UAVsBuilding a More Credible Force
U.S. Air Force restrictions on the management of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)
operators have reduced the developmental potential of these technologies. A training plan that
more effectively utilizes the USAF personnel resources would result in a more operationally
robust UAV force. This proposed training plan first recognizes the importance of experienced
combat pilots in the development and integration of UAV technologies into the combat air forces.
However, it also recognizes the inherent differences between UAVs and traditional aircraft. This
paper addresses two of these differences. First, because pilots do not physically fly in the UAV,
they would rather be assigned to traditional flying units. Secondly, the different physiological
and motor skills requirements of UAV operators as compared to pilots justify different training
requirements. Taking these two items into account, the new plan recognizes budgetary,
personnel, and cultural constraints within the Air Force while maximizing personnel training
dollars. The proposed training plan uses limited Air Force resources more effectively, resulting
in a more motivated and combat capable UAV operator force.
The UAV Community is Growing
The capabilities of unmanned aerial vehicles continue to expand with the advent of new
technologies. Recently, UAVs proved their combat worthiness in operations over Iraq and
Afghanistan. These successes only increase the demand for the limited UAV resources. Not
surprisingly, the amount of money invested into UAV research continues to grow.1 At the same
time the number of manned aircraft within the Air Force inventory continues to decline.2 As the
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number of UAV airframes increases, so will the demand for individuals to remotely operate
these air vehicles.
Military leadership continues to call for the advancement of UAV technologies and
support these calls with defense dollars. Senator John Warner, chairman, Senate Armed Service
Committee believes that by the year 2010, one-third of deep strike aircraft should be unmanned.
General Jumper, in his Global Strike Task Force, calls for UAVs to have the capability to
maneuver around, or go through advanced defensive systems. The 2001 Quadrennial Defense
Review Report states, “The Department of Defense will procure unmanned combat aerial
vehicles and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance unmanned aerial vehicles such as
Global Hawk.” These beliefs by senior leadership are supported by a 2004 fiscal year budget
request of over $1 billion for Air Force UAV production and development.3
Once tasked only for reconnaissance, advances in technology allow modern Air Force
UAVs to support regional combatant commanders like never before.4 Many experts state that
the Air Force is still anxiously awaiting the arrival of its unmanned combat aerial vehicle
(UCAV). However, the successful Nov 2002 attack on a senior al Qaeda terrorist in Yemen
proves that the Air Force already maintains a platform capable of combat. The Predator A,
although often operated by Central Intelligence Agency operatives and often restricted by
numerous operational constraints, is deployed to many theaters of interest, proving its limited
operational worthiness. The advent of the Predator B only enhances these capabilities. Predator
B eliminates some of the operational constraints of the A model, will be capable of increased
loiter time, an internal payload of 750 lbs, and an external payload of 3000 lbs. In addition to
Hellfire, the Predator B will be capable of employing a variant of the combat proven GBU-31,
the GBU 30, a 500 lb class version of the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM).5 In addition to
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the Predator B, the Air Force also presses forward with its development of the UCAV. Currently
under some pressure for reevaluation of its operational requirements, the UCAV has already
successfully undergone initial flight testing. 6 Whatever the result of the testing program, the
UCAV will bring additional combat capabilities to UAVs beyond those of the Predator.
Uninspired Pilots Flying UAVs
The challenge of finding volunteer pilots to serve as willing UAV operators has been no
small task. A former Predator squadron commander characterized a large part of his squadron
personnel as those classified as, ‘sick, lame, or lazy,’ within the personnel system.7 On April 29,
2002, The Wall Street Journal reported a story, “Top Guns Grounded: Pilots Fume at Duty on
Unmanned Craft,” which focused on the discontent felt by fighter pilots stationed at Indian
Springs while flying the Predator.8 Only in the past 6 or 7 years have the Predator and Global
Hawk had a significant impact on the assignment system. Before that time pilots never heard of
anyone ever getting a UAV assignment. There is no doubt that over time, UAV assignments will
continue to work their way into the culture of Air Force pilots. However, there is also no doubt
that as long as Air Force pilots continue to go through a traditional pilot training program where
they are required to fly aircraft, that they will resist these assignments.
Few professions garner as much enthusiasm and excitement as military aviation.
Throughout the twentieth century numerous stories of daring aviators thrilled movie theater
audiences and readers alike. Millions have read the tales of the brave test pilots in The Right
Stuff. Even more have seen daring naval aviators dance the skies in Top Gun. What pilot cannot
relate to the poetic words written by John Gillespie Magee Jr.? Pilots pursue the aviation
profession not just because it’s a job. For the most part, pilots fly because they love to fly.
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Flying challenges pilots, both physically and mentally, often drawing on their bravery and
courage. Pilots join the Air Force to fly airplanes because of their inherent love of flight, not to
control UAVs from the ground.
