1
台灣研究訪問學者正式報告書
A Comparison of Migrant Laborers and Marriage Immigrants
in Taiwan and South Korea
In-Jin Yoon (Korea University)
Ⅰ. Introduction
1. Research Goals
Northeast Asia has become one of the most significant and
globalized region in Asia not only in terms of the cross-border
movement of capital and goods, but also in terms of the movement of
people. Migrant workers, visitors and tourists, students who study
abroad, and marriage immigrants cross national borders at an
increasing rate and establish complex networks of interpersonal
relationships. As a result, Northeast Asia has become a transnational
space for the economy, culture, family, community, and identity.
Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea are leading countries in Asia that
accept increasing numbers of migrant workers and marriage immigrants.
As a result, the three countries now face similar problems that
challenge each country to cope with unprecedented phenomena by novel
approaches. For example, as of June, 2008, there are about 542,670
foreign migrant workers in South Korea who began to enter South Korea
in the early 1990s to fill in labor shortage in so-called “3-D
industries” where native workers are reluctant to work. About 11% of
the migrant workers are known to be undocumented workers who stay in
South Korea after the visa expiration date (Korea Immigration Service,
2008). These undocumented workers are subject to many forms of
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2
discrimination and human rights violation. Also, as of June, 2008,
there are about 118,421 marriage immigrants, most of whom are Asian
women who came to South Korea to start a new life with great
expectations. However, many of them experience great difficulty in
adapting to a new environment due to language barriers, cultural
differences, and insufficient support from the husband and the familyin-law. In addition, as of May, 2007, there are about 44,258 children
of international marriage and 32% of them are now enrolled at the
primary and secondary levels. Many of these children are reported to
have difficulties in learning and receiving proper care and nurturing
from their parents. When they mature and enter the labor market, they
are likely to experience disadvantages and discrimination and
consequently form the underclass in Korean society.
Because of similar stages of social and economic development and
geographical proximity, Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea experience
similar demographic changes and multicultural phenomena. Anecdotal
observations hint that the three countries respond to similar
phenomena in some different ways. While Japan continues to hold on the
trainee system, South Korea abandoned the Japanese model of trainee
system in 2007 and now employs the seemingly more advanced employment
permit system. Taiwan has developed a highly regulative and effective
guest worker system from the beginning that treats migrant workers as
regular workers (Lu, 2008). It also relies on private brokers to
import migrant workers and uses them in construction, manufacturing,
and domestic work.
By contrast, South Korea authorizes a semi-government organization
to import and manage migrant workers and protects construction and
domestic work from foreign labor. During the past two relatively
progressive governments of Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Mu-hyun, South Korea
improved conditions and rights of migrant workers by establishing news
laws and expanding basic benefits. During the same period, however,
Taiwan was under the similarly progressive government of Chen Shuibian but it failed to change some repressive elements of foreign labor
policy like the brokerage system, which drains unfair portions of
wages earned by migrant workers.
Despite important similarities and differences among the three
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countries, previous research tends to focus on the case and experience
of single country without comparing and theorizing the experiences of
the three countries. I think it is right time to take a comparative
approach to examine and analyze common issues and actions the three
countries face and employ to cope with new challenges.
In this research, I aim at examining and comparing the history and
the current state of labor migrants and marriage immigrants, the
government’s policy of foreign labor and marriage immigration, and
the roles of NGOs, the mass media, and the general public in regards
to migrant workers and marriage immigrants of Taiwan and South
Korea. 1 This comparative approach is expected to enable us to go beyond
description and become more analytic enough to develop a theory out of
empirical observation. Also, I aim at evaluating pros and cons of the
government policy of the two countries and making recommendations that
can improve immigration and social integration policy.
2. Research Methods
I rely on literature review for information on international
immigration, immigrants, and government policy of Taiwan and South
Korea. I also use secondary data from government statistics and survey
research conducted by individual researchers and research institutions.
I supplement this research by information and insights I gathered
during my field research in Taipei in July, 2008 where I interviewed a
number of researchers, government officers, NGO activists, and
immigrants. 2 During my field research, I also visited several ethnic
business strips, a shelter for migrant workers, and a primary school
that runs multicultural education and programs. While I discussed with
my informants, I compared constantly Taiwan and South Korea to find
how they are similar to or different from each other and tried to
1
Japan is not included for comparison at this time to focus on Taiwan and South
Korea, but it will be included in the next research.
2
Two of my sociology graduate students of Korea University, Young Ho Song and YangSook Kim, participated in the field research and helped note taking and report
writing. I also thank Jun-Ho Shin for interpretation and information about Taiwanese
society.
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search clues for the observed similarities and differences.
3. Research Questions
In this research, I raise the following questions and try to find
answers for them.
First, under what conditions migrant workers and marriage
immigrants have entered Taiwan and South Korea? What characteristics
and motivations these immigrants have?
Second, how do migrant workers and marriage immigrants fare in
Taiwan and South Korea? What are their problems and concerns? What are
legal, political, social, and cultural barriers against their
adjustment and integration?
Third, what policies Taiwan and South Korea have taken and how
their policies have changed over time and what prompted those changes?
