VAN RIPER, MATTIS CRITICIZE JOINT STAFF'S FORCE-DEVELOPMENT
PROCESS
1246 words
23 January 2006
Inside the Navy
Vol. 19, No. 3
English
Copyright © 2006, Inside Washington Publishers. All rights reserved. Also
available in print and online as part of InsideDefense.com.
The Joint Staff's force-development process is flawed because it is producing
a plethora of insubstantial warfighting concepts, damaging effective military
discourse and threatening professional military education, according to
retired and active-duty Marine Corps generals.
The goal of the Pentagon's relatively new Joint Capability Integration and
Development System (JCIDS) is to provide the U.S. military with the
capabilities needed to perform a full range of missions. But lately the process
has faced heavy criticism behind closed doors. This is clear from internal email messages reviewed by Inside the Navy.
Retired Lt. Gen. Paul Van Riper launched an assault on the process last
month in a private e-mail message to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Gen. Peter Pace, Marine Corps Commandant Gen. Michael Hagee and Army
Chief of Staff Gen. Peter Schoomaker. Van Riper slammed JCIDS for being
"overly bureaucratic and procedurally focused."
In the last two years, JCIDS has led to the creation of an excess of concepts,
most of which are devoid of meaningful content, he wrote Dec. 11.
"My greatest concern is that as these concepts migrate into the curricula of
professional military schools they will undermine a coherent body of doctrine
creating confusion within the officer corps," Van Riper continued. "In fact, I
have begun to see signs of just that!"
Three days later, Hagee forwarded the lengthy missive to 17 Marine
generals, including Lt. Gen. James Mattis, the head of Marine Corps Combat
Development Command. Mattis, who has the job that Van Riper held when
he retired in 1997, agreed completely with Van Riper's arguments.
"We have been engaged on this issue for many months now, highlighting the
flaws in the effects-based approach that is permeating all aspects of Joint
warfighting doctrine," Mattis wrote in his reply to Hagee. Like Van Riper's
missive, Mattis' e-mail was not intended for public release. Mattis'
spokesman had no comment.
"For example," Mattis wrote, "at tomorrow's Senior Level Review, we are
prepared to again push back against the proposed way ahead for the Joint
Urban Operations Integrating Concept, for many of the reasons
summarized/highlighted by Gen. Van Riper."
Mattis' e-mail said he expressed concerns last November about the
Pentagon's effects-based approach.
"This is a continual fight on many levels," Mattis continued. "There is nothing
in . . . Van Riper's statement with which I disagree." Van Riper has been
"highly supportive of our efforts and we are in routine contact" about "how
we shape this effort," Mattis wrote. "I think he is squarely on target."
Contacted last week, Van Riper expressed confidence in Hagee, Pace and
Schoomaker's ability to handle the situation.
"I have every confidence that the three officers I sent the e-mail to
understand the two issues I discussed and will take actions as necessary," he
told Inside the Navy. He said he has been asked why he did not also send the
e-mail to the Navy's chief of naval operations and the Air Force's chief of
staff. Van Riper noted he simply sent it to leaders he knew personally.
In a presentation at the Surface Navy Association's annual conference in
Arlington, VA, Rear Adm. John Blake, deputy director for resources and
acquisition in the Joint Staff's J-8 office, noted some changes are being
considered for the JCIDS process. Officials recognize there are "warts on the
baby," he said Jan. 11.
But Van Riper's concerns, seconded by Mattis, target the heart of the
process.
"The seeming inability to express ideas clearly, loose use of words, and illconsidered invention of other terms have damaged the military lexicon to the
point that it interferes with effective professional military discourse," Van
Riper wrote. "The result will soon prove harmful to professional military
education."
Though Van Riper has a reputation as a scholar of warfare, his e-mail
stresses his concerns about JCIDS should not be dismissed as academic.
"These are not merely esoteric concerns of secondary importance," he wrote.
"Ideas move institutions, for good or ill, and I firmly believe that the result of
leaving these concerns unaddressed will be a military that is significantly less
able to meet its future requirements."
Van Riper continued, "Recent claims of a 'revolution in military affairs' or a
'military transformation' ring hollow since there is little to suggest these
movements were undertaken to solve clearly identified military problems."
Mostly, the names of these movements now serve as mantras for those
advocating advanced technologies, he wrote.
He criticized today's warfighting concepts as vacuous and cited the idea of
"effects-based operations" as a prime example. This concept, he wrote, is
rooted in efforts undertaken by Air Force Col. John Warden (now retired) and
Lt. Col. Dave Deptula (now a three-star general) during the planning for
Operation Desert Shield. These officers, Van Riper recounted, sought to
make the military more efficient when eliminating an enemy's capability -for instance, by targeting the radar at a missile site rather than planning to
strike each individual launcher.
Warden and Deptula later expanded this technique to target systems -- for
example, taking out a few key transformers rather than destroying an entire
plant to shut down an electrical power grid, Van Riper wrote. "This targeting
methodology is eminently sensible and proved its worth during Operation
Desert Storm," he wrote.
"Unfortunately," according to Van Riper, Deptula argued after Desert Storm
that this "effects-based" approach offered a new way to plan for and conduct
all military operations. This "fatally flawed" approach amounts to "nonsense,"
Van Riper told ITN. The U.S. military has wasted hundreds of millions of
dollars on this approach, he said. Deptula disagrees with this criticism of
effects-based operations.
Van Riper "never discussed these subjects with me before attributing to me
the positions that he did," Deptula told ITN. Deptula e-mailed Van Riper Dec.
26, 2005, complaining his role in Desert Storm was incorrectly described and
his views on effects-based operations were characterized in an inaccurate
and misleading way.
"Like you, I do not agree with how some are attempting to turn EBO into a
mechanistic process of tactics, techniques, and procedures treating physical
and cognitive systems as one in the same," Deptula wrote to Van Riper.
"Each requires separate means for appropriate understanding and analysis."
Deptula continued, "I have also long been an advocate of mission-type
orders (MTO), and would suggest that by virtue of your support of MTO that
you are also an advocate of effects-based approaches to the conduct of
warfare -- what you find of concern is how those approaches are being
shaped and defined -- so do I."
The Air Force general defended effects-based operations. "Resistance to this
kind of approach may be warranted when individuals mischaracterize EBO as
(1) requiring complete knowledge of an adversary's intentions, (2)
discounting the enemy's human dimension, and (3) being overly dependent
on centralization to succeed. With an accurate understanding of the intent of
EBO, none of these assertions has any validity," he wrote.
In comments to ITN, Deptula accused Van Riper of taking a narrow view of
national security by focusing on urban operations and insurgencies. Deptula
acknowledged "some of the 'joint concepts' being developed require much
additional work." But, he asserted, "the key in all these endeavors is that we
learn by exploring new concepts." -- Christopher J. Castelli
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VAN RIPER'S E-MAIL TO PACE, HAGEE, AND SCHOOMAKER
REGARDING JCIDS
3032 words
23 January 2006
Inside the Navy
Vol. 19, No. 3
English
Copyright © 2006, Inside Washington Publishers. All rights reserved. Also
available in print and online as part of InsideDefense.com.
From: Paul Van Riper Sent: Sunday, Dec. 11, 2005 11:07 p.m. Subject:
Concerns
Generals,
For the past three years, I have watched with misgiving as the new Joint
Capability Integration and Development System evolved into its current
form. Unfortunately, I believe my apprehension has proved valid for today
JCIDS evidences all the signs of an overly bureaucratic and procedurally
focused process. Moreover, in the last two years that process has led to the
creation of an excess of concepts most of which-in my view-are devoid of
meaningful content. My greatest concern is that as these concepts migrate
into the curricula of professional military schools they will undermine a
coherent body of doctrine creating confusion within the officer corps. In fact,
I have begun to see signs of just that!
