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HEADQUARTERS, CFC 9518
Seoul, ROK
1June 19XX
ANNEX G TO CFC OPLAN (KOREA) 9518X-XX
CIVIL AFFAIRS
REFERENCES:
a. “Civil Affairs Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan,” 21 January 1997. (Classified)
b. DOD Directive, Number 2000.13, “Establishes policy and assigns responsibility for conducting
DOD-wide Civil Affairs activities,” 27 June 1994.
c. DOD Directive 2000.11 “Procedures for Handling Requirements for Political Asylum and
Temporary Refuge.”
d. Joint Publication 1.0, “Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).”
e. Joint Publication 3-08, “Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations,” September 1995.
f. Joint Publication 3-57, “Civil Affairs Support to Joint Operations,” May 1995.
g. CFC Regulation 10-3, “Organizations and Functions, Terms of Reference for Component
Commanders,” 21 December 1989.
h. CFC Regulation 525-1, “Operations Standing Operating Procedures,” 21 August 1996. (FOUO)
i. CFC Regulation 550-2, “Responsibilities and Relationships of US Defense Representatives and
CFC Representatives in foreign Countries,” October 1988.
j. Annex to Hague Convention No. IV. “Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land,” 18
October 1907 (36 Statute 2295 Treaty Series 539). Suggested sources AFP 110-20 and DA PAM 27-1.
k. Hague Convention No. V, “Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Case of War on
Land,” October 1907 36 Statute 2310-1 Treaty Series 540-1). Suggested sources are AFP 110-20 and DA
PAM 27-1.
l. Geneva Conventions, “For the Protection of War Victims,” 12 August 1949. Suggested sources
are AFP 11 and DA PAM 27-1.
m. “Status of Forces Agreement, UNITED STATES of AMERICA and the REPUBLIC of SOUTH
KOREA,” 1 June 19WW.
Maps, WGS-84, series L654, KOREA, sheets 3118,3119, 3120,
3121, 3122, 3218, 3219, 3220, 3221, 3222, 3318, 3319, 3320, 3321,
n.
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3322, 3418, 3419, 3420, 3421, 3422, 3515, 3516, 3517,3518, 3519,
3520, 3521, 3615, 3616, 3617, 3715, 3716, 3717, 3815, 3816,and
3817, 3915, 3916, 3917, 4016, 4017, edition 001-KAMC, scale
1:100,000.
o. Map, WGS, series L654, sheets in ref n 1:1,000,000.
1. Situation
a. General
(1) This Annex provides guidance and defines responsibilities for the conduct of civil Affairs
(CA) activities prior to and during a combat/contingency operation involving US forces countering a threat to
US policies, objectives, and interests.
(2) The legal basis for Civil affairs will be the principles and requirements of international
law, bilateral agreements between the US and Host-Nation Governments in the Joint Operations Area, and
US law. Civil Affairs activities will be guided by directives and policies issued by the Department of Defense,
CFC, and JTF Korea.
(3) When directed by CINCKorea, Civil Affairs forces will be chopped to COMJTF Korea to
provide Civil Affairs support as required for the conduct of Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) of
American Citizens (AMCITS), Third Country Nationals (TCNs), and selected Host-Nation nationals.
b. Enemy
(1) Refer to Annex B, Intelligence.
(2) Democratic People Republic of Korea. North Korea’s military force structure and
doctrine reflect aspects of both Soviet operational art and Chinese People's Liberation Army light infantry
doctrine. However, the primary influences have always been Pyongyang's operational experience in the
Korean war, the peninsular environment, and North Korea’s military culture and martial philosophy.
(a) Focus on DPRK Army Military Capabilities
1. The ground forces have eight conventional infantry corps, four
mechanized corps, an armored corps, an artillery corps, and the Pyongyang Defense Command's Capital
Defense Corps dedicated to wartime operations. The geographic dispersal of ground forces reflects the
varied terrain of the nation and the consideration given to both defensive and offensive operations. The
most capable ground forces are near the DMZ, where they defend the border or could be rapidly
committed to a cross-border assault. Behind this zone, a layered disposition of mechanized exploitation
forces provides for a speedy offensive or active defense of Pyongyang as needed. Korean reserve forces
are positioned to defend against a sea invasion along either coast and can quickly assume territorial
defense roles to allow for forward commitment of active-duty forces.
