PRESCRIPTION OF OFFENSE; Prescription in criminal cases is a matter of substantive law. The prescriptive period for reckless imprudence with slight physical injury is interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the Fiscal’s office and remained tolled pending the termination of the case.
FACTS: On the evening of October 17,. 1987, petitioner lsabelita Reodica was driving a van which hit the car of complainant Norberto Bonsol. The complainant alleged that he sustained physical injuries and damages to his car because of petitioner’s recklessness. Three (3) days after the incident or on October
20, 1987, BonsaI filed an Affidavit of Complaint against Reodica with the Fiscal’s Office. On January 13,
1988, an Information was filed before the RTC of Makati charging Reodica wih Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Damage to Property with Slight Physical Injury. She pleaded not guilty but the trial court convicted her as charged. She was sentenced to suffer six (6) months of arresto mayor.
She appealed on ground, among others, of prescription of offense. She alleged that the offense of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence being punishable by arresto menor is a light offense and as such, it prescribes in two (2) months. She posited that since the Information was filed on January 13, 1988 or almost three (3) months from the date when vehicular collision occurred, the offense had already prescribed invoking the provision of the Rules on Summary Procedure and the ruling in Zaldivia vs.
Reyes (211 SCRA 277) stating that what tolls the prescriptive period was only the filing of information in the proper court and not the filing of complaint with the Fiscal which does not constitute a judicial proceeding.
She likewise assailed the jurisdiction of the RTC to try the case and argued that the case was improperly because RTC’s do not deal with arresto menor cases. Thus, only the filing with the proper MTC could have tolled the prescriptive period.
ISSUE: Whether or not the offense has already prescribed.
HELD: Prescription in criminal cases is a matter of substantive law. Pursuant to the Constitution, the
Supreme Court is not allowed to diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. In case of conflict between the Rules on Summary Procedure promulgated by the Supreme Court and the Revised Penal
Code, the latter prevails.
As the offenses involved are covered by the provision of Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code and not the rules on summary procedure apply. Prescriptive period for the quasi-offense in question was interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the Fiscal’s office three (3) days after the vehicular mishap and remained tolled pending the termination of the case. Neither the ruling in Zaldivia controls because it covers violation of municipal ordinance. [Reodica vs. CA, G.R. No. 125066, July 8, 1998; FIRST
DIVISION---Davide Jr, J]
QUASI-RECIDIVISM; Quasi-recidivism like recidivism and reiteracion, necessitates the presentation of a certified copy of the sentence convicting an accused. The fact that the accused was an inmate in a penal institution does not prove that final judgment had been

rendered against him.
FACTS: Two lnformations were filed against the accused Gaorana charg ing him the crime of rape for having raped a 15-year old Marivel on two occasions, first on March 5 and the other on March 6. The lnformations alleged the aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism in both instances.
According to the prosecution, the accused had been previously convicted and was serving sentence for the crime of homicide. He was a living out prisoner which means that he is living in a house outside the compound of the Davao Penal Colony (DAPECOL). The trial court convicted the accused as charged but made no express ruling that the accused is a quasi-recidivist.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is a quasi-recidivist.
HELD: The trial court rightly made no express ruling that appellant was a quasi-recidivist. During the trial, the prosecution manifested that appellant had been convicted for the crime of homicide and was serving sentence therefor. However, the prosecution failed or neglected to present in evidence the record of appellant’s previous conviction. Quasi-recidivism, like recidivism and reiteracion, necessitates the presentation of a certified copy of the sentence convicting an accused. The fact that the accused was an inmate of DAPECOL does not prove that final judgment had been rendered against him. [People vs.
Gaorana, G.R. Nos. 109138-39, Apri1 27, 1998—-FIRST DI VISION; Panganiban, J.]
NOCTURNITY; Evidence must show that nighttime darkness was pucposely sought by the offender, or that it facilitated the commission of the crime.
FACTS: Ernesto BeIo was charged with Robbery with Rape before the Regional Trial Court of Naga
City. On October 11, 1991, at around 1:00 o’clock in the morning, accused appellant forced open the door of Leonila Pellosis’ house
.
He poked a foot-long double bladed knife at the neck of the latter and demanded money from her. Leonila handed over the family’s money to the accused. Suddenly, the
“gasera” which was placed near the window to illuminate the house was furtively struck with a piece of wood from the outside by an unidentified person. Then, accused-appellant demanded more money. When
Leonila could not heed to his demand, he dragged her towards the kitchen and forcibly committed sexual intercourse with her. Accused-appellant was convicted of the crime charged. The penalty of reclusion perpetua was imposed upon him.
ISSUE: Whether or not the crime of Robbery with Rape was committed with the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity.
HELD: By and of itself, nighttime is not an aggravating circumstance. The fact that the offense was committed at night will not suffice to sustain nocturnidad. There are two tests for nocturnity as an aggravating circumstance: the objective test, under which nocturnity is aggravating because it facilitates the commission of the offense; and the subjective test, under which nocturnity is aggravating because it was purposely sought by the offender. These two tests should be applied in the alternative. The records of the case failed to show that it passed either of the tests. [People vs. Belo, G.R. No. 109148, December 4,
1998, FIRST DIVISION
—
Q uisumbing, J.]
TREACHERY; Treachery may still be appreciated even when the victim was forewarned of the danger to his person. What is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend or to retaliate.
FACTS: A fistfight ensued between one of the accused and the victim Longasa. Jimenez, a friend of both of them came to mediate but as he approached the two, the group of the accused numbering seven

came. One of them attacked Jimenez causing the latter to flee. While he was about eight arms length away, he saw that one of the accused hit Longasa with a piece of wood, the other two stabbed him seven or eight times, as two others held the victim’s arms. Some struck Longasa with a piece of wood and bottles and two other stabbed him. The attack continued until Longasa fell dead.
