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Affs That Create New Visas 1NC
Affirmatives have to increase visas for previously existing visa categories- the aff creates a new visa
Increase requires a pre-existing baseline
Buckley et al. ‘6 (Jeremiah Buckley, Attorney, 2006, AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF, SAFECO INS. CO. OFAMERICA ET AL
V. CHARLES BURR)
First, the court said that the ordinary meaning of the word “increase” is “to make something greater,” which it believed should not “be limited to cases in which a company raises
the rate that anindividual has previously been charged.” 435 F.3d at 1091. Yet the definition offered by the Ninth Circuit compels the opposite conclusion. Because
“increase” means “to make something greater,” there must necessarily have been an existing premium, to which Edo’s actual
premium may be compared, to determine whether an “increase” occurred. Congress could have provided that “adverse action” in the insurance context
means charging an amount greater than the optimal premium, but insteadchose to define adverse action in terms of an “increase.” That definitional choice must be
respected, not ignored. See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 392-93 n.10 (1979) (“[a] definition which declares what a term ‘means’ . . .
excludes any meaning that is not stated”). Next, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that because the Insurance Prong includes the words “existing or applied for,” Congress
intended that an “increase in any charge” for insurance must “apply to all insurancetransactions – from an initial policy of insurance to a renewal of a long-held policy.” 435 F.3d
at 1091. This interpretation reads the words “existing or applied for” in isolation. Other types ofadverse action described in the Insurance Prong apply only to situations where a
consumer had an existing policy of insurance, such as a “cancellation,” “reduction,” or “change” in insurance. Each of these forms of adverse action
presupposes an already-existing policy, and under usual canons of statutory construction the term “increase” also should be
construed to apply to increases of an already-existing policy. See Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004) (“a phrase gathers meaning from the words
around it”)
“Its visas” requires the federal government to increase an already existing visa
Merriam Webster Online 07
its: of or relating to it or itself especially as possessor, agent, or object of action
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SKFTA
The South Korean Free Trade Agreement will pass – Obama is pushing
AgWired, 1/9/2011 (Korea free trade optimism, p. http://agwired.com/2011/01/09/korean-free-trade-optimism/)
Korea’s ambassador to the United States is optimistic that Congress will pass the Korea-US Free Trade Agreement when it is submitted by the
president. Han Duk-soo spoke at a town hall forum sponsored by American Farm Bureau during the Ag Connect Expo on Saturday and then held a press conference, accompanied
momentum is very high now, I would say there’s no objections from US
industry,” Han said during the press conference. “President Obama is very strong on passing this agreement, so I think it will be
submitted to congress by the administration soon and if it is submitted, I think Congress should act within 60 days.” His hope is that it will be finished by
by AFBF’s Congressional Relations Director Chris Garza. “The
the end of June.
Taking on immigration would destroy Obama’s political capital- tanks the agenda
Hill ’10 (Obama: Political Capital “Tank” Running on Empty Posted on 02 May 2010 by admin Share
Obama’s Political Capital Tank Running On Empty By Dell Hill
Understanding the American political process doesn’t require a PhD., but it does require a basic understanding of what it takes to present, move and enact legislation to become
law. It’s called “political capital”. Basically, political capital is the currency of politics. It’s what one politician uses to convince another
politician to support a particular piece of legislation. Some would call it “one hand washing the other” and that’s a fair analogy.
For the President to advance a political agenda, political capital is his fuel tank to get things done. He wheels and deals – all the
while using that political fuel tank to get what he ultimately wants, and some agendas consume incredible amounts of that fuel.
ObamaCare, for instance, required an enormous amount of political capital to get enacted. It has become the centerpiece of the
Obama administration and is, quite frankly, about the only real victory the President can claim, but it came at a tremendous cost,
literally and figuratively. Washington Post columnist, Dana Milbank, writing in the Sunday, May 2, 2010 edition, discusses the
President’s “fatal flinch on immigration reform”; a piece that seems to scold and defend the President’s actions all in one fell swoop. You can read the entire
piece here http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/30/AR2010043001389_pf.html Milbank dances all around the fact that Barac k Obama has
just about run out of political capital and is in no position to jump out of the frying pan into the fire by attempting to advance
immigration reform legislation during this legislative session. The cost – in political capital – would be much too great and that fuel
tank is already running on empty. Even though we’ve only scratched the surface on the “who promised whom, what” to get ObamaCare passed, suffice to say it required every
imaginable political trick and Chicago-style political skull-duggery. To Obama, it was worth it, even if nearly 60% of the country still doesn’t like it, at least it’s something he can
call a political victory. When you throw in the obvious problem of potential massive losses in the mid-term elections, now just a few months away, you get a much better
understanding of how the system does, or doesn’t work.
Political Capital is key to SKFTA
Wall Street Journal, 12/6/2010 (A Korea-U.S. Trade Deal, At Last The Korea pact is a step forward, but now the President has
to sell it. Printed in The Wall Street Journal, page A18)
These caveats should not deter Congress from ratifying what is still an excellent deal. Mr. Obama
has asked GOP House Speaker-designate John Boehner to assist in
getting the pact approved, and we're told Mr. Boehner has suggested grouping this deal together with pending agreements with Colombia and Panama in a single House
vote. This would make it easier for pro-trade forces in Congress to concentrate their political capital. Mr. Boehner will bring a majority or more of his GOP
Members along, but Mr. Obama will have to spend his own political capital to rebuild American public support for free trade and
gain Democratic support. The President would have made more progress toward his goal of doubling American exports if he had supported this deal in 2008 and pressed
it through Congress in 2009. The failure in leadership was to side with the United Auto Workers and other unions against the national interest. Those who think they'll lose from
trade always have the strongest motivation to lobby, while the consumers and businesses that benefit (such as American pickup truck buyers) are harder to organize. Every
American President since Hoover in the 1920s has taken the broad view, speaking up for the many trade beneficiaries. U.S. public support for freer trade has
eroded amid the recession and the lack of Presidential leadership. It is crucial for U.S. competitiveness in particular, and the world
economy more broadly, that Mr. Obama and his allies make a strong and unapologetic case that trade is in the best interests of
American businesses and workers.
