PARTICIPATORY RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN
WEST BENGAL: AN ALTERNATIVE TO
SOCIAL CAPITAL APPROACH
MANIK BHATTACHARYA
DOCTORAL STUDENT
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICS
VISVA-BHARATI
SANTINIKETAN – 731 235
ABSTRACT
Based on primary field survey this study seeks to analyze the interrelation between
the village level class structure in a differentiated economy in West Bengal and the
participation of different classes into the political and administrative process of
decision-making. We refute the populist and neo-liberal ideas of a homogenous peasantry and
their mutual reciprocity (‘Social Capital’) in a depoliticized environment with inactive state
as a source of decentralized rural transformation. The West Bengal experience of
participatory development is an alternative to neo-liberal orthodoxy of anti statism and
NGOnization. It is agriculture-based development led by the direct class action and the
interventionist state. The participatory development process in West Bengal though has been
successful in breaking the ‘agrarian impsse’ (Boyce 1987) and stopped the extra-economic
coercion and the nationwide process of immiserization of the rural poor; it has failed to
initiate the second phase of institutional reform on the basis of some unfinished agenda like
health care, education, gender justice and co-operative movement. The participation of rural
poor at the grass root level administrative decision-making in Gram Sansad meeting is not
much higher, though they participate in majority in political movement. The participation of
rural female population at the same decision making process is also very small.
1
1. INTRODUCTION
Based on primary field survey, this study analyses the village level class
structure, the extent of class differentiation and the pattern of the mobilisation of the
rural poor in the participatory democracy. Like any market economic regime, West
Bengal's agrarian economy also experienced a rapid class differentiation with the advent of
advanced technology. This does mean a greater concentration of ownership in the structure of
land and non-land asset in the hands of a few belonging to higher economic classes. The
lower economic classes that are large in number, under unrestricted operation of the market,
are increasingly losing control over the means of production and pushed back into the ranks
of proletariat. However, West Bengal is a unique case of class differentiation under a propoor state intervention. The limited agrarian reform in West Bengal, by moderating the
effects of the market, had a positive impact on the economic condition of the poorer classes.
Such a pro-poor intervention helped to stabilise the petty peasant production1. It has helped to
stop the market-led process of immiserisation2 and has made differentiation itself more broad
based - giving an upward impetus to people3. But these positive changes are not sufficiently
strong to stop the process of differentiation altogether or to alter the concentration of means
of production in the hands of a few. Therefore we can expect a consistent pattern of the
distribution of land and non-land assets are likely to be biased towards higher economic
classes. That does not necessarily mean that the rural poor lost the battle and have no political
hegemony at all. On the contrary it is our strong presumption that they maintains a
domination in the participatory democracy in West Bengal, particularly in the Gram Sabha
and Gram Sansad meeting introduced in West Bengal through 73rd constitutional
amendments.
2
In this paper we have used an alternative methods of classification of the peasantry
side by side the standard acreage criterion. In West Bengal since there was a thorough
fragmentation of land due to the land reform, we expect that the farm-size wise categorisation
of households does reflect their true economic strength. As a result the acreage grouping
criterion may confuse us about true picture of the differentiation of the peasantry. This is why
we have also used Patnaik’s labour exploitation (E-) criterion, which would help us to
understand the dynamic process of agrarian capitalism in a small farm economy like West
Bengal. Our strong anticipation is that the agrarian economy of West Bengal is highly classdifferentiated. We have looked into markets of land and non-land assets side by side the
labour market. We expect that there is a strong concentration of means of production among
higher classes of peasantry. The participation rate of extent of hiring in and hiring out of the
labour power also reveals consistent tendency in this regard. However, unlike other Indian
states, the lower classes in rural West Bengal are highly mobilised which was a result of a
prolonged political struggle in the past. Therefore we expect a clear domination of the lower
classes in the Gram Sansad and Gram Sabha meeting. The participatory democracy is the
most fertile ground for enhancing the class struggle with no bloodshed. This is because in a
participatory democracy the prioritisation of the scheme and annual plan of the village are
finalized where the lower classes can put forward their agenda successfully since they are the
big majority among the total households in a village.
In this paper, we put forward three hypotheses to test. First, the ‘peasant
economy’ of West Bengal is a highly (class) differentiated, and far from the idea of a
monolithic homogenous community, advocated by the populist writers. Secondly, the
usual acreage grouping fails to reveal the dynamic aspects of this differentiation. For
this purpose, the Marxian concept of economic class is a far superior criterion to
3
classify the rural households. Thirdly, for the viable social transformation the
development process has to be participatory. This participation must be based on
conscious and organised class action instead of de-politcized network norms
advocated by the Social Capital theorists. The limits to such transformation may be
reached if some attempts are made to form a politically 'stable' rural society with an
assured electoral mandate undermining the class struggle.
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Lenin (1977) in his historic contribution ‘Development of Capitalism in Russia’ first
published in 1899 developed his thesis of differentiation of the peasantry. Lenin refuted the
contemporary populist Narodnik view that the peasantry was a homogeneous entity and any
kind of impoverishment of the peasantry would lead to a collapse of the home market. Lenin
showed that capitalism was already the dominant tendency in the Russian countryside where
the process of differentiation transformed the bulk of the old peasantry into two distinct
classes - rural bourgeoisie and rural proletariat. In Lenin's scheme, the differentiation of the
peasantry comprised a process that created a home market for capitalism where a large
proportions of peasants were alienated from all means of production including land. The
Narodnik’s opinion was that since the process of emerging capitalism was accompanied a
process of impoverishment therefore it may lead into a collapse of the home market by
restraining the purchasing capacity of the large mass of the peasantry. Lenin laid bare the
fallacy of the argument by showing that though with the emergence of the capitalist relation
people were consuming less but they were forced to buy more owing to the dominance of the
money, market and exchange relation.
4
The ideas of Narodnik in Russia gained a resurrection all over the globe primarily in
the hands of A. V. Chayanov. He reinstated the concept of homogenous peasantry by
assuming the latter as a different mode of production where instead of economic
differentiation a distinct process of cyclically operated biological differentiation was
applicable (Chayanov, 1966). N. Georgescu-Roegen (1960) and A. K. Sen (1966) extended
the notion of the homogenous peasantry. The latter advocated that the family labour farms (a
homogenous set of petty producers) were more ‘efficient’ than the capitalist farms, who hire
the labour service at the existing wage rate. However, Bhaduri (1993) in his analysis (that
appeared to be a Marxist analysis) developed a theoretical framework of an agrarian
economy, where differentiation was shown to arise from indebtedness, with some households
escaping debt via increased thrift and other falling more deeply into debt and becoming poor.
This theory of differentiation does not have any relation to the development of capitalism in
agriculture. Rather it explores a process of differentiation from within an assumedly
homogenous set of peasants, in an environment of pre-capitalist relations. In a previous work
Bhaduri (1973) showed a conflict between a typical landlord and a typical peasant within a
backward semi-feudal relation. Easwaran and Kotwal (1989) started with postulating
classes defined by unequal access to credit by peasant households, similarly, without
specifying the basis for inequality of access. Such a model is not very far from a typical
neo-classical model based on utility maximisation behaviour of the principal and the agent
(Stiglitz 1987) or the idea of a homogenous peasantry in ‘traditional’ versus the ‘modern’
economy. Similarly, Ranajit Guha (1988) bifurcated the entire population into two
communities - elite and subaltern. A notion of ‘community’ is projected instead of ‘class’ and
in this way the differentiation of the peasantry arising from unequal possession of assets is
intentionally overlooked. The common thread of all the above work is that they have
5
neglected the role of ownership of the means of production as the basis on which the class
differentiation in the rural economy takes place. In our opinion the classical Marxist analysis
is much more complex and nuance than these simplistic positions. It recognises that there is a
complex interpretation of different modes of production in any given transitional social
formation.
The World Bank as well as neo-liberal writer on social capital extended the
idea of the community and the homogenous group of people in the sphere of
participatory democracy. The idea that the participation of a depoliticised and
homogenous group of 'people' in an atmosphere of inactive / apathetic state is not
very far from the above ideas in favour of a monolithic rural society 1. (World Bank
2001, www.worldbank.org/poverty/scapital). World Bank proposed three concepts of
social capital, viz, bonding (ties between same or similar demographic groups),
bridging (ties between different demographic character but within same economic
status) and linking (co-operation between poor people in formal organisation) social
capital. The first two concepts highlighted the idea of demographically and
economically homogenous community. According to the World Bank if poor people
‘voluntarily’ helps each other in a market oriented ambience of the civil society,
mediated by NGOs and depoliticised local bodies (which for some unknown reasons
can give good governance according to the World Bank), poverty will ultimately be
eradicated. There is no mention of the political parties (not to speak about class) in
World Bank ideas. According to Harriss (2002) the World Bank idea of
‘decentralization’ is nothing but an extension to the old ‘Washington consensus’. It is
well evident that in many parts of the third world rural areas where peasant
movement and/or state intervention is weak, instead of ‘linking social capital’ some
6
exploitative system like ‘market interlinkage’ prevails (Bhaduri 1973, Bharadwaj
1974, Rudra and Bardhan 1978, Basu 1998) that resists the indegenous
development of capitalism and therefore the market mechanism in agriculture
(Bhaduri 1973, 1984). We also observe that such an exploitative system has been
dissolved in West Bengal with the rise in class based political struggle
(Bhattacharyya 2005).
Long before the World Bank launched their idea about participatory democracy, West
Bengal successfully practised it since 1978, from that time regular three tier elections at five
years interval took place. Since the introduction of the Panchayat Raj Institution (PRI)
the bureaucratic Block Level Administration was subordinated to the elected
Panchayat. The 73rd amendment of the constitution empowered the Scheduled
Castes (SC) and Scheduled Tribes (ST) categories to represent in Panchayat
according to their respective shares in the population. Also the same constitutional
amendment made provision of reservation of 30 per cent of the total Panchayat
seats for female candidates. About half of the rural development budget and the
amount allocated to various poverty alleviation schemes of the state are spent
through the Panchayats at various levels. In 1994 two additional tiers had been
introduced namely Gram Sabha and Gram Sansad respectively. All the electors of a
Gram Panchayat and Panchayat Samity are members of the Gram Sansad and
Gram Sabha respectively. It is mandatory that one tenth members should present
the meeting as quorum. It is also mandatory that at least two meetings of these two
bodies must be held in a year. The village level plan that includes prioritisation of
schemes and the identification of beneficiaries are to be initiated at the level of the
7
Gram Sansad. The gram sabha accommodates all plan proposed by all gram
sansad and prepares a block level annual plan.
