B. Duns Scoti: Ordinatio, prolog., pars prima:
De Necessitate Doctrinae Revelatae
DOCTOR SUBTILIS ET MARIANI
IOANNIS DUNS SCOTI
ORDINIS FRATRUM MINORUM
OPERA OMNIA
Ordinatio
PROLOGUS
FIRST PART
ON THE NECESSITY OF REVEALED DOCTRINE
QUESTION SOLE
Vol. I, pp. 1-58
IUSSU ET AUCTORITATE Rmi P. PACIFICI M. PERANTONI
TOTIUS ORDINIS FRATRUM MINORUM MINISTRI GENERALIS
STUDIO ET CURA COMMISSIONIS SCOTISTICAE
AC FIDEM CODICUM EDITA
PRAESIDE
P. CAROLO BALIĆ
TYPIS POLYGOTTIS VATICANIS
MCML
English Translation by
The Franciscan Archive
http://www.franciscan-archive.org
B. Duns Scoti: Ordinatio, prolog., pars prima:
De Necessitate Doctrinae Revelatae
[ PROLOGUS
PROLOGUE
PARS PRIMA
FIRST PART
DE NECESSITATE DOCTRINAE
REVELATAE
ON THE NECESSITY OF REVEALED
DOCTRINE
QUAESTIO UNICA
QUESTION SOLE
UTRUM HOMINI PRO STATU ISTO SIT
NECESSARIUM ALIQUAM DOCTRINAM
SUPERNATURALITER INSPIRARI ]
WHETHER FOR MAN FOR HIS PRESENT STATE
IT BE NECESSARY THAT ANY DOCTRINE
SUPERNATURALLY INSPIRE HIM
1. [Q. 1] Quaeritura utrum homini pro statu
isto sit necessarium aliquam doctrinam
specialem supernaturaliter inspirari, ad quam
videlicet non posset attingere lumine naturali
intellectus1.
Et quod non, arguo sic:
Omnisb potentia habens aliquod commune
pro primo obiecto, potest naturaliter in
quodlibet contentum sub ipso sicut in per se
obiectum naturale.
1. [Q. 1]* It is askeda whether for man for
his (present) state it be necessary that any
special doctrine supernaturally inspire (him),
to which he could not attain by the natural
light of the intellect.1
And that (it is) not (so), I argue thus:
Everyb power [potentia] having anything
common for its first object, can naturally
(act) upon [in] anything contained under it
just as upon a per se natural object.
a
a
An interpolated text prefaces this
commentary: Desiring to show something
etc..2 About the prologue of the First Book
five questions are asked. The first concerns
the necessity of this doctrine: whether it be
necessary for man for his (present) state that
any doctrine supernaturally inspire him.3
The second looks at the genus of the formal
cause of the same, and is: whether a
necessary supernatural cognition has been
sufficiently handed on to the wayfarer in
Sacred Scripture.4 The third pertains to the
genus of the material cause, and is: whether
theology concerns God as its first subject.5
The fourth and fifth pertain to the genus of
the final cause, and the fourth is: whether
theology is practical;6 the fifth: whether
from its order to praxis as to its end it is
called a per se practical science.7
b
The text is marked here by Duns Scotus
with the letter: a8
Praemittitur textus interpolatus: Cupientes
aliquid2 etc. Circa prologum primi libri
quaeruntur quinque.
Primum est de
necessitate huius doctrinae:
utrum
necessarium sit homini pro statu isto
aliquam doctrinam sibi supernaturaliter
inspirari3.
Secundum spectat ad genus
causae formalis eiusdem, et est: utrum
cognitio supernaturalis necessaria viatori
tradita sit sufficienter in Scriptura sacra4.
Tertium pertinet ad genus causae materialis,
et est: utrum theologia sit de Deo tamquam
de subiecto primo5. Quartum et quintum
pertinet ad genus causae finalis, et est
quartum: utrum theologia sit practica6;
quintum: utrum ex ordine ad praxim ut ad
finem dicatur per se scientia practica7.
b
Textus a Duns Scotus signatur littera: a8.
1
Cf. Duns Scotus, Lectura prol. pars 1 q.
unicus.; Rep. A prol q. 3. 2 Cf. Lombardus,
Sent. prol. (ed. Claraq. I 1). 3 Cf. supra n. 1.
4
Cf. infra n. 95. 5 Cf. infra n. 24. 6 Cf. infra
n. 217. 7 Cf. infra n. 233. 8 Cf. infra p. 2,
16-3,19.
* Text within square [ ] brackets has been
added for clarity in the case of headings and
citations by the editors of the Critical edition. In
the translation words supplied by the context are
in round ( ) brackets, and references to the
original Latin text in square [ ] brackets.
Paragraph numbers are according to the Critical
Edition.
1
B. Duns Scoti: Ordinatio, prolog., pars prima:
Hoc probatur per exemplum de primo
objecto visus et aliis contentis sub illo, et ita
inductive in aliis obiectis primis et potentiis.
Probatur etiam per rationem, quia primum
obiectum dicitur quod est adaequatum cum
potentia; sed si in aliquo esset ratio eius,
scilicet primi obiecti, circa quod non posset
potentia habere actum, non esset potentia
adaequata,
sed
obiectum
excederet
potentiam. Patet igitur maior. Sed primum
obiectum intellectus nostri naturale est ens
inquantum ens;
ergo intellectus noster
potest naturaliter habere actum circa
quodcumque ens, et sic circa quodcumque
intelligibile
non-ens,
quia
negatio
cognoscitur per affirmationem1. Ergo etc.
Probatio minoris, Avicenna I Metaphysicae
cap. 5: « Ens et res prima impressione in
animam
imprimuntur,
nec
possunt
manifestari ex aliis »; si autem esset aliquid
aliud ab istis primum obiectum, ista possent
manifestari per rationem eius; sed hoc est
impossibile2a.
a
Adnotatio Duns Scoti: In ista quaestione
nota a, b, c3 ad principale; item pro
difficultatibus, d, e, f, g4; factae sunt in
quaestione secunda5.
Nota, a valet
distinctione 36 et c quaestione 17; b et
sequens, communiter in supernaturalibus; d,
e quaestione de scientia theologiae nobis8.
1
Cf. Aristot., Anal. Post. I c. 24 [t. 40] (A.
C. 25, 86b 34-35): « per affirmativam enim
negativa nota est »; De interpr. II. C. 2 (c.
14, 24b 3); « affirmationi contraria quidem
negatio est »; Metaph. IV t. 16 (III c. 4,
1008a 17-18): « notior utique erit dictio
quam opposita negatio »;
Avicenna,
Metaph. I c. 6 (73ra): « esse vero notius est
quam non esse ». 2 Pro n. 1 cf. Henricus
Gand., Summa a. 1 q. 2. 3. 11. 12; a. 3 q. 1.
3. 4. 5; a. 19 q. 1; a. 21 q. 2. 3 a cf. supra p.
1, 23; b cf. infra p. 3, 20; c cf. infra p. 5, 20.
4
Cf. infra p. 7, 15; e cf infra p. 25, 19; f cf.
Infra p. 6, 15; g cf infra p. 22, 22. 5 Cf. infra
n. 95. 6 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I d. 3
pars 1. 7 Cf. Ib. Q. 1-2. 8 Cf. Infra n. 124.
De Necessitate Doctrinae Revelatae
This is proven through the example of the
first object of sight and the other things
contained under it, and thus inductively in
the other first objects and powers. It is also
proven through reason, because a first object
is said to be that which is adequate with the
power; but if in anything there be a
reckoning of this, that is of a first object,
about which a power could not have an act,
it would not be an adequate power, but the
object would exceed the power. The major
is therefore clear. But the first natural object
of our intellect is ‘being’ inasmuch as it is
‘being’ [ens inquantum ens]; therefore our
intellect can naturally have an act about
whatever being, and thus about whatever
intelligible non-being, because negation is
cognized through affirmation.1 Ergo etc..
Proof of the minor, Avicenna in his First
Book on the Metaphysics, chapter 5 [chapter
6 (72rb)] (says): « A being and thing by a
first impression are impressed upon the soul,
and they cannot be manifested out of other
(means) »; if, however, anything other than
these would be the first object, those could
be manifested through a reckoning of it; but
this is impossible.2a
Duns Scotus’ footnote: In this question
notes a, b and c3 (refer) to the principle
(argument); likewise for the difficulties, d,
e, f and g;4 have been dealt with in the
second question.5
Note, a refers to
distinction 36 and c question 17; b and the
following, commonly (pertain) to the
supernatural (aspects); d and e to the
question concerning our science of
theology.8
a
1
Cf. Aristot., Posterior Analytics I c. 24 [t.
40] (A. C. 25, 86b 34-35): « for through an
affirmative statement the negative is known
»; On Interpretation II. C. 2 (c. 14, 24b 3);
« to an affirmation the contrary is indeed the
negation »; Metaphysics IV t. 16 (III c. 4,
1008a 17-18): « indeed, a saying will be
more known than its opposite negation »;
Avicenna, Metaphysics. I c. 6 (73ra): «
being on the other hand is more known than
non-being ».