Ratifying SKFTA is critical to the US-South Korean alliance
Stangarone, 11/4/2010 (Troy - director of Congressional Affairs and Trade for the Korea Economic Institute, On the sidelines of
the g-20, Asia Pacific Bulletin, No. 79, p. 1-2)
The pending free trade agreement between the United States and South Korea, KORUS FTA, is heading into a defining period. After more than three years of delay, Presidents
Barack Obama and Lee Myung-bak have committed to resolving each side’s differences by the upcoming G-20 summit in Seoul on November 11-12, paving the way for passage
in 2011. However, for political reasons in both countries, 2011 may be the last opportunity to move forward on the KORUS FTA for a period of years
and falling short of that could have reverberations for the alliance. Timelines and the G-20 The KORUS FTA’s prospects are inversely tied to the next
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US presidential election. As it draws nearer, the agreement’s chances of passing Congress grow slimmer. For this reason, the FTA needs to be sent to Congress no later than this
spring to ensure it is passed prior to the August recess, and thus avoids any budget showdown next fall. If there is not a vote in 2011, the chances of a vote in a presidential election
year are slim. Instead, the agreement might be facing the worst of all possibilities—delay until the next administration. In that case, a vote might not occur until late 2013 or early
2014, as a reelected Obama administration or a new Republican administration would want to move on any major campaign promises first. The only real window of opportunity is
the first half of 2011. The Consequences of Not Reaching a Deal The sinking of the Cheonan earlier this year focused the US administration’s thinking about the KORUS FTA and
the US-ROK alliance. In the face of North Korean aggression the Obama administration sought to signal its support for an embattled
US ally in the strongest terms possible. Continued delay on a key alliance issue such as the KORUS FTA would have signaled that there was distance
between the two governments, especially in light of the policy significance that South Korea places on the agreement. Having publicly committed to a resolution on
the FTA means that falling short will have a quantitatively different impact on relations than would have occurred in the absence of a public commitment. As the G-20 approaches,
its worth considering what this would mean. First, the alliance will not come to an end. Core security considerations relating to North Korea and the Korean peninsula will not
change. However, there is the possibility for policy divergence in other areas and a change in the conception each side has for the future direction of the alliance. The first impact is
the easiest to quantify—the continued decline of the United States as an economic actor on the Korean peninsula. This is a process that is already taking place. The last decade has
seen China rapidly surpass the United States in terms of trade with South Korea, as well as the European Union. The European Union’s FTA with South Korea will come into force
on July 1 of next year, while South Korea is expected to engage in FTA negotiations with China in 2012. Along with South Korea’s other FTAs, these will continue to erode the
United States’ position as an economic player on the Korean peninsula. On a regional level, there
would be consequences to the U nited S tates’ economic
position as well. The United S tates would lose credibility as a negotiating partner on the most significant set of issues in Asia, trade and
economic growth. This would likely have a direct impact on the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations, as America’s partners would likely have concerns about the United States’
ability to follow through on its commitments. On the political and strategic side, the nature of the outcome could create disappointment that would have political consequences in
South Korea. It would be understandable for South Koreans to question the United States’ commitment to the alliance and further a
narrative, even if untrue, of the United States as an unreliable partner in some quarters. This
would strengthen the position of those in South Korea who
believe that South Korea’s future is outside of the US-ROK alliance and weaken those who want to work with the United States.
At a time when China is growing more assertive as a regional power and South Korea’s economic ties to the United States are loosening, it would give new context to the question
of whether South Korea’s long- term future is tied to that of the United States, especially if unification were to occur. Policy divergence might also occur in other areas such as
trade, economics, nuclear proliferation and climate change, to name but a few. In the absence of a close relationship with the United States the recent decision by South Korea to
impose additional sanctions on Iran might have been different. This decision was highly contentious in South Korea because of the potential consequences it had for South Korean
interests in the Middle East. In a less friendly political environment it might be difficult for a South Korean government that wanted to
work with the United States. Let alone a government that did not, creating incentives to take a different course much as Turkey has done as it reorients its foreign policy
in the light of cooling relations with Washington and Europe. Concluding the FTA would provide an institutional structure to the alliance and
point to a commitment by both sides beyond the resolution of long-standing tensions on the peninsula. This would help the alliance to weather
changes in government better by providing an additional institutional framework. As has been the case before with South Korea and is currently the case with Japan,
every relationship goes through difficult periods and having additional ties between both sides will help to make those periods
easier to weather. The KORUS FTA as a First Step in Asia With South Korea being awarded the distinction of hosting the G-20 summit this November and the 2012
nuclear summit attest, Seoul is beginning to come of age on the global stage. It is also doing so during a time of significant change. The G-20 is already rewriting the global
economic power structure and those same shifts in economic power will precipitate changes in diplomatic and international power structures in the years ahead. While the KORUS
FTA will not address all of the challenges the United States will face in a changing international system, it is a key part of the strategic picture for the United States in South Korea
and Asia more generally. If
the U nited S tates allows itself to continue to lose ground as an economic presence on the peninsula and Asia,
will see the same outcome on its diplomatic and military influence. The first step to avoiding that outcome is to reach an
understanding on the KORUS FTA.
over time it
A strong alliance is key to prevent North Korean nuclear crisis
Pritchard et al, 2009 – President of the Korea Economic Institute (Charles L, 6/16. With John H. Tilelli Jr., Chairman and CEO, Cypress International, and Scott A.
Snyder, Adjunct Senior Fellow for Korea Studies, CFR. “A New Chapter for U.S.-South Korea Alliance.” Council on Foreign Relations.
http://www.cfr.org/publication/19635/new_chapter_for_ussouth_korea_alliance.html)
While all eyes have been trained on North Korea's belligerent and aggressive actions in recent weeks, it is important to note that the
U.S.-South Korea alliance has
emerged as a linchpin in the Obama administration's efforts to successfully manage an overcrowded global agenda, and a pivotal tool for safeguarding U.S.
long-term interests in Asia. When South Korea's President Lee Myung-bak meets with President Barack Obama at the White House Tuesday, the two leaders must
effectively address three main areas: policy coordination to address North Korea's nuclear threat, the development of a global security agenda that extends beyond the peninsula,
and collaboration to address the global financial crisis as South Korea takes a lead on the G-20 process. By conducting a second nuclear test in May, followed by a number of
missile launches, North Korea has forced its way onto the Obama administration's agenda. First and foremost, effective U.S.-South Korea alliance coordination
is critical to managing both the global effects of North Korea's nuclear threat on the nonproliferation regime and the regional
security challenges posed by potential regime actions that lead to further crisis in the region. North Korea's internal focus on its leadership
succession, and the apparent naming of North Korean leader Kim Jong-il's little-known and inexperienced youngest son as his successor, make the task of responding to North
Korea's aggressive and destabilizing actions all the more challenging. Both deterrence and negotiation must be pursued on the basis of close
consultations. Presidents Obama and Lee must also develop coordinated contingency plans in the event of internal instability in North Korea.
Through effective U.S.-South Korea alliance coordination, it should be possible to forge a combined strategy capable of managing
the nuclear, proliferation, and regional security dimensions of North Korea's threat. A coordinated position would also strengthen the
administration's hand in its efforts to persuade China to put pressure on North Korea.
North Korean nuclear crisis causes extinction
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Hayes and Green, 2010 - *Victoria University AND **Executive Director of the Nautilus Institute (Peter and Michael, “-“The Path Not Taken, the Way Still Open:
Denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia”, 1/5, http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/10001HayesHamalGreen.pdf)
The consequences of failing to address the proliferation threat posed by the North Korea developments, and related political and
economic issues, are serious, not only for the Northeast Asian region but for the whole international community. At worst, there is the possibility of nuclear
attack1, whether by intention, miscalculation, or merely accident, leading to the resumption of Korean War hostilities. On the
Korean Peninsula itself, key population centres are well within short or medium range missiles. The whole of Japan is likely to come within North Korean missile range.
Pyongyang has a population of over 2 million, Seoul (close to the North Korean border) 11 million, and Tokyo over 20 million. Even a limited nuclear exchange
would result in a holocaust of unprecedented proportions. But the catastrophe within the region would not be the only outcome. New research
indicates that even a limited nuclear war in the region would rearrange our global climate far more quickly than global warming.
