework for civil protection exercises
in ongoing. More specifically, taking advantage of the know-how of other
countries in this field we define the type of exercises, we describe the
process and the instruments for their preparation and implementation, as
well as the evaluation criteria and procedures for the supplying and
improvement of the whole mechanism.
We all know that as perfect as a plan can be, it needs to be tried through
exercises for two main reasons:

the first is for the concerned personnel to be trained – this is a
very important reason

and the second – which is as important – is that through trial,
as most of us know, the plan will be updated and improved.
Apart from the above, the use of information and communication
technologies as a means to supplement the emergency planning and to
support the decision-making either by the General Secretary or the
Central Civil Protection Coordination Body which consists of the
competent Ministers at a ministerial level and the General Secretaries of
the Ministries at a general secretariat level, is mainly achieved through
the “Comprehensive Information System for Civil Protection”. This
system, composed of a number of ICT applications, allows for the
collection, processing and presentation of crucial information from the
disaster site on a geographical background or a satellite image, under
any circumstances, with the contribution of the Regional Civil Protection
Directorates. The material is being tested as I mentioned before at a
regional level and within the limits of the 4th EU(CSF) plan and in the
framework of the operational program “Nomos” (Prefecture) the
expansion of the said system to a prefecture level is provided for.
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An important technological capacity, but also a responsibility for the
General Secretariat for Civil Protection is that of the telephone center of
the Pan-European Emergency Hotline “112”. Since 1999, the General
Secretariat for Civil Protection has signed a contract with OTE for the
operation of the 112 hotline, which caters to the needs of Greek and
foreign citizens in three (3) languages irrespective of the emergency.
Recently, as a way of adapting to the wishes of the European
Commission, "112" has been equipped wit the capacity to track the
position of the caller, upon request, while the automatic tracking service
for all calls without a special request is underway.
Another similar action which has been undertaken is the orientation of
SMS messages through the mobile as well as the fixed telephony
concerning the activation, mobilization of geographical regions where
there is valid information that a hazardous phenomenon might occur.
Emergency planning also includes the involvement of civil protection
volunteer organizations. The existence of at least one hundred thousand
registered volunteers in the Volunteer Organizations Register offers, on
the one hand, an excellent contribution opportunity in the reduction of
disaster consequences but on the other hand it creates huge
responsibilities concerning the use of this workforce which is mostly not
sufficiently trained and with no certification, so far, of the duties it is able
to undertake.
The priority of the General Secretariat for Civil Protection is to improve
the existing institutional framework in order to cover the weaknesses
concerning their administrative de-centralization at a prefecture level and,
if possible, a municipality level, the institution of accession criteria,
training, certification and finally issues of urban liability and insurance.
Our main goal remains to create a volunteer conscience to all citizens,
according to international standards, by using the capabilities the Ministry
of Internal Affairs operational program "Administrative Reform" offers. In
this direction international cooperations are also in progress with
234
Germany - on the 1st and 2nd of this month we conducted a similar
workshop with our German friends on issues concerning volunteering
and civil protection crisis management.
To conclude, it should be made clear to everyone that the responsibility
for the preparation in order to cope with potential disasters does not only
lie with the state but it is also an individual responsibility and a
responsibility of all citizens. All citizens must comply with zoning and
urban rules, prepare and update a family emergency plan, which should
at least include elements such as an alternative communication scenario,
a known and sure escape route towards a safe and agreed location, be
constantly informed on issues concerning their safety etc.
As for the civil protection actions on an international level, the dominant
perception in the disaster management field is that "every disaster is first
and foremost a local disaster". However, the drastic increase of human
society vulnerability as well as the ever so rapidly developing change in
the environmental balance, often makes us witnesses to developments
such as the one we experienced last summer and a few weeks ago in
Myanmar. In these cases, a special chapter in the emergency planning
field is activated, i.e. the receiving and sending of international aid.
For these reasons, the General Secretariat for Civil Protection is
developing a manifold international activity. This activity is mostly
developed within the EU through the European Civil Protection
Mechanism and the Financing Framework 2007-2013. The objective of
the Mechanism is to facilitate the enhanced cooperation in interventions
for the provision of help, in emergency situations or in cases where there
is immediate danger or threat of major disasters, centrally coordinated in
Brussels. More specifically, when a country suffers major disasters and
requests it, it is possible to mobilize the operational means of the
countries participating in the Mechanism to send help. For the operation
of the Mechanism an MIC - Monitoring and Information Center was
235
established in Brussels, which operates on a 24-hour basis, all year
round and employs personnel from the civil protection unit.
For the exchange of information between the National Civil Protection
Authorities of the member-states inter se as well as with the European
Commission an internet application was developed, CECIS - Common
Emergency Communication and Information System, to which only
authorized users have access. The Financing Framework for civil
protection was instituted by Council decision, in March 2007, and its
objective is to unify in one legislative text the financing of actions
undertaken by the Mechanism as well as those undertaken by the
European Commission which will contribute to the enhancement of the
prevention and readiness measures for 2007-13. As you know, the
actions undertaken by the European Commission and in general the EU
for the enhancement of civil protection are very important.
Apart from our participation in the EU proceedings, we also actively
participate in matters of Civil Protection which are discussed and decided
upon by international organizations like the UN, NATO etc.
In addition, we signed with France in November last year an
“Administrative Memorandum” aiming at facilitating the procedures for the
inter se disposition of fire-extinguishing capabilities from the air.
Furthermore, we formed a common interstate team with this country
(HEFRA), aiming at the further expansion of our bilateral cooperation in
the domain of extinguishing forest fires.
We joined, as a fifth member, the initiative «FIRE 4» of the European
countries Italy, France, Spain and Portugal, which is now called «FIRE 5»
due to our participation, aiming at the exchange of experiences and the
common participation in European programs for coping with the common
threat, namely "Mediterranean type forest fires". There is a similar
cooperation with America and Germany.
