International Organization
New York University, Fall 2002, V53.0730
Professor:
Classes:
Office Hours:
Thomas D. Zweifel, thomas.zweifel@nyu.edu
Tuesdays and Thursdays 2:00-3:15pm, Room Main 711
Tuesdays 1:30-2:00pm, 715 Broadway, 4th Floor, Room 435B and online.
Description
Perhaps the most pressing issues of our time transcend national boundaries. A deteriorating
environment, AIDS, world hunger and poverty, population pressures and transnational migration,
global arms trade and drug smuggling – none of these problems can be solved by nation states
alone. International organization may be the most, if not the only, appropriate forum for tackling
transnational issues.
But are international organizations democratic – do they represent the interests of the global
citizenry? Or are they mere vehicles for the agendas of powerful nations, of international
bureaucrats, or of multinational corporations?
After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the United States emerged (or
re-emerged) as the sole remaining superpower – “the indispensable nation” (former US secretary
of state Madeleine Albright). But the United States has recently isolated itself from the
international community. It failed to ratify the new International Criminal Court (ICC) that would
prosecute individual war criminals; it was kicked off the UN Human Rights Commission; it left the
Kyoto treaty on climate change; it wants to replace the 1972 Antiballistic Missile (ABM) treaty with
its own missile shield. Has the United States become a predatory hegemon that uses its military,
economic, and cultural power only to maximize its own narrow interests?
Meanwhile, the European Union has emerged as a powerful actor – a regulatory state, able to
impose binding rules on the citizens of its 15 member states – and has begun to openly challenge
the primacy of the United States. But since many “Eurocrats” are neither directly elected nor
accountable to elected officials, the EU has been accused of suffering from a “democratic deficit.”
Activists in Seattle, Washington, Davos and elsewhere have questioned the legitimacy of
international agencies such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Trade
Organization (WTO), and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD or
World Bank). They have asserted that these institutions merely serve the expansion of US-style
capitalism and global corporations.
This introductory course examines international organization in theory and practice. The first half
of the course is concerned with competing theories of international organization. We apply
realism, neorealism, and hegemonic stability theory; and their rival theories, idealism and
neoliberal institutionalism, to international organization. We then review alternative theories and
their capacity to predict and explain international organization today – for example Marxism,
domestic influences, and ideas.
The second half of the course covers specific international institutions: global institutions (such as
the United Nations), regional organizations (such as the European Union, NAFTA, or Mercosur),
and functional organizations (such as the World Trade Organization or the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development). We investigate whether, and to what extent, international
institutions are democratic.
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International Organization, Fall 2000
Requirements and Grading
 Completion of all required readings and attendance of all classes.
 Active class participation based on weekly question sets and case studies (20% of grade).
 Research, presentation, and class discussion of one weekly case study (30%).
 Final exam (50%).
Readings Required
Kratochwil, Friedrich and Edward D. Mansfield. 1994. International Organization: A Reader. New
York: HarperCollins.
Pease, Kelly-Kate S. 2000. International Organizations. Upper Saddle River NJ: Prentice Hall.
Nugent, Neill. 1994. The Government and Politics of the European Union. Durham NC: Duke
University Press.
Zweifel, Thomas D. 2002. Democratic Deficit? European Union, Switzerland, United States.
Lanham MD: Lexington Books / Rowman & Littlefield.
Readings Recommended
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce. 2000. Principles of International Politics. Washington DC:
Congressional Quarterly Press.
Keohane, Robert O. 1984. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political
Economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. Theory of international politics. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Ziring, Lawrence, Robert Riggs and Jack Plano. 2000. The United Nations: International
Organization and World Politics. New York: Harcourt Brace.
Schedule (Subject to Change)
Week 1 (9/6): Introduction
Introductions. Overview. Requirements. How to research and present a case study. Case study
teams. Levels of analysis: first, second, and third image. International regimes as values, norms,
rules, and decision-making procedures. Do institutions matter?
Read (Recommended):
Barber, Benjamin. 1995. Jihad vs. McWorld. New York: Ballantine Books.
Do:
Organize for action around the case study you selected, and begin research.
Week 2 (9/11, 9/13): Realism, Neorealism, Hegemonic Stability Theory
Study:
The assumption of anarchy. System. Balance of power. Bipolar stability. Relative vs. absolute
gains. Hegemonic stability or hegemonic decline? The United States as sole superpower: “the
indispensable nation” or bully? Benevolent or predatory hegemon?
Read:
Pease pp. 18-53.
