CONFIDENTIAL:
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE, ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
Memorandum
TO:
FROM:
RE:
DATE:
Attorneys; Lewis Jackson file
Amy Shu, Intake Paralegal
Interview with Lewis Jackson
August 28, 2014
Client:
Lewis Jackson
Address/Contact info: 555 Badger Lane, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 53200 (414) 555-1122
DOB:
12-17-58
SSN: 123-45-6789
Occupation:
Senior print shop operator, Milwaukee Herald Newspaper Co.
Income: approx. $42,000 per year
Immediate Family members: Elaine Jackson (wife - deceased);
Raheem Jackson (son - deceased)
I interviewed Lewis Jackson today at our offices. Lewis’s son Raheem Jackson was killed in an
incident with the Milwaukee police on Friday, July 22, 2011. (See attached police report.)
Lewis was not present at the incident, but he has viewed the videotape of the incident made by
an eyewitness, Vikram Kumar. Lewis states that he would like to sue the Milwaukee police for
damages for “police brutality” and for a court order “to prevent this from happening again to
somebody else’s kids.”
Lewis initially retained Arthur Mulligan of the Milwaukee plaintiff’s firm Stahl and Mulligan to
represent him in this case, in August 2011. He said that Mulligan has “done nothing on the
case.” I checked both federal and state court filings and confirmed that no case has been filed.
He said he will “fire” Mulligan as soon as he can find another attorney.
Lewis provided the following details about his son. Raheem was born on March 22, 1992. Lewis
says that Raheem was a good boy and a loving son, although he had a few difficulties as a teen,
which Lewis attributes to the premature death of his wife, Raheem’s mother, Elaine Jackson.
Elaine died of cancer in May 2005, at age 41. Lewis says he needed help raising Raheem after
that, and relied on friends and family members to look after Raheem while Lewis was at work.
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Raheem was only 13 at the time of his mother’s death and became depressed and prone to
occasional outbursts of anger. However, he “stayed within the law” as far as Lewis knows,
except for two incidents. In 2007, Raheem Jackson (then 15 years old) spent a year in a juvenile
detention home for assaulting a police officer. Lewis says that that criminal record “has been
sealed.” In March 2010, celebrating his 18th birthday, Raheem “broke somebody’s nose” in a
fight in a bar. Lewis thinks Raheem pled guilty to a misdemeanor and completed his sentence of
six months probation.
Despite these two brushes with the law, Raheem was a good student and graduated high school
in May 2011 with a B average. He had been accepted into Milwaukee Area Technical College
for a two-year degree program to start this September and was planning to transfer into a fouryear college program and eventually go to law school. Raheem was living at home with Lewis at
the time of his death and was planning to remain in Lewis’s home while attending MATC.
Lewis says he is “devastated” by the loss of his son, and that his promptness in seeking a lawyer
was motivated by “anger” and “a need for justice” rather than a desire for money.
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MILWAUKEE POLICE DEPARTMENT
INCIDENT REPORT
Date of Report: July 22, 2011
Time of Report: 2340 hrs
Date and time of incident: July 22, 2011 (Friday), approx. 9:15 p.m.
Offense(s)
1) Aggravated assault; 2) resisting arrest
Victim(s)
Salvatore Aiello (V-1) (assault) 123 Cornwall Ave., Milwaukee; DOB: 2-2-1961
Gary Long (V-2) (resisting) Patrol Officer, MPD
Suspect/arrestee and description
Raheem Jackson (source driver’s license) DOB: 3-22-1990, Ht: 6'1", Wt. 225 lbs
Suspect is an African-American male, medium complexion, appears much older than age on ID.
Suspect armed?
Yes. Brass knuckles.
Witnesses:
Numerous eyewitnesses, identities unknown. Responding officers unable to interview witnesses
on scene due to exigency.
Description of incident:
Officers Gary Long, Miguel Ponte and Anthony Bonamo responded to 911 call at 2115 hrs
reporting fight in progress and possible riot. On arrival, suspect was observed kneeling astride
V-1, who was lying prone on ground, and choking him. A large crowd of onlookers was
shouting various statements, such as “stop, you’re killing him” or “kill him.” No onlookers were
attempting physically to break up fight. Responding officers grabbed Suspect by the arms and
chest to remove him from V-1, but suspect exhibited extreme physical strength and resistance.
Suspect resisted officers attempts to restrain him and verbal commands to cease choking and
submit to arrest. Therefore, Ofcr Long applied chokehold at which point Suspect was
successfully separated from V-1. Suspect immediately collapsed to the ground and appeared
unconscious. Suspect was placed in back of patrol vehicle and rushed to ER, arriving
approximately 2130. Suspect pronounced dead at 2145 hrs.
Reporting Officer:
P.O. Miguel Ponte, Badge No. 9113
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OFFICE OF THE MILWAUKEE COUNTY CORONER
DATE and HOUR AUTOPSY PERFORMED: 07.23.2011 at 12:30 P.M. by
Neil Alderman, M.D.