An Information was filed against the accuseds charging them of murder qualified by treachery. The trial court held the accuseds guilty of murder. However, it ruled against the presence of treachery since
Longasa was engaged in a fight with the accused before the fatal attack and was therefore sufficiently warned of the assault against him.
ISSUE: Whether or not the findings of the trial court as to the absence of treachery was proper.
HELD: The findings of the trial court was not proper. Treachery may still be appreciated even when the victim was forewarned of danger to his person. What is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate. The overwhelming number of the accuseds, their use of weapons against the unarmed victim, and the fact that the victim’s hands were held behind him preclude the possibility of any defense by the victim. [People vs ViIlonez, G.R. No. 122976-77,
November 16, 1998 ---FIRST DIVISION, Davide,J.]
TREACHERY; The circumstance requires for its application the (1) employment of means, method, or manner of execution which will ensure the safety of the malefactor from defensive or retaliating acts on the part of the victim when no opportunity is given to the latter to defend himself or to retaliate; (2) deliberate or conscious adoption of such means, method or manner of execution.
FACTS: Juancho Gatchalian was charged with the crime of murder alleg edly committed against Arthur
Aumentado. Luisito Reyes together with his father Agapito Reyes testified that they saw the assailants armed with iron pipe and jungle bob when they approached towards the direction of the victim. Boyong
Hagibis suddenly struck the victim on the head. When the victim fell to the ground Juancho Gatchalian stabbed him once in the breast and again in the abdominal area. The victim was unaware of the oncoming attack since he was merely buying some cigarettes from the store and was looking toward Sevilla Street where a fight had earlier taken place. The court found accused-appellant guilty of the crime of murder and imposed upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua.. The accused claimed that treachery was not sufficiently proven hence he is not guilty of the crime of murder.
ISSUE: Whether or not the qualifying circumstance of treachery was sufficiently proven.
HELD: The qualifying circumstance of treachery was sufficiently proven by the prosecution. There is no doubt that the first requisite is present. The victim was attacked in such a manner as to foreclose the possibility that he would defend himself. He was unaware of the oncoming attack since he was merely buying some cigarettes from the store and was looking toward Sevilla Street where a fight had earlier taken place when suddenly he was struck on the head with an iron pipe by the accused and then subsequently stabbed by accused-appellant while he was lying on the ground, hurt and helpless.
It can also be deduced from the testimonies of the witnesses that the accused appellant and Boyong
Hagibis consciously adopted a mode which would ensure the realization of their purpose without danger to themselves: the accused appellant and Boyong Hagibis were already carrying weapons when they first saw the victim; “Pare, may kaaway Tayo”: they approached the victim when his back was to them and hit him with an iron pipe as he turned towards them; the victim w~s stabbed when he was already lying on the ground, hurt and helpless; The manner in which the victim was killed and the aforementioned external manifestations of the accused-appellant and his companion clearly show that they consciously and deliberately adopted the particular method or form of attack to insure the accomplishment of their purpose. [People vs. Gatchalian, G.R.. No. 90301, December 10, 1998, SECOND DIVISION
-
Mendoza,
J.]

TREACHERY; The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack without the slightest provocation on the part of the person attacked.
FACTS: The complainants were relatives of the victim Paterno. They were awakened by the sound of stones virtually raining on their house one evening. Accused appellant Loreto Noay called upon Paterno to open the door of his house. As Paterno opened the door, appellant flashed the beam of his flashlight toward the face of Patérno and stabbed him on the chest. Paterno died by reason of the stab wounds inflicted. Because of this incident, accused-appellant was charged with murder for the killing of Paterno, which was qualified by treachery.
ISSUE: Whether or not treachery attended the killing as to qualify the offense to murder.
HELD: The fact that Paterno was stabbed on the chest does not militate against the lower court’s finding of treachery. Even if the attack is frontal, there is treachery if it was so sudden and unexpected that the deceased had no time to prepare for his defense; and that in fact Paterno was rendered temporarily sightless immediately before he was stabbed by appellant. The former did not even have the opportunity to have a good look at his attacker or at his assailant’s weapon. The requisites of treachery are present in the case at bar. [People vs Noay, G. R. No. 122102, September 25, 1998
-~
SECOND DIVISION;
Regalado, J.]
CONSPIRACY; For conspiracy to exist, it is not required that there be an agreement for an appreciable period prior to the occurrence. It is sufficient that at the time of the commission of the offense, the accused had some purpose and were united in its execution.
The agreement to commit a crime may be gleaned from the mode and manner of the commission of the offense or inferred from the acts of the accused which point to a joint purpose or design, concerted action, and community of intent.
FACTS: A fistfight ensued between one of the accuseds and the victim Longasa. Jimenez, a friehd of both of them came to mediate but as he approached the two, the group of the accused numbering seven came. One of them attacked Jimenez with a bottle. He was able to escape from his attackers. When he was about eight meters away, he called Longasa but he saw that his attackers were already upon Longasa.
He saw that one of the accused hit Longasa with a piece of wood, the other two stabbed him seven or eight times, as two others held the victim’s arms. Some struck Longasa with a piece of wood and bottles and two other stabbed him. The attack continued until Longasa fell dead.
The group was charged with murder. The trial court held that there was conspiracy among the accused, thus, found all of them guilty as charged.
On appeal, the accused contended that there is no sufficient proof of conspiracy. The short interval between the attack on Jimenez and the attack on Longasa precluded the existence of a preconceived plan among the accused to assault Longasa. Additionally, if there was indeed conspiracy among them, all should have stabbed Longasa, not just that some of them hit the victim with bottles or a piece of wood.