The Panchayat Raj was the key factor in breaking the 'agrarian impasse' in West
Bengal and as a result rural poverty declined significantly (Sen & Sengupta, 1995, Mukherjee
& Mukhopadhyay 1995, Sen 1996, Sengupta and Gazdar 1998, Swaminathan and
Ramchandran 1999). In view of the above facts the West Bengal experience can be named as
Panchayat-led development or agriculture-led development following the idea of Kalecki
(1970). This is an alternative model of participatory development in contrary to the
neo-liberal orthodoxy of withdrawal of the state in a depoliticised environment. One must be
enough clear with the fact that the national trend of peasant class differentiation cannot be
halted in West Bengal so long as this state continued to be operated under same national
market economy and the same constitution (Bhattacharyya 2001). West Bengal experience
shows a substantial achievement towards democratization within the existing overall
constraints. As we have mentioned earlier the Panchayat Raj reforms in West Bengal has
made differentiation more broad based and has helped to prevent the immiserization of the
labourers and poor seen in most other parts of India.
3. MEHTODOLOGICAL ISSUES: ECONOMIC CLASS AND FARM SIZE
This analysis is based on a field survey conducted in the year 2004-05 in
two parts of Bankura district among 200 sample households. Of which 100
households belong to the advanced and remaining 100 households to the
backward block4. The straightforward generalization of acreage grouping as the proxy for
economic status within the peasantry is to some extent confusing. Such a simplistic
generalization is propagated in the methodology adopted by the organizations of the
8
Government of India like Agricultural Census of India and National Sample Survey
Organization (NSSO)5. Such a proxy would be a miserable failure in an economy like West
Bengal where due to a limited land reform people are not allowed to hold land in excess of
the ceiling limit. Particularly NSSO 48th round data revealed a liquidation of the size group
10 hectares and above in the year 1991. The acreage group criterion obscures the simple fact
that the West Bengal rural economy has diversified a lot during the recent period and class
differentiation is still going on based on tiny land but increasing command in the hands of
higher classes over asset, irrigation, input, output and product marketed.
We are, therefore, in need for a second criterion that will reflect the economic strength
of the household and indicate economic classes of the households in proper. We classify our
total sample households on the basis of Patnaik's (1987) labour-exploitation criterion
(E-criterion) side by side with the usual acreage criterion. The labour-exploitation index of
Patnaik (1987) attempts to give an empirical approximation to the analytical concept of the
class status of the household. The class-status of a household is determined by the fact that
whether the household employs wage labour from outside or whether the household sells its
labour power to others or whether the household is a self-employed one i.e. neither employs
nor sells the labour power. In our study we use the following form of Patnaik's E-criterion in
order to classify the households.
E = X/Y = {(Hi-Ho) + (Lo-Li)}/F
where Hi = Labour-days hired on the operational holding of the household
Ho = Family labour days hired out to others
Li = Labour days worked on leased in land (whether by family or hired labour)
Lo = Labour days similarly worked on land leased out by the household
F = Labour days worked by household workers on the operational holding.
9
Classes within the cultivating peasantry are identified by looking at the degree of working for
others or of employing others' labour, relative to self-employment. For this purpose certain
limits are set upon the values of the E-ratio, which are given in the Appendix.
We have classified the households by two different criteria - farm size and labour use.
The distribution of sample households according to the two criteria for the advanced and the
backward regions as well as for both regions combined is presented in the Table-1. This table
shows the number of the households according to cross-classification using the two criteria
namely, economic class and operated land size. Some general observations follow. First,
while the two criteria are associated, as we would expect, they are not identical since we get
positive non-diagonal elements (especially above the diagonal, not so much below). The
number of landless households is relatively small (This category is identical in both the
classifications). Only 6 households or 3 per cent of the sample was found to be landless in
the proper sense of the term, neither owning any land, nor operating any land. This in itself
seems to reflect the small incidence of immiserisation and landlessness in the sample villages.
Secondly, the modal farm size is below 2.5 acres, with 153 out of 200 households, or 76.5 per
cent of the sample falling in this group. This high concentration of farms in the smallest farm
size group, reflects the fact that a large number of landless households had moved up to the
0.01 to 2.5 acreage group by receiving the vested ceiling-surplus land during the Left Front
period after 1977. On the other hand the households belonging to the upper size groups lost
their land during the Left front regime, and came down to this size groups. At the same time,
the landed holding being subdivided over time following the inheritance rule. It is surprising
to notice that only 59 households out of 153 or 38.56% of the households in this acreage
group are poor peasants. According to a field level study conducted in 1993-94 based on
similar kind of classification witnessed about 51% of the households within this acreage
10
group were poor peasants (Bhattacharyya 2001). It seems that over time acreage grouping has
increasingly been non-representative of the economic strength of the peasant households.
However a sizeable minority, 48 households or nearly 31% are small or middle
peasants, who are mainly self-employed and do not need to sell their labour power to any
great extent to the wealthy households. In fact the middle peasants are by definition small net
employer of others. Interestingly we find as many as 46 households, or 30% of the total in
this size-group (0.01-2.5 acre), fall in the rich peasant and landlord category (mainly or
wholly using non-family labour) despite the relatively small size of their farms. They make
up nearly 68% of all rich peasants and landlords.
11
TABLE- 1
CROSS CLASSIFICATION OF THE NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS,
NET LABOUR DAYS HI/HO PER HOLDING AND TOTAL AREA
Landless
All
Region
Poor Peasant
Hh. Net lab
Avr.
Totl. Hh. Net lab
No Days
Area Area No Days
0
0.00
Avr.
Small Peasant
Totl.
Area Area
0.00
0.00
Hh. Net lab Avr.
No Days
0
0.00
Middle Peasant
Totl.
Area Area
No
Days
Totl.
Area Area
0.00
6
-132.50
0.00
0.00
0.00
0
0.00
0.00
0.01to 2.5
0
0.00
0.00
0.00 59 -153.03
0.76 44.83 39
-17.44
0.94 36.83
9
66.11
1.51 13.60
2.5 to 5
0
0.00
0.00
0.00
4
-96.00
2.71 10.85
8
-39.50
3.00 24.01
6
138.50
4.03 24.17
5 to 10
0
0.00
0.00
0.00
0
0.00
0.00
0.00
0
0.00
0.00
0.00
1
392.00
8.00
8.00
10 to 15
0
0.00
0.00
0.00
0
0.00
0.00
0.00
0
0.00
0.00
0.00
0
0.00
0.00
0.00
15 & abv
0
0.00
0.00
0.00
0
0.00
0.00
0.00
0
0.00
0.00
0.00
0
0.00
0.00
0.00
Total
6
-132.50
0.00
0.00 63 -149.41
0.88 55.68 47
1.29 60.84
16
113.63
0.00
5
-120.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.01to 2.5
0
0.00
0.00
0.00 23 -157.00
0.46 10.59 24
-11.96
0.60 14.32
6
78.83
1.49
8.93
2.5 to 5
0
0.00
0.00
0.00
0
0.00
0.00
0.00
1
126.00
3.67
3.67
2
164.50
3.34
6.67
5 to 10
0
0.00
0.00
0.00
0
0.00
0.00
0.00
0
0.00
0.00
0.00
1
392.00
8.00
8.00
10 to 15
0
0.00
0.00
0.00
0
0.00
0.00
0.00
0
0.00
0.00
0.00
0
0.00
0.00
0.00
15 & abv
0
0.00
0.00
0.00
0
0.00
0.00
0.00
0
0.00
0.00
0.00
0
0.00
0.00
0.00
Total
5
-120.00
0.00
0.00 23 -157.00
0.46 10.59 25
-6.44
0.72 17.99
9
132.67
0.00
1
-195.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.01to 2.5
0
0.00
0.00
0.00 36 -150.50
0.95 34.24 15
-26.20
1.50 22.51
3
40.67
1.56
4.67
2.5 to 5
0
0.00
0.00
0.00
4
-96.00
2.71 10.85
7
-63.14
2.91 20.34
4
125.50
4.38 17.50
-21.19
0.00
Hh. Net lab Avr.
0.00
2.86 45.77
Advanced
Region
0
0.00
0.00
0
0.00
2.62 23.60
Backward
Region
0
0.00
0.00
0
5 to 10
0
0.00
0.00
0.00
0
0.00
0.00
0.00
0
0.00
0.00
0.00
0
0.00
0.00
0.00
10 to 15
0
0.00
0.00
0.00
0
0.00
0.00
0.00
0
0.00
0.00
0.00
0
0.00
0.00
0.00
15 & abv
0
0.00
0.00
0.00
0
0.00
0.00
0.00
0
0.00
0.00
0.00
0
0.00
0.00
0.00
Total
1
-195.00
0.00
0.00 40 -145.05
1.95 42.85
7
89.14
3.17 22.17
1.13 45.09 22
12
-37.95
CONTD. TABLE-1
CROSS CLASSIFICATION OF THE NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS,
NET LABOUR DAYS HI/HO PER HOLDING AND TOTAL AREA
Rich Peasant
Landlord
Total
All Region Hh.
Net lab Avr. Totl. Hh.
Net lab Avr. Totl. Hh.
Net lab Avr.
No
Days
Area Area No
Days Area Area No
Days
Area
0.00
0
0.00 0.00 0.00
0
0.00 0.00 0.00
6
-132.50 0.00
0.01to 2.5
20
136.40 1.42 28.36 26
82.04 1.10 28.72 153
-27.80 1.00
2.5 to 5
9
320.56 3.57 32.16
4
440.75 3.83 15.33 31
154.16 3.44
5 to 10
5
409.80 7.37 36.83
3
521.33 7.33 22.00
9
445.00 7.43
10 to 15
0
0.00 0.00 0.00
1
700.00 15.00 15.00
1
700.00 15.00
15 & abv
0
0.00 0.00 0.00
0
0.00 0.00 0.00
0
0.00 0.00
Total
34
225.35 2.86 97.35 34 181.18 2.38 81.05 200
22.18 1.70
Totl.