555 Grand Avenue
Milwaukee, WI XXXXX
608-XXX-XXXX (FAX 608-XXX-XXXX)
SUMMARY REPORT OF AUTOPSY
Name: JACKSON, Raheem
Date of Birth: 03.22.1992
Date of Death: 07.22.2011
Sex: Male
Case Number: 000388-31A-2011
Body Identified by: Lewis Jackson, father
Time of Autopsy: 07.23.2011, 12:30 P.M.
Investigative Agency: City of Milwaukee
Police Department
EVIDENCE OF MEDICAL INTERVENTION:
None.
EXTERNAL EXAMINATION:
The body is received in a sealed black body bag marked “County Morgue”. The seal of the bag is
opened in the presence of Milwaukee Police Department Investigator at 12:30 P.M. on July 23,
2011. The body is that of a normally developed African American man measuring 6 feet 1 inch
in height, and weighing 225 pounds. Body is generally consistent with the stated age of 19 years.
The deceased is clothed in a white t-shirt, khaki shorts, with white tennis shoes and red socks on
both feet. Across the knuckles of both hands there are gold colored metal ring-plates, measuring
4 x 1 inches, the left plate spelling “LOVE” and the right plate spelling “HATE”.
The hair is black and three inches in length. The eyes are partially open, the irises are brown and
the corneas are cloudy. The sclerae are slightly bloodshot. The pupils measure 0.45cm
bilaterally. There are red to purple contusions and mild superficial abrasions noted centrally over
the anterior neck, measuring 12 x 3 cm in greatest dimensions. The chest, abdomen and back are
symmetrical and intact. The right ninth rib is fractured anteriorly and there are multiple focal red
to purple hematoma over the fracture site. Limbs are equal, symmetrically developed and intact.
Abrasions are noted on the flexor surfaces of both knees, each measuring 6 x 4 cm at greatest
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dimension. There are no scars, brands or identifying tattoos.
INTERNAL EXAMINATION:
RESPIRATORY SYSTEM – THROAT STRUCTURES:
Trace amounts of vomit are present in the posterior oral cavity. The oral cavity shows no lesions.
The mucosa is intact and there are no injuries to the lips, teeth or gums. There is extensive
hemorrhagic discoloration and contusion noted in the anterior and lateral laryngeal mucosa. The
hyoid bone is fractured over the anterior larynx, and there is a trace amount (less than 5 ml) of
bloody fluid in the laryngeal cavity. The lungs are grossly unremarkable and of appropriate
weight bilaterally.
CARDIOVASCULAR SYSTEM:
The heart weighs 249 grams, with normal coronary vasculature without significant
atherosclerosis, and normal anatomic configuration. Examination of the myocardium reveals no
evidence of infarct.
GASTROINTESTINAL SYSTEM:
The mucosa and wall of the esophagus are intact but demonstrate hemorrhagic discoloration
anteriorly and laterally in the upper esophagus. The stomach contains 70mls of partially digested
food. There is no evidence of pill fragments or toxic substance ingestion. The mucosa of the
duodenum, jejunum, ileum, colon and rectum are intact. The subject’s liver reveals a 5 cm
capsular laceration with acute bleeding under the site of the ninth rib.
URINARY SYSTEM:
The kidneys weigh: Left, 120 grams; Right, 115 grams. The kidneys are of the usual size, shape
and anatomic location without discernible lesions.
LABORATORY AND IMAGING DATA:
X-RAY:
Multiple hairline fractures of the mandible are observed. There is a single anterior fracture of the
right ninth rib.
TOXICOLOGY:
Blood, urine, and vitreous fluid are collected for laboratory analysis. Urine drug screen is
negative. Blood ethanol level is 0 mg/d.
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COMMENTS:
The cause of death is asphyxiation due to external compression of the larynx, and the manner of
death is homicide. The bruises observed across the neck, as well as the corresponding
hemorrhage noted in the internal neck structures, are consistent with application of significant
force across the deceased’s neck leading to death. This is compatible with the observed
application of a baton to the deceased prior to death. There is also a right rib fracture causing a
hepatic laceration, indicating severe trauma to the right thorax and abdomen. There is no
evidence of natural anatomic medical abnormalities that could have resulted in death. The
deceased was not intoxicated. Time of death is consistent with Police Investigator’s reported
time of 9:15 P.M. on 07.23.2011.
// Neil Alderman, M.D.
Milwaukee County Coroner’s Office
July 23, 2011
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Tennessee v. Garner
No. 83-1035
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
471 U.S. 1; 105 S. Ct. 1694; 85 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1985)
Excerpt from Supreme Court opinion:
[Note: this case has been heavily edited. When the Supreme Court refers to “petitioner” or
“appellant,” they mean the defendants in the case: the State of Tennessee, the City of Memphis,
and the individual police officers. These are the parties who “petitioned” the Supreme Court for
review or “appealed” the lower court decision to the Supreme Court.]