B. Duns Scoti: Ordinatio, prolog., pars prima:
2. Praetereaa, sensus non indiget aliqua
cognitione supernaturali pro statu isto; ergo
nec intellectus. Antecedens patet. Probatio
consequentiae: « Natura non deficit in
necessariis », III De anima; et si in
imperfectis non deficit, multo magis nec in
perfectis; ergo si non deficit in potentiis
inferioribus quantum ad necessaria earum
propter actus suos habendos et finem earum
consequendum, multo magis nec deficit in
necessariis potentiae superiori ad actum
suum et finem consequendum. Ergo etc.1
2. Moreover,a sense does not need any
supernatural cognition for the (present) state;
therefore neither the intellect.
The
antecedent is clear. The Proof of the
consequent: « Nature is not deficient in
necessaries », De anima, Book III [t. 45];
and if in things imperfect it is not deficient,
much more neither in things perfect;
therefore if it is not deficient in inferior
powers as much as regards those things
necessary for them for their acts to be had
and to completely attain their end, much
more neither it is deficient in those things
necessary for a superior power as regards its
act and to completely attain its end. Ergo
etc..1
3. Praeterea, si aliqua talis doctrina sit
necessaria, hoc est quia potentia in puris
naturalibus est improportionata obiecto ut
sic cognoscibili; ergo oportet quod per
aliquid aliud a se fiat ei proportionata. Illud
aliud aut est naturale, aut supernaturale; si
naturale, ergo totum est improportionatum
primo obiecto;
si supernaturale, ergo
potentia est improportionata illi, et ita per
aliud debet proportionari, et sic in infinitum.
Ergo cum non sit procedere in infinitum, II
Metaphysicae, oportet stare in primo, . . .
a
De Necessitate Doctrinae Revelatae
3. Moreover, if any such doctrine be
necessary, this is because a power in purely
natural things is disproportionate to its
object that (it be) in this manner cognizable;
therefore it is opportune that through
something other than itself it be made
proportionate to it. That other is either
natural, or supernatural; if natural, therefore
the whole is disproportionate to its first
object; if supernatural, therefore the power
is disproportionate to the same, and thus
through another ought to be proportioned,
and thus unto infinity. Therefore, since
there is not proceeding unto infinity,
Metaphysics, Book II, [t. 5-13], it is
opportune to stand still in the first, . . .
Textus a Duns Scotus signatur littera: b2.
1
Cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a. 1 q. 4 arg.
2. 4 (I f. 11 A); q. 2 in corp. (f. 4B);
Thomas, De veritate q. 14 a. 10 arg. 4. 13
(ed. Parmen. IX 242b-243a. 243b). 2 Cf.
supra p. 2, 16-3, 19.
a
The text is marked here by Duns Scotus
with the letter: b.2
3
B. Duns Scoti: Ordinatio, prolog., pars prima:
De Necessitate Doctrinae Revelatae
...dicendo, quod potentia intellectiva sit
proportionata
omni
cognoscibili
et
secundum omnem modum cognoscibilis.
Ergo etc.1
. . . by saying, that the intellective power is
proportionate to every cognizable and (is)
according to every manner of the
cognizable. Ergo etc..1
4. Ad oppositum:
4. Opposed to this:
Tim. 3: Omnis doctrina divnitius inspirata
utilis est ad arguendum etc.
Timothy, chapter 3, [v.16]: Every divinely
inspired doctrine is useful for putting
(things) in clear light etc..
Praeterea, Bar. 3 de sapientia dicitur: Non
est qui possit scire vias eius, sed qui scit
universa novit eam; ergo nullus alius potest
habere eam nisi a sciente universa. Hoc
quantum ad necessitatem eius. De facto
autem subdit: Tradit eam Iacob puero suo et
Israel dilecto suo, quantum ad Vetus
Testamentum; et sequitur: Post haec in
terris visus est et cum hominibus
conversatus est, quantum ad Novum
Testatmentum.
Morevoer, in Baruch chapter 3, [vv. 31-32]
there is said of wisdom: There is not one
who can know Her ways, but He who knows
all knew Her; therefore no other can have
Her except by a universal knower. This (is
said) as much as regards its necessity.
Moreover of the fact (the Prophet) adds
[ibid. V. 37]: Jacob passed Her on to his
son and Israel to his beloved, as much as
regards the Old Testament; and there follows
[v. 38]: After these (days) among the lands
He is seen, and He has conversed with men,
as much as regards the New Testament.
[I. Controversia inter Philosophos et
Theologos]
5. In ista quaestione videtur controversia
inter philosophos et theologos. Et tenent
philosophi perfectionem naturae, et negant
perfectionem supernaturalem; theologi vero
cognoscunt defectum naturae et necessitatem
gratiae et perfectionem supernaturalema.
I. The Controvery among Philosophers and
Theologians
5. On this question there seems to be a
controvery among philosophers and
theologians. And philosophers hold that the
perfection of nature, and deny supernatural
perfection; on the other hand theologians
recognize the defect of nature and the
necessity of grace and supernatural
perfection.a
a
Sequitur textus interpolatus: et ideo eam
magis honorant.
1
Cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a. 3 q. 5 arg.
2 (I f. 29S).
a
There follows an interpolated text: and for
that reason they honored Her more.
4
B. Duns Scoti: Ordinatio, prolog., pars prima:
De Necessitate Doctrinae Revelatae
[A. Opinio Philosophorum]
A. The Opinion of Philosophers
Diceret igitur philosophus quod nulla est
cognitio supernaturalis homini necessaria
pro statu isto, sed quid omnem cognitionem
sibi necessariam posset acquirere ex actione
causarum naturalium1. — Ad hoc adducitur
simul auctoritas et ratio Philosophi ex
diversis locis.
A philosopher, therefore, would say that
there is no supernatural cognition necessary
to man in his (present) state, but that every
cognition necessary for him he can acquire
from the action of natural causes.1 — For
this there is adduced together the authority
and reckoning of the Philosopher from
diverse passages.
6. Primo illud III De anima, ubi dicit quod «
intellectus agens est quo est omnia facere, et
possibilis est quo est omnia fieri ». Ex hoc
arguo sica : activo naturali et passivo simul
approximatis et non impeditis sequitur actio
necessario2, quia non dependet essentialiter
nisi ex eis tamquam ex causis prioribus;
activum autem respectu omnis intelligibilis
est intellectus agens, et passivum est
intellectus possibilis, et haec sunt naturaliter
in anima, nec sunt impedita. Patet. Ergo
virtute naturali istorum potest sequi actus
intelligendi
respectu
cuiuscumque
3
intelligibilis .
6. First that of De anima, Book III, [t. 18],
where he says that « the agent intellect is
that by which it makes all things, and the
possible is that by which it becomes all
things ». From this I argue thus:a to an
active and a passive natural (virtue) together
approximate and not impeded there follows
action necessarily,2 because it does not
depend essentially except from these as from
prior causes; moreover the active in respect
to every intelligible is the agent intellect, and
the passive is the possible intellect, and these
naturally are in the soul, and they are not
impeded. This is clear. Therefore by their
natural virtue an act of understanding can
follow in respect to whatsoever intelligible.3
7. Confirmatur ratione : omni potentiae
naturali passivae correspondet aliquod
activum naturale, alioquin videretur potentia
passiva esse frustra in natura si per nihil in
natura posset reduci ad actum ; sed
intellectus possibilis est potentia passiva
respectu quorumque intelligibilium ; . . .
a
7. It is confirmed by reason: to every
natural passive power there corresponds
some active natural, otherwise the passive
power would seem to be in vain [frustra] in
the nature if by means of nothing in the
nature it could be reduced to act; but the
possible intellect is a passive power in
respect to whatever intelligibles ; . . .
Textus a Duns Scotus signatur littera: c4.
1
Cf. Averroes, Metaphy. II. Com 1; De an.
III com. 36. — Cf. etiam Henricus Gand.,
Summa a. 4 q. 5 in corp. (I f. 33E. 32B).
2
Cf. Aristot., Metaphy. IX t. 10 (Theta, c. 5,
1048a 5-7): « Tales quidem potentias
[irrationales] necesse, quando ut possunt
activum et passivum appropinquat, hoc
quidem facere, illud vero pati ». 3 Cf.
Henricus Gand., Summa a. 1. q. 5 ad 2 (f.
15F); a. 3 q. 2 arg. 1 et in corp. (F. 28E-F). 4
Cf. supra p. 2, 16-3, 19.
a
The text is marked by Duns Scotus with the
letter c.4
2
Cf. Aristot., Metaphysics. IX t. 10 (Theta,
c. 5, 1048a 5-7): « It is indeed necessary
that the [irrational] powers be such that,
when the active and the passive drawn near
to one other, as they are able, the former
indeed works, the other indeed suffers ».
5
B. Duns Scoti: Ordinatio, prolog., pars prima:
. . . ergo correspondet sibi aliqua potentia
activa naturalis1. Sequitur igitur propositum.
Minor patet, quia intellectus possibilis
naturaliter appetit cognitionem cuiuscumque
cognoscibilis; naturaliter etiam perficitur per
quamcumque cognitionem; igitur est
naturaliter
receptivus
cuiuscumque
intellectionis.
. . . therefore some active natural power
corresponds to it.1
The proposition,
therefore, follows. The minor is clear,
because the possible intellect naturally
desires [appetit] the cognition of whatsoever
cognizable; it also naturally perfected
though whatsoever cognition; therefore is
naturally
receptive
of
whatsoever
intellection.
