1
T-Military Presence Definitions (1/1)
Military or police presence refers to stationed personnel within a place.
Compact Oxford English Dictionary, 10 (http://www.askoxford.com/concise_oed/presence?view=uk)
presence
• noun 1 the state or fact of being present. 2 the impressive manner or appearance of a person. 3 a person or
thing that is present but not seen. 4 a group of soldiers or police stationed in a particular place: the USA would
maintain a presence in the region.
Presence is measured by the number of military personnel in a region
Poon et al, 6 - Department of Geography, University at Buffalo-SUNY, Buffalo (Jessie, “The role of US
defense exports in Asia Pacific regionalism,” Political Geography 25 (2006) 715-734, Science Direct)
The major source of defense trade data comes from the United States International Trade Commission
(USITC) where 1989 forms the earliest year that the data are available and 2004 the most recent
(http://dataweb.usitc.gov/scripts/user_set.asp). From this database, current and historical records may be
searched for U.S. exports to Asia Pacific countries with the end use category ‘‘defense.’’ This ensured that dual
use products were excluded from the search. Seven sectors may be identified for defense trade including
military aircrafts, aircraft launching gear/parachutes, etc., engines/turbines for military aircraft, military
trucks/armored vehicles, etc., military ships/boats, tanks/artillery/ missiles/rockets/guns/ammunition, and
parts/special goods, etc. Not all of the sectors will be analyzed because many countries contain only very sparse
data. Approximately thirty Asia Pacific countries are identified to be engaged in defense trade with the US
although this number varies from sector to sector. The countries include all members of APEC and the ARF but
also extend to other countries that have been excluded from these arrangements such as Nepal, Bhutan,
Mongolia, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Oceania. Defense exports are supplemented by two other sources of data,
that is, US military presence and countries’ military expenditure. US military presence is measured by the
number and shares of active military personnel in the region. This information is compiled by the US
Department of Defense (http://www.dior.whs.mil/mmid/military/miltop.htm). Statistics on military expenditures
may be obtained from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (www.sipri. org). In addition,
contextual information is also collected from research monographs on US military strategies. These reports are
compiled by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) in Washington, D.C., and CRS constitutes the public
policy research arm of the US Congress. Many of these reports include testimonials to the Congress regarding
defense and strategic events in the Asia Pacific, and provide important documentation as well as evidence of US
geopolitical interests, policies and developments in the region.
2. Violation- Drones aren’t military presence
3. Standards
a. Allowing weapons explodes limits- there are thousands of different weapons systems that could
possibly be removed
b. prefer our definition- inclusive, sets clear limits
Voting issue for fairness and education
2
ILAW Frontline (1/3)
1. Drones don’t violate ILAW
David Rittgers- a legal policy analyst at the Cato Institute, served three tours in Afghanistan as a Special Forces officer and
continues to serve as a reserve judge advocate, February 25, 2010, The Wall Street Journal, “Both Left and Right Are Wrong about
Drones”, online at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704240004575085511472753150.html
Liberal critics should refrain from erroneously labeling drone strikes as "nonjudicial killings." Even the most controversial drone
strikes—those that kill American citizens who have joined al Qaeda affiliates overseas—are permissible under the laws of war.
Neither Congress nor the courts should micromanage tactical decisions such as whether the president can order soldiers to seize a
particular hill or employ a certain weapon. Referring to drone strikes as "nonjudicial" implies that the courts should be given the
ability to rule out specific drone attacks. Vetting these targets for accuracy of intelligence and minimization of collateral damage is
essential, and the record continues to improve on that front.
2. International law is unenforceable
Rachel A. Bahn Presidential Management Fellow at USAID 2008 "Reputational Risk and Enforceability in
International Law" SAIS Review Volume 28, Number 2, Summer/Fall, Project Muse
The lack of an automatic enforcement mechanism represents the greatest challenge to the development of international organizations
and the body of international public law that they represent. Evidence of the impact of this non-enforceability is found in all areas of
the international realm—economic, humanitarian, and political-strategic. However, the nature of political-strategic affairs heightens
the impact of possible damage to national reputation and sets this branch of international law and organization apart. The World Trade
Organization (WTO) has no absolute means through which to ensure compliance with its standards, even when its Dispute Settlement
Panel determines that a member state has violated the WTO’s international liability and must alter its behavior or face retaliation from
the harmed state. More to the point, there is no absolute means to ensure compliance with WTO standards. One need only look to the
gambling case brought against the United States by the Caribbean nation of Antigua and Barbuda in order to verify the ineffectiveness
of WTO panel decisions. In 2003, Antigua and Barbuda brought a legitimate complaint to the WTO that the United States had
improperly restricted the sale of online gaming and betting services from the island nation. Nevertheless, even after the complaint was
raised, the United States, another WTO member state, refused to comply with WTO standards, due in part to domestic political and
ethical concerns about gambling.1 Because Antigua and Barbuda has little leverage against the United States, its WTOsanctioned countermeasures (to the tune of $221 million)have been ineffective, permitting the behemoth to continue barring the sale of
gambling services across its national borders.2 Subsequent to the WTO ruling, the United States retroactively altered its commitment
to the General Agreement on Trade in Services—effectively continuing to violate its previously agreed international economic
obligations.3 Humanitarian bodies have proven no more adept at ensuring compliance with international norms and standards. The
authority and eventual judgment of human rights tribunals may be flaunted by states unwilling to deliver the politically powerful to the
judgment of the international community. For years, Serbia refused to deliver a number of suspected Serbian war criminals to the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia [End Page 101] so that their actions could be considered and judged on the
international stage.4 (Included among these war criminals was Ratko Mladic, the Bosnian Serb general who was responsible for the
massacre of nearly 8,000 Muslim men and boys at Srebrenica in 1995, and Radovan Karadzic, the former Serbian president.5 ) To
date, Serbia has refused to directly deliver either Mladic or Karadzic. Both men remain fugitives from international law.6 The United
Nations and the body of international humanitarian and political law that it represents are similarly at the mercy of member states that
choose to enforce or disregard their agreed-upon commitments and obligations. This is most evident in the case of the Security
Council, where a single member may utilize its veto block action on the part of the entire UN. Without an international police force to
ensure compliance with the will of the majority, absolute compliance with international norms remains a hope rather than a certainty.
3
ILAW Frontline (2/3)
3. Drones are legal under ILAW
Chris Jenks- Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army Judge Advocate General's Corps. Presently serving as the Chief of the International
Law Branch, Office of The Judge Advocate General, Rosslyn, Virginia, 2009, “LAW FROM ABOVE: UNMANNED AERIAL
SYSTEMS, USE OF FORCE, AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT”, North Dakota Law Review, 85 N. Dak. L. Rev. 649,
Lexis
Analyzing UAS strikes in Pakistan under both jus ad bellum and jus en bello provides a useful vehicle by which to consider not only
the ultimate question of legality, but the framework used to do so. Implicit in the analysis are questions that require a determination of
the parameters of self defense under the U.N. Charter, and even whether the Charter applies. [*671] Similarly, how the conflict in the
FATA is characterized, either internally or externally, shapes the analysis, as does whether Pakistan consents to the strikes.