ISSUE: Whether or not the findings of the trial court as to the existence of conspiracy was proper.
HELD: Conspiracy is present in the instant case. For conspiracy to exist, it is not required that there be an agreement for an appreciable period prior to the occurrence. It is sufficient that at the time of the commission of the offense, the accused had some purpose and were united in its execution. The agreement to commit a crime may be gleaned from the mode and manner of the commission of the offense or inferred from the acts of the accused which point to a joint purpose or design, concerted action, and community of intent.
In this case, the accused simultaneously attacked Longasa, with two of them holding the victim’s arms.

Some struck him with a piece of wood or bottles and two others stabbed him.The attack continued until
Longasa fell dead. These acts clearly point to a joint purpose to accomplish the desired end. [People vs.
Villonez, G.R. No. 122976-77, November 16, 1998 --FIRST DlVISION, Davide, J.]
ALIBI; Alibi is settled as the weakest of all defenses. It cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused by witnesses who have no ill motive to testify falsely.
FACTS: While Fe was preparing to go to sleep, she heard a noise in front of their house as it sledge was being dragged. She stood up and opened her window. Seeing that accused-appellant together with his four accused were all beating the victim Mansueto, she went outside followed by her husband Hilario. The couple pleaded to stop beating Mansueto but instead, a certain Joebert shot Hilario and then the victim.
The latter died. During the trial of the case, Fe categorically testified that she saw Narito acted in conspiracy with his other co-conspirator. However, Narito interposed the defense of alibi. The lower court find the accused guilty of murder.
ISSUE: Was the conviction proper.
HELD: The defense of alibi must fall. It is a settled rule that alibi is the weakest of-all defenses. It cannot prevail over the positive identification of the aácused by witnesses who have no ill motive to testify falsely. Alibi becomes less plausible when it is corroborated by relatives and friends who may not be impartial witnesses. More so, when the corroborating testimonies are marred by discrepancies. [People vs. Araneta, GR. No. 125894; December 1 1 1998; Second Division-
-
-Puno, J.]
RAPE; The absence of spermatozoa in the vagina or thereabouts does not negate the commission of rape. it is penetration, however slight, and not ejaculation that constitutes rape.
FACTS: Merlinda Desacula was a twelve-year old girl suffering from severe mental retardation with the mental intelligence of a three to four-year old child. Given her delicate condition, she was usually left to the care of an elder sister when her parents were at work. One day, while she was left to her sister’s care, her sister’s husband Anecito Tabor came looking for her so that she could feed his fighting cocks. Unable to find her, Anecito decided to feed the cocks himself. On his way to the back of their house where the cocks were kept, Anecito noticed the cage rocking. To his surprise, he saw the accused-appellant, Antonio dela Paz, Jr. in the act of sexual intercourse with Merlinda. He was on top of the victim who was lying flat on the ground, with her panties pulled down and her skirt raised. Anecito turned over the accused-appellant to the barangay captain and was subsequently brought to the police station. Merlinda was brought to the nearby provincial hospital for medical examination which revealed healed hymen lacerations and the absence of spermatozoa.
ISSUE: Whether or not the absence of spermatozoa in the vagina negates the commission of rape.
HELD: The absence of spermatozoa in the vagina or thereabouts does not negate the commission of rape. For the presence or absence of spermatozoa is immaterial in the prosecution of a rape case as it is well-settled that penetration, however slight, and not ejaculation, that constitutes rape. The only essential point to prove is the entrance or at least the introduction of the male organ into the labia of the pudendum.
[People vs. DeIa Paz, Jr., G. R.. No. 119316, November24, 1998
-
THIRD DIVISION; Kapunan, J.]
ESTAFA; Conviction of estafa can stand notwithstanding the conviction in illegal

recruitment.
FACTS: Felipe Ganaden recruited the services of the complainants. The latter were asked to pay placement fees in consideration of Ganadens promise to facilitate their employment overseas. The plaintiffs flew to Singapore~where they waited for their job placements. Giving up hope of employment, all of them eventually returned to the Philippines. Upon arrival, they asked the accused-appellant to return their money and reimburse them for their expenses which the latter refused. MZ Ganaden Consultancy
Service was discovered to have neither authority nor license to recruit workers for deployment abroad.
Aside from being charged with illegal recruitment, the accused appellant was likewise charged with estafa.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused-appellant is guilty of estafa.
HELD: The accused, appellant is guilty of estafa aside from illegal recruitment. Through insidious words and machinations, he deluded complainants into believing that for a fee he would provide them overseas employment. They parted with their hard earned money enticed by the prospect of a well paying job in a foreign land.. There is estafa when a person defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit causing damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation to the offended party or third person.
Conviction of estafa can stand, albeit the conviction in illegal recruitment. [People vs. Ganaden, G. R.
No. 125441, November27, 1998
-
FIRST DIVISION; BelIosiIIo, J.]
ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT IN LARGE SCALE AND ESTAFA; Conviction for the crime of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code does nor preclude punishment under the statutes if some other crimes or felonies are committed.
FACTS: An Information charging the accused Elvis Sanchez with illegal recruitment in large scale was filed. It was alleged in the Information that the accused represented himself to have the capacity to contract, enlist and hire, and transport Filipino workers for employment abroad to the herein five complainants-- kimay, Filog, Acena, Fesset and Akia. The complainants alleged that the said accused promised them employment. As a result of such misrepresentation and promise, the complainants paid the accused placement fees in the following amounts: Kimay
-
P16,000; Akia
-
P15,000; and Acena
-
P18,000.