Area
0.00
152.34
106.52
66.83
15.00
0.00
340.69
Advanced
Region
0.00
0.01to 2.5
2.5 to 5
5 to 10
10 to 15
15 & abv
Total
0
14
6
4
0
0
24
0.00
158.29
372.00
538.25
0.00
0.00
275.04
0.00
1.50
3.31
7.42
0.00
0.00
2.94
0.00
21.03
19.83
29.67
0.00
0.00
70.53
0
10
3
1
0
0
14
0.00
121.30
554.33
816.00
0.00
0.00
263.71
0.00
0.99
3.44
10.00
0.00
0.00
2.16
0.00
9.87
10.33
10.00
0.00
0.00
30.20
5
77
12
6
0
0
100
-120.00
0.05
362.50
560.17
0.00
0.00
71.15
0.00
0.84
3.38
7.95
0.00
0.00
1.53
0.00
64.74
40.50
47.67
0.00
0.00
152.91
Backward
Region
0.00
0.01to 2.5
2.5 to 5
5 to 10
10 to 15
15 & abv
Total
0
6
3
1
0
0
10
0.00
85.33
217.67
-104.00
0.00
0.00
106.10
0.00
1.22
4.11
7.16
0.00
0.00
2.68
0.00
7.33
12.33
7.16
0.00
0.00
26.82
0
16
1
2
1
0
20
0.00
57.50
100.00
374.00
700.00
0.00
123.40
0.00
1.18
5.00
6.00
15.00
0.00
2.54
0.00
18.85
5.00
12.00
15.00
0.00
50.85
1
76
19
3
1
0
100
-195.00
-56.01
22.58
214.67
700.00
0.00
-26.79
0.00
1.15
3.47
6.39
15.00
0.00
1.88
0.00
87.60
66.02
19.16
15.00
0.00
187.78
Looking at the size grouping, we find very few farms operating above 5 acres that
only 9 or 4.5% of the total number, though of course these farms control 19.62% of the total
area operated (Table 1). The successful acquisition of ceiling surplus land has led to the
reduction in the concentration of land in the hands of the erstwhile landlords in the higher
13
acreage groups. But at the same time implementation of the ceilings might have induced the
need for more intensive cultivation of their reduced areas of land on the part of many of these
erstwhile landlords, thus promoting a switch over from rent to capitalist cultivation, as a
result of which, their dependence on hired in labour has increased. By and large those who
do no manual work themselves - the landlord as defined here, the highest group - hail from
the class of erstwhile rentiers, though some are of rich peasant origin, who might have
improved their position. Operation Barga has also curbed the former power of the rentiers as
effectively as it has guaranteed occupation to the bargadars and reduced the area directly
operated by erstwhile landlords (jotedars).
The region wise classification of the data gives further insight. It is quite clear that the
structures discussed above are the outcome of structural differences between the advanced
region and the backward region. Thus 77% of farms are below 2.5 acres in the advanced
compared to 76 per cent in the backward region. As much as 28% of farmers are of landless
and poor peasant status in the advanced region compared to 41% in the backward region. The
corresponding shares in the total number holdings, of the better-off farmers, mainly or wholly
using outside labour (the rich peasants and the landlords) are 38% and 30% respectively.
Thus the small and middle peasants or mainly self-employed farmers constitutes 34% of all
farms in the advanced compared to 29% in the backward region.
The picture becomes clearer when the distribution of total area by economic class and
farm size is taken into account. Table-1 also presents the cross-classification of the farms
according to the two grouping criteria on the basis of which the following observations might
be made. First, there are only 10 farms operating above 5 acres or 5% of the total number, but
they account for 24% of the total area. In the advanced region there are no farms above 10
acres. In fact there is only one farm exists in the backward region with above 10 acres having
14
15 acres of land. According to the NSSO categorisation the farms below 2.5 acres are the
marginal peasants, 5 to 10 acres are the semi-medium, and 10 to 25 acres are classified as
medium holding. In this regard about 77% of households with 77% of total land area belongs
to the ‘marginal peasant’ according to the NSSO. This partly supports the hypothesis that the
concentration of land has declined owing to the successful implementation of the land reform
measures. But this is true more of the advanced region, assuming those earlier farms above
10 acres existed here. Secondly looking into the distribution of the average area, according to
farm size it is observed as expected, the average farm size increase steadily with rising size
groups up to the fifth group. In the combined region the average farm size rises from the poor
peasant to the middle peasant and then stagnated for rich peasant and then it drops for the
landlords. Thus the poor peasants operate less than 1 acre on an average - the small peasants
1.29 acres, the middle and rich peasants have 2.86 acres each, and the landlords 2.38 acres.
It has been mentioned above that a particular acreage-group is likely to have holdings
ranging from poor peasant to rich peasant status. However as we would expect, the
proportion of labour-hiring holdings (middle peasants, rich peasants and landlords) in the
total holdings by acreage group is found to predominate in the farms above 2.5 acres.
However, the converse holds good for the poor and small peasants whose share is higher on
smaller farms below 2.5 acres. But, out of the total number of households under each
economic class, the farms below 2.5 acres are the big majority. Thus 93.65% of poor
peasants, 82.98% of small peasants, 56.25% of middle peasant, 58.82% of rich peasant and
76.47% of landlords are on farms below 2.5 acres.
Table 1 on the net labour days hired in or out per holding, reveals the variation in the
economic status of households within each acreage group. It is quite clear from the table that
the class categories isolate successfully holdings of different types with respect to the
15
variables of labour hiring, and therefore show consistently and significantly different mean
values for holdings in the different economic classes, regardless of the acreage group they fall
into. For example, in the rich peasant class (taking combined region) labour hiring ranges
from 136.40 to 409.80 days per annum per holding over the acreage groups, while for the
middle peasant class it ranges from 66.11 to 392 days over the acreage groups. For the smallpeasants labour hiring ranges from -17.44 to –39.5 and for poor peasants it ranges from –
153.03 to -96.
On the other hand, within a given acreage group, such as 0.01-2.5 acres, the labour
hiring ranges from –153.03 (hiring out) to 82.04 (hiring in). It is clear enough that
diametrically opposite types of holdings in terms of labour process get included in every
acreage group - both the households which are themselves exploiters of others' labour as well
as the households which are themselves exploited. In other words, acreage as an index fails to
discriminate between different types of holdings that differs in the crucial respect of labour
use and hence the extent to which they remain `peasant' households.
4. TESTING FOR THE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN THE TWO CRITERIA:
We would expect the two methods of grouping to be associated but not identical. First
we test for the null hypothesis that there is no association, treating only the crossclassification of the number of the households for the combined region in Table 2 as a
contingency table. The chi-square test is not applicable if the expected frequencies in the cells
are less than 5. We pool some of the cultivating groups in Table 2 together so that this
condition is satisfied. We obtain a 3 x 3 table with 4 degrees of freedom. The observed chisquare value of 24.84 is above the critical value of 9.49 and 13.28 for which the null
hypothesis is accepted at the 5% and 1% level. So the null hypothesis is rejected. We have
16
reduced the contingency table to a 2 x 2 table with 1 degree of freedom. The observed chisquare value 14.54 is still above the critical value 3.84 and 6.64 at the 5% and 1% level and
the null hypothesis is rejected. After applying Yates' correction, the observed value of chisquare comes down to 14.46 and it was found that the null hypothesis continues to be rejected
at the 1% and the 5% level. The contingency table is further modified by excluding the
landless class. The observed chi square value is found to have dropped to 13.81. The same
value with Yates' correction is observed as 13.76. In both the cases the null hypothesis is
rejected. The coefficient of contingency (proposed by Karl Pearson) works out to be C =
0.33 with the 4 d.f. and reduces considerably to C = 0.26 and 0.25 with the 1 d.f after Yates
correction (Table 2). Thus the association between the two methods of grouping can be said
to be moderate, since the maximum value the coefficient can assume is 0.8.
D.F.
4
1
1
TABLE – 2
RESULTS OF CHI-SQUARE TEST OF ASSOCIATION AND
COEFFICIENT OF CONTINGENCY OF TABLES
Observed
Yates'
Critical
Critical
Co-eff.
Chi-sqr.
Corrc. Value at 5% level Value at 1% level Of
Cont.(C)
24.84
------9.49
13.28
0.33
14.54
14.46
3.84
6.64
0.26
13.81
13.76
3.84
6.64
0.25
It is observed that that, first of all, while the two criteria are associated, as we would expect,
they are not identical since we get positive non-diagonal elements, especially above the
diagonal, not so much below. The number of landless households is relatively small (This
category is identical in both the classifications). Only 6 households or 3% of the sample was
found to be landless in the proper sense of the term, owning neither any land, nor operating
any land. This in itself seems to reflect the small incidence of immiserization and
17
landlessness in the sample villages. Secondly, the modal farm size is 0.01 - 2.5 acres, with
153 out of 210 households, or 76.5% of the sample falling in this group. This high
concentration of farms in the smallest farm size group reflects the fact that a large number of
landless households had moved up to the 0.01 to 2.5 acreage group by receiving the vested
ceiling-surplus land during the Left Front period after 1977. The majority of the households
in this acreage group are poor peasants, since we find that 59 out of the 153 or 31.50% fall in
this category. However a sizeable minority, 48 households or nearly 31.37% are small or
middle peasants within 0.01 – 2.5 acres, who are mainly self-employed and do not need to
sell their labour power to any great extent to the wealthy households. In fact the middle
peasants are by definition small net employer of others. Interestingly we find as many as 46
households, or 30.06% of the total in this size-group (0.01-2.5 acre), fall in the rich peasants
and landlord category (mainly or wholly using non-family labour) despite the relatively small
size of their farms. They make up nearly 67.64% of all rich peasants and landlords.
5. HOUSEHOLD STRUCTURE AND PARTICIPATION:
The first step to understand the problem of the differentiation of the peasantry is to
develop a proper idea of household structure and participation from our sample
households. The key concept in this regard is the work participation rate. It is the ratio of
worker to member in a family. In Table 3 and 4 the trend of participation rate is
given. It is just over 45.81% in the backward region compared to only 36.55% in the
advanced region, the overall average being 41.42 per cent. This is perhaps to be expected
as the families in the backward region are likely to have a lower income per worker, and
more members in the family must work to obtain a minimum family income. In short
participation rates will be inversely related to economic well- being.
18
This tends to be broadly confirmed when we look at the variation by class and
size, of the members to workers ratio. Its reciprocal, giving the work participation rate, is
higher than average for the poorer classes and declines to lower than average as the
economic position improves. Thus the participation rate for the landless, poor peasants
and small peasants are 76, 46.87% and 48.23% respectively whereas for the middle.
