University at Albany
Rockefeller College of Public Affairs and Policy
Department of Political Science
Prospectus for Dissertation Research
POLITICAL CLEAVAGES AND
PARTY SYSTEM STABILITY:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY
Submitted as one of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science
Reviewed by:
Prof. Erik P. Hoffmann, Chair
Prof. Victor Asal
Prof. José E. Cruz
Prof. Sally Friedman
Luis F. Clemente
December 2005
1
Introduction
Part of the emphasis of scholarly literature in comparative politics has been
dedicated to political party systems. The reasons range from the theoretical to the
empirical: party systems are not only considered an integral part of theory in the field
(through structuralism), but also as crucial actors in political practice. In the words of
Mala Htun, “[a] key insight of an institutionalist perspective on politics is that the
configuration of governing institutions and political party systems shapes the
relationships among political actors and the possibility for policy change (2003:17).” The
consequences of that configuration for democracy stem from this assessment and have
been considered crucial for its overall prospects for stability (Ibid:20). Related to this
assessment, party systems are the arena where political parties perform the functions of
political mobilization, political education, and interest aggregation within a specific
polity. All these functions have direct relevance for governance, especially in the areas of
policy formulation and implementation, because they represent the manifestation of a
priori demands for the authoritative allocation of resources by the state. The existing
literature presents reasons why party system stability is important1.
Yet the building blocks of party systems – political parties – face situations that
threaten their performance of those three functions and their overall character of crucial
political actors and have a direct bearing on party systems themselves. The state as a
political entity is currently affected by globalization, specifically by the ever more salient
role of intergovernmental organizations in areas such as macroeconomic policy and
human rights. The programmatic positions of political parties, when transformed into
actual state policies, can be curtailed by external imperatives. All in all, the decisions of
international organizations are a direct challenge to the concept of state sovereignty.
Domestically, social movements have challenged the primacy of political parties as
sources of information and axis for mobilization regarding specific issues, and have made
important strides in influencing state policy through direct lobbying or transnational
activist networks. Social movements are said to provide a more direct link between
citizens and governments for the consideration of specific concerns that otherwise might
be not considered by political parties, thus rendering the latter irrelevant. Demographic
tendencies like international migration, sociological phases like post-materialism, and
even technological advances pertinent to the links between politicians and the masses are
also part of these challenges (Montero and Gunther 2002) because they transform some
of the nuances of partisan competition. Some have spoken about a “crisis” in political
parties and party systems that has four guises: parties as threats to the good society
(denial of parties), “good” versus “bad” political parties (selective rejection of parties),
“good” versus “bad” party systems (selective rejection of party systems), and parties as
fleeting forms of political organization (redundancy of party) (Daalder 2002:39). It is
noteworthy to mention that these assessments have been made in the case of Western
European parties and party systems.
It is also noteworthy to say that in the opinion of Hans-Jürgen Puhle (2002),
Western European political parties have been able to adapt to changed conditions and
1
See pp. 8-9.
2
maintain their salience as political institutions, thus giving a “second wind” to party
systems. The crisis seems to have been averted in that part of the world. However,
political parties in fledging democracies not only have to face the same situations
confronted by Western European parties, but also to the added pressures of being part of
the process of democratic consolidation (Moreno and Gunther 2002:5). Latin America
represents an important case in point. Elected leaders like Alberto Fujimori in Perú, Hugo
Chávez in Venezuela, and Fernando Collor de Mello in Brazil have campaigned under an
“above-all-parties” platform, representing citizens who are dissatisfied with traditional
political parties. In some cases, these elected leaders have also resorted to plebiscitarian
rule or direct democracy procedures in order to expedite the implementation of policies,
thus sidelining political parties as mechanisms for interest aggregation and political
education, and party systems as their overall framework. What these cases show are
instances of breakdown in normal patterns of party competition that on the longer term
represent a real threat to democratic stability, especially in Latin America’s fragile “third
wave” democracies. Adding insult to injury is the fact that most Latin Americans distrust
political parties and not consider them truly representative (United Nations Development
Program 2004).
Notwithstanding the importance of the challenges faced by political parties, the
focus of this dissertation project is on party systems because they can initiate internal
changes in the parties themselves (Sauger 2003)2. Although party systems are
inextricably related to political parties to the point of mentioning the latter at several
points in the project, the implication of the above statement is that much of the problems
faced by political parties can be resolved through party systems. Political parties do their
functions of mobilization, education, and aggregation within the larger arena of political
competition for control of state and government; and party systems formalize, organize,
and regulate that competition. While party systems cannot exist without political parties,
political parties need to have their political rivalries structured and formalized if
democratic politics is to achieve the highly important characteristics of predictability and
controllability. I am dealing here with the concept of the stability of party systems, and
thus I ask the following research question: what are the conditions that provide that
stability to party systems? I will explain why studying party system stability is important
in the next section.
As a possible answer to my research question, I propose that the variable that
explains party system stability is the concept of cleavage and thus hypothesize that the
more profound the cleavage, the better the chances are for the party system to remain
stable. The focus will be on Latin America because of the special salience and major
implications of stable party systems for the overall prospects for democracy in that
region. I will look at whether or not three cleavages that refer to political, social, and
economic issues can set in motion a process that results in party system stability. The
Sauger’s exact argument is that there is a feedback loop between political parties and party systems that
can help bridge the systematic study of both. However, the other side of the loop (“The modification of the
number of relevant parties in a system will modify the mechanics of inter-party relations therein [2003:7]”)
points to an argument for party system stability that is not adequate for explaining certain cases. I will
expand on this assessment later in this prospectus.
2
3
model I will present later in this prospectus, which shows that process, will be compared
with competing explanations for the same independent variable for the purposes of
falsifying my hypothesis, and will be the subject of a qualitative comparison of a small
sample of cases.
Theory
The theory I will propose for this project includes three intervening variables:
polarization, political competition, and institutionalization. These variables, however,
should not be regarded as three separate outcomes of the independent variable, but as part
of something larger. Rather than three separate processes resulting from the existence of
profound cleavages, they should be considered as steps in a process towards party system
stability. The following paragraphs will provide the necessary explanation regarding
those three variables, and will also define the independent and dependent variables.