Kratochwil and Mansfield 97-109, 174-189 (Krasner, Mansfield).
Read (recommended):
Mearsheimer, John. 1994 “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security
19:3, Winter 1994/95.
Kennedy, Paul. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. New York: Random House. 1-30.
Kindleberger, Charles. 1973. The World in Depression, 1929-1939. Berkeley: University of
California Press.
Strange, Susan. 1987. “The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony,” International Organization 41,
Autumn.
Milner, Helen and Jack Snyder. 1988. “Lost Hegemony?” International Organization 42, Autumn.
Strange, Susan. 1988. “Reply to Milner and Snyder,” International Organization 42, Autumn.
Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. Theory of international politics. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Case:
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International Organization, Fall 2000
Kyoto Treaty, HR Commission, UN back dues, ABM Treaty, International Criminal Court: a new
United States isolationism?
Do:
How do realism and neorealism explain and/or predict the case you selected? What is missing or
contradictory? Are international institutions epiphenomenal, as realists claim, or are they
independent variables in international politics? Give examples that support either interpretation.
Create a “balance sheet” of indicators of hegemonic decline or hegemonic stability of the United
States.
Week 3 (9/18, 9/20): Liberalism and Neoliberal Institutionalism
Study:
Grotianism: the primacy of international society. Globalism vs. internationalism. Neoliberalism vs.
neorealism. Institutions. Game theory.
Read:
Pease 54-69.
Kratochwil and Mansfield 32-76, 140-174 (Ruggie, Yarbrough and Yarbrough).
Read (recommended):
Bull, Hedley. 1968. “Society and Anarchy in International Relations,” in Herbert Butterfield and
Martin Wight, Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Grieco, Joseph M. 1988. “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest
Liberal Institutionalism,” International Organization, 42, August. 485-507.
Kant, Immanuel. [1795] 1963. “Perpetual Peace,” in Immanuel Kant: On History, Lewis White
Beck, ed. and trans. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.
North, Douglass C. 1981. Structure and Change in Economic History. New York: W.W. Norton.
Case:
Who is in charge: great powers? International organizations? Multinationals?
Do:
How do idealism and neoliberal institutionalism explain and/or predict the issue you selected last
week? What is missing?
Week 4 (9/25, 9/27): Domestic Actors, Ideas
Study:
Domestic actors as independent variable. The second image reversed. Two-level games.
Domestic cleavages. Democratic peace. Cognition. Perceptions. Nesting. Constructivism. Norms.
Read:
Kratochwil and Mansfield 77-94, 128-139 (Wendt, Haas).
Read (recommended):
Goldstein, Judith, and Robert O. Keohane, eds. 1993. Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs,
Institutions and Political Change. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Gourevitch, Peter. 1978. “The Second Image Reversed,” International Organization 32:4,
Autumn. 881-912.
Putnam, Robert. 1988. “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,”
International Organization, vol.42, no.3, Summer. 427-60. [in Lipson and Cohen]
Case:
The International Criminal Court (ICC): how does US domestic politics influence its foreign policy
stance?
Do:
Apply the perspective of domestic actors to your international politics issue from the beginning of
the course.
Week 5 (10/2, 10/4): Marxism, Feminism
Study:
Marxism in IR. Feminism in IR.
Read:
Pease 70-98.
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International Organization, Fall 2000
Read (recommended):
Hilferding, Rudolf. 1981. Finance Capital. Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Lenin, V.I. [1917] 1939. Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism. New York: International
Publishers.
Case:
Are the WTO, IMF, World Bank controlled by multinationals?
Do:
Contrast theories of ideas with central Marxist tenets. Apply the perspectives of Marxism and
Feminism to your international politics issue from the beginning of the course.
Week 6 (10/9, 10/11): The United Nations I – History and Institutions
Study:
History of the UN: Concert of Europe, League of Nations, United Nations. UN Structure.
Colonialism. Nonaligned movement.
Read:
Pease 18-36 (re-read), 251-273.
Kratochwil and Mansfield 190-201 (Claude).
Read (recommended):
Ziring, Riggs and Plano. 2000. The United Nations: International Organization and World Politics.
New York: Harcourt Brace. 1-209, 301-320.
Case:
Can Kofi Annan bring the UN closer to the people?
Do:
Explain the UN’s current status and influence from the four major theoretical perspectives we
have discussed during the course.
Week 7 (10/16, 10/18): The United Nations II – Collective Security
Study:
Rational choice. Game theory. Prisoners’ Dilemma. Security dilemma. Problems of cooperation.