TABLE-3
ACRAGE GROUPWISE DISTRIBUTION OF LABOUR DAYS,PARTICIPATION RATE AND EMPLOYMENT INTENSITY PER ACRE
Acrage
Partici-.FL
Workers Total HI FL+HI
FL
Total HI
FL + HI
% of
Total
Group
pation Per
Per
Per
Per
Per
Per
Per
HI to
HO Per Per
HO
Rate
Acre
Acre
Acre
Holding
Holding
Holding Total
Holding Holding
to Total Wkr
Acre
FL + HO % of
FL
HO
FL +HO
Per
Per
Per
Wkr
Wkr
All Regions
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
132.50
132.50
100.00
0.00
41.84
41.84
0.01 to 2.5
0.00
40.02 51.43
2.25
38.59
90.02
51.44
38.50
89.95
42.81
66.30
117.75
56.31
22.95 29.57
52.52
2.5 to 5
45.93 31.23
1.06
55.97
87.20
117.58
192.32
309.90
62.06
38.16
155.74
24.50
32.26 10.47
42.73
5 to 10
30.95 24.02
0.39
61.72
85.74
178.33
458.33
636.67
71.99
13.33
191.67
6.96
61.73
4.62
66.35
10 to 15
50.00
0.00
0.40
46.67
46.67
0.00
700.00
700.00
100.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
15 & abv
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
41.42 37.49
1.49
48.91
86.39
65.61
83.39
149.00
55.97
61.21
126.82
48.27
25.88 24.15
50.03
75.00
Total
76.00
Advanced
Region
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
120.00
120.00
100.00
0.00
40.00
40.00
0.01 to 2.5
0.00
36.27 66.94
2.29
62.36
129.30
56.29
52.43
108.71
48.23
52.38
108.66
48.20
29.28 27.25
56.53
2.5 to 5
32.58 30.89
0.72
107.41
138.30
104.25
362.50
466.75
77.66
0.00
104.25
0.00
43.14
0.00
43.14
5 to 10
31.75 33.25
0.42
70.51
103.75
264.17
560.17
824.33
67.95
0.00
264.17
0.00
79.25
0.00
79.25
10 to 15
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
15 & abv
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
36.55 46.89
1.39
76.83
123.72
71.70
117.48
189.18
62.10
46.33
118.03
39.25
33.82 21.85
55.67
80.00
Total
Backward
Region
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
195.00
195.00
100.00
0.00
48.75
48.75
0.01 to 2.5
0.00
43.43 40.00
2.22
21.09
61.09
46.54
24.39
70.93
34.39
80.41
126.95
63.34
18.14 31.34
49.48
2.5 to 5
53.50 31.45
1.27
24.42
55.86
126.00
84.84
210.84
40.24
62.26
188.26
33.07
28.50 14.08
42.58
5 to10
28.57
1.04
0.31
39.87
40.92
6.67
254.67
261.33
97.45
40.00
46.67
85.71
3.33
20.00
23.33
10 to 15
50.00
0.00
0.40
46.67
46.67
0.00
700.00
700.00
100.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
15 & abv.
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
45.81 29.84
1.57
26.21
56.05
59.51
49.30
108.81
45.31
76.09
135.60
56.11
20.17 25.79
45.97
Total
Note: FL = Family Labour, HI = Hired Labour, Ho = Hired Out
19
TABLE-4
ECONOMIC CLASS WISE DISTRIBUTION OF LABOUR DAYS,PARTICIPATION RATE AND EMPLOYMENT INTENSITY PER ACRE
Economic
Classes
Partici-.FL
Workers
Total HI FL+HI
FL
Total HI
FL + HI
% of
Total
pation Per
Per
Per
Per
Per
Per
HI to
HO Per Per
Rate
Acre Acre
Acre
Holding Holding
Holding
Total
Holding Holding to Total Wkr
Acre
Per
FL + HO % of
HO
FL
HO
FL +HO
Per
Per
Per
Wkr
Wkr
All Regions
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
132.50 132.50 100.00
0.00
41.84
41.84
Poor Peasant
Landless
46.87 57.29 2.82
5.51
62.81
50.63
4.87
55.51
8.78
154.29 204.92
75.29
20.32 61.91
82.23
Small Peasant
48.23 62.41 2.24
6.80
69.21
80.79
8.81
89.60
9.83
30.00
110.79
27.08
27.92 10.37
38.29
Middle Peasant
40.00 58.03 0.96
40.53
98.56
185.88
129.69
315.56
41.10
9.81
195.69
5.01
67.59
3.57
71.16
Rich Peasant
31.90 32.15 0.76
79.88
112.03
92.94
231.82
324.76
71.38
4.71
97.65
4.82
42.70
2.16
44.86
32.08
0.95
77.73
77.73
0.00
176.47
176.47
100.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
41.42 37.49 1.49
48.91
86.39
65.61
83.39
149.00
55.97
61.21
126.82
48.27
25.88 24.15
50.03
Landlord
Total
76.00
0.00
0.00
Advanced Region
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
120.00 120.00 100.00
0.00
40.00
40.00
Poor Peasant
Landless
42.61 90.65 4.63
1.70
92.35
41.74
0.78
42.52
1.84
157.78 199.52
79.08
19.59 74.06
93.65
Small Peasant
40.56 93.72 3.22
12.01
105.73
67.44
8.64
76.08
11.36
15.08
82.52
18.27
29.07
6.50
35.57
Middle Peasant
35.59 75.00 0.89
50.89
125.89 196.67
133.44
330.11
40.42
0.78
197.44
0.39
84.29
0.33
84.62
Rich Peasant
29.52 39.05 0.69
93.87
132.92 114.75
275.88
390.63
70.62
0.83
115.58
0.72
56.20
0.41
56.61
0.00
263.71
263.71
100.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
71.70
117.48
189.18
62.10
46.33
118.03
39.25
33.82 21.85
55.67
Landlord
Total
75.00
25.97
0.00
0.00
0.66 122.25 122.25
36.55 46.89 1.39
76.83
80.00
123.72
Backward Region
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
195.00 195.00 100.00
0.00
48.75
48.75
Poor Peasant
Landless
49.09 49.46 2.40
6.41
55.87
55.75
7.23
62.98
11.47
152.28 208.03
73.20
20.65 56.40
77.05
Small Peasant
56.12 49.26 1.82
4.62
53.89
95.95
9.00
104.95
8.58
46.95
142.91
32.86
27.06 13.24
40.31
Middle Peasant
45.10 39.96 1.04
29.50
69.46
172.00
124.86
296.86
42.06
21.43
193.43
11.08
52.35
6.52
58.87
Rich Peasant
37.88 14.22 0.92
43.52
110.32
40.60
126.10
166.70
75.64
14.00
54.60
25.64
16.24
5.60
21.84
34.97
1.12
51.29
0.00
0.00
115.40
115.40
100.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
45.81 29.84 1.57
26.21
49.77
59.51
49.30
108.81
45.31
76.09
135.60
56.11
20.17 25.79
45.97
Landlord
Total
0.00
0.00
Note: FL = Family Labour, HI = Hired Labour, Ho = Hired Out
peasant it is 40% from which it declined steadily around 32% for rich peasant and
landlords. As the economic position of the household improves it becomes possible for
even adult members of working age to withdraw from work, and enjoy leisure, which is
reflected in lower participation rates. By farm size too broadly find the similar kind of
20
relationship, but for the very low representation of households in the higher farm sizes the
trend is always not very clear. As regards the individual regions too the same patterns of
variation are observable as in the case of both regions combined.
A.V. Chayanov, in his `Theory of the Peasant Economy' put forward the argument
that the ratio of consumers to workers in the farming household is a crucial variable because
it is this ratio which determines the amount of labour effort that the family workers will put
into production (Chayanov 1966). According to Chayanov, the higher the consumer to
worker ratio, the higher will be the number of days of work, performed by the family
workers. In our data the ratio of `members to workers' is the same as Chayanov's concept of
consumer-worker ratio. It is clear that there is a broadly direct relation between farm size and
the consumer-worker ratio, and similarly a direct relation between economic class and the
consumer-worker ratio. However the relationship that Chayanov puts forward that rising
consumer worker ratios will be accompanied by larger inputs of labour on the farm by each
family workers, is not borne out, as we will see later.
In Tables 3 to 4 we have summarised the on-farm and off-farm employment, and
outside labour hired in on wages. Because of the criterion adopted for classifying
households by economic status, the landless and poor peasants' by definition are those
who work for others to a greater extent than they work for themselves. The `small and
middle peasants' are those, whose work on their farms exceeds either hiring in or hiring
out, while the `rich peasants and landlords' by definition primarily exploit others labour
for work on their farms. However the exact extent of hiring in, self-employment and
hiring out can only be ascertained from aggregation of household data and obtaining the
class averages as in Tables 3 and 4. From Table 3 and 4 we see that the total labour days
(from all sources) put in per holding ranges from only 55.51 for poor peasants, to 176.47
21
for landlords. The range is even larger by farm size, from 89.95 days on farms below 2.5
acres to 700 days on farms above 10 acres. The composition of the total labour input
between family labour and hired in labour shows that (by definition) landlords hire in all
of the 176.47 days labour they use per farm not working themselves for a single day in
the field. However, the rich peasants rely on hiring in for 71.38% of their labour input of
about 229.47 days and the remaining 29.62% being contributed by family workers. The
middle peasants hire in 41.1%, contributing 58.9% by way of family workers' labour. The
small peasants and poor peasants hire in only negligible proportions 9.83% and 8.78% of
their total labour input of 55.51 days and 89.60 days, contributing family labour to the
extent of 90.17% and 91.22% respectively. If our information stopped here we would be
obliged to treat the `poor peasants' as not so different from `small peasants' except in their
much smaller extent of on-farm employment. Since we also have the data on the off-farm
employment on wages of the family workers, we can obtain a complete picture by
looking at a crucial variable - the extent of working on wages outside in addition to own
farm work.
This variable is obtained by calculating the percentage of labour days hired out on
wages to the sum of family labour days worked on the farm, and the labour days hired out
on wages. It is obvious that poor peasants would not be able to make ends meet with only
55.51 days of on-farm employment. We find that on an average each household works for
as much as 154.29 days on wages, and such work constitute 75.29% of the total labour
days worked by them. Clearly these poor peasants can be more accurately described as
basically agricultural labourers with some land. In principle households would get
classified as poor peasant even if 50% of the total days worked was hired out days. If the
22
class average was around 50-60 percent even then we could think of them as peasants.
With such a high class average as 75.29% hired out labour days and only 24.71% worked
on farm, these households are better thought of as labouring households. As regards the
small peasants, they rely on hiring out to the extent of 27.08% of total days worked, while
middle peasants have a very small extent of hiring out of only 5.01% of the days worked.
The rich peasants can also in principle have some hiring out (often this is complementary
to hiring of equipment). In this particular sample there is 4.82% hiring out by rich
peasants, which is the outcome in the backward region. Needless to say, by definition
middle peasants are net hirers in of labour.
The farm size grouping also shows a broad direct association between the size of
farm and the percentage of total labour hired in and a broad inverse relation between the
size of farm and the proportion of family labour days hired out on wages. However the
range is much smaller and there is no clear relation in the higher farm size ranges. Thus
the proportion of hired in to total labour days used on farm, starts at a high level of nearly
42.81% for farms up to 2.5 acres, rises progressively to 62.06% for the 2.5 - 5 acre,
71.99% for the 5 –10 acres and 100% for 10 – 15 acres. Conversely the percentage of
hired out labour days, starting at 56.31% for farms below 2.5 acres, drops to 24.50
between 2.5 – 5 acres, drops further to 6.96% for farms between 5 to 10 acres and is zero
for the farms larger than 10 acres.