In the following paragraphs I outline evidence to support my fears that:
* The Joint Staff has created a flawed force development process
* This process has produced too many concepts and most lack substance
* The seeming inability to express ideas clearly, loose use of words, and illconsidered invention of other terms have damaged the military lexicon to the
point that it interferes with effective professional military discourse
* The result will soon prove harmful to professional military education
These are not merely esoteric concerns of secondary importance. Ideas move
institutions, for good or ill, and I firmly believe that the result of leaving
these concerns unaddressed will be a military that is significantly less able to
meet its future requirements.
Recognizing your all too-busy schedules, I apologize for the length of this email at the outset. I have attempted several times to shorten it; however, in
each instance deleting material seemed to lessen the impact of the account.
Thus, my hope is that the importance of the issues will encourage you to
read and consider the entire e-mail.
First, I would like to share my thoughts on the current force development
process.
Admiral Stansfield Turner, and Generals Donn Starry and Al Gray, worked
diligently in the 1970s and 1980s to reintroduce the historically sound
theories upon which their followers created new approaches to strategic
thinking and operational art. Their efforts also led to the creation of the
related air-land battle and maneuver warfare service doctrines, which
demonstrated their value in Operation Desert Storm. In the 1990s, the joint
community incorporated the essence of these ideas into a solid and relatively
complete body of joint doctrine that has repeatedly proved itself. I fear that
we are drifting away from these now time-tested concepts without offering
worthy replacements. I am further troubled that if we weaken the intellectual
content of the concepts upon which we base joint and service doctrine we will
materially weaken professional military education.
Admiral Turner and Generals Starry and Gray focused on specific problems.
This is not surprising for a truly useful military operating concept only results
when there is a need to solve a significant problem or through recognition
that an opportunity exists to perform some military function better or in a
new way. Professor Williamson Murray notes in Military Innovation in the
Interwar Period that between the two world wars:
A number of factors contributed to successful innovation. The one that
occurred in virtually every case was the presence of specific military
problems the solution of which offered significant advantages to furthering
the achievement of national strategy." [Italics added.]
For this reason alone, recent claims of a "revolution in military affairs" or a
"military transformation" ring hollow since there is little to suggest these
movements were undertaken to solve clearly identified military problems.
Merely to be "transformational" does not qualify as a specific military
problem. Mostly, the names of the movements now serve as a mantra for
those advocating advanced technologies.
The operating concept for air-land battle, as expressed in the 1982 and 1986
editions of Field Manual 100-5, Operations, fundamentally changed the way
the U.S. Army approached war. Similarly, maneuver warfare, first explained
in detail in a 1989 edition of Fleet Marine Force Field Manual 1, Warfighting,
fundamentally changed the way the U.S. Marine Corps approached war. The
unique thing about these documents is that no staffs produced them; rather
they were the products of a few authors supervised by senior leaders
championing the projects.
In the case of FM 100-5, it was then Lieutenant Colonels Don Holder, Huba
Wass de Czege, and Rick Sinnreich working with General Starry. In the case
of FMFM 1, it was then Captain John Schmitt working with General Gray.
After each service promulgated a manual describing its operating concept, no
one perceived a need to produce a vast hierarchy of supporting concepts
offering increasing specificity. One document "drove" changes in doctrine,
organization, material, and training and education throughout each service.
Senior leaders expected combat developers, informed by their understanding
of war, to exercise considerable judgment in their duties. They could not
anticipate additional and more detailed concepts to justify directly their every
programmatic decision.
In contrast, today, we see the creation of an overabundance of joint
concepts-a Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, four operating concepts,
eight functional concepts, and nine integrating concepts with more reportedly
under development. Further, some plans I have seen call for the revision of
these documents on a regular two-year cycle. Upon approval, the Joint Staff
then employs these concepts to conduct capabilities-based assessments,
another seemingly overly complex methodology. In an effort to remain
consistent with the joint approach the services are beginning to create
similarly overpopulated families of concepts and complex developmental
processes.
Rather than a method to drive change, the joint concepts seem to serve
more as a means to slow innovation. Services, agencies, and even individuals
claim they need ever-increasing detail before they can proceed with force
development. I can imagine what sort of reaction subordinates might have
gotten from General Starry or General Gray if they had demurred from taking
action because of a supposed lack of detail in FM 100-5 or FMFM 1. After an
appropriate butt chewing and a short reminder of what mission-type orders
meant, the generals would have sent the offenders away with orders to move
out swiftly or pack up their gear and leave. Nowadays the more likely
outcome is the development of another layer of concepts in an everexpanding hierarchy. We have already seen the creation of "joint enabling
constructs," a fifth level of concepts created to fit below integrating concepts
in the hierarchy because developers deemed the integrating concepts not
sufficient for the capabilities-based assessment.
In summary, neither uniform nor civilian leaders can simply mandate the
development of worthwhile concepts. For every concept, there must be a
problem in search of a solution or a previously solved problem for which
someone envisions a better solution. Though force development is inherently
a complex undertaking, making the process too complex causes commanders
and staffs to focus inward on that process rather than on the problem they
are trying to solve. When they do the process becomes dysfunctional.
Let me turn now to what I perceive to be a lack of intellectual content in
emerging joint concepts.
Assigning our best thinkers to infuse content into vacuous slogans such as
"information superiority" and "dominant maneuver," is fruitless and wastes
valuable resources. Even worse, such efforts are potentially dangerous when
they produce an empty "concept" that is imposed upon our operating forces.
I believe there is considerable evidence that the latter is happening.
Several cases come to mind, none more egregious than the idea of "effectsbased operations." This concept has its roots in efforts undertaken by Colonel
John Warden (USAF) and then Lieutenant Colonel Dave Deptula (USAF)
during the planning for Operation Desert Shield. These two officers wanted to
move beyond the practice of building air-tasking orders based on the work of
targeting experts employing joint munitions effectiveness manuals, since this
practice focuses on the efficient servicing of single targets. Accordingly,
Warden and Deptula did not allow their "Checkmate" staff to concentrate on
individual targets. Rather, they required the staff to build ATOs that took into
account the larger effects or results they wanted to achieve.
This required the staff to identify a target-set and then to select an element
within that set to be attacked in order to accomplish a specific effect or
outcome. To illustrate, rather than planning to strike each launcher in a
ground-to-air missile site the staff would target the radar unit, thus offering a
more efficient way to eliminate the site's capability. Warden and Deptula
later expanded this technique to target systems, for example, taking out a
few key transformers rather than destroying an entire plant to shut down an
electrical power grid. This targeting methodology is eminently sensible and
proved its worth during Operation Desert Storm.[i][i]
Unfortunately, Colonel Deptula argued after Desert Storm that this "effectsbased" approach offered a new way to plan for and conduct all military
operations. He did not seem to recognize that mission-type orders with their
tasks and associated intents accomplish the same goal, but in a far less
restrictive way. More important, neither he nor Colonel Warden showed that
they had any understanding of the differences between structurally complex
systems-such as integrated air defense systems and power grids-and
interactively complex systems-such as economic and leadership systems.
Operational planners can understand the first using the reductionism of
systems analysis. They can only understand the second type of system
holistically. Tools for one type of system are inappropriate for the
other.[ii][ii]
The concept of effects-based operations formally entered the joint
community's thinking when a former JWAC commander put forward a refined
version as an "operating concept." This occurred in 2000 during a
congressionally mandated experiment sponsored by the Joint Forces
Command, known as the Rapid Decisive Operations Analytical War Game.