NATO. Regional conflicts (e.g. Congo, Northern Ireland)
Read:
Pease 99-122.
Kratochwil and Mansfield 234-282 (Haas, Coate and Puchala, Puchala).
Read (recommended):
Ziring, Riggs and Plano, 210-300.
Orme, John. 1997/98. “The Utility of Force in a World of Scarcity,” International Security, vol.22,
no.3, Winter. 138-67.
Schelling, Thomas C. [1960] 1994. The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge MA: Harvard University.
Rieff, David. 1994. “The Illusions of Peacekeeping,” in World Policy Journal, vol.XI, no.3. 1-18.
Case:
US secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld: Missile Shield or ABM Treaty?
Do:
Select an issue of international security and analyze it, using theories of international security
(game theory, strategy, security dilemma).
Week 8 (10/23, 10/25): Regional Organizations I – Overview
Study:
APEC, ASEAN, Ecowas, EU, Mercosur, Nafta, OAU.
Read:
Pease 123-139.
Kratochwil and Mansfield 283-300 (Nye).
Case:
From OAU to African Union: can the AU strengthen democracy in Africa?
Week 9 (10/30, 11/1): Regional Organizations II – EU History and Institutions
Study:
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International Organization, Fall 2000
Historical underpinnings of the EU. Institutional structure and political processes of the EU.
Theories: supranationalism; intergovernmentalism; regulatory state.
Read:
Nugent 1-234, 269-338, 411-427.
Kratochwil and Mansfield 301-324 (Brewin, Sbragia).
Zweifel ch. 1-3.
Read (recommended):
Grieco, Joseph M. 1988. “The Renaissance of the European Community and the Crisis of Realist
International Theory,” 1992. Paper presented at the International Political Economy
workshop, October.
Mitrany, David. 1943. A Working Peace System. London: National Peace Council.
Case:
Is the EU democratic – does it represent the interests of the EU citizenry?
Do:
How is the EU different from other international organizations we have studied?
Week 10 (11/6, 11/8): Regional Organizations III – EU Issues
Study:
EU trade policy. Common Agricultural Policy and the budget. Political union.
Read:
Nugent 339-405, 429-443.
Zweifel ch. 4-7.
Case:
Is the European Central Bank (ECB) accountable?
Do:
Select one issue area in the EU and explain it from each of the theoretical perspectives discussed
last week.
Week 11 (11/13, 11/15): Functional Organizations I -- Goods, Services, Money
Study:
The Bretton Woods System. IMF, IBRD, GATT/WTO. Other functional organizations.
Read:
Pease 141-157.
Read (recommended):
Ziring, Riggs and Plano, 384-420.
Hirschman, Albert O. 1945. National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade, exp.ed. Berkeley:
University of California Press.
Martin, Lisa. 1992. Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Rosecrance, Richard. 1986. The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the
Modern World. New York: Basic Books.
Case:
Are the rule-making and arbitration of the WTO, IMF, World Bank accountable?
Do:
Analyze an international trade or monetary issue, using rival perspectives of political economy.
Week 12 (11/20, 11/27): Functional Organizations II – People, Firms
Study:
Human rights. The International Criminal Court. Transnational corporations.
Read:
Pease 205-225, 33-34.
Kratochwil and Mansfield 202-233 (Donnelly, Cowhey).
www.iccnow.org, www.un.org/law/icc, www.un.org/icty, www.igc.org/icc/rome/html/ratify
Read (recommended):
Ziring, Riggs and Plano, 321-383.
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International Organization, Fall 2000
Donnelly, Jack. 1986. “International human rights: a regime analysis,” International Organization
40:3, Summer. 599-642.
Nowell, Gregory P. 1994. Mercantile States and the World Oil Cartel, 1900-1939. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press.
Case:
Yahoo v. France: who wins – the Internet or the State?
Do:
Do independent research on the proposed International Criminal Court. Understand key issues
facing the proposed Court and explain these issues, using competing theoretical approaches.
How would the proposed Court change the paradigm in which the UN and international
organization operates?
Week 13 (11/29, 12/4): Functional Organizations III – Environment, Development
Study:
Rich and poor. Dependency theory. Dependent development. Sustainable development.
Read:
Pease 158-204.
Kratochwil and Mansfield 109-127 (Young).
Read (recommended):
Ziring, Riggs and Plano, 421-470.
Cardoso, Fernando H. 1973. “Associated Dependent Development,” in Alfred Stepan, ed.,
Authoritarian Brazil. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Klare, Michael T. “East-West versus North-South: Dominant and Subordinate Themes in U.S.