8. Praetereaa, VI Metaphysicae distinguitur
habitus speculativus in mathematicam,
phyiscam et metaphysicam; et ex probatione
eiusdem, ibidem, non videtur possibile esse
plures habitus esse speculativos, quia in istis
consideratur de toto ente, et in se et quoad
omnes partes. Sicut autem non posset esse
aliqua speculativa alia ab istis, sic nec posset
esse aliqua alia practica a practicis acquisitis
activis et factivis. Ergo scientiae practicae
aquisitae sufficiunt ad perficiendum
intellectum speculativum2.
a
De Necessitate Doctrinae Revelatae
8. Besides,a in Metaphysics, Book VI, [t. 2],
there is distinguished the speculative habit in
mathematics, physics and metaphysics; and
from the proof of the same, in the same
place [t. 1-2], it does not seem that it is
possible that there are many speculative
habits, because in them there is a
consideration of [consideratur de] the whole
being, both in itself and in regard [quoad] all
its parts. However, just as there cannot be
any speculative (habit) other than these, so
neither can there be any other practical
(habit) than the active and factitive acquired
practical (ones). Therefore the acquired
practical sciences suffice to perfect the
speculative intellect.2
Textus a Duns Scotus signatur littera: f3.
1
Cf. Aristot., De an. III t. 17 (III c. 5, 430a
10-14); Metaph. V t 17 (IV c. 12, 1019a 151019b 15); De caelo I t. 32 ( I c. 4, 271a 3233); Averroes, Metaphy. II com. 1. — Cf.
Henricus Gand., Summa a. 3 q. 4 arg. 2 (I f.
29 O); a. 35 q. 2 in corp. (f. 223Y)). 2 Cf.
Henricus Gand., Summa a. 2 q. 3 in corp. (f.
24M); a. 3 q. 3 in corp. et arg. 2 (f. 29L.K).
— Thomas, De Veritate q. 14 a. 10 arg. 3
(ed. Parmen. IX 242b). 3 Cf. supra p. 2, 163, 19).
a
The text is marked here by Duns Scotus
with the letter: f.3
6
B. Duns Scoti: Ordinatio, prolog., pars prima:
9. Praetereaa, potens naturaliter intelligere
principium, potest naturaliter cognoscere
conclusions inclusas in principio. Hanc
conclusionem
probo,
quia
scientia
conclusionum non dependet nisi ex
intellectu
principii
et
deductione
conclusionum ex principio, sicut patet ex
definitione ‘scire’ I Posteriorum; sed
deductio est ex se manifesta, sicut patet ex
syllogismi perfecti definitione I Priorum,
quia « nullius est indigens ut sit vel appareat
evidenter necessarius »; igitur si principia
intelligantur, habentur omnia quae sunt
necessaria ad scientiam conclusionis. Et sic
patet maior.
9.
Besides,a being able naturally to
understand a principles, it can naturally
cognize the conclusions included in the
principle. This conclusion I prove (thus),
because the knowledge [scientia] of
conclusions does not depend (on anything)
but the understanding of the principle and
the deduction of the conclusions from the
principle, just as is clear from the definition
of ‘knowing’ [‘scire’] in Posterior Analytics,
Book I, [c. 2 t. 5]; but deduction is of itself
manifest, just as is clear from the definition
of the perfect syllogism in Prior Analytics,
Book I, [c. 1], because « it is lacking in
nothing that is and/or appears evidently
necessary »; therefore if the principles are
understood, all things which are necessary
for the knowledge of the conclusion are had.
And thus the major is clear.
10.
Sed naturaliter intelligimus prima
principia, in quibus virtualiter includuntur
omnes conclusiones; ergo naturaliter
possumus scire omnes conclusiones scibiles.
10. But naturally we understand the first
principles, in which there are included all
conclusions; therefore naturally we can
know all knowable conclusions.
Probatio primae partis minoris: quia termini
principiorum primorum sunt communissimi,
igitur illos naturaliter possumus intelligere, .
..
a
Textus a Duns Scotus signatur littera: d .
1
Cf. supra p. 2, 16-3,19.
De Necessitate Doctrinae Revelatae
The proof of the first part of the minor:
because the terms of the first principles are
most common, therefore we can naturally
understand them, . . .
1
a
The text is marked by Duns Scotus with the
letter: d.1
7
B. Duns Scoti: Ordinatio, prolog., pars prima:
. . ., quia ex I Physicorum communissima
primo intelliguntura; « principia autem
cognoscimus et intelligimus in quantum
terminos cognoscimus », I Posteriorum; ergo
prima principia possumus naturaliter
cognoscere1.
De Necessitate Doctrinae Revelatae
. . ., because from Physics, Book I, [t. 3],
the things most common are understood
first;a « but we cognize and understand
principles inasmuch as we cognize (their)
terms », Posterior Analytics, Book I, [c. 3 t.
6]; therefore we can naturally cognize the
first principles.1
11. Probatio secundae partis minoris: quia
termini
primorum
principorum
sunt
communissimi, igitur quando distribuuntur,
distribuuntur pro omnibus conceptibus
inferioribus; accipiuntur autem tales termini
universaliter in primis principiis, et ita
extendunt se ad omnes conceptus
particulares, et per consequens ad extrema
omnium conclusionum specialiumb.
11. The proof of the second part of the
minor: because the terms of the first
principles are most common, therefore when
they are distributed, they are distributed on
behalf of all the inferior concepts; but such
terms are accepted universally in the first
principles, and thus they extends themselves
to all particular concepts, and consequently
[per consequens] to the extremes of all
special conclusions.b
Loco igitur (p. 7, 14) — intelliguntur (p.
8,1) textus a Duns Scoto cancellatus: igitur
naturaliter illos cognoscimus, quia sunt sicut
ianua in domo, II Metaphysicae2; loco igitur
(p. 7,14) — intelliguntur (p. 8,1) et igitur
(p. 8, 12) — Metaphysicae (p. 8, 13) textus
interpolatus:
igitur illos possimus
naturaliter intelligere, quia ex I Physicorum3
communissima primo intelliguntur a nobis,
etiam quia sunt sicut ianua in domo, II
Metaphysicae4.
b
Sequitur textus interpolatus: Et ita est
haec pars minoris secunda probata.
a
a
In place of therefore (p. 7, final sentence) .
. . . are understood (p. 8, first sentence) stood
this text cancelled by Duns Scotus: therefore
we naturally cognize them, because they are
as the door in the house, II Metaphysics,
Book II;2 in place of the same and of
therefore (p. 8, 12) . . . Metaphysics (p. 8,
13) was the interpolated text: therefore we
can naturally understand them, because from
Physics, Book I,3 the things most common
are understood by us first, also because the
are as the door in the house, Metaphysics,
Book II.4
b
There follows the interpolated text: And
thus has this second part of the minor been
proved.
1
Pro n. 9-10 cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a.
6 q. 1 arg. 1 (I f. 42A); a. 1 q. 2 in corp. (f.
4B); q. 5 in corp. (f. 15B); q. 12 in corp. (f.
22L); a. 13 q. 3 arg. 2 (f. 91A). 2 Aristot.,
Metaph. II t. 1 (I c. 1, 993b 4-5). — cf.
etiam Henricus Gand., Summa a. 1 q. 10 in
corp. (f. 20G); a. 22 q. 1 in corp. (f. 130L). 3
Cf. ad lin. 1. 4 Cf. ad lin. 12-13.
8
B. Duns Scoti: Ordinatio, prolog., pars prima:
[ B. Improbatio Opinionis Philosophorum]
De Necessitate Doctrinae Revelatae
B. The Reproof of the Opinion of
Philosophers.
12. Contra istam positionem tripliciter
potest argui.
12. Against this position on can argue in a
threefold manner:
Nota, nullum supernaturale potest ratione
naturali ostendi inesse viatori, nec necessario
requiri ad perfectionem eius; nec etiam
habens potest cognoscere illud sibi inesse.
Igitur impossibile est hic contra Aristotelem
uti ratione naturali: si arguatur ex creditis,
non est ratio contra philosophum, quia
praemissam creditam non concedet. Unde
istae rationes hic factae contra ipsum alteram
praemissam habent creditam vel probatam
ex credito; ideo non sunt nisi persuasiones
theologicae, ex creditis ad creditum.
Note, no supernatural can be shown by
natural reason to belong to [inesse] the
wayfarer, nor to be required necessarily for
his perfection; nor even can one having it
cognize that it belongs to him. Therefore it
is impossible here to use natural reason
against Aristotle: if one argue from things
believed, this is not a reason against the
philosopher, because he does not concede
the believed premise. Whence these reasons
of mine made here against him have another
believed and/or proven premise from what is
believed; for that reason they are not but
theological persuasions, from things
believed for that which is believed.
13. [Prima ratio principalis] — Primo sic:
omni agenti per cognitionem necessaria est
distincta cognitio sui finis1. Hanc probo,
quia omne agens propter finem agit ex
appetitu finis2; omne per se agens agit
propter finem3; igitur omne per se agens suo
modo appetit finem. Igitur sicut agenti
naturali est necessarius appetitus finis
propter quem debet agere, ita agenti per
cognitionem — quod etiam est per se agens,
ex II Physicorum — necessarius est
appetitus sui finis propter quem debet
agere4. Patet ergo maior.