Fourth, what kinds of actions and roles civil society and NGOs have
taken to protect migrants in Taiwan and South Korea?
Fifth, how the general public perceive and interact with migrants
in Taiwan and South Korea? How the mass media portrays migrants and
how it influences the general public and policy makers?
4. Research Contributions
The study of Taiwan is not well developed in South Korea,
especially in the field of social science. Although Chinese study has
well developed in Korea in quantity as well as quality, most of
Chinese study focuses on the People’s Republic of China. It is
regrettable that few Korean scholars pay attention to social issues of
Taiwan. I believe that the need for study of Taiwan is great because
Taiwan is a good comparison group for understanding South Korea. The
two countries share many similarities such as rapid economic
development, democratization, and constant fear of military threat
from the communist counterpart.
The need for the study of Taiwan is even greater at this time
because of increasingly multiracial and multicultural changes and
phenomena the two countries face as a result of growing international
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migration. The growth of multiracial and multicultural families and
children provides impetus for reconstruction of national identity,
citizenship, and social integration. The two countries now face very
important tasks of achieving social integration out of racial and
cultural diversity. For that reason, this research is expected to make
significant contribution to the study of Taiwan by investigating
important issues of contemporary Taiwan such as international
migration, multiculturalism, and social integration. Moreover, by
comparing Taiwan and South Korea, this study is thought to help us
distinguish global and structural forces from domestic and historical
particularities of each country that affect each country to take
similar or different courses of actions.
Moreover, the study of multiculturalism in Taiwan and South Korea
will make significant contribution to multiculturalism studies in
general. Because most research on multiculturalism has relied on the
experience of Western countries such as Canada and Australia, policy
and programs of those countries cannot be directly applied to Asian
settings. If multicultural trend is an inevitable course of
development in global ages, each Asian country needs to develop
tailored multicultural policy and programs that fit its social,
political, and cultural contexts. For this reason, this study will
advance multiculturalism studies by providing new models of
multiculturalism in Asian contexts.
Ⅱ. The Current State of Labor Migrants and Marriage
Immigrants
1. South Korea
Until the 1980s, South Korea was mainly an immigrant-sending
country. The South Korean government encouraged emigration to reduce
population pressure in the nation and gain remittances sent home by
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Koreans abroad. Since the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games, however, South
Korea experienced a sharp decline in emigration but a rapid increase
of foreign visitors and residents. During the past decade, the number
of foreign visitors to South Korea increased 64% from 7,506,804 in
1997 to 12,312,871 in 2006 and the number of foreign residents
increased 135% from 386,972 in 1997 to 910,149 in 2006. In August 2007,
the number of foreigners residing in South Korea reached 1 million,
representing 2% of the total South Korean population.
<Figure 1> Number of Foreigners in South Korea, 1997-2007
1) Migrant Workers
The increase of foreign residents has been driven mainly by two
different flows: migrant workers and marriage immigrants. Migrant
workers began to enter South Korea in the early 1990s and continued to
increase since then. There was 142% increase of foreign migrant
workers from 1995 to 2005 (140,000 in 1995 to 345,000 in 2005). In
June, 2008, their number reached 542,670 and 11% of them were counted
as unauthorized workers who often overstayed their visa expiration
date. The largest sending country is China and half of Chinese
migrants are ethnic Koreans (or Korean Chinese). Other sending
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countries include the Philippines, Vietnam, Bangladesh, Indonesia,
Thailand, Mongolia, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Russia, India,
Nepal, Kazakhstan, Myanmar, and Iran.
The history of labor migration in South Korea began in 1991 when
Korean firms with offices overseas began to recruit foreign migrant
workers as “trainees” to work in their headquarters in Korea, and in
1994 private employers’ associations-such as the Korea Federation of
Small and Medium Business (KFSB), the Construction Association of
Korea, the National Federation of Fisheries Cooperatives, and the
Korea Shipping Association-followed suit by recruiting foreign migrant
workers as “trainees.”
Although termed “trainees,” these foreign workers received no
genuine training and were instead immediately thrusted into lowskilled, menial jobs in the small- and medium-size business sector.
Classifying them as “trainees” denies them the workers’ three
primary rights of unionizing, collective bargaining, and collective
action. Therefore, they were regarded as “disguised workers.”
Many undocumented foreign migrant workers came to Korea without
proper legal process. For example, many of them entered the country
through tourist or short-term visiting visas. The number of foreign
migrant workers reached 367,158 in February 2003. About 78% (287,808)
of these, however, were undocumented.
The number of foreign migrant workers decreased temporarily around
1998 because of the economic crisis in Korea, but the number has been
increasing steadily since the autumn of 1999. Foreign migrant workers
fill labor market vacancies in small factories, restaurants, farms,
and fisheries. Consequently, their presence in certain sectors of the
job market has now become so indispensable to the Korean economy that
the sustainability of current levels of economic growth will
increasingly hinge on it.