The effects-based operations concept, despite its title, is at most a concept
for planning not an operating concept. Operating concepts by definition
center on how joint forces bring combat power to bear, normally through
maneuver and fire, not how they plan. However, even as a planning concept
its utility is limited since it does not deal effectively with the interactively
complex systems that make up most of the systems that military forces must
deal with.
Many of the ongoing endeavors to train joint headquarters on effects-based
operations concentrate on defining the word effects.[iii][iii] Since 2002, I
have seen upwards of a hundred e-mails and papers that staffs have written
in an attempt to define "effects." The usefulness of these endeavors is
suspect as the following transcript of a recent Joint Forces Command training
session illustrates.
Student: "What is an objective?"
Instructor: "A goal that is clearly defined and achievable."
Student: "What is an effect?"
Instructor: "A change in behavior or capability after an element of DIME is
applied against the adversary."
Student: "Is this a good objective? [Pointing to a statement written on
butcher block]"
Instructor: "No. That is really an effect."
Student: "Okay...so what about this? Is this a well written effect?"
Instructor: "Sort of. How are you going to measure that?"
Student: "How would you measure my effect that was previously an
objective?"
Instructor: "Well, sometimes objectives can also be effects." . . .
Student: Next, I point out . . . [the center of gravity] analysis methodology
as being useful and similar to the Effect-Node-Action-Resource link in EBO.
Instructor: "Well, yeah...but we really don't use that stuff. Clausewitz is just
too ethereal."
Joint Forces Command instructors and others have displayed this sort of
convoluted logic as well as disdain for the classical theorists during their
nearly five years of trying to teach effects-based operations. It reminds me
of a "Mobius Strip" approach to thinking! One officer who has worked with
the development of effects-based operations from its outset recently noted
that it had taken him fours years to earn a degree in electrical engineering,
yet in the same amount of time he has not mastered effects-based
operations.
If there is an advantage to effects-based operations as an approach to
operational art, it must be explainable in simple English. Moreover, if the
joint community desires to introduce this term into the existing planning
lexicon its proponents should be able to explain how it improves upon current
terms, especially mission with its inherent task and purpose or intent. They
have not! Incredibly, some officers in the joint community are advocating for
an entirely new definition of mission that would include effects. Attached as
an annex is a discussion of today's planning terms to illustrate not only their
heritage, but also their great power.
To correct the shortcomings outlined above will require several steps. First,
senior joint and service leaders must clearly identify the most significant
problems or opportunities-not more than one or two of each-presently
confronting joint forces. I would offer two problems for consideration,
insurgency and operational design and planning. In the case of the latter, the
good news is that both the Army and Marine Corps are evaluating "systemic
operational design" as a potentially more powerful approach.
Second, with close involvement of these leaders, staffs need to assist in
developing a clear understanding of each identified problem or opportunity.
That is, what are its boundaries, its character and form, and most
importantly its logic.
Third, senior leaders through discourse with other experienced and
professionally schooled officers must seek to find a counter-logic that will
enable them to solve the problem or take advantage of the opportunity. Such
a counter-logic constitutes the essence of a concept as it describes in some
detail how to attack or solve the identified problem. Failure to discover and
portray a counter-logic is the most serious deficiency in current methods of
concept development. Thus, many contemporary concepts are merely
descriptive and filled with jargon.
Concurrent with step three, leaders must select a few authors of known
talent and immerse them in the process to ensure they are conversant with
the best thinking, thereby helping them to explain the concept in clear and
concise language, language free of slogans and jargon. This, I believe, was
one of the "secrets" of General Starry's and General Gray's successes when
they set out to solve the post-Vietnam operational problems-they chose a
few very talented writers who possessed a special ability to grasp and then
write clearly about complex ideas.
Since retiring eight years ago I have spent considerable time teaching and
mentoring field grade officers. Without a doubt, they are the most motivated
and intellectually curious officers the American military has ever produced.
Recently, however, I have found they lack a firm grasp of many proven
doctrinal concepts and their speech and writing is filled increasingly with an
unintelligible "effects-speak." A flawed force development process is
producing a plethora of concepts that, from my observations, make it difficult
to focus current force development efforts. In addition, it is eroding what
until recently was a clear and concise professional lexicon.
Very respectfully, Paul (Rip) Van Riper
[i][i] There remains some dispute as to whether this idea originated with the
two officers mentioned or came from earlier work at the Naval Warfare
Analysis Department, later the Naval Warfare Analysis Center, a predecessor
organization to the Joint Warfare Analysis Center. In any case, the JWAC
perfected this systems methodology during and after the first Gulf War.
[ii][ii] "Systems can be complex based on the numbers of elements they
have: the greater the number of elements, the greater the complexity. This
is structural complexity. Systems can also be complex in the ways that their
elements interact: the greater the degrees of freedom of each element, the
greater the complexity. This is interactive complexity. Of the two, the latter
can generate greater levels of complexity-by orders of magnitude. Systems
that are both structurally and interactively complex, not surprisingly, exhibit
the most complex behavior of all.
A system can be structurally complex and interactively simple. That is, it can
consist of many parts but exhibit relatively simple behavior because those
parts interact in limited ways. Such systems tend to exhibit orderly,
mechanistic and predictable behavior. Automobiles, like many modern
machines, are perfect examples. They consist of a huge number of parts, but
those parts interact only in a designed process. As long as the parts function
as designed, the automobile performs in a consistent way. Take action on
one part of the automobile or interrupt one sub-process, and the results are
generally predictable.
By comparison, a system can be structurally simple and yet exhibit highly
complex behavior because its elements interact freely in interconnected and
unconstrained ways. Such systems are highly sensitive to initial conditions
and ongoing inputs; immeasurably small influences can generate
disproportionately major effects. As a result, these systems tend to exhibit a
qualitatively different type of complexity, a disorderly, organic complexity
that may exhibit broadly identifiable patterns and boundary conditions but
remains steadfastly unpredictable and uncontrollable in its details. Within
interactively complex systems it is usually extremely difficult, if not
impossible, to isolate individual cases and their effects, since the parts are all
connected in a complex web. Reductive analysis will not work with such
systems: the very act of decomposing the system changes the dynamics of
the system. It is no longer the same system. Most social systems, such as
economies, governments, diplomacy, culture, and war, exhibit rich
interactive complexity."
[This description is taken from a paper I co-authored for the Defense
Adaptive Red Team (DART), an OSD sponsored project of Hicks & Associates
Center for Adaptive Strategies & Threats.]
[iii][iii] The word effect has as many as eight different meanings. A recent
book on the most misunderstood words in the English language prominently
lists effects. Choosing an inherently imprecise term seems particularly unwise
for a profession that requires precision and clarity in language to avoid
misunderstandings, which might lead to confusion in battles and operations.
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DEPTULA'S REPLY TO VAN RIPER'S CONCERNS
516 words
23 January 2006
Inside the Navy
Vol. 19, No. 3
English
Copyright © 2006, Inside Washington Publishers. All rights reserved. Also
available in print and online as part of InsideDefense.com.
From: Lt. Gen. David Deptula Sent: Monday, Dec. 26, 2005 7:35 a.m.
Subject: Your 11 Dec 05 Concern Email
Dear Gen Van Riper,
Your 11 Dec 05 "Concerns" email to the CJCS, CMC, and CSA recently came
across my desk and I was disappointed to see that what you wrote regarding
my views on effects based operations (EBO) is inaccurate and misleading. In
addition, your email is factually incorrect regarding my role in Desert Storm.