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We are also active members both of the South-Eastern European
Cooperation Process (SEECP) – a ministerial meeting recently took
place in Sofia, Bulgaria - and the Adriatic-Ionian Initiative (the presidency
of which we assumed as of June 1st of this year, for one year until the
end of May 2009).
Finally, we have concluded bilateral cooperation agreements with
America, Russia, Cyprus, Ukraine, Turkey, Hungary, Malta and Albania,
while the conclusion of similar agreements with Bulgaria, Morocco,
Azerbaijan, etc, is in progress.
Emergency planning does not aim at drawing up a text which will remain
locked up in some drawer only to be produced dusted and outdated when
the conditions require it, but the procedure itself is a sign of progress of
society, since it proves its capability:
 to set visions and objectives,
 to decipher the blurry image of future social, environmental and
economic conditions and
 to create the appropriate environment for the cooperation between
the citizens, the state and private companies
always aiming at a safer future.
Thank you very much
237
“Contingency Plans and Crisis Management in case of a major
disaster or accident – International Cooperation”
Police
Major
Tsounakis
Georgios,
Hellenic
Police
–
Crisis
Management Division
Good afternoon, Ladies and Gentlemen.
It’s a great honor for me to be here and I want to thank you for the
invitation. I want to make my presentation in the Greek language of
course, because as I have been informed, they have very good
translators. So it’s better for me to speak my language.
First of all, I would like to speak about the national crisis management
system in our country. As the Chairman previously mentioned, we have a
lot of experience in managing such crises and we could isolate two kinds
of crises, the external crises and we are of course talking about armed
conflicts, the responsibility of which lies with the army. Then, there are
the internal security crises, which take place in many countries and even
more in our own given its geographical position and given the fact that it
is neighboring with countries where problems often arise and we try to
help them resolve these issues by contributing or in some other way.
So, the police help both as an operational power and a supporting power,
depending on the crisis, in criminal actions, in counter-terrorism of
course, in natural disasters, technological disasters and other disasters
which entail consequences and losses. In this sector, we offer support.
We help the authorities that are responsible for managing such crises or
major incidents.
As to the term crisis of course, you all know that there is no exact
definition of this term. We, in the police, would say – taking into account

Power Point presentation available. Click here.
238
our plan, Polydeukis, which we have formed in order to cope with such
crises and on which I will say a few words later on – that a crisis is
something that is beyond our powers. We cannot manage it any longer
on our own. This is for us a crucial incident, a crisis. Other things may be
a major incident which may lead to a crisis. However a crisis occurs when
Greece gives up, as other countries in the past, and cannot cope with it
alone.
Here, I would like to show you on this slide how our country manages two
different kinds of crises. As you can see, at the top we have the Prime
Minister with his government, who makes the final and important
decisions, should the need arise. On the left, we have the External
Security Military Threats and the KYSEA which is the instrument that
makes the decisions, the council which makes proposals on how to cope
with the crisis and of course the Ministry of Defense.
To pass on to our own turf now, concerning crime and terrorism of course
and not the rest that I mentioned, where we offer support and help in the
work of the incident commander and as I said these are terrorist acts
responsible for which is the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of
Mercantile Marine with regard to the port authorities and all of this under
the Crisis Management Council in which the Chief of Police, the Minister
and everyone who must give an opinion, a solution participate - and here
other authorities are involved who may help even in the case of a terrorist
attack.
On the other hand, in case of natural and technological disasters, the
Ministry of Internal Affairs with the General Secretariat for Civil Protection
is responsible for managing these crises not only with our contribution but
also the contribution of other authorities. And of course the National
Government Coordination Body is responsible for presenting an image of
this crisis, managing the resources and splitting, as we say, the work;
managing the overall crisis.
239
So, we, the Hellenic Police, after our experience during the Olympic
Games, decided to create this Crisis Management Division - in which I
am honored to serve - in an effort not to waste any of the know-how and
experience we acquired, to give it to our country and especially the
officers serving in the Hellenic Police. Thus, we formed a plan,
Polydeukis, which – I will only say a few words, because you can see in
the slide what it deals with - is applied both when we are in charge of an
incident but also when we are helping. This plan mentions what our
competencies are when we are only helping another service.
Following this plan, it is clear who does what and for what reason. Here, I
would like you to see again how these are connected on an
administration level: the incident commander is connected to the
“Σ.Ν.Ο.”; the “Σ.Τ.Ο.” is the lowest level in a crisis which corresponds to
the mayoral level and even lower depending on the crisis, which is
connected and helps the scene commander and of course, as I
mentioned earlier on, is the last, the highest level. This is why we created
a new center, we created “E.K.E.T.A.”; it’s a united security and order
center of the Hellenic Police, which is interconnected with all these
centers that you see: firstly with the police centers and if the crisis is
beyond our powers, authorities, authority representatives contribute to
this center by providing direct information, by collecting all the
information. A special team for the assessment of threats and the
collection of information also contribute to this center. Here we have the
participation of the National Intelligence Agency and our own information
services and that of the army of course, depending on the crisis, to
provide the center which manages the crisis with filtered and quick
results and inform the political leadership of any further decisions.
This center has been functioning for about a month now; it has already
helped a lot in dealing with the fires, it has helped us in our contribution to
the General Secretariat for Civil Protection, to the fire department which
240
is in charge. The information is received rapidly with no delays and we
can in turn respond rapidly to the crisis. When some information is
different from one center to another and gets to us after a certain amount
of time, this does not help us respond quickly enough to an incident, to
run and do what the fire departments ask us to do. We do not put out
fires, but we must open the road for the fire department to get there first.
This center of ours is connected – as you can see - with 14 other smaller
operation centers which give us this image from the police departments
of our country. This center has satellite image capacities using a new
system. Depending on the incident, we can provide the image from any
inaccessible point directly to the Chief’s office and the Crisis
Management Council; a live image which reporters cannot provide
because they will be placed into a specific position not to interfere with
our work.