2) Marriage Immigrants
Marriage immigrants began to enter South Korea since the 1990s. In
the early 1990s foreign spouses were the brides of Korean farmers who
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could not find local Korean women willing to marry Korean men in the
countryside. In the early stage of marriage migration, the Unification
Church played an important role in introducing foreign spouses to
rural areas in Korea. Later, provincial governments that experienced
the population decline in their districts sponsored international
marriage between Korean farmers and foreign women. Commercial marriage
brokers or agencies mushroomed to capitalize the boom of international
marriages. While there was little regulation, international marriage
between Korean men and foreign women increased rapidly from 34,710 in
2002 to 104,749 in 2007. 160,000 foreign brides entered South Korea in
the 1990-2005 period and in 2007, 146,508 marriage immigrants lived in
South Korea.
The rate of international marriage is more striking than its
absolute number. International marriage accounted for 11% of total
marriages in Korea in 2006, and in rural areas its rate reached some
33%. In 2008, 14,000 children of international marriage are known to
enroll at primary and secondary school levels.
<Figure 2> Trend of Marriage Immigration to South Korea, 1990-2005
Foreign brides come mainly from developing countries of Asia. China
and Vietnam have been the two main source countries, but marriages
with Japanese and US women have increased gradually. Also, there was a
shift from marriages with Japanese and US men to marriages with
Chinese men during the past decades.
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<Figure 3> Source Countries of International Marriage
2. Taiwan
1) Migrant workers
Since bringing migrant workers has been officially started in 1989
with government’s permission for the legal recruitment of 3,000
foreign workers to supply labor for 14 key national infrastructure
projects, it has been expanding dramatically. After this first
official influx, the government established guest worker program which
is highly regulative and restrictive system. The first wave of migrant
workers entered the public sector only, but the later waves entered
the private sector because there were huge demands of labor forces in
labor intensive industries, so-called 3-D industries, and personal
services such as housekeeping and care labor. The number of migrant
workers has been increasing in response to those demands, and it is up
to 372,097 in 2008.
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<Table 1> Quota of guest workers by sector, 1991-2007
Sector
Governmental
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2,999 17,287 35,117 40,138 41,588 29,619 12,747
2005
2007
6,193
5,992
construction
---
7,506
1,320
6,205
6,433
8,902
8,505
5,875 2,259
208
71
55
50
26,233 67,063 103,780 115,724 141,752 159,702
12,879 7,730 9,154 4,874 2,263 2,526
------
426
23,837
28,198
10,409
22,377
1,454
18,157
20,423
16,597
34,654
1,144
993
17,636 12,785
16,107 892
19,534 1,438
37,018 7,251
----
----
4,813 4,607
467
212
18
6
6
20,537 3,428
146
51
50
45
11,541
11,089 36,160 67,128 50,520 47,226 40,379 34,705
--
--
1,095
1,405
---
---
1,275
--
3,304
142
17
14
12
9
22,928 81,915 93,405 91,728 87,657 83,084
--
--
--
--
241
--
--
--
--
--
6 industries
Care workers
Domestic work
Sailor
68 occupations
73 occupations
Pottery etc.
Setting up New
1,249
2,292
207
192
459
3,396
387
158
135
193
3,147
178
147
117
168
3,786
143
138
106
153
plants
EPZ SP
3K SP
Major investment
manufacture
Major investment
2,929
2,502
301
6,087
1,677
construction
7 industries SP
Manufacture 2-year
restructuring
Non high-tech
10,361 22,206 36,163 48,236
manufacture
High-tech
377
922
3,027
3,641
manufacture
Total
2,999 97,565 189,051 248,396 294,967 304,605 300,150 327,396 357,937
Source: Employment and Vocational Training Administration, Council of Labour
Affairs, Executive Yuan, ROC (reorganised)
Indeed, Taiwan’s program made a big growth in past two decades.
According to Tseng (2004), 304,605 legal foreign workers in 3D sector
were living and working in Taiwan- approximately 3.1 percent of
island’s entire labour pool and 9.5 percent of the unskilled labour
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pool is occupied by those workers. By end of 2001, the manufacturing
sector was hiring nearly half of all the foreign workers, with
domestic helpers and care workers forming the second most important
category, accounting for 37% of all foreign workers. The top three
sending countries are Indonesia, Philippines, and Thailand as the
table 2 shows. On the composition of workers’ nationality, only a few
countries are approved to send workers, and the importing of mainland
workers is very limited; Taiwanese policy strictly forbidden the entry
of mainland Chinese workers (from People’s Republic of China, PRC)
except so-called PTM (professional, technical and managerial
occupants). According to the revised Act of Permission of People from
the Mainland Region Conducting Professional Activities (June 20, 2002).
However, mainland Chinese in academic, scientific and other high-tech
professions can enter Taiwan and “conduct professional activities”
for certain period time (Lu, 2007).
<Table 2> Number of workers by nationality, 1998-2008.June
Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Thailand Vietnam
Mongolian
Total
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
22,058
41,224
77,830
91,132
93,212
56,437
27,281
49,094
85,223
115,490
940
158
113
46
35
27
22
13
12
11
114,255
113,928
98,161
72,779
69,426
81,355
91,150
95,703
90,054
86,423
133,367
139,526
142,665
127,732
111,538
104,728
105,281
98,322
92,894
86,948
7,746
12,916
29,473
57,603
90,241
84,185
70,536
69,043
59
79
36
22
270,620
294,967
326,515
304,605
303,684
300,150
314,034
327,396
338,755
357,937
2008
124,725
11
85,158
85,326
76,866
11
372,097
Source: same as Table 1.