This article argued that in the jus ad bellum context, UAS strikes are permissible as preventive use of force in self defense if Pakistan
does not consent to the strikes. In the more likely event that Pakistan consents to the strikes, then they are at the implicit behest of
Pakistan as part of a conflict against a mutual enemy. The LOAC informs the analysis at all stages, particularly in terms of the conduct
of the strikes themselves, jus en bello. UAS raise situational awareness on the battlefield to unprecedented levels, but this should not
be mistaken for omniscience.
4. International law is too weak to prevent war and environmental desturction
Jack L. Goldsmith- law professor at Harvard University and Eric A. Posner is the Kirkland and Ellis Professor of Law at the
University of Chicago, April 2005, American Enterprise Institute, “The Limits of International Law”, online at
http://www.angelfire.com/jazz/sugimoto/law.pdf
We can conveniently use 9/11 as the date on which this optimism ended, but there were undercurrents of pessimism even
earlier. The UN played a relatively minor role in bringing the conflicts in the Balkans to the end. Members of the Security
Council could not agree on the use of force in Kosovo, and the NATO intervention was thus a violation of international
law. The various international criminal tribunals turned out to be cumbersome and expensive institutions, they brought
relatively few people to justice, and they stirred up the ethnic tensions they were meant to quell. Aggressive international
trade integration produced a violent backlash in many countries. Treaty mechanisms seemed too weak to solve the most
serious global problems, including environmental degradation and human rights abuses.
4
ILAW Frontline (3/3)
5. ILAW has momentum now
Antonio Scalia, Supreme Court Justice, August 20, 2009, “Outsourcing American Law Foreign Law in Constitutional
Interpretation”, American Enterprise Institute, http://www.aei.org/docLib/20090820-Chapter2.pdf
In many other cases, however, opinions for the Court have used foreign law for the purpose of interpreting the Constitution.
The first such case I am familiar with was a 1958 decision involving the Eighth Amendment, the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause. In Trop v. Dulles, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment forbids the penalty of forfeiture of
citizenship because inter alia, “The civilized nations of the world are in virtual unanimity that statelessness is not to be
imposed as punishment for crime.” 6 Reliance upon foreign law has been made with increasing frequency in Eighth
Amendment cases. In Coker v. Georgia, a 1977 case, the Court noted that “out of 60 major nations in the world surveyed in
1965, only three retained the death penalty for rape where death did not ensue.” 7 In Enmund v. Florida, a 1982 case, the
Court noted that the doctrine of felony murder (murder that occurs in the course of a felony is made a capital crime under
the laws of many states) “has been abolished in England and India, severely restricted in Canada and a number of other
Commonwealth countries, and is unknown in continental Europe.” 8 In a 1988 case, Thompson v. Oklahoma, the Court
noted that “other nations that share our Anglo-American heritage” and “the leading members of the Western Europe
community” opposed the death penalty for a person less than 16 years old at the time of the offense. 9 (I must interject that
almost all of those countries also opposed the death penalty when a person was more than 16 years old at the time of the
offense — but never mind.) In Atkins v. Virginia, decided in 2002, the Court thought it relevant that, “within the world
community, the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly
disapproved.” That was deemed relevant to the Court’s interpretation of our Eighth Amendment. Recently the Court has
expanded the use of foreign law beyond the area of the Eighth Amendment. For example, in Lawrence v. Texas, decided in
2003, the Court relied upon action of the British Parliament and a decision of the European Court of Human Rights in
declaring that laws punishing homosexual conduct were unconstitutional under the American Constitution. 11 Individual
Justices have urged the relevance of foreign law in other cases as well. I expect, or rather I fear, that the Court’s use of
foreign law in the interpretation of the Constitution will continue at an accelerating pace. That is so for three reasons. First,
because the “living Constitution” paradigm for the task of Constitutional interpretation prevails on the Court and indeed in
the legal community generally. Under this view, it is the task of the Court to make sure that the current Constitution
comports with, as we have put the point in the Eighth Amendment context, “the evolving standards of decency that mark
the progress of a maturing society.” 12 Thus, a Constitutional right to abortion, which assuredly did not exist during the
first few centuries of our country’s existence, does exist today. Likewise, a constitutional right to homosexual conduct.
6. Citing International Law does not set precedent
Adam Liptak-the Supreme Court correspondent of The New York Times, September 18, 20 08, “U.S. Court Is Now Guiding Fewer
Nations” New York Times, online at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/18/us/18legal.html?_r=3&hp=&adxnnlx=12217537178pdanTsDalyAfCQgzjrVvQ&pagewanted=print
Judicial citation or discussion of a foreign ruling does not, moreover, convert it into binding precedent. Chief Justice John
Marshall, sitting as a circuit court judge, discussed the question in 1811. “It has been said that the decisions of British
courts, made since the Revolution, are not authority in this country,” he said. “I admit it — but they are entitled to that
respect which is due to the opinions of wise men who have maturely studied the subject they decide.” Indeed, American
judges cite all sorts of things in their decisions — law review articles, song lyrics, television programs. State supreme
courts cite decisions from other states, though a decision from Wisconsin is no more binding in Oregon than is one from
Italy. “Foreign opinions are not authoritative; they set no binding precedent for the U.S. judge,” Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg said in a 2006 address to the Constitutional Court of South Africa. “But they can add to the story of knowledge
relevant to the solution of trying questions.” But Professor Fried said the area was a minefield. “Courts have been citing
foreign law forever, but sparingly, for very good reason,” he said. “It is an invitation to bolster conclusions reached on other
grounds. It leads to more impressionistic, undisciplined adjudication.”
5
Pakistan Relations (1/2)
1. They only ban drones in Afghanistan, means they don’t solve drone use in Pakistan
2. Civilians support Drones
Scott Shane, December 3, 2009, “C.I.A. to Expand Use of Drones in Pakistan”, New York Times, online at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/04/world/asia/04drones.html?pagewanted=1&_r=3&adxnnlx=12802716218iMosAsJ5vqHxWZNwEybtw
Interestingly, residents of the tribal areas where the attacks actually occur, who bitterly resent the militants’ brutal rule, are far less
critical of the drones, said Farhat Taj, an anthropologist with the Aryana Institute for Regional Research and Advocacy. A study of
550 professional people living in the tribal areas was conducted late last year by the institute, a Pakistani research group. About half of
those interviewed called the drone strikes “accurate,” 6 in 10 said they damaged militant organizations, and almost as many denied
they increased anti-Americanism.
Dr. Taj, who lived at the edge of the tribal areas until 2002, said residents would prefer to be protected by the Pakistani Army. “But
they feel powerless toward the militants and they see the drones as their liberator,” she said.
3. Pakistan secretly supports drones
Scott Shane, December 3, 2009, “C.I.A. to Expand Use of Drones in Pakistan”, New York Times, online at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/04/world/asia/04drones.html?pagewanted=1&_r=3&adxnnlx=12802716218iMosAsJ5vqHxWZNwEybtw
In an interview this week with the German magazine Der Spiegel, the Pakistani prime minister, Syed Yousuf
Raza Gilani, said the drone strikes “do no good, because they boost anti-American resentment throughout the
country.” American officials say that despite such public comments, Pakistan privately supplies crucial intelligence, proposes targets
and allows the Predators to take off from a base in Baluchistan.