Let’s have a look at the international contribution, because I would like
my presentation to insist on the video which I will project in a while and I
would like you to see sort of an assessment concerning a real incident in
our country. I will talk about this later on.
So, let’s take a look at the international contribution which is quite clear in
Greece. Greece had to decide early on – and the Olympic Games greatly
helped in this – on the following: in some cases we need help and
contribution. What should we do? Do we ask from countries like Poland,
France, England to help us when that time comes? They will respond
with every good intention, “Ok. But what do you need?” Will we search at
that time to find what we need? No. So, what do we do? We start with the
civil protection which is near us in any incident concerning the police,
terrorism or some big terrorist attack, let's say a plane hijacking; it is there
ready to help us with resources if it can cover it.
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When the crisis is bigger, we appeal to the armed forces which will help
us with material means which they can offer in peace time. And if this still
isn’t enough, we search abroad, i.e. the civil protection and the system
created by the European Union. We are members of the EU and this is
where we will appeal for help. And we, as the police, have made our own
plans on what we want, how we want it and how long it may take to get
here.
When you have such a basic plan ready, codified with names, who is in
charge of responding to your request, if we know for example that we
need a specific department in Austria which has a very good team
responsible for disarming explosive devices and we know that this might
be very helpful to us when it comes and we are unable to cope with the
situation any longer, we notify Austria, which is aware of the time needed
to sent it, we have signed an agreement and this help will arrive when
needed.
This is it for the EU. Now let’s pass on to NATO. We are a member of
NATO and we expect it politically to help any way it can. Now our
cooperation with other countries especially concerning the police sector.
We cooperate with organizations, special services which train our people,
we train people from other countries, we are on constant alert and
training, we often attend substantial conferences and not conferences
which are organized just to organize a conference. We present our
proposals to the EU and I am happy to say that most of them, concerning
police matters, our materialized. We collaborate with a series of liaison
officers which most countries have here in Greece that my department is
responsible for informing. At regular intervals we gather, discuss, see
where we need to focus the help we want from each other, the pieces of
the puzzle that everyone can put in so that we may get some results.
Our cooperation is not formal, but substantial. We have regular meetings
and talk, and the same happens when something occurs in another
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country. They inform us, some of our people go to that country, they are
informed in after action reports, so this is a very good and real
cooperation. Without good cooperation, without honest information we
cannot cope with a situation. If one hides things from the other, because
some things can’t be disclosed or he believes that some information
should remain a secret, then we won’t have any results.
Furthermore, the Hellenic Police cooperates with and is one of the first
members of Interpol and Europol where we exchange information. We
have information networks. Units inform us and we inform them on our
part of whatever takes place so that there may be an image when
Interpol can help, send a name, any other kind of help, a similar case
which may help.
There is nothing more I would like to add. Thank you very much for your
attention.
Back to agenda
243
“CBRN Crisis Management in urban environment”
Col (Dr) Galatas Ioannis, MD, MC (Army), Head of Department of
Asymmetric threats Joined Military Intelligence Directorate –
HNDGS
Thank you, Chairman.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
As a physician I know very well that after a very good meal, at this
moment our organisms are in a state of increased peptic activity which is
accompanied by a slight drowsiness. I will try with a lot of photographic
material to go through an issue which is multidimensional and extremely
hard to manage.
The issue we are going to talk about is CBRN crisis management in an
urban environment. That means we will talk about the crisis and its
management, the objectives and the CBRN threats, what happens during
a CBRN attack in an urban environment, which forces will deal with such
an incident, what is the current situation both at an operational as well as
at a healthcare level and finally some conclusions.
As you all know or may know, crisis is a Greek word which defines the
mental activity defining the relationship between the concepts, compares
and tells apart the differences. At an operational level, I will borrow a term
from the US General Staff which mentions that a crisis is a situation that
contains a threat to the United States, its territories, its citizens, the
military forces and vital interests, develops rapidly and creates such
conditions of diplomatic, economic, political or military importance as to
envision the possibility of use of military might in order to achieve national
goals. Professor Charles Herman also mentions that a crisis is a situation
characterized by surprise, high risk for important values and little reaction
time.

Power Point presentation available. Click here.
244
The Chinese approach to the term “crisis”, essentially consisting of two
ideograms – yiei and zi - is particularly interesting. Yiei represents a
confrontation with a very powerful animal and represents danger while zi
depicts an open space and an opportunity, which means that within the
crisis we have two other parameters, danger and opportunity for future
actions.
Crisis management: according to Burnet crisis management constitutes a
strategic problem, the resolution of which has to do with the activation of
the six basic stages of the strategic management procedure. Analysis of
the environment and definition of goals, definition and evaluation of a
strategy, implementation of the strategy and strategic control.
Also, according to Ian Microf, crisis management is a way of thinking and
a procedure which dictates, on a daily basis, the decisions and the
activities of an organization or a country. The immediate goal is to
contribute to the prevention of potential crises and to effectively handle
unavoidable crises.
This is the urban environment on which we will focus our attention. We
can see the big cities all over the world with the population expected for
the next twenty years.
Which are the goals, the CBRN goals? As you can see, they are goals
which encompass a great deal of people, such as public transportation
means, airports and ports, public buildings, commercial centers and
streets, athletic centers and hospitals. Once the Cross represented a
place respected by everyone; this is probably a pleasant memory.
What are the dangers that a big city or even a modern urban center may
face? Biological warfare, epidemics or pandemics, industrial accidents of
a large extent, chemical warfare and a series of radiological nuclear
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threats: the dirty bomb, nuclear weapons, nuclear accidents and all of
these of course also include the explosives parameter which almost
always accompanies them.