Westberg draws attention to new studies modelling the effects of even a limited nuclear exchange involving approximately 100 Hiroshima-sized 15 kt bombs2 (by comparison it
should be noted that the United States currently deploys warheads in the range 100 to 477 kt, that is, individual warheads equivalent in yield to a range of 6 to 32
Hiroshimas).The studies indicate that the soot from the fires produced would lead to a decrease in global temperature by 1.25
degrees Celsius for a period of 6-8 years.3 In Westberg’s view: That is not global winter, but the nuclear darkness will cause a deeper drop in
temperature than at any time during the last 1000 years. The temperature over the continents would decrease substantially more than the global average. A
decrease in rainfall over the continents would also follow...The period of nuclear darkness will cause much greater decrease in grain production than 5% and it will continue for
many years...hundreds of millions of people will die from hunger...To make matters even worse, such amounts of smoke injected into the
stratosphere would cause a huge reduction in the Earth’s protective ozone.4 These, of course, are not the only consequences. Reactors might also be
targeted, causing further mayhem and downwind radiation effects, superimposed on a smoking, radiating ruin left by nuclear next-use. Millions of refugees would flee the affected
regions. The direct impacts, and the follow-on impacts on the global economy via ecological and food insecurity, could make the
present global financial crisis pale by comparison. How the great powers, especially the nuclear weapons states respond to such a crisis, and in
particular, whether nuclear weapons are used in response to nuclear first-use, could make or break the global non proliferation and disarmament regimes.
There could be many unanticipated impacts on regional and global security relationships5, with subsequent nuclear breakout and
geopolitical turbulence, including possible loss-of-control over fissile material or warheads in the chaos of nuclear war, and aftermath chain-reaction
affects involving other potential proliferant states. The Korean nuclear proliferation issue is not just a regional threat but a global one that warrants priority
consideration from the international community.
SKFTA is a bellwether for US trade policy and the role of free trade in the international system
Manyin et al, 9 – Specialist in Asian Affairs at the Congressional Research Service (Mark E, with William H. Cooper, Remy Jurenas, and Michaela D. Platzer, 6/17. “The
Proposed U.S.-South Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA): Provisions and Implications.” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress.
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34330.pdf)
The fate of the KORUS FTA could affect U.S. efforts to institutionalize its economic presence in East Asia, a goal the Bush Administration
has been pursuing in part through FTAs. In addition to the KORUS FTA, the United States has an FTA with Singapore. It has been negotiating with Malaysia and Thailand, but
these negotiations have been slow or dormant. In September 2008, the United States announced it would launch negotiations to join the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic
Partnership Agreement (also called the “P-4” agreement), a trade liberalization arrangement among Brunei, Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore. The U.S. use of FTAs in
Asia also has been a response to the plethora of bilateral and multilateral FTAs that are being negotiated in the region. None of the actual or
proposed multilateral agreements include the United States. Failure of the KORUS FTA could be viewed as a serious blow to the U.S.
“competitive liberalization” strategy. With FTAs throughout East Asia proliferating, a failure of the KORUS FTA to be
implemented would also likely mean that the United States would be shut out of regional economic groupings in East Asia. In contrast,
the implementation of the KORUS FTA could spark interest of other East Asian countries, such as Japan, to negotiate FTAs with the
United States in order not to lose their share of the huge U.S. market to South Korea. Thus, if the proponents of the “competitive liberalization”
argument are correct, the fate of the KORUS FTA could play an important role in accelerating or decelerating the move to open market
regionalism in East Asia. Similarly, the fate of the KORUS FTA is likely to be seen as a bellwether for broader U.S. trade policy, which
is now in a period of re-evaluation. In addition to the KORUS FTA, U.S. FTAs with Colombia and Panama are pending and may
be acted on during the 111th Congress. The Doha Development Agenda round in the WTO is, for all intent and purposes, on life support, if not dead. This
raises questions in the minds of U.S. policymakers and other experts, regarding the future role of the WTO and multilateral negotiations
in shaping the international trading framework. The KORUS FTA will likely play a role in this reassessment. For better or worse, its
rejection or indefinite delay might call into question the viability of FTAs as a serious U.S. tool to strengthen economic ties with
major trading partners.
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Free trade solves extinction
Copley News Service, December 1, 1999, “Commentary”
For decades, many children in America and other countries went to bed fearing annihilation by nuclear war. The specter of nuclear winter freezing the life out of planet Earth
seemed very real. Activists protesting the World Trade Organization's meeting in Seattle apparently have forgotten that threat. The truth is that nations join together in
groups like the WTO not just to further their own prosperity, but also to forestall conflict with other nations. In a way, our planet has
traded in the threat of a worldwide nuclear war for the benefit of cooperative global economics. Some Seattle protesters clearly fancy
themselves to be in the mold of nuclear disarmament or anti-Vietnam War protesters of decades past. But they're not. They're special-interest activists, whether the cause is
environmental, labor or paranoia about global government. Actually, most of the demonstrators in Seattle are very much unlike yesterday's peace activists, such as Beatle John
Lennon or philosopher Bertrand Russell, the father of the nuclear disarmament movement, both of whom urged people and nations to work together rather than strive against each
other. These and other war protesters would probably approve of 135 WTO nations sitting down peacefully to discuss economic issues that in the past might have been settled by
bullets and bombs. As long as nations are trading peacefully, and their economies are built on exports to other countries, they have a
major disincentive to wage war. That's why bringing China, a budding superpower, into the WTO is so important. As exports to the United States and the rest of the
world feed Chinese prosperity, and that prosperity increases demand for the goods we produce, the threat of hostility diminishes. Many anti-trade protesters in Seattle claim that
only multinational corporations benefit from global trade, and that it's the everyday wage earners who get hurt. That's just plain wrong. First of all, it's not the military-industrial
complex benefiting. It's U.S. companies that make high-tech goods. And those companies provide a growing number of jobs for Americans. In San Diego, many people have good
jobs at Qualcomm, Solar Turbines and other companies for whom overseas markets are essential. In Seattle, many of the 100,000 people who work at Boeing would lose their
livelihoods without world trade. Foreign trade today accounts for 30 percent of our gross domestic product. That's a lot of jobs for everyday workers.
Growing global prosperity has helped counter the specter of nuclear winter. Nations of the world are learning to live and work
together, like the singers of anti-war songs once imagined. Those who care about world peace shouldn't be protesting world trade. They should be celebrating it.
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Waivers
Text: The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services should grant advance parole with all
necessary extensions to persons who cooperate in investigations of employers by providing information
regarding pattern or practice hiring of unauthorized employees.