As a result of the above-mentioned controlling mechanisms, the number
of illegal migrant workers, defined as overstaying or runaway, is
actually very low, as compared to neighbouring countries in East Asia.
In 1995, the percentage of illegal migrants against the total number
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of guest workers of the year was 6.7% in Taiwan. By 1998, as Table 3
shows, it has dropped to 1.8% and stays below 2% until 2001 (Lu, 2008).
This figure is very low compared to that of South Korea where about
28% of migrant workers were undocumented in 2005 (Yoon, 2005). In
Japan, there were 250,000 undocumented workers in 2004 accounting for
13% of all migrant workers (Yoon, 2005). In both absolute and relative
numbers, illegal migrant workers in Taiwan are far less numerous than
in Japan and South Korea.
<Table 3> Number and percentage of “Disappeared” migrant workers
according to country of origin
Indonesia
Philippines
Thailand
Vietnam
Total of the
year
No.
%
1998
493
1999
760
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
2.8 2,450 2.3 1,728 1.3
--
--
4,689 1.8
6,646
2.5 1,882 1.6 1,403 1.0
--
--
4.057 1.4
5,504
2000
1,680 2.9 1,303 1.2 1,234 0.9
35
0.7
4,288 1.4
5,514
2001
2,804 3.2 1,048 1.2
293
2.8
5,089 1.6
6,220
2002
3,809 4.0
643
0.9 1,042 0.9 1,584 7.8
7,079 2.3
8,143
2003
3,411 4.6
873
1.2 1,171 1.1 4,233 9.6
9,688 3.2
11,125
2004
1,978 4.9 1,177 1.4 1,369 1.3 7,536 10.2 12,060 4.0
16,593
942
0.7
No.
%
Total
number on
the run
Source: Council of Labour Affairs, 2003, quoted by Lo (2007:39).

The terms “disappeared migrant workers” and “total number on the run” are used in the original
report.

Percentage = disappeared number (of workers from a given country)/total number (of migrants from
this country).
Total number on the run = accumulated number deducting the ones being caught and deported.
Lu
(2008)
reports
that
Taiwan
manages
to
keep
the
number
of
undocumented workers as low as possible because it uses effectively
the technique of “governance at a distance” by which commercial
brokers surveil and deport irregular migrants to their countries of
origin. However, human rights of migrant workers are not properly
protected and many of them work under harsh working conditions.
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2) Marriage migrants
Since the late 1980s, the number of cross-strait marriages has
increased rapidly in Taiwan. Currently there are 404,142 of marriage
migrants in Taiwan. In other words, one fourth of marriage is
international marriage, and over 10% of newly born babies are those
couples’ children. The main origins of those women’ is mainland with
254,520 people, consisting 65% of marriage migrants of whole Taiwanese
national; and Vietnam spouses account for around 30% and Indonesian
compose 10%.
According to TASSAT (Trans Asia Sisters Association, Taiwan), a NGO
for women marriage migrants, the origin of marriage migration begun
between farmers in Meinong in Kaohsiung Province and brides from
Indonesia due to the linguistic similarity. The prototype of marriage
migration was mainly subject to the people who have something common
with her spouses such as half-Chinese or ethnic Chinese. Those
marriages begun in early 1980s, and increased rapidly, however, the
government stopped issuing visa to the women from South Asia in late
1980s for the reason of some accidents that a few women came to the
island through that channel were arrested for the prostitution.
Although Taiwanese men who wanted spouses from abroad had to visit
directly brides’ house after that, the demand from veterans, farmers,
and low-class men in urban area and the supply of women who wanted
escape from poverty via marriage matched and commercial marriage
brokers intervened to capitalize profits in international marriage
business.
< Table 4> The scope of the marriage migrants in Taiwan
Nationality
Subtotal
Percent
Sex
Subtotal
Sex ratio
Mainland
China
254,520
63%
Male
11,133
4.4%
Female
243,387
95.6%
Hong Kong/
Macao
11,319
Male
5,252
46.4%
Female
6,067
53.6%
Foreigners
138,303
Male
10,090
7.3%
2.8%
34.2%
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Female
Vietnam
79,796
Indonesia
26,039
Thai
8,736
Philippines
6,180
Cambodia
4,441
Japan
2,702
Korea
846
Others
9.563
128,213
92.7%
Source: National Immigration Agency (NIA), 2008
Examining their socio-economical status, they are in harsh situation
in general. The language barrier is the biggest obstacle they face at
first if the bride is not from mainland. Moreover, since their spouses
are poor originally and the perception of “foreign spouses for sale”
exists in Taiwan society, they suffer economic hardship, domestic
violence, social prejudice and isolation. According to the recent
investigation conducted by the government in 2003, unemployment rate
of immigrant spouses was up to 64%, and 31.3% of them earned income
less than their expenditure. Particularly, the situation of women
marriage migrants from South Asia is even serious; about 65% of their
husbands earned less than 20,000NTD.