4. Relations high now- intelligence sharing
Eric Schmitt covers the nation's war on terrorism for The New York Times, and Mark Mazzetti has covered national security
from the newspaper's Washington bureau since April 2006, May 13, 20 09, “In a First, U.S. Provides Pakistan With Drone Data”, New
York Times, online at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/14/world/asia/14drone.html?fta=y
As a compromise, the American military in Afghanistan a few months ago offered to increase the amount of sensitive surveillance
information it shared with the Pakistani military. American officials said the information could help Pakistani forces combat an
increasingly lethal militancy that was spreading not only in the tribal areas, but also in the settled areas of Swat and Buner, closer to
Islamabad, the Pakistani capital. American and Pakistani officials said that such information-sharing initiatives could build trust
between the security services of both nations.
6
Pakistan Relations (2/2)
5. US and Pakistan cooperating now
Ben Arnoldy- Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor, August 7, 2009, Christian Science Moniter, “Strike on Mehsud could
spur stronger US-Pakistan cooperation”, Lexis
US officers have complained for years that Pakistan has been reluctant to help kill or capture some Taliban leaders who operate in the
lawless tribal region along the Afghan border.
But the US drone strike that apparently killed senior Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud (click here for the Monitor's story on the strike)
on Wednesday couldn't have pleased Pakistani officials more, since Mr. Mehsud led an army of 10,000 militants who were more
focused on overthrowing the Pakistani government than on returning Taliban rule to Afghanistan.
Pakistani analysts say the strike was made possible by marrying American technology to Pakistani ground intelligence. They say the
US may now get more Pakistani cooperation in hunting down militant leaders who are based in Pakistan but conduct most of their
attacks on the other side of the border. The US will now probably be seeking a "quid pro quo," says Imtiaz Gul, head of the Center for
Research and Security Studies in Islamabad. Mr. Gul argues that the US is going to have the following conversation with Pakistan:
"We [the US] took care of a person who was inflicting damage against Pakistan - now you take care of those going after the US and
NATO forces in Afghanistan." The apparent killing of Mehsud "should clear the way for greater coordination as far as the other
militants are concerned," he adds. Cooperation until now has been hampered by mistrust on both sides. Just as US commanders have
complained that the Afghanistan-focused Taliban haven't been a priority for Pakistan, some Pakistani officials have complained the
US has ignored "actionable intelligence" on Mehsud in the past.
6. Can’t solve-CIA will still launch drones from Pakistan
Jeremy Page, Staff writer for The Sunday Times, 2009, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article5762371.ece
The US was secretly flying unmanned drones from the Shamsi airbase in Pakistan's southwestern province of Baluchistan as early
as 2006, according to an image of the base from Google Earth. The image — that is no longer on the site but
which was obtained by The News, Pakistan's English language daily newspaper — shows what appear to be three
Predator drones outside a hangar at the end of the runway. The Times also obtained a copy of the image, whose co-ordinates confirm
that it is the Shamsi airfield, also known as Bandari, about 200 miles southwest of the Pakistani city of Quetta. An
investigation by The Times yesterday revealed that the CIA was secretly using Shamsi to launch the Predator drones that observe and
attack al-Qaeda and Taleban militants around Pakistan's border with Afghanistan.
7
Pakistan Stability (1/3)
1. ACTUAL DATA proves Pakistanis don’t know about the drones program—can’t cause instability
Spencer
Ackerman,
journalist,
7-29-2010.
[Wired,
Pakistanis
Ask:
Drones?
What
Drones?,
http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/07/pakistanis-drones-what-drones/]
Here in the America, the CIA’s drone program targeting extremists in the tribal areas of Pakistan is the subject of heated
debate. The CIA calls it a uniquely valuable and precise counterterrorism tool. The Obama administration, which has
stepped up the program significantly since taking office, considers it legal under the 2001 congressional Authorization to
Use Military Force. The human-rights community, along with many security experts, fear that the program will create more
terrorists than it kills due to anger at civilian casualties.
Pakistanis, however, think the drones are — sorry; huh? What are you talking about? Did you say clones?
That’s according to a new Pew poll on Pakistani attitudes (.pdf) that’s filled with surprises. Top of the list: “Just over onein-three Pakistanis (35 percent) have heard about the drone strikes.” Apparently, Pakistanis barely know this program even
exists. Another 43 percent say they’ve heard “nothing at all” about the drones. You can hear the champagne corks popping
at Langley.
and military elite love the drones—they’re effective and avoid collateral damage, reduce
instability.
C. Christine Fair, Assistant Professor, Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program, 8-2-2010. [Huffington Post, Drones Over
2. Pakistanis
Pakistan -- Menace or Best Viable Option?, p. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/c-christine-fair/drones-over-pakistan---m_b_666721.html]
Earlier in June, I met with a senior army officer in the Pakistan army's 11th Corps in Peshawar who categorically rubbished
the claims that drones result in civilian casualties and further offered that those persons killed with the "terrorists" are
unlikely to be purely innocent. At a minimum they are aware of the militants in most cases and do nothing but enable them
by not providing information to the authorities. In extremis, they are active supporters and collaborators. He cited the
example of Baitullah Mehsud, the leader of the Pakistani Taliban (Tehreek-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan or TTP) until he was killed
in a drone strike in August 2009 along with his second wife while the latter was giving him a leg massage. While she was
his wife, she was nonetheless aiding and abetting the mass murderer. Curiously, her own father provided the intelligence
that resulted in the death of both his daughter and her ruthless husband likely for remunerative allurements.
This senior officer himself attested to Pakistan's own inability to eliminate key threats and the necessity of the drones to
eliminate terrorists in a way that most effectively minimizes the loss of innocent lives. His account accords with that of the
police chief of the Northwest Frontier Province (recently renamed Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa) as well with senior officials
whom I have met in Pakistan's Foreign Ministry and in various U.S. government agencies.
But don't just believe the word of well-informed military officers overseeing the actual area of operations and other
Pakistani officials, listen to the locals of the areas of themselves.
While sitting in a meeting in a Peshawar sitting parlor with several Pakistanis from South Waziristan and other agencies in
FATA, one of my hosts articulated what he called a "criminal conspiracy" among the politicians, the intelligence agencies,
the media and even the military to sustain a public narrative undermining the drone program while benefiting from the
same.
These FATA residents are strong proponents of the drones. They report that the drones are so precise that the local nonmilitants do not fear them when they hear the drones above as they are confident that they will hit their target. Locals
attribute this precision in part to the placement of "targeting chips" which direct the ordinance to the exact location of the
militants in their redoubts. The accurate placement of these chips requires local cooperation to provide the whereabouts of
these militants. This has driven an important wedge between the locals and militants with the former shunning the latter.
Another interlocutor explained that when children hear the buzz of the drones, they go their roofs to watch the spectacle of
precision rather than cowering in fear of random "death from above."
These observers are not alone. Professor Ijaz Khattak, in the Department of International Relations at University of
Peshawar explained to a popular television host Skaukat Khattak, that "The drone attacks have proved effective and have
targeted the terrorists and there had been little collateral damage in the US drone attacks."
8
Pakistan Stability (2/3)
3. Even if Pakistan becomes unstable, it wouldn’t go nuclear.
BBC Monitoring South Asia, 2/29/’8 l/n
2. Local military commanders using the nuclear weapons for their own ideological motive: The hypothesis is devoid of
basic understanding about how the custody of nuclear weapons is maintained in most nuclear-weapon states. To ensure
foolproof custody of nuclear weapons, Pakistan has devised its own locks in the form of Permissive Action Links (PALs).
