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Non-rationalism in East Asian Philosophy: A Whiteheadian
Evaluation
Wang Shik Jang (Methodist Theological University)
Introduction
It has been pointed out that non-rationalism is one of the strong characteristics of East Asian
philosophy.
It is often said that even some arguments that seem to be ambiguous and
irrational are sometimes easily accepted in East Asian philosophy.
Interestingly enough, many people have insisted that such a characteristic has not so much
weaknesses but rather strengths. Scholars such as David Hall, Roger Ames and Francois
Jullien have argued in this way. They have said that not only is non-rationalism a salient
characteristic of East Asian thoughts, it also has many merits in this post-modern world.
Although I agree with their argument in a sense, I also want to claim that their arguments
are based on an exaggerated one.
facts.
To my understanding, they quite often go beyond the
Although non-rationalism is a strong philosophical phenomenon in East Asian thought,
it is fair to say that such a phenomenon has been so much emphasized by some scholars as to
stand out erroneously. The phenomenon has often been magnified one-sidedly especially to
the eyes of the interpreters who are inclined to be favorable to the merits of post-modernism.
In other words, my claim is that if the phenomenon were seen from a different point of view,
we would end up with different consequences. This is also to imply that rationalism is also
prominent in the tradition of East Asian thoughts.
Another point to be mentioned in this small paper is that the over-emphasis on nonrationalism made by some scholars as representing East Asian thoughts does not always
make the positive contribution to the advancement of East Asian civilization. To my
understanding, the bright future of East Asian civilization lies rather in the equal emphasis on
rationalism as well as non-rationalism. In what follows, I will try to hold that East Asian
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philosophy can be more successful in developing Asian civilization only when rationalism can
be kept in balance with non-rationalism. Furthermore, I will attempt to show how we can
discover the fact that rationalism has been as significant as non-rationalism in some East
Asian traditions of thoughts, even if it has shrunk as a main trait sometimes.
Finally, my suggestion is that East Asian thoughts can get some valuable insights from
Whitehead’s philosophy as they wish to find out an ideal type of collaboration between nonrationalism and rationalism.
I will hold that such an equal emphasis on non-rationalism and
rationalism made by Whitehead’s philosophy can be of great help in giving rise to an ideal
type of civilization in this post-modern world.
1. The Position of Non-rationalism in East Asian Philosophy
It is often pointed out that non-rationalism is the main characteristics of East Asian
philosophy. David Hall and Roger Ames have been two of the most important proponents for
this.
They have insisted on this point especially in terms of aesthetics, which is regarded by
them as the key to understanding the main traits of East Asian culture. 1
As we know, aesthetic philosophies, generally speaking, construe aesthetic experiences as
the primary factor in perceiving an object.
Here, to say that an aesthetic experience is the
primary factor in perceiving an object is tantamount to saying that an intuition or an irrational
factor plays a primary role in the process of knowing. As we are all aware of, aesthetics is
the academic field that deals with the world of immediate feelings or emotional experiences.
Immediate feelings or emotional experiences start with an intuition, which is, generally
speaking, vague and unclear. Therefore, the feelings based on an intuition are relatively
undifferentiated and uncertain.
What the feelings really are is not to be clarified until they
are identified by means of the concepts derived from our consciousness and reason.
Hall and Ames’ claim that the main characteristics of East Asian thoughts lie in the
philosophy of aesthetics is correct in this sense, because it is true to say that both Buddhist
and Taoist thoughts, generally speaking, have preferred non-rationalism to rationalism in
their philosophical reasoning, wherein the role of immediate feelings or emotional
experiences based on intuitions have been emphasized.
1
See especially, David Hall and Roger Ames’ book, Thinking through Confucius, ch. 3.
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Francois Jullien, a French scholar, argues for the similar point.
For him, the reason why
Chinese philosophy, representing East Asian thoughts particularly, has preferred nonrationalism to rationalism is that the thoughts based on wisdom have been prevalent in
Chinese traditions.
According to him, what has been favored in the tradition of East Asia is
not so much philosophers but rather the wise, for whom a wisdom is more important than a
truth. Jullien claims that the philosophical reason in which wisdoms are more important than
truths in East Asia can be traced back to the tradition that has been affected by a kind of
process thinking. 2
East Asian thoughts usually rely on the philosophy of process or
becoming, in which the very nature of reality is change.