Counterplan solves 100% of case
Endelman and Mehta ‘10 (Gary Endelman, practices immigration law at BP America Inc, serves on the Editorial Advisory
Board of Immigration Daily, and Cyrus D. Mehta, nationally recognized in the field of immigration law. He represents
corporations and individuals from around the world in business and employment immigration, family immigration, consular
matters, naturalization, federal court litigation and asylum. He also advises lawyers on ethical issues. Based on 18 years of
experience in immigration law, He is also an Adjunct Professor of Law at Brooklyn Law School where he teaches a course,
Immigration and Work, Chair of the American Immigration Lawyers Association’s (AILA) National Pro Bono Committee and
Co-Chair of the AILA-NY Chapter Pro Bono Committe COMPREHENSIVE IMMIGRATION REFORM THROUGH
EXECUTIVE FIAT, April 25, 2010, http://cyrusmehta.blogspot.com/2010/04/comprehensive-immigration-reform.html)
For instance, there
is nothing that would bar the USCIS from allowing the beneficiary of an approved employment based I-140 or family
based I-130 petition, and derivative family members, to obtain an employment authorization document (EAD) and parole. The Executive, under INA §
212(d)(5), has the authority to grant parole for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefits. The crisis in the priority dates where beneficiaries of petitions may
need to wait for green cards in excess of 30 years may qualify for invoking § 212(d)(5) under “urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefits.” Similarly, the authors credit David Isaacson who
pointed out that the Executive has the authority to grant EAD under INA §274A(h)(3), which defines the term “unauthorized alien” as one who is not “(A) an alien lawfully admitted for permanent
residence, or (B) authorized to be so employed by this Act or by the Attorney General” (emphasis added). Under sub paragraph (B), the USCIS may grant an EAD to people who are adversely impacted by
the tyranny of priority dates. Likewise, the
beneficiary of an I-130 or I-140 petition who is outside the U.S. can also be paroled into the U.S. before the
priority date becomes current. The principal and the applicable derivatives would enjoy permission to work and travel regardless
of whether they remained in nonimmigrant visa status. Even those who are undocumented or out of status , but are beneficiaries of approved I130 and I-140 petitions, can be granted employment authorization and parole. The retroactive grant of parole may also alleviate those who are subject to the three or ten year
bars since INA § 212(a)(9)(B)(ii) defines “unlawful presence” as someone who is here “without being admitted or paroled.” Parole, therefore, eliminates the accrual of
unlawful presence. While parole does not constitute an admission, one conceptual difficulty is whether parole can be granted to an individual who is already admitted on a nonimmigrant visa but
has overstayed. Since parole is not considered admission, it can be granted more readily to one who entered without inspection. On the other
hand, it is possible for the Executive to rescind the grant of admission under INA §212(d)(5), and instead, replace it with the grant parole. As an
example, an individual who was admitted in B-2 status and is the beneficiary of an I-130 petition but whose B-2 status has expired can be
required to report to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). who can retroactively rescind the grant of admission in B-2 status and
instead be granted parole retroactively.
CP avoids politics and is key to presidential powers
Lawrence ‘10 (Stewart J, is a Washington, DC-based public policy analyst and writes frequently on immigration and Latino
affairs, He is also founder and managing director of Puentes & Associates, Inc., a bilingual survey research and communications
firm, September 2, Immigration: the case for executive orders,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2010/sep/02/us-immigration-obama-executive)
Executive action is risky. But it's far less risky, politically, than convening a "lame-duck" session of congress, as some Democrats like senate majority
leader Harry Reid (Democrat, Nevada) now propose, to try to ram through the Dream Act or other broader immigration measures, much as they did with healthcare reform. Most outgoing
Democrats aren't going to play ball, especially if they have to vote to expand enforcement. And even those who survive the mid-terms still have to
face the voters in 2012. Supporting legalisation in a GOP-controlled congress could well cost them their seats. As president, Obama is uniquely placed to step in and exercise
Solomon-like leadership on behalf of Democrats and Republicans alike. Recent polls show that a majority of voters – including a
majority of GOP voters – support expanded enforcement coupled with some kind of legalisation. At a time when the public
discourse on immigration is degenerating into near-hysteria, and congress remains paralysed, even-handed executive action can
point the country forward. It sends a powerful signal to voters that the president still has the courage to stick his neck out, even
when a nervous and recalcitrant congress, including members of his own party, won't. The entire country – Democrats,
Republicans and independents alike – would stand up and cheer.
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Strong presidential powers are critical to the global economy and preventing global wars
South China Morning Post ‘2K
(12-11, Lexis)
A weak president with an unclear mandate is bad news for the rest of the world. For better or worse, the person who rules the United States influences events far beyond the
shores of his own country. Both the global economy and international politics will feel the effect of political instability in the US. The first
impact will be on American financial markets, which will have a ripple effect on markets and growth across the world. A
weakened US presidency will also be felt in global hotspots across the world. The Middle East, the conflict between India and
Pakistan, peace on the Korean peninsula, and even the way relations between China and Taiwan play out, will be influenced by
the authority the next US president brings to his job. There are those who would welcome a weakening of US global influence. Many Palestinians, for example, feel they would
benefit from a less interventionist American policy in the Middle East. Even within the Western alliance, there are those who would probably see opportunities in a weakened US presidency. France, for
the dangers of having a weak, insecure US presidency
outweigh any benefits that it might bring. US global economic and military power cannot be wished away. A president with a
shaky mandate will still command great power and influence, only he will be constrained by his domestic weakness and less certain about
how to use his authority. This brings with it the risks of miscalculation and the use of US power in a way that heightens conflict. There are
very few conflicts in the world today which can be solved without US influence. The rest of the world needs the United States to
use its power deftly and decisively.
example, might feel that a less assertive US might force the European Union to be more outward looking. But
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Solvency
the Aff doesn’t solve– underground status immigrants ensures the exploited never come forth or are deported – studies
prove
Arsovska, John Jay College International Criminal Justice Assistant Professor and Janssens, Interculturalism, Migration and
Minorities Research Centre (IMMRC) Associate Researcher, 2009
[Jana and Stef, “ Human Trafficking & Policing: Good & Bad Practices”, Strategies Against Human Trafficking: The Role of the
Security Sector, pdf, accessed: 8-31-10]
In many other cases, victims do not dare to file a complaint against their exploiters. The police must therefore identify them. But victims
often stay “underground” due to their illegal status, and many are traumatised. 44 They tend to blame themselves for what has happened to them,
which can stop them from seeking help. Moreover, systematic isolation makes them dependent on the traffickers. In some cases, they do not
consider themselves victims at all and refuse to provide information. They may also distrust authorities. Studies show that only a
minority of victims are identified by law enforcement. Victims often have some contact with law enforcement representatives who
fail to understand the situation and take appropriate action. 45 Thus, there is a high risk of categorising trafficking victims as
“illegal immigrants” and repatriating them to their country of origin (Box 8).
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Advantage 1 Wages
Turn—immigrants boost the economy
Fix, 06 (Michael Fix, Vice President and Director of Studies, “’Immigrants’ Costs and Contributions: The Effects of Reform’
Testimony Prepared for the Committee on Ways and Means U.S. House of Representatives Hearing on the Impacts of Border
Security and Immigration on Ways and Means Programs,” Migration Policy Institute National Center on Immigrant Integration
Policy, July 26, 2006, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/FixTestimony072606.pdf)
Immigrants are increasingly associated with further openings to trade and other forms of exchange that promote business.
The foreign-born population’s willingness to follow jobs to other states and localities makes the US economy run more
efficiently. High-skilled immigrants innovate in key sectors of the economy. And immigrant workers both produce and, in
turn, consume goods and services – thus creating jobs that might not otherwise have existed that in turn have wider
economic ripple effects.
Empirically, the economy is resilient – no risk of a downturn
Michael Dawson, US Treasury Deputy Secretary for Critical Infrastructure Protection and Compliance Policy, January 8,
2004, Remarks at the Conference on Protecting the Financial Sector and Cyber Security Risk Management, “Protecting the
Financial Sector from Terrorism and Other Threats,” http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/js1091.htm
Fortunately, we are starting from a very strong base. The American economy is resilient. Over the past few years, we have seen
that resilience first hand, as the American economy withstood a significant fall in equity prices, an economic recession, the
terrorist attacks of September 11, corporate governance scandals, and the power outage of August 14-15. There are many reasons
for the resilience of the American economy. Good policies – like the President’s Jobs and Growth Initiative – played an important
part. So has the resilience of the American people. One of the reasons are economy is so resilient is that our people are so tough,
so determined to protect our way of life. Like the economy as a whole, the American financial system is resilient. For example,
the financial system performed extraordinarily well during the power outage last August. With one exception, the bond and major
equities and futures markets were open the next day at their regular trading hours. Major market participants were also well
prepared, having invested in contingency plans, procedures, and equipment such as backup power generators. The U.S. financial
sector withstood this historic power outage without any reported loss or corruption of any customer data. This resilience mitigates
the economic risks of terrorist attacks and other disruptions, both to the financial system itself and to the American economy as a
whole.