You state of Colonel John Warden and I that "they required the staff to build
ATOs that took into account the larger effects or results they wanted to
achieve." In Desert Storm it was Gen Schwarzkopf who called the shots, and
the ATO built to support his campaign plan was directed by Gen Horner. As
part of Gen Horner's staff I was pleased to do my part, and am grateful the
ideas developed for that air campaign, and executed by Gen Horner and the
thousands of airman from each service component who participated in Desert
Storm changed the way our forces conduct joint warfare for the better.
Like you, I do not agree with how some are attempting to turn EBO into a
mechanistic process of tactics, techniques, and procedures treating physical
and cognitive systems as one in the same. Each requires separate means for
appropriate understanding and analysis.
I have also long been an advocate of mission-type orders (MTO), and would
suggest that by virtue of your support of MTO that you are also an advocate
of effects-based approaches to the conduct of warfare -- what you find of
concern is how those approaches are being shaped and defined -- so do I.
From the perspective of challenges to our Nation's security, desired effects or
outcomes should determine our engagement methods. In this context EBO
can be a springboard for the better linking of military, economic, information,
and diplomatic instruments of power to conduct security strategy in depth.
The challenge lies in understanding and developing the potential of an
effects-based approach to operations. Resistance to this kind of approach
may be warranted when individuals mischaracterize EBO as (1) requiring
complete knowledge of an adversary's intentions, (2) discounting the
enemy's human dimension, and (3) being overly dependent on centralization
to succeed. With an accurate understanding of the intent of EBO, none of
these assertions has any validity.
General Van Riper, I request that in your zeal to assure "intellectual content
in emerging joint concepts" you give people the professional courtesy of
asking them for their positions on a particular subject before describing their
viewpoints or their roles in history to your readers. I would also encourage
you to be "jointly" inclusive in sharing your concerns-you left both the Chiefs
of the Navy and the Air Force off your "concerns" email. I look forward to a
new year of securing better means to conduct joint operations through
honest and open discussion of ideas on this subject. Please join me in this
endeavor.
Very Respectfully, Dave Deptula
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GENERAL: DOD'S FORCE-DEVELOPMENT PROCESS GETTING 'A LOT OF
REVIEW'
679 words
30 January 2006
Inside the Navy
Vol. 19, No. 4
English
Copyright © 2006, Inside Washington Publishers. All rights reserved. Also
available in print and online as part of InsideDefense.com.
The Pentagon is reviewing the Joint Staff's force-development process in an
attempt to make it more efficient, according to Air Force Maj. Gen. Charles
Simpson, director of the joint requirements and integration directorate at
U.S. Joint Forces Command.
Last week, Inside the Navy reported that retired and active-duty Marine
Corps generals have argued the Pentagon's relatively new Joint Capability
Integration and Development System (JCIDS) is flawed because it is
producing a plethora of insubstantial warfighting concepts, damaging
effective military discourse and threatening professional military education.
Retired Lt. Gen. Paul Van Riper launched an assault on the process last
month in a private e-mail message to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Gen. Peter Pace, Marine Corps Commandant Gen. Michael Hagee and Army
Chief of Staff Gen. Peter Schoomaker. Van Riper slammed JCIDS for being
"overly bureaucratic and procedurally focused." Van Riper's comments were
later endorsed by Lt. Gen. James Mattis, the head of Marine Corps Combat
Development Command. Air Force Lt. Gen. David Deptula subsequently
raised some objections about Van Riper's comments.
Asked for his view on the debate Jan. 25, Simpson told Inside the Navy,
"Actually, I'm sort of sitting back and taking an academic look at the
discussion. In my heart, I think we're all trying to do the same thing and we
sometimes get hung up on what words we use to try to do the same thing.
And so I think the dialogue will continue and the information flow will
continue and that as it continues a common sense answer is going to come
out."
Simpson said he has to use the JCIDS process "in order to get the things I do
done." He noted the process is two years old.
"It's getting a lot of review right now to see if we can do it better," he said.
"And so, the way I look at is, I have the road I have to travel and a lot of
people are trying to address how can we make this road smoother, more
efficient -- maybe wider lanes, maybe create an HOV lane that allows me to
get things through quicker if I need to for short-term capability."
He continued, "So there are a lot of areas that we're looking at. . . . It's only
two years old. . . . We think it could probably work more efficiently."
Asked whether he agrees or disagrees with Van Riper's criticism of the
process, Simpson replied, "I don't think I do either agree or disagree. I take
it as it's more information to apply to the academic argument we're
discussing and that our end goal is how do we identify requirements that
meet the needs of the department and how do I do that with service buy-in."
The armed services are responsible for organizing, training and equipping
military forces, he noted. "Therefore they want to go organize, train and
equip. We're trying to figure out how to bring those Title X requirements and
turn them into joint capabilities," Simpson said.
In fact, the new Quadrennial Defense Review emphasizes the development of
joint capabilities, although the JCIDS process -- designed to provide the U.S.
military with the capabilities needed to perform a full range of missions -- is
still being debated.
Army Col. Pat Kelly, the director of the analysis section of the Pentagon's
Quadrennial Defense Review team, said the JCIDS process is one of the
topics being examined in a DOD institutional reform and governance study
sparked by the QDR. Pentagon acquisition executive Kenneth Krieg and Army
Lt. Gen. Walter Sharp, director of the Joint Staff, are leading the study,
which is supposed to provide guidance for ways to "implement new
acquisition policies, procedures and processes for dramatic improvement by
all measures," according to a Pentagon directive. The study will also explore
options for a "portfolio-based approach" to defense planning, programming
and budgeting, InsideDefense.com reported this month. -- Christopher J.
Castelli
Document INAVY00020060130e21u00003
© 2007 Factiva, Inc. All rights reserved.
VAN RIPER, DEPTULA DISAGREE OVER EFFECTS-BASED OPS, ENEMY
'CONTROL'
949 words
6 February 2006
Inside the Navy
Vol. 19, No. 5
English
Copyright © 2006, Inside Washington Publishers. All rights reserved. Also
available in print and online as part of InsideDefense.com.
In a continuing debate over the nature of warfare, retired Marine Corps Lt.
Gen. Paul Van Riper is defending his characterization and criticism of the
views of Air Force Lt. Gen. David Deptula.
Last month, Inside the Navy reported that retired and active-duty Marine
Corps generals have argued the Pentagon's relatively new Joint Capability
Integration and Development System (JCIDS) is flawed because it is
producing a plethora of insubstantial warfighting concepts, damaging
effective military discourse and threatening professional military education.
Van Riper launched an assault on the process and the notion of effects-based
warfare in December in a private e-mail message to Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff Gen. Peter Pace, Marine Corps Commandant Gen. Michael
Hagee and Army Chief of Staff Gen. Peter Schoomaker. Van Riper's
comments were later endorsed by Lt. Gen. James Mattis, the head of Marine
Corps Combat Development Command.
Van Riper accused Deptula of wrongly arguing after Operation Desert Storm
that an effects-based approach offered a new way to plan for and conduct all
military operations. As ITN reported, that led to a Dec. 26 reply from
Deptula, who complained his views on effects-based operations were
characterized in an inaccurate and misleading way. Deptula also defended
effects-based operations.
Inside the Navy has now reviewed Van Riper's Dec. 29 reply to Deptula. In
the e-mail, Van Riper notes the positions he attributed to Deptula and retired
Air Force Col. John Warden were derived from articles and publications that
Deptula and Warden wrote for public consumption or from a book that cited
Deptula's personal log from Operation Desert Storm as the authority.