Party system stability
I define party system stability as the condition in which the patterns of interaction
between political parties are kept from one electoral event to the next. In turn, I define
party systems in a way that combines the arguments of Samuel Huntington (1968) and
Herbert Kitschelt and Elizabeth Zechmeister (2003): they are mechanisms that control
the rate of political inclusion and participation; and serve as a canvas for political
parties to define their positions, and for voters to make a choice between them. The
literature review section will introduce two contrasting explanations for party system
stability, but agrees that those patterns of interaction should remain in place. This
definition is contrary to the one proposed for the same variable by Lawrence C. Dodd
(1976): the continuity in time of the identity and strength of a parliamentary party. My
definition goes beyond the characteristics of specific parties and emphasizes on the
external conditions represented by cleavages. However, Dodd also argues that party
system stability determines how complete is the information available to party leaders
about other parties, something that is crucial for creating coalitions prior to forming
cabinets. That argument is more consistent with interactions between parties than with
their identity, but it explains why having party system stability as a dependent variable is
important: it shows and facilitates the patterns of interaction between parties. The
literature on Latin American democratization provides another justification: stable party
systems are necessary (but not sufficient) for a successful democratic transition and
consolidation, and for democratic regimes to work properly.
Profound cleavages
My concept of profound cleavages is a way of formulating Seymour Lipset and
Stein Rokkan’s (1967) and Douglas Rae and Michael Taylor’s (1970) theses in a new
way. Lipset and Rokkan define cleavages as a conflict over policies and value
4
commitments, while Rae and Taylor say they are “the criteria which divide the members
of a community or subcommunity into groups [...],” arguing also that those cleavages that
are relevant divide the people into political groups (1970:1). This means that contrasting
positions in a political issue should be considered as the constitutive parts of a cleavage.
Those cleavages can be classified as ascrpitive (traits such as ethnicity or race),
attitudinal (opinions), and behavioral (related to voting or political membership) (Rae and
Taylor 1970:1). My dissertation will pay the most attention to behavioral cleavages
because of their evident relationship to political parties and party systems.
However, I deviate from Rae and Taylor by changing their description of the
properties of cleavages: crystallization (how many in the community have taken a
position), fragmentation (how many in the community are divided over a cleavage), the
intensity of that fragmentation, overlapping (how many in the community have taken a
position on another cleavage and whether or not it is the same number on the previous
one), and cross-cutting (how many in the community separated by one cleavage could be
bridged together by a different one) (1970:3-4). The model I will propose later pays more
attention to the first three characteristics because they have more relevance to the
definition of cleavages as conflicts or divisions, thus leaving out overlapping and crosscutting. I also aggregate those three characteristics into the concept of profound cleavage
to make the process described in my model more sound and consistent. Crystallization,
fragmentation, and the intensity of fragmentation should be considered as preconditions
for the eventual process of polarization I will describe later. I thus define profound
cleavages as those that create the highest levels of crystallization and fragmentation.
Those profound cleavages thus generate a process represented by the intervening
variables of polarization, political competition, and institutionalization. I also deviate
from Rae and Taylor by arguing that party systems produce mutually exclusive
groupings. Their argument is that most party systems – not all of them – almost approach
the condition of mutual exclusivity, but the reality is that they invariably do.
Polarization
A key element I identify in the concept of profound cleavages (and cleavages in
general) is polarization. Many scholars (e.g. Haggard and Kaufman 1995, Mainwaring
and Scully 1995, Coppedge 2001b) argue that polarization is dangerous because it entails
the high probability of a breakdown in the political system caused by a lack of political
compromise. However, I posit that this happens in situations that are not replicated often,
such as during the power vacuum experienced by Germany during the Weimar years 3.
The irreconcilability of political positions, as exemplified by this historical case, can and
does cause governability crises, but polarization cannot be completely eradicated even in
3
Weimar Germany (1919-1939) is considered by historians and political scientists as the most salient
example of extreme political polarization. The German party system at the time had a considerable number
of political parties that occupied the entire political spectrum, including nationalists (right), communists
(left), Christian Democrats (center), and Social Democrats (center-left). Polarization was exacerbated by
the country’s parliamentary system, based on proportional representation. Almost all existing parties did
not want to reach the necessary political consensus with the Social Democrats, which were the major
political force.
5
more normal circumstances because issues never leave citizens apathetic. We only need
to look, for instance, at how Americans react to current domestic issues (e.g., the best
approach against terrorism, Social Security reform, abortion, etc.). This lack of apathy is
at the center of cleavages defined as conflicts over value commitments. The view of
polarization as something that has to be prevented at all costs has more importance for
Western European parliamentary systems than for Latin American presidential systems
because the need to bargain and create political consensus on parliamentary blocks is
greater, especially when a winning party does not obtain a majority (see Dodd 1976).
For the purposes of the project, I define polarization as a conscious choice within
the electorate among contrasting positions in a political issue as opposed to being totally
apathetic or not interested. It is something that should be controlled rather than
eradicated. This even includes the Downsian “median voters” because they somehow
have found a middle ground between the extremes in the continuum without sidelining
themselves out of it. Crystallization and fragmentation (and the latter’s intensity, as well)
polarize voters, who are then faced with the decision of supporting one alternative or
another in a specific issue continuum. Because political parties perform the functions of
interest aggregation and political mobilization, any decisive choice of issue positions on
this kind of cleavages will be captured by party organizations and incorporated into party
platforms. This applies to both the creation of new political parties and of programmatic
positions by existing ones. In short, as Lipset (2001) argues, the polarization materialized
by these cleavages creates social support bases for political parties. Political parties that
are embedded in society reduce the information costs associated with the political
education of voters, and impose constraints on elected politicians (Inter American
Development Bank 2000)4.
Political competition
All these considerations make much more sense if and when we also look at the
competitive interactions between the parties themselves – the lifeblood of party systems.
We should start here by incorporating Max Weber’s (1994 [1919]) definition of politics
as competition for the control of the state. There is a consensus in the comparative
politics literature in that the state musters the capacity for having both its policy decisions
authoritative and binding, but we should understand that those decisions first came to
light as points in a platform espoused by a political party that once strived for control of
the state and competes regularly with other parties with that same objective through
periodic elections. Stefano Bartolini provides a more technical description: he defines
political competition (“individual competition in politics”) as a way to achieve the social
value of responsiveness or the periodic accountability of those in government, and as
something that comprises four conditions: free and fair elections (contestability), the
threat of electoral sanction against political leaders (vulnerability), the existence of
electoral options within reach of voters (availability), and differentiation amongst those
political offers (decidability) (2002:89-90). Nevertheless, this responsiveness can also be
defined as the authoritative allocation of state resources in what has been contained in
4
Discipline and internal coherence are also important for this outcome.