3) Comparison
The distinct feature of labor migration in Taiwan is a very low
number of undocumented workers. While Korea is concerned about the
loss of control over migrant workers as indicated by a high rate of
undocumented workers (28% in 2005), Taiwan maintains a very effective
control on migrant workers and as a result it reports the lowest
percent of undocumented workers in Northeast Asia (below 2% since
2001).
The size and trend of both countries are quit similar in migration,
but the composition of the two groups is somewhat different. For
instance, because of the strict limitation on sending countries,
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Taiwanese migrant workers’ origins include only 6 countries whereas
Korea imports workers from various countries. Also, because of strict
restriction on migration from mainland China, the number of migrant
workers from mainland China is small in Taiwan whereas the Chinese
account for the largest share of migrant workers in Korea. In terms of
industrial and occupational distribution, Korea is more likely than
Taiwan to limit the range of industries and occupations open for
migrant workers. Korea protects construction and personal service from
the entry of migrant workers, whereas in Taiwan migrant workers work
heavily in construction, housekeeping, and care labor.
With regard to agents of labor migration, Korea authorizes a semigovernment organization to import and manage migrant workers, whereas
Taiwan relies on commercial brokers for the management of migrant
workers. Migrant workers in Taiwan have to pay brokerage fees to
commercial brokers and work under constant surveillance and harsh
working conditions. Many of commercial brokers are known to be
influential political or economic leaders or at least related with
these power elites who have vested interests in labor brokerage and
hence resist attempts to reform current labor migration policy.
Marriage migration began earlier in Taiwan and the absolute number
and the proportion of marriage migrants are greater in Taiwan. In both
countries, women account for a much larger share of marriage migrants,
and women marriage migrants come mainly from Asia, such as China,
Vietnam, the Philippines, Cambodia, and Mongolia. These women choose
international marriage to escape poverty in their countries of origin
and to support their families by remittances abroad. Their husbands in
receiving countries are commonly the disadvantaged people who are old,
farmers, low-income, and less-educated and thus have difficulty
finding native women for marriage. Because women marriage migrants
themselves are generally less-educated and from rural and low-class
family backgrounds, many of these couples suffer from unemployment and
poverty as well as prejudice and discrimination.
One major difference between Taiwan and Korea is social perception
and treatment of women marriage migrants. In Taiwan, foreign spouses
are perceived to lower so-called the population quality and,
especially, women from mainland China are under stricter surveillance
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and discrimination. These women are often portrayed in the mass media
as being greedy, morally questionable or sexually degrading. Their
high fertility rate is regarded as a social problem and the Taiwanese
government tried unsuccessfully to foster the use of contraceptive
measures. By contrast, the general public’s attitudes toward foreign
spouses are generally sympathetic. Their low level of education and
poor class backgrounds are not perceived to lower the population
quality of Korea. Rather, Koreans think they need support from the
government and civil society in order to achieve settlement and
adjustment as quickly as possible. The Korean government took
progressive measures to assist these women and their children to
adjust to Korean society and culture. Thus, economic conditions of
women marriage migrants may be similar in both countries, but social
perceptions and treatments are very different.
Ⅲ. Policy of Foreign Labor and Marriage Immigration
1. South Korea
The South Korean government has taken a series of policy
initiatives to respond to the multicultural trends of Korean society.
It legislated the Discrimination Prohibition Act for a comprehensive
and effective response to discrimination in accordance with the
recommendations of the National Human Rights Commission in 2006. That
Act would include specific references to discrimination on the basis
of race being considered an illegal and prohibited act. In addition,
as part of efforts to meet the growing demand for supporting the
adjustment of foreigners to Korean society, the Basic Act on the
Treatment of Foreigners in Korea had been passed and had come into
operation in July 2007. The legislation included provisions such as
extending support for married immigrants and their children to help
their social integration, assisting education of the Korean language
and culture, as well as providing childcare. Moreover, foreigners who
had obtained Korean nationality could, for three years, also enjoy the
benefit of a range of measures and policies to assist their social
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integration.
With regard to the situation of foreign migrant workers and
industrial trainees, a number of important steps had been taken to
promote the human rights of migrants. The Industrial Trainee System
had been phased out and finally abolished as of 1 January 2007.
Accordingly, the Employment Permit System, which had been adopted in
2003, and had been in effect since 2004, had become the sole gateway
for foreign workers employment in South Korea. The abolition of the
previous system was expected to provide an opportunity to solve
various problems, such as the infringement of foreign workers' human
rights and the illegal use of foreign workers.
With regard to refugees, the Korean government had been making
efforts to improve the refugee recognition procedure and refugee
relief policies. For example, to protect the human rights of refugee
applicants, the government was working on legislatively prohibiting
the forced repatriation of applicants whose refugee status
determination procedure was not yet complete. Moreover, a legal
framework would soon be laid down to create refugee support facilities
and to allow employment for refugee applicants and for those permitted
to stay on humanitarian grounds, if they met certain minimum
requirements.
Regarding protective measures to victims of racial discrimination,
foreigners were entitled to the same rights as Korean nationals with
regard to protection, remedies and compensation in the case of acts of
discrimination. Foreigners were also provided with foreign language
interpretation services and notified of available services. In
addition, starting from 10 May 2007, undocumented foreigners were
granted permission to stay and even work in Korea until any procedure
for remedy, such as the provision of medical treatment or compensation
for industrial accidents, was completed.
