5. Opinions of profilers

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November 14, 2002
"The men and women who had been described on the air and in print as
'forensic psychologists' and 'former FBI investigators' took many swings at
the who and why of the sniper case - and mostly missed."
- Paul Farhi and Linton Weeks (The Washington Post) - 10/25/02
Just Say No
When people, from acquaintances to reporters, asked me what I thought about
the "Beltway Sniper" or the "DC Sniper" or whatever the buzz words were that
day, I'd say, "I don't know." When I got calls to do media appearances about the
case, I'd say, "No." That's been my practice. On the occasions that I have
answered questions about highly publicized cases, especially serial killings, I've
tended to speak very generally, and talk about profiling as a technique.
I'm not trying to grandstand, but since the suspects are in custody, I felt I could
finally say something for the integrity of the profiling program. Maybe some of my
colleagues and some wanna-be profilers will listen.
Speculation is not Profiling; Profiling is not Speculation
It's dangerous to speculate if you have any shred of authority or expertise
or influence but aren't directly involved in the investigation.
In this case, it was especially cavalier given that these guys, the snipers, were
responding to the press. On one side of the equation, you've got people working
around the clock, from now-famous Chief Moose to the guys in my old unit at the
Bureau.
They're sorting through thousands of leads, evidence gathered at very
difficult sites, witness accounts, and so forth, and they're piecing it
together. They're in communication with the snipers (at this time, most
"profilers" still believed it was the work of one person), and from their end
it's largely through the press. So the snipers are paying close attention.
Then some very well-trained, some semi-trained and some self-trained
individuals make statements to the press that are almost always based on the
same information we all had.
Most of the people profiling on television were introduced as "network
analysts". It seems when you're hired as an analyst you're forced to say
something. You can't really go on TV and say "I don't know" again and
again. So you get yourself in trouble, make statements that are bad
guesses (as opposed to behavioral analyses based on good information),
and maybe damage the investigation.
Such statements are just speculation. But the "profilers" speak with such
authority about the "sniper" that most viewers take them seriously, listening
intently to the talk of how the sniper has a lot of anger and how he's probably
going home every night and won't leave the DC area, and so forth. Who's to say
the snipers aren't taking it seriously, too? That's a dangerous chance to take.
The dangers of that sort of speculation aren't just theoretical. Every day the
snipers were at large they could've killed another person, or several more. Every
time someone's speculations misdirected the public's attention, or possibly
provoked the snipers, the investigation was at stake. Since the snipers were
choosing victims seemingly at random in an easily and frequently traveled
geographic area, there were a lot of lives at risk. What is the motivation for me, or
for the "profilers" we saw on TV? 15 more minutes on a morning show or CNN-more like 1.5 minutes actually, with the speed of things these days.
That's not enough.
Good Apples, Bad Apples
I said "No" to interviews because I had no access to information. I wasn't part of
the formal investigation, either as I had been with the Bureau when our unit was
called in, or I've been since retiring when called in by authorities. The reporters I
quoted at the beginning of this piece included me in their article among the
profilers broadcasting their opinions on the TV. (They'd perhaps be interested to
know that I concur with many of their opinions, and that I chose to quote them
here.) But they missed an important point:
When I "told Larry King and Katie Couric and everybody in between" what my
observations were about the JonBenet Ramsey case, it was because I was
involved--I'd been called in by the Ramseys' legal team to determine whether, in
my opinion, the Ramseys could have had anything to do with their daughter's
murder. I had access to witnesses, the crime scene, the medical examiner's
findings, victimology, and to the Ramseys themselves. I had similar access when
I worked on the O.J. Simpson civil trial.
If we're not involved, we have little reason to comment. And if we are involved,
we're bound by what the authorities want or will allow. I realize that doesn't leave
much for television profiling, but since there's not much real information there,
that means most of it's simply entertainment--which we can do without.
I think most of the men and women I've worked with would agree. If only those
highly visible other folks would concur. Because on top of it all, they're giving
profiling a bad name. I don't care about that for the sake of my reputation, or
anybody's reputation for that matter.
It's much more important than that: Profiling is a very, very important
investigative and prosecutorial tool. If police officers, prosecutors, and
others stop trusting profilers, we won't be called in to help on
investigations and trials, which means one very important tool won't be
used to solve cases and put criminals behind bars the way it should.