The per acre employment intensity is shown in the same Tables 3 and 4. It is shown
that the overall employment (family labour plus hired in labour) per acre registers a broad
direct association with the ascending economic classes and size groups. Though the per acre
employment of family labourers and workers exhibit an inverse relationship that is very much
23
expected. Both the advanced and the backward regions more or less follow the same
tendency.
6. LAND ASSETS AND STRUCTURE
Data on land owned, operated, leased in and leased out by economic class and
farm size are presented in Table 5 and 6. Land asset is in physical unit only and not in
value terms. Unfortunately owing to land transactions being almost non-existent we
found valuation of land to be impossible. Even when a particular plot is sold, its price
cannot be imputed to land of a different quality.
Out of 357.74 acres of total owned areas, 321.31 acres (89.82%) is self-cultivated
by owners. The remaining 10.18% is used for the purposes of house, tank, orchard,
fisheries and other, or left uncultivated. A larger share of owned land in the backward
region remains uncultivated owing to more adverse topographic and climatic conditions
compared to the advanced region where area uncultivated in zero.
The labour hiring farms, which are 34% of total, own 53.83% of total land,
whereas the exploited classes with 34.4% of farms, own only 15.14% of total land.
Holdings up to 2.5 acres or 79.5% of the total household own 46.84% of total land while
those of 5 acres and above or 5% of total household own 23.60% of land. In the advanced
region there is a greater degree of class inequality. The exploited classes making up 28%
of farms own only 6.28% of land - whereas the labour hiring classes comprising 38% of
farms own 70.15% of total area. In the backward region the exploited classes with 41% of
holdings own 21.60% of total land, while labour hiring classes with 30% of holdings own
42.02%. The wide ranging interclass and inter size group wise inequality is also revealed
24
from the distribution of per holding owned and self operated area. These respective values
for the poor peasant are 0.86 acres and 0.76 acres as against 2.89 acres and 2.77 acres for
the rich peasant and 2.77 acres and 2.45 acres for the landlord. The inequality is far wider
when one considers the distribution per acreage group. The backward area shows
enhanced figures for these variables than the advanced region indicating higher average
land area in the former.
TABLE-5
ECONOMIC CLASS WISE STRUCTURE OF OWNED LAND
Percent
of
Holding
Total
Owned
Oprtd
Owned
Total
owned
area
Area LI
Area LO
Opertd
area
Self
Area
Opertd
% of
% of
Per
Per Holding
LI Area
LO Area Holding
Owned Area
to Opretd
to Opretd
Owned
Self Opertd
Area
Area
Area
All Region
Landless
3.00
0.22
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.04
0.00
Poor Peasant
31.50
53.94
47.96
7.72
0.00
55.68
13.87
0.00
0.86
0.76
Small Peasant
23.50
67.27
54.53
6.30
0.00
60.83
10.36
0.00
1.43
1.16
Middle Peasant
8.00
43.73
41.27
4.50
0.00
45.77
9.83
0.00
2.73
2.58
Rich Peasant
17.00
98.27
94.17
5.16
1.67
97.67
5.29
1.71
2.89
2.77
LandLlord
17.00
94.31
83.38
0.00
2.33
81.05
0.00
2.88
2.77
2.45
Total
100.00
357.74
321.31
23.69
4.00
341.00
6.95
1.17
1.79
1.61
Advanced Region
Landless
5.00
0.13
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.03
0.00
Poor Peasant
23.00
9.30
8.93
1.67
0.00
10.59
15.74
0.00
0.40
0.39
Small Peasant
25.00
13.47
12.35
5.63
0.00
17.98
31.33
0.00
0.54
0.49
Middle Peasant
9.00
21.97
21.10
2.50
0.00
23.60
10.59
0.00
2.44
2.34
Rich Peasant
24.00
71.80
70.37
1.83
1.67
70.53
2.60
2.36
2.99
2.93
LandLlord
14.00
33.61
32.53
0.00
2.33
30.20
0.00
7.73
2.40
2.32
Total
100.00
150.27
145.28
11.63
4.00
152.91
7.61
2.62
1.50
1.45
Backward Region
Landless
1.00
0.08
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.08
0.00
Poor Peasant
40.00
44.65
39.03
6.06
0.00
45.09
13.43
0.00
1.12
0.98
Small Peasant
22.00
53.81
42.18
0.67
0.00
42.85
1.56
0.00
2.45
1.92
Middle Peasant
7.00
21.76
20.17
2.00
0.00
22.17
9.02
0.00
3.11
2.88
Rich Peasant
10.00
26.47
23.81
3.33
0.00
27.14
12.27
0.00
2.65
2.38
LandLlord
20.00
60.70
50.85
0.00
0.00
50.85
0.00
0.00
3.04
2.54
Total
100.00
207.47
176.03
12.06
0.00
188.09
6.41
0.00
2.07
1.76
25
TABLE- 6
ACREAGE GROUP WISE STRUCTURE OF OWNED LAND
Percent
of
Holding
Total
Owned
Oprtd
Owned
Total
owned
area
Area LI
Area LO
Opertd
area
Self
Area
Opertd
% of
% of
Per
Per Holding
LI Area
LO Area Holding
Owned Area
to Opretd
to Opretd
Owned
Self Opertd
Area
Area
Area
All Region
0.00
3.00
0.22
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.04
0.00
0.01-- 2.5
76.50
167.36
140.14
12.52
0.00
152.66
8.20
0.00
1.09
0.92
2.5 -- 5
15.50
105.73
99.01
8.17
0.67
106.51
7.67
0.63
3.41
3.19
5 -- 10
4.50
69.10
67.16
3.00
3.33
66.83
4.49
4.99
7.68
7.46
10 -- 15
0.50
15.33
15.00
0.00
0.00
15.00
0.00
0.00
15.33
15.00
15 & Abv.
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
Total
100.00
357.74
321.31
23.69
4.00
341.00
6.95
1.17
1.79
1.61
Advanced Region
0.00
5.00
0.13
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.03
0.00
0.01-- 2.5
77.00
61.02
57.61
7.13
0.00
64.74
11.02
0.00
0.79
0.75
2.5 -- 5
12.00
37.52
36.67
4.50
0.67
40.50
11.11
1.65
3.13
3.06
5 -- 10
6.00
51.60
51.00
0.00
3.33
47.67
0.00
6.99
8.60
8.50
10 -- 15
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
15 & Abv.
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
Total
100.00
150.27
145.28
11.63
4.00
152.91
7.61
2.62
1.50
1.45
Backward Region
0.00
1.00
0.08
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.08
0.00
0.01-- 2.5
76.00
106.34
82.53
5.39
0.00
87.92
6.13
0.00
1.40
1.09
2.5 -- 5
19.00
68.22
62.34
3.67
0.00
66.01
5.56
0.00
3.59
3.28
5 -- 10
3.00
17.50
16.16
3.00
0.00
19.16
15.66
0.00
5.83
5.39
10 -- 15
1.00
15.33
15.00
0.00
0.00
15.00
0.00
0.00
15.33
15.00
15 & Abv.
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
Total
100.00
207.47
176.03
12.06
0.00
188.09
6.41
0.00
2.07
1.76
26
Taking both regions the extent of leasing in and leasing out is small: only 6.95%
of operated area is leased in and 1.17% of owned area is leased out. Some scholars have
pointed out that share-tenancy has become a dying institution following the years of
operation barga in West Bengal6 (Dasgupta 1984). In the advanced region however
7.61% of operated area is leased in and 2.62% of owned area is leased out. This is a much
higher percentage than that in the backward region where no owned land in leased out at
all and only 6.41% of operated area is leased in.
The class wise distribution of leasing in and leasing out show some interesting
aspects. The percentage of the leased in to operated area is 13.87% for the poor peasant,
10.36% for small peasant, 9.83% for middle peasant, 5.29% for rich peasant and nil for
the landlord. The poorer economic classes enter into share-tenancy to augment the low
income from their meagre owned land. The rich peasant also has a small percentage
leased-in, but this represents reverse tenancy; the rich peasants being attracted by the
higher potential profits from extending cultivation. It is also a fact that after the operation
barga, generally no new tenancy contracts have been signed. It might be the case that a
section of today's rich peasant households were not so rich when they entered into the
existing tenancy arrangements, but improved their position with the limitation of rent
payment.
7. STRUCTURE OF ASSET:
Here we consider only the non-land assets, and within non-land assets only
material productive assets and not financial assets of the holdings. The asset structure of
the farms grouped by economic class and farm size is presented in Table 7 and 8. Asset
27
data collected under detailed heads have been aggregated into four main types:
mechanical and irrigational, storage and transport equipment and livestock. Comparing
the two regions nearly 67% of total asset value is with the farmers in the advanced region
though they have 50% of the holdings.
By and large where there is economic differentiation taking place in a market
regime without any state intervention, we would expect a minority of households with
command over large share of land and other resources per head, to be able to invest in
modern irrigation and other machinery, while the majority of the households are not able
to do so. This should show up in the fact that a higher share of the assets with the upper
classes (landlord and rich peasant) would be in the form of modern assets and a lower
share in the form of livestock. Conversely the poorer peasants would have a lower than
average share of their assets in the form of modern assets while the bulk would be
livestock.
The data for the two regions taken together broadly supports this. Table 7 and 8
reveal that out of total value of assets, more than the half (53%) is occupied by the rich
peasant and landlord. Again among the total asset, the labour hiring classes have keen
domination on mechanical and irrigation asset (63.77%) and storage and transport
(55.56%). On the contrary they occupy a relatively lower share of livestock (43.95). Of
the total asset value with landlords and rich peasants 46.66% consists of mechanical and
irrigational assets while the landless and poor peasants have only 0.6%. Conversely
livestock constitutes around 80.63% of asset value for the last two groups, and around
38.52% for the landlords and rich peasants. The category `storage and transport' should
also as a share of total assets, show a broad positive association with economic status as
28
the better-off cultivators with large output will have large storage capacities and also
better access to markets through ownership of transport equipment. Such a positive
relation is visible from the data. Adding up the two categories of `machinery and
irrigation' and `storage and transport' assets, we find that for the landless and poor peasant
only 19.36% of assets take this form, while for the labour exploiting classes, as much as
61.67% per cent of assets are of these forms. Clearly therefore for our sample farmers the
structure of asset ownership shows the theoretically predicted type of variation.