6
party platforms. This nuanced version of Bartolini’s description will be used as the
definition of political competition I will apply to the project. The importance of
competition lies in the fact that competitive political parties are “effective conduits of
democracy (Corrales 2001)” and must be so if democratization is to make any sense. This
concept of competitive parties immediately presupposes that this competition must be
held within a party system.
Institutionalization
Those two elements – polarization and political competition – show the
profundity of existing cleavages and the need to settle the matter. At this point, voters
have taken sides within an issue continuum and have been mobilized by political parties
that strive to transform the positions they represent into policy that will be enforced by
the state. Thus, the next and final step in the process is to set up a party system (or to
work within an existing one) through which political competition can occur. The idea
here is that political competition will create the need for establishing a party system that
will be binding to all concerned, organize the overall interactions between parties, and
make political competition controllable and predictable. With the need to establish a
party system comes the more important concern for having it accepted by all concerned –
that is, institutionalized.
The first mention of this variable comes from Huntington (1968), who defined the
institutionalization of party systems as a widespread agreement on their existence and
basic rules, and the element that imprints predictability and familiarity to political
competition and party platforms. More recently, Scott Mainwaring, who agrees with
Huntington, has argued repeatedly about the importance of institutionalized party
systems, principally for Latin America (1995 [with Timothy R. Scully], 1998, 1999).
Institutionalized party systems have four dimensions (Mainwaring 1999):
1. Stability: Party competition is regular and does not show consistently high
electoral volatility.
2. Embededness: Political parties are rooted in society and can articulate social
demands.
3. Legitimacy: Political parties are considered imperative for democratic politics
even if there is criticism or skepticism towards specific parties.
4. Organizational independence: Party organizations are, in Weberian terms,
rational and not dominated by charismatic leadership. It also entails territorial
presence, internal coherence, and their own supplies of resources
These two descriptions of party system institutionalization – Huntington’s and
Mainwaring’s – will comprise the definition of that concept used in the project.
The importance of party system institutionalization is noteworthy. An
institutionalized party system reduces the possibility of political anomy and radical
change (Huntington 1968), and where they are not institutionalized, governability suffers,
7
politics are more erratic, political personalisms are more pronounced, and accountability
is lacking (Mainwaring and Scully 1995). Along with political parties themselves, they
also determine the success and failure of democracy, especially in a region like Latin
America (Diamond et. al. 1999).
The model
The following diagram illustrates the model I will test, which contains in turn the
arrangement of all relevant variables:
Profound cleavages → Political polarization → Political competition → Party systems → Party system stability
(contain issue
(the conscious choice
(competing parties
and the need to (the patterns of
positions open to
of issue positions
representing issue
institutionalize
interaction are kept
the choice of voters)
within a cleavage line) positions)
them (makes
from one electoral
patterns of
event to the next)
interaction
binding and
organizes
political
competition)
Explained in words, if the cleavages are profound enough, citizens will be polarized and
consciously take sides. As they take sides, they will also support political parties that
have adopted their interests and views. These parties will display their traditional
tendency to seize government and state power, by which their positions become policy.
The citizens that take sides with those parties also expect responsiveness from that
government. Partisan positions will be necessarily contrasting and differentiated, thus
creating competition. This also creates the need for an institutionalized party system that
will structure that competition. The need for institutionalization translates in the need to
make political competition structured, effective, and knowable.
There are two important considerations that apply to this model. First, it shows
what some might consider a deterministic process: the existence of cleavages is always
expected to set in motion the sequence of events represented by the intervening variables.
Any challenge to this determinism might come from non-partisan organizations because
it implies that profound cleavages do not always result in anything related to party system
stability or even political parties. Polarized individuals can assemble in social movements
or interest groups that can try to influence in policy implementation. However, the nature
of those cleavages as a priori ideas for the allocation of state resources makes political
parties more suited and prepared for political competition through periodic national
elections than social movements. In Puhle’s (2002) assessment, social movements
become more structured and institutionalized when they enter into politics. In other
words, they behave more like political parties and less like non-partisan organizations
within civil society.
A second consideration has to do with the possibility of feedback loops. As
alternative causal explanations that differ from the traditional linear model, they have an
inherent danger: they do not establish a precise starting point in a causal relationship.
8
Such a determination is necessary if we want the testing of those causal relationships to
build theories and, most importantly, to explain political phenomena. The project will
base itself in traditional causation, but I will also present the possibility of a feedback
loop between the variables. It could happen that the cleavages that initiated the process of
stabilization will be reinforced and become permanent through the party system itself.
Research Design
With the theory described above in mind, I intend to test my hypothesis by
employing both quantitative and qualitative methods.
Quantitative methods
If profound cleavages include crystallization, fragmentation and the intensity of
fragmentation, the way to measure them is by replicating Rae and Taylor’s calculations
of those characteristics (1970:24-26, 32-33):
1. Crystallization (C) is measured by looking at the number of people that choose
between issue positions (N) and the total number of people in the community (S),
or
C=N/S
2. Fragmentation (F) is based on the following statement (Rae and Taylor 1970:24):
A perfectly fragmented community over some given cleavage has no matched pairs of individuals,
since each individual belongs to his own nominal group. A perfectly unfragmented community has
no mixed pairs of individuals who are divided by a cleavage, since all individuals belong to the
same nominal group.
Accordingly, fragmentation is determined by looking at how many mixed pairs
exist in the community and the total number of possible pairs, or
F = number of mixed pairs / total number of pairs
After creating the individual formulas for number of mixed pairs and total number
of pairs, and incorporating them into the basic formula for fragmentation, the
authors come to this, more nuanced formula:
F = 2 / N (N – 1) (Σ fi * fj)
where 2 / N (N – 1) represents the total number of pairs and (Σ fi * fj) symbolizes
the number of mixed pairs defined as the sum of all possible pairs. However,
since we are considering millions of people who are crystallized by a cleavage,
this formula needs further refinement. The result is
9
F = 1 – Σ (fi / N)2
3. In the simplest terms, the intensity of fragmentation (I) is measured by looking at
the mixed pairs and how distant are their members, or
I = 1 / 2m – 2 (Σ dPd)
I will utilize those three calculations to determine the profoundity of existing cleavages in
the cases that will be studied. Taking off from the model described in the theory section,
it is expected that those profound cleavages will set in motion the process that will result
in party system stability.