The next decade of UAV operations promises numerous capability upgrades.9 As UAVs
move from a supporting role to more of a supported role, they will require the expertise of
combat experienced aviators. There is no question that fighter and bomber pilots, navigators,
and weapons systems operators are the most qualified individuals to develop the tactics,
techniques, and procedures of UAVs for incorporation into the combat air forces. These air
warfare experts bring to the planning tables experience that no one else can.
The challenge becomes how to continue the development of these very important UAV
technologies, while keeping the pilot force motivated, inherently a difficult task. While current
Air Force policy states that UAV operators must either be rated pilots or navigators,10 one option
would be to indefinitely continue to force pilots into ‘voluntary’ UAV assignments. However,
this option brings with it several disadvantages. First, it forces Air Force pilots into assignments
they do not want. Although comprised of professional aviators, what pilot cannot relate to the
disappointment of being assigned to a base where their flying skills, skills that they have been
training for years to develop, will no longer be challenged? Second, related to the staffing of
these positions by pilots, is the opportunity cost by not staffing UAV operator positions with
non-pilots. As UAV operators, the thousands of highly motivated individuals not medically
qualified for aviation service now have an ideal position to serve on the ‘tip of the spear’ in an
operational combat unit.
A change in Air Force policy governing the staffing of UAV operators would increase the
motivation levels in the UAV community. It would allow for development of a UAV specific
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syllabus which would result in better trained UAV operators while at the same time saving a
significant amount of training dollars. In the end the UAV community would benefit by
providing a more combat capable force.
While the Predator and Global Hawk go through their trials and tribulations, the F/A-22
also undergoes development. Last year, the Air Force asked for volunteers to operationally test
and evaluate the stealthy new fighter jet. Hundreds of fighter pilots volunteered to be one of the
first to fly what will be the most capable fighter jet ever produced. After review by a formal
selection board, the Air Force released its list of operational and test evaluation pilots. Not
surprisingly, each of the seven pilots is a graduate of the premiere USAF Weapons Instructor
Course at Nellis AFB. These highly qualified aviators will be responsible for test and evaluation
of the Air Force’s newest and most capable fighter technology. This process of taking the most
highly qualified individuals and tasking them with developing the tactics for new weapons
platforms only makes sense. The important point to take away from the comparison of the F/A22 with the Predator is this: Volunteers for the F/A-22 will continue to flood the personnel
center. Once selected, pilots will have to be taken away kicking and screaming from their
position as F/A-22 pilots. In contrast, Predator pilots seldom volunteer for their assignment.
Once assigned to a Predator squadron they normally anxiously count the days until their
departure. However, in order to develop UAV operations to their fullest, UAV squadrons
require committed individuals, expert in their operation. UAV squadrons require individuals
with a sense of ownership that have to be taken away kicking and screaming.
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AVOs Maintain Different Training Requirements from Pilots
Now that multiple UAV squadrons have established themselves, and for the foreseeable
future UAV operations will only continue to expand, why must we continue to train fixed-wing
pilots to fly UAVs? The medical requirements to fly UAVs are different from those of manned
aircraft. Of even more significance is the difference between the UAV operator-UAV interface
and that of the pilot-aircraft interface. A fundamental difference exists between the two man and
machine interfaces.
Currently, in order to be eligible for AVO training, the U.S. Air Force requires
individuals to either be a graduate of Specialized Undergraduate Pilot Training or a graduate of
Undergraduate Navigator Training and also possess a current FAA fixed wing pilot and
instrument certificate. There is no other public plan to develop a separate syllabus for AVOs.
This policy is overly conservative and costing thousands in unnecessary training dollars. A new
syllabus that focuses on the training requirements of AVOs and eliminates the Class A flight
physical examination is required and overdue.
Individuals who aspire to grow up and one day become UAV operators should not
require the same rigorous physiological training that pilot training candidates endure. UAV
operators do not maintain the same physiological requirements. When the same physiological
requirements are placed on UAV operators as those placed on pilots, the end result is wasted
training dollars.
In addition to requiring different medical standards, UAV operations differ significantly
from those of aircraft operations. The methods of controlling a UAV differ from that of a
traditional aircraft. Some of these control mechanisms more closely resemble that of flying an
aircraft with traditional stick and rudder skills. The Predator A model makes use of manipulation
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of a stick and throttle with the addition of keystrokes on a keyboard to control the air vehicle.
Still other UAV control systems resemble more closely that of a fully automatic aircraft autopilot.
Global Hawk does not use a control stick or a throttle. Control is accomplished completely
through the use of keystrokes through a keyboard. Some have classified these various control
systems as remote, semiautonomous, and autonomous.11 As future UAVs complete
development, vehicle control will fall under one of these three classifications or may operate
across a combination of the three. New technologies will most likely continue the trend in
automation. This will reduce the workload on the operator and is aimed at increasing
survivability and combat effectiveness.