Class/Group
TABLE-7
ECONOMIC CLASS WISE PER ACRE AND PER HOLDING DISTRIBUTION
OF MAJOR ASSETS AND PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION
Mechanical &
Storage &Transport Livestock
Total
Irrigational
Per
Per
Per
Per
Per
Per
Per
Per
Acre
Holding
Acre
Holding Acre
Holding Acre
Holding
All Region
Landless
Poor Peasant
Small Peasant
Middle Peasant
Rich Peasant
Landlord
Total
0.00
639.40
526.33
10238.04
9059.29
771.12
4356.76
360.00
565.11
681.32
29287.19
26024.15
1838.21
7428.50
0.00
1293.28
1757.56
1322.92
1926.90
1388.65
1587.17
166.67
1143.02
2275.11
3784.38
5535.29
3310.29
2706.20
0.00
7978.72
5658.78
4188.99
4312.28
4451.70
5217.49
2826.67
7051.67
7325.11
11983.13
12387.65
10612.06
8896.08
0.00
9911.40
7942.67
15749.95
15298.46
6611.46
11161.41
3353.33
8759.79
10281.53
45054.69
43947.09
15760.56
19030.77
Advanced
Region
Landless
Poor Peasant
Small Peasant
Middle Peasant
Rich Peasant
Landlord
Total
0.00
1034.47
1141.19
18086.02
12220.26
824.01
8809.79
402.00
476.30
821.20
47425.56
35912.29
1777.50
13471.05
0.00
2696.88
3020.01
1563.56
2312.49
1584.44
2166.90
120.00
1241.74
2173.20
4100.00
6795.83
3417.86
3313.40
0.00
11496.69
8525.29
4451.27
4648.38
5021.52
5728.66
3260.00
5293.48
6134.80
11672.22
13660.42
10832.14
8759.70
0.00
15228.05
12686.49
24100.85
19181.13
7429.97
16705.35
3782.00
7011.52
9129.20
63197.78
56368.54
16027.50
25544.15
Backward
Region
Landless
Poor Peasant
Small Peasant
Middle Peasant
Rich Peasant
Landlord
Total
0.00
546.62
268.19
1883.85
844.73
739.71
736.81
150.00
616.18
522.36
5966.43
2292.60
1880.70
1385.94
0.00
963.63
1227.54
1066.76
924.83
1272.37
1115.90
400.00
1086.25
2390.91
3378.57
2510.00
3235.00
2099.00
0.00
7152.47
4455.31
3909.79
3438.84
4113.27
4801.94
660.00
8062.63
8677.73
12382.86
9333.00
10458.00
9032.45
0.00
8662.72
5951.04
6860.40
5208.40
6125.35
6654.65
1210.00
9765.05
11591.00
21727.86
14135.60
15573.70
12517.39
29
Class/Group
CONTD. TABLE-7
ECONOMIC CLASS WISE PER ACRE AND PER HOLDING DISTRIBUTION
OF MAJOR ASSETS AND PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION
Percentage Distribution
Percentage Distribution
Mechanical Storage & Livestock
&Irrigational Transport
Total
MechanicalStorage & Livestock
&Irrigational
Transport
Total
All Region
Landless
Poor Peasant
Small Peasant
Middle Peasant
Rich Peasant
Landlord
Total
0.15
2.40
2.16
31.54
59.56
4.21
100.00
0.18
13.30
19.76
11.19
34.77
20.79
100.00
0.95
24.97
19.35
10.78
23.67
20.28
100.00
0.53
14.50
12.70
18.94
39.26
14.08
100.00
10.74
6.45
6.63
65.00
59.22
11.66
39.03
4.97
13.05
22.13
8.40
12.60
21.00
14.22
84.29
80.50
71.25
26.60
28.19
67.33
46.75
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
Advanced
Region
Landless
Poor Peasant
Small Peasant
Middle Peasant
Rich Peasant
Landlord
Total
0.15
0.81
1.52
31.68
63.98
1.85
100.00
0.18
8.62
16.40
11.14
49.22
14.44
100.00
1.86
13.90
17.51
11.99
37.43
17.31
100.00
0.74
6.31
8.93
22.27
52.96
8.78
100.00
10.63
6.79
9.00
75.04
63.71
11.09
52.74
3.17
17.71
23.80
6.49
12.06
21.32
12.97
86.20
75.50
67.20
18.47
24.23
67.58
34.29
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
Backward
Region
Landless
Poor Peasant
Small Peasant
Middle Peasant
Rich Peasant
Landlord
Total
0.11
17.78
8.29
30.13
16.54
27.14
100.00
0.19
20.70
25.06
11.27
11.96
30.82
100.00
0.07
35.71
21.14
9.60
10.33
23.16
100.00
0.10
31.20
20.37
12.15
11.29
24.88
100.00
12.40
6.31
4.51
27.46
16.22
12.08
11.07
33.06
11.12
20.63
15.55
17.76
20.77
16.77
54.55
82.57
74.87
56.99
66.02
67.15
72.16
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
30
TABLE- 8
ACREAGE GROUP WISE PER ACRE AND PER HOLDING DISTRIBUTION OF
MAJOR ASSETS AND PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION
Class/Group Mechanical &
Storage &Transport Livestock
Total
Irrigational
Per
Per
Per
Per
Per
Per
Per
Acre
Holding Acre
Holding Acre
Holding Acre
All Region
0.00
0.01-- 2.5
2.5 -- 5
5--10
10--15
15 & Abv.
Total
Per
Holding
0.00
3817.16
2858.64
8765.67
700.00
0.00
4356.76
360.00
3808.67
9822.65
65090.00
10500.00
0.00
7428.50
0.00
1940.52
1022.34
1909.32
500.00
0.00
1587.17
166.67
1936.21
3512.90
14177.78
7500.00
0.00
2706.20
0.00
7163.40
3676.21
3784.23
1613.33
0.00
5217.49
2826.67
7147.48
12631.94
28100.00
24200.00
0.00
8896.08
0.00
12921.08
7557.19
14459.22
2813.33
0.00
11161.41
3353.33
12892.37
25967.48
107367.78
42200.00
0.00
19030.77
Advanced
Region
0.00
0.01-- 2.5
2.5 -- 5
5--10
10--15
15 & Abv.
Total
0.00
7803.21
6314.69
12254.46
0.00
0.00
8809.79
402.00
6560.78
21312.08
97361.67
0.00
0.00
13471.05
0.00
2686.75
1066.67
2383.05
0.00
0.00
2166.90
120.00
2258.96
3600.00
18933.33
0.00
0.00
3313.40
0.00
8254.87
3751.85
3635.41
0.00
0.00
5728.66
3260.00
6940.52
12662.50
28883.33
0.00
0.00
8759.70
0.00
18744.83
11133.21
18272.92
0.00
0.00
16705.35
3782.00
15760.26
37574.58
145178.33
0.00
0.00
25544.15
Backward
Region
0.00
0.01-- 2.5
2.5 -- 5
5--10
10--15
15 & Abv.
Total
0.00
882.02
738.52
85.59
700.00
0.00
736.81
150.00
1020.36
2566.16
546.67
10500.00
0.00
1385.94
0.00
1391.04
995.15
730.69
500.00
0.00
1115.90
400.00
1609.21
3457.89
4666.67
7500.00
0.00
2099.00
0.00
6359.70
3629.81
4154.49
1613.33
0.00
4801.94
660.00
7357.17
12612.63
26533.33
24200.00
0.00
9032.45
0.00
8632.76
5363.48
4970.77
2813.33
0.00
6654.65
1210.00
9986.74
18636.68
31746.67
42200.00
0.00
12517.39
31
CONTD. TABLE- 8
ACREAGE GROUP WISE PER ACRE AND PER HOLDING DISTRIBUTION OF
MAJOR ASSETS AND PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION
Class/Group
Percentage Distribution
Percentage Distribution
MechanicalStorage & Livestock
&Irrigational
Transport
Total
MechanicalStorage & Livestock
&Irrigational
Transport
Total
All Region
0.00
0.01-- 2.5
2.5 -- 5
5--10
10--15
15 & Abv.
Total
0.15
39.22
20.50
39.43
0.71
0.00
100.00
0.18
54.73
20.12
23.58
1.39
0.00
100.00
0.95
61.46
22.01
14.21
1.36
0.00
100.00
0.53
51.82
21.15
25.39
1.11
0.00
100.00
10.74
29.54
37.83
60.62
24.88
0.00
39.03
4.97
15.02
13.53
13.20
17.77
0.00
14.22
84.29
55.44
48.65
26.17
57.35
0.00
46.75
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
0.00
100.00
Advanced
Region
0.00
0.01-- 2.5
2.5 -- 5
5--10
10--15
15 & Abv.
Total
0.15
37.50
18.98
43.36
0.00
0.00
100.00
0.18
52.50
13.04
34.29
0.00
0.00
100.00
1.86
61.01
17.35
19.78
0.00
0.00
100.00
0.74
47.51
17.65
34.10
0.00
0.00
100.00
10.63
41.63
56.72
67.06
0.00
0.00
52.74
3.17
14.33
9.58
13.04
0.00
0.00
12.97
86.20
44.04
33.70
19.90
0.00
0.00
34.29
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
0.00
0.00
100.00
Backward
Region
0.00
0.01-- 2.5
2.5 -- 5
5--10
10--15
15 & Abv.
Total
0.11
55.95
35.18
1.18
7.58
0.00
100.00
0.19
58.27
31.30
6.67
3.57
0.00
100.00
0.07
61.90
26.53
8.81
2.68
0.00
100.00
0.10
60.64
28.29
7.61
3.37
0.00
100.00
12.40
10.22
13.77
1.72
24.88
0.00
11.07
33.06
16.11
18.55
14.70
17.77
0.00
16.77
54.55
73.67
67.68
83.58
57.35
0.00
72.16
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
0.00
100.00
Looking at the same structure of assets by farm size, we find no consistent pattern
at all. The share of mechanical and irrigational assets is the highest at 60.62% for farms
between 5 and 10 acres, but the share is much lower than this for both the smaller sized
farms and the ones above 10 acres. Similarly the share of livestock is the highest for the
landless (84.29%), but it is also very high at 57.35% for the farms 10 - 15 acres in size.
32
This cannot be explained with reference to farm size. The explanation lies in the fact that
over within the farm size 5 – 10 acres of total of 9 holdings, 1 belongs to the middle
peasant, 5 belong to rich peasants and 3 to landlords, are cultivated intensively (ref. Table
1). No other farm size group contains such a high proportion of mainly labour-hiring
farms representing the commercial, capitalist tendency.