Unlike the US, as declassified documents tell us, the codes were set at "all zeros" for two decades until the late 70's,
primarily to avoid any delays in the launching of nuclear missiles. The Pakistani version of PALs ensures that the custody
of the nuclear weapons remains with the NCA till the very last moment. Without these codes, the local field commander or
a pilot cannot operate a nuclear device on his own.
4. No risk of state collapse.
Synott 2/1/9— Hilary Synnott, Consulting Senior Fellow at the IISS, former British High Commissioner in Pakistan from 2000 until
2003, former Coalition Provisional Authority Regional Coordinator for Southern Iraq in 2003-04, “What is Happening in Pakistan?”
Survival, Feb/Mar 2009
Despite these considerable difficulties it would be wrong to regard Pakistan as a lost cause or as doomed to go down the
path of violent extremism, leading to the establishment of an Islamic caliphate. In this context, Pakistan's diversity is also
one of its strengths. Although the vast majority of Pakistanis are Sunni Muslims, there are minority Shia and Ismaili
communities as well as Christians. There is also diversity among the Sunni, which encompasses the Deobandi and Barelvis
sects. Far from being sympathetic to the cause of radical Salafists and Wahhabis, many Pakistani Muslims have been
influenced by the Sufi tradition of Islam, which is unaggressive and tolerant, and enriched by poetry, song and dance. The
great majority of the much maligned madrassas, or religious schools, fulfil an essential social service by providing food,
clothing and shelter to poor children, as the state's primary-education system has been severely weakened through neglect
and corruption by successive governments. It is a recalcitrant minority of such schools which actively support the Taliban
and which need firmer control. Nor is Pakistani nuclear weaponry likely to fall into terrorist hands. The Pakistani military
remain a powerful and cohesive force. And, with some external help, it has established powerful security measures. It is
therefore reasonable to judge that, while violence and disorder will very likely increase unless or until greater attention is
paid to Pakistan's challenges, it is unlikely that the country is on the brink of state failure. Some parts of the country
undoubtedly suffer from severe security challenges and deprivation. But others, including much of Punjab, provide a core
of stability which has weathered many storms in the past and which is unlikely to disintegrate into chaos.
5. Pakistan will stay stable – China and India check
The
Hindu
7/12/10
“Call
for
China-India
initiative
for
Pakistan
stability”
http://www.hindu.com/2010/07/12/stories/2010071255571100.htm)
A senior member of the Chinese Foreign Ministry's Advisory Group has proposed that China and India cooperate for the stability
of Pakistan in the present circumstances. The Ministry's Foreign Policy Advisory Group Member, Wu Jianmin, told TheHindu
here his intention was to “present this idea to the Chinese government in due course.” He said this on the sidelines of a
conference on “the role of the media in India-China relations,” organised by the Singapore-based Institute of Southeast Asian
Studies and its Nalanda Sriwijaya Centre, the National University of Singapore, and the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy.
The participants included India's former Ambassador to China, C. V. Ranganathan, and author Sunanda K. Datta-Ray. On
whether the idea of a China-India initiative for the stability of Pakistan would at all fly, Mr. Wu, formerly a career diplomat,
said: “The rise of Asia requires peace and stability in this region. So, you can see that China's interest and the Indian interest
coincide. … We [in China] do not regard Pakistan as a counterweight to India. It is not propaganda: you [only] have to put
yourself in China's shoes. .... For the first time since 1840, we have a chance to modernise China. To achieve our goal, what we
need is peace abroad and stability at home.”
9
Pakistan Stability (3/3)
6. Nuclear terrorism won’t happen—no means or motivation.
John Mueller, Department of Political Science, Ohio State University, April 30, 200 9, “The Atomic Terrorist?” International
Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, http://www.icnnd.org/latest/research/Mueller_Terrorism.pdf
Thus far terrorist groups seem to have exhibited only limited desire and even less progress in going atomic. This may be because, after
brief exploration of the possible routes, they, unlike generations of alarmists on the issue, have discovered that the tremendous effort
required is scarcely likely to be successful. It is highly improbable that a would-be atomic terrorist would be given or sold a bomb by a
generous like-minded nuclear state because the donor could not control its use and because the ultimate source of the weapon might be
discovered. Although there has been great worry about terrorists illicitly stealing or purchasing a nuclear weapon, it seems likely that
neither “loose nukes” nor a market in illicit nuclear materials exists. Moreover, finished bombs have been outfitted with an array of
locks and safety devices. There could be dangers in the chaos that would emerge if a nuclear state were utterly to fail, collapsing in
full disarray. However, even under those conditions, nuclear weapons would likely remain under heavy guard by people who know
that a purloined bomb would most likely end up going off in their own territory, would still have locks, and could probably be
followed and hunted down by an alarmed international community. The most plausible route for terrorists would be to manufacture
the device themselves from purloined materials. This task requires that a considerable series of difficult hurdles be conquered in
sequence, including the effective recruitment of people who at once have great technical skills and will remain completely devoted to
the cause. In addition, a host of corrupted co-conspirators, many of them foreign, must remain utterly reliable, international and local
security services must be kept perpetually in the dark, and no curious outsider must get consequential wind of the project over the
months or even years it takes to pull off. In addition, the financial costs of the operation could easily become monumental. Moreover,
the difficulties are likely to increase because of enhanced protective and policing efforts by self-interested governments and because
any foiled attempt would expose flaws in the defense system, holes the defenders would then plug. The evidence of al-Qaeda’s desire
to go atomic, and about its progress in accomplishing this exceedingly difficult task, is remarkably skimpy, if not completely
negligible. The scariest stuff—a decade’s worth of loose nuke rumor—seems to have no substance whatever. For the most part,
terrorists seem to be heeding the advice found in an al-Qaeda laptop seized in Pakistan: “Make use of that which is available ... rather
than waste valuable time becoming despondent over that which is not within your reach.” In part because of current policies—but
also because of a wealth of other technical and organizational difficulties—the atomic terrorists’ task is already monumental, and their
likelihood of success is vanishingly small. Efforts to further enhance this monumentality, if cost-effective and accompanied with only
tolerable side effects, are generally desirable.
7. A nuclear terrorist attack will not cause extinction.
Gregg Easterbrook, WIRED, November 7, 2003, http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/11.07/doomsday.html
If we're talking about doomsday - the end of human civilization - many scenarios simply don't measure up. A single nuclear bomb
ignited by terrorists, for example, would be awful beyond words, but life would go on. People and machines might converge in ways
that you and I would find ghastly, but from the standpoint of the future, they would probably represent an adaptation.