Economic collapse is slow
Bruce Russett, Dean Acheson Professor of International Relations and Political Science at Yale University, December 1983,
International Studies Quarterly, v27 n4, “Prosperity and Peace: Presidential Address,” http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=00208833%28198312%2927%3A4%3C381%3APAPPA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-V, p. 384
The ‘optimism’ argument seems strained to me, but elements of Blainey’s former thesis, about the need to mobilize resources
before war can be begun, are more plausible, especially in the 20th century. Modern wars are fought by complex organizations,
with complex and expensive weapons. It takes time to design and build the weapons that military commanders will require, and it
takes time to train the troops who must use them. Large bureaucracies must plan and obtain some consensus on those plans; and
even in a dictatorship the populace in general must be prepared, with clear images of who are their enemies and of the cause that
will justify war with them. In short, preparations for war take time. Just how long a lag we should expect to find between an
economic downturn and subsequent war initiation is unclear. But surely it will be more than a year or two, and war may well
occur only after the economy is recovering.
Economic decline won’t escalate
Morris Miller, economist, adjunct professor in the University of Ottawa’s Faculty of Administration, consultant on international
development issues, former Executive Director and Senior Economist at the World Bank, Winter 2000, Interdisciplinary Science
Reviews, Vol. 25, Iss. 4, “Poverty as a cause of wars?” p. Proquest
The question may be reformulated. Do wars spring from a popular reaction to a sudden economic crisis that exacerbates poverty
and growing disparities in wealth and incomes? Perhaps one could argue, as some scholars do, that it is some dramatic event or
sequence of such events leading to the exacerbation of poverty that, in turn, leads to this deplorable denouement. This exogenous
factor might act as a catalyst for a violent reaction on the part of the people or on the part of the political leadership who would
then possibly be tempted to seek a diversion by finding or, if need be, fabricating an enemy and setting in train the process leading
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to war. According to a study undertaken by Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
there would not appear to be any merit in this hypothesis. After studying ninety-three episodes of economic crisis in twenty-two
countries in Latin America and Asia in the years since the Second World War they concluded that:19 Much of the conventional
wisdom about the political impact of economic crises may be wrong ... The severity of economic crisis - as measured in terms of
inflation and negative growth - bore no relationship to the collapse of regimes ... (or, in democratic states, rarely) to an outbreak of
violence ... In the cases of dictatorships and semidemocracies, the ruling elites responded to crises by increasing repression
(thereby using one form of violence to abort another).
Economic decline doesn’t cause conventional war
Deudney 91 – Hewlett Fellow in Science, Technology, and Society at the Center for Energy and
Environmental Studies, Princeton (Daniel, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Ebsco)
Poverty Wars. In a second scenario, declining living standards first cause internal turmoil. then war. If groups at all levels of affluence protect their standard of living by pushing deprivation on other groups class war and revolutionary
upheavals could result. Faced with these pressures, liberal democracy and free market systems could increasingly be replaced by authoritarian systems capable of maintaining minimum order.9 If authoritarian regimes are more war-prone
. The record of previous
depressions supports the proposition that widespread economic stagnation and unmet economic expectations contribute to
international conflict. Although initially compelling, this scenario has major flaws. One is that it is arguably based on unsound
economic theory. Wealth is formed not so much by the availability of cheap natural resources as by capital formation through
savings and more efficient production. Many resource-poor countries, like Japan, are very wealthy, while many countries with
more extensive resources are poor. Environmental constraints require an end to economic growth based on growing use of raw materials, but not necessarily an end to growth in the production of goods and
services. In addition, economic decline does not necessarily produce conflict.How societies respond to economic decline may largely
depend upon the rate at which such declines occur. And as people get poorer, they may become less willing to spend scarce
resources for military forces. As Bernard Brodie observed about the modein era, “The predisposing factors to military aggression
are full bellies, not empty ones.”’” The experience of economic depressions over the last two centuries may be irrelevant, because
such depressions were characterized by under-utilized production capacity and falling resource prices. In the 1930 increased
military spending stimulated economies, but if economic growth is retarded by environmental constraints, military spending will
exacerbate the problem. Power Wars. A third scenario is that environmental degradation might cause war by altering the relative power of states; that is, newly stronger states may be tempted to prey upon the newly
weaker ones, or weakened states may attack and lock in their positions before their power ebbs firther. But such alterations might not lead to war as readily as the lessons of history suggest, because economic power
and military power are not as tightly coupled as in the past. The economic power positions of Germany and Japan have changed
greatly since World War 11, but these changes have not been accompanied by war or threat of war. In the contemporary world,
whole industries rise, fall, and relocate, causing substantialfluctuations in the economic well-being of regions and peoples without
producing wars.There is no reason to believe that changes in relative wealth and power caused by the uneven impact of environmental degradation would
inevitably lead to war. Even if environmental degradation were to destroy the basic social and economic fabric of a country or
region, the impact on international order may not be very great. Among the first casualties in such country would be the capacity
to wage war.The poor and wretched of the earth may be able to deny an outside aggressor an easy conquest, but they are
themselves a minimal threat to other states.Contemporary offensive military operations require complex organizational skills,
specialized industrial products and surplus wealth.
because they lack democratic control, and if revolutionary regimes are warprone because of their ideological fervor and isolation, then the world is likely to become more violent
Protectionism doesn’t cause war
Friedman and Friedman, ’96 [George and Meredith, Founder and Chairman of Stratfor, The Future of War, p. 7-9]
The argument that interdependence gives rise to peace is flawed in theory as well as in practice. Conflicts arise from friction, particularly friction
involving the fundamental interests of different nations. The less interdependence there is, the fewer the areas of serious friction. The more interdependence there
is, the greater the areas of friction, and, therefore, the greater the potential for conflict. Two widely separated nations that trade little with each other are unlikely
to go to war—Brazil is unlikely to fight Madagascar precisely because they have so little to do with each other. France and Germany, on the other hand,
which have engaged in extensive trade and transnational finance, have fought three wars with each other over about seventy years.
Interdependence was the root of the conflicts, not the deterrent. There are, of course, cases of interdependence in which one country effectively absorbs the other or in which their
interests match so precisely that the two countries simply merge. In other cases, interdependence remains peaceful because the economic, military, and political power of one country is overwhelming and
inevitable. In relations between advanced industrialized countries and third-world countries, for example, this sort of asymmetrical relationship can frequently be seen. All such relationships have a quality
of unease built into them, particularly when the level of interdependence is great. When one or both nations attempt, intentionally or unintentionally, to shift the balance of power, the result is often
tremendous anxiety and, sometimes, real pain. Each side sees the other’s actions as an attempt to gain advantage and becomes frightened. In the end, precisely because the level of interdependence is so
Consider the seemingly miraculous ability of the United States and Soviet Union to be
rivals and yet avoid open warfare. These two powers could forgo extreme measures because they were not interdependent. Neither
relied on the other for its economic well-being, and therefore, its social stability. This provided considerable room for maneuvering. Because
there were few economic linkages, neither nation felt irresistible pressure to bring the relationship under control; neither felt any time constraint. Had one
great, the relationship can, and frequently does, spiral out of control.