As we know, since something that
changes cannot be grasped by our intellectual power, thought in the form of reason and
concepts cannot provide direct access to the nature of things.
Therefore, the thinking based
on seeking a truth is quite often replaced with the thinking based on seeking wisdoms.
For
only seeking wisdoms can guarantee the access to the nature of things, whereas seeking
truth is futile in doing so. According to Jullien, process thoughts in East Asia make a thinker
judge nothing even when he wishes to do make a judgment. This is because there is no
concept that can be employed as the final criterion in our world where everything is in
process and changing.
In a word, any thinkers in the East couldn’t be fixated on a position,
because they knew that every position is changing and in process. This had led to developing
a wisdom tradition in East Asia.
For Jullien, the meaning of wisdom is contrasted with that of “philosophy” connoted in the
West.
Here, what he means by the term “philosophy” in the West is generally the system of
thought based on an exclusive truth in which only a correct truth is sought for. According to
him, such a tendency to seek an exclusive truth has been constituted by the Western style of
thinking by means of which other kinds of truths are so excluded as to form a stubborn
philosophic community.
In short, the western philosophic community favors a consistent
system of thought in which an exclusive truth is pursued, the system that is called
“philosophy.”
By contrast, according to Julian, the Eastern attitude of seeking “wisdom” is
not so much exclusive but rather collaborative. The community that prefers wisdom over
truth has a tendency to appreciate the value of a truth in its relationship with others.
It goes
without saying that this community does not much care about setting up the tradition of an
2
Francois Jullien, Un Sage Est Sans Idee 171
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exclusive truth or a consistent system of thought in which such an exclusive truth is
emphasized.
Some people may argue that if a philosophic community does not have a consistent system
of thoughts, there will be only a slim chance to make a great advancement in civilization. This
is because it is often assumed that a great advancement in civilization is more likely to take
place in the context where there is a single-ordered society based on such a consistent
system of thought. In other words, it is assumed here that a philosophic community based on
a single-ordered society can easily be able to avoid a chaotic situation wherein there is
merely little chance for making advancement in civilization.
However, this hasn’t been the case in the East Asia. It is not true to say that the East Asia
has had little chance to make a great advancement in their civilization.
There is no doubt
that it has created its own unique cultures and civilizations in the history of human beings.
It
may be fair to say that the East Asian philosophic communities have often preferred nonrationalism to rationalism in the sense that seeking an exclusive truth and setting up a
single-ordered society are not favored by some school of East Asian thoughts
Nevertheless, this also doesn’t mean to say that while non-rationalism has been principal
in the East Asia, rationalism has never been so.
No wonder that this was not the case either.
Even Jullien also concedes that a strong type of causality theory has existed in ancient China,
a rational theory which is quite similar to the Western type of theory that has played an
important role in developing science and technology in the West.
that rationalism is discovered in the East too.
East that was seeking the exclusive truth.
Therefore, it is fair to say
There was even a philosophic tradition in the
Jullien goes on to argue, however, that the only
reason that rationalism based on a causality theory was not prevailing in the East was
coincidental.
Due to some contingent occasions, such rationalism based on the causality
theory was regarded as secondary, having been marginalized and trivialized in the long run in
the East.
Therefore, Jullien holds that although East Asians were well aware of a truth
seeking an objective appropriateness or a logical validity, they couldn’t have a holistic
conceptual system by means of which multiple kinds of truth can be covered. 3
As we know, since a holistic conceptual system can provide an ideal tool by which the
logical coherence of multiple positions and fields can be secured, philosophies cannot
become fully rational until they finally construct such a system.
3
Francois Jullien, Un Sage Est Sans Idee 152.
And, this system has been
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called metaphysics in the history of Western philosophy.
The rationality of theories can be
secured only within a metaphysical system of thought in the sense that without such a system
based on a logical coherence, all theories cannot be given the validity of its own position, and
therefore, end up with colliding each other. In short, without a metaphysical system as a
reliable buttress, theories have little choice but to be in conflict and incoherent.
If we apply such a definition of metaphysic to our discussion, then it may be fair to hold
that East Asian thoughts have not been equipped with a proper kind of rationalism.
In fact, it
is not easy to find out in the East Asia such philosophies based on a metaphysical system as
that of Thomas Aquinas or Alfred N. Whitehead.