Another inherent difference between flying aircraft and controlling UAVs is the
requirement of multiple datalinks. The datalink is the lifeblood of a UAV. UAVs depend upon
datalinks for their flight control and sensor control. They also depend upon them for the
monitoring of aircraft systems. Finally, a datalink makes it possible to transmit important data
collected through onboard sensors. In order to effectively operate any UAV, a thorough
understanding of the electro-magnetic spectrum is necessary. The allocation of bandwidth
within a theater of operations will someday become the difference between whether a particular
airframe can operate or not.12 In contrast, nowhere in the Specialized Undergraduate Pilot
Training syllabus is the management of the electro-magnetic spectrum covered in any detail.
UAVs vs Aircraft- Inherent Differences From an Aviation Safety Perspective
A review of USAF aviation mishaps continues to point out the fundamental differences
between the control of aircraft and the control of UAVs. More importantly, it highlights the
training dollars wasted to train UAV operators how to handle physiological situations that do not
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impact UAV operations. In the last ten years the Air Force has experienced multiple Predator
and Global Hawk mishaps. Not a single mishap was related to physiological factors. In
comparison, over the past ten years, the Air Force reported over 1000 physiological incidents in
traditionally manned aircraft. These incidents included hypoxia, g-loss of consciousness,
airsickness, and rapid decompression to name a few.13
Several of the UAV mishaps were due to the loss of one or more aircraft systems. In a
traditional pilot training syllabus, pilots are taught how to recognize the loss of, or the impending
loss of aircraft systems through several means. Obviously cockpit instrumentation provides an
important reference. However, many indicators are a direct result of physically being in the
cockpit – aircraft vibrations, unusual noises, odors, the sound of the airflow around the cockpit,
and acceleration forces. These sensations do not exist in UAV operations. A tailored UAV
syllabus would focus on these inherent differences and correct training deficiencies.
Reduction in Training Costs
An updated syllabus aimed at training UAV operators would result in a significant
reduction in training costs as compared to the specialized undergraduate pilot training (SUPT)
syllabus. Significant savings could be realized in three areas- first, a reduction in flying hour
costs, second, elimination of the physiological training requirements of the SUPT syllabus, and
third, increase in UAV simulator events.
Flying hour costs for the T-38 are $1500. Flying hour costs for the F-16 are upwards of
over $3800. In comparison, flying hour cost for the Predator are significantly less expensive at
under $200.14 Elimination of the requirement for UAV operators to be rated pilots would
eliminate millions of dollars of flying hour training costs.
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Additionally, elimination of the physiological training requirements for AVOs would also
reduce overall training costs as compared to training pilots. Adjusting a pilot’s body to the
rigors of high-g maneuvering, operating off of 100% oxygen, spatial disorientation, and optical
illusions are just a few of the physiological challenges that pilots require training to overcome.
None of these factors affect AVOs.
Finally, because the interface between the AVO and the UAV and the interface between
the AVO and a UAV simulator are so similar, a greater portion of the UAV syllabus could be
converted to simulator training as compared to the SUPT syllabus. When sitting at a UAV
control console, a UAV operator receives the same sensor inputs as when operating in ‘simulated
UAV flight’ vice ‘actual UAV flight’. Therefore when converting portions of the syllabus from
actual UAV flights to simulated UAV flights the net result is minimal loss of training
effectiveness for the operator while at the same time saving training dollars.
Looking for UAV Volunteers
Comprising the UAV operator force of all volunteers would positively serve the UAV
community through its existence. Many might ask where would these volunteers come from? I
would argue that once a new training syllabus is created and a new community was officially
established, individuals would step forward anxiously looking for the challenge of operating
UAVs. Flying aircraft is not a profession that everyone aspires to do. Many individuals may
have the desire to be a part of the ‘operational’ Air Force but not want to fly airplanes. Still
others might have medical or physiological restrictions that keep them out of the cockpit.
Countless highly motivated individuals who want to serve at the tip of the spear are
restricted from flying operations due to the numerous physiological requirements. Many people
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simply don’t enjoy the physical sensation of flying. Others are not medically qualified to fly.
Even prior to ever touching an aircraft, the initial medical screening process eliminates a
percentage of pilot and navigator candidates. Once enrolled in a flying training course,
additional medical standards result in the elimination of still more officers. Air Education and
Training Command Instruction 36-2205 spells out guidance for medical management
requirements during formal aircrew training. Three primary areas include airsickness,
manifestation of apprehension, and in-flight G-tolerance problems.15 Every year an additional
percentage of officers are eliminated from training due to these factors.