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country been dependent on the other for something as important as oil or long-term investment, there would have been enormous
fear of being held hostage economically. Each would have sought to dominate the relationship, and the result would have been catastrophic. In the years before World
War I, as a result of European interdependence, control of key national issues fell into the hands of foreign governments. Thus,
decisions made in Paris had tremendous impact on Austria, and decisions made in London determined growth rates in the Ruhr. Each government sought
to take charge of its own destiny by shifting the pattern of interdependence in its favor. Where economic means proved
insufficient, political and military strategies were tried. The international system following the Cold War resembles the pre—World War I system in some fundamental ways.
First, there is a general prosperity. That is to say, the international economic system appears to be functioning extremely well, in spite of the normal cyclical downturns of the early 1990s. Second, almost no
fundamental ideological issues divide the major powers; one could say there is general agreement on matters of political principle. Third, there is a long-standing pattern of interdependence, measured in
both trade and financial flows—capital has become transuational. Fourth, and perhaps most important, beneath the apparent prosperity and stability there is a sense within each great power of a real and
growing vulnerability to the actions of others. Some nations fear that growing protectionism will shift the balance of the system against them, while others are convinced that maintaining the current system
will be devastating to their interests. Today, observers focus on the first three phenomena, as they did prior to World War I, and argue that there is no economic basis for political conflict. What they miss is
that the subsurface sense of insecurity— experienced by Japan, the United States, and Europe—marks the beginning of such conflict. Thus, the argument that war is obsolete because of growing interdependence is unsupportable. War may be obsolete, but, if it is, it is not because of interdependence. As we have seen, World War I broke out at a time when interdependence was substantially higher than
it is today; indeed, in all likelihood war broke out because interdependence was so high. Today, war remains not only possible but, as a simple statistical matter, highly likely.
Prefer our evidence – studies in support of free trade are worse
Barbieri, ‘2 [Katherine, The Liberal Illusion: Does Trade Promote Peace, p. 45-48]
Even at the dyadic level ,the empirical findings are mixed. Wallensteen (1973) and my own work provide evidence of the
conflictual nature of interdependent relationships. These analyses include a more comprehensive temporal and spatial domain than
those found in dyadic studies that support the trade promotes-peace hypothesis and are therefore more generalizable to a diverse
group of trading relationships.
Free trade doesn’t cause peace
Christopher Layne, visiting associate professor of international politics and military strategy at the Naval Postgraduate School,
consultant to the RAND Corporation, Summer 1998, World Policy Journal, “Rethinking American grand strategy: hegemony or
balance of power in the twenty-first century?” v15 n2 p8(21), infotrac
These arguments notwithstanding, international economic interdependence does not cause peace. In fact, it has very serious
adverse security consequences that its proponents either do not understand or will not acknowledge. Economic relations (whether
domestic or international) never take place in a vacuum; on the contrary, they occur within a politically defined framework.
International economic interdependence requires certain conditions in order to flourish, including a maximum degree of political
order and stability. Just as the market cannot function within a state unless the state creates a stable “security” environment in
which economic exchange can occur (by protecting property rights and enforcing contracts), the same is true in international
relations. Because there is no world government, it falls to the dominant state to create the conditions under which economic
interdependence can take hold (by providing security, rules of the game, and a reserve currency, and by acting as the global
economy’s banker and lender of last resort). Without a dominant power to perform these tasks, economic interdependence does
not happen. Indeed, free trade and interdependence have occurred in the modern international system only during the hegemonies
of Victorian Britain and postwar America.
Mechanized agriculture not sustainable—small farms inevitable
Marty 08
[Marty. Dir of the Rural School and Community Trust – Family farming – a New Economic Vision, 2008, Pg xliv]
I believe the remnant of family farming will be the source of its restoration as the dominant form of agriculture as industrial
agribusiness collapses under the weight of its dependence on cheap energy, its inherent instability, and its incapacity to protect the
environment. When the first edition of Family Farming was published, family farming was still predominant but in decline,
eroding from with giving in to the values of industrial agribusiness. Perhaps the biggest change in the last twenty years is that now
the remnant of family farming, though not predominant, is the dynamic, energetic counterculture whose new ideas, rooted in old
values, are reinventing agriculture. A prairie fire may destroy the grass above, but the prairie comes back from its roots, richer
than before. So, too, family farming may have been burned out on the industrial agribusiness treadmill, but from deep roots the
remnant may yet restore it to a greater future.
And, that solves the impact
Boyce ‘4
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[James. Prof of Ag @ UMass. “A Future for Small Farms?”
http://www.peri.umass.edu/fileadmin/pdf/Boyce_paper_griffin_conference.pdf 2004//JVOSS]
s a future for small farms. Or more precisely, there can be and should be a future for them. Given the dependence of ‘modern’ low-diversity
ture on ‘traditional’ high-diversity agriculture, the long-term food security of humankind will depend on small farms and
ontinued provision of the environmental service of in situ conservation of crop genetic diversity. Policies to support small
an be advocated, therefore, not merely as a matter of sympathy, or nostalgia, or equity. Such policies are also a matter of human survival.
versity that underpins the sustainability of world agriculture did not fall from the sky. It was bequeathed to us by the 400 generations of farmers
carried on the process of artificial selection since plants were first domesticated. Until recently, we took this diversity for granted. The ancient reservoirs of crop genetic diversity, plant
‘the speed which enormous crop
y can be essentially wiped out is astonishing.’ 26 The central thesis of this essay is that efforts to conserve in situ diversity
o handin- hand with efforts to support the small farmers around the world who sustain this diversity. Economists and
nmentalists alike by and large have neglected this issue. In thrall to a myopic notion of efficiency, many economists fail to
ate that diversity is the sine qua non of resilience and sustainability. In thrall to a romantic notion of ‘wilderness,’ many
nmentalists fail to appreciate that agricultural biodiversity is just as valuable – indeed, arguably more valuable from the
oint of human wellbeing – as the diversity found in tropical rainforests or the spotted owls found in the ancient forests of the
estern United States.