The amount paid by the other two complainants were not ascertained for they had already left for abroad pending trial of the case and before they could be put to the witness stand. However, the appellant reneged on his promise to send them abroad.
Likewise, a separate Information was filed against the accused charging him with the crime of estafa for having collected the abovementioned amounts. The trial court found the accused guilty of the separate crimes of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale and three counts of estafa.
ISSUE: Whether or not the conviction was proper.
HELD: The conviction was proper. All the Glements of illegal recruitment in large scale as well as all the elements of estafa in general were satisfied in the present case. Conviction for the crime of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code does not preclude punishment under the statutes if some other crimes or felonies are committed in the process. Thus, a person convicted for illegal recruitment may also be convicted for the crime of estafa. The principal reason for this is that the former offense is ma/um pro hibiturn where the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction, while estafa is malum in se where the criminal intent of the accused is an additional element for conviction. [People vs Sanchez,
GR. No. 122508, June 26, 1998-- FIRST DIVISION; Vitug, J.]
COMPLEX CRIME; Where one of the resulting offenses in criminal negligence constitutes a light felony, there is no complex crime. They are separate offenses subject to distinct penalties.

FACTS: Petitioner Reodica was driving a van when it hit the car of complainant Bonsol. The complainant alleged that he sustained physical injuries and damages to his car amounted to Php 8542.00.
An Information was filed before the RTC of Makati charging Reodica wih Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Damage to Property with Slight Physical Injury.. She pleaded not guilty bi4 the trial court convicted her as charged. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. In a motion for reconsideration, the petitioner alleged that it was error to complex damage to property and slight physical injuries as both were light offenses. The Court of Appeals denied the motion. Thus, certiorari under Rule 45.
ISSUE: Whether or not a reckless act would amount to a complex crime of damage to property and slight physical injuries.
HELD: If a reckless, imprudent or negligent act results in two or more grave or less grave feIoni~s, a complex crime is committed. However, where one of the resulting offenses in criminal negligence constitutes a light felony, there is no complex crime. They are separate offense~ subject to distinct penalties. Thus, the trial court erred in considering as complex crime the felonies of less grave felony of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of Php 8,852.00 and the light felony of reckless imprudence resulting in physical injuries. [Readica vs. CA, G.R. No. 125066, July 8, 1998;
FIRST DIVISION---Davide Jr, J]
SPECIAL COMPLEX CRIME OF KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM WITH MURDER;
Where the person kidnapped is killed in the course of the detention, regardless of whether the killing was purposely sought or was merely an afterthought, the kidnapping and murder or homicide can no longer be complexed under Art. 48, nor be treated as separate crimes, but shall be punished as a special complex crime under the last paragraph of Art.
267, as amended by RA No. 7659.
FACTS: Abanilla, an employee of Meralco, was hostaged by the accused Ramos while she was on her way to her work. The hostage incident transpired while the accused and the victim were on board a taxicab. The accused demanded from the victim an amount of P200,000 which the victim heeded by immediately calling her boss at Meralco and pleaded to send her the amount because she was being hostaged. The amount was sent and received by the accused. Notwithstanding such receipt, the victim was not released and instead the accused decided to bring her to Bulacan. On their way to Bulacan, the victim attempted to escape. In her desperate effort to free herself, the victim opened the left rear door and jumped out of the cab; unfortunately, her blouse was caught in the process. As a consequence, she was dragged by the vehicle. The accused suddenly stopped the taxi, and as Abanilla attempted to rise, he aimed his gun at the back of his hapless victim, fired at her twice, hitting her just above her nape. The victim died.
An Information was filed against the accused charging him with the complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with murder, to which he pleaded not guilty. The trial court convicted the accused of two (2) separate crimes-kidnapping for ransom and murder-- instead of complex crime charged in the
Information. It held that there was no proof that the victim was kidnapped for the purpose of killing her so as to make the offense a complex crime. Thus, the killing of the victim was found to be merely an afterthought, making the accused liable for two separate offenses.
ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the trial court was proper.
HELD: The decision of the trial court was not proper. The crime committed was the special complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with murder under Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by
RA 7659. Prior to December 31,1993, the date of effectivity of RA 7659, the rule was that where the kidnapped victim was subsequently killed by his abductor, the crime committed would either be a complex crime of kidnapping with murder under Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, or two (2) separate crimes of kidnapping and murder. Thus, where the accused kidnapped the victim for the purpose of killing him, and he was in fact killed by his abductor, the crime committed was the complex crime of

kidnapping with murder under Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, as the kidnapping of the victim was a necessary means of committing the murder. On the other hand, where the victim was kidnapped not for the purpose of~killing but was subsequently slain as an afterthought, two (2) separate crimes of kidnapping and murder were committed.
However, RA 7659 amended Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code by adding thereto a last paragraph which provdes that the maximum penalty shall be imposed when the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention. This amendment introduced in our criminal statutes the concept of special complex crime” of kidnapping with murder or homicide. It effectively eliminated the distinction drawn by the courts between those case where the killing of the kidnapped victim was purposely sought by the accused, and those where the killing of the victim was not deliberately resorted to but was merely an afterthought. Consequently, the rule now is: Where the person kidnapped is killed in the course of the detention, regardless of whether the killing was purposely sought or was merely an afterthought, the kidnapping and murder or homicide can no longer be complexed under Art. 48, nor be treated as separate crimes, but shall be punished as a special complex crime under the last paragraph of Art. 267, as amended by RA No. 7659.