8. Terrorists cannot produce requisite materials for Nuclear Weapons
Annette Schaper ,senior research associate at the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF) and has a Ph.D. in experimental
physics, 2003, (http://www.unidir.ch/pdf/articles/pdf-art1907.pdf)
It can be ruled out that a terrorist group has the capability to produce plutonium or HEU. At most, only a state with appropriate
resources could carry out such an endeavour, and it is doubtful whether such a programme could be kept hidden for long. Large-scale
nuclear plants are necessary, the procurement and operation of which could not be kept secret. All procedures for the enrichment of
uranium or for plutonium reprocessing leave traces in the environment. In case of a suspicion in non-nuclear-weapon states, illicit
activities could be discovered immediately as all plants are subject to IAEA safeguards. The production of uranium or plutonium is
extraordinarily resource intensive, as can be illustrated by the fact that Iraq employed thousands of members of staff throughout the
1980s in order to clandestinely manufacture HEU. Nevertheless, only small amounts of HEU were produced. At that time, the IAEA
inspections were less thorough and the extent of the production activities was only discovered after the Gulf War. As a result of this
deception, IAEA safeguards have been strengthened and it is considered improbable that a similar case could go undiscovered today.
10
RoboWar (1/2)
1. An unmanned army would deter conflicts from happening
ANDREA SHALAL-ESAR
and JUSTIN POPE , 2/8/03, “MILITARY TECHNOLOGY; War without death”, The Advertiser
Many wars would not start, it's argued, with the immense deterrent of an unmanned army. While facing impossible odds
have not forced Saddam Hussein to back down in his standoff with the US, the unmatchable odds of facing an unmanned
army might avoid future conflicts. No wonder harnessing an unmanned army, even a heavily robot-assisted army, has been
something US military commanders dream of. Vice president of US company Foster-Miller's military robot division, Arniss
Mangolds, explained: "When you see a robot coming down (on the battlefield), it's interesting and even if it has a weapon
on it, maybe it's a little scary and you give it a little respect. But if you're standing somewhere and see 10 robots coming at
you, it's scary."
2. Coordinated military bots deter
Associated Press, January 14, 2003, “New robots well trained for war”, online at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3078710/
Robots will someday master many of the complex, individual tasks required in combat, experts insist. Then, something
even more powerful will follow: robots that work together. It’s a prospective weapon whose effectiveness would derive at
least partly from the sheer terror it could impose on an enemy. “When you see one robot coming down, it’s interesting and
even if it has a weapon on it, maybe it’s a little scary and you give it a little respect,” said Arniss Mangolds, vice president
of Foster-Miller’s robot division. “But if you’re standing somewhere and see 10 robots coming at you, it’s scary.”
3. Bad robots are decades away
Associated Press, January 14, 2003, “New robots well trained for war”, online at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3078710/
In future wars, robots may drop from the sky by the hundreds from unmanned aircraft, swarming like giant insects over battlefields in
coordinated, terrifying assaults. But that is a decades-away scenario. For now, military planners and robot designers are simply trying
to improve devices — some of which could see action soon in Iraq — by incorporating lessons from Afghanistan, where robots saw
their first significant military action.
4. If the US doesn't use the tech, others still will
James John Bell is a writer for Sustain, a national environmental information group based in Chicago, October, 2002
http://www.zmag.org/zmagsite/oct2002/commentary/bell1002.htm#bio
Hermes and other robots are being tested by a few different military companies and will be left behind to assist U.S. troops in
Afghanistan. Present-day cloning, nanotechnology and robotics research are beginning to blur the lines between human and machine.
Laboratory-created biotech organisms, cloned lifeforms, and advanced robotic machines are now proliferating around the globe. As
these technologies advance they begin to represent a great challenge to the political order and stability of the world. This is why the
US military and other militaries are aggressively backing research into many of these new technologies. The nuclear arms race of the
twentieth century has become the biorobotics arms race of today.
11
RoboWar (2/2)
5. Artificial intelligence impossible
Isaac Asimov, visionary genius, 1990, First Contact, p. 26-27
But computers do change, if not as a result of their own inner capacities, then because human beings are forever building new ones of
improved design. Will we ever be the agents for the evolution of computers that are examples of true “artificial intelligence”? I doubt
it. One must first understand the true complexity of the human brain as it has evolved over three and a half billion years. The human
brain consists of 10 billion neurons and 90 billion auxiliary cells. No computer, either now or in the foreseeable future, is going to
contain 100 billion switching units. And even if a computer were to contain so many units, the neurons of the brain are interconnected
with extraordinary complexity, each being connected to dozens or thousands of others in a manner that passes our understanding.
Computers don’t have even the beginnings of such complexity. And even if we learn to duplicate the complexity, too, then the fact
remains that the units in computers are switches that move from on to off and back to on, and nothing more. The neurons of the brain,
on the other hand, are enormously complex structures of macromolecules of various types whose functions we do not entirely
understand.
6. Drone use wont expand
Abu Muqawama- blog dedicated to following issues related to contemporary insurgencies as well as counterinsurgency tactics and
strategy, April 16, 2010, quoting Bruce Riedel, a former CIA analyst, “On Drone Strikes” online at
http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawama/archive/201004
No matter their merits, the use of drones is unlikely to expand beyond the tribal areas, says Riedel. FATA is unique, “you couldn’t do
what we’re doing here in other parts of the world.” The FATA has a 5th century infrastructure and is not urbanized. Expanding
programs into Baluchistan would increase collateral damage and cross Pakistani red lines.
12
Politics DA (1/2)
1. START Passing—Republicans are getting on board
Ivan Eland, Senior Fellow and Director of the Center on Peace & Liberty, 8/6/2010, “Republicans dragging their feet for political
reasons - expert on START ratification”, http://english.ruvr.ru/2010/08/06/14811460.html
John Robles: My last question was regarding, back to the political thing with the Republicans, I read somewhere that some people are
saying that the Republicans just don’t want to give President Obama a success. Ivan Eland: Well, I suppose that probably some
Republicans do, but I think even Republicans recognize that these arms control Treaties have a long history in the US of bipartisan
support. And I think you will eventually see this one too. Many other Republicans are not demagogues, I think in the end the
Republicans will do the right thing, enough of them will ratify this. This is an important centerpiece. It has always been a centerpiece
between US-Russian relations, and I think it will continue to be. The Treaty will pass and I think the Obama administration is sincere
about trying to reset relations. Now Russia and the United States still don’t agree on everything, missile defense may be one of those
issues. I think this Treaty is good in itself and I think the Republicans will eventually come around and I think Kerry will get a lot of
Republicans votes
START isn’t an easy win—requires a fight.
Oxford Analytica 12-10-2009. [Forbes, Obama's Nuclear Agenda Troubles, p. http://www.forbes.com/2009/12/09/russia-obamanulear-weapons-business-oxford_print.html]
Timelines and contingencies. The 1991 Russia-U.S. Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) expired on Dec. 5 without
a replacement. The day the treaty expired, Russia and the United States jointly stated they would continue to be guided by
the treaty's main provisions pending negotiation of a follow-on accord. The two governments have made considerable
progress on a new bilateral strategic arms control treaty, which suggests that a post-START accord is likely to be signed
within a few weeks or months. The issue would then become securing ratification in both national legislatures.
Senate ratification prospects. Ratification in the Russian legislature is not considered a problem given the dominance of
pro-government members in that body, but securing the approval of the U.S. Senate will be difficult. Two-thirds of the
Senate (67 members if all 100 senators vote) must consent for the United States to ratify any international treaty. Since only
60 senators are Democrats or Democratic-leaning independents, the administration will need to secure the support of
several Republican senators for START ratification.