Let’s examine an attack using biological weapons. There are different
stages, starting from the release of the biological agent, suddenly
patients start arriving at hospitals. At this point the government realizes
there’s a problem, patients overrun hospitals, the state starts taking
measures and of course the epidemic or pandemic is simply a matter of
days, depending on the incubation period of the biological agent used.
This is why this stage is very important, i.e. without the proper
surveillance we would not be able to notice what is going on, we would
have already lost the first stage, get wind of it at the second stage and
the game is played at this point in time, whether we will be able to react
in time to prevent an even worse situation.
I would like to remind you of the SARS pandemic and the turmoil it
caused all over the world, the story with the H5N1 bird flu, a story which
is not yet over and as it seems will continue being an important issue in
the future as well.
An attack with biological weapon. Health casualties after the hypothetical
release of a bio-terrorist agent with regard to the dead and patients
depending on the biological weapon or the biological agent used. You
can see many zeros in both the numbers of the deceased and the
patients. This is why the English have a lovely expression, i.e. they say “if
you hear these hoof beats, think of the zebras”, which means that if you
notice many of these symptoms, wait for something very unpleasant. And
it is very important that these do not disappear without being evaluated;
but for someone to evaluate them, they must know that they exist.
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An attack with nuclear weapons. I think that crisis management in this
case is a bad joke. Whatever remains and with whatever remains we will
try to deal with health casualties and God help us.
Accident at a nuclear plant. We remember the Chernobyl story in 1986.
We can see that very far and very near are two relative concepts; within
ten days from up here, it came down to Greece, so despite the thousands
and thousands of kilometers that separate the two countries, very far is
extremely near and not only that, but the future is always unpleasant
because the consequences from radioactivity might henceforth begin to
become clear.
An attack with a dirty bomb, i.e. conventional explosives and weapons
with a radioactive source. Two small scenarios: one in Hide Park; the
explosion takes place here. As you can see the whole Manhattan area is
reduced to a deserted area. The second scenario, near the White house;
you can see health casualties, dead, and of course the entire area is out
of reach.
And after the dirty weapons, we have something even more modern: the
dirty human. I would like to remind you of the story of Alexander
Litvinenko, where one man, one dead man caused great turmoil where
33.000 passengers were involved, 30 countries and crisis management
cost approximately 2.000.000 English pounds and only one contaminated
person was found.
Attack with chemical weapons. Let’s see what happens – this also
applies to radiological weapons – when there is an attack in an urban
center. At some point, suddenly, there is an explosion, approximately
20% of the health losses will remain on site because they are either
dead, injured or contaminated. However, 80% of the people will run in
every possible direction and if there is a health problem towards every
existing hospital irrespective of its size or whether it is a civilian, military
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or private hospital seeking help. Then, the fire brigade, the police, the
special forces, civil protection will hurry to the scene to deal with the
situation. A third number we must keep in mind are the worried healthy
people. The ration of victims to worried healthy people is 1:5 and this
ration will soon lead to the collapse of the most organized healthcare
system in the world.
This is the evolution of an attack with chemical weapons at 11 minutes,
21 minutes and 30 minutes and here we must keep in mind that this is
not an attack with chemical weapons, chemical ammunition in the
battlefield between two enemy armies; it is in an urban environment
where we need to take into account when we consider the planning,
many characteristics in the urban canyons such as the airflow and the
dissemination and the specificities it has in tall buildings, low buildings
etc.
The first agents will get to the scene with their special gear, they will
select samples, report on the situation, try to discover what was released
and then there will be a massive decontamination if there is only one
target, if there are no more threats, if the authorities are located around
the perimeter etc. So, in reality it might be somewhat unlikely to see such
situations being handled.
As we said, the majority of the victims will reach a hospital. Let’s take one
hospital: as you see, people are flocking to hospitals, but they are not all
patient and they don't all sit and wait for their turn; someone may jump
over a fence and try to get in, which means we need to have a lot of
security personnel and then there is a procedure to check whether those
coming in are contaminated, whether they are injured, where various
paths are followed to finally get to the selection, the triage, where those
who have a real problem will be hospitalized and the others will leave the
hospital with instructions about what to do in case they are contaminated
and are not simply worried healthy people.
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In 1995 the person in this picture, a member of AUM Shinrikyo attacked
the Tokyo subway with sarin gas. These situation are not theoretical; they
stopped being theoretical at the St Luke’s hospital where the external
patient rooms and hallways were filled with victims, 5.000 people arrived
at all the hospitals and all the clinics in Tokyo, irrespective of the fact that
the dead were only a few dozens. So, we should keep at the back of our
minds that the disaster does not only concern buildings, but people as
well and that this kind of disaster could happen to us, too, which is
something that we tend to forget or put under the rug.
Large-scale biomechanical accidents. Here I would like to mention the
Union Carbide tragedy in Bhopal, the AZF plant in Toulouse in
September 2001 and our own, the big explosion and fire at Jet Oil which
cost human lives; In such accidents chemical substances can be
released which, in an urban environment, are as catastrophic as any
chemical warfare.
After 9/11, many manuals, instructions, directions, strategic plans were
written, printed, published, new ministries were formed, etc; but what did
this fix? What was the result of all of these? Things don't seem very
good. Two examples: a transatlantic one from the US that faces the
biggest problem. In a report, “Ready or not – 2006”, it was clear that only
one state met the ten criteria and many serious observations were made
that you will be able to read on your own. The same report in 2007 stated
that eight states now met the ten criteria, but a lot of work has been done
in the other states as well. However, there still are many important
observations.
Let’s cross the Atlantic to our continent, to Austria. You can see here a
study which was conducted in all the emergency care hospitals of the
country. The results are disappointing; it seems that the healthcare
personnel, doctors and nurses, do not have a good relationship with
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CBRN defenses and something should be done about that. The same
goes for a second study from European Union which demonstrates that
the most important problem in all countries is in fact tied to medicinal
products, mainly antiviral and pox medication as well as on organizational
issues while there are many differences from country to country.