The second set of quantitative methods (regression analysis) will compare that
model with others that provide alternative explanations to party system stability. Those
competing explanations are based in the following variables:
1. The number of political parties: It is perhaps the most studied variable in the
existing literature about party systems for one crucial reason: those who
emphasize on it argue that it is an important indication of power concentration
and fragmentation, the streams of interaction between the parties, and the existing
tactics of party competition. It has also sustained the more intuitive argument that
bipartisan systems are more stable than multiparty ones because the former keep
polarization in check, though polarization is defined in this sense as the first step
towards political collapse and not as an inevitable mark of politics.
2. Political culture: It has been argued time and again that political culture is
instrumental in the overall success of democracy because the former reflects the
overall values, understandings and beliefs that sustain the institutionalization of
democracy. One very compelling argument comes from Inglehart and Welzel
(2004): “a political culture that emphasizes self-expression, tolerance, trust, life
satisfaction, and participatory orientations plays a crucial role in effective
democracy.” Although the main argument points to a dichotomy between
democracies based solely on suffrage and those that include the recognition of
formal equality, they also say that those values are essential for the flourishing of
democratic institutions. One can intuitively argue that party systems – one of
those democratic institutions – also depend on a political culture that is conducive
to their acknowledgement.
3. Post-modernization: The literature on the political effects of post-modernization
(Inglehart 1990 [1977], Inglehart and Flanagan 1987, Flanagan and Dalton 1990,
Wolinetz 1990) concludes that the value changes caused by this process, in which
the emphasis shifts from economic to non-economic issues, has created processes
of political realignment or dealignment (Flanagan and Dalton 1990), fragmented
existing party systems (Wolinetz 1990) and has set off a situation of electoral
volatility that affected political parties that mobilize around economic issues
(Inglehart 1990 [1977], Inglehart and Flanagan 1990). In this sense, it is a change
10
in existing cleavages rather than their creation what influences the stability of
party systems, although this process can create cleavages of its own. Either way,
post-modernization scholars have criticized Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) idea that
cleavages, once materialized, remained unchanged (the “freezing hypothesis”).
4. Cognitive mobilization: This theory posits that access to higher education is
creating a class of individuals that are more politically sensitized and more
interested in political information. This has a direct bearing on political parties as
traditional sources of political education and crucibles of polarization, which is
part of the process for party system stability. Conversely, limited or non-existent
access to higher education results in apathetic citizens (Nevitte and Kanji 2004).
5. Social capital: Robert Putnam mentions that “[s]ocial context [...] profoundly
condition[s] the effectiveness of institutions [...]. Effective and responsive
institutions depend, in the language of civic humanism, on republican values and
practices. Democratic government is strengthened, not weakened, when it faces a
vigorous civil society (1993:182).” At the heart of that statement is the concept of
social capital, defined as “features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and
networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated
actions (Putnam 1993:167). Although between political parties there is the
concept of competiton, inside them we should find individuals engaging in
coordinated actions thanks to social capital. This alternative explanation is very
compelling when we consider existing political and socioeconomic issues in Latin
America (see the analysis of Edward Newman [2001] below).
6. Electoral systems: “Duverger’s Law” (majority electoral systems will create twoparty systems) is perhaps the most important example of this theory, which also
posits that “[t]aken as an independent variable and, indeed, as a causal factor,
electoral systems are assumed to affect the party system [...]” and that “electoral
systems cause the party system, which in turn causes parties per se to be as they
are (Sartori 2001:90)5.”
Qualitative methods
I will make a comparative analysis of the party systems of four Latin American
countries – Venezuela, Perú, Argentina, and Chile. The comparison will be made through
the method of most similar systems design (MSSD), a method that shares a long and
proud history in comparative politics. It is part of what is known as the widely used
“comparative method,” which focuses on small samples of carefully chosen countries that
are studied through a middle level of abstraction and taking into account the details of
every case. MSSD owes its lineage to John Stuart Mill’s “method of difference” and, like
its predecessor, it studies cases that share a set of characteristics but differ in the variable
or variables that explain the analyzed outcome (Landman 2003:29). It is precisely what
this method does what encapsulates its utility for the project, because the four cases are
5
Italics in the original.
11
comparable and indeed share a series of characteristics, though not the outcome to be
explained.
Before addressing the issue of comparability, I must justify my exclusive focus on
Latin America. Although it can be safely argued that preventing party system breakdown
is also crucial for a deeper democracy in areas of the world like Russia and Eastern
Europe, the need for strong party systems in Latin America is more imperative.
Authoritarian (or quasi-authoritarian) setbacks have gone from threats to actual
occurrences in which regular political competition has been interrupted. To be sure,
Russian president Vladimir Putin has been criticized for his increasingly autocratic rule,
but by and large the experience of some Latin American countries is not being repeated
in Russia or Eastern Europe. Another justification for focusing in Latin America, as
described by Edward Newman (2001), is that the chronic social problems of the region
undercut citizenship, and that the traditional “socio-political matrix” represented by the
state, social actors and political parties is being challenged – sometimes subverted – by
structural conditions that affect all three nodes of this matrix equally. Two of the
conditions he identifies have already been mentioned in this prospectus: the effects of
globalization, and the tendency shown by some presidents towards unconventional
political procedures. He also points to other situations, such as a low quality of political
debate, a lack of interest in political participation, and scarcity of political choices. My
assumption is that such problems could discourage citizens to crystallize themselves in
cleavages and join political partisanship.
The four countries that will be compared are similar in the following
characteristics:
1. They reactivated their party systems after episodes of non-democratic rule: The
four cases experienced military regimes that eventually gave way to democracies,
and one of the first actions under all of them was the celebration of presidential
elections, which presupposes the reappearance of political parties and party
systems. Argentina and Chile are two classic examples of a type of nondemocratic regime imposed by the military during the 1960s and 1970s that was
characterized by an ideology based on the aspects of social reordering, national
security, renovation of public administration, and the deepening of import
substitution initiatives based on economic investments sustained by favorable
political stability (Htun 2003:19-20). In the cases of Argentina and Chile, the
military establishment in those countries saw itself as a “protector” of the status
quo in the face of political pressures. Hence, Argentina had two of those regimes
in a period of less than 20 years (1966-1973, 1976-1983), while its Chilean
equivalent spanned from 1973 to 1990. Argentina’s democratization started in
1983 and was sparked both by a gripping economic crisis (Haggard and Kaufman
1995) and the country’s defeat in the Falklands War against the United Kingdom.
That same year, presidential elections were held (Linz and Stepan 1996). The
Chilean regime started to unravel in 1988, when General Augusto Pinochet – the
head of government – called for a referendum on his permanence in power. In
numerical terms, Pinochet won the referendum with 44% of the vote, but in
12
practice Pinochet was “forced” out of office because his winning percentage was
short of an absolute majority. A number of moderate parties created a coalition
known as Concertación and later won the presidential elections of 1990, although
the outgoing regime implemented a number of rules and laws that severely
constrained democratic consolidation (Linz and Stepan 1996).