13. [The first principal reason] — First in
this manner: to everyone acting through
cognition there is necessary a distinct
cognition of one’s own end.1 This I prove,
because everything acting on account of an
end acts out of an appetite for the end;2
every per se agent acts on account of an
end;3 therefore every per se agent in its own
manner has an appetite [appetit] for its end.
Therefore just as to a natural agent there is a
necessary appetite of its end for the sake of
which it ought to act, so to one acting
through cognition — which is also a per se
agent, from Physics, Book II [t. 49] — there
is a necessary appetite of its own end for the
sake of which it ought to act.4 Ergo the
major is clear.
1
Cf. Thomas, Summa Theologiae, I q. 1 a.
1 in corp. (IV 6b); De Veritate q. 14 a. 10
arg. 3 (ed. Parmen. IX 242b) 2 Cf. Aristot.,
Metaph. II t. 8 (I c. 2, 994b 13-14). 3 Cf.
Aristot., Physic. II t. 49 (II c. 5, 196b 17-22).
4
Cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a. 4 q. 3 in
corp. (I f. 31N-32O).
9
B. Duns Scoti: Ordinatio, prolog., pars prima:
Sed homo non potest scire ex naturalibus
finem suum distincte; igitur necessaria est
sibi de hoc aliqua cognitio supernaturalis1.
De Necessitate Doctrinae Revelatae
But man cannot know [scire] his own end
distinctly from natural (things); therefore
there is necessary for him some supernatural
cognition concerning this.1
14. Minor patet: primo, quia Philosophus
sequens naturalem rationem aut ponit
felicitatem esse perfectam in cognitione
acquisita substantiarum separatarum, sicut
videtur velle I et X Ethicorum, aut si non
determinate asserat illam esse supremam
perfectionem nobis possibilem, aliam ratione
naturali non concludit, ita quod soli naturali
rationi innitendo vel errabit circa finem in
particulari vel dubius remanebita; unde I
Ethicorum dubitando ait: « Si quod est
deorum donum, rationabile est felicitatem
esse »2.
14. The minor is clear: first, because the
Philosopher, following natural reason, either
posits felicity to be perfect in the acquired
cognition of separated substances, must as
he seems to want in the Nicomachian Ethics,
Books I [c. 9] and X [c. 8 and 10], or if he
does not determinately assert that to be the
supreme perfection possible for us, he does
not draw another conclusion [aliam non
concludet], so that by supporting himself by
natural reason alone he will err about his end
in particular and/or will remain doubtful;a
whence doubting in the Nicomachian Ethics,
Book I, [c. 13], he says: « If that is a gift of
the gods, it is reasonable that there is a
felicity (for man) ».2
15. Secundo probatur eadem minor per
rationem, quia nullius substantiae finis
proprius cognoscitur a nobis nisi ex actibus
eius nobis manifestis ex quibus ostenditur
quod talis finis sit conveniens tali naturaeb;
nullos actus experimur nec cognoscimus
inesse . . .
15. Second, the minor is proven by the same
reckoning, because of no substance is the
end more properly cognized by us unless out
of its acts manifested to us from which it is
shown that such an end is convenient to such
a nature;b we experience no acts nor do we
cognized them to belong to . . .
a
Adnotatio Duns Scoti: Hoc est creditum3.
b
Sequitur textus interpolatus: Hoc patet de
descensu gravis deorsum, qui est actus
gravis respectu centri et finis.
Duns Scotus’ note: This is (something)
believed.3
b
There follows the interpolated text: This
is clear from the descent of a weight
downwards, which is an act of weight in
respect of its center and end.
a
1
Cf. Thomas, Summa Theologicae I q. 1.
a. 1 in corp. (IV 6b); Henricus Gand.,
Summa a. 4. q. 5 in corp. (I f. 32B-33E). 2
Cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a. 1 q.12 in
corp. (f. 21 I); a. 4. q. 5 in corp et ad 5 (f.
33B.I); a. 3 q. 3 in corp. (f 29L). 3 Cf. Supra
n. 12.
10
B. Duns Scoti: Ordinatio, prolog., pars prima:
De Necessitate Doctrinae Revelatae
... nostrae naturae pro statu isto ex quibus
cognoscamus
visionem
substantiarum
separatarum esse convenientem nobis; igitur
non possumus naturaliter cognoscere
distincte quod ille finis sit conveniens
naturae nostrae1.
. . . our nature for this (our present) state out
of which we cognize the vision of separated
substances to be fitting [convenientem] for
us; therefore we cannot naturally cognize
distinctly that that end is fitting to our
nature.1
16. Hoc saltem certum est quod quaedam
condiciones finis propter quas est
appetibilior et ferventius inquirendus non
possunt determinate cognosci ratione
naturali.
Etsi enim daretur quod ratio
sufficeret ad probandum quod visio Dei
nuda et fruitio est finis hominis, tamen non
concludetur quod ista perpetuo convenient
homini perfecto, in anima et corpore, sicut
dicetur in IV distinctione 432. Et tamen
perpetuitas huiusmodi boni est condicio
reddens finem appetibiliorem quam si esset
transitorium. Consequi enim hoc bonum in
natura perfecta est appetibilius quam in
anima separata, sicut patet per Augustinum
XII Super Genesim. Istas igitur et similes
condiciones finis necesssarium est nosse ad
efficaciter inquirendum finem, et tamen ad
eas non sufficit ratio naturalis; igitur
requiritur doctrina supernaturaliter tradita.
16. This at least is certain, that certain
conditions of (our) end, on account of which
it is to be more desirably [appetibilior] and
fervently inquired after, cannot be cognized
in a determinate manner by natural reason.
For even if it be given that reason would
suffice to prove that the unencumbered
[nuda] vision and fruition of God is the end
of man, nevertheless it would not come to
the conclusion [concludetur] that these (acts)
of (enjoying) God perpetually befit the
perfect man, in soul and body, just as is said
in
Book IV, Distinction 43.
And
nevertheless the perpetuity of this manner of
good is the condition rendering (his) end
more desirable than if it were transitory. For
to completely attain this good in a perfected
nature is more desirable than in a separated
soul, just as is clear through (the testimony
of St.) Augustine, On Genesis, Book XII, [c.
35, n. 68]. Therefore these and the similar
conditions of (his) end it is necessary to
know to efficaciously inquire into (his) end,
and nevertheless for these natural reason is
not sufficient; therefore there is required a
doctrine supernaturally transmitted [tradita].
17. [Secunda ratio principalis] — Secundo
sica: . . .
a
Adnotatio Duns Scoti: Haec procedit de
contingentibus; ergo non de scibilibus.
17. [The second principle reason]
Second (I prove) in this manner:a
1
Cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a. 4. q. 5 in
corp. (I f. 32B-33D). 2 Duns Scotus,
Ordinatio IV d. 43 q. 2 n. [32].
—
Duns Scotus’ note: This proceeds from
contingents; therefore not from knowables.
a
11
B. Duns Scoti: Ordinatio, prolog., pars prima:
... omni cognoscenti agenti propter finem
necessaria est cognitio quomodo et qualiter
acquiratur talis finis; et etiam necessaria est
cognitio omnium quae sunt ad illum finem
ncessaria; et tertio necessaria est cognitio
quod omnia illa sufficiunt ad talem finem.
Primum patet, quia si nesciat quomodo et
qualiter finis acquiratur, nesciet qualiter ad
consecutionem ipsius se disponet. Secudum
probatur, quia si nesciat omnia ncessaria ad
ipsum, propter ignorantiam alicuius actus
necessarii ad ipsum poterit a fine deficere.
Sit etiam, quantum ad tertium, nesciantur illa
necessaria sufficere, ex dubitatione quod
ignoret aliquid necessarium, non efficaciter
prosequetur illud quod est necessarium.
. . . for every agent cognizing for the sake of
its end there is a necessary cognition (of)
how and in what kind of way [quomodo et
qualiter] such an end is acquired; and there
is also a necessary cognition of all things
which are necessary for that end; and third
there is a necessary cognition that all those
things suffice for such an end. The first is
clear, because if one does not know how and
in what kind of way his end is acquired, he
will not know in what kind of way he will
dispose himself to the attainment of it. The
second is proven, because if one does not
know all the things necessary for it, on
account of the ignorance of any necessary
act for it he will not be able to attain his end
[poterit a fine deficere]. It may also be, as
much as regards the third, that those things
necessary are not known to be sufficient, out
of a doubting that ignores something
necessary, one does not efficaciously pursue
that which is necessary.
18. Sed haec tria non potest viator naturali
ratione cognoscere. Probatio de primo1, quia
beatitudo confertur tamquam praemium pro
meritis quae Deus acceptat tamquam digna
tali praemio, et per consequens non naturali
necessitate sequitur ad actus nostros
qualescumque sed contingenter datur a Deo,
actus aliquos in ordine ad ipsum tamquam
meritorios acceptante2a.