As for human rights education, starting in 2009, human rights
education would gradually be included as a topic of study in a wide
range of school subjects at the primary and middle school level.
Teaching of the value of human rights would be incorporated in a
comprehensive and systematic manner. Also, training programs on the
prevention of human rights violations were now being offered to law
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enforcement officials dealing with foreigner-related matters.
As for measures to assist children of married immigrants, in May
2006, the government had established and initiated an Educational Plan
for Children from Multicultural Families. The government also intended
to establish, in 2007, a multicultural education support committee,
composed of regional stakeholders, including city/provincial offices
of education, universities, local governments, non-governmental
organizations and mass media organizations. A base centre for
multicultural education would also be set up. In addition, the
government would build an information sharing system among central and
local governments, and between cities and provinces, to find effective
ways to support the children of married immigrants.
In May 2006, the government established the Basic Direction and
Promotion System for Policy on Foreigners, which laid out general
policy guidelines for the marriage of migrants and their children,
migrant workers, professional foreign manpower, permanent foreign
residents, Koreans of foreign nationality and refugees. The legal
basis for that policy was the Act on the Treatment of Foreigners in
Korea, which had been operational since 18 July 2007. That Act
stipulated basic treatment for foreigners in Korea, which enabled them
to better adapt to Korean society and to fully demonstrate their
ability. Also, the Act aimed at contributing to development and social
integration through the promotion of mutual understanding and respect
between foreigners and Korean nationals. For the effective
implementation of that Act, the Ministry of Justice would establish a
five-year implementation plan and other concerned ministries would
establish and operate their own implementation plans.
It was also significant that the Immigration Bureau of the Ministry
of Justice had been restructured and expanded to the Korea Immigration
Service. Within the Korea Immigration Service, the Planning Evaluation
Division had been established and it was charged with formulating and
evaluating basic and operational plans. The Social Integration
Division had also been established to take charge of social
integration of foreigners.
The Korean government’s policy initiatives are quicker and more
comprehensive than we can find in other neighboring East Asian
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countries. There are several reasons for the Korean government’s
swift actions. First, there is popular support for policy for married
immigrants and their children. South Koreans regard married immigrants
and their children as Korean nationals who deserve the government’s
protection and support for successful integrated into Korean society.
Second, there has been close relationships between the government and
the civil society during the Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo-hyun progressive
governments. The governments adopted somewhat liberal ideas of
multiculturalism proposed by NGOs and progressive scholars. Third,
President Roh Moo-hyun had strong personal beliefs in human rights of
minorities and played a pivotal role in establishing progressive
immigration policies and laws. Upon his inauguration, he ordered the
Ministry of Justice to prepare the comprehensive plan for immigration
policy.
However, if we look more carefully into the Korean government’s
multicultural policy, it is evident that it does not orient toward
multiculturalism as we can find in Canada and other advanced western
countries. It is more like multiculture-oriented policy and very
assimilationist in essence. Also, it distinguishes foreigners into
legal and illegal residents and excludes illegal foreign migrant
workers who make up a large percent of foreigners. As Eom (2006: 35)
states, a distinction is being made between ‘positive immigration’
and ‘negative immigration.’ While marriage migrant women are
grateful immigrants who support the family system by marrying Korean
men who struggled to find spouses, male migrant workers are
acknowledged as illegal workers who take away jobs and send their
paychecks to their homelands, away from South Korean economy.
2. Taiwan
Taiwanese policies regulating migrant workers are relatively
independent from international labor convention and global standard of
human right, due to Taiwan’s isolation from international politics.
It is also restrictive; except for student visa, the criteria of labor
and marriage migration are ethnic, class and gender specific (Lu,
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2007). In fact, foreigners could obtain a long term or permanent
immigration permission only via marriage before the revision of
nationality law in 1990s. However, the Taiwanese government is
relatively generous to ethnic linked or economically beneficial people,
like other neighbor counties. For example, overseas Chinese who can
prove their paternal ancestral ties with Taiwanese can get nationality
more easily. It is because Taiwan’s immigration is based on the
principle of jus sanguinis, which is inclusive of people who can claim
a common ancestral origin, real or imagined, and somewhat exclusive of
people who do not share that commonality (Hsia, 2007). In this respect,
South Korea is similar in its emphasis on ancestral origin in
citizenship.
Taiwan’s management of migrant workers is known to be very
“effective” because of a low percentage of undocumented workers.
This reputation, however, is based on the highly regulative discipline
on body and limitation of human right. The “Deposit” which is
introduced by the government in 1998 is giving employers the rights to
deduct up to 30% of salary until the contract expired. To prevent
“run away” and “overstaying”, employers keep workers’ passports
and the government escorts those workers to the airport directly when
the due is terminated. The government and agencies which have common
purpose-preventing undocumented workers-cooperate. For instance,
agencies catch up directly missing workers because they worry that a
high missing rate would downgrade the reputation of their companies
and eventually hamper their business. For these reasons, foreign
migrant workers work under harsh working conditions and severe
limitations in their choice of the workplace. Especially, many female
domestic workers have to work without a day off.
