1 - College of Natural Resources

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ESPM 169 - US Foreign Environmental Policy and the Presidential Election

November 2, 2004

section reading: Gulbrandsen

reading reviews

it's not just the occupant of the White House who determines US FEP - nor, historically, have particular parties had a monopoly over environmentalism

 environment: low profile in the election - why?

Major issues: energy, air pollution regulation, recreational vehicles in national parks, wetlands, forests - but, FEP practically invisible

1. Importance of US to GEP

The US is the world’s most powerful country

- biggest economy, user of resources – e.g. has 18.5% of world’s annual consumption of forest products (1996 figures); 1995 – world average per capita materials consumption 1.66 tons

– 10.84 tons in US in 1995; difference has remained constant since 1970; emits 22% of world’s

CO2 and has 4.6% of world’s population

- role as benevolent hegemon in post WW2 era

- considered very important to success of any treaty; though does not have to actually initiate diplomatic activity

- however, role has been decidedly mixed: has certainly not been a leader (with exception of Montreal protocol), and has been a laggard in many instances

1994

- though actively participates in CITES; launched International Coral Reefs Initiative in

- also took on a leadership role in combating ozone depletion

Other treaties: CBD, climate, Basel

- despite strong record at home (see Easterbrook 1995)

Institutional structure: OES, EPA, State Department – key roles in making international environmental policy (foreign environmental policy)

- but influenced by many other actors and interests, governmental and extragovernmental

- often at odds with each other

Components of US FEP:

1. engagement in negotiations

2. ratification

3. other international links and institutions with respect to environment: investment, multilateral banks, UN funding, population policy, NAFTA and WTO

4. Transboundary issues: Canada and Mexico (e.g. air pollution and waste); also US military bases abroad

- so US is directly affected by international environmental issues other than global commons

2. General trends in US foreign policy

- strongly driven by concept of "national interest", which has meant very different things in different eras

- also traditionally more elite driven (lower levels of public interest in international issues, hence Congress, driven by electoral concerns, trends the same way)

Phases: isolationism - pre-WW1 and pre-WW2 (1941); hegemony (until early 1970s, end of

Vietnam War and fixed currency); multilateralism (especially in executive branch); currently,

"aggressive unilateralism"

- e.g. pulling out of Kyoto, International Criminal Court, Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, war in Iraq

- issue of direct threat to US national interest – international environmental issues have to be framed in those terms on the whole

the global environment typically has held low priority with the Administration (with exception of Gore) - this can work both ways

3. 2 Level Games: A general theory of international negotiation

- agreements need to be ratified; majority in house, two thirds majority in Senate

- Putnam provides framework for analyzing these situations: resonance

- in order to succeed, policy requires international pressure and domestic

- Level I - negotiators, Level II - constituents who ratify - and their interactions

- notion of "win-sets" - the set of outcomes that will be accepted at home - the larger this is, the greater chance of success, BUT the greater the chance of negotiator being pushed around

- size depends on level II interests and coalitions, political institutions, negotiators' strategies (maximize other countries' sets, appear to minimize one's own)

What does this framework tell us about environmental negotiations?

- that negotiators have to take domestic interests and institutions into account when negotiating

- have an incentive to play tough when facing other countries

- more likely to succeed when powerful domestic interests unlikely to be negatively affected

- works especially well with respect to climate change; ozone - Kyoto - Gore ignored domestic interests

- need on part of UNEP etc. to work on issue linkage: by, say, linking in environmental issues to trade debates more likely to get environmental cooperation: NAFTA side agreements

4. Trajectory: Bush to Clinton/Gore to Bush

1992: Clinton and Gore elected: brave new era??

- new advisory committees

- people with activist, albeit high level, backgrounds appointed to key positions

But, with BD: has not ratified, though c. 180 countries have

- observer status means that US unable to participate in decisions that will severely affect its industry – which had initially reluctantly endorsed the treaty

Senate worries: too binding on Congressional freedom of action; too many concessions to other countries; outright oppose giving any powers to international organizations and groups

Paarlberg : pure partisanship, senate rules (though not always an issue) and weak connection to human health and welfare

- p. 252: “most of the additional species the CBD would be protecting [cf. CITES] would be plants or insects living in settings for the most part distant from and unfamiliar to US voters”

CC: domestic opposition from labor and industry, weak science and unsolved international cooperation problems

- LDC participation, costs of compliance

- industry deadly opposed to taxes, e.g. on BTUs (a broadly based tax based on the heating ability of all energy sources; British Thermal Unit)

- congress: refusing to ratify – or even release funds to look into ratification

- but, fiercest debates happened in executive branch, right before Kyoto – and during

(delegation given flexibility to reduce on 1990 levels by 2008)

– though failed to meet goal set by senate – that LDC participation mandatory before new emissions limits could be agreed to, let alone reductions – AND that agreement would not result in serious harm to US economy

Rejecting Kyoto - April 2001

Why?

- initial thoughts of GW doing a "Nixon to China"

- CC negotiations set up to keep US on board

- role of LDCs

- scientific evidence

- oil and fossil fuel lobby

- general attitude of administration towards international treaties

- general attitude towards environmental regulation

- Kyoto: unratifiable anyway?

- Paarlberg: "the worst of both worlds: a promised US cut larger than Congress was ready for, without the guarantee of developing country participation that Congress had warned would be necessary" (p. 243)

- senate: Byrd-Hagel resolution - not to ratify any CC agreement unless it mandated equivalent reductions from developing countries

- Europe goes ahead: US attitude hardening the rest of the world?

5. Making Foreign Environmental Policy in the US http://www.state.gov/g/oes/

- Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs

The Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (OES) coordinates

U.S. international oceans, environmental and health policy, integrating U.S. domestic interests with geopolitical concerns. OES promotes the full range of U.S. interests in the oceans to advance our national security, facilitate commerce, manage fish resources, foster scientific understanding and protect the marine environment through bilateral, regional, and multilateral fora. OES balances U.S. interests in natural resource protection with economic considerations to ensure effective international management of fresh water, forests, hazardous chemicals, and the atmosphere. OES coordinates USG international policies on HIV/AIDs and other infectious diseases. The bureau ensures that science underpins its policies. OES manages 35 + bilateral and multilateral science and technology (S&T) agreements and promotes international cooperation to advance U.S. space interests. The bureau maintains liaison with executive branch departments, business groups, and other stakeholders involved with international oceans, environment, science and health issues and consults with them to formulate USG positions and lead negotiations with foreign governments and international organizations.

- EPA

- other departments, e.g. commerce, play a role in international negotiations

Summary of Constraints

- foreign policy philosophy

- attitude of executive branch

- balance of power in Congress

- salience, characteristics of the issue

- powerful domestic interests - industry cf. environment lobby

- balance of power among domestic agencies

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