The extent of concentration by economic class also varies markedly by region,
with the advanced region showing much higher concentration as we would expect, given
its more polarised land holding and social class structure noted earlier. Thus the two
classes mainly operating with hired labour (rich peasants and landlords) account for
61.75% of total asset value in the advanced region compared to 36.18% in the backward
region. Conversely the landless and poor peasants control only 7% of total assets in the
advanced region compared to 31% in the backward region. The mainly self-employed
peasants control therefore around 31.2% of total assets in the advanced region (making up
18% of holdings) compared to as much as 32.52% in the backward region (making up
21% of holdings) (Tables 7 and 8). This tends to confirm the proposition that growth
under a market regime will lead to a greater concentration over time where the rich
peasants and landlords will raise the command over assets and the exploited and selfemployed peasants lost the same.
It will be noted from the Tables 7 to 8, that the average value of all assets per
household is quite low, only Rs 19030.77 taking both regions together. This average is
the outcome of level of assets value per holding in the advanced region (Rs 25544.15),
which is almost double the level of the value in the backward region (Rs 12517.39). The
value of assets per holding shows more or less increasing trend with the economic classes
33
and size groups. However the range of per holding asset value is much larger in the
advanced region. Thus the rich peasants' per household assets is 15 times more than that
of the landless, and is 8 times more than that of the poor peasants in the advanced region,
whereas the corresponding multiples are 11.68 and 1.44 respectively in the backward
region. For both the regions taken together the landlords' per household assets are 13.11
times that of landless households and 5 times that of the poor peasants.
The value of per acre of assets similarly shows no definite trend as we have seen
starting at Rs 9911.40 for poor peasants, dropping slightly to Rs 7942.67 for small
peasants, rising again to Rs 15749.95 for middle peasants, dropping to Rs 15298.46 for
rich peasants and then dropped again to Rs. 6611.46 for landlords. With regard to the size
of farm grouping there is clear inverse relation of asset value per acre with size starting at
Rs 12921.08 per acre on farms below 2.5 acres, it drops to Rs 7557.19 on the farms up to
5 acres, rises to Rs 14459.28 for farms between 5 and 10 acres, drops drastically to Rs
2813.33 for 10 – 15 acres.
8.. CLASS, CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS AND PARTICIPATION
In West Bengal the peasant history of the state preceding the Left rule is the history of
a relentless class struggle against the landlord, where the state always protected the latter. The
struggle for Tebhaga immediately after the independence, where peasants demanded two
third of the crop share was the beginning of a radical peasant movement in independent India.
Though the ruling Congress government, ruthlessly suppressed the movement, it became
clear that any further suppression of peasant movement would erode the credibility of the
ruling class among the electorate. In effect the government passed many laws in favour of the
poor peasant but could not implement them at all. In the fifties there was a acute food
shortage in the country. The left peasant organisations successfully developed food
movement and mobilized a large section of poor and middle class population in Bengal on
34
this issue. The peasant movement in Bengal peaked up in second half of sixties when a LeftCentrist alliance, the United Front successfully dislodged Congress Party from power. During
the second United Front Ministry some kind of ‘radical land reform from below’ took place,
where the local peasants recovered more than 5,00,000 acres of benami land (name of the
land ownership was changed to a fictitious one by its real lord to evade the ceiling law) and
distributed it among the landless. This was a kind of forced land reform, undertaken outside
the government framework, more or less spontaneous through popular participation with the
support of the United Front parties. The Naxalbari peasant struggle, which originated in West
Bengal and spread over a number of states in late sixties and early seventies also contributed
to this transformation. This was the background on which the Left Front government came to
power with a huge mandate in 1977. The early phase of the agrarian reform in the state under
the Left Front government since 1977 is characterised by the state intervention from above
and mobilisation of poor people from the below. A distinguished subaltern scholar portrays
the agrarian reform in West Bengal as a ‘socalled operation barga’ led by the urban middle
class (Chatterjee, 1997). This opinion reiterates the ‘subaltern’ interpretation that the recent
agrarian change in West Bengal is the elite perception of history that does not touch the
subaltern. This is an unhistorical position that has discarded the history of peasant struggle
and the consciousness of the poor classes in developing a political hegemony. In this
section we will look into the basis of political mobilization and its limitation in
achieving participatory decentralization.
In last twenty nine years of the Left Front rule in West Bengal the robust form of
political participation has been gradually translating into participation at the grass root level
administrative decision making. As mentioned earlier government made it mandatory that at
least two meetings of the gram sansad and gram sabha have to be conducted annually. Since
the landless, poor peasants and small peasants remain the majority in a village (58% in our
sample) the active participation of these classes in the Gram Sansad meeting is the most
important aspect of the class struggle and class based rural transformation.
35
It has been seen from Table 9 and 10 that 58% of households attended at least one
Gram Sabha and / or Gram Sansad meeting. The attendance in Gram Sansad and / or Gram
Sabha is marginally higher in the backward region (60%) than the advance one (56%).
However, ironically only 23% of total sample households took part in discussion and the
remaining 77% were the mute spectator of the meeting. Again the percentage distribution in
the advanced (22%) and the backward (24%) are close to each other. Looking into the gender
divide the situation is extremely gloomy. Only 2% of the among total female adult members
participated in at least one Gram Sansad / Gram Sabha meeting. The female participation is
far less in the advanced region (1.03%) than the backward (2.93%) one. The same ratio
among total male adult members is 30.17%, which is also not at all promising. The negligible
representation of the female members makes a mockery to the 73rd constitutional
amendments which emphasized about female representation by making one third of
Panchayat seats reserved for them.
The size group wise distribution shows a big concentration of all the participatory
representation from a single size group 0.01 – 2.5 acres, which is quite obvious since this size
class constitutes 77% of households. The distribution is almost similar in both the regions.
36
Economic
Class
TABLE - 9
ECONOMIC CLASS WISE PARTICIPATION
IN GRAM SANSAD/GRAM SABHA MEETING
Attendance in the Gram Sansad/
Take part in
Gram Sabha Meeting(Atleast One)
the discussion
No. Of % Distribun. % to total No. Of
% Distribun. % to total
HL.D
Household
HL.D
Household
All Region
Landless
Poor Peasant
Small Peasant
Middle Peasant
Rich Peasant
Land lord
Total
3.00
42.00
26.00
7.00
17.00
21.00
116.00
2.59
36.21
22.41
6.03
14.66
18.10
100.00
50.00
66.67
55.32
43.75
50.00
61.76
58.00
0.00
19.00
9.00
3.00
8.00
7.00
46.00
0.00
41.30
19.57
6.52
17.39
15.22
100.00
0.00
30.16
19.15
18.75
23.53
20.59
23.00
Advanced
Region
Landless
Poor Peasant
Small Peasant
Middle Peasant
Rich Peasant
Land lord
Total
1.00
14.00
15.00
3.00
13.00
10.00
56.00
1.79
25.00
26.79
5.36
23.21
17.86
100.00
20.00
60.87
60.00
33.33
54.17
71.43
56.00
0.00
5.00
7.00
1.00
6.00
3.00
22.00
0.00
22.73
31.82
4.55
27.27
13.64
100.00
0.00
21.74
28.00
11.11
25.00
21.43
22.00
Backward
Region
Landless
Poor Peasant
Small Peasant
Middle Peasant
Rich Peasant
Land lord
Total
2.00
28.00
11.00
4.00
4.00
11.00
60.00
3.33
46.67
18.33
6.67
6.67
18.33
100.00
200.00
70.00
50.00
57.14
40.00
55.00
60.00
0.00
14.00
2.00
2.00
2.00
4.00
24.00
0.00
58.33
8.33
8.33
8.33
16.67
100.00
0.00
35.00
9.09
28.57
20.00
20.00
24.00
37
Economic
Class
CONTD. TABLE - 9
ECONOMIC CLASS WISE PARTICIPATION
IN GRAM SANSAD/GRAM SABHA MEETING
No of adult member
%of Adult Mem. Participated
Participated
to total Adult Member
Male
% Distribun. Female % Distribun.
Male
Female
All Region
Landless
Poor Peasant
Small Peasant
Middle Peasant
Rich Peasant
Land lord
Total
3.00
48.00
29.00
8.00
24.00
28.00
140.00
2.14
34.29
20.71
5.71
17.14
20.00
100.00
0.00
6.00
2.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
8.00
0.00
75.00
25.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
100.00
25.00
43.64
25.00
17.39
25.53
32.56
30.17
0.00
5.61
2.33
0.00
0.00
0.00
2.00
Advanced
Region
Landless
Poor Peasant
Small Peasant
Middle Peasant
Rich Peasant
Land lord
Total
1.00
17.00
17.00
3.00
18.00
12.00
68.00
1.47
25.00
25.00
4.41
26.47
17.65
100.00
0.00
2.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
2.00
0.00
100.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
100.00
10.00
38.64
30.91
10.71
27.69
42.86
29.57
0.00
5.88
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
1.03
Backward
Region
Landless
Poor Peasant
Small Peasant
Middle Peasant
Rich Peasant
Land lord
Total
2.00
31.00
12.00
5.00
6.00
16.00
72.00
2.78
43.06
16.67
6.94
8.33
22.22
100.00
0.00
4.00
2.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
6.00
0.00
66.67
33.33
0.00
0.00
0.00
100.00
100.00
46.97
19.67
27.78
20.69
27.59
30.77
0.00
5.48
4.65
0.00
0.00
0.00
2.93
38
Group
TABLE 10
ACREAGE GROUP WISE PARTICIPATION
IN GRAM SANSAD/GRAM SABHA
MEETING
Attendance in the Gram Sansad/
Take part in
Gram Sabha Meeting(Atleast One)
the discussion
%
No.
%
No. Of
Distribun.
% to total Of
Distribun.
HL.D
Household HL.D
% to total
Household
All
Region
0.00
0.01--2.5
2.5--5
5--10
10--15
15 & Abv.
Total
3.00
91.00
17.00
4.00
1.00
0.00
116.00
2.59
78.45
14.66
3.45
0.86
0.00
100.00
50.00
59.48
54.84
44.44
100.00
0.00
58.00
0.00
35.00
8.00
2.00
1.00
0.00
46.00
0.00
76.09
17.39
4.35
2.17
0.00
100.00
0.00
22.88
25.81
22.22
100.00
0.00
23.00
Advanced
Region
0.00
0.01--2.5
2.5--5
5--10
10--15
15 & Abv.
Total
1.00
44.00
9.00
2.00
0.00
0.00
56.00
1.79
78.57
16.07
3.57
0.00
0.00
100.00
20.00
57.14
75.00
33.33
0.00
0.00
56.00
0.00
17.00
4.00
1.00
0.00
0.00
22.00
0.00
77.27
18.18
4.55
0.00
0.00
100.00
0.00
22.08
33.33
16.67
0.00
0.00
22.00
Backward
Region
0.00
0.01--2.5
2.5--5
5--10
10--15
15 & Abv.