2. The most significant development in the ground
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forces has been the continued deployment of long-range artillery systems (240-mm multiple rocket
launchers and 170-mm self-propelled guns) near the DMZ. Although these deployments are. not yet
complete, the North is continuing production of these long-range systems. The increasing number of
long-range artillery systems gives North Korea the ability to provide devastating indirect firepower in
support of ground force operations. Pyongyang has deployed over 10,000 artillery systems, an increase of
almost 10 percent over the past 15 years, in addition to over 2,300 multiple rocket launchers. Most of the
artillery is self-propelled and can support a rapidly moving operation.
3. North Korea Army Personnel and Equipment. Although most of the Army is
light infantry, it contains about 2,300 armored personnel carriers. North Korea has made a dedicated effort
to expand motorized transportation available to its infantry forces. This provides Pyongyang with a flexible,
mobile exploitation force that would be called on to exploit breakthroughs in defensive lines during
wartime. The Army is the Largest of the Three Services. The majority of the ground forces are infantry.
(b) DPRK Air Force Capabilities
1 Air Force. The North Korean Air Force has four primary missions: air
defense, transport of special operations forces, strategic bombing, and air support to ground forces.
.
2. Approximately 840 jet aircraft, 300 transport aircraft, 300 helicopters,
and 85,000 people form the Air Force's fighter, bomber, helicopter, and transport regiments. Most aircraft
traditionally have been deployed in the central and northern regions of the country. The regiments are well
organized for command and control of forces in wartime.
(c) Naval Capabilities.
1. The 46,000-member North Korean Navy is
primarily a coastal defense force. Most naval vessels are small, patrol-sized craft unable to operate over
50 nautical miles from the coast but capable of policing North Korea!s territorial waters. The Navy's
numerous amphibious craft and midget submarines also can clandestinely insert special operations forces
into South Korea.
2. Nuclear Capabilities. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
currently possessess no more than one or two “primitive” nuclear weapons, if it has any at all, according to
most open source estimates. Neither do North Korea armed forces have any credible aerial delivery
vehicle. The U.S. Director of Central Intelligence suggests that truck transportation might be feasible,
given the probable size and weight. Commercial boats and ships might infiltrate South Korean ports with
one or more atomic bombs embarked. The DPRK may someday acquire man-portable suitcases size
bombs for use by SOF but Seoul, some times mentioned as a lucrative target, mean while seems safe (it
is not clear why Kim II Sung would want to destroy Seoul rather than preserve its skilled manpower and
economic treasures for his own use). W ith testing and now deployment of No Dong and Taep Dong
missiles, North Korea now has the capability to deliver nuclear weapons outside of the Korean Peninsula,
but has not mastered the required technology for placing such a warhead on a missile at this time.
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3. NBC Capability. North Korea besides the former Soviet Union has an
extensive biological arsenal that will most likely be used to exploit success to meet a strict time table for
their conventional forces. .
(3) Joint Capabilities. None
(4) Although there is no support from any outside government, the DPRK have been able to
procure and obtain the latest technology in military weapons, ammunition, and other supplies on the
international market. Some South Korean military armories have been successfully raided.
(5) Weapons are MLRS rockets and 170s artillery pieces, but nKPA SOF possess
shoulder-fired anti-air missiles as well. They are also skilled in the placement, fusing, and general use of
explosives.
(6) The following information is presented to enhance the planning of Civil Affairs operations
in the Repbulic of South Korea for support of CFC theater objectives.
(a) Political. South Korea, has a relatively free and open political system in which a
number of parties participate. The two major parties have traditionally been the Conservative party (now
known as the South Korea Social Conservative party), favoring strong central government and close relations
with the United States, and the Liberal party, favoring stronger local governments and separation of ties with
the United States and a focus on reunification. Between 1958 and 1974 the Liberals and Conservatives were
the only legal parties in South Korea because of a 1957 constitutional amendment intended to defuse the
explosive antagonisms between them. Under this arrangement, called the National Front, each party held
half of the seats in each house of the legislature, the cabinet, and other agencies During the 1980s, an
increase in student radicals involvement in the national political scene as alter the political landscape
significantly. In the 1990’s the first civilian presidential was elected, the student opposition merged as the
third leading political party.
(b) Economic. Despite rapid industrial growth in recent decades, South Korea is
primarily an industrial nation with its economy traditionally dependent on exports. Approximately 70% of the
workers are engaged in manufacturing, and 31% in mining and information technology and the rest in
government service or the service industry. The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is estimated to be $943
billion, or approximately $3,752 per capita.