Again, this is not to be interpreted as
arguing that there has not been any kind of rationalism in the East.
This is merely to imply
that in some aspects it is not an exaggeration to say that the rationalism based on a more
consistent and coherent type of metaphysics has not been strong enough in the East Asia.
II. Reconciliation between Rationalism and Non-Rationalism in Whitehead’s Philosophy
It is obvious that Whitehead’s philosophy is pretty much aesthetically oriented more than any
other philosophy. We may be able to discover the aesthetic tendency in a variety of
Whitehead’s texts.
For instance, when Whitehead describes what an actual fact is really all
about, he says: “…an actual fact is a fact of aesthetic experience.
All aesthetic experience
is feeling rising out of the realization of contrast under identity.” 4
When he gives an
explanation about the characteristic of the moral order, he says: “All order is therefore
aesthetic order, and the moral order is merely certain aspects of aesthetic order.”5
In this
way, as we can see it, Whitehead’s philosophy is aesthetically oriented. Due to this,
furthermore, Whitehead’s philosophy easily incorporates non-rationalism into its frame of
thoughts.
As we saw in the above, when an aesthetic experience in the process of
perception is stressed, the role of intuition or emotion is to become significant. This is why
non-rationalism has performed a significant role in Whitehead’s philosophy. In Whitehead’s
philosophy, immediate feelings, or physical feelings starting with an intuition usually turn out
to be vague and unclear.
4
5
A. N. Whitehead, Religion in the Making, 111.
A. N. Whitehead, Religion in the Making, 101.
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However, Whitehead’s philosophy never goes to the extremes. It never neglects the
importance of the other side, i.e., rationalism. Indeed, Whitehead’s philosophy always
attempts to keep the balance between rationalism and non-rationalism. Then, how is it
possible for Whitehead’s philosophy to affirm those two irreconcilable positions when it is
obviously an aesthetics-oriented philosophy?
For Whitehead, this is made possible due to
the doctrine of what he calls “symbolic reference.” In what follows, we will be able to see
how Whitehead’s philosophy, based on Whitehead’s doctrine of symbolic reference, can
emphasize the importance of both non-rationalism and rationalism simultaneously.
According to Whitehead, when it comes to any perceptual process, three factors are to be
involved.
The first factor is physical feelings, which are the most primitive phase in the
perceptual process. This is the feelings of the efficacy of the object which is, in Whitehead’s
epistemology, called the past, since the perceiver involved in the present is expected to feel
the object as the past one.
Since, what is felt is delivered from the past as an efficacy to the
present, such mode of feeling is called “causal efficacy.” As we already talked about in the
above, this kind of feelings is usually vague and irrational in the sense that those feelings are
not yet put in order and differentiated. This mode of feeling is so primary or primitive that
any kind of perception cannot avoid this, since without this, the perception as such doesn’t
get started. This is why Whitehead’s philosophy can be called an aesthetics-centered one in
which intuition or emotion is a significant factor.
This also shows how Whitehead’s
philosophy puts much priority on non-rationalism.
However, what is felt in that perception does not consist merely of the causal efficacy,
which is the physical feeling derived from one’s past world.
only when something else is added.
That is to become complete
For Whitehead, what is added to that perception is
composed of conceptual feelings, which are able to complement the vague and emotional
factors in that perception.
Such conceptual feelings are constituted by the variety of mental
abilities, among which consciousness is one of the most prominent cognitive tools.
Our consciousness usually depends on sense perceptions.
However, although what we
have perceived through senses is, strictly speaking, presented to us as an immediate thing, it
cannot be regarded as fundamental. To use Whitehead’s terminology, “presentational
immediacy” is not foundational or primary, since it is given to us only after something
physical is obtained. What is fundamental and primary is an aesthetic experience based on
intuition or emotion. This is what makes Whitehead differ from the traditional understanding.
Traditional philosophy has interpreted sensory perceptions fundamental.
However, sensory
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perceptions put an attention, in terms of Whitehead’s philosophy, only to the perceived things
abstracted from sensation, and, therefore, they are confined merely to dealing with limited
elements. Therefore, from Whitehead’s perspective, the perception in the mode of
presentational immediacy is no more than one factor that can explain what is perceived.