Perú and Venezuela represent two slightly different cases because their military
regimes were not consistent with Htun’s description of those of the 1960s and
1970s, but were nevertheless non-democratic. The Peruvian military regime
began in 1968 with a bloodless coup led by General Juan Velasco Alvarado that
was nevertheless quietly supported by most citizens because of the gross
incompetence of the prior civilian presidency. Although it was undoubtedly a
dictatorship, its most fascinating aspect was its ideology and resulting policies,
which were populist in character and included nationalizations of industries and
foreign-owned lands, protectionism, agrarian reform, and social welfare
initiatives, among other policies. Starting in 1975, after the ousting and death of
Velasco Alvarado, the Peruvian regime initiated negotiations with civilian
political groups with the aim of reestablishing democratic rule, but it was not until
1985 that presidential elections were held (Sonntag 2001:139-140). The
Venezuelan regime also started with a coup; in 1948, the military and the
bourgeoisie forced a democratically elected president out of office because of
what they believed was a lack of will on the latter’s part to quell rising political
pressure from lower socioeconomic classes. In 1952, General Marcos Pérez
Jiménez proclaimed himself president, but when his policies clashed with the
interests of the Venezuelan bourgeoisie the latter withdrew their support and
started negotiations with exiled political leaders. This led to Pérez Jiménez’s
demise in January 1958 and a formal agreement known as “Pacto de Punto Fijo,”
which instituted a political system in which political parties were considered the
most important channels for citizen participation, among other points. There were
many political parties created after that agreement was reached, but the ensuing
party system was sustained by two parties, AD and COPEI. The first presidential
elections under Punto Fijo were held in December 1958 (Sonntag 2001:148-149).
2. Their citizens show a widespread dislike of political parties: Recent results of
Latinobarómetro, the most important database of Latin American public opinion,
are extremely revealing, but also sobering for supporters of democracy and even
ominous. In Latin America as a whole, only 4% of those surveyed in 2001 had “a
lot of confidence” in political parties (Lagos 2003). In general, political parties are
said to be “aloof and an alien and self interested sector that offers no possibility of
a shared future (UNDP 2004),” or as “weak links” in Latin American politics
(Colburn 2002). A 2002 consultation with the leaders of Venezuela, Argentina,
Chile and Perú shows that they all believe that political parties are not fulfilling
their roles (UNDP 2004)6. The percentages of confidence in political parties by
6
This consultation was made to 231 individuals who were considered influential in policy making,
including former and current presidents and vice-presidents. The sample included not only the four cases,
but the rest of Latin America.
13
country in 20027, also calculated by Latinobarómetro, demonstrate that 20% of
Venezuelans8, less than 15% of Peruvians, 10% of Chileans, and almost 17% of
Argentines show confidence in political parties (The Economist, 17 August
2002:30, chart 7). If citizens distrust political parties this much, then party
systems are pointless.
3. They all share significant cleavages: This should not be interpreted as saying that
those cleavages are profound. What I mean is that there are discernible cleavages
that can be found in the four countries of the sample. The analysis of Alejandro
Moreno (1999) is fundamental. He identifies three issue dimensions within which
citizens in the four countries can be found: democratic-authoritarian (political
regime), liberal-fundamentalist (abortion, religion, national sentiment) and
economic left-right (social change, income equality and economic individualism).
The utility of Rae and Taylor’s calculations lies in that they should determine how
profound these cleavages are, although Moreno also argues that the democraticauthoritarian cleavage has lost importance as Latin America embraces democracy.
Determining how profound are those three dimensions is an important first step
before analyzing if those cleavages do set in motion the process described in my
model and if it has more weight than the alternative explanations.
Previous Research: Party Systems and their Stability
Before analyzing the existing literature about party system stability, it is
imperative to look closely at how the root concept – party systems – has been defined. In
Kenneth Janda’s (1993) assessment, the existing theory about party systems has two
characteristics: 1. what defines a party system for most investigators are the parts and
how do they interact, and 2. the theory of electoral systems is its most developed version.
Examples of the existing literature (some of them already mentioned in this prospectus)
include Kenneth Benoit’s (2002) review of the existing literature about this subject,
Stefano Bartolini’s (2002) differentiation between political and economic competition,
and Arendt Lijphart’s (1990) study of the effects of electoral systems over political
parties. Janda (1993) also says that attention has been paid to seven factors or
dimensions: minimum winning coalitions, government durability, the effective number of
parties, issue dimensions, electoral disproportionality, party competition, and electoral
volatility. A large number of interpretations of party systems, however, (e.g. Sodaro
2004, Danziger 2005, Dodd 1976, Ware 1996, Duverger 1965 [1954], Sartori 1976,
Pedersen 1990 [1979], Chhibber and Kollman 1998) focus on the total number of
political parties. This variable includes the creation of related quantitative measurements
such as the widely used indices created by Douglas Rae (the index of fractionalization)
and Laakso & Taagapera. Other characteristics considered to be constitutive of party
systems have also been mentioned, such as ideology (Sodaro 2004) and nationalization
The percentages shown are those of respondents who answered “a lot” and “some” taken together.
It is nevertheless striking that a similar survey made in 1996 showed even lower numbers – the level of
confidence in political parties was just above 10%. However, the larger implication of this and the other
cases is that political parties are held in a very low esteem.
7
8
14
(Jones and Mainwaring 2003). Anne Bennett (1998) provides a different interpretation:
party systems have as characteristics the number of parties, social orientation, and
volatility. Typologies of party systems also reflect the emphasis on the number of parties
that compose them. Duverger (1965 [1954]), for instance, has divided party systems into
single-party, two-party and multiparty systems, and most scholars of the subject have
adopted more or less similar typologies. Giovanni Sartori (1976) argues that party
systems have a channeling function: they provide channels of communication to the state
where specific demands are autonomously represented and expressed. This proposition
implies that political parties are the vehicles for the expression and communication of
political demands coming from society, and for the overall representation of citizens.
When combined with how concentrated or dispersed is political power throughout the
polity, we have seven kinds of party systems, based on the capacity of individual parties
to create coalitions or influence competition in a significant way (“blackmail potential”)
(Sartori 1976):
1. One-party system: Only one political party, which concentrates all political
power, is allowed to exist.