"Therefore, since I believed I was accurately reflecting your positions on the
subject of effects-based operations and the history of its development, I
thought asking you to verify these positions unnecessary. Later in this
response I identify the specific sources from which I drew my comments,"
Van Riper wrote.
Next, Van Riper challenges Deptula's understanding of mission-type orders.
"By definition, a mission consists of a task and an associated purpose or
intent," the retired Marine Corps general writes. The task describes the action
a commander must take to achieve the purpose, according to Van Riper.
"Of the two, the purpose is supreme since it illustrates why the commander
wants the task performed, thus if a subordinate commander cannot
successfully carry out the assigned task he is obligated to undertake another
as long as the purpose or intent is achieved," Van Riper writes. "As I look
over your writings I question if you truly understood this very powerful idea,
otherwise, why would you not have argued for its use by air planners rather
than choosing a new term, that is, effect. In other words, why did you not
simply assign a task and intent to each target set or target system vice a
task and an effect?" Such an approach would have been in keeping with
Army and Marine Corps doctrine from 1988 onward and joint and Navy
doctrine emerging in the early 1990s, Van Riper wrote.
"More importantly, by introducing the effects-approach you contributed, in
my opinion, to a decades long undermining of the powerful and coherent
professional lexicon created at some cost during the intellectual renaissance
of the late 1970s and 1980s," Van Riper asserted.
Van Riper also cited various sources to support his statement that Deptula
and Warden provided the intellectual impetus behind the effects-based
approach to air planning before and during Operation Desert Storm. Further,
Van Riper noted several publications and articles written by the Air Force
general indicate Deptula argued an effects-based approach offered a new
way to plan and conduct all military operations.
"For example, your pamphlet Effects-Based Operations: Change in the
Nature of Warfare evidences in its very title the breadth of your assertion
about an effects-based approach," Van Riper noted. "More recently, the
opening words of your 2005 Pointer Journal article titled, 'Effects-Based
Operations: A U.S. Commander's Perspective,' illustrate how important and
wide ranging you believe this approach is."
Van Riper argued that Deptula's description of an approach based on "control
of the enemy" demonstrates Deptula's lack of understanding of non-linear or
structurally complex systems. Such systems -- a living, breathing enemy, for
instance -- are inherently not subject to control, according to Van Riper.
In comments to ITN, Deptula acknowledged he believes enemies are, in fact,
subject to control -- a fundamental difference with Van Riper. But Deptula
disputed the assertion this belief is a sign of ignorance.
Van Riper can certainly take the position that enemy systems are inherently
not subject to control, Deptula noted. But, he added, "I think it rather unfair
that he ascribes to me a lack of understanding about a subject simply
because I don't agree with his interpretation of it."
Van Riper concluded his Dec. 29 missive to Deptula by writing, "Though I
enjoy intellectual debates and again accept your challenge to engage in an
open discussion, I believe we are starting from fundamentally incompatible
positions."
In comments to ITN, Deptula said, "That implies to me that his mind is made
up on the subject." Deptula then reiterated his side of a fundamental
disagreement between the two generals. "That is unfortunate -- if that is the
case -- as I believe we have not seen the end of warfare, nor of innovations
in ways and means by which we may be able to 'control' an adversary -particularly at the strategic level." Deptula told ITN that he and Van Riper
have not exchanged further e-mails. -- Christopher J. Castelli
Document INAVY00020060206e22600004
© 2007 Factiva, Inc. All rights reserved.
Van Riper's Reply To Deptula, Dec. 29, 2005
2074 words
6 February 2006
Inside the Navy
Vol. 19, No. 5
English
Copyright © 2006, Inside Washington Publishers. All rights reserved. Also
available in print and online as part of InsideDefense.com.
From: Paul Van Riper Sent: Thursday, Dec. 29, 2005 12 a.m. Subject: Re:
Your 11 Dec 05 Concern Email
Dave,
Good to hear from you, though we are clearly in great disagreement about
some significant issues. In this message I will answer each of the topics you
raised in your e-mail below, but in reverse order.
First, I accept with enthusiasm your offer to join in an "honest and open
discussion of ideas" on joint war fighting, though in all honesty I believe I
have been involved in such discussions for a decade or more. Nonetheless, in
my view, a wider conversation across the larger defense community is long
overdue.
Second, I did not exclude the Chief of Staff of the Air Force and the Chief of
Naval Operations from my e-mail of 11 December for parochial reasons.
Rather, I intended that e-mail as private communication to three officers I
know personally. I have no such relationship with the Air Force and Navy
service chiefs. Since I sent the e-mail to only the three generals, I surmise
that one or more chose to share it with staff members, some of who
forwarded it to others outside their headquarters.
Third, the positions I attributed to you and John Warden were ones I derived
from articles and publications each of you wrote for public consumption or
from a book that cited your personal log from Operation Desert Storm as the
authority. Therefore, since I believed I was accurately reflecting your
positions on the subject of effects-based operations and the history of its
development, I thought asking you to verify these positions unnecessary.
Later in this response I identify the specific sources from which I drew my
comments.
Next, I must challenge your understanding of mission-type orders. By
definition, a mission consists of a task and an associated purpose or intent.
There is and has been no other military definition for mission (when
associated with orders and directives) for at least 70 years. The task
describes the action a commander must take to achieve the purpose. Of the
two, the purpose is supreme since it illustrates why the commander wants
the task performed, thus if a subordinate commander cannot successfully
carry out the assigned task he is obligated to undertake another as long as
the purpose or intent is achieved. As I look over your writings I question if
you truly understood this very powerful idea, otherwise, why would you not
have argued for its use by air planners rather than choosing a new term, that
is, effect. In other words, why did you not simply assign a task and intent to
each target set or target system vice a task and an effect? If you and John
had done so, you would have been in line with both Army and Marine Corps
doctrine from 1988 onward and joint and Navy doctrine emerging in the early
1990s. More importantly, by introducing the effects-approach you
contributed, in my opinion, to a decades long undermining of the powerful
and coherent professional lexicon created at some cost during the intellectual
renaissance of the late 1970s and 1980s.
In the first paragraph of your e-mail you say that what I wrote about your
"views on effects based operations (EBO) is inaccurate and misleading" and
"factually incorrect regarding [your] role in Desert storm." You then offer
some specifics:
You [Van Riper] state of Colonel John Warden and I that "they required the
staff to build ATOs that took into account the larger effects or results they
wanted to achieve." In Desert Storm it was Gen Schwarzkopf who called the
shots, and the ATO built to support his campaign plan was directed by Gen.
Horner. As part of Gen Horner's staff I was pleased to do my part, and am
grateful the ideas developed for that air campaign, and executed by Gen
Horner and the thousands of airman from each service component who
participated in Desert Storm changed the way our forces conduct joint
warfare for the better.
I think anyone remotely familiar with how operational level military
headquarters conduct planning understands that the senior commander
normally gives guidance as to what he expects from a plan or order and
makes the final decisions. Thus, no one can disagree with your observation
that General Schwarzkopf "called the shots" and General Horner ensured the
JFACC staff built the "ATO . . . to support his campaign plan." I did not assert
otherwise. What I wrote was:
This concept [effects-based operations] has its roots in efforts undertaken by
Colonel John Warden (USAF) and then Lieutenant Colonel Dave Deptula
(USAF) during the planning for Operation Desert Shield. These two officers
wanted to move beyond the practice of building air-tasking orders based on
the work of targeting experts employing joint munitions effectiveness
manuals, since this practice focuses on the efficient servicing of single
targets. Accordingly, Warden and Deptula did not allow their "Checkmate"
staff to concentrate on individual targets. Rather, they required the staff to
build ATOs that took into account the larger effects or results they wanted to
achieve.