Military Strategy Since 1945,” in Gillis, John, ed. 1989. The Militarization of the Western
World. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.
Lumsdaine, David H. 1993. Moral Vision in International Politics: The Foreign Aid Regime, 19491989. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Case:
The United States and the Kyoto Protocol: sign or not sign?
Do:
Look at the issue of rich and poor from the perspectives we have discussed in the course. Which
perspective, in your view, explains the issue best? What, if anything, does each perspective
predict for the 21st century?
Week 14 (12/6, 12/11): Prognoses and New Directions
Study:
New theories and directions. Competing prognoses. Is the nation-state obsolete?
Read:
Pease 226-240.
Kratochwil and Mansfield 325-384 (Dessler, Cox, Haas).
Axelrod, Robert M. 1997. The Complexity of Cooperation: Agent-Based Models of Competition
and Collaboration. Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Introduction)
Masters, Roger D. 1990. “Evolutionary Biology and Political Theory,” American Political Science
Review 84:1, March, 195-210.
Read (recommended):
Ziring, Riggs and Plano, 471-484.
Mearsheimer, John J. 1990. “Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War,” The Atlantic, vol.266, no.2,
August.
Case:
The Beijing Women Summit (1995): a precursor to global citizenship?
Do:
Come up with your own predictions for international organization in 2075. Which theoretical
perspective do you favor over others, and why?
Week 15 (12/18): Final Exam
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International Organization, Fall 2000
Appendix: Template for Weekly Case Presentations
Teams of two or three students will present a case study each week for approximately 30
minutes. This entails
 doing independent research on an assigned case,
 explaining the case by critically using the theories in the readings for that week and (if
appropriate) from the readings for any week,
 leading a discussion of the case and theories that encourages all students to participate.
Here are some tips for how to produce an effective presentation:
 Go directly to the heart of the case and come up with an explanatory “puzzle” that is
genuinely interesting to you in the context of the course – international organization and
accountability/democracy/power. Be crystal clear on your research question.
Case/Puzzle
E.g.: Are the WTO, IMF,
and World Bank
controlled by powerful
states or multinational
corporations?







Dependent (Outcome) Variable
E.g.: The IMF offers a bailout
package to Argentina subject to
austerity and anti-inflation
policies.
Independent (Input) Variables
E.g.: Who dictated the terms?
The United States? MNCs
looking to invest in a lowstandard country? Neither?
Both?
Do research by using a search machine (e.g. www.google.com or ABI/Inform on the 6th
Floor of Bobst Library).
Come up with a hypothesis (e.g. “The IMF is controlled by the United States”) and
argument to verify or falsify your hypothesis. Back your argument with theories from the
readings. Determine the dependent and independent variables each author presents in
their arguments.
Begin your presentation by introducing the topic, and why the topic is important.
Use handouts and/or transparencies to highlight main points and focus attention on areas
for discussion. Keep your visuals simple: as a rule, less is more. For example, use the
above template for one visual.
Remember that it is okay to find that your hypothesis is wrong. The task is not to be right,
but to use theories and get a finding. It is perfectly legitimate to find that “Our hypothesis
is wrong.”
Close your presentation with a set of discussion questions aimed at provoking a good
discussion. A visual might help here too. E.g. Is the IMF good or bad for Argentina? What
evidence do proponents and opponents of the IMF bring to bear to make their case?
Have fun with this – don’t make it too hard.
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International Organization, Fall 2000
Date, Topic
9/11
9/18
9/25
10/2
10/9
10/16
10/23
10/30
11/6
11/13
11/20
11/27
12/4
Case
Kyoto Treaty, HR Commission, UN back dues,
ABM Treaty, International Criminal Court: a new
United States isolationism?
Who is in charge: great powers? International
organizations? Multinationals?
The International Criminal Court (ICC): how
does US domestic politics influence its foreign
policy stance?
Are the WTO, IMF, World Bank controlled by
multinationals?
Can Kofi Annan bring the UN closer to the
people?
Team
US secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld:
Missile Shield or ABM Treaty?
From OAU to African Union: can the AU
strengthen democracy in Africa?
Is the EU democratic – does it represent the
interests of the EU citizenry?
Is the European Central Bank (ECB)
accountable?
Are the rule-making and arbitration of the WTO,
IMF, World Bank accountable?
Yahoo v. France: who wins – the Internet or the
State?
The United States and the Kyoto Protocol: sign
or not sign?
The Beijing Women Summit (1995): a precursor
to global citizenship?
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International Organization, Fall 2000