No wonder that the perception made by presentational immediacy is of great importance
too in the process of human knowledge.
cut without such mode of perception.
For all the feelings are not differentiated and clear-
This is exactly what Whitehead really wishes to claim:
feelings cannot become complete until they are followed by a rational process supported by
our conscious recognitions.
However, the greatness of Whitehead doesn’t stop here. Whitehead goes on to hold that the
more complete type of our perception needs one more factor, which is called the perception
in the mode of “symbolic reference.”6 The reason for the doctrine of symbolic reference is
that although our perception is consisted of two modes, i.e., causal efficacy and
presentational immediacy, how the perception can be completely rationalized cannot be
grasped until another mode should be added.
As is well known, the function of the symbolic
reference is to associate what is given through aesthetic feelings with conscious grasp of
meaning. This is to say that although those vague feelings given through the causal efficacy
can be clearly recognized by the presentational immediacy, they are not all that exist there.
What is obtained by the mode of presentational immediacy is limited by many elements. It is
sometimes limited by our frame of thought in our community. In a word, it is affected and
distorted by the paradigm of a community.
If we apply this principle to our cultural theories,
then it can be said that since our cultures are constituted with the variety of concepts, words,
and languages, they should be so compared and contrasted that their limitation can be
manifested. Until we do understand such limitations that each culture faces and until we are
equipped with a more universal type of symbols or categories that can overcome the
limitation of various cultures and civilization, it would be difficult for human beings to possess
an ideal type of civilization in the future. This is why it is necessary for us to need a
philosophy in which a better type of rationalism can be introduced.
Here, such a philosophy
should be able to suggest a system of thought that compare and contrast the limitations of
cultures, consequently bringing about a more complete type of rationalism.
6
See especially chapter 1 of A. N. Whitehead’s Symbolism: its Meaning and Effect .
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It seems to me that what makes Whitehead differ from East Asian philosophy is this. When
it comes to a more complete type of rationalism, Whitehead’s philosophy is more systematic
than East Asian thoughts.
And, sometimes, this makes Whitehead’s philosophy more
rationalistic than East Asian’s.
However, this does not necessarily mean that Whitehead’s
philosophy looks more rational than East Asian one. No, that is not the case.
It is obvious that since East Asian thoughts are also well aware of the fact that nonrationalism should be complemented by rationalism, they too have emphasized the
importance of both rationalism and non-rationalism. However, many East Asian scholars have
stressed, especially when they try to compare East Asian thoughts to Western’s, that one of
the most salient traits of East Asian thoughts is its non-rationalism.
They even argued that
such a trait makes East Asian thoughts have much strength in this post-modern era.
Of course, I agree with those scholars when they said that East Asian thoughts can have
some strength in this post-modern world, because East Asian thoughts is an aestheticoriented philosophy and considers non-rationalism significant. However, I disagree with them
when they argue that the salient characteristic of East Asian thoughts lies only in its nonrationalism and therefore do not have to care about the construction of a systematic
philosophy based on rationalism and a consistent frame of thoughts.
It seems to me that the
reason why they insist that the importance of both rationalism and a consistent frame of
thoughts are not emphasized in East Asian thoughts is not because that those characteristics
are really lacking in East Asia. That is merely because they wish to interpret so and insist
that way.
I believe both Whitehead and East Asian thoughts are very much similar when
they try to reconcile non-rationalism with rationalism, even though they are all aesthetically
oriented. What makes them different is merely that Whitehead has endeavored to construct a
systematic philosophy wherein both rationalism and non-rationalism can be well incorporated
into a more consistent frame of thoughts, whereas East Asian thoughts has made a relatively
weak attempt to construct such a systematic philosophy. However, this does not mean to say
that East Asian thoughts never emphasized the importance of rationalism and a consistent
and coherent frame of thoughts. My point is merely that East Asian thoughts can be
contrasted with Whitehead’s thoughts when it comes to proposing an ideal model of
metaphysics by means of which both rationalism and non-rationalism can be embraced into a
more consistent system of thought.
I believe such a system of thoughts can provide us with
a better opportunity to make a great advancement in building up our civilization in this post
modern era.
I also believe that an East Asian aesthetic philosophy can become a better type
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of systematic philosophy when it endeavors to provide a frame of thought into which both
rationalism and non-rationalism can be incorporated at the same time.