The results of the “See Threat” program are also very important; you can
see some examples on the internet. The Athens University Medical
School is heading this program which aims at the creation of an
educational package which will include the knowledge and information
that doctors and nurses working at civilian and military hospitals should
have in order to clinically cope with the new threats i.e. threat from
chemical, biological and radiological agents in time.
Now, let’s quickly take a look at some results; let’s say, the capacity to
discern between natural and terrorist incidents. As you can see, the
percentages concerning chemical, biological and radiological incidents
are not very promising. The numbers concerning how well- prepared the
healthcare personnel is to identify chemical, biological and radiological
agents are not very encouraging either.
Let’s move on to the level of knowledge concerning the various agents.
As you can see here, doctors and nurses did much better with respect to
biological weapons, perhaps because this is our job on a daily basis, but
with regard to nerve gases and mustard you see that the results are not
very good. And to confirm this, we also asked the CBRN defense
professionals from 16 countries what percentage of first line healthcare
personnel in their country was prepared well enough to identify and deal
with biological attacks, chemical attacks and attacks using a dirty bomb. I
would say that this cartoon represents the results of this question to the
specialized personnel, so there’s still a lot of work to be done.
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CBRN crisis management in an urban environment, I believe, comprises
three stages: preparation, coping with the crisis and recovery.
Preparation, planning is based on information, equipment and training. I
believe that the problem in planning CBRN crisis management has to do
with our giving too much emphasis on equipment and operational training
instead of training those who will be called to deal with the thousands of
health losses for many years to come. And of course there is a big
question mark in the preparation for recovery since it is very difficult to
predict the exact extent of the disaster.
In CBRN crisis management in an urban environment we have the
participation of the armed forces, civil protection, international aid in this
order. During the Olympic Games, as you heard from the previous
speakers,
we
had
a
very
good
and
very
detailed
although
multidimensional, complex plan in four levels - political, military,
operational and tactical – and two big crisis management groups and
consequences management groups. Fortunately, none of these was
needed.
The US also have similar teams, the weapons of mass destruction civil
support teams in every state, and some states have two teams, which
are mobilized to help the state if such an incident should occur. However,
what is important – and I was really happy to hear Mr General mentioning
it – I believe is the civilian defense because what are all these
instructions good for when you are asking the population to perform a
sheltering place and they don’t even understand what you are talking
about. So, what they usually do is go out into the streets and provoke
havoc.
The conclusion: CBRN crisis management in an urban environment
continues to be problematic on an international level. CBRN operations
last a couple of hours, while CBRN health consequences and losses last
decades and here allow me to show you two pictures from training in
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Tehran in 2003 from the organization for the prohibition of chemical
weapons where we had the “chance” and opportunity to examine real
losses from the Iran-Iraq chemical war.
At an external practice where cases were brought on a daily basis –
dermatological, pulmonary, ophtalmological and pathological – and we
saw real losses. This girl was a small child in 1987 with her family which
you can also see here and when we examined her she was practically
blind and had a very serious respiratory problem and a very low life
expectancy and all this many years after 1987.
The healthcare personnel must be properly trained, well-equipped to be
able to rapidly and effectively deal with CBRN losses. Perhaps a good
suggestion on an international level would be to introduce a course of
CBRN defense treatment at the Medical and Nursing Schools in the last
years, so that apart from all other knowledge, new doctors and nurses
would have very basic knowledge of this, so as not to be surprised in
case they are called to deal with a CBRN weapon attack.
And finally, I would like to stress once more the special importance that
should be given to urban defense. Before closing I would like you to
remember something that did not appear on the screen. There, under
that sign, there was a quote by the IRA representative after the
unsuccessful murder attempt on Margaret Thatcher’s life, saying that
“She must be lucky every day; we only need to get lucky once.”
Thank you very much for your attention.
Back to agenda
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253
“The Hellenic Center of Health Operations and Crisis Management”
Mr Spirou, Deputy Director of the Hellenic Center of Health
Operations
Good afternoon from me as well. I would like to thank the Ministry of
National Defense for the invitation. Esteemed Chairman, General,
esteemed participants, perhaps my presentation will be a little lighter
because it was quite at the last moment for me.
I will refer to the organization, functioning and the role of the National
Center of Health Operations which was established during the Olympic
Games to cover the healthcare needs and still exists today with a four
year lifespan and participates in the management of the acute public
health matter.
In June 2005, we had to also participate, after Presidential Decree, in the
daily rotating duties which of course is not an emergency and crisis
management in the sense of everything that was previously mentioned,
but it is often a sort of crisis management in the Greek reality.
The objective of this measure was to offer additional beds at the time and
better quality of life and of course it is something that is being controlled
until today. In February 2007, the health coordination body was re-named
“Center of Health Operations”. Apart form our own center, during the
Olympics we also had another one functioning at the Main Press Center
where the reporters were accommodated. There is another one in
Thessaloniki and three other operational centers under development in
Heraklion, Larissa, Patra.
This is a picture of our center of operations as it is today with modern
technological equipment, high tech equipment I would say, with a rapid

Presentation in .pdf format available. Click here
254
information flow and immediate response. Let me make a reference to
the basic structure of the health system:
During crisis management there is always cooperation with the political
leadership of course, with the minister, the deputy ministers and we try to
coordinate the activities together with the chairmen of the seven
healthcare divisions in Greece and the National Center for Emergency
Situations (EKAB) and the Hellenic Center for Infectious Diseases
Control (KEEL).
Here is a reference to the structure of the National Center of Health
Operations with its council, the chairman and the deputy chairman that
we cannot see here, with its healthcare divisions and the relative
branches.
What are our objectives? To coordinate the operation of the health subsystems, wherever necessary, to implement actions concerning public
health and of course to cope with emergency situations which is also the
controversial point.