ack Harlan (1975, p. 619) wrote three decades ago, ‘seemed to most people as inexhaustible as oil in Arabia.’ Yet, Harlan warned,
No impact to food shortages—and war turns it
Ronald Bailey, science correspondent, author of Earth Report 2000: Revisiting the True State of the Planet, former Brookes
Fellow in Environmental Journalism at the Competitive Enterprise Institute, member of the Society of Environmental Journalists,
adjunct scholar at the Cato Institute, May 2000, Reason Magazine, “Earth Day, Then and Now,”
http://reason.com/0005/fe.rb.earth.shtml
The Soylent Green crowd didn’t simply predict mass starvation. They argued that even trying to feed so many people was itself a
recipe for disaster. As Lester Brown, a former U.S. Department of Agriculture agronomist who would later become far more
prominent as the founder of the Worldwatch Institute, put it in Scientific American, “There is growing doubt that the agricultural
ecosystem will be able to accommodate both the anticipated increase of the human population to seven billion by the end of the
century and the universal desire of the world’s hungry for a better diet. The central question is no longer `Can we produce enough
food?’ but `What are the environmental consequences of attempting to do so?’” Even if somehow famine were avoided, what
would the world’s population be in 2000? Peter Gunter predicted 7.2 billion. Ehrlich foresaw that “by the end of the century we’ll
have well over 7 billion people if something isn’t done.” Brown agreed that “world population at the end of the century is
expected to be twice the 3.5 billion of today.” In the April 21, 1970, Look, Rockefeller University biologist and Pulitzer Prizewinning writer Rene Dubos made the shocking suggestion that, “To some overcrowded populations, the bomb may one day no
longer seem a threat, but a release.” Time has not been gentle with these prophecies. It’s absolutely true that far too many people
remain poor and hungry in the world--800 million people are still malnourished and nearly 1.2 billion live on less than a dollar a
day--but we have not seen mass starvation around the world in the past three decades. Where we have seen famines, such as in
Somalia and Ethiopia, they are invariably the result of war and political instability. Indeed, far from turning brown, the Green
Revolution has never been so verdant. Food production has handily outpaced population growth and food today is cheaper and
more abundant than ever before. Since 1970, the amount of food per person globally has increased by 26 percent, and as the
International Food Policy Research Institute reported in October 1999, “World market prices for wheat, maize, and rice, adjusted
for inflation, are the lowest they have been in the last century.” According to the World Bank’s World Development Report 2000,
food production increased by 60 percent between 1980 and 1997. At the same time, the amount of land devoted to growing crops
has barely increased over the past 30 years, meaning that millions of acres have been spared for nature--acres that would have
been plowed down had agricultural productivity lagged the way Ehrlich and others believed it would.
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Advantage 2 Exploitation
Aff increases exploitation—they result in people getting kicked out of the country, that’s worse
Double standards undermine effectiveness.
Irish Times, 1/24/05, lexis
Too often, however, democracy and human rights are subjugated to short-term interests, whether they be maintaining access to oil,
countering terrorism or securing contracts in China.The gap between here and there, however, is large. The double standards of the US and the
world's other democracies make the bridging of this gap difficult, undermining democracy in the short-term and convincing many
in places such as the Middle East that the rhetoric of democracy is simply cover for the promotion of Western interests.
Turn – advanced democracies cause conflict and terrorism.
Ackerman, editor New Republic, 8-29-6 [Spencer, “Against Democracy,” The American Prospect,
http://www.prospect.org/web/page.ww?section=root&name=ViewWeb&articleId=11933]
democratic processes in Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine, and Egypt have
strengthened precisely the religious extremists that Hamid thinks they will ultimately defeat. But the United States is insane to promote democratic
elections in which the victors proclaim eschatological hostility to it. Hamid blithely writes that "over the long-term, the responsibilities of government are likely to
privilege pragmatism over ideology, practicality over posturing," but democracies, both advanced and maturing, are always vulnerable to demagoguery,
and are particularly vulnerable when faced with security threats like those likely to plague the Middle East for the foreseeable
future. (India, Israel, Turkey, and the United States -- all democracies under threat -- have grown more reactionary in recent decades, not less.) Hamid concedes that in the "short term," the rise of
For American interests, it gets worse. During the Bush era, the United States has seen that
radical Islamists will be "frustrating," but "in the right conditions and with sustained international involvement," those Islamists will moderate themselves. The idea of democratic failure -- the idea that
democracy in certain conditions cannot meet social expectations, leading to its collapse -- never occurs to him, despite three and a half years of the Iraq
War. Even more perversely, Hamid argues that living with such "frustrations" is the mark of a progressive foreign policy. For all its tough-minded posturing, this is doughfaced liberalism
at its worst: the implicit assumption that good intentions excuse actual, real-world consequences. To take the example of Iraq, the rise of
democracy is directly correlative with marauding death squads. Among the most powerful figures in democratic Iraq is Moqtada al-Sadr, whose followers serve in
parliament, run ministries, and slaughter men in barber shops for insufficient beard growth. Recently, Iraq's most famous archeologist, Donny George, fled to Syria when Sadr's thugs at the Ministry of
Antiquities had raised an eyebrow at George's interest in Iraq's pre-Islamic historical treasures. If he returns to democratic Iraq, he will surely be murdered for crimes against Islam. Hamid's argument
entails telling George that if he survives enough elections, Sadr's men will eventually change their minds. This is liberalism?
Democratic peace theory fails
John Moore, professor of law at Virginia, former Chairman of the Board of the US Institute of Peace, 9-9 -02, Engaging the Mind
Lecture Series, http://www.virginia.edu/facultysenate/speakers/2020/John%20N%20Moore%20ETM%20Lecture.pdf
For all its power, however, the democratic peace proposition is by itself incomplete. In its most common formulations, it focuses only on the correlation between democracy
and war, and this in turn fails to capture the real strength of the case for democracy, the rule of law, and human freedom across virtually all of the most commonly shared goals of mankind. Statistical
quarrels with the proposition have less ability to persuade when we see that the same correlation is common across a wide variety of human goals and on some, as with the staggering twentieth century
since democracies are all too frequently engaged in major war, as World Wars I and II and
numerous “limited wars” since attest, the concept of the “democratic peace” alone has not explained war. After all, Rummel’s
analysis of wars between 1816 and 1991, which concludes that there were no wars between established democracies in this period,
also shows 155 major war pairings between democracies and nondemocracies. How did democracies get into these wars? Are they
recklessly attacking nondemocracies? Are wars between democracies and nondemocracies simply random or accidental? Or are
democracies engaged in major wars with nondemocracies as a result of attacks by nondemocracies? Questions such as these caused Professors Singer and
Small, who first uncovered the statistical correlation of the democratic peace in their seminal Wages of War Statistical Handbook in 1972, to largely dismiss the proposition in their early study of war. Further, the democratic
peace proposition as yet has produced no consensus as to the mechanism accounting for the reduced rate of major war between
well-established democracies. Principal competing hypotheses focus on structural or institutional checks peculiar to democracies,
on broadly shared normative or cultural perspectives, or on game-theoretic models of democratic nation interactions with
adversaries. Finally, there are a variety of other loose ends with the proposition, including questions of how well the proposition
applies to minor coercion and to nations in transition rather than to major war and stable democracy. Given the power of the democratic peace correlation
genocide, is even more conclusive. Perhaps most importantly,
and the strongly supportive parallel correlations between government type and other major community goals, it would seem a mistake to ignore the democratic peace. But given the remaining unanswered questions with the proposition, it
would seem equally necessary to formulate and test broader hypotheses if we are truly to solve the war puzzle. This essay will suggest one such hypothesis, discuss the supporting evidence, and recommend, in general terms, actions likely to
lessen the risk of war if the suggested approach is correct. But first, it may be useful to examine some additional pieces of the puzzle.