(c) Psychological. Refer to Tab D, to Appendix 3, to Annex C, this OPLAN.
(6) Enemy Capabilities to Counter US Objectives. The North Korea forces are capable of
conducting widespread military operations, psychological warfare, and terrorist type activities to counter US
operations in South Korea.
c. Friendly. Refer to Annex A, this OPLAN.
(1) Conventional. . South Korea has a moderately large standing Army with strength of
633,000, divided into 22 divisions, which are again divided into 65 brigades. The army is currently over
extended protecting key installations and facilities from DPRK SOF attacks. The Republic of Korea
government remains supportive of the international community and US interests in eliminating the threat of
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attack by DPRK military forces, but South Korea is unable to adequately protect itself from attack by DPRK
military forces.
(2) Special Operations Command. The Command Unconventional Warfare Command
Task Force(CUWTF) consists of approximately 50,000 individuals (25 brigades) which work closely with the
national police and other Special Operation forces elements of the CFC in combat operations. This force is
well equipped and trained especially in small unit tactical operations and long range surveillance.
(3) Paramilitary. The 200,000 person National Police is the leading agency in confronting
student and other radical demonstrations and maintaining of law and order. There are several special units,
however, the secret police (a special rural force) is charged with counterinsurgency operations.
d.
Assumptions
(1) See Basic Plan.
(2) Required Civil Affairs forces will be available, to include reserves, on short notice (e.g.,
Temporary Tour of Active Duty (TTAD), Active Duty for Special Work (ADSW), or Presidential Selective
Reserve Call Up (PSRC).
2. Mission. CFC forces conduct Civil-Military Operations (CMO) to further UNITED STATES national policy
interests and objectives and support UNITED STATES/SOUTH KOREAN military operations in the Joint
Operations Area.
3. Execution. CMO must be closely coordinated to minimize adverse effects on military operations and the
civilian populace, and to gain indigenous support for US objectives. In instances of conflict between US
national policy and military operations, policy objectives will take precedence. Primary emphasis will be on
minimizing civilian interference with military operations and fulfilling moral and legal obligations to the local
population. Secondary emphasis will be on restoration of facilities to support current and future operations.
a. Concept of Operation
(1) CINCKorea’s intent is to provide COMJTF Korea civil-military operations support
throughout all five phases of the operation. Success is realized by maximizing indigenous resources and
establishment of essential services; informative and timely coordination with governments, embassies, and
civilian organizations; and the minimizing of civilian interference with military operations, as well as minimizing
impact of military operations on civilians.
(2) Civil Affairs units conducts operations to enhance military effectiveness; support US
military interface with civilians, civil authorities, International Service Organizations (ISOs)/Non-Governmental
Organizations (NGOs); coordinates civil-military operations in the Joint Operations Area; and facilitate the
coordination of civil-military issues with foreign governments and agencies. Civil Affairs Commanders will
coordinate with COMJTF Korea on issues requiring attention by CINCKorea, NCA, and non-DOD US
Government Agencies and others.
(3) Military operations will focus on evacuation of US citizens and qualified foreign nationals,
securing of US radar sites and facilities, and the destruction of North Korea sleeper agents cells
headquarters. Civil Affairs Commanders can strengthen US national policy, interests, and objectives by:
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(a) Coordinating non-sensitive military operations with the Government of South
Korea.
(b) Minimizing the affects of military operations on the population and infrastructure
of South Korea, particularly combat operations.
(c) Adhering to legal obligations under US law, international treaties, international
law, and rules of engagement.
(d) Assisting the Government of South Korea in retaining overall responsibility for
civil affairs where South Korea Military Forces share areas of responsibility with US Military Forces.
(e) Ensuring mutual support between Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, and
Information Operations includes intelligence collection, rear area security, and logistics operations.
b. Tasks. COMMANDER, JOINT TASK FORCE KOREA.
(1) Conduct CMO to support US national policy, interests, and objectives.
(2) Coordinate non-sensitive military operations with civil authorities.
(3) Establish and maintain liaison with the Host-Nation Government, American Embassy
(AMEMBASSY), other military forces conducting simultaneous operations, Non-Governmental
Organizations (NGOs)/Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs), and others as deemed appropriate.
(4) Formulate and recommend Civil Affairs policies and activities to Service Component
Commanders.
(5) Conduct military operations in a manner that minimizes population interference.
(6) Be prepared to take actions to prevent civilian interference with military operations
and to restore law and order within the Joint Operations Area.