2. Hegemonic party system: There is more than one party, but the others exist as
satellite or subordinate parties. The only effective party retains all the power.
3. Predominant party system: More parties are allowed without restrictions and a
single party wins elections by absolute majority (as all political parties strive
to do), but there is no alternation. Political power is concentrated on that
governing party in a unimodal fashion.
4. Two-party system: There is alternation and political power is spread evenly
between two parties. It also includes when there is a third party that
nevertheless does not affect bipartisan competition.
5. Limited pluralist party system: Alternation remains, but political power is
spread between more than two parties (fragmentation increases, but to
manageable levels). Polarization is kept low.
6. Extreme pluralist party system: Polarization and fragmentation increase.
Political power is dispersed between more parties.
7. Atomized party system: Political power is scattered throughout the system, and
fragmentation and polarization are extreme.
Herbert Kitschelt and Elizabeth Zechmeister (2003) offer a very innovative interpretation
of party systems: they include processes in which politicians coordinate in building brand
names and reputations for policies, and voters have to screen those alternatives and act
upon their choices. Huntington (1968) defined party systems as mechanisms that control
the rate of political inclusion and participation. In other words, a party system organizes
and mobilizes citizens, and controls polarization (meaning here extreme political
disagreement). Stable party systems can fulfill these functions to the highest degree, and
one of their characteristics is their degree of institutionalization (Huntington 1968)9.
9
Huntington mentions another main characteristic of stable party systems: their degree of participation, or
how it is capable to mobilize prospective voters. He also applied the concept of institutionalization to the
study of political parties as the establishment of long-term ties and commitments to political parties that
will make them legitimate institutions instead of vehicles for the ulterior motives of power-seekers.
15
Mainwaring and Scully (1995) create a typology of Latin American party systems that is
based on their description of institutionalized party systems and has three types:
institutionalized (where the four characteristics are present), inchoate (where they are
not), and hegemonic systems in transition (halfway between institutionalization and noninstitutionalization, and usually characterized by the total dominance of one political
party [e.g., Mexico]). The authors have characterized the Argentine, Chilean, and
Venezuelan party systems as institutionalized, but that remark does not show the
progression of the Venezuelan system towards breakdown (Coppedge 1998 and 2000,
Sonntag 2001). Perú is listed in the category of inchoate systems.
Regarding party system stability, I classify the existing literature into two kinds of
explanation: endogenous and exogenous. These two terms are mine and point to where is
the main factor for explaining the dependent variable, whether inside or outside the party
system, respectively. The endogenous explanation conceives a party system as a system
of interaction between political parties; and its stability depends on what the parties do,
not on factors external to the structure. The number of parties that integrate the system is
the most important variable and, as a result, what constitutes party system stability is
whether or not a particular system maintains a specific number or parties for a
considerable amount of time. Conversely, a change in the party system is a function of
new parties entering it or older ones leaving it. This latter argument has been advanced by
Ware (1996), who focuses on the variation between countries on the propensity of
existing parties to split and of new parties to appear. Another argument with bearing on
the number of political parties as the key for stability is that multiparty systems are
inherently more unstable (Midlarski 1984, Roberts and Wibbels 1999) because of
fractionalization. In turn, G. Bingham Powell, Jr. (1981) believes that party systems that
curtail citizen involvement, contribute to the springing-up of riots, and harbor many
political parties show more instability than others, which is shown in the electoral support
for extremist parties (communist, fascist, etc.). Sartori makes two arguments: first, that
the continuity of party systems and their transformation from competitive to noncompetitive is a function of discontinuous change (i.e., political breakdown or the result
of a violation of the existing constitutional order in the face of a revolutionary threat or
occurrence, military insurgence, or coups) while also taking the effective number of
political parties as the independent variable of his model (1976); and second, that mass
parties are what ensures the stability of party systems and what can also alter the latter’s
constitutive nature because pre-existing political élites are forced into forming more solid
parties, or else their parties will lose electoral support and be pushed to the margins of the
party system (1990 [1968]). Scholars that take sides with the endogenous explanation,
including Moshe Maor (1997), believe that the reason why party systems are stable is
because political parties have strategic capabilities; that is, they create their own
mechanics rather than being subject to exogenous circumstances. Katrina Burgess and
Steven Levitsky (2003) present an argument very similar to Maor’s by studying how
Latin American populist parties have reacted to external pressures. Methodologically,
research based on this interpretation is based on case studies, such as Maor’s (1997)
largely qualitative single case study of the British party system, but it also includes the
more quantitative examination of electoral results (Sartori 1976) and the inclusion of the
existing measurements of number of parties. Peter Mair (1997) believes that the key for
16
understanding party system stability is the separation of party members from party elites,
but John Carey (1998) points out an inconsistency in his argument: what Mair thinks is
the reason for party system stability in the West contributes to the opposite effect in new
democracies.
The exogenous approach gives more importance to factors external to the party
system, mainly electoral shifts (volatility) and cleavages (Mair 1997)10. These variables
can also be interconnected. Also, following Benoit’s (2002) analysis, we can also say that
the study of electoral systems proper as independent variables over party systems is also
part of this approach11. The concept of electoral volatility has been defined as “the
change in vote shares obtained by individual parties in a given political system across
consecutive elections (Roberts and Wibbels 1999),” and research on the subject
incorporates comparative case studies of Western European party systems using
qualitative methods and, like within the endogenous interpretation, the examination of
electoral results. Existing studies also include mathematical formulas to determine
change such as Mogens Pedersen’s (1990 [1979]). He (1990 [1979]) and Richard Rose &
Derek Urwin (1990 [1970]) include volatility as an independent variable, but they reach
different conclusions: for Rose and Urwin, Western party systems do not show
significant changes since the end of World War II; but for Pedersen some party systems
have gone through considerable changes. Kenneth Roberts and Erik Wibbels (1999)
argue that unstable party systems, especially multiparty ones, contribute to electoral
volatility, thus reversing the causal arrow.