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRENNAN, MARSHALL,
BLACKMUN, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. O'CONNOR, J., filed a dissenting
opinion, in which BURGER, C. J., and REHNQUIST, J., joined.
JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case requires us to determine the constitutionality of the use of deadly force to prevent
the escape of an apparently unarmed suspected felon....
I
At about 10:45 p. m. on October 3, 1974, Memphis Police Officers Elton Hymon and Leslie
Wright were dispatched to answer a "prowler inside call." Upon arriving at the scene they saw a
woman standing on her porch and gesturing toward the adjacent house. She told them she had
heard glass breaking and that "they" or "someone" was breaking in next door. While Wright
radioed the dispatcher to say that they were on the scene, Hymon went behind the house. He
heard a door slam and saw someone run across the backyard. The fleeing suspect, who was
appellee-respondent's decedent, Edward Garner, stopped at a 6-feet-high chain link fence at the
edge of the yard. With the aid of a flashlight, Hymon was able to see Garner's face and hands.
He saw no sign of a weapon, and, though not certain, was "reasonably sure" and "figured" that
Garner was unarmed. App. 41, 56;Record 219. He thought Garner was 17 or 18 years old and
about 5'5" or 5'7" tall. While Garner was crouched at the base of the fence, Hymon called out
"police, halt" and took a few steps toward him. Garner then began to climb over the fence.
Convinced that if Garner made it over the fence he would elude capture, Hymon shot him. The
bullet hit Garner in the back of the head. Garner was taken by ambulance to a hospital, where he
died on the operating table. Ten dollars and a purse taken from the house were found on his
body….
Whenever an officer restrains the freedom of a person to walk away, he has seized that
person. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975). While it is not always clear
just when minimal police interference becomes a seizure, see United States v. Mendenhall, 446
7
U.S. 544 (1980), there can be no question that apprehension by the use of deadly force is a
seizure subject to the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment.
.... A police officer may arrest a person if he has probable cause to believe that person
committed a crime. E. g., United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976). Petitioners and
appellant argue that if this requirement is satisfied the Fourth Amendment has nothing to say
about how that seizure is made. .... [But] notwithstanding probable cause to seize a suspect, an
officer may not always do so by killing him. The intrusiveness of a seizure by means of deadly
force is unmatched. The suspect's fundamental interest in his own life need not be elaborated
upon. The use of deadly force also frustrates the interest of the individual, and of society, in
judicial determination of guilt and punishment. Against these interests are ranged governmental
interests in effective law enforcement. It is argued that overall violence will be reduced by
encouraging the peaceful submission of suspects who know that they may be shot if they flee.
Effectiveness in making arrests requires the resort to deadly force, or at least the meaningful
threat thereof. ...
Without in any way disparaging the importance of these goals, we are not convinced that the
use of deadly force is a sufficientlyproductive means of accomplishing them to justify the killing
of nonviolent suspects. ... And while the meaningful threat of deadly force might be thought to
lead to the arrest of more live suspects by discouraging escape attempts, the presently available
evidence does not support this thesis. The fact is that a majority of police departments in this
country have forbidden the use of deadly force against nonviolent suspects. ... Petitioners and
appellant have not persuaded us that shooting nondangerous fleeing suspects is so vital as to
outweigh the suspect's interest in his own life.
The use of deadly force to prevent the escape of all felony suspects, whatever the
circumstances, is constitutionally unreasonable. It is not better that all felony suspects die than
that they escape. Where the suspect poses no immediate threat to the officer and no threat to
others, the harm resulting from failing to apprehend him does not justify the use of deadly force
to do so. It is no doubt unfortunate when a suspect who is in sight escapes, but the fact thatthe
police arrive a little late or are a little slower afoot does not always justify killing the suspect. A
police officer may not seize an unarmed, nondangerous suspect by shooting him dead... Where
the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm,
either to the officer or to others, it is not constitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape by using
deadly force. Thus, if the suspect threatens the officer with a weapon or there is probable cause
to believe that he has committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of
serious physical harm, deadly force may be used if necessary to prevent escape, and if, where
feasible, some warning has been given....
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed, and the case is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
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TITLE 42, UNITED STATES CODE: THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE
CHAPTER 21: CIVIL RIGHTS GENERALLY
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Civil action for deprivation of rights
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any
action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial
capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or
declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress
applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the
District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1988. Proceedings in vindication of civil rights
….
(b) Attorney's fees. In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1977, 1977A,
1978, 1979, 1980, and 1981 of the Revised Statutes [42 USCS §§ 1981-1983, 1985, 1986], title
IX of Public Law 92-318 [20 USCS §§ 1681 et seq.], the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
1993, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 [42 USCS §§ 2000d et seq.], or section 40302 of the Violence Against
Women Act of 1994, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the
United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs, except that in any action brought
against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity such
officer shall not be held liable for any costs, including attorney's fees, unless such action was
clearly in excess of such officer's jurisdiction.
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