The government department in charge of marriage migrants is Nation
Immigration Agency (NIA), which was set in 2007. Prior to the
establishment of this department, marriage migrants were regulated by
two departments: The Department of Immigration Control was in charge
of marriage migrants from mainland China and the Department of Alien
was in charge of marriage migrants from South Asia.
The segregation in policy between women from mainland and South
Asia is still a distinct feature of marriage migration policy of
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Taiwan even though both groups are managed by the same department now.
For instance, both groups are different categories even in government
statistics. The term of “foreign spouse” indicates women from South
Asia and has negative connotations of poverty, inferiority, and
uncivilized. They are treated as “foreigners” and migrants with
certain purpose; escaping poverty via marriage. They are the main
target of government support and surveillance at the same time. On the
other hand, women from mainland are subject to severe control. Because
the broker system is not the main channel of entry for migrants from
mainland, their motivations for the migration are more various. Unlike
women from South Asia, they have no language barriers, and they are
not treated as “inferior others” in terms of civilization and
industrialization. However, because of hostile relations between
Taiwan and PRC for many years, women from mainland were perceived to
be suspicious and not trustworthy. For that reason, women from
mainland have to wait for longer periods of time to enter Taiwan and
become naturalized.
To respond to emerging new social problems, the Taiwanese government
has taken new directions in immigration policy. The government made
the entrance and getting citizenship process more strict and
discriminative by the origin of migrants. Furthermore, the Taiwanese
government investigated their living condition and established support
programs to facilitate successful integration of migrants, such as
“Assistance Measure for Foreign Spouse”, which has become the most
important guideline for executing marriage immigrant policy. Up to NTD
300,000,000 (per year) of money was invested in this program that
includes accommodation counseling, health care, education support,
child-raising support and so on. The most popular program is 72 hours
language course as a prerequisite for getting ID. Like other
neighboring countries, many of these services are provided in
cooperation with NGOs and voluntary workers. The government thinks
that it has built successful partnership with civil society, however,
some NGOs still protest that the government does not properly protect
foreign migrants and particularly, the NIA is criticized the most in
its oppressive handling of undocumented workers.
Although the Taiwanese government has made some progresses in
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immigration policy, several problems still remain. Firstly and most of
all, as many scholars point out, negative perception toward those
women marriage migrants, like “disguised”, “disloyalty for
marriage”, and “greedy blood sucker”, is reflected in the
government policy. Marriage migrants are the target of strong
discipline and surveillance and treated as potential risk; sexually
transmitted disease, criminals and cause of “lowering the quality of
next generation”. What these “concern” reflected are the obligation
of these women to have medical check-up including HIV and other
sexually transmitted disease at the time of entry inspection and
citizenship application. Secondly, government support programs look
great on paper but their effectiveness and quality are questioned.
Tseng (2008) comments that there is no regular evaluation of policy
outcomes and no appropriate system to select qualified persons for
their services. Lastly, as in Korea and Japan, the government policy
is not truly multicultural in its orientation and implementation. It
focuses on teaching Chinese language and culture to migrants and
facilitating their assimilation into Chinese society and culture.
Ⅳ. Conclusion
Taiwan and Korea emerged as newly industrialized countries in the
1960s and achieved democratic development in the 1980s and 1990s. As
the two countries participated in the globalization trend, the crossborder movement of capital and goods and people accelerated. Also, as
the standard of living improved, native people did not want to engage
in labor-intensive industries and occupations. Small- and medium-sized
firms wanted to import foreign migrant workers to fill in labor
shortage and the Taiwanese and Korean governments opened the door to
foreign labor in the late 1980s and 1990s. During the course of
industrialization and urbanization, rural areas of both countries
experienced underdevelopment, depopulation, and aging. Men in these
rural areas found it difficult to marry native women who did not want
to live in poverty-stricken areas. These men then sought their spouses
abroad and marriage migration began in the 1980s and 1990s in the two
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countries.
In those respects, Taiwan and Korea share many similarities. Also,
the two have similar cultural bases such as ethnic and cultural
homogeneity, nationalism, ethnocentricism, and anti-communism. Despite
those similarities, the two have shown somewhat diverging paths of
immigration policy. Korea has taken progressive measures in regard to
migrant workers, marriage migrants, and foreigners in general during
the past decade, and as a result, living conditions and human rights
of foreigners have improved and the general public’s attitudes toward
foreigners have become tolerant and sympathetic. Although many people,
especially the old generation, still believe in the myth of the
homogeneous nation and the importance of blood ties as a condition of
being a Korean, it is no longer politically correct to express antiimmigrant sentiments and take hostile actions against foreigners and
immigrants. The government has taken active measures to facilitate
adjustment and integration of immigrants into Korean society and
transform Korean people’s perceptions and attitudes to be more
multicultural in nature.