(7) Establish a Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) to coordinate civil-military
operations.
(8) When appropriate:
(a) Be prepared to provide emergency medical assistance to dislocated civilians.
(b) Be prepared to coordinate for the transport and distribution of relief supplies.
(c) Be prepared to assist in reconstruction of critical infrastructure.
c. Coordinating Instructions
(1) Service Component Commanders will ensure personnel deployed to the Joint
Operations Area receive appropriate indoctrination on customs, traditions, the requirements of international
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law, the political situation they may encounter, and the importance of respecting the persons and property of
the local general public.
(2) Service Component Commanders will establish measures to protect cultural property,
with particular emphasis given to safeguarding religious shrines.
(3) Intelligence collection plans will include Civil Affairs Essential Elements of Information.
(4) Responsibility for handling and processing Dislocated Civilians rest with the Host-Nation
Government.
(5) Commanders will coordinate with Host-Nation officials prior to the dissemination of
information to the civilian population. Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, and Information Operations
activities will be coordinated to ensure maximum mutual effectiveness. Civil Affairs, Psychological
Operations, and Information Operations senior representatives will coordinate the development of deception
plans to support military operations.
(6) Commanders, in coordination with Host-Nation sources, will identify available resources
to support Civil Affairs efforts in the event of widespread destruction of private property.
(7) The Government of South Korea maintains authority over local civilians, whenever
possible.
(8) When civilian interference with military operations is likely, US Forces will provide
temporary population control until local government law enforcement agencies regain control.
(9) Deployed Civil Affairs forces will liaison with the AMEMBASSY and Host-Nation military
command posts when established.
4. Administration and Logistics
a. Military Resource Requirements
(1) Military equipment and supplies that are not required by US Forces may be used in
support of Civil Affairs and humanitarian assistance operations, if Host-Nation resources are insufficient.
(2) The use of captured enemy supplies or equipment to support Civil Affairs is encouraged,
consistent with military operations requirements.
b. Civilian Personnel. Use of local civilian labor will be IAW US Embassy guidance, commercial
agreements negotiated with Host-National authorities, and local agreements.
c. Civilian Facilities and Supplies. Civil Affairs representatives will identify required local facilities
and supplies. CFC, CJG4 contracting officers, in coordination with the comptroller will carry out procurement
and contracting.
d. Reports. Service Component Commands will report significant CMO activities to JTF Korea (Info
CFC) for consolidation in the Daily Civil Affairs Report. Items of interest include location, status, and activities
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of local authorities and indigenous armed forces; location, status, and condition of Dislocated Civilians (DCs);
and other items that may directly affect US military operations. Time sensitive information of a critical nature
will be forwarded to JTF Korea using immediate spot reports.
5. Command and Control. The senior Civil Affairs Commander will be the Commander of all Civil Affairs
forces in the Joint Operations Area as well as dual hatted as the senior Civil Affairs official and JTF Korea’s
staff advisor on Civil-Military Operations. Civil Affairs units will be OPCON JTF Korea to provide direct
support to designated Service Components.
JIM R. RILEY
General, USA
Commander in Chief
Appendixes:
1 - Civil Affairs Dislocated Civilian Plan
2 - Civil Affairs Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
3 - Civil Affairs Consequence Management
4 - Civil Affairs Host-Nation Supplies and Services
OFFICIAL
/s/
GEORGE J. JOLLY
Major General, USA
Director, J5
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HEADQUARTERS, CFC 9518
Seoul, ROK
1June 19XX
APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX G TO CFC OPLAN (KOREA) 9518X-XX
CIVIL AFFAIRS DISLOCATED CIVILIAN PLAN
1. Purpose. This Appendix provides policy and guidance to ensure dislocated civilians (DCs) in the Republic
of South Korea are treated humanely and responsibilities under international law are followed.
2. The following constitutes CFC’s DC policy and guidance for commanders at all levels:
a. Humanitarian assistance should be provided to the extent that military operations allow.
b. CFC’s Commanders must avoid injury to DCs and avoid placing them in danger of enemy forces;
however, military requirements take precedence.
c. Subordinate Commanders will use available information dissemination means to encourage a
stay-put policy. If stay-put is unsuccessful, use Information Operations to direct DCs to minimize
interference.