Dr. Williamson Murray, a member of the Gulf War Air Power Survey writes in
his book, which he based largely on the results of that survey; "[The
CENTAF] air staff plan moved a possible air campaign beyond merely
servicing targets to a search for target sets, the destruction of which would
have interrelated or synergistic effects on the Iraqis."[1] Below I fully quote
Dr. Murray's footnote for the paragraph in which that particular passage
appeared:
In particular, the personal log for Lt Col David Deptula for 11 August 1990,
when the Instant Thunder concept was being worked up by the air staff, has
a sketch of a flow plan for attacks on Iraq in support of the air campaign with
a final category: "Desired Effect." The diagram became the prototype for the
Master Attack Plans utilized during the war. Lt Col David A. Deptula, Personal
Log, 9 Aug to 20 Aug 1990, entry for 11 Aug, copy in possession of the
author.[2] Later in his book Dr. Murray states:
What made the articulation of the air campaign against Iraq substantially
different from earlier efforts lay in both its process and its conceptualization.
In the earliest days of Instant Thunder, Colonel Deptula had hit on the idea
of the using the "Master Attack Plan" as an intermediate step between the
target list and the ATO.[3]
Retired Colonel John Warden in his book Winning In Fast Time writes:
Major General (then Lieutenant Colonel) Dave Deptula, one of the brilliant
officers on John's staff in the two years before the war, was intimately
familiar with "effects-based" targeting and was one of its major proponents. .
. . Dave was to play one of the most important roles in the war, not only as
an integral part of the original Checkmate planning team in Washington, but
also as the heart of the planning and execution effort in Riyadh.[4] [Italics
added.]
Continuing with a discussion of how to employ limited air resources Colonel
Warden states, "Because he understood effects-based planning Dave came
up with the solution. He focused only on achieving the Desired Effect for the
air defense centers . . . ."[5] Warden then offers the following quote from
you:
There was the answer. We didn't need to physically destroy every target; we
only needed to render them ineffective -- unable to conduct normal
operations. Therefore, the emphasis need not be on levels of physical
destruction -- the usual measure of success -- but rather it should be on
creating "system effects."[6]
Finally, I take from your official Air Force biography this sentence; "He was
the principal planner for attack operations for the Desert Storm coalition air
campaign."
Therefore, though you very generously give credit to those who oversaw and
conducted air operations, I believe you and John Warden provided the
intellectual impetus behind the effects-based approach to air planning before
and during Operation Desert Storm. Thus, based on the sources cited above
as evidence, I stand by what I wrote concerning John Warden and your
development of the air tasking orders for Operation Desert Storm. I also note
that I wrote, "This targeting methodology is eminently sensible and proved
its worth during Operation Desert Storm."
Though your e-mail does not state so specifically, I take from the words in
paragraphs four through six that you either miss my point or disagree with
my following observation:
Unfortunately, Colonel Deptula argued after Desert Storm that this "effectsbased" approach offered a new way to plan for and conduct all military
operations.
Several publications and articles you have authored lead me to this
conclusion. For example, your pamphlet Effects-Based Operations: Change in
the Nature of Warfare evidences in its very title the breadth of your assertion
about an effects-based approach. More recently, the opening words in of
your 2005 Pointer Journal article titled, "Effects-Based Operations: A U.S.
Commander's Perspective," illustrate how important and wide ranging you
believe this approach is:
Effects-Based Operations (EBO) is a fundamental concept behind what is
required to really "transform" the future of how we conduct national or
coalition security in depth.[7]
Your words are not just claims for a better method of planning. More
astoundingly, they are claims for how an effects-based approach might
change the nature of war and transform the way in which the U.S. conducts
national or coalition strategy in the future. In the former document you
equate adoption of your approach to a paradigm change as significant as
moving from a Ptolemaic view of the universe to a Copernican one. Thomas
Kuhn might disagree. I certainly do!
The dichotomy you build between those who support an attrition focused
approach and an effects-based one is false. You apparently missed reading or
understanding such seminal documents as the Army's 1982 and 1986
editions of Field Manual 100-5, Operations or the Marine Corps' 1988 Fleet
Marine Force Field Manual 1, Warfighting. The latter document states on
page 59; ". . . the aim in maneuver warfare is to render the enemy incapable
of resisting by shattering his moral and physical cohesion--his ability to fight
as an effective, coordinated whole--rather than to destroy him physically
through incremental attrition, which is generally more costly and time
consuming." Contrast this with your words in Effects-Based Operations:
Change in the Nature of Warfare:
Today, the permanence of the philosophies of attrition and annihilation tend
to inhibit the development of organizations and doctrine that capitalize on
effects-based operations that enable parallel war.
I am unsure of who you think had or has this "permanence" for attrition and
annihilation. It certainly was and is not the mindset of the soldiers and
Marines I have known over the past twenty years. Nor in recent years have I
found many sailors or airmen with such a mindset.
Finally, let me say that your description of an approach based on "control of
the enemy" demonstrates, at least to me, your lack of understanding of nonlinear or structurally complex systems. Such systems are inherently not
subject to control. A living, breathing enemy constitutes such a system. So
again, I stick by my words:
. . . neither he nor Colonel Warden showed that they had any understanding
of the differences between structurally complex systems -- such as
integrated air defense systems and power grids -- and interactively complex
systems -- such as economic and leadership systems. Operational planners
can understand the first using the reductionism of systems analysis. They
can only understand the second type of system holistically. Tools for one
type of system are inappropriate for the other.
Though I enjoy intellectual debates and again accept your challenge to
engage in an open discussion, I believe we are starting from fundamentally
incompatible positions.
Very respectfully, Paul (Rip) Van Riper
[1] Williamson Murray, Air War in the Persian Gulf, (The Nautical & Aviation
Publishing Company of America: Baltimore, Maryland), 1995, p. 16. [2]
Murray, p. 16. [3] Murray, p. 35 [4] John A. Warden III and Leland A.
Russell, Winning in Fast Time, (Venturist Publishing Montgomery, Alabama),
pp. 128-129. [5] Warden and LeLand, p. 129. [6] Warden and LeLand, pp.
129-130. [7]
http://www.mindef.gov.sg/safti/pointer/back/journals/2005/Vol31_2/2b.htm
[http://www.mindef.gov.sg/safti/pointer/back/journals/2005/Vol31_2/2b.ht
m].
Document INAVY00020060206e22600005
© 2007 Factiva, Inc. All rights reserved.
A TOP COMMANDER ACTS TO DEFUSE MILITARY ANGST ON COMBAT
APPROACH
3208 words
20 April 2006
Inside the Pentagon
Vol. 22, No. 16
English
(c) 2006 Inside Washington Publishers. All Rights Reserved
A top combatant commander at a key U.S. military headquarters is moving
quietly to defuse growing military consternation over a warfighting approach
that has become a hallmark of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's
leadership.
The internal debate comes amid an unusual flurry of public criticism from
retired generals who allege Rumsfeld has given short shrift to military needs
and rejected their counsel. In this case, dissent revolves around the defense
secretary's proclivity for lean military campaigns, like the relatively small and
swift victory achieved in Afghanistan after the 9/11 terror attacks.