Which means more criminals stay free to commit more crimes.
I'm not stretching here. It took years of hard work and proving ourselves, proving
the science, going from city to city and working with police officers and
prosecutors around the country before profiling was incorporated into their work.
They had good reason to be skeptical. It seemed like a pseudo-science to them
at first, and we had to demonstrate that it was based on years of education,
training, experience, statistics, interviews and research.
But profiling is like any other profession. There are some very good
profilers, some very average ones, and some that aren't very good. I speak
to a lot of medical groups and demonstrate the similarities in our professions; I've
written about those similarities in the past. For example, doctors use patient
history and diagnostic tests to determine a course of treatment; we use
victimology and forensic evidence to determine a course for an
investigation.
The harm done to the medical profession by disreputable doctors and
quacks is similar to that done to profiling by unscrupulous profilers and
unqualified people calling themselves profilers. But medicine has had
centuries to establish itself. Profiling is in its infancy, relatively speaking,
and its misuse or misrepresentation can have a much bigger, more
damaging impact because of that.
An Uncommon Profile
Even with access to all the pertinent information, these snipers had an
uncommon profile. From what I understand from colleagues, they were a real
challenge because this case was unlike any other. It was very difficult to
profile the Unabomber at first because of Motive. We didn't know what the guy
wanted. The sniper shootings also had no easily identifiable motive, and
from the outside it looked like the clues were few and far between. Just like
the Unabomber, once the snipers started to communicate with law
enforcement it made it a lot easier.
Now there was something to work with. Even then, the best route to take was to
get information out to the public and to develop possible proactive techniques.
Had the subjects not been identified at that Maryland rest stop, law enforcement
could've considered releasing any handwritten text of the snipers' threats and
demands, or an audiotape recording of the snipers, like the call to Rockville,
Maryland 911 we've been hearing on TV. Both would be clues to the public, ways
to get folks who might recognize someone's handwriting or voice and be able to
give authorities a name to go with it.
Whatever authorities chose to do, it was up to those of us on the sidelines to stay
out of it.
Connections
Now they're in custody: John Allen Muhammad and John Lee Malvo, the alleged
snipers. They're linked with 20 shootings and 13 deaths; the number increases
weekly it seems. It includes the Virginia and Maryland shootings between
October 2 and October 22 (the last known shooting prior to their arrest), as well
as shootings as far back as February 16 in Tacoma, WA and as recently as
September 23 in Baton Rouge, LA.
The publicity the snipers have gotten has led to these connections being made.
How many people will end up on their list of victims? Why weren't the other cases
linked sooner? Remember the "Railroad Killer"--Angel Resendiz--who's admitted
to killing eight people in three states (though he may have killed more) during a
three-year rape and murder spree from 1997 - 1999, during which he eluded
authorities by moving from state to state and from the U.S. to Mexico. Due to the
national publicity of that case, police started looking at similar cases in their
jurisdictions, which helped them isolate Resendiz as their man. I'd hoped that
after that case the federal government would have mandated our violent crime
database but they didn't.
I talk and talk about the need for a mandatory violent crime database, and I hope
this case spurs the government and various state and local agencies to make
this a reality. As it stands, participation in VICAP (in existence since 1985) is
voluntary, which means police officers can enter information about violent crimes
if they elect to, but it isn't required. So cities and states don't always share
information with the national database (and therefore with each other). The
federal government should fully support and mandate the participation of all
agencies relative to the VICAP program.
Think of all the cases in America that do not receive national publicity, and
imagine if every violent crime was entered into our national database...those
"low-profile" cases (as these cases now connected with the snipers once were)
might have a better chance of getting solved. VICAP data could be modified and
enhanced over time and cross-referenced with other databases, like those for
gun registrations.
It's Over
I know everyone on the East Coast, practically, breathed a sigh of relief when we
learned that Muhammad and Malvo were in custody and that authorities were
certain they had their men. It's over, everybody said. And it is, in a sense. The
public that was cowering, afraid to stand up straight while pumping gas, can now
return to a state of normalcy. And we all forget, of course. Even the Twin Towers
have left our immediate consciousness, for the most part.
It's over.
But not for the people most directly affected by Muhammad and Malvo--the
friends and families of the victims, those we know they killed or wounded, as well
as those whose murders are unsolved but who may end up on their long list of
victims.
I hope in all that's to come we remember them.
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