d. Subordinate Commanders will utilize Host-Nation Services and international relief organizations to
the fullest extent possible in their efforts to assist DCs. The following is a list of Non-Governmental
Organizations (NGOs), Private Volunteer Organizations (PVOs), and International Organizations (IOs) that
can be expected to be present in the Joint Operations Area which may seek assistance, information,
coordination, and/or personnel and equipment supplies in support of their humanitarian assistance and relief
efforts:
(1) Amnesty International (http://www.amnesty.org)
(2) Care (http://www.care.org)
(3) Doctors Without Borders
(http://www.tiac.net/user/dwb/index/htm)
(4) International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), (http://www.icrc.org)
e. Under Article 10 of the Geneva Conventions, the ICRC (or any impartial humanitarian
organization) may, with the consent of the parties concerned, undertake activities for the humanitarian relief
of civilians. The ICRC can provide emergency assistance and immediate care for dislocated civilians (DCs)
whether they are displaced persons, refugees, or evacuees (DPRE). ICRC inspectors could be on the scene
within 48 hours of the initiation of hostilities to assist in developing assistance plans. Inspectors report to the
central organization, which will begin to coordinate necessary relief efforts by contracting member national
societies and the appropriate NGOs/PVOs.
(1)International Red Cross (http://www.redcross.org.
(2) Refugee International(http://www.clark.net/pub/ri).
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(3) United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR),
http://www.unhcr.ch/welcome.htp).
f. The United Nations has charged the UNHCR with providing for physical, social, and legal needs of
refugees who cross international borders in search of security. The UNHCR can play a key role in the
repatriation, resettlement, and assimilation of dislocated persons. Other organizations include.
(1) UNICEF (http://www.unicef.org)
(2) World Bank (http://www.worldbank.org)
(3) World Health Organization (http:www.who.ch)
g. Subordinate Commanders will, in all circumstances, treat DCs humanely; without discrimination
on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, birth, wealth, or similar criteria.
h. CINCKorea approval is required prior to establishment of DC camps. DC camp locations will be
determined based on coordination with Host-Nation and appropriate staff sections.
i. Subordinate Commanders may establish temporary control measures to prevent DC interference
with military operations.
j. Subordinate Commanders will not provide transportation for DCs across international boundaries
without prior approval of CINCKorea.
k.Subordinate Commanders will use supporting Civil Affairs units to develop, coordinate, and
implement DC plans.
l. Wounded and sick DCs will be provided medical care, when necessary, to save life or limb.
Tabs:
A - Dislocated Civilian Plan Support Requirements
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Seoul, ROK
1June 19XX
TAB A TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX G TO CFC OPLAN (KOREA) 9518X-XX
CIVIL AFFAIRS DC PLAN SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS
1. Purpose. This Tab provides guidance for establishment of DC camps and requirements for support to
DCs housed within these camps.
2. All logistics planners will use the United Nations High Commission for Refugees Handbook for
Emergencies for planning.
3. Local facilities such as hotels, schools, halls, theaters, warehouses, or vacant factories should be utilized if
possible. Every effort should be made to minimize the need for engineering support and construction
materials. The availability of such structures must take into account, and be weighed against, the need to
avoid vital communications centers and main supply routes dedicated to combat efforts and potential targets.
The availability of water, food, power, and the potential for waste disposal is of critical importance in selecting
a camp location. The establishment of camps is the last resort.
4. For DC camps, topography, soil conditions, and climate are extremely important. A gently sloping site
above flood level will avoid potentially serious drainage problems from waste and storm water. Soil with good
drainage is preferable to hard rock or impervious clay.
5. Camp size should be limited to 5,000 persons. Problems of supply, health, logistics, and control increase
exponentially with size. A linear, grid-type layout is simplest and allows for the greatest population density.
However, density is a problem, and the linear design tends to destroy any sense of community. It is
preferable to organize the site into small community units or villages containing decentralized community
services, and to organize these villages around core service types. Housing/shelter ideally is planned for
family units unless communal living is the norm for that ethnic group. This configuration will facilitate the
organization of the DCs who will tend to provide for themselves.
6. Immediate steps must be taken to prevent pollution of water sources, especially by excreta, when DC
camps are established. Moreover, a large quantity of reasonably safe water is preferable to a small quantity
of very safe water. Water collection points must be within 100 meters of domiciles.
7. The United Nation’s Handbook provides for the following planning factors regarding water provisions for a
DC camp:
a. 15 to 20 liters per person per day plus communal needs.
b. 40 to 60 liters per day per patient in a health center.
c. 20 to 30 liters per day per person in feeding centers.
d. 30 liters per day for large livestock, 5 liters per day for small livestock.
e. Irrigation and sanitation as required.