Istud non est
naturaliter scibile, . . .
a
De Necessitate Doctrinae Revelatae
18. But these three a wayfarer cannot
cognize by natural reason. Proof of the
first,1 because beatitude is conferred as a
reward for the merits which God accepts as
worthy of such a reward, and consequently
not by a natural necessity does it follow after
our acts, whatever kind (they may be), but it
is given contingently by God, accepting
some acts in order to it as meritorious.2a
That is not naturally knowable, . . .
Adnotatio Duns Scoti: Hoc est creditum3.
1
Cf. supra n. 17. 2 Cf. Duns Scotus,
Ordinatio I d. 17 pars 1 q. 3 n. [24-25];
Quodl. Q. 17 n. [3-6]. 3 Cf. supra n. 12.
Duns Scotus’ note: This is (something)
believed.3
a
12
B. Duns Scoti: Ordinatio, prolog., pars prima:
. . .ut videtur, quia hic etiam erabant
philosophi, ponentes omnia quae sunt a Deo
immediate esse ab eo necessario1. Saltem
alia duo membra2 sunt manifesta: non enim
potest sciri naturali ratione acceptatio
voluntatis
divinae
utpote
tamquam
contingenter acceptantis talia vel talia digna
vita aeterna, et quod etiam illa sufficiant;
dependet mere ex voluntate divina circa ea
ad quae contingenter se habet; igitur etc.
De Necessitate Doctrinae Revelatae
. . . as it seems, because in this even the
philosophers used to err [cf Aristotle,
Physics, VIII t. 4-9, 13-15, 53; Metaphysics,
IX, t. 17, XII t. 30; Averroes, in h.1;
Epitome on the Books of Metaphysics, tr. 4;
Destruction of the destructions of the
Philosophy of Algazel, disp. 1; Avicenna,
Metaphysics, VI, ch. 2; IX ch. 1;
Metaphysics compendium, I, part 3, tr. 1, ch.
3], positing all things which are from God
immediately to be necessarily from Him.1
At least the other two members (of the
argument)2 are manifest: for there cannot be
known by natural reason the acceptance of
the Divine Will, understood as of one
contingently accepting such (acts) and/or
such (acts) as worthy of eternal life, and that
these also suffice; it depends merely on the
Divine Will about these, to which It holds
itself contingently; therefore etc..
19.
[Instantiae contra duas rationes
principales] — Contra istas duas rationes3
instatur. Contra primam4 sic: omnis natura
creata essentialter dependet a qualibet per se
causa eius, et propter talem dependentiam ex
causato cognito potest sciri demonstratione
quia5 et cognosci quaelibet eius per se causa;
igitur cum natura hominis sit homini
naturaliter cognoscibilis, quia non est
potentiae eius cognitivae improportionalis,
sequitur quod ex ista natura cognita possit
naturaliter cognosci finis illius naturae6a.
19. [Instances against the two principle
reasons] — Against those two reasons3 let
(the argument) be pursued. Against the first1
in this manner:
every created nature
essentially depends from whatever per se
cause of it, and on account of such a
dependence, from the thing caused having
been cognized, by a demonstration quia it
can be known and whatever (is) the per se
cause of it (can) be cognized; therefore since
the nature of man is to man naturally
cognizable, because there is nothing
improportional to his cognitive power, it
follows that from this nature of his having
been cognized there can be naturally
cognized the end of that nature.6a
a
Adnotatio Duns Scoti: Concedo, finis qui
est causa finalis, et hoc sub ista ratione sub
qua est causa finalis et similiter sicut
cognoscitur efficiens sub ratione quae
necessario requiritur ut sit efficiens
primum7.
1
Cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a. 29 q. 5 in
corp (I f. 174I); a 30 q. 4 ad 1 (f. 181E182K). 2 Cf. supra n. 17. 3 Cf. supra n. 1318. 4 Cf. supra n. 13-16. 5 Cf Aristot., Anal.
Post., I c. 13 [t. 30] (I c. 13, 78a 22-78b 34),
6
Cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a. 4 q. 8 in
corp. (f. 34V-35X). 7 Cf. infra n. 29.
Duns Scotus’ note: I concede (that there
is) an end which is the final cause, and this
under that reckoning of it under which it is a
final cause and similarly just as the efficient
cause is cognized under a reckoning of what
is required necessarily that it be the first
efficient (cause).7
a
13
B. Duns Scoti: Ordinatio, prolog., pars prima:
20. Confirmatur ratio: si enim ex natura
inferiori cognita cognoscatur eius finis, non
hoc minus est possibile in proposito, quia
nec minor dependentia in proposito finiti ad
suum finem est quam in aliis1.
De Necessitate Doctrinae Revelatae
20. It is confirmed by reason: for if from a
inferior nature having been cognized there is
cognized its end, this is no less possible in
the proposed (argument), because neither is
there a lesser dependence in the proposed
(argument) of the finite to its own end than
in other (finites).1
21. Ex hac etiam ratione videtur quod falsa
sit propositio ‘finis substantiae non
cognoscitur nisi ex eius actibus’2, quia ex
cognitione naturae in se potest eius finis
cognosci demonstratione quia.
21. Also from this reckoning it seems that
the proposition ‘the end of a substance is not
cognized except from its own acts’ is false,
because from a cognition of a nature in itself
there can be cognized its end by a
demonstration quia.
22. Quod si dicatur quod ratio concludit
hominem posse naturaliter cognoscere suum
finem naturalem, non autem de fine
supernaturali, contra, Augustinus libro De
praedestinatione sanctorum: « Posse habere
fidem, sicut posse habere caritatem, naturae
est hominum, quamvis habere fidem, sicut
habere caritatem, gratiae sit fidelium ». Si
ergo natura hominis est naturaliter
cognoscibilis homini, naturaliter est etiam
cognoscibilis illa potentia ut est talis naturae,
...
22. Wherefore if it be said that reason
concludes that man can naturally cognize his
own natural end, not however (is this so)
concerning his supernatural end, on the
contrary, (St.) Augustine in his book On the
Predestination of the Saints (says): « To be
able to have faith, just as to be able to have
charity, belongs to the nature of men, though
to have faith, just as to have charity, belongs
to the grace of the faithful ». If, therefore,
the nature of man is naturally cognizable to
man, there is also naturally cognizable that
power that belongs to such a nature, . . .
1
Cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a. 4. q. 8 cin
corp. (I f. 34V-35V). 2 Cf. ibid. Ad 1 et 2
(f. 35Y.Z). — Cf. supra n. 15.
14
B. Duns Scoti: Ordinatio, prolog., pars prima:
De Necessitate Doctrinae Revelatae
. . . et per consequens ordinabilitas talis
naturae ad finem ad quem fides et caritas
disponit.
. . . and consequently the ordinability of such
a nature to the end to which faith and charity
dispose it.
23. Item, homo naturaliter appetit finem
illum quem dicis supernaturalem; igitur ad
illum finem naturaliter ordinatur1; igitur ex
tali ordinatione potest concludi finis ille ut
ex cognitione naturae ordinatae ad ipsum.
23. Likewise, man naturally desires that end
which you call supernatural; therefore to
that end he is naturally ordained;1 therefore
out of such an ordination that end can be
concluded to as out of the cognition of a
nature ordained to it.
24.
Item, naturaliter est cognoscibile
primum obiectum intellectus esse ens,
secundum Avicennam2, et naturaliter
cognoscible est in Deo perfectissime salvari
rationem entis; finis autem cuiuscumque
potentiae est optimum eorum quae
continentur sub eius obiecto primo, quia in
illo solo est perfecta quietatio et delectatio3,
ex X Ethicorum*; ergo naturaliter
cognoscibile
est
hominem
ordinari
secundum intellectum ad Deum tamquam ad
finem.
24. Likewise, it is naturally cognizable that
the first object of the intellects is ‘being’,
according to Avicenna [Metaphysics, I ch.
6],2 and it is naturally cognizable that in God
there is most perfectly conserved [salvari]
the reckoning of ‘being’; but the end of
whatsoever power is the best of those things
which are contained under its first object,
because in that alone is there a perfect
resting and delectation,3 from the
Nicomedian Ethics, Book X [c. 4]*;
therefore it is naturally cognizable that man
is ordained according to his intellect to God
as to his End.
25. Confirmatur ratio, quia cui naturaliter
cognoscibilis est potentia aliqua, ei
naturaliter cognoscibile est quid sit eius
primum obiectum, et ulterius, potest
cognoscere in quo salvatur ratio illius primi
obiecti et quod perfectissimum tale est finis
potentiae; . . .
25. (This) reckoning is confirmed, because
to that for which there is (an end) naturally
knowable by some power, that which is its
first object is naturally knowable, and
further, it can cognize in what the reckoning
of its first object is conserved and what most
perfect (thing) as such is the end of the
power; . . .
1
Pro n . 22-23 cf. Henricus Gand., Summa
a. 8 q. 2 ad 1 ( I f. 65N); a. 4 q. 5 in corp. Et
ad 1 (f. 33C-F). 2 Cf. ibid., a. 3 q. 4 arg. 1
(f. 29 O); a. 7 q. 3 ad 4 (f. 51L); a. 19 q. 1 in
corp. (f. 115B). — Cf. supra n. 1. 3 Cf.
ibid., a. 4 q. 9 in corp. (f. 35B-D).