Air Force Gen. Lance Smith, who heads U.S. Joint Forces Command in
Norfolk, VA, said in an interview he wants to "disavow the term" for the
controversial strategy, "effects-based operations," following complaints from
high-ranking Marines and Army generals who regard it as dangerously
simplistic. The general just completed a 25-month assignment as the No. 2
officer at U.S. Central Command in the Middle East, where he helped oversee
U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
"There are no doubt some legitimate concerns out there [about] people,
including some in Joint Forces Command, that try and make this whole thing
too prescriptive. [They] said, 'This is how you do it,'" Smith told Inside the
Pentagon in his first exclusive interview as head of the command. "I refuse to
use a term of 'EBO' that means . . . different things to different people."
Proponents of effects-based operations, or "EBO" for short, seek greater
efficiency and less destruction in combat by linking each use of military force
-- down to the most tactical levels -- to overarching, strategic "effects" or
objectives.
Few would quarrel with the basic idea.
"It only makes sense," says Smith, whose command was a leading military
advocate for effects-based operations under its prior leader. Smith took over
at Joint Forces Command in November from Adm. Edmund Giambastiani,
whom Rumsfeld picked to become vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
But over the past several months, three-star generals who run military
training and doctrine in the Army and Marine Corps have argued the effectsbased approach assumes a level of predictability in planning military
operations that is rarely achievable.
By way of example, some critics note it might have seemed sensible at the
outset of the 1991 Persian Gulf War to target selected nodes in Iraq's
electrical system to disrupt then-President Saddam Hussein's command and
control over troops. But the move also brought unwanted effects. Electricity
was required for water purification and the attack inadvertently helped
trigger a public health crisis.
In practice, intelligence is often lacking and a thorough understanding of the
full range of effects in a military operation is frequently elusive, critics say.
Armed with better intelligence about how set systems like power grids
operate in an adversary nation, it may yet prove possible to more accurately
predict the consequences of such an attack. And nearly all commanders
agree that even when grappling with inadequate intelligence, it is a good idea
to lay out objectives clearly at the outset of a campaign and tie those
objectives to specific tasks.
Yet some battles do not lend themselves well to achieving an understanding
in advance about what effects particular actions will produce. Some critics
say it remains virtually impossible to reliably identify the effects of an
operation when facing what experts call "complex adaptive" or "interactively
complex" targets, like the various insurgent groups in Iraq. There U.S. troops
may encounter any number of human responses to the actions they take,
and an amount of trial and error is necessary to discern patterns and hone
instincts, according to some ground officers.
Actions U.S. forces take may have so many cascading effects as to be
"generally not computable," says retired Marine Corps Lt. Gen. Paul Van
Riper, who has contributed to the criticism of effects-based operations. He
says the approach could mistakenly lull commanders into a false sense of
confidence about their level of control over the way in which events with
second- and third-order effects will play out.
"It's a damn virus and it's infected and continues to infect the joint
community," Van Riper said in an April 7 interview. "[It is] starting to infect
the services."
A growing number of officials across the four military branches have similarly
cautioned against training troops to expect they can foresee specific effects
of their actions with any great certainty. Rather, skeptics of the effects-based
approach say training should focus on making troops agile enough to adapt
to any of the myriad ways in which a conflict might evolve.
"You cannot take down a government . . . the same way you can an electrical
grid," Lt. Gen. James Mattis, head of Marine Corps Combat Development
Command, told ITP in a March 6 interview in Quantico, VA. "When you enter
into the areas where human beings -- with their willpower, their imagination,
their courage, their fears, their cultural tendencies -- all come to bear, the
idea that you can put an algebraic equals sign between something you do
and the response that you're going to get is not born out by the last 5,000
years of human interactions on this planet."
Mattis and other senior ground officers successfully lobbied Smith for a new
operations manual that jettisons the term "effects-based operations" in favor
of a looser "effects-based approach" that, according to Joint Forces
Command, remains short of compulsory "doctrine." The new handbook was
issued in February (ITP, March 2, p3).
Several critics say they're encouraged by the new developments.
Smith "has a good plan and is already reaching out to the services to repair
the damage," says one senior officer, speaking on conditon of anonymity.
"[He] seems more focused on the mission and building teamwork -- with
service input -- than . . . ignoring the input of the warfighters."
But some remain wary that the change Smith has introduced may be limited
to semantics.
The joint force commander agrees with critics that the phrase "effects-based
operations" has "got baggage attached to it" that is "just not useful to this
discussion," in his words. But he also complains the debate "doesn't make a
lot of sense to me."
"I would take exception to anybody that is opposed to effects-based
thinking," Smith said during the March 30 interview. "We've always done
effects-based thinking. It's what we do."
Commanders regularly use an effects-based approach to consider the
potential for intended and unintended consequences of the actions they plan,
he said. Such a tool might be most useful on a strategic level at top
headquarters, where commanders must integrate military operations with
U.S. political and economic objectives, Smith said.
Air Force Lt. Gen. David Deptula, a key military thinker behind effects-based
operations, agrees.
"EBO is a springboard for the better linking of military, economic, information
and diplomatic instruments of power to conduct security strategy in depth -not individual-level tactical actions," he told ITP this week in an e-mailed
response to questions.
In a recent article, Deptula described how he used an effects-based approach
as the principal planner for attack operations during the 1991 Persian Gulf
War air campaign. Even the harshest critics of an effects-based approach
credit Deptula for bringing to the air targeting process an emphasis on logic
and economy of force that greatly improved upon a penchant in some
quarters for measuring combat progress in terms of amount destroyed.
"For each target set, specific effects-based objectives were identified," he
writes of the air campaign. "Every new target that came into the planning
cell for consideration was evaluated according to how well it could contribute
to accomplishing those objectives."
To Mattis, the focus of effects-based operations on command-center
decisions reveals a "centralization culture" prevalent in some pockets of the
military. In fact, he says, the U.S. military often sees strategic effects from
decisions taken by forces dispersed at the tactical level, like the positive
ramifications of making a town like Tall Afar safe for civic activity or the
negative consequences of prisoner abuses at Abu Ghraib.
Indeed, a key concern among critics has been whether effects-based
operations allow commanders to issue subordinates a clear statement of their
overall "intent" but leave the details of how best to solve specific problems to
troops on the tip of the spear.
"War has fleeting opportunities," says Mattis. "If you don't have a
commander's intent that guides people, so you decentralize these kinds of
activities, the dynamics of war will [make you] miss the fleeting
opportunities. And the human dimension gets left behind."
Deptula, now vice commander of Pacific Air Forces, rejects this criticism out
of hand.
"Mission-type orders and commander's intent are in fact expressions of EBO
at a tactical level," Deptula told ITP.
Sister publication Inside the Navy reported in February that Deptula and Van
Riper had recently engaged in an e-mail debate over the issue, with the
retired Marine general saying, "As I look over your writings, I question
whether you truly understood this very powerful idea [of commander's
intent], otherwise, why would you not have argued for its use by air planners
rather than choosing a new term, that is, 'effect.'"
In future warfare, Deptula anticipates a stronger ability to create "cognitive
effects" on an enemy. Though he notes such effects are more challenging to
model than those in the physical realm, they might offer "the larger payoff."
"Imagine a future commander anticipating enemy actions and options well
before they take place," Deptula says. "This ability represents a crucial step
toward achieving Sun Tzu's 'acme of skill' -- subduing the enemy without
combat."
One Army leader critical of effects-based operations, Maj. Gen. David
Fastabend, worries about the "misapplication of the theory to the cognitive
and moral domains." In a briefing subtitled, "What Only Your Best Friends
Will Tell You About EBO," the two-star opines that the "best case" is that "we
have a ridiculous semantic argument," while the "worst case" is more
ominous: "We are seriously dorking up operational art and putting the nation
at risk."