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8. In DC camps, the control of human excreta is the key to controlling health hazards. Deep trench latrines
are better than shallow trench latrines because the deeper variety can be used for several months while the
shallow type last only a few days, and the excreta must be covered with soil after each use. Ideally, a latrine
should be provided for each family (who will keep it cleaner and healthier than a communal facility) with some
communal latrines in central locations.
a. A camp needs at least one latrine for each 20 people, 6 meters or more from dwellings and at
least 10 meters from wells or drinking water sites. However, the latrines should be no more than 50 meters
from the users, or they will not be used.
b. Soil conditions, climate, water table, and availability will determine the best method of latrine
construction.
9. For DC camps, it is preferable to use local food of the type that the DCs are familiar with rather than
providing prepackaged Western food, such as MREs. While it may be feasible in certain circumstances to
provide centralized feedings (mess hall type), it is preferable to make provisions for family units to provide for
themselves. Each family needs cooking and storage utensils and fuel. Average rations for DCs must
provide at least 1500 kilocalories (Kcal) initially and over 2000 Kcal and 50 grams of protein over the long
term. (1000 Kcal = 4.184 megajoules (MJ); 1 MJ = 239 Kcal).
10. Regarding medical aid, emphasis should be placed on self-help and the use of local resources
maximized to the extent possible. Supplies can be provided to the DCs working under the direction and
coordination of local Government and/or relief agencies. ICRC, WHO, and the local Red Crescent can field
medical teams on short notice. UNHCR and WHO have emergency health kits prepackaged, which are
designed to cover the needs of 10,000 refugees for three months, (or 30,000 for one month). Who also
stocks vaccines at various locations in the Joint Operations Area.
a. 1 local clinic per 5000 DCs.
b. 2 doctors and 8 to 10 nurses per 20,000 refugees; 1 doctor at each health center, 1 doctor to
service clinics, and 4 nurses at each clinic full-time.
11. The following figures, calculated from the United Nation’s Handbook, illustrate the requirements of
50,000 DCs at a DC camp:
a. Administrative personnel at camp - 64.
b. Food (350g cereal staple) per month - 750 Metric Ton (MT).
c. Latrines (1 per 20 persons) - 2500.
d. Shelter space (3.5 square meters/person) - 175,000 square m.
e. Water for individuals per month - 80,000,000 gals.
12. Livestock and pets.
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a. Livestock will be processed by veterinary services. Livestock will be penned an appropriate
distance from DC camps. Livestock will be identified so that they may be returned to the proper owner at the
appropriate time.
b. Pets will be examined by veterinary services. Pets may be maintained in DC camps with their
owners so long as their presence does not present a disruption to DC camp operations.
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HEADQUARTERS, CFC 9518
Seoul, ROK
1June 19XX
APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX G TO CFC OPLAN (KOREA) 9518X-XX
NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS
REFERENCES:
a. DOD Directive 5100.51, “Protection and Evacuation of Citizens and Certain Designated Aliens in
Danger Areas Abroad.”
b. CFC CONPLAN 6100-91, “Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO).”
c. Joint Publication 3-07.5 “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Noncombatant Evacuation
Operations,” 30 September 1997.
1. Situation
a. General. Department of State (DOS) has overall responsibility for protection and/or evacuation of
US citizens and certain designated aliens abroad. Upon request of DOS, DOD will provide military
assistance to support, or direct and control evacuation operations for allied nations’ and US civilians.
Reference b provides for CFC support to DOS in protection and/or evacuation of US noncombatants and
designated foreign nationals within the Joint Operations Area.
b. Enemy. Refer to Annex B, this OPLAN.
c. Friendly. Refer to Basic Plan, this OPLAN.
(1) Allied and Host-Nation forces are not available for planning, but may assist a US NEO, if
in the vicinity.
(2) Supporting Psychological Operations forces will be prepared to support all aspects of
NEO within capabilities.
(3) CFC has a mission to conduct Noncombatant Evacuation Operations.
d. Assumptions. Refer to Basic Plan, this OPLAN.
(1) DOD will assume the overall responsibility for protection and follow-on evacuation of US
citizens.
(2) DOS will designate safe-havens and obtain necessary transit and overflight rights,
authorizations, and facility arrangements.
(3) Host-Nation will allow the use of commercial/military airfields/seaports in support of NEO.