Individuals medically disqualified from aviation service are forced to seek roles that
support the war fighter. However, since the operation of a UAV does not require the individual
to actually fly, the only medical requirements become that of world-wide deployability.
Although medically ineligible to fly aircraft, a significant portion of these officers may be
medically qualified to operate UAVs at the very tip of the spear, perhaps one day putting bombs
on target.
The Future
While keeping the objective of producing the most combat effective UAV operators at
the lowest cost, the following conclusions can be drawn. In order to build a credible UAV force
an all-encompassing rated force plan must be developed. The plan must take into account the
Air Force’s limited financial resources, limited number of pilots, and finally, the ever-important
Air Force cultural considerations. The following three-phased plan leverages the expertise
already within the combat air forces while pressing forward towards the establishment of, and
eventual independence of, a cadre of UAV specific experts.
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Phase I (next 5 years) Since so little combat experience resides within the UAV weapon
systems, it is necessary for UAVs to continue to draw upon the expertise resident within other
major weapon systems. Highly experienced fighter and bomber pilots, navigators, and weapons
systems operators will continue to leave their major weapon system to transfer their expertise to
UAV operations. However, simultaneously the Air Force needs to build an acceptable training
syllabus that produces UAV operators from the bottom up. This syllabus must satisfy the FAA
requirements to operate as a pilot would in controlled airspace. It must satisfy the Air Force’s
stringent requirements for engrained military flight discipline and at the same time be tailored to
meet the unique training requirements of UAV operations.
Phase II (5-10 years from now) of the implementation plan calls for the introduction of
these young officers, trained under the new UAV syllabus to enter service within operational
UAV squadrons. Similar to the young lieutenants that enter fighter squadrons for the first time
from their initial major weapons system training, the young UAV operators will serve within
UAV squadrons training to become experts at the employment of their weapon system.
Throughout their careers they will move between UAVs in order to learn the unique challenges
associated with each different UAV platform. By working side by side with combat experienced
pilots, they will gather the necessary skills required of them to continue the integration of UAVs
into the combat air forces.
Phase III (10-15 years from now) establishes the UAV major weapon systems’
independence. The unmanned weapons platforms will no longer depend upon manning support
from pilots. Enough expertise will have been developed over the previous 10-15 years to selfsustain its existence. This is not to say that pilots that have been medically disqualified from
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flying service will not filter into the community on a limited basis. The community will continue
to absorb pilots in limited numbers but will be capable of self-sustaining itself.
Change within any organization is never without turmoil. This case is no different. The
U.S. Air Force has a rich heritage as a rated, manned-aircraft force. The transition to a partially
unmanned force will be controversial. However, in order to maximize the impact of unmanned
technologies, many significant changes are required. These changes not only maximize training
dollars, but most importantly produce a UAV community most capable and ready to support the
Air Force’s Global Strike vision.
1
Department of Defense UAV Roadmap, 2002-2025
Air Force Magazine, May 2003, Total number of aircraft within ANG, AFRC, and Active Duty, (1995- 6633
aircraft), (2003- 6183 aircraft)
3
As reported by Defense News, February 3, 2003
4
Understanding that traditional UAV operations began sometime even before World War II, the focus of this paper
is on UAV operations in the 1990’s and beyond
5
As reported by Janes Defense Weekly, December 4, 2002
6
Aviation Week and Space Technology, “Uncertainty Engulfs Pentagon’s Unmanned Aircraft Plans,” Robert Wall,
Spetember 16, 2002.
7
Interview 4 Oct 2001 with Lt Col (ret) Brian Bergdahl, Commander 15 th Reconnaissance Squadron, Nellis AFB,
NV
8
Wall Street Journal, April 29, 2002. “Top Guns Grounded: Pilots Fume at Duty on Unmanned Craft”
9
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Roadmap 2000-2025, April 2001, Office of the Secretary of Defense
10
Currently, UAV operators must either be a graduate of Specialized Undergraduate Pilot Training (SUPT) OR a
graduate of Specialized Undergraduate Navigator Training (SUNT) and also maintain a current FAA single-engine
land certificate with instrument rating
11
White Paper on USAF Use of Unmanned Aerospace Vehicles in 2020, Maj Mike Pietrucha, 8 Mar 2001
12
Klausner, Kurt A., LtCol, USAF, Air & Space Power Journal – Winter 2002, “Command and Control of Air and
Space Forces Requires Significant Attention to Bandwidth
13
USAF Flight Safety Statistics, USAF Safety Center, Kirtland AFB, NM
14
T-38Flying hour cost- 14th FTW/RA, Columbus AFB, MS; F-16 Flying hour cost- PACAF/; Predator Flying hour
cost- 99FW, Nellis AFB,NV
15
AETCI36-2205 29 June 2001 Formal Aircrew Training Administration and Management, Randolph AFB, TX
2
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