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Disposability Defense
Scheper-Hughes is wrong about disposability—prefer our evidence
Taylor 6 [“A “Queen of Hearts” trial of organ markets: why Scheper-Hughes’s objections to markets in human organs fail”, J S
Taylor, Department of Philosophy, The College of New Jersey, May 9, 2006]
Until very recently, only highly deviant authoritarian and police states—Nazi Germany, Argentina in the 1960s and 1970s, and South Africa under apartheid—had assumed this
capacity [i.e., “to define and determine the hour of death and to claim…the ‘first rights’…to the disposal of the body’s parts”] in the 20th century…the creation and maintenance of
a surplus population of “living dead”…the “disappeared” in Argentina, or those walking cadavers kept hostage in Nazi concentration camps.17 Scheper-Hughes is here
explicitly comparing the use of policies of presumed consent (whereby a person will be presumed to have consented to have his or
her organs removed for transplantation if they are suitable for this, unless he or she has expressly indicated otherwise) with the atrocities that “highly
deviant authoritarian and police states” have visited upon their citizens. She has similarly harsh words to say about organ sale (which
she has repeatedly described as cannibalism) and even organ donation, which she claims “carries some trace elements of Aztec hearts ripped—
still beating—from the chests of state-appointed ritual scapegoats”.18 Yet despite Scheper-Hughes’s rhetoric, there is a vast ethical gulf between
Argentinean death squads and Nazi concentration camps on the one hand, and policies of presumed consent, legal organ sales and organ
donation on the other. In particular, voluntary trades in human organs that take place between consenting adults, untainted by force or fraud, make all parties
to them better off. As such, the burden of proof in this debate should rest with those who claim that such sales are immoral. And this will be a considerable burden to meet,
as the lifesaving nature of such sales differentiates them from the typical market transaction in an important way: people who sell their
organs are possibly motivated to do so by considerations of virtue and finance. As Kishore19 puts it, “A person who sells his organ does so
because he knows that his organ is going to save the life of a fellow human being and as such he is convinced that he is not doing anything immoral or
inhuman.” To prohibit such transactions would thus not only restrict voluntary commercial activity but also prohibit people from acting virtuously and expressing solidarity with
strangers in virtue of their shared humanity. In response to this rejection of her above comparisons, Scheper-Hughes may claim that, economic theory aside, it “pretty much…
[turns]…out to be the case” that “in the real world, we cannot find any happy kidney sellers…”.20 There initially seems to be ample support for this claim . Scheper-Hughes
provides anecdotal evidence from kidney sellers that they were made worse off by the sale of their organs, owing to the shame and
social stigma that was attached to them as a result of their sales. For example, one kidney seller said, “We [kidney sellers] are worse than prostitutes because what we have
sold we can never get back. We have given away our health, our strength, and our lives.”21 Moreover, vendors in currently existing markets for human
kidneys typically receive less for their organs than they agreed to accept, and fail to receive the postoperative care that they were promised, whereas end-use
purchasers often receive diseased organs or organs that do not match.22 However, such evidence does not undermine the claim that voluntary
transactions untainted by force or fraud make both parties to them better off, for it is taken from the experiences of people who trade in black markets in
human organs. As people who trade in such markets cannot legally enforce the contracts that they make, fraud is endemic and so it is to be expected that many
who participate in such markets will fail to benefit from their transactions. In a legal, regulated market for human organs, however,
contracts will be enforceable, and so both vendors and buyers could expect to reap the benefits of voluntary trade. Moreover, in addition to
this theoretical reply to Scheper-Hughes’s possible response, it should be noted that Scheper-Hughes herself had earlier recognised that in Manila kidney sellers typically did
benefit from the sale of their organs, using the money they gained to buy “new VCRs, karaoke machines and expensive tricycles”.21 It is thus unclear why she holds
that “pretty much” no such happy kidney sellers can be found.
No impact to disposability—modern states don’t do it
Edward Ross, University of Cincinnati, “Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About “Modernity,” Central
European History, vol. 37, no. 1, March)
A second example is Geoff Eley’s masterful synthetic introduction to a collection of essays published in 1996 under the title Society, Culture,
and the State in Germany, 1870–1930. Eley set forth two research agendas derived from his review of recent hypotheses regarding the origins
and nature of Nazism. One was to discover what allowed so many people to identify with the Nazis. The second was that we explore the ways
in which welfare policy contributed to Nazism, by examining “the production of new values, new mores, new social practices, new ideas about
the good and efficient society.” Eley suggested that we examine “strategies of policing and constructions of criminality, notions of the normal
and the deviant, the production and regulation of sexuality, the . . . understanding of the socially valued individual . . . the coalescence of
racialized thinking . . .”62 So far so good; but why stop there? Why not examine the expanding hold of the language of rights on the
political imagination, or the disintegration of traditional authority under the impact of the explosive expansion of the public
sphere? Why not pursue a clearer understanding of ideas about the nature of citizenship in the modern state; about the potentials of
a participatory social and political order; about human needs and human rights to have those needs met; about the liberation of the
individual (including her sexual liberation, her liberation from ignorance and sickness, her liberation from social and economic
powerlessness); about the physical and psychological dangers created by the existing social order and how to reduce them, the
traumas it inflicted and how to heal them? In short, why not examine how the construction of “the social” — the ideas and practices
of the modern biopolitical interventionist complex — contributed to the development of a democratic politics and humane social
policies between 1918 and 1930, and again after 1945? Like Fritzsche’s essay, Eley’s accurately reflected the tone of most of those it
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introduced. In the body of the volume, Elizabeth Domansky, for example, pointed out that biopolitics “did not ‘automatically’ or ‘naturally’
lead to the rise of National Socialism,” but rather “provided . . . the political Right in Weimar with the opportunity to capitalize on a discursive
strategy that could successfully compete with liberal and socialist strategies.”63 This is correct; but the language of biopolitics was
demonstrably one on which liberals, socialists, and advocates of a democratic welfare state could also capitalize, and did. Or again,
Jean Quataert remarked—quite rightly, I believe — that “the most progressive achievements of the Weimar welfare state were
completely embedded” in biopolitical discourse. She also commented that Nazi policy was “continuous with what passed as the ruling
knowledge of the time” and was a product of “an extreme form of technocratic reason” and “early twentieth-century modernity’s dark side.”
The implication seems to be that “progressive” welfare policy was fundamentally “dark”; but it seems more accurate to conclude
that biopolitics had a variety of potentials.64 Again, the point here is not that any of the interpretations offered in these pieces are wrong;
instead, it is that we are, collectively, so focused on unmasking the negative potentials and realities of modernity that we have
constructed a true, but very one-sided picture. The pathos of this picture is undeniable, particularly for a generation of historians raised
on the Manichean myth— forged in the crucible of World War II and the Cold War— of the democratic welfare state. And as a rhetorical
gesture, this analysis works magnificently — we explode the narcissistic self-admiration of democratic modernity by revealing the
dark, manipulative, murderous potential that lurks within, thus arriving at a healthy, mature sort of melancholy. But this gesture
too often precludes asking what else biopolitics was doing, besides manipulating people, reducing them to pawns in the plans of
technocrats, and paving the way for massacre. In 1989 Detlev Peukert argued that any adequate picture of modernity must include
both its “achievements” and its “pathologies”— social reform as well as “Machbarkeitswahn,” the “growth of rational relations
between people” as well as the “swelling instrumental goal-rationality,” the “liberation of artistic and scientific creativity” as well as the
“loss of substance and absence of limits [Haltlosigkeit].”65 Yet he himself wrote nothing like such a “balanced” history, focusing exclusively
on Nazism and on the negative half of each of these binaries; and that focus has remained characteristic of the literature as a whole. What I
want to suggest here is that the function of the rhetorical or explanatory framework surrounding our conception of modernity seems
to be in danger of being inverted. The investigation of the history of modern biopolitics has enabled new understandings of
National Socialism; now we need to take care that our understanding of National Socialism does not thwart a realistic assessment
of modern biopolitics. Much of the literature leaves one with the sense that a modern world in which mass murder is not
happening is just that: a place where something is not —yet— happening. Normalization is not yet giving way to exclusion, scientific
study and classification of populations is not yet giving way to concentration camps and extermination campaigns. Mass murder, in short, is
the historical problem; the absence of mass murder is not a problem, it does not need to be investigated or explained
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