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(4) Even though COMJTF Korea has responsibility for NEO, COMARFOR should be given
the mission to act as Chief of the Military survey and Liaison Team (MSALT). COMMARFOR should act in a
support role, as necessary.
(5) NEO will be conducted in Phase III, but not in the other phases.
3. Execution
a. CINCKorea’s Intent. Theater will watch the situation and time the departure of contract personnel
and civilians from camps so that the personnel can move into designated assembly points or other safehavens without requiring a NEO operation. If a NEO is required, JTF Korea will conduct the actual NEO.
The operation will be kept as short as possible, thereby minimizing the diversion of combat power from its
secondary mission of securing radar sites and protecting US property. Airfields needed for NEO in South
Korea are the same ones designated for force generation. Quickly moving noncombatants to safe-havens
will free the airports for force generation.
b. Civil Affairs Commanders will conduct CMO for NEO planning and execution. Teams will be in
position at both the US Embassy in Seoul and the US Consulate in Pusan. Other Civil Affairs Teams will be
in the Joint Operations area to assist the NEO operations. Success is stringent, but flexible planning,
focusing on Host-Nation assets for support and resulting in few or no losses to American civilians, embassy
staff members, other designated nationals, or participating military members.
c. Concept of the Operation
(1) Alert: Supporting Civil Affairs units are alerted of impending NEO based on mission
needs and tasks appropriately.
(2) Marshalling: Marshalling of units involved will be in a central location where the Civil
Affairs elements not in place at the embassy will prepare their aspect of the mission and maintain high state
of readiness. The Civil Affairs teams at the embassy will conduct pre-operation planning and preparation
with the embassy staff.
(3) Three general evacuation environments or situations will be considered for employment
of forces:
(a) Permissive Environment. Personnel to be evacuated are not in immediate
danger, but a request may be made for a military survey and liaison team (MSALT) and civilian or military
transportation. This is the most desirable condition.
(b) Uncertain Environment. Danger to personnel to be evacuated is uncertain. The
host-government can not guarantee the safety of personnel, yet maintains sufficient control to preclude the
necessity of employing US combat forces. This is the most probable condition.
(c) Hostile Environment. Personnel to be evacuated are in immediate danger. The
host-government has lost control to the point where US combat forces must provide protection and
assistance for evacuation operations. This is the most dangerous.
G-2-2
UNCLASSIFIED
SECRET FOR TRAINING ONLY
(4) Methods of Evacuation. The primary means of evacuation will be by air to safe-havens
designated by DOS upon execution of operations (most likely the Republic of Korea). Sea transportation
may be used to supplement airlift. Normally, movement by air or sea will be conducted using DOS procured
and controlled civilian transportation. COMJTF Korea will be prepared to use military transportation to
supplement the DOS obtained transportation assets, although available truck assets for COMJTF Korea will
be constrained by the need to sustain the mission, and the limited number available.
(5) CFC CONPLAN 9518, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations will be used for the
conduct of a NEO operation. The primary forces for NEO will come from CFC assets. If the assumption for
warning time holds, and there is a timely decision to evacuate, the evacuation will be in a permissive
environment. Upon arrival in South Korea Civil Affairs Commander coordinates with COMJTF Korea to
determine requirements for support of NEO.
4. Administration and Logistics. Refer to Basic Plan, this OPLAN.
5. Command and Control. Refer To basic Plan, Annexes J and K. CINCKorea is the supported commander
for the NEO. CINCACOM AND CINCTRANS are the supporting CINCs.
G-2-3
UNCLASSIFIED
SECRET FOR TRAINING ONLY
HEADQUARTERS, CFC 9518
Seoul, ROK
1June 19XX
APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX G TO CFC OPLAN (kOREA) 9518X-XX
CIVIL AFFAIRS CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT
1. During peacetime the US Embassy assumes lead responsibility for responding on the behalf of the US to
a SOF warfare threat. However, given the potential for the North Korea to sponsor an incident during Phases
I or II, CFC may be tasked with command and control or monitoring of consequence management (CM) in
the event of such activities by the paramilitary forces of South Korea.