2. Drones are the Pentagon’s favorite weapon
Christopher Drew, March 17, 2009, New York Times, “Drones Are Weapons of Choice in Fighting Qaeda”, online at
http://www.commondreams.org/headline/2009/03/17-4
And Pentagon officials say the remotely piloted planes, which can beam back live video for up to 22 hours, have done more than any
other weapons system to track down insurgents and save American lives in Iraq and Afghanistan The planes have become one of the
military's favorite weapons despite many shortcomings resulting from the rush to get them into the field. An explosion in demand for
the drones is contributing to new thinking inside the Pentagon about how to develop and deploy new weapons systems.
Defense lobbying is strong
Julian Hattem B.A in Anthropology, Huffington Post, 1-21-10, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/01/21/top-defensecontractors-s_n_431542.html
The ten largest defense contractors in the nation spent more than $27 million lobbying the federal government in the last
quarter of 2009, according to a review of recently-filed lobbying records. The massive amount of money used to influence
the legislative process came as the White House announced it would ramp up military activity in Afghanistan and Congress
considered appropriations bills to pay for that buildup. All told, these ten companies, the largest revenue earners in the
industry, spent roughly $7.2 million more lobbying in the fourth quarter of 2009 (October through December) than in the
three months prior. Such an increase in lobbying expenditures is partly a reflection of just how profitable the business of
waging war can be. Each of these companies earned billions of dollars in defense contracts this past year. As the U.S. ramps
up its military activities overseas, and the army is stretched thin by other ventures, it stands to reason that the contracts
won't dry up any time soon. In mid-December, Congress passed a defense appropriations bill that totaled more than $635
billion. Shortly thereafter, the firm Northrop Grumman moved its corporate office to the Washington D.C. region to be
closer to the heart of legislative action. Among the issues on which these ten firms lobbied, "appropriations" was the most
frequently cited in lobbying forms. "We've built Rome," one longtime good-government official said of the symbiosis
between contractors and the government. On a related note, the Congressional Research Service released a report on
Thursday, which showed that the number of private security contractors has bulged in the wake of Obama's Afghanistansurge announcement. Currently, contractors in Afghanistan make up between 22 percent and 30 percent of armed U.S.
forces in Afghanistan.
13
3. Pushing controversial issues drains Obama’s capital
Mark Seidenfeld, Associate Professor, Florida State University College of Law, Iowa Law Review, October 19 94
In addition, the propensity of congressional committees to engage in special-interest-oriented oversight might seriously
undercut presidential efforts to implement regulatory reform through legislation. n198 On any proposed regulatory
measure, the President could face opposition from powerful committee members whose ability to modify and kill
legislation is well-documented. n199 This is not meant to deny that the President has significant power that he can use to
bring aspects of his legislative agenda to fruition. The President's ability to focus media attention on an issue, his power to
bestow benefits on the constituents of members of Congress who support his agenda, and his potential to deliver votes in
congressional elections increase the likelihood of legislative success for particular programs. n200 Repeated use of such
tactics, however, will impose economic costs on society and concomitantly consume the President's political capital. n201
At some point the price to the President for pushing legislation through Congress exceeds the benefit he derives from doing
so. Thus, a President would be unwise to rely too heavily on legislative changes to implement his policy vision.
14
Politics DA (2/2)
4. START key to prevent nuclear war
Blanchfield 9
Mike Blanchfield, staff writer, 7-4-2009. [Montreal Gazette, “Duck and cover or a world without nukes?”
http://www.montrealgazette.com/story_print.html?id=1759991&sponsor=]
Still, Blair and many others say the need for the U.S. and Russia to show leadership is even more pressing, to remove not
only the ever-present Cold War possibility of a world-ending nuclear accident, but the 21st-century threat of nukes falling
into terrorist hands. Much has been made of the need to press the "reset" button on the strained relations of late between the
White House and the Kremlin. Medvedev struck a conciliatory note this week when he called for a new era in relations with
Washington, based on a "purely pragmatic" agenda. Thomas Graham, a retired U.S. diplomat and Clinton-era arms-control
ambassador, said Russian and U.S. co-operation on arms control, including a new START treaty, would pay dividends in a
much broader sense. "For too long in this post-Cold War world, the two former Cold War adversaries have remained in a
semi-hostile relationship," Graham said. "There could be a serious threat of broader nuclear-weapon proliferation. Many
people are concerned about the Iranian nuclear program. ... This administration, I believe, correctly understands that we
cannot effectively deal with either of those issues, and many others as well, without close co-operation with the Russian
Federation." Officials from both countries are already hammering out the details of an agreement that would replace the
START 1 treaty, which expires Dec. 5. Though the Moscow-Washington relationship is tangled in a web of tension over
the U.S. missile-defence-shield plans for Europe, and NATO's eastward expansion, positive signals emerged from the
Kremlin yesterday on one front: Medvedev's spokesman said he and Obama would sign a side deal that would allow the
U.S. military transit of goods through Russian territory to Afghanistan. The main goal would be a new START framework
that would essentially see both sides slashing their nuclear-warhead stockpiles by one-quarter, down to about 1,500
warheads each. Despite the spread of nuclear-weapons arsenals to such countries as China, Pakistan, India and elsewhere,
nine out of every 10 nuclear bombs on the planet are under the control of the White House and the Kremlin. Lilia
Shevtsova, of the Moscow office of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, suggests that a renewed version of
START will not necessarily make the world a safer place. "When you start counting nukes, you start talking disarmament
and verification procedure. It's a sign not of mutual trust - it's rather a sign of lack, an absence of mutual trust," Shevtsova
said. Charles Ferguson, a senior fellow with the Council on Foreign Relations, says if Russia and the U.S. were to go so far
as to cut their arsenals down to 1,000 each, other nuclear countries could begin to compete with them. For Blair, it's well
past the time to abandon long-held suspicions and animosities. After walking his Ottawa luncheon crowd through his Paris
doomsday vision, Blair piles on more scenarios. If there were an accidental launch of weapons that triggered all-out nuclear
war between Russia and the U.S., 119 million people in each country would die in the initial exchange. That would include
15 million around the Kremlin in Moscow. A city like Chicago or Ottawa would be gone within the hour. "We've pushed
our luck as far as we can; now we need a policy. So to put it bluntly, there are two paths that stretch before us: We either
bury our weapons or we're buried by them," Blair said.
15
Cite don’t rule CP (1/1)
Text:
The United States Supreme Court should prohibit the use of remotely piloted combat vehicles. The United States
Supreme Court will cite Customary International Law in the dicta of the majority decision.
1. Citing international law without relying on it moves the U.S. towards international law acceptance,
making incorporation much more viable long-term.
