47.03.13
(1930w)
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN MONSIEUR
GEORGES BIDAULT AND GENERAL MARSHALL1
March 13, 1947
[Moscow, USSR]
Secret
GENERAL MARSHALL:
“I would have liked to return your
visit earlier, but you must understand that being a
newcomer to the Council of Foreign Ministers, I am finding
some difficulty in adapting myself to it. Up to the present
time, I was occupied with conducting war; that is a
relatively simple profession, because one understands
clearly the objectives to be attained. To make peace seems
to me to be a more complicated matter. It is my experience
that I form certain opinions when, suddenly, a new element
is introduced which is misleading. It is difficult for me
to decide on the best methods to adopt. “
MONSIEUR BIDAULT:
“Yesterday’s session, in fact, was
an example of the difficulties of the methods to which you
refer. “2
GENERAL MARSHALL:
“I admired the manner in which you
yourself presented the problem of demilitarization in such
a manner as to avoid giving a too provocative aspect to
your proposals. “
MONSIEUR BIDAULT:
“I must say that I was a bit
disappointed by the reception given to these proposals and
I did not understand very well the attitude of Mr. Bevin in
this matter. We will have to talk about many complex
problems: economic unity, coal, level of industry, war
potential, reparations, all questions which are extremely
involved with each other. Whereas it was possible to
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isolate, as I indicated, the question of demilitarization:
I regret that it was not done and that the consequence may
be general confusion on all the problems which are before
us. “
GENERAL MARSHALL:
“Please note that it is Mr. Molotov
himself who proposed that the question of demilitarization
alone not be referred to the Deputies in order to examine
the other items on the agenda. “3
MONSIEUR BIDAULT:
“Yes, but what was involved there
was only an alternative proposal and which, in any case,
did not satisfy the interests of the French Government. “
GENERAL MARSHALL:
“It must be admitted that the
problem is a very complex one.
I speak to you now as someone who has fought and who
knows the Germans. We do not fear so much seeing Germany
rising again if a genuine agreement of the Four Powers is
established. What we are worried about is a Germany which
will ally herself with one or the other of these Four
associated powers. On two occasions, at least, in history,
she has succeeded in evading obligations which were imposed
on her by treaties. The German people are indomitable. If
we are not careful, they will start all over again. And we
should recall that her motto is: ‘Divide in order to
rule.’”
MONSIEUR BIDAULT:
“That is the very reason for our
vigilance and our concern. “
GENERAL MARSHALL:
“Believe me that the United States
is thinking also about the future. In my opinion, the best
guarantee for peace is the conclusion of an agreement
between the Four Powers, on a sound basis.4
While I was Chief of Staff of the American Army, I
thought often that the last war could have been avoided on
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two conditions: on the one hand, if the United States had
made a commitment; on the other hand if American military
preparation had been more advanced. “
MONSIEUR BIDAULT:
“Mr. Byrnes, while he proposed a
pact for the Four Powers, seemed a bit surprised and
disappointed with our lack of enthusiasm. I must tell you
here, in the most clear manner, how I declared on the first
day that the French Government attached the greatest
importance to the presence of the United States in Europe
and, obviously, above all in Germany. We consider that
there lies the fundamental element of world peace. But what
we fear is that the Four Power Treaty may be considered as
a sort of ‘substitute’ for other guarantees which we
believe necessary. Perhaps we have exaggerated our fears.
But we firmly believe that a whole series of measures are
indispensable to guarantee peace: demilitarization,
control, Four Power Pact and alliances, occupation. Each
one of them, taken by itself, would not be sufficient to
permit us to achieve our objectives.
I hope therefore no one will accuse us of indifference
with regard to Mr. Byrnes’ proposal, but rather they should
remember that the real solutions must be global.
France has various reasons for adopting this attitude.
She remembers the Treaty of 1919. In a troubled world where
the United States and the Soviet Union can affront each
other, it seems necessary to us to superimpose on the
Treaties material guarantees of a territorial and
industrial character.
The Four Power Treaty constitutes a peaceful gesture,
generous, courageous on the part of the United States.
However, other guarantees seem to us also indispensable. “
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GENERAL MARSHALL:
“I return to your idea of global
solution. All that the United States can do to increase the
prestige of UN will be done but UN is a very young child,
without tradition, without experience, and which has not
yet been tested. We must therefore in the immediate future
take intermediary measures. The Four Power treaty is, it
seems to me, in this respect, essential. “
MONSIEUR BIDAULT:
“I wish to remind you that it was I
myself who at San Francisco took the responsibility of
insisting that there be inserted in the Charter measures
permitting the negotiation of pacts against the Axis
Powers. “
GENERAL MARSHALL:
“The Four Power Treaty is a basic
element. On the one hand, it will have in its favor, making
known to all countries, and notably France, that the United
States agrees to take responsibility in Europe; on the
other hand it will serve to make the American people
conscious of this responsibility. The necessary measures
will be taken therefore by us in order to develop our
industry in accordance with commitments made. The President
of the United States would not have to spend a lot of time,
as President Roosevelt was obliged to do, in order to lead
the American people during the war. Many things would,
therefore, be simplified in this manner and a greater
confidence would exist in international relations.