The instant case falls within the purview of the provision of Art. 267 as amended. Although the crime of kidnapping for ransom was already consummated with the mere demand by the accused for ransom
- even before the ransom was delivered
- the deprivation of liberty of the victim persisted and continued to persist until such time that she was killed by the accused while trying to escape. Hence, the death of the victim may be considered as a consequence of the kidnapping for ransom. [People vs Ramos G.R. No. 118570,
October 12, 1996--- EN BANC; Per Curiam]
SPECIAL COMPLEX CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH RAPE; For robbery with homicide to prosper, it is enough that robbery shall have been accompanied by rape whether the latter was committed before, during, or after the former.
FACTS: Ernesto BeIo is charged with the special complex crime of Robbery with Rape allegedly committed against Leonila Pellosis. On October 11, 1991, at around 1:00 o’clock in the morning, accused appellant forced open the door of the victim. With the use of his foot-long double bladed knife, poked at the neck of Leonila, he took from the latter the amount of P 5,060.00. Thereafter, he demanded for more money. When the victim could not heed to his demand, he dragged her to the kitchen, and forcibly had sexual intercourse with her. Finding Ernesto Belo guilty of the crime charged, the Regional Trial Court of
Naga City imposed upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered him to return the amount of P
5,060.00.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused-appellant is guilty of the special complex crime of Robbery with
Rape.
HELD: In Robbery with Rape, it is enough that robbery shall have been accompanied by rape to be punishable under Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code which does not differentiate whether the rape was committed before, during orafterthe robbery.
In the case at bar, all the elements of the crime of Robbery with Rape are present and proved: First, appellant employed violence against and intimidation on the person of Leonila Pellosis by poking a double bladed knife on her neck to compel her to give money. Second, after getting the money of the victim, he dragged her to the kitchen where he mercilessly raped her. [People vs. Belo, G.R. No. 109148,
December 4, 1998, FIRST DIVISION
-
Q uisumbing,J.]
PENALTY; In case of qualified theft where the convict is meted the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, the next higher penalty is not death but reclusion perpetua with the accessory

penalties of death under Article 40 of the Revised Penal Code and the convict is not entitled to pardon before a lapse of forty-year period.
FACTS: Fernando Cañales and Romeo Sarmiento were employees of First Based Industries Corporation.
They were found guilty by the trial court of the crime of theft of a van and cargo of frozen prawns of the corporation amounting to Php 1,800,000.00 and were sentenced the penalty of reclusion temporal. The
Court of Appeals sentenced the accused for the crime of qualified theft and ordered them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for forty (40) years with the accessory penalties of death under Article 40 of the Revised Penal Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not the penalty imposed was proper.
HELD: The penalty imposed was proper. Ordinarily, the penalty for the crime committed by the accused under Art. 309 is reclusion temporal on the basis of the value of the van and the cargo amounting to Php
1.8 million. However, the crime committed was qualified theft since the accuseds were employees of the owner of the properties stolen and they abused the confidence and trust reposed on them. Under Article
310 of the Revised Penal Code, qualified theft is punishable by the penalty next higher by two (2) degrees than that meted under Article 309. Article 25 provides that the penalty two (2) degrees higher than reclusion temporal is death. However, Article 74 of the same Code provides that when a given penalty has to be raised by one or two degrees and the resulting penalty is death according to the scale, but is not specifically provided by law as a penalty, the latter cannot be imposed. The given penalty and the accessory penalties of death under Article 40 shall be considered as the next higher penalty.
Thus, Canales should be meted the penalty reclusion perpetua for forty years with the accessory penalties of death under Art. 40 and he is not entitled to pardon before a. lapse of forty-year period. [People vs.
Cañales,, G.R. No. 126319, October 12, 1998--- SECOND DIVISION; Regalado, J.]
PENALTY FOR QUASI-OFFENSE; Reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and slight physical injuries is not punishable by mere fine. The third paragraph of Art. 365 does not apply since the reckless imprudence did not result in damage to property only but
what applies is the first paragraph of Art. 365 which provides for a penalty of arresto mayor
in its minimum and medium periods.
FACTS: On the evening of October 17, 1987, petitioner lsabelita Reodica was driving a van which hit the car of complainant Norberto Bonsol. The complainant alleged that he sustained physical injuries and damages to his car amounting to Php 8,542.00 because of petitioner’s recklessness. Three (3) days after the incident or on October 20, 1987, Bonsol filed an Affidavit of Complaint against Reodica with the
Fiscal’s.Off ice. On January 13, 1988, an Information was filed before the RTC of Makati charging
Reodica wih Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Slight Physical Injury. She pleaded not guilty but the trial court convicted her as charged. She was sentenced to suffer six (6) months of arresto mayor.
She filed a motion for reconsideration and asking for a review of the penalty. She stated that the courts should have pronounced that therewere two separate light felonies involved, kG. reckless imprudence with slight physical injuries and reckless imprudence with damage to property. She then suggested that the penalties of two light felonies, both imposable in their maximum period and computed together, only sum up to 60 days imprisonment and not six months as imposed by the lower courts.
ISSUE: Whether or not the penalty imposed was corect.
HELD: The penalty of six months of arresto mayor is incorrect. The submission of the petitioner that the penalty of arresto menorin its maximum period shall be the proper penalty is likewise incorrect. Under
Art. 365 of the RPC, the penalty for reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries, a light

felony, is arresto menor in its maximUm period, with a duration of 21 to 30 days. If the offense of slight physical injuries is, however, committed deliberately or with malice, it is penalized with arresto menor under Art. 266 of the RPC, with a duration of 1 day to 30 days. Plainly, the penalty then ur~der Art. 266 may either be lower than or equal to the penalty prescribed under the first paragraph of Art. 365. This being the case, the exception in the sixth paragraph of Art. 365 applies. Hence, the proper penalty for reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries is public censure, this being the penalty next lower in degree to arresto menor. As to reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of Php 8,542.00, the third paragraph of Art. 365, which provides for the penalty of fine, does not apply since the reckless imprudence in this case did not result in damage to property only. What applies is the first paragraph of Art. 365, which provides for arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods for an act committed through reckless imprudence which, had it been intentional, would have constituted a less grave felony. [Readica vs. CA, G.R. No. 125066, July 8, 1998; FIRST DIVISION---Davide Jr., J.]
ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF UNLICENSED FIREARM AS AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCE; Illegal possession of firearms can be considered as aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide if such possession has been established beyond reasonable doubt.
FACTS: Two inforrnations were filed against Noel Navarro for murder and illegal possession of unlicensed firearm before the RTC-Alaminos. After the trial, the court convicted the accused of murder but considered illegal possession of firearm merely as an aggravating circumstance in the commission of murder considering that the alleged firearm used was not recovered by the authorities and never presented in court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the illegal possession of firearm may be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance.
HELD: Illegal possession of firearms can be considered as aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide if such possession has been established beyond reasonable doubt. To prove illegal possession of firearms, the prosecution must establish (1) the existence of the subject firearm and (2) the fact that the accused who owned and possessed the firearm did not have the corresponding license or permit to carry the same outside of his residence. In the case at bar, the existence of the subject firearm was not established since the firearm was not presented in court or offered as evidence. [People of the Philippines vs. Noel Navarro, G.R. NO. 129566, October 7, 1998; Panganiban, J.]
BOUNCING CHECKS LAW; Where check was issued to evidence a share in the partnership, the subject check was not made, drawn and issued in exchange for value received as to qualify it as a check on account or for value.
FACTS: Petitioner Irma dos is a businesswoman engaged in leather tanning. Her accuser for violation of
B.P. 22 is her erstwhile supplier and business partner, Eddie Alarilla. In 1985, the latter joined Idos’ business and formed with her a partnership. However, the partnership was short-lived. In January, 1986 the parties agreed to terminate their partnership. Upon liquidation of the business, the partnership had receivables and stocks worth P1,800,000.00. Alarilla’s share of the assets was P900,000.00. To pay for which, dos issued four postdated checks. Alarilla was able to encash the first, second and fourth checks but the third check was dishonored on October, 1986 for insufficiency of funds. Alarilla demanded payment from ldos but the latter failed to pay. He made a formal demand for payment. ldos denied liability. She claimed that the check had been given upon demand of complainant in May, 1986 only as
“assurance” of his share in the assets of the partnership and that it was not supposed to be deposited until the stocks had been sold. AIarilIa charged dos of violation of B. P. 22. The trial court and the Court of
Appeals found Idos guilty as charged. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not Idos committed a violation of B.P. 22.
HELD: Irma Dos deserved acquittal. The elements of the offense penalized under B.P. 22 (Bouncing
Checks Law) are: (1) the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply on account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and (3) subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.
The first element of the offense is lacking. Evidence shows that the subject check was to be funded from receivables to be collected and goods to be sold by the partnership, and only when such collection and sale were realized. Thus there is sufficient basis for the assertion that the petitioner issued the subject check to evidence only complainant’s share or interest in the partnership, or at best, to show her commitment that when receivables are collected and goods are sold, she would give to Alarilla the net amount due him representing his interest in the partnership. It did not involve a debt of or any account due and payable by ldos. In other words, the subject check was not made, drawn and issued by Idos in exchange for value received as to qualify it as a check on account or for value. [Idos vs Court of
Appea/s, G.R. No. 110782, September25, 1998--EN BANC; Quisumbing,J. ]
ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT AND ESTAFA; Conviction for offenses under Labor Code does not bar punishment for offenses punished by other laws. An illegal recruiter may be charged and convicted separately of illegal recruitment and estafa because the former is malum prohibitum and the latter is malum in se.
FACTS: Nenita Juego is the wife of Abelardo who is the owner of AJ International Trade Link (AJITL), a real estate business engaged in the importation of cement and fertilizer from Iraq. Although AJITL was given a special power of attorney by two licensed agencies accredited by the Taiwan Labor, it is not actually engaged in recruitment. Nenita and certain Wilf redo Gaerlan convinced twenty-six (26) individuals to apply as factory workers with a salary of approximately $500.00 a month with free accommodation on different occasions. For this purpose, they persuaded them to give initial payments for processing fee. Nenita then issued receipts but signed in the name of her husband Abelardo with the excuse that the latter is always out of town. When the applicants failed to leave the country as what
Nenita had promised, they tried to withdraw their payments but to no avail. The applicants then filed criminal action against Nenita and Wilfredo. The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration issued a certificate that Nenita and Wilfredo Gaerlan are neither licensed nor authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment. The trial court rendered judgment convicting Nenita and Wilf redo of the separate crimes of illegal recruitment and estafa.
ISSUE: Whether or not Nenita Juego and Wilf redo Gaerlan could be charged and convicted separately of illegal recruitment and estafa.
HELD: Juego and Gaerlan can be convicted for the two crimes separately. Conviction for offenses under the Labor Code does not bar punishment for offenses punishable by other laws. A person who committed illegal recruitment may be charged and convicted separately of illegal recruitment and estafa, as the former offense is malum prohibitum where the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction, while the latter offense is malum in se where the criminal intent of the accused is crucial for conviction.
All the elements of illegal recruitment are present. The certification issued by the POEA clearly showed that Nenita and Alf redo did not possess the requisite license or authority. Despite absence thereof, they engaged in recruitment activities as overwhelmingly substantiated by the prosecution witnesses. Also all the elements of estafa are present in the case: accused Nenita and Wilt redo deceived the complaining witnesses into believing that they had the authority and capability to send them abroad for employment; that there were available jobs for them in Taiwan although there were none; and that by reason or on the strength of such assurance, the complainants parted with their money in payment of the placement fee. All

these representations of appellants were actually false and fraudulent. [People vs. Juego, G.R. No.