Martha F. Davis, Prof. of Law @ Albany, 2k (64 Alb. L. Rev. 417, ln)
The Supreme Court has never relied on the ICCPR as a basis for decision , despite its ratification by the United States in 1992. The
amicus argued, however, that the ICCPR requires the United States to take action against gender-based violence perpetrated by both
states and individuals as "an extreme form of gender-based discrimination." According to amicus, the UN General Assembly in its
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women cites the ICCPR as the source of the obligation to eliminate gender-based
violence. In addition, the Human Rights Committee established to oversee state compliance with the ICCPR has "made it clear to
dozens of states that providing remedies for gender-based violence is mandated under the Covenant." Perhaps most significantly in
this domestic context, the United States' Executive branch had reported to the Human Rights Committee that VAWA was
implementing legislation intended to meet U.S. obligations under the ICCPR. Amici further argued that Congress had constitutional
authority to enact VAWA to implement international customary law obligations. According to amici, this authority was contained in
the Congressional constitutional power to "define and punish Piracies [and other offenses] ... against the Law of Nations." In addition,
amici argued that the "necessary and proper" clause of article I, section 8, clause 18 supported application of international law. The
Court wholly ignored these arguments. Accepting them wholesale would likely have required a different result in the case. But
adopting the modest step that I suggest, the Court could have acknowledged that international law constitutes persuasive and relevant
authority, yet still concluded that domestic law nevertheless did not ultimately support Congress's power to enact the Violence
Against Women Act civil rights remedy. For example, focusing on the section 5 aspect of the case, the Court was presented with the
question of whether Congress could exercise its remedial authority to implement the Equal Protection Clause by enacting a statute
directed against private actors. Two nineteenth century cases had largely restricted such authority, but two more recent Supreme Court
decisions had brought those earlier decisions into question.83 As presented to the Court in Morrison, this could have been approached
as an open constitutional question. In its decision, relying on the older opinions as probative of Congress's intent in crafting section 5,
the Court in Morrison concluded that Congress's remedial authority is limited to state actors. Yet many international conventions and
more recently adopted state constitutions take a different view. The Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, for example, permits governments to regulate private actors in order to promote equality between women and men.
South Africa's constitution and the European Convention on Human Rights likewise extend to private actors. The Supreme Court's
opinion in Morrison would have been significantly enhanced had it acknowledged this international authority, explained how and why
it differs from the domestic law applied by the Court, and why the Court doesn't find the international approach persuasive under the
circumstances. Though requiring only a small difference in the Court's approach to opinion-writing, this change would ensure a
"transparency" of decision-making that is increasingly demanded from other branches of government. Further, it would give direction
to Congress and as well as future litigants addressing the United States' international obligations. Ignoring the arguments entirely
ensures that the debate over the role of international law in adjudicating domestic human rights claims remains at a very basic,
undeveloped level, and that the Court seems unresponsive to changes in the larger world.
2. Using international law in a nonbinding way prevents the disad.
Daniel Ryan Koslosky, Senior Fellow, Institute for Human Rights, Peace, and Development, University of
Florida Levin College of Law; 2009, 31 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. 203, ARTICLE: TOWARD AN INTERPRETIVE
MODEL OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: A CASE STUDY OF EASTERN EUROPE,
Section 4 examines two case studies: the Lithuanian Constitutional Court and the Estonian Supreme Court. Both of these
countries have similar normative experiences as constituent components of the Soviet Union, yet adopted dissimilar judicial
structures and procedures. As such, a comparative study between these two countries will be helpful in deducing
conclusions by looking for patterns and dissimilarities in their courts' reasoning while controlling for systemic variables of
their legal systems. Specifically, this Article argues that the development of an independent judiciary in Estonia and
Lithuania was done through utilizing, what I have termed, "external source legitimacy." By interpreting domestic
constitutional norms in light of nonbinding international law, national courts can largely deflect political and popular
pressures while simultaneously asserting their own legitimacy as a dispute arbiter.
16
Court Stripping (1/3)
1. Move towards CIL is gradual and sustainable in the squo
Mark C. Rahdert, Prof. of Law @ Temple, ‘7 (56 Am. U.L. Rev. 553, “Comparative Constitutional
Advocacy,”)
The American tradition of legal and constitutional isolation is slowly breaking down and will continue to do so. There are several
factors contributing to this development, including the increasing globalization of American law, the interaction and exchange among
judicial officials of different nations, the international convergence of constitutional norms, and the increasing sophistication and
progressivism of foreign constitutional courts.
A. Globalization and its Constitutional Implications
Globalization of the law is eroding American constitutional isolation. Globalization of American law has advanced along many fronts,
most notably in areas related to trade and finance, but also in environmental law, intellectual property, and other important domains.
Where globalization has occurred, it has introduced into the American judicial process a new need for attention to comparative legal
analysis. While most of these developments do not have direct constitutional implications, they carry overtones that can indirectly
introduce a comparative element into American constitutional discourse.
For example, the United States has agreed to abide by and enforce a variety of international legal principles that constrain domestic
discretion both to adopt restrictive policies toward foreign trade and to provide preferential treatment for domestic competitors in
global markets. Two prominent examples are U.S. participation in the World Trade Organization and the North American Free Trade
Agreement. Such agreements introduce comparative elements into U.S. judicial decision-making. They create the possibility of
conflict between their terms and domestic laws, contracts, or other legal arrangements. When that occurs, U.S. courts will be called
upon to interpret the language of the multinational agreements, determine the extent (if any) of their legally cognizable conflict with
domestic laws or regulations, and decide how the conflict will be resolved. Conflict between international trade arrangements and
domestic law has constitutional overtones because, under Article VI's Supremacy Clause, such international free trade obligations
become part of the "supreme law of the land" in the United States, binding upon government and private citizens alike. Under the
constitutional doctrine of preemption, the international trade obligations adopted at the national level displace conflicting state and
local law. They also become judicially binding in domestic as well as international commercial arrangements, for example by
rendering certain contractual arrangements illegal or defeating claims based on domestic protective legislation that conflicts with
international legal commands.
Globalization of this sort obliges greater consideration of transnational and comparative principles and materials in American courts. It
not only promotes awareness of international and comparative precedents, but it also creates a pressure for conscious complementarily
of decision-making between American and foreign tribunals, which in turn requires comparative analysis. In litigation over domestic
application, American courts must interpret the international agreements in question. When they do so, they must be aware that other
foreign national tribunals will also interpret the same agreements, and that international tribunals may exist to provide final
authoritative interpretation of disputed questions.
The U.S. courts thus may well have occasion to consider: (1) how other world tribunals have interpreted the provisions of the
international agreement in question; (2) whether similar domestic law conflicts have been detected in other participating nations; and
(3) if so, how other court systems have chosen to resolve those conflicts. At a minimum, U.S. courts probably would not want to give
the international norms more restrictive
effect in the United States than they received abroad. And while the U.S. courts might not be required to
interpret the international agreements in the same way as foreign courts, divergent interpretation could trigger various forms of
international conflict. This conflict may range from international litigation, to legal and diplomatic responses by other nations (or in
some cases even by foreign corporations or citizens) whose interests are harmed by the U.S. interpretation, to economic or legal
retaliation by foreign states whose interests are negatively affected by the U.S. decision.
Given the prospect for such international consequences, it would behoove American courts to attend carefully to potential
interpretative divergences from foreign tribunal. At a minimum, American courts need to know what foreign and international courts
have said regarding the trade provisions in question before adopting a different interpretation. Where possible, the American courts
should probably harmonize U.S. interpretation with the weight of interpretation elsewhere; alternatively, they should have good cause,
solidly grounded in U.S. law and policy, for adopting any interpretation that is at odds with comparative precedent. In either event,
they need to know what comparative law is on the interpretative issues in question in order to make an intelligent decision. They
should not depart from comparative precedent lightly, let alone ignorantly or absent-mindedly.