Fastabend is deputy director and chief of staff for the Army Capabilities
Integration Center at the service's Training and Doctrine Command, a service
component organization for Smith's Joint Forces Command. Early this month
he was nominated to become deputy chief of staff for strategic operations at
the U.S.-led Multinational Force-Iraq in Baghdad.
Echoing Deptula, Smith insists the notion of commander's intent is
compatible with an effects-based approach. Drawing from his recent
experience at U.S. Central Command, Smith says uniformed leaders can
convey their intent to tactical forces in the form of effects-based thinking.
"You go into a town in Iraq or Afghanistan . . . and you're getting shot at
from a minaret in a mosque by a sniper," Smith said. "We expect [a soldier]
to think through his actions so he understands the effect that is going to be
achieved if he takes a tank barrel and blows that whole minaret apart, versus
avoiding the mosque or taking the guy out with another sniper."
Gen. T. Michael Moseley, the Air Force chief of staff, says he concurs
"absolutely" that commander's intent can be conveyed as part of effectsbased operations.
Moreover, he told reporters at an April 11 breakfast, "I don't think that this is
purely predictive. I think this is a notion of [looking at] what do you want this
to look like before you attack it."
Joint Forces Command has -- at least in the past -- described a predictive
element to effects-based operations. To develop a knowledge base in support
of EBO, the organization has said military commanders can use "operational
net assessment" to predict and calibrate effects, according to a draft working
paper on the topic by Jim Miller of Hicks & Associates. He says the command
anticipates the strategy might be applied to either physical systems or nonphysical entities such as economic, political and social networks.
While virtually all military leaders agree it is crucial to set clear objectives,
Mattis and others are concerned that, in practice, the effects-based approach
can lead to potentially dangerous self-delusion about the capacity to control
outcomes.
"The consequences of fighting [include] the sense that you don't want to
make mistakes because people are going to die. Even if you don't make
mistakes, people are going to die," Mattis says. "And it can create a
conservative effort to try and get certainty. But war is unpredictable by its
very nature."
The best warfighters across the military services embrace war's "friction" and
try to use it to advantage, according to some officers and experts.
"Friction is manifest in danger, physical exertion, imperfect information,
structural resistance, chance events, physical and political limits,
unpredictability from interactions and disconnects between ends [and]
means," according to Zoltán Jobbágy, a Hungarian military officer serving as
guest researcher at the Clingendael Centre for Strategic Studies in The
Hague. "Friction works essentially against effects-based operations."
In a February briefing on effects-based operations, Jobbágy speculates why
such an approach has gained momentum over the past few years as the
international environment has grown increasingly tumultuous.
"During turbulent times in which orientation becomes difficult, humans
increasingly turn to panaceas for advice," he writes. Though it may be more
challenging, "complex adaptive systems theory" suggests war is waged
between "two self-organizing, living and fluid like organisms, consisting of
many mutually interacting and co-evolving parts that form a rich interlacing
tapestry of emergent possibilities."
Though Mattis says he can "understand why we all want" certainty and
predictability, "we are in a line of work that if we need that, we cannot
effectively carry out our jobs."
"In general, the opponents of EBO are focused at the tactical-level
applications involving units engaged in force-on-force operations," Deptula
responded this week. "That is not the focus of EBO."
Nonetheless, in his recent paper, titled "Effects-Based Operations: A U.S.
Commander's Perspective," Deptula describes an approach to be taken at a
tactical level that critics fear will lead to increased micromanagement from
headquarters.
"The key to success of effects-based operations is a top-down approach
where coalition strategy is translated to specific objectives at each level down
to specific tactical-level tasks. Each tactical level task must be directly related
to the highest order objectives of the operation," Deptula writes. "Failure to
do so will result in random attacks of discrete enemy elements unrelated to
the ultimate objectives -- not unlike what happened in Vietnam, and what
some might say happened in the first half of the air war over Serbia in
1999."
Regarding the emergence of unintended effects during the 1991 Gulf War,
such as the water purification crisis, Deptula said this week such questions
"make no sense and are of little relevance to the subject when not put in the
context of the campaign strategy."
Sometimes potentially desirable effects cannot be achieved because of
decisions made on one's own side of a battle. Deptula said the Operation
Desert Storm planning cell developed an option to "accomplish other effects"
by leveraging "the loss of electricity in conjunction with inserting rapid-repair
teams to re-establish power." But those actions were never taken because of
"the strategic choice of not pursuing the replacement of the Saddam regime
in 1991."
Deptula states in his recent article that "the essence of EBO is manifested in
the role it played in the design and execution of the Desert Storm air
campaign."
One critic noted recently, though, that "coalition attacks did not achieve the
desired result of isolating the Hussein regime."
"Approximately 70 percent of leadership telecommunications, 30 percent of
the leadership and 25 percent of the military communications targets were
still operational after the air campaign," writes Jefferson Reynolds in the
winter 2005 issue of Air Force Law Review. "One notable reason for the low
percentage of targets destroyed was reluctance to engage targets after an
estimated 288 Iraqi civilians seeking shelter were killed at the al-Firdos
bunker on Feb. 13, 1991. Although the coalition was confident the site was a
valid military objective, the event was a pivotal point in the war."
In his own recent article, Deptula rails against overusing "the traditional
military concepts of annihilation and attrition, with their focus on
destruction." Here even critics of an effects-based approach would agree.
Fastabend and others suggest EBO proponents have used attrition and
annihilation as straw man alternatives to knock down in favor of a new
strategy, even though the more destructive approaches have not been the
focus of U.S. military doctrine for decades.
In promoting what he calls "effects-based thinking" or an "effects-based
approach to operations," Smith clearly hopes to satisfy Rumsfeld and others
who seek economies of force in military activities while mollifying criticism
that the strategy fails to account for war's complexity.
"I don't want to get into the middle of this huge debate right now," the
general complained during the interview.
Smith plans to test the waters on his compromise terminology at a
"commanders conference" at Joint Forces Command, tentatively slated for
early May, at which each service component for combat forces, training and
doctrine will be represented. He is also seeking advice on the approach from
retired Army Gen. Gary Luck, a former U.S. commander in Korea.
"I am convening a group . . . just to make sure that we are all on the same
sheet of music, so I don't have people out there that are approaching this in
a prescriptive way that I'm concerned about," Smith said.
Moseley, the air force chief, says the Joint Chiefs of Staff have debated the
merits of effects-based operations recently in secret "tank" meetings.
"I'm encouraged that there's a wider debate about the issue," Van Riper told
ITP. But the retired three-star says he remains "very suspicious" of the
changes afoot because, at least in the past, Joint Forces Command officials
responsible for testing effects-based concepts have "been disingenuous about
it."
As military thinkers have developed the effects-based approach over the
years, the strategy has spawned an expanding set of related concepts like
operational net assessment -- a phenomenon Smith likely has in mind when
he refers to EBO's "baggage."
Deptula, too, decries "attempts to turn EBO into [tactics, techniques and
procedures] that embrace a 'checklist' mentality in execution."
Mattis has drawn his own personal line in the sand.
"Watch for these two words: 'predictive analysis,'" he says. "That'll be the
canary in the mineshaft."
"Predictive analysis techniques identify the level of probability of an event
based on combinations of indicators, trends, patterns and historical events,"
explains Charles Harlan, a former Army intelligence officer writing last year in
the Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin.
Despite Mattis' best efforts to resist what he sees as a counterproductive
concept, the term is "rapidly being incorporated" into Pentagon lexicon, he
says. -- Elaine M. Grossman
Document IPEN000020060420e24k00001
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