115938, October 13, 1998; Bellosillo, J.]
CONSPIRACY; Conspiracy does not require an agreement for an appreciable period prior to the occurrence. It maybe deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated such as the joint purpose and design and community of interest of the accused.
FACTS: At around 1:30 in the morning of January 27, 1995, Imelda and Hector were awakened by the barking of their dogs outside their house. Suspicious, the couple went outside to check what the noise was all about. There they saw accused-appellant Eliseo Gomez who when asked what he was doing in the vicinity, immediately boxed Hector. A scuffle ensued, after which the accused ran away towards the direction of Luis Aleonar. The latter tried to get hold of the appellant but failed.
A moment later, the accused returned with five companions, two of whom were Felix and Sanao. The appellant pointed to Hector sayingthis one.” Instantaneously, Felix shot Hector hitting him in the left eye.
Lying prostrate on the ground, another shot was fired at Hector. The authorities apprehended Eliseo but the other culprits remained at large. Convicted of the crime of murder based on conspiracy, the accused appealed though no longer necessary because murder is meted with death penalty which is subject of automatic review.
ISSUE: Whether or not conspiracy was present in the instant case.
HELD: There was conspiracy among the accused. Conspiracy does not require an agreement for an appreciable period prior to the occurrence. It maybe deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated such as the joint purpose and design and community of interest of the accused.
The testimony of Imelda and Luis is the measure of Gomez’s participation in the killing of Hector. It is clear therefrom that the gunman was Felix. Gomez’s criminal liability for Hector’s death would then depend on a finding of conspiracy between the accused and Felix.
In the case at bar, it can be inferred that Gomez had kept a grudge against Hector. He ran away not to avoid any retaliation from Hector who attempted to hold him, but to get the assistance of his friends.
Gomez must have exaggerated his version of the incident, or his friends might have miscomprehended the report and thought that Hector committed a serious offense against Gomez, hence, they naturally agreed to execute a common plan and accomplish a common objective--to kill Hector. Gomez was convicted, as he was one of the conspirators, but only for homicide for no qualifying aggravating circumstance was proved. [People vs. Gomez, G.R. No. 126914; October 1, 1998—En Banc; Davide, Jr., J]
ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE; Where the homicide is not conclusively shown to have been committed for the purpose of robbing the victim, or where the robbery was not proven at all, there can be no conviction for robo con homicidio .
FACTS: Alejandro Oledar, a security guard, heard a loud scream of a person seemingly being slaughtered. He saw appellant Judy Sanchez, standing in the direction where the scream came from and where the body of the victim, Reynald Paborada was sprawled. Alejandro and another security guard, joined in chasing the appellant, who got lost. Several hours later, the appellant was arrested for trespassing. The appellant’s shirt and pants were splattered with blood. Recovered from the appellant’s possession were the victim’s personal belongings. Judy Sanchez was charged and convicted with the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. Hence, this case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the offense constitutes a special complex crime of robbery with homicide
HELD: Accused-appellant is guilty of the separate crimes of homicide and theft. The prosecution palpably failed to substantiate its allegaticn of the presence of criminal design to commit robbery, independent of the intent to commit homicide. The finding of guilt in regard to the crime of homicide

does not sufficiently sustain the conclusion that the death of the victim occurred by reason or on the occasion of the robbery to make the offense a special complex crime of robbery with homicide. The crucial elements of the offense include the presence of criminal design on the part of the accused to commit robbery, and the commission of homicide by reason, or on occasion, of the robbery. Thus, the phrase “by reason” covers homicide committed before or after the taking of personal property of another as long as the motive of the offender in killing a person before the robbery is to deprive the victim of his personal property which is sought to be accomplished by eliminating an obstacle or opposition or in killing a person after the robbery to do away with a witness or to defend the possession of the stolen property. [People of the Philippines vs Judy Sanchez, G. R. No. 120655, October 14, 1998; Quisumbing,
J.]
FRONTAL ATTACK, WHEN TREACHEROUS; Even if the attack is frontal, it is treacherous when it is sudden and unexpected and the victim is unarmed.
FACTS: The victim Lutgardo Fumar was fast asleep in his residence when he was awakened by the commotion outside his house involving his brother and the accused Nicandro Abria. When he stepped out of the house, the accused wasted no time in venting his ire on him by stabbing him in the right chest. Two days after the incident, the victim died. The accused was charged with the crime of murder qualified by treachery.
On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in appreciating treachery as a qualifying circumstance since the assault was committed frontally or while they are facing each other.
ISSUE: Whether or not a frontal attack constitutes treachery.
HELD: The trial court was correct when it appreciated treachery as a qualifying circumstance. Although the accused and the victim were facing each other when the stabbing occurred, the attack was so sudden and unexpected that the victim (who was unarmed) was unable to ward off and thwart the assault and put up any semblance of defense. Although the attack on Lutgardo was frontal, it caught him off-guard and defenseless as he had just been roused from sleep and was not aware of what was happening outside his house. [People of the Philippines vs. Nicandro Abria,, G.R.. 113445, December 29, 1998; Romero, J.]
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT; Conviction for drug pushing requires that the drug subject of the sale be positively and categorically identified in open court. Absent the identity of marijuana, which is the corpus delicti and its examination as proof of its being a prohibited merchandise, the conviction has no leg to stand on.
ILLEGAL SALE OF PROHIBITED DRUGS, WHEN CONSUMMATED; The commission of the offense of illegal sale of prohibited drugs requires merely the consummation of the selling transaction which happens the moment the buyer receives the drug from the seller.