* « (This belongs) to every sense of the one
operating according to the sensible, having
been disposed, to perfectly draw near to the
most beautiful (thing) of those (things) lying
under the sense; for such most of all seems
to be the perfect operation . . . This,
however, will indeed be most perfect and
most delectable. For according to every
sense there is a delectation; moreover
similarly both an understanding and a
outward-looking vision [speculationem].
Moreover the most delectable (operation is)
the most perfect; but the most perfect
(operation) is that which belongs to the
(power) holding (itself) well to that which is
most to be studied [studiosissimum] of those
(things) which are under it ».
* « Sensus omnis ad sensibile operantis,
perfecte
attrahere
dispositi
ad
publcherrimum sub sensu iactentium; tale
enim maxime esse videtur perfecta operatio .
. . Haec autem utique perfectissima erit et
delectabilissima. Secundum omnem enim
sensum est delectatio; similiter autem et
intellectum
et
speculationem.
Delectabilissima
autem
perfectissima;
perfectissima autem quae bene habentis ad
studiosissimum eorum quae sub ipsam ».
15
B. Duns Scoti: Ordinatio, prolog., pars prima:
. . . mens autem nota est sibi, secundum
Augustinum De Trinitate; igitur sibi est
notum quod sit eius primum obiectum1. Et
novit Deum non excedi a ratione illius primi
obiecti, quia tunc nullo modo esset ab ipsa
mente intelligibilis2; ergo novit Deum esse
optimum in quo salvatur ratio sui obiecti, et
ita ipsum novit esse finem potentiae.
. . . but the mind is known [nota] to itself,
according to (St.) Augustine in De Trinitate
[IX, c. 11-12 n. 16.18]; therefore to itself is
known what is its first object.1 And it knows
that God is not exceeded by the reckoning of
its first object, because then in no manner
would He be intelligible by the mind itself;2
therefore it knows that God is the best thing
in which the reckoning of its object is
conserved, and thus it knows Him to be the
end of its power.
26. Contra secundam rationem3 arguitur sic:
si per unum extremum cognoscitur aliud
extremum, ergo et media; sed necessaria ad
consecutionem finis sunt media inter
naturam et finem suum consequendum4;
igitur cum ex cognitione naturae possit finis
cognosci, secundum prius probata5, videtur
quod similiter media ad finem necessaria
possunt cognosci.
26. Against the second reason it is argued in
this manner: if by means of one extreme
there is cognized the other extreme,
therefore also the means; but the necessaries
for the attainment of an end are the means
between the nature and its own end to be
attained;4 therefore since from the cognition
of the nature the end can be cognized,
according to the things previously proven,5 it
seems that similarly the means necessary to
the end can be cognized.
27. Confirmatur ratio: ita enim in proposito
videtur esse necessaria conexio entium ad
ipsum finem sicut est in aliis; sed propter
talem conexionem in aliis ex fine
cognoscuntur alia, sicut per rationem
sanitatis concluditur talia et talia requiri ad
sanitatem; igitur etc.6
28. [Responsio ad instantias] —
primum7 istorum dico quod licet . . .
De Necessitate Doctrinae Revelatae
27. (This) reckoning is confirmed: for thus
in the proposed (argument) there seems to be
a necessary connexion of beings to that end
just as there is among the other (ends); but
on account of such a connexion among the
other (ends) other things are cognized from
the end,just as through the reckoningof
health there is concluded that such and such
are required for health; therefore etc..6
Ad
1
Cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a. 40 q. 7 arg.
2 et in corp. (I f. 259G.H). 2 Cf, ibid. a. 4 q.
5 in corp. (f. 33C). 3 Cf. supra n. 17-18). 4
Cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a. 4 q. 9 in
corp. (f. 35B). 5 Cf. supra n. 19) 6 Cf.
Henricus Gand., Summa a. 3 q. 3 arg. 1 (f.
28K). 7 Cf. supra n. 19-21.
28. [Reponse to the instances] — To the
first7 of these I say that though . . .
16
B. Duns Scoti: Ordinatio, prolog., pars prima:
. . . procedat de fine qui est causa finalis et
non de fine attingendo per operationem —
quorum finium distinctio dicetur infra1 —
potest tamen dici ad illud, et ad sequens de
Augustino2, et ad tertium de potentia et
primo obiecto3, unica responsione, quod
omnia accipiunt naturam nostram vel
potentiam
intellectivam
esse
nobis
naturaliter cognoscibilem; quod falsum est,
sub illa ratione propria et speciali sub qua ad
talem finem ordinatur, et sub qua capax est
gratiae consummatae, et sub qua habet
Deum pro perfectissimo obiecto. Non enim
cognoscitur anima nostra a nobis nec natura
nostra pro statu isto nisi sub aliquo ratione
generali, abstrahibili a sensibilibus, sicut
patebit infra distinctione 34. Et secundum
talem generalem rationem non convenit sibi
ordinari ad illum finem, nec posse capere
gratiam, nec habere Deum pro obiecto
perfectissimo.
De Necessitate Doctrinae Revelatae
. . . it proceeds from the end which is the
final cause and not from the end being
attained through operation — of which ends
the distinction will be discussed below1 —
nevertheless there can be said according to
that (argument), and according to what
follows from (St.) Augustine,2 and according
to the third (argument) concerning the power
and its prime object,3 in a single response,
that all (these arguments) accept our nature
and/or intellective power to be naturally
cognizable by use; which is false, under that
reckoning proper and special under which it
is ordained to such an end, and under which
it is capable of the consummate grace, and
under which it has God for its most p4erfect
Object. For our soul is not cognized by us
nor by our nature in this present state except
under some general reckoning, abstractible
from sensibles, just as will be clear below in
Distinction 3.4 And according to such a
general reckoning it does not find it
agreeable [non convenit sibi] to be ordained
to that end, nor to be able to receive [capere]
grace, nor to have God for its most perfect
Object.
29. Tunc ad formam. Cum dicitur quod ex
ente ad finem potest demonstrari finis
demonstratione quia5, dico quod non est
verum nisi cognito ente ad finem sub illa
ratione propria sub qua habet finem illum.
Sic minor est falsa. — Et cum probatur per
proportionem6, dico quod licet mens sit
eadem sibi, non tamen pro statu isto . . .
29. Next according to the form (of the
argument). When it is said that from
(something) being for an end the end can be
demonstrated by a demonstration quia,5 I
say that it is not true except having cognized
it being for and end under that proper
reckoning under which it has that end. Thus
the minor is false. — And since it is proved
through a proportion,6 I say that though the
mind is the same to itself, it is nevertheless
not in this present state . . .
1
Cf. Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I d. 1 pars 1 q.
1 n. [5]. 2 Cf. supra n. 22. 3 Cf. supra n. 24.
4
Cf. Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I d. 3 pars 1 q.
3 n. [24]. 5 Cf. supra n. 19. 6 Cf. ibidem.
17
B. Duns Scoti: Ordinatio, prolog., pars prima:
De Necessitate Doctrinae Revelatae
. . . est sibi proportionalis tamquam
objectum nisi secundum rationes generales
quae possunt abstrahi ab imaginabilibus.
. . . proportional to itself as an object except
according to general reckonings which can
be abstracted from imaginables.
30. Ad confirmationem1 dico quod nec
aliarum substiantiarum fines proprii
cognoscuntur, qui scilicet sunt earum
secundum rationes proprias, nisi sint aliqui
actus manifesti ex quibus concludatur ordo
earum ad talem finem.
30. For a confirmation (of this argument)1 I
say that the proper ends of other substances
are also not cognized, which namely belong
to these according to proper reckonings,
unless they are of some manifest act out of
which there is concluded their order to such
an end.
31. Et ex hoc patet ad illud quod additur2
contra probationem minoris, quod illa
propositio non est falsa, ‘non cognoscitur a
nobis finis proprius substantiae nisi per
actum eius manifestum’3; non enim accipit
propositio quod non posset aliter finis
cognosci. Bene enim verum est quod si
substantia cognosceretur sub propria ratione,
ex ipsa sic cognita posset eius per se causa
cognosci. Sed non sic cognoscitur a nobis
nunc aliqua substantia, et ideo nunc nullum
finem possumus concludere proprium
substantiae nisi per actum evidentem de illa
substantia ut nota in universali et confuse.
In proposito deficit utraque via; sed probatio
minoris4 tangit unam, de ignoratia actus,
supponendo aliam, de ignorantia scilicet
naturae in se.
31. And from this it is clear regarding that
which is added2 against the proof of the
minor, that that proposition is not false, ‘the
proper end of a substance is not cognized by
us except through its manifest act’;3 for the
proposition does not accept that the end
could be otherwise cognized. For well is it
true that if a substance would be cognized
under its proper reckoning, from it being
cognized in this manner the per se cause of
it could be cognized. But not so is any
substance now cognized by us, and for that
reason now we can conclude to no proper
end of a substance except through and
evident act from that substance as (it is)
known in a universal and confused
(manner). In the proposed (argument) each
way is lacking; but the proof of the minor4
touches the one concerning the ignorance of
the act, by substituting another, namely
(that) concerning the ignorance of the nature
in itself.
32. Ad secundum de Augustino5 dico quod
illa potentia habendi caritatem ut ipsa est
dispositio respectu Dei in se sub propria
ratione amandi, . . .