2. The following are issues of concern to CFC planners with respect to involvement in consequence
management:
a. CFC currently possesses detailed SOPs and CONPLANs dealing with command and control of
paramilitary, terrorist attacks, mass casualty situations, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
operations. These can be expanded and modified relatively easily to recognize the unique requirements
imposed by consequence management in the Joint Operations Area.
b. CFC’s Joint Consequence Management Operations Task Force (JCMOTF) is active in planning
branch and sequel and operations in order to integrate other US agencies, NGOs, and Host-Nation services
into the overall consequence management effort.
c. In the event a Joint Psychological Operations Task Force (JPOTF) is established, it will be tasked
with providing a comprehensive information campaign in the event of CM operations. The goal of this
campaign is twofold; to inform and direct Host-Nation civilian, reducing panic and increasing order, and to
provide local and nationwide media with information consistent with overall CFC goals.
d. Medical teams can deploy to augment Host-Nation medical efforts. Medical surveys have been
completed which detail Host-Nation capabilities, stores, and hospital capacities and locations.
G-3-1
UNCLASSIFIED
SECRET FOR TRAINING ONLY
HEADQUARTERS, CFC 9518
Seoul, ROK
1June 19XX
APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX G TO CFC OPLAN (Korea) 9518X-XX
CIVIL AFFAIRS HOST-NATION SUPPLIES AND SERVICES
1. CFC will utilize Civil Affairs assets to provide coordination and facilitation to obtain Host-Nation supplies
and services not readily available through previous agreements.
2. The following is a list of firms who have submitted proposals to provide services and equipment prior to
and during execution of this OPLAN.
FIRM
AT&T FEDERAL SYSTEM GROUP
707-823-0653
BLACK & VEATCH
206-383-1436
BROWNING FERRIS INDUSTRIES
707-669-8886
CABLE & WIRELESS
703-287-6684
CADILLAC GAGE
937-548-9398
CATEPILLAR
904-721-3434
CENTURY II, INC.
403-268-8328
CHAS-T-MAIN INTERNATIONAL
202-444-6324
CLARK EQUIPMENT
509-877-2488
COLT ARMS
617-279-1466
DeLEW CATHER INTL.
614-243-0445
DHL INTERNATIONAL TRANS
281-443-2400
EST TECHNOLOGIES LTD.
915-435-8723
ENVIRONMENTAL WATER PURIFICATION
972-422-5727
FEDERAL EXPRESS
508-391-4760
FLOUR DANIELS
704-824-5387
FORD MOTOR CO.
SERVICE/EQUIPMENT
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
SANITATION SYSTEMS
SOLID WASTE DISPOSAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
ARMS & WEAPONS
HEAVY CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT
CRANES
CONSTRUCTION
AIR CARGO HANDLING
ARMS & WEAPONS
CONSTRUCTION
COURIER SERVICES
VEHICLES
REVERSE OSMOSIS UNITS
TRANSPORTATION SERVICES
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
TRUCKS & AUTOMOTIVE
G-4-1
UNCLASSIFIED
SECRET FOR TRAINING ONLY
707-446-4500
FREIGHT LINES
903-486-1426
GENERAL MOTORS CORP.
617-237-1252
G.M. CANADA
806-924-6192
GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM
464-2088
GROVE, INC.
504-928-4827
HILL & KNOWLTON
404-240-8550
HORIZON TRADING
202-783-4455
IBM
212-319-1286
INGERSOLL-RAND
386-1725
KOHLER
508-689-3770
MACK TRUCKS
508-753-1403
MOTOROLA, INC.
517-332-3274
PEAT MARWICK
212-909-5299
OMI CORP.
218-358-9325
PARSON CONSULTANTS
407-644-1642
RAYTHEON
404-691-7154
SEALAND
813-251-6100
SHAD
801-735-6249
STEELE UTZ
202-758-2130
TRADE TECH
847-359-0411
TURN-KEY MANAGEMENT, INC.
301-951-9544
ULTRA PHONE
577-0560
WASTE MANAGEMENT, INC.
VEHICLES
TRUCKS & AUTOMOTIVE
ARMS & WEAPONS
TACTICAL COMM EQUIPMENT
CRANES
PUBLIC RELATIONS
MILITARY EQUIPMENT
COMPUTER HARDWARE
PUMPS & COMPRESSORS
GENERATORS
VEHICLES
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
ACCOUNTING
CONSTRUCTION
PROJECT MANAGEMENT
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL TOWER
SHIPPING
SEWAGE
WATER PRODUCTS
MILITARY EQUIPMENT
MILITARY EQUIPMENT
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
SOLID WASTE DISPOSAL
G-4-2
UNCLASSIFIED
SECRET FOR TRAINING ONLY
201-997-1800
WILSON ELECTRIC
508-526-4675
AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION
202-789-7400
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL TOWER
MEDICAL
G-4-3
UNCLASSIFIED