Total
2.00
47.00
8.00
2.00
1.00
0.00
60.00
3.33
78.33
13.33
3.33
1.67
0.00
100.00
200.00
61.84
42.11
66.67
100.00
0.00
60.00
0.00
18.00
4.00
1.00
1.00
0.00
24.00
0.00
75.00
16.67
4.17
4.17
0.00
100.00
0.00
23.68
21.05
33.33
100.00
0.00
24.00
39
CONTD.
TABLE-10
ACREAGE GROUP WISE PARTICIPATION
IN GRAM SANSAD/GRAM SABHA MEETING
Group
Male
No of adult member
Participated
%
%
Distribun. Female Distribun.
%of Adult Mem.
Participated
to total Adult Member
Male
Female
All
Region
0.00
0.01--2.5
2.5--5
5--10
10--15
15 & Abv.
Total
3.00
109.00
22.00
5.00
1.00
0.00
140.00
2.14
77.86
15.71
3.57
0.71
0.00
100.00
0.00
8.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
8.00
0.00
100.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
100.00
25.00
34.71
22.92
13.51
20.00
0.00
30.17
0.00
2.99
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
2.00
Advanced
Region
0.00
0.01--2.5
2.5--5
5--10
10--15
15 & Abv.
Total
1.00
51.00
13.00
3.00
0.00
0.00
68.00
1.47
75.00
19.12
4.41
0.00
0.00
100.00
0.00
2.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
2.00
0.00
100.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
100.00
10.00
32.69
38.24
10.00
0.00
0.00
29.57
0.00
1.56
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
1.03
Backward
Region
0.00
0.01--2.5
2.5--5
5--10
10--15
15 & Abv.
Total
2.00
58.00
9.00
2.00
1.00
0.00
72.00
2.78
80.56
12.50
2.78
1.39
0.00
100.00
0.00
6.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
6.00
0.00
100.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
100.00
100.00
36.71
14.52
28.57
20.00
0.00
30.77
0.00
4.29
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
2.93
Looking into the interclass variation we have found a clear hegemony of the landless,
poor peasant and the small peasant. The participation in at least one meeting by each class are
40
55%, 66.67% and 55.32%. These three classes together constitute about 61%, considering
total number of participant as 100. About 67% among total adult male members participated
from these three lower classes and the pattern of participation are more or less same in both
the regions. Surprisingly all the representation from female members are from these three
classes and not a single female member from middle, rich peasant and landlords participated
in the meeting in both regions. The vocal members among these class are 61% among total
vocal members participated in the meeting. These three classes participated in a higher
percentage in the backward (66%) than in the advance one (54%).
Therefore, we have found that the lower class still dominates in the gram sabha and
gram sansad meeting and among the vocal members they have complete hegemony. However
the representation is not at all enough. Among the total adult male members 70% prefers not
to attend any meeting. The female representation is just negligible (2%). This has shown that
in spite of the reservation of one third of Panchayat seats for the female candidates, the
attendance of female population in Gram Sansad remained abysmally low.
The poor participation in Gram Sansad meeting is the reflection of the fact that a big
majority of local activists may start to believe that a favourable political equilibrium in terms
of the electoral gain is much important than the task of intensifying class struggle ( Mukherji
and Bandyopadhyay, 1993). They fail to recognise themselves as a self-governed
decision making units. However, we may consider all these constraints towards
grass root self governance as a transient phase. We must hope that over a
period of time poor people will be conscious enough to understand their right and
will execute the self-governance. An analogy might be appropriate enough. When
the first electoral process started in India, rural poor caste their vote after the
consultation with the village headman. But over the time they are conscious
enough (at least in West Bengal) to caste their own vote. We may keep similar
hope in mind in favour of gradual encroachment of grass root democracy.
41
9. CONCLUSION
This study seeks to analyse the interrelation between the village level class structure
in a differentiated economy and the participation of different classes into the political and
administrative process of decision-making. We refute the populist and neo-liberal ideas of a
homogenous peasantry and their mutual reciprocity in a depoliticized environment with
inactive state as a source of decentralized rural transformation. The primary level data of
rural West Bengal suggests that like any market economic regime, development of capitalist
relation in agriculture brings out a process of differentiation of the peasantry in the agrarian
economy of West Bengal. However the differentiation of the peasantry in West Bengal is
associated with a process of a strong pro poor state intervention. As a result the nation wide
process of immiserisation has been halted in West Bengal and the process of differentiation
has become more broad based. In our view the standard acreage grouping is not at all
satisfying criterion to analyse the process of dynamic aspects of capitalist development and
class differentiation. For this purpose we have used Patnaik’s labour exploitation criterion
based on Marxian analysis, side by side the standard acreage criterion. Since the Indian
independence, a series of peasant movement took place in West Bengal, which gave rise to
class consciousness and class struggle. This was the foundation on which Panchayat Raj was
established in West Bengal. The West Bengal experience is nothing but agriculture based
development, led by the direct class action and the interventionist state. This is an alternative
model of development in contrary to the neo-liberal orthodoxy of withdrawal of the state in a
depoliticized environment. Though the poor classes in West Bengal has achieved higher level
of class consciousness to resist extra economic coercion, the participation of them at the grass
root level administrative decision making is not much higher, though they have dominated
the gram sansad and gram sabha meeting. We think that this is a short run phenomenon,
which may be overcome in the long run.
42
NOTES
1. West Bengal economy may be characterised by a small farm economy where average
operated area is much less than that of the national average. Such an economy
experienced the overall rate of agricultural output growth at 1.74 per cent per annum
during the period 1949 to 1980 that was below the rates of rural (2.31 per cent) and
total population (2.42 per cent) increase in the same period [Boyce, 1984]. Saha and
Swaminathan (1994) using an index number series on aggregate agricultural
production, claimed that ‘the exponential growth rate of all West Bengal for the
period 1981-82 to 1990-91 was an impressive 6.4 per cent per annum. Though some
doubt has been cast regarding the validity of the official data [Datta Ray, 1994] based
on which some conclusion was derived, no effective challenge was made against the
findings showing high growth performance of West Bengal. On the contrary Sen and
Sengupta (1995) using an alternative source of data (Comprehensive Cost of
Production Studies by the Central Government, Ministry of Agriculture) reaffirmed a
significant trend-break in the growth rate during the eighties.
2. We have already mentioned in our discussion that the magnitude of decline in the
percentage of people living below the poverty line was the largest in West Bengal
among all other Indian states. It may be shown in terms of the following indicators
that the process of immiserisation has actually been stopped in West Bengal: (i) The
percentage of male and female agricultural labour population to main workers marked
an increase for India, but experienced a decline for West Bengal during 1981-91
(Census of India 1981 and 1991). (ii) Casualisation of rural workers increased steadily
for all India from 1972-73 to 1983, it marked a fall in 1987-88 [Chandrasekhar,
1993]. (iii) It is evident from NSSO Surveys that between 1983 and 1987-88
unemployment rates of all kind (Usual Status Unemployment Rate, Current Weekly
Status Unemployment Rate and Current Daily Status Unemployment Rate) for male
workers declined in West Bengal, while it marked a general rise for all India
[Chandrasekhar, 1993]. (iv) Agricultural wages tripled in West Bengal during 197778 to 1987-88, and the real wage increase in West Bengal was also among the highest
in India [Sen and Sengupta, 1995]. (v) The percentage of agricultural labour
households with land declined during 1977-78 to 1983 in all India, while the same
had increased in West Bengal during the same period [Govt. of India, Ministry of
Labour, 1991]. (vii) West Bengal follows the same national trend in the demographic
front in the sense that birth rate, death rate and the infant mortality rate - all declined
between 1980-81 and 1990-91. However the ranks of West Bengal for these three
rates have improved among all other Indian states from 8 to 5 (birth rates) between
1980 and 1990-91.
3. It may be noted that a radical redistribution of land did take place immediately after
the 1917 October Revolution. But in Lenin’s analysis this simply laid the basis for a
democratic and wide-based process of peasant class differentiation, rather than the
narrowly based process of landlord oppression [Lenin, 1970: 97-98].
43
4. We have chosen Kotulpur (as economically advanced) and Khatra-II (as
economically backward) blocks from two topographically and
demographically opposite zones of Bankura.
5. NSSO has prepared five broad size classes in the direction given by the Agricultural
Census of India. These classes are:
marginal holdings
- those of size less than 2.5 acres
small holdings
- those of size 2.5 to 5 acres
semi-medium holding
- those of size 5 to 10 acres
medium holdings
- those of size 10 to 25 acres
large holdings
- those of size larger than 25 acres
6. Before the Left Front Government coming to power, all the tenancy contracts were
verbally maintained. It was impossible for a poor tenant to establish his identity as
a tenant, not to speak about other legal rights that a tenant should enjoy. Apart
from that it had been altogether a headache for a poor tenant to bear the legal
expenses and troubles for dispute settlement. Left Front’s Operation Barga is a
revolution in two respects. First of all the tenants now have a barga certificate for
which he can’t be evicted and his constitutional legal rights can’t be deprived.
Secondly, in the case of disputes all the trouble of court and legal provisions were
squarely put on the shoulder of the landlord. In this way the Operation Barga has
provided balance of power on land in favour of the tenants. Under this situation
the landlord can virtually expect nothing from the leased out land except the legal
share, the stop of which may open the only one way for the landlord - to take
trouble of lengthy legal confrontation. This is why the owners of land in rural
West Bengal stop giving land under lease contract. Also the owners of the already
leased out land are generally willing to dispose of land at a nominal amount to
their tenants. All these factors make the tenancy a dying institution.
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46
APPENDIX
TABLE – A.1
The following limits are specified to the value of E in order to classify households into a set of
mutually exclusive and all-exhaustive categories (sub-categories not specified here are not ruled out)
Class
Defining Characteristic
Value of
E = X F
Reason
1. Landless
labourers
No self-employment;
working entirely for others
(E)
F=0
X0
and large
2. Poor peasant
(Poor tenant and
labourer with land)
Working for others to a
greater extent than selfemployment
( E   1)
F0,
X  0,
X   F
(0E1)
F0,
X0,
X   F
3. Small peasant
Zero employment of others
or working for others ; and
working for others to
smaller extent than selfemployment
4. Middle peasant
Smaller employment of
others’ labour than selfemployment
(1E0)
F0,
X0,
XF
5. Rich peasant
At least as large an
employment of others’
labour as self-employment
(E1)
F0,
X0,
XF
No manual labour in self(E)
F0,
employment , large
X  0,
employment of others’
and large
labour
Source: Utsa Patnaik (1987), Peasant Class Differentiation: A Study in Method with
Reference to Haryana, Delhi, Oxford University Press.
6. Landlord
47
PRIMARILY
EXPLOITED
BY OTHERS
PRIMARILY
SELFEMPLOYED
PRIMARILY
EXPLOITING
LABOUR OF
OTHERS