Because of its nature for purposes of this project as the independent variable, the
concept of cleavages deserves a separate mention in this prospectus. That concept was
first addressed in the work of Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan (1967), who believe that
cleavages are the main building blocks of political parties and party systems by
polarizing individuals into specific dimensions within those considerations. One
proposition made by both authors, that those cleavages have remained the same since the
1920s (the “freezing hypothesis”), has been the subject of research because of its alleged
lack of clarity, but Mair (2001) believes that what froze was actually the interactions
between political parties rather than any sociological differentiations. In any event, Lipset
and Rokkan’s conclusions have been debated and questioned by a considerable number
of scholars. For instance, Pedersen’s (1990 [1979]) conclusion about electoral volatility
in Western Europe does point to something different than what Lipset and Rokkan have
concluded. Post-modernization theory has brought strong criticism to Lipset and
Rokkan’s conclusions, and in response Lipset (2001) argues that even with the issues
created by post-modernization the traditional cleavage structure – mostly the class
cleavage – remains in place because its representative political actors are still
predominant in polities. Finally, Alan Zuckerman (1975) posits that the linkages between
10
Mair mentions a third subject: the study of changes in coalitional alignments and in the balance of
representative power between parties and interest groups. Nevertheless, this part of the existing research
can be related to the study of political cleavages because the cleavage shifts created by post-modernization
do have an effect in the creation of new party coalitions and the newfound salience of interest groups. This
will be explained below.
11
I separate electoral volatility from the study of electoral systems despite their relatedness because the
former analyzes individual behavior and the former is more related to the study of institutions.
17
cleavages and political conflict must be revised, and that the primacy of the former in
most research shuns other variables of equal importance, such as elites. In the case of
Latin America, Mainwaring (1999) and Robert Dix (1989) argue that the theory cannot
be applied to Latin America because the region has experienced a sociological
development much more different than the one in Western Europe, hence reducing the
possibility of the formation of cleavages.
However, the concept of cleavages still has its supporters:
1. Ronald Rogowski (1987) argues something very similar to Lipset and
Rokkan: changes in the conditions of external trade (risks and costs) create
conflict between producers of abundant and scarce materials, thus
demonstrating the polarization effect of cleavages.
2. Lawrence Dodd (1976) identifies the importance of cleavages for the stability
of parliamentary party systems, arguing that it is this characteristic what
enables bargaining towards the creation of cabinets.
3. Shaheen Mozaffar, James Scarrit and Glen Galaich (2003), in their
comparative study of African party systems, believe that there is a debate in
the literature between cleavages and electoral institutions as the determinants
of party system structure, but that both taken together can also create effects,
especially when coupled with ethnopolitical cleavages and establishing the
long-term effects of those party systems for democratic stability.
4. Kanchan Chandra (2005) argues that Indian ethnic politics can contribute to
democratic stability when anchored in multiple dimensions of ethnic identity.
The concept of ethnic politics is studied in a way that resembles Mozaffar,
Scarrit and Galaich (2003) in that it is considered a cleavage with political
repercussions.
5. Powell, Jr. (1976) points that individuals who belong to two groups
represented by different parties show weak partisanship because they are in
the middle of a cross-cutting cleavage, although he also tries to fine-tune this
theory. While not replicating Lipset and Rokkan, he nevertheless proves the
relevance of the subject of cleavages by arguing for its existence.
6. Gary Miller and Norman Schofield (2003) conclude that American political
parties (Democrats and Republicans, more exactly) function in the midst of
cleavages that have changed since the late 1890s, and that the reason for the
change are their spatial positions through time. Political parties thus engage in
“flanking moves” that target disaffected voters whose issues have been
ignored by the major parties, resulting in a shift of emphasis from economic to
social issues. The conclusion reached is that the American cleavage structure
(defined much à la Lispet and Rokkan) is still there, but that Democrats and
Republicans have switched sides.
18
7. Alan Angell (undated manuscript) argues that there is a cleavage in Chilean
politics, that between those who have supported the authoritarian regime of
General Augusto Pinochet and those who opposed it. This is materialized in
the constant electoral support for the governing Concertación alliance (antiPinochet) over right-wing parties (pro-Pinochet).
8. Jakub Zielinski (2002) addresses the relationship between cleavages and
partisan politics in the case of democratizing Eastern Europe. He argues that a
reduced number of political parties affects the political expression of
cleavages, but also that not all new cleavages have to be salient in a polity.
His research combines game theory with the Lipset and Rokkan thesis.
The analysis of Kitschelt and Zechmeister (2003) represents a “curious” case. While not
defending the concept for the same reasons exposed by Mainwaring (1999) and Dix
(1989), they nevertheless do not discount the possibility of the existence of cleavages that
appeared in a different way than those in Western Europe. What makes this case curious
is that it cannot be placed squarely within the literature about cleavages due to theoretical
or empirical disagreements with Lipset and Rokkan’s thesis, but nevertheless
acknowledges that the theory is not entirely flawed or irrelevant.
Despite the evident depth and breadth of the existing literature about party system
stability, there are several counts for why it falls short in many respects at present.
Although the number of parties is a widely used variable, thus justifying its inclusion in
this project as an alternative explanation, it does not seem to elucidate why party systems
such as the Venezuelan system broke down after Hugo Chávez’s electoral victory in 1999
despite the fact that Punto Fijo created a virtual two-party system sustained by Acción
Democrática and COPEI. While scholars like Roberts and Wibbels (1999) think that
multiparty systems are unstable because of their inherent fragmentation, with Midlarski
(1984) making the implicit argument that two-party systems are more stable, such a
conclusion is not warranted empirically, because this two-party system did break down.
Other cases, such as Colombia, for instance, show that two-party systems cannot always
curtail unrestrained political polarization. Two of that country’s historical political parties
– Liberals and Conservatives – were immersed in a bloody conflict known as “La
Violencia (“The Violence”).” However, Sartori’s notion of party system breakdown, the
view of party systems as systems of interaction, and the concept of institutionalization
proposed by Mainwaring and Scully (1995) should not be ignored because they all point
to important structural factors that stabilize party systems other than the number of
parties, such as links between political parties and society, and electoral volatility.
The exogenous interpretation is ostensibly more solid. Electoral volatility reflects
points of stress in the party system that can cause a breakdown, even if Mair (1997)
cautions against the use of electoral statistics; and Ersson & Lane (1998) think that any
change in the vote share of a political party does not have a determinant effect on party
system stability. Mainwaring (1998, 1999) and Mainwaring and Scully (1995) include
volatility as part of what differentiates institutionalized party systems from those that are
19
not, as I mentioned before. The theory of cleavages points to the fact that political parties
are not (and cannot be) in a vacuum; Maor’s (1997) strategic capacity of parties is
actually determined by external conditions such as the ones identified by Inglehart and
others, and Burgess & Levitsky’s (2003) thesis does point to external factors influencing
political parties. Those two conditions influence party systems by altering their
composition and recasting existing cleavages, thus transforming political competition.