Sectors of intervention:

Accidents. Mr Tsounakis already mentioned the Helios
accident, we were there, it was a very important lesson for us
as well, because we had the know-how from the Olympic
Games and we were able to handle it in a competent manner
as we had hoped.

Pre-hospital healthcare, EKAB. There is daily involvement of
the two operational centers on a 24-hour basis. This may
concern a simple incident concerning the transportation of a
patient because one clinic may be full or it could be something
very important for the management of any crisis.

Hospital healthcare. It is important that we, as an operational
center, have approximately eighty physicians at the given time
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and that on every duty there is communication with the
administration of the hospitals, the administrator and the deputy
administrator, mainly the latter since he is also the head of duty
control and assessment. Therefore, given the ministerial
decree which appoints him to this position, we are in daily
contact with him for various problems and of course crisis
management if the need for it should occur.

Primary healthcare. I will not talk about this.

Environmental healthcare. Just a quick reference to rotating
duties: at the moment a hospital is on duty from half past two in
the afternoon till eight the next morning, while in the past,
hospitals were on duty four days in a row. Now there have
been some modifications to be better able to manage additional
beds and this is where we cooperate with KEEL, PNO and the
Hellenic Police and any other competent authority concerning
migrants, but usually the interventions are made by KEEL.

Operations
coordination
in
case
of
massive
disasters,
earthquakes, floods, fires, road accidents, aircraft crashes, as it
was mentioned earlier and of course lately we also have boat
accidents.

Management of major disasters caused by chemical, biological,
radiological and nuclear agents. We also participated in all the
Olympic educational seminars, we are trying to attend all of the
exercises which they organize. There is great cooperation with
the other centers of operations, the General Secretariat for Civil
Protection, the Fire Departments operational center, the coast
guard and of course all these European organizations. We also
participated in a series of exercises which were conducted with
ECDC.

Implementation of operational plans. There is “Filoktitis”
concerning the management of a biological, radiological,
chemical problem; “Perseus”, concerning emergency situations
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at our hospitals, a flu pandemic, as was mentioned by a
previous speaker; and here we have the operational plan
“Artemis” to which a lot of attention must be paid and as of
lately we have “Sostratos”, another operational plan for the
management of earthquakes which was implemented with the
relocation of the St Andreas hospital in Rio, in Patra, after the
recent earthquakes.
Here we have a reference to our actions starting from the past, the
Olympic Games: Sri Lanka, the aircraft crash, the Polonium, major
athletic games like the Champions League, Eurovision is never
mentioned, the recent fires that we had last summer, Albania and
Myanmar. We try to participate by sending specialized personnel,
doctors, pathologists, surgeons, orthopedics, by sending medicinal
products and of course tents for the injured people.
This concerns Albania. The slide does not show the colors very well.
There was an immediate response to the explosion which occurred in
Albania within four hours and there were two missions with specialized
medical and paramedical personnel, medical technological equipment
and of course we contributed in the selection of patients who were sent to
the hospitals of Ioannina and Thessaloniki – here is a picture of the C130.
This is a picture of last year's fires, the flaming rage, where we also
participated with the establishment of a crisis management center, by
sending ambulances from Athens and Corinth and by implementing the
“Perseus” plan.
What actions were taken during the fires:
We created a social support center where political figures were present.
The objective of this center was the psychosocial support, healthcare and
protection of the public health.
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Here there is a small reference to the Eurovision part in which we
participated with medical supplies, infrastructure control and specialized
personnel.
Here we have the August 2005 airplane accident, which for us was really
a great experience. We already had of course the knowledge from the
Olympic Games and therefore we were able to mobilize at once, we
managed to activate seven big hospitals, we had excellent cooperation
with the EKAB, we sent the relevant specialized personnel and of course
special psychological support units were put into operation, which for us
was a first I would say… we had the knowledge, but we had never put
the scenario into effect until that point and we saw that being able to cope
with human pain at that time was extremely important. It was very difficult
to deal with the presence of the relatives of the victims and their pain,
who were arriving at the scene from various places.
This picture of the ambulances I could say helped us a lot with our image
on an international level through the media, but in the long run, if we look
at it a little more strictly, operationally the fact that all of these had only
one escape route may not have been our best decision. I don’t know that
for sure, but it is an image that helped a lot.
Sri Lanka: we also contributed with a humanitarian mission, helping with
the organization and the equipment of a floating clinic, with medicinal
coverage and in collaboration with Interpol to identify the victims.
And here due to the Polonium, as mentioned by previous speakers, there
was an important mobilization and 830 people were tracked down and. In
this case as well our cooperation with KEELPNO was also very
important.
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Here is a mention to the Champions League concerning the health
coverage framework and the Olympic Games, which for us was the
beginning, the point of departure. The Ministry of Health had up until then
a coordination body which was then transformed into the National Center
of Health Operations. I would just like to mention, that at that time, in
2004, we had to coordinate 24 Olympic hospitals, 16 Olympic emergency
divisions, the CBRN hospitals, hospitals for the special Olympics, the
daily reports and of course the organization of healthcare controls aboard
cruise ships. What was important to us was that we were able to
coordinate the operation of two Athens hospitals as isolation, quarantine
hospitals to cover extremely infectious diseases.
Some exercises were performed in hospitals, having as a starting point
the Olympics, and it is important for us that other such exercises should
be performed because the existing knowledge must be maintained and of
course it is very important that we be well-prepared and ready through
constant training to respond to the situations at hand.
To conclude, I would like to say that our action motto is good planning
and immediate and effective operational readiness. However, in order to
do anything, you need to keep in mind that you must deal with people
who want to do the same as you, the opposite from you and mostly the
majority of people who do absolutely nothing and judge you. Thank you.
Back to agenda
259
Conclusions
Chairman:
Thank you very much for your attention and for your patience and
indulgence for two and half days, almost three days of - I hope – very
interesting discussions and debates. I know that the time is running short
and it will be a great opportunity for you to enjoy the afternoon and
evening in Athens, so we’ll try to make it short. Now is the session of
course of recapitulating the works of the conference so I would like to
pass the floor to Secretary General of Information, Mr Livadas, the
moderator for the Media session. Mr Livadas, you have the floor.