1
Cf. supra n. 20. 2 Cf. supra n. 21. 3 Cf.
supra n. 15. 4 Cf. ibidem. 5 Cf. supra n. 22.
32. To the second (argument) from (St.)
Augustine5 I say that that potency of having
charity, as it is a disposition in respect to
God in itself under a proper reckoning of
loving, . . .
18
B. Duns Scoti: Ordinatio, prolog., pars prima:
. . . convenit naturae hominis secundum
ratinoem specialem, non communem sibi et
sensibilibus; ideo non est illa potentialitas
naturaliter cognoscibilis pro statu isto de
homine, sicut nec homo cognoscitur sub illa
ratione sub qua eius est haec potentiaa. Ita
respondeo ad istud in quantum adduci potest
ad conclusionem principalem1, scilicet
oppositam minori rationis primae2. Sed in
quantum
adducitur
contra
illam
responsionem de fine supernaturali et
naturali3, respondeo: concedo Deum esse
finem naturalem hominis, sed non naturaliter
adipiscendum sed supernaturaliter4. Et hoc
probat ratio sequens de desiderio naturali5,
quam concedo.
De Necessitate Doctrinae Revelatae
. . . befits the nature of man according to a
special reckoning, not common to himself
and sensibles; for that reason that
potentiality is not naturally cognoscible in
this present state of man, just as neither is
man cognized under that reckoning under
which this potency belongs to him.a Thus I
respond to that (argument) of theirs
inasmuch as it can be lead to a principle
conclusion,1 namely the opposite of the
minor of the first reckoning.2 but inasmuch
as it is lead against that response concerning
the supernatural and natural end, I respond:
I concede that God is the natural end of man,
but obtained [adipiscendum] not naturally,
but supernaturally.4 And the reckoning,
which I concede, following from natural
desire,5 also proves this.
33. Ad aliud6 negandum est illud quod
assumitur,
quod
scilicet
naturaliter
cognoscitur ens esse primum obiectum
intellectus nostri, et hoc secundum totam
indifferentiam entis ad sensibilia et
insensibilia, et quod hoc dicit Avicenna
quod sit naturaliter notum7. Miscuit enim
sectam suam — quae fuit secta Machometi
—...
33. To the other6 there must be denied that
which is assumed, namely that ‘being’ is
naturally cognized to be the prime object of
our intellect, and this according to the total
[totam] indifference of ‘being’ to sensibles
and insensibles, and this which Avicenna
says, that it is naturally known.7 For he
mixed up his own sect — which was the sect
of Mohammed — . . .
a
Sequatur textus interpolatus: Vel vult
Augustinus quid in natura est potentia ad
recipiendum. Non tamen potest reduci ad
actum per naturam8.
a
There follows the interpolated text:
And/or (St.) Augustine wants that in nature
there is a power to receive it. However it
cannot be reduced to act through nature.8
1
Cf. supra n. 19-20. 2 Cf. supra n. 14-15. 3
Cf. supra n. 22. 4 Cf. Henricus Gand.,
Summa a. 13 q. 2 in corp (I f. 91T-X); a. 8 q.
2 in corp. (f. 64H). 5 Cf. supra n. 23. 6 Cf.
supra n. 24. 7 Cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a.
21 q. 3 in corp. (f. 126D-E); q. 2 ad e (f.
124P); a. 19 q. 1 ad 3 et r (f. 115k-116L); a.
7 q. 6 ad 2 (f. 56R-S); q. 2 ad 2 (f. 118F); a.
26 q. 2 ad 1 (f. 159T). — Cf. infra n. 92. 8
Cf. ib. A. 35. q. 4 in corp. (f. 224O-225O) et
Aristot., Metaph. V t. 17 (IV c. 12, 1919a
15-1929a 6), pro lec. Var. Ad lin. 17-18.
19
B. Duns Scoti: Ordinatio, prolog., pars prima:
. . . philosophicis, et quaedam dixit ut
philosophica et ratione probata, alia ut
consona sectae suae: unde expresse ponit
libro IX Metaphysicae cap. 7a animam
separatam
cognoscere
substantiam
immaterialem in se, et ideo sub obiecto
primo intellectus habuit ponere substantiam
immaterialem contineri1.
Non sic
Aristoteles; sed secundum ipsum, primum
obiectum intellectus nostri est vel videtur
esse quiditas sensibilis, et hoc vel in se
sensibilis vel in suo inferiori; et haec est
quiditas abstrahibilis a sensibilibusb.
De Necessitate Doctrinae Revelatae
. . . with philosophical (arguments), and said
certain things as proven by philosophy and
reason, others as consonant with his own
sect: whence he expressly posits in his
Metaphysics, Book IX [c. 7], that a
separated
soul
cognizes
immaterial
substance in itself, and for that reason he had
to posit that immaterial substance is
contained under the first object of the
intellect. Not so Aristotle [De Anima, III t.
26]; rather according to him, the first object
of our intellect is and/or seems to be the
quiddity of the sensible, and this sensible in
itself and/or in its inferior; and this is a
quiddity abstractible from sensibles.b
34. Quod autem dicitur in confirmatione
illius rationis de Augustino2, respondeo:
dico quod dictum Augustini debet intelligi
de actu primo, sufficiente omnino ex se
respectu actus secundi, sed tamen nunc
impedito; propter quod impedimentum . . .
34. But because there is said in the
confirmation of that reckoning from (St.)
Augustine, I respond: I say that the saying
of (St.) Augustine ought to be understood of
the first act, entirely sufficient of itself in
respect to the second act, but nevertheless
now impeded;
on account of which
impediment . . .
a
Loco IX et 7 a Duns Scoto relinquitur
spatium vacuum.
b
Sequitur textus interpolatus: Sed si ad hoc
opponitur quod si quiditas materialis sit
primum et adaequatum obiectum potentiae
intellectivae quod intellectus intelligere non
poterit aliquid de substantiis separatis, quia
obiectum adaequatum vel virtualiter vel
formaliter includit omne illud in quod potest
potentia ferri — se quiditas materialis nec
virtualiter nec formaliter continet substantias
separatas, ergo etc. — dico quod assumptum
non est verum, quia quinque sensibilia
communia, puta numerus, figura, etc.,
sentiuntur a sensu visus per se, quae nec
formaliter nec virtualiter continentur sub
colore vel luce3; sufficit enim aliqua
continentia concomitantiae.
a
In place of IX and 7 a blank space is left
by Duns Scotus.
b
There follows the interpolated text: But if
to this there is opposed that if material
quiddity be the first and adequate object of
the intellective power because the intellect
cannot understand anything concerning
separated substances, because an adequate
object virtually and/or formally includes
every thing [illud] unto which the power can
be brought to bear [ferri] — if material
quiddity neither virtually nor formally
contains separated substances, ergo etc.. —
I say that the assumption is not true, because
the five common sensibles, that is number,
figure, etc., are sensed by the sense of sight
per se, which neither formally nor virtually
are contained under color and/or light;3 for it
suffices that some contain others
concomitantly
[aliqua
continentia
concomitantiae].
1
Cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a. 22 q. 5 in
corp. (I f. 134B-135F). 2 Cf. supra n. 25. 3
Cf. Aristot., De anima II t. 64 (II c. 6, 418a
17-29).
20
B. Duns Scoti: Ordinatio, prolog., pars prima:
. . . actus secundus non elicitur nunc ex
primo actu. De hoc amplius infra1.
De Necessitate Doctrinae Revelatae
. . . the second act is not now elicited from
the first act. Concerning this more (will be
said) below.1
35. Si obiciatur contra istud quod homo in
statu naturae institutae potuit cognoscere
naturam suam, ergo et finem naturae, ex
deductione primae rationis2; ergo illa
cognito non est supernaturalis.
35. If it is objected against this that man in
the state of nature instituted could cognize
his own nature, therefore also the end of his
nature, from a deduction of the first reason;2
therefore that cognition is not supernatural.
36. Item, contra responsionem3 ad ultimam
rationem: si ideo non cognoscitur quid sit
obiectum primum intellectus, quia non
cognoscitur intellectus sub omni ratione
propria sub qua respicit tale obiectum, igitur
non potest cognosci de quocumque quod
ipsum sit intelligibile, quia non cognoscitur
potentia sub omni ratione propria sub qua
respicit
quodcumque
ut
obiectum
intelligibile.
36. Likewise, against the response3 to the
last reckoning: if for that reason that which
is the first object of the intellect is not
cognized, because it is not cognized under
every proper reckoning of the intellect under
which (the intellect) looks back to such an
object, therefore it cannot be cognized from
anything whatsoever that it is intelligible,
because is not cognized under every proper
reckoning under which it looks back to
anything whatsoever as an intelligible
object.
37. Respondeo: ad primum4 requireret dici,
qualis fuit cognitio hominis instituti, quod
usque alias differatur5.
Saltem tamen
respectu viatoris pro statu isto est dicta
cognitio supernaturalis, quia facultatem eius
naturalem excedens; naturalem, dico,
secundum statum naturae lapsae.
37.
I respond:
as regards the first
4
(argument) it would require that there be
said [requireret dici], what kind of cognition
was (that) of the man instituted, to make it
differ from the others [usque alias
differatur]. Nevertheless at least in respect
to the wayfarer in this state it is said to be a
supernatural cognition, because it exceeds
his natural faculty; natural, I say, according
to the state of fallen nature.