By contrast, the Taiwanese government has maintained restrictive
stance toward migrant workers and working conditions and their human
rights have not improved significantly during the past decade. When
the Korean government adopted the Employment Permit System and now
allows migrant workers to change their workplace within the maximum
limit of three times, the Taiwanese government still keeps the guest
worker system where migrant workers do not have freedom to change
their employers. Also, in Korea, a semi-government organization,
called Korea Council of Medium Industry, is in charge of import and
management of migrant workers and hence Korean foreign labor policy
takes more or less a public approach. By contrast, commercial brokers
play more important roles in Taiwan in importing, distributing, and
administering migrant workers. These brokers charge stiff fees on
migrant workers and put close surveillance and work for the benefits
of employers. It is also known that many of commercial brokers are
power elites themselves or related with these power elites who have
vested interests in keeping current labor policy that are more
beneficial for employers than migrant workers.
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It is a very complicated and difficult task to explain why the two
countries have different courses of actions during the past decade.
There are many variables we need to consider to explain the
differences. With such difficulties in mind, I propose a political
economic theory as a starting point of our analysis. In this theory,
the government is the main decision maker in immigration policy. It
should consider both economic issues and social and political issues
simultaneously. When it gives priority to economic issues, such as
providing less-expensive and reliable source of foreign labor to
employers, it is likely to take a pro-employer labor policy. By
contrast, when it views social and political issues, such as improving
human rights conditions of migrant workers and elevating national
image of Korea in the world community, it is likely to take a socially
progressive labor policy.
It seems that the Taiwanese and Korean governments have had
different agenda that have different priorities in decision making. In
terms of economic considerations, the Taiwanese economy is more
heavily dependent upon small- and medium sized firms than the Korean
economy. The continuing growth of these firms is essential for the
economic growth of Taiwan and thus the Taiwanese government is likely
to take a foreign labor policy that works for the interests of
employers even if it puts migrant workers in disadvantaged positions.
Also, as pointed out earlier, power elites are involved in commercial
brokerage and make profits in importing migrant workers in large-scale
government construction projects. They import migrant workers aside
from the annual quota and puts these workers in dormitories adjacent
to construction project sites while the projects continue. In that
sense, they have enormous influence and vested interests in keeping
currently restrictive labor policy. By contrast, the Korean economy is
no longer heavily dependent upon small-sized firms that employ most of
migrant workers. The Korean government regards these firms as
marginalized and insignificant part of the Korean economy. Moreover,
the previous two governments were relatively progressive and put
emphasis on social justice, equality, and human rights. They regarded
international reputation of Korea in the international community as
important as economic development. In their eyes, violations of basic
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human rights and mistreatment of migrant workers and the consequent
anti-Korea sentiments in their countries of origin were viewed as
national disgrace and the serious problem to be corrected if Korea
wants to be the respectable member of the world community. Also, the
two governments had close policy networks with civil society and NGOs
and regarded civil society as their political allies. As a matter of
fact, during the two governments, leaders of NGOs participated in many
social policies. As the Korean government views social, political, and
international issues of foreign labor and adopts civil society’s
visions and goals, it naturally takes progressive policy and programs
that enhance human rights and working and living conditions of migrant
workers.
In the same vein, migrant workers have different values or
importance in the two countries. In Taiwan, migrant workers are
heavily concentrated in construction and personal service such as
household maids and care givers. However, such industries are closed
to migrant workers to protect domestic workers. Because the demand for
migrant workers is stronger in Taiwan, the government is more likely
to take actions to provide consistent supply of foreign labor. For
example, in Taiwan, the demand for housemaids and care givers is
greater than in Korea, because Taiwanese women are more likely than
their Korean counterparts to work. In Korea, the labor force
participation of women is generally lower and especially, women of
middle-class status is much lower. Middle-aged women are expected to
be in charge of housekeeping and children’s education. To meet the
demand of foreign housemaids and care givers among Taiwanese
households, the Taiwanese government imports foreign women. To keep
costs of domestic personal service, the government condones
restrictive labor policy, labor standards, and practices used by
commercial brokers that keep foreign service workers inexpensive and
docile. As a result, it is reported that many housemaids and care
givers do not day offs and receive lower wages after the deduction of
commissions paid to commercial brokers.
In short, economic value or importance of migrant workers is one of
important factors for the government to consider when it designs
foreign labor policy. When migrant workers are essential part of labor
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force, the government is likely to take side with employers, whether
they are firms or individual households, and implement restrictive
policy against the interests of migrant workers. By contrast, if
migrant workers are not essential part of the economy and have limited
influence in isolated sectors of the economy, the government does not
have a strong interest or motive to maintain restrictive foreign labor
policy. Moreover, if the government views social, political, and
international issues as importantly as economic ones, it is likely to
take a pro-social and progressive policy that may improve working and
human rights conditions of migrant workers. Also, the relations
between the government and civil society is another important factor
in determining the nature of immigration policy. If the government
regards civil society as its policy partner, it is more likely to
adopt visions and goals of civil society and take progressive stance
toward immigrants. By contrast, if the government does not regard
civil society as a partner or if civil society is not influential
enough to put pressure on the government, the government is likely to
take side with more influential group of economic leaders and groups.
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Statistical Data: http://www.moi.gov.tw/stat/english/index.asp
http://www.cla.gov.tw/cgi-bin/SM_theme?page=432fa270
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