17
Ultimately, of course, authoritative U.S. interpretation of disputed provisions in international trade agreements becomes the
responsibility of the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court is most likely to take up this duty where the terms of the agreement are subject to
competing plausible interpretations. That possibility could emerge (as with domestic statutory law) through a conflict in interpretation
by lower federal courts, or between federal and state tribunals. In the case of international agreements, it could also arise because of a
conflict in interpretation between a lower U.S. court and a foreign tribunal.
In such a case, the Supreme Court's interpretation will perform the important constitutional function of providing uniformity in federal
law. But the Court's choice among competing interpretations of international agreements will carry additional constitutional
significance. This occurs both because the choice will affect how the provision in question preempts other American laws, and
because the choice will have implications for the exercise of national legislative and executive powers. Although the Court may not be
technically required to consider foreign interpretations of the disputed treaty language, there are powerful constitutional policy reasons
for doing so. A decision at odds with international precedent, for example, could affect the President's ability to conduct foreign policy
by triggering international litigation, inviting retaliatory measures by other states, or leading to sanctions against the United States in
international tribunals.
As globalization progresses, and as U.S. participation in international agreements proliferates, the circumstances in which both the
Supreme Court and lower federal courts need to be aware of foreign precedents will increase. As they do, judicial demand for
information about foreign law will grow, as will the need for both advocates and judges proficient in understanding and utilizing
international and foreign precedent. Over time, the inevitable effect will be more extensive knowledge and use of foreign legal
decisions in American courts.
2. Using CIL as binding law would mobilize opposition to the Court and cause stripping efforts.
David T. Hutt, J.D., Ph.D., legal trainer in Washington, and former Adjunct Assistant Professor at Le Moyne College, and Lisa K.
Parshall, Ph.D., Assistant Professor in the Department of History and Gov’t at Daemen College, 20 07. (33 Ohio N.U.L. Rev. 113,
Divergent Views on the Use of International and Foreign Law: Congress and the Executive versus the Court)
In its last few terms, the United States Supreme Court has utilized foreign and international law to justify decisions in three highprofile cases involving matters of constitutional interpretation. In these decisions, the High Court explicitly referenced international
and foreign decisions in striking down the death penalty for the mentally retarded,' invalidating statutes prohibiting same- sex sodomy,
and declaring the juvenile death penalty unconstitutional. Although these rulings avoided any claim that foreign and international legal
decisions are dispositive to domestic constitutional interpretation, the Court's use of foreign and international legal material set in
motion expressions of outrage by Congress, including the introduction of legislation designed to reign in such practice.
This article addresses the apparent divergence of views between the legal and political branches of the U.S. government regarding the
role of foreign and international law in domestic constitutional interpretation and the formulation of U.S. law and policies. This basic
thesis of a conflict emerging between the Court, and the Congress and the Executive in the appropriateness of internationalizing
American law was recently articulated by Hadar Harris. Like Harris, we argue that executive policy decisions and congressional
legislative action reveals much less receptivity to international and foreign law than exemplified in the recent trend in Supreme Court
decision-making. From restrictions placed on U.S. cooperation with the International Criminal Court, to the Bush Administration's
unilateral withdrawal from the Optional Protocol on the Vienna Convention for Counselor Relations, the political branches have taken
a more restrictive, if not hostile, approach towards the importation of foreign legal jurisprudence than the Court. While we accept
Harris' argument, we expand on his approach, providing more justification for the existence of the divergence, and considering
possible reactions by the U.S. Supreme Court to the mounting political pressure over the continued use of "comparative constitutional
analysis." In addition, we assert that the divergence ultimately impacts American law in different ways with disparate implications for
the international and domestic arenas. In fact in several respects, the divergence highlights a contrast between the international and the
domestic spheres of the three branches. The Supreme Court's decisions utilizing foreign law have primarily domestic consequences,
whereas congressional and executive action have greater ramifications for U.S. relations with other nations and international
organizations.
18
Court Stripping (3/3)
3. Court stripping turns the aff—means no future use of CIL and plan’s unenforced.
David Kubiak, Project Censored award-winning journalist,’5 [ZMag, April 3, Introducing The Constitution Restoration Act,
http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?SectionID=104&ItemID=7569]
In other words, the bill ensures that God's divine word (and our infallible leaders' interpretation thereof) will hereafter trump all our
pathetic democratic notions about freedom, law and rights -- and our courts can't say a thing. This, of course, will take "In God We
Trust" to an entirely new level, because soon He (and His personally anointed political elite) will be all the legal recourse we have left.
This is not a joke, a test, or a fit of libertarian paranoia. The CRA already has 28 sponsors in the House and Senate, and a March 20
call to lead sponsor Sen. Richard Shelby's office assures us that "we have the votes for passage." This is a highly credible projection as
Bill Moyers observes in his 3/24/05 "Welcome to Doomsday" piece in the New York Review of Books: "The corporate, political, and
religious right's hammerlock... extends to the US Congress. Nearly half of its members before the election-231 legislators in all (more
since the election)-are backed by the religious right... Forty-five senators and 186 members of the 108th Congress earned 80 to 100
percent approval ratings from the most influential Christian Right advocacy groups."
This stunning bill and the movement behind it deserve immediate crash study on at least 3 different fronts.
1. Its hostile divorce of American jurisprudence from our hard-won secular history and international norms. To again quote the
Conservative Caucus: "This important bill will restrict the jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court and all lower federal courts to that
permitted by the U.S. Constitution, including on the subject of the acknowledgement of God (as in the Roy Moore 10 Commandments
issue); and it also restricts federal courts from recognizing the laws of foreign countries and international law [e.g., against torture,
global warming, unjust wars, etc. - ed.] as the supreme law of our land."
Re the last point, envision some doddering judges who still revere our Declaration of Independence's "decent respect to the opinions of
mankind," and suppose they invoke in their rulings some international precepts from the UN's Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women or, God forbid, the Geneva Conventions.
Well, under the CRA that would all be clearly illegal and, thank God, that's the last we'd ever hear from them
4. Court authority is key to democracy
Dudziak 2003
(Mary L. Dudziak; Judge Edward J. and Ruey L. Guirado Professor of Law and History, University of Southern
California Law School. A.B. 1978, University of California, Berkeley; J.D. 1984, M.A., M.Phil. 1986, Ph.D.
1992, Yale. May, 2003, 101 Mich L Rev 1622,
http://www.lexisnexis.com:80/us/lnacademic/search/journalssubmitForm.do)
At this moment in the history of American courts, it may be helpful to reflect on the lesson Widner offers about
Tanzania. In a democracy, judicial legitimacy and authority ultimately flow from a public, from a culture,
supportive of judicial review.n29 And as we can see in this example from Africa, support for the courts can
depend on the very nature of judicial action. The courts and the people together worked to build a rule of
law in Tanzania premised on the idea that the courts play a central role in a democracy: the protection of
individual rights against government tyranny.
In this sense, perhaps, Francis Nyalali also has a lesson for popular constitutionalism. He emphasizes a public
conception, a political culture, not just on the nature of rights, but also on the role of courts in a
democracy. And so, paradoxically, the popular constitutionalism we see in Building the Rule of Law is not
only a popular constitutional vision about rights. It is also a popular vision of the importance of courts. How
interesting that as African nations embrace judicial review, there is less consensus among American scholars
that it matters to care about courts.
THE DA SOLVES CASE!