FACTS: Acting upon a confidential information that accused Ramon Magno was engaged in selling marijuana at his residence, the police conducted a buy-bust operation which led to the arrest of the accused and the confiscation of twenty-two (22) pieces of marijuana cigarette sticks. Out of the 22 sticks, only one (1) stick was submitted to the PNP crime laboratory for examination and said specimen was found positive of marijuana. The trial court convicted him of violation of RA No. 6425 for illegal sale of marijuana and ruled that there is no need to submit the entire 22 sticks for one of them suffices for the purpose of examination as to its contents. He was accordingly sentenced to suffer life imprisonment and pay fine of P20,000.00.
He appealed contending that the prosecution was not able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that he sold the marijuana based on the inconsistencies of the statements of the police. He also questions the penalty

for his conviction based on the twenty-two sticks of marijuana seized.
ISSUE: Whether or not the conviction is valid.
HELD: The prosecution was able to prove beyond a scintilla of doubt that the accused had sold and delivered a prohibited drug. The commission of the offense of illegal sale of prohibited drugs requires merely the consummation of the selling transaction which happens the moment the buyer receives the drug from the seller. Reversal of the decision based on the alleged inconsistencies of the investigators’ statements is unwarranted. The findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to the highest degree of respect and will not be disturbed absent any clear showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight or substance which could have affected the result of the case.
The penalty imposed is not correct. The accused should be held liable for the illegal sale of only one stick of marijuana. Conviction for drug pushing requires that the drug subject of the sale be positively and categorically identified in open court. All the 22 cigarette sticks must have undergone forensic examination or the prosecution must prove by other competent evidence that the object seized from the accused was indeed marijuana. The identity of marijuana, which constitutes the corpus delicti, must be established with certainty and conclusiveness. Absent the corpus delicti and its examination as proof of its being a prohibited merchandise, the conviction of the accused-appellant has no leg to stand on. [People of the Philippines vs. Ramon Magno, G.R. . No. 126049, September25, 1998; Regalado, J.]
NATURE OF RESISTANCE IN RAPE CASES; It is not necessary that the force and intimidation employed in accomplishing the crime of rape be so great or of such character as could not be resisted, it is only necessary that the force and intimidation be sufficient to consummate the purpose which the accused had in mind.
FACTS: One afternoon, fourteen-year old Charmaigne Abad, was grabbed forcefully, her mouth was covered by the accused’s hand and she was dragged to a forested area near an acacia tree. There, accused, using force and intimidation, removed her pants, laid her on the ground, lowered her panty and went on top of her. She tried to fight back but accused was too strong for her. After the sexual abuse, she went home but did not intimate to anybody the ordeal for she was threatened by the accused. It was not until her abdomen became noticeably bigger that she was forced to relate the rape committed against her which rape resulted in her pregnancy. An Information was filed charging Gerald Tayaban with rape. Tayaban pleaded not guilty to the charge against him. After trial on the merits Tayaban was found guilty. Hence, this appeal. Appellant alleges that it can be deduced from Charmaigne’s testimony that her hands and feet were free, therefore, she could have resisted the rape and even escaped had she really wanted to.
ISSUE: Whether or not the failure to resist the appellant’s assault necessarily negate her charge of rape or taint her credibility.
HELD: The arguments do not persuade. Charmaigne’s failure to resist the appellant’s assault successfully and to escape when the opportunity presented itself should not be constructed as a manifestation of consent. It does not necessarily negate her charge of rape or taint her credibility, for the indelible fact remains that appellant employed force and intimidation in the sexual assault, and the victim offered resistance. This is evident from Charmaigne’s testimony. It is not necessary that the force and intimidation employed in accomplishing it be so great or of such character as could not be resisted, it is only necessary that the force and intimidation be sufficient to consummate the purpose which the accused had in mind. [People of the Philippines vs. Gerard Tayaban, G.R.. No. 128487, September25, 1998;
Panganiban, J.]
RAPE; Once force is proven by the prosecution, the “sweethearts defense” does not by itself negate rape. Love is not a license for lust. A sweetheart cannot be forced to have sex against her will.

FACTS: Complainant Abad was then 14 years of age when she was sexually abused by accused Gerald
Tayaban by using force and intimidation. After the sexual abuse, she went home but did not intimate to anybody the ordeal for she was threatened by the accused. It was not until her abdomen became noticeably bigger that she was forced to relate the rape committed against her which rape resulted in her pregnancy. An Information was filed charging Gerald Tayaban with rape. Tayaban pleaded not guilty to the charge against him. After trial on the merits Tayaban was found guilty. Hence, this appeal. Tayaban asserts that the victim was his sweetheart and that she consented to their sexual relationship.
ISSUE: Whether or not the “sweethearts defense” negates the commission of rape.
HELD: The allegation of an amorous relationship with the private complainant is unworthy of credence.
Charmaigne was a girl of fourteen and a student in a Catholic school, while Tayaban was a married man twice her age who was related to her by affinity. Other than appellant’s self-serving testimony, no other evidence were presented to prove his alleged relationship with Charmaigne. Besides even assuming that the appellant and the private complainant were indeed sweethearts, this fact alone would not negate the commission of rape, especially when it has been established in this case that coitus took place, not with the victim’s consent, but through force and intimidation. A sweetheart cannot be forced to have sex against her will. From a mere fiancée, definitely, a man cannot demand sexual submission, and worse, employ violence upon her on a mere justification of love. Love is not a license for lust. [People of the
Philippines vs. Gerald Tayaban, G.R. No. 128481, September25, 1998; Panganiban, J.]