This explanation, to be sure, does not ignore completely the number of political parties,
but it does not stop there. Most importantly, reprising Lipset (2001), political parties must
have links with society, and cleavages represent existing issue positions within society
that existing parties can incorporate. Nevertheless, the issue of post-modernization has
been mostly addressed for Western Europe and not for Latin America. If that theory is to
have any explanatory or predictive power, it must be extrapolated to that region.
Flanagan and Dalton (1990) argue that cleavages have changed rather than remaining
frozen by looking at how the value changes associated to post-modernization have
occasioned electoral realignment and dealignment. If they are correct, then those
countries that have not reached a healthy state of economic development cannot
experience any level of electoral dealignment (or realignment) because their basic
economic needs have not been satisfied so far. As a consequence, the traditional
economy-based cleavage system and its subsequent electoral alignments should remain in
place, especially in a region with chronic economic problems such as Latin America.
Moreno (1999) points to this possibility by examining the economy left-right dimension.
What we should do then is to determine the profundity of that cleavage, whether or not it
could initiate the process towards party system stability, and if my model can hold
ground against post-modernization theory.
Potential contribution
The review of the literature points to one of the potential contributions of my
project, also the most important one. The literature on party system stability at present is
not entirely adequate for explaining it if the endogenous approach bases party system
stability as an increase or decrease in the number of existing political parties, and if postmodernization theory has ignored the experience of Latin America. I speak of a
normative gap (what party system stability ought to be). In normative terms, the number
of existing political parties does not necessarily have an effect on the probabilities for
party system stability. The American party system is quite similar to what the Venezuelan
system was before Hugo Chávez was elected (multiparty on the surface but practically
sustained by two major parties), but the American system still stands and the Venezuelan
system broke down. We should hence concentrate on external structural causes for
stability, especially on the fact that political parties need to be connected to society. More
technically,
1. We must start thinking about party system stability not by looking at the
number of parties, but at polarization, political competition, and
institutionalization, and
20
2. We must acknowledge that the interactions between parties are not wholly
dependent on the parties themselves, as the endogenous approach suggests.
Another contribution of the project is empirical. Almost all sources on party
system stability concentrate on Western Europe and its parliamentary systems, not on
Latin America and its presidential systems (especially those in its “third wave”
countries). The region’s economic issues make the closing of the empirical gaps all the
more important because of their possible relation to party system stability. Lipset (2001)
mentions some Latin American countries, but his analysis is very superficial. Roberts and
Wibbels (1999) talk in more detail about Latin America, but they concentrate more on
electoral volatility as a dependent variable, not on cleavages. Bennett (1998) centers her
analysis of party systems on democratizing countries, but the sample does not include
Latin American countries at all. Mainwaring (1999) provides a much better source by
mentioning the possible causes of party system breakdown, but he does not incorporate a
cross-country analysis that can sustain the salience of those causes.
The closing of the existing normative and empirical gaps can be related quite
closely to a concern brought in by Morris Fiorina (2002): the interaction between theory
and practice in the study of political parties. More exactly, when assessing the state of
research in American political parties, he argues that “important components of
traditional democratic theory now lag the realities of contemporary American democracy
(Fiorina 2002:511).” In other words, the theory is not consistent with the empirical facts.
A third possible contribution of the project is that it will address the same issue from a
slightly different standpoint. The issues of how globalization influences polities and their
politics, and how political parties lost their monopoly on political mobilization should be
sufficient reason for studying the interaction between theory and practice in the study of
party systems and, more importantly, in the more narrow study of party system stability.
A final possible contribution has to do with the field of comparative politics in
general. As Peter Hall has argued regarding comparative methodology (2003), the
ontologies of comparative politics have outgrown its methodologies, meaning that the
political world cannot be construed any longer in the terms of traditional causality. His
suggestion is to do systemic process analyses – small-n studies that, instead of
determining causal relationships, test the predictions of existing theories and focus on
multiple interaction effects. Although my hypothesis and overall research design point
precisely to the establishment of traditional causal relationships, they also point –
indirectly – to testing the theory of political cleavages and its predictions, something
precisely within the expectation of determining how consistent is the theory with
empirical facts. Hall’s suggestion of doing small-n studies is also consistent with the
technique of paired comparisons as described in the research design section. That, in
itself, constitutes a contribution in the sense that it proves the plausibility of Hall’s
proposition, and that it does not have to be diametrically opposed to traditional
explanation in comparative politics.
21
Appendix: Preliminary table of contents
Chapter I: Introduction
a. Initial comments and research question
b. Hypothesis
c. Research design
d. Theory
Chapter II: Review of the literature
Chapter III: The Peruvian case
Chapter IV: The Venezuelan case
Chapter V: The Chilean case
Chapter VI: The Argentine case
Chapter VII: The cases in comparative perspective
Chapter VIII: Conclusion
Chapter IX: Bibliography
22
Preliminary Bibliography
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Barczak, Monica. 2001. “Representation by Consultation? The Rise of Direct Democracy
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Bartolini, Stefano. 2002. “Electoral and Party Competition: Analytical Dimensions and
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Bartolini, Stefano and Peter Mair. 2001. “Challenges to Contemporary Political Parties.”
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Parties.” Western Political Quarterly 20:1 (March), 132-148.
Bennett, Anne. 1998. “Party System Change in Redemocratizing Countries.” In
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Benoit, Kenneth. 2002. “Models of Electoral System Change.” Paper presented at the ReThinking Democracy in the New Millennium Conference, Houston, TX.
Burgess, Katrina and Steven Levitsky. 2003. “Explaining Populist Party Adaptation in
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23
Cavarozzi, Marcelo. 2001. “Transitions: Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Uruguay.” In
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Chandra, Kanchan. 2005. “Ethnic Parties and Democratic Stability.” Perspectives on
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Chhibber, Pradeep and Ken Kollman. 1998. “Party Aggregation and the Number of
Parties in India and the United States.” American Political Science Review 92:2
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Coppedge, Michael. 1993. “Parties and Society in Mexico and Venezuela: Why
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______. 2001a. “Party Systems, Governability, and the Quality of Democracy in Latin
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Politics in Latin America,” Buenos Aires, Argentina.
______. 2001b. “Political Darwinism in Latin America’s Lost Decade.” In Political
Parties and Democracy, 173-205.
______. 2003. “Venezuela: Popular Sovereignty versus Liberal Democracy.” In
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24
Daalder, Hans. 2001. “The Rise of Parties in Western Democracies.” In Political Parties
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______. 2002. “Parties: Denied, Dismissed, Or Redundant? A Critique.” In Political
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______. 1992. “Democratization and the Institutionalization of Latin American Political
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