Mr Livadas:
Good afternoon. Coming from the communications standpoint and if one
had to choose within a few minutes to incorporate the most important
things, I would isolate:
1. The most important thing during the communicational crisis
management is retaining and protecting the authorities’ credibility.
It is true that credibility isn’t built within a moment of crisis; it’s built
within time, in a daily fashion, business as usual circumstances,
but it should be protected during a crisis both because of the
importance of the crisis itself, but also because - chances are - it
isn’t going to be the last crisis. So you want that capital in the
future.
2. The second point that I would like to highlight is inter-organization
cooperation and coordination. It is true that all of us are doing our
best to make sure that our own organization functions in the most
efficient way, but sometimes we miss the fact that in order for our
organization to function efficiently we depend on another
organization or other organizations and vice versa. And that’s why
it is extremely important to know the demands and the problems of
260
the rest of the organizations to coordinate ourselves, because the
bottom line is that the authorities, the state has to speak in one
language and broadcast a single message.
In today’s media environment differences in what one organization
and what the other organization says is the best gift you can give
to a medium or to a journalist, because within their competitive
environment everyone tries to find those differences, those
exaggerations, etc, etc, because everyone is trying and is forced to
build some reality and have competitive advantages as far as the
competitive medium is concerned. So the least the authorities
could do is speak with one language and broadcast one single
message.
3. Third is the time considerations. Yes, we need to be prompt and
yes, we need to be speedy and yes, we need to incorporate the
time constraints that the media have to do especially because you
want to confirm to them that communicating in a transparent way
your messages and informing the public is a top priority. So you
need to work on that; and actually there are very practical rules,
the so-called “golden hour” rule which means that within the first 60
or 90 minutes to talk in approximate terms. You need to have the
first message sent - what is called the soft statement – which has
to have secure, factual first data that basically shows to the media
that you are there, that the state is there, that it’s the top priority to
inform the journalists and through them the public opinion and thus
securing the fact that the media recognize you as a credible
information source – because it’s information that they need most
of all – and by default they’re not going to search for information
elsewhere and that is good because chances are that they are
going to find the truth half, the information compartmentalized or
distorted.
261
So, you want to have credibility with them; you want to inform them
immediately. But that under the supposition that speed will not
endanger operational aspects, because sometimes those two
things are not getting along very well.
So, if someone really needs to isolate one or two factors, it’s credibility, it
is cooperation and it is speed under the presupposition that I talked
about. How about that for five minutes, Mr Chairman, and I’ll be very
willing to discuss if someone wants to elaborate on something further.
Chairman:
Excellent. Thank you very much, Mr Secretary General, Mr Livadas. I
then could pass the floor and ask Professor Mazis to recapitulate on the
Middle East session. Thank you.
Professor Mazis:
Thank you very much, Mr Chairman. During the session on the Middle
East we heard some very interesting opinions.
First of all, we heard the presentation of Mr Nachmani who – we must
say – kept a quite low profile approach mentioning that the Arab-Israeli
conflict until the present days proves that neither the Arab nor the Israeli
side is alone responsible, but that the responsibility is divided between
them. He mentioned that concerning the Israeli state the problem with
certain powers, certain countries of the region lies before a big question
mark which is caused by the denial of the existence of this state.
Then he posed some questions on the role of Russia and Turkey in the
Middle East stating that Russia is starting to find its role in the Middle
East again - of course it’s too soon to say that it has re-assumed the
place it held before the Cold War – and Turkey is trying – given that it’s a
state with a Muslim civilization - to play, let's say, this card of promoting
262
its cultural views in order to participate in the establishment of peace and
stability in the region.
He also spoke about the anti-Americanism which characterizes, from a
cultural point of view, most of the peoples of the region and mainly the
Arab and Muslim peoples of the region and often there are good
solutions that we could objectively judge as such, but they cannot be
applied though, simply because they were proposed by the Americans.
Professor Koutsis presented us a rather pessimist aspect of the
developments in the Middle East saying that there is a lot of hypocrisy in
this region stressing that the Palestinian position and that of the Arab
peoples of the region is not so good vis-à-vis Western policies and mainly
American giving at the same time a rather obscure image of the political
situation.
Mr Iakovou, whose text was read by Mr Toumazis, spoke to us with a
rather technocratic spirit of Cyprus’ future, stressing the issue of the
geographical youth which characterizes Cyprus. He spoke of the water
issue which could be very serious for the future if no one deals with it
now while it’s still at the beginning. He also mentioned the fanaticism
issue which must necessarily be dealt with as well as the bad timing
which has characterized all efforts up to now to find a solution to the
Cyprus issue.
Mr Nomikos Ioannis spoke of the necessity to create an information
network between the Western and the local powers in order to be able to
deal with terrorism and organized crime in a more efficient way in the
Western Mediterranean region.
And finally, I would say that after this discussion, the image which was
presented concerning the Middle East was neither obscure nor bright, but
an image which could be ameliorated through the will of the
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Mediterranean peoples and the will of the Great Powers who think that
they have a certain national interest in this troubled region. I believe that
this is a quite realistic image, we couldn’t argue with that and the
message is, in my opinion, rather optimistic. Thank you.
Chairman:
Thank you very much, Professor. I would now like to pass the floor to our
colleague, Mr Kintis, for the session on international organizations and
crisis management.
Mr Kintis:
Thank you, Ambassador. I think that what has become evident from the
presentations and the subsequent interventions on the issue of crisis
management and international organizations and their role in crisis
management is that transatlantic security at the beginning of the 21st
century is deeply institutionalized. States cooperate with each other in a
range of different institutions and across the spectrum of different security
issues. In particular, the national security and defense policies of the
members of the EU and NATO are increasingly coordinated and
integrated into common policies towards external security challenges and
crises.