“Beside the Four Power Accord, I can see the utility
of the bilateral treaty, such as that which exists between
France and Great Britain. At all times these treaties, in
my opinion, have less prime importance than the Four Power
Pact. Finally, in the immediate future, we would also have
to take measures such as those we are discussing now with
regard to demobilization and the level of industry of
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Germany, but these measures are not the decisive factors. A
determined Germany can always evade them if the pact
between the Four Powers does not exist.
“I wish to add that this pact seems to me equally
fundamental for the solution of the problems in the Far
East.
“That is why Mr. Byrnes may have seemed a bit
disappointed in stating that this ‘revolutionary’ change of
attitude on the part of the United States had not been
fully understood, particularly on the part of France which
is one of the principal beneficiaries.
“All the measures which you imagine for the
establishment of the future regulation of Germany--except
those which concern, for the immediate future, the
rebuilding of your economy--seem to me ‘superficial,’ if I
compare them with the necessity for the Four Power Pact. “
MONSIEUR BIDAULT:
“With that exception, in the
meantime, it is important in the immediate period as in the
future that the French economy not be destroyed by the
German economy. We are going to raise these economic
questions in the Council. Do you not believe that it may be
necessary that our experts have a preliminary exchange of
views on this subject? “
GENERAL MARSHALL:
“I agree. I think that we must talk
first of all about coal. General Robertson has arrived.5 We
can decide to submit this question to study by French,
British and American experts. “
MONSIEUR BIDAULT:
“I agree. I am going to return once
more to the reaction of Mr. Byrnes. I understand his
feelings, but I wish to remind you that he for the first
time made his proposal at a moment when he discarded
simultaneously the suggestions by the French Delegation
5
made with regard to the future of Germany. I myself was a
bit surprised then by his attitude and that explains
perhaps the sentiment of Mr. Byrnes. “
GENERAL MARSHALL:
“I knew these problems after the
last war. I have personally heard Foch and Weygand talk
about them.6 They were discussing at that time, as now, the
Ruhr. The solution of Foch was simple, it was a solution of
force. Do you not think that there may be an element of
force in the Four Power Treaty? An element of continuity
also? What preoccupies me is not what is going to happen in
four or five years in Germany, it is the situation in which
we will find ourselves within 10 years.
“It is necessary that our public opinion be informed
continuously in order that we may counteract propaganda by
constantly keeping our peoples informed; it is a
consideration which our Department of State will not lose
sight of. “
___________________
It was decided that Mr. Matthews and M. Alphand will
take the necessary steps towards arranging an early meeting
of American, British and French experts on the question of
coal.
NA/RG 59 (Central Decimal File, 740.00119 Council/3–1047)
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1. H. Freeman Matthews (director of the State
Department’s Office of European Affairs) and Hervé Alphand
(director general for political affairs in the French
Foreign Ministry) were present at the meeting and
presumably prepared the French text from which this version
was translated.
2. Bidault was chairman at the March 12 meeting, which
began with British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin reading a
lengthy statement regarding Germany’s demilitarization and
economy in response to charges the previous day by Soviet
Minister of Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav Molotov. Secretary
Marshall’s report on the discussion ( “most of which
appeared to be propaganda for home consumption “) is in
Foreign Relations, 1947, 2: 244–45. (These meeting reports
are cited herein as Marshall’s, because they were signed by
him, but they were normally written by his aide, Marshall
S. Carter.)
3. The deputies for Germany and for Austria of the
Council of Foreign Ministers had met in London between
January 14 and February 25, 1947. See ibid., pp. 1–138.
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4. In mid-February 1946, Secretary of State Byrnes had
submitted a draft treaty on the disarmament and
demilitarization of Germany that would be carried out by a
four-power treaty lasting twenty-five years. He submitted a
slightly revised version to the second session of the
Council of Foreign Ministers in Paris on April 29, 1946,
and requested that discussions take place on the draft.
(The draft treaty is in U.S. Department of State, Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1946, 11 vols. [Washington:
GPO, 1969-72], 2: 190-93.) The other three powers voiced a
number of reservations about the proposal, so nothing had
happened prior to the Moscow conference.
5. Lieutenant General Sir Brian H. Robertson was
deputy commander in chief of British Forces of Occupation
in Germany and the deputy British military governor for
Germany.
6. General (later Marshal of France) Ferdinand Foch
had served as Allied Supreme Commander beginning in March
1918. He played an important advisory role at the Paris
Peace Conference. Major General Maxime Weygand was a member
of Foch’s staff and served as France’s representative on
the Supreme War Council; after the war he served on the
armistice negotiations.
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