The existence and development of the European Union, NATO and the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe is in part a reflection
of the emergence of the transatlantic security community. Freed from the
past risk of war with one another, the members of this community view
now external problems rather than each other as a primary threat to their
security. Combined with the consolidation of common democratic values
this has facilitated the emergence of broad security interests among the
members of the transatlantic security community.
In this context, it was clearly pointed out during our session that it is
hardly surprising that the countries of Western Union joined since the end
264
of the Cold War by the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe
have sought to deal and manage crises through institutions such as the
EU and NATO. These institutions provide a mechanism for countries to
address common security challenges, to increase their leverage vis-à-vis
those security challenges by acting collectively and therefore to deal with
crises in an effective and efficient manner.
Finally, from the discussions during the session on crisis management, it
has become apparent that the development of security institutions may
also be a self-reinforcing process. Members of these institutions and the
functional dynamics of cooperation reinforce perceptions of common
interest and help to create the sense of common identity on which these
institutions are in part based.
All in all I would say that in the period of change and reform that the
transatlantic community is experiencing, there still remain different
perceptions of risks and security challenges. The character of these risks
and challenges is such that no organization can cope alone with
elements of early warning, preventive diplomacy, crisis management and
conflict rehabilitation.
The aim should be to enhance and maximize the degree and extent of
cooperation, coordination and complimentarity among overlapping
security oriented organizations. This, as it was pointed out by all
speakers during the morning session will ensure that the comparative
advantages of each organization can be combined and fully exploited in
the pursuit of peace and stability.
One final remark and I’ll stop here: I would like to congratulate and thank
the organizers of this crisis management seminar and especially
Ambassador Stoidis and in particular Brigadier General Basiakoulis,
Commander Tsiantoulas and of course last but not least Mrs Fola for
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putting together such an excellent conference. Thank you very much, Mr
Chairman.
Chairman:
Thank you, Mr Kintis. You are ever so kind to thank us in person. Thank
you very much for your contribution. Professor Tsapanos, please, for the
session on response to disasters. You have the floor, Professor.
Dr Tsapanos:
Thank you, Chairman. Well, the crisis management problem is a
multidisciplinary event. We were lucky to have the crucial event of the
Olympic Games in 2004 in Greece and this is very good not only from a
theoretical point of view but also from a practical point of view.
We have two kinds of crises: the natural disasters and the man-made
disasters as the speakers of my sessions told us. As natural hazards, I
can mention earthquakes, fires in urban sites or forest fires, floods,
landslides and volcanic eruptions. The most common in Greece is
earthquakes, fires and floods. We don’t have landslides very often and
we rarely have volcanic eruptions. These natural hazards, these natural
disasters are faced by the General Secretariat of Civil Protection as Mr
Mouzas told us and the man-made disasters are accidents – traffic or
airplane accidents – as Mr Galatas told us and chemical, biological or
radiological, let’s say, wars.
In crisis management there are 43 authorities which contribute to the
management of such crisis. As the speakers told us the problem must be
faced at the beginning of the event. The Olympic Games give us the
opportunity to prepare to face such kind of problems early.
There are three steps: scenarios, plans and exercises of the population,
especially the children in schools which behave as a multiplying factor of
266
knowledge. They go home and tell their parents that they learned about
such things in school.
As a conclusion we can say that crisis management in Greece is in a
very good position and this was very recently shown in the recent
earthquake in the Ileia area were we had injured people and homeless
people and all the authorities which are involved in such kind of problems
were there from the first hours, the injured people were taken very quickly
to hospitals, tents and camps were installed to accomodate the homeless
people. Improvements and steps forward can be made and national
cooperations are welcome as well. Thank you very much.
Chairman:
Thank you, Professor. Allow me to just share some final thoughts with
you. I think that during these days member-states have confirmed their
commitment and the initiatives they undertake to create capabilities and
assets to respond effectively and credibly to crisis management
challenges. Afghanistan and Chad are the current priorities where the
international community tries to react and respond in a comprehensive
manner in order that stability, normality, normalcy, human rights
protection prevail.
The missions that we undertake should define the capabilities and not
vice versa. Individual states and international organizations - we feel –
would rather be operationally apt to respond whenever an appropriate
crisis arises but not on the grounds of disposing capabilities or assets for
the sake of using them.
The concern that we all share in seeking the peaceful resolution of crises
through enhancing constructive dialogues, conciliatory moods, good
neighborness is manifested in the cases of Southeastern Europe and in
particular the Western Balkans as well as the Middle East. I’ll make a
small parenthesis, allow me to say that unfortunately the moderator on
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the Western Balkans session could not be with us this afternoon, so after
the conference you will be receiving the procès verbal, the minutes of this
conference. So I will continue, if I may.
Then again effective, flexible and practical cooperation among various
international actors appears to be not only useful but imperative in order
to bear tangible results to the people that are in need. Equally solidarity
which is a principle that we share and feel dear about in Greece, a
common effort is necessary for coping as best and as fast as possible
with the consequences of increasingly frequent natural disasters. Natural
disasters do not have borders and can potentially evolve in full scale
crisis management.
Now, with these remarks I feel that we all realize the relevance of crisis
management in conflict resolution and our quest for stability, security and
development. I hope that this conference, “Athena 2008”, provided,
offered a small contribution to this debate and all this was due to your
participation and active involvement in these days and for your
involvement for which we are immensely appreciative. We are very
grateful to the moderators for the excellent way you conducted your
sessions. We thank you very much. We thank of course all the speakers
for the eloquence with which they presented their speeches in front of
you, a very big thank you for the organizers and all the people that
helped make this conference possible. So, looking forward to seeing you
in numbers next year, we wish you a safe return back home and pleasant
summer holidays. Thank you very much for all being here.
Back to agenda
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