38. Ad secundum6 concedo quod non
habetur modo cognitio de anima vel aliqua
eius potentia ita distincta quod ex ipsa possit
cognosci quod aliquod obiectum intelligibile
sibi correspondeat; sed ex ipso actu quem
experimur concludimus potentiam et
naturam . . .
38. As regards the second6 I concede that
now cognition by the soul and/or any other
power of is not had so distinctly that from it
there can be known that any intelligible
object corresponds to it; but from this act
itself which we experience we conclude that
the power and nature . . .
1
Cf. Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I d. 3 pars 1
q.3 n. [24-25]. 2 Cf. supra n. 19. 3 Cf. supra
n. 33. 4 Cf. supra n. 35. 5 Cf. Duns Scotus,
Ordinatio IV d. 1 pars 2 q. 2 n. [7] 6 Cf.
supra n. 36.
21
B. Duns Scoti: Ordinatio, prolog., pars prima:
. . . cuius est ille actus illud respicere pro
obiecto quod percipimus attingi per actum,
ita
quod
obiectum
potentiae
non
concludimus ex cognition potentiae in se sed
actus quem experimur. Sed de obiecto
supernaturali
neutram
cognitionem
possumus habere; et ideo ibi deficit utraque
via cognoscendi finem proprium illius
naturae.
. . . to which that act belongs looks back to it
as the object which we perceive to be
attained through the act, so that we do not
conclude to the object of the power from the
cognition of the power in itself but (from the
cognition) of the act which we experience.
But concerning a supernatural object we can
have neither cognition; and for that reason
there each way of cognizing the proper end
of that nature fails.
39. Ad argumentum1 contra secundam
rationem patet, quia supponit quoddam2 iam
negatum3. — Ad confirmationem4 illius
rationis dico quod quando finis sequitur
naturaliter ea quae sunt ad finem et
naturaliter praeexigit illa, tunc ex fine
possunt concludi ea quae sunt ad finem; hic
autem non est consecutio naturalis, sed
tantum acceptatio voluntatis divinae,
compensantis ista merita tamquam digna
fine tali.
39. As regards the argument1 against the
second reckoning, it is clear that it supposes
something2 already denied.3 — For a
confirmation4 of this reckoning I say that
when an end follows naturally those things
which are for the end and naturally requires
them beforehand, then from the end those
things which are for the end can be
concluded; but here there is no natural
consequence, but only an acceptance of the
Divine Will, compensating those merits of
his as worthy of such an end.
40. [Tertia ratio principalis] — Itema tertio
arguitur contra opinionem philosophorum
principaliter. VI Metaphysicae:* cognitio
substantiarum separatarum est nobilissima,
quia circa nobilissimum genus5; igitur
cognitio eorum quae sunt propria eis est
maxime scibilia quam illa in quibus
conveniunt cum sensibilibus.
Sed illa
propria non possumus cognoscere ex puris
naturalibus tantum. Primo, quia si in aliqua
scientia modo possibili inveniri traderentur
talia propria, . . .
a
De Necessitate Doctrinae Revelatae
40.
[The third principle reason]
—
a
Likewise in the third one argues principally
against the opinion of the philosophers.
Metaphysics, Book VI, [t. 2]:* the cognition
of separated substances is the most noble,
because (it is) about the most noble genus
(of ‘being’);5 therefore the cognition of those
which are proper to them is much more
[maxime] knowable than those in which they
convene with sensibles. But those proper we
cannot cognize from pure naturals only.
First, because if in any science now possible
there are discovered [inveniri traderentur]
such proper (objects), . . .
Textus a Duns Scotus signatur littera: g6.
* « honorabilissimam scientiam oportet
circa honorabilissimum genus esse; ergo
theoricae aliis scientiis desiderabiliores sunt;
haec autem [id est thoelogia] de theoricis ».
a
The text is marked by Duns Scotus with the
letter: g.6
1
Cf. supra n. 26. 2 Cf. supra n. 19. 3 Cf.
supra n. 28-29. 4 Cf. supra n. 27. 5 Cf.etiam
Henricus Gand., Summa a. 7 q. 3 in corp. (I
f. 50E). 6 Cf. supra p. 2, 16-3, 19.
* « it is opportune that the most honorable
science be about the most honorable genus;
therefore the theoretical are more desirable
than the other sciences; but this [that is,
theology] concerns theoreticals ».
22
B. Duns Scoti: Ordinatio, prolog., pars prima:
. . . hoc esset in metaphysica; sed ipsa non
est possibilis a nobis naturaliter haberi de
propriis passionibus istarum substantiarum
separatarum, ut pateta. Et hoc est quod dicit
Philosophus I Metaphysicae, quod oportet
sapientem omnia cognoscere aliqualiter, et
non in particulari; et subdit: « Qui enim
novit universalia, novit aliqualiter omnia
subiecta ».
‘Sapientem’ vocat ibi
metaphysicum, sicut metaphysicam vocat ibi
‘sapientiam’1.
De Necessitate Doctrinae Revelatae
. . . this would be in metaphysics; but it is
not naturally possible that this (science) of
the proper passions of those separated
substances be had by us, as is clear.a And
this is what the Philosopher says in
Metaphysics, Book I [c. 2], that it is
opportune that the wise man cognize in
some manner all things, and not in
particular; and he adds: « For he who
knows [novit] universals, knows in some
manner all subjects ». There he calls the
‘wise man’ the metaphysician, just as there
he calls metaphysics ‘wisdom’.1
41.
Secondo probo idem, quia non
cognoscuntur ista propria cognitione propter
quid nisi cognita sint propria subiecta, quae
sola includunt talia propter quid; sed propria
subiecta eorum non sunt a nobis naturaliter
cognoscibilia; ergo etc.
41. Second I prove the same thing, because
those proper (objects) are not cognized by a
cognition propter quid unless they be
cognized as proper subjects, which include
such (objects) alone propter quid; but the
proper subjects of these are not naturally
cognizable by us; ergo etc..
Nec cognoscimus ista eorum propria
demonstratione quia et ex effectibus. Quod
probatur:
nam effectus vel reliquunt
intellectum . . .
Nor do we cognize those proper (objects) of
these by a demonstration quia and from their
effects. Which is (thus) proved: for effects
leave the intellect . . .
a
Sequitur textus a Duns Scoto cancellatus:
quia ista non includuntur virtualiter in primo
subiecto metaphysicae, scilicet ente.
a
There follows the text cancelled by Duns
Scotus: because these are not included
virtually in the first subject of metaphysics,
namely ‘being’.
1
Cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a. 3 q. 3 in
corp. (I f. 29L); a. 7 q. 3 arg. 4 (f. 49A).
23
B. Duns Scoti: Ordinatio, prolog., pars prima:
. . . dubium quoad ista propria, vel abducunt
illum in errorem.
Quod apparet de
proprietatibus
primae
substantiae
immaterialis in se; proprietas enim eius est
quod sit communicabilis tribus; sed effectus
non ostendunt istam proprietatem, quia non
sunt ab ipso in quantum trino. Et si ab
effectibus arguatur ad causam, magis
deducunt in oppositum et in errorem, quia in
nullo effectu invenitur una natura nisi in uno
supposito1. Proprietas etiam istius naturae
ad extra est contingenter causare; et ad
oppositum huius magis effectus ducunt, in
errorem, sicut patet per opininem
philosophorum,
ponentium
primum
necessario causare quiquid causata. De
proprietatibus etiam aliarum substantiarum
patet idem, quia . . .
De Necessitate Doctrinae Revelatae
. . . doubtful in regard to those proper
(objects), and/or lead it away into error.
Which appears from the properties of the
first immaterial Substance in Itself; for Its
property is that It be communicable to the
Three; but the effects do not show this
property (of God), because they are not from
Him inasmuch as (He is Triune). And if
from effects one argue to the cause, they
lead forth more unto the opposite and unto
error, because in no effect is there found one
nature except in one supposit.1 It is the
property of that Nature also to contingently
cause ad extra; and the effects of this lead
more toward the opposite, into error, just as
is clear through the opinion of the
philosophers, positing the First (Being) to
cause whatever it causes necessarily.a
Concerning the properties of the other
substances the same is also clear, because . .
.
a
Sequitur textus interpolatus: Diceret
philosophus ad istam rationem quod illud
quod est impossibile a nobis cognosci, non
est necesssarium a nobis cognosci; sed
impossibile est a nobis aliquam cognitionem
haberi
de
propriis
substantiarum
separatarum, sive per naturam sive per
infusione, nisi sicut modo habetur — et ideo
non est necesssarium scientiam infundi ad
cognitionem propriorum substantiarum
separatarum2.
a
There follows the interpolated text: A
philosopher would said to this reckoning that
that which is impossible to be cognized by
us, is not necessarily cognized by us; but it is
impossible that there by had by us any
cognition of the proper (objects) of separated
substances, either through nature or through
an infusion (of divine knowledge), unless
just as is had now — and for that reason it is
not necessary that science be infused for a
cognition of the things proper to separated
substances.2
1
Cf. Bonaventura, Sent. I d. 3. q. 4 arg. 2 in
opp. (I 76a). 2 Cf. Henricus Gand., Summa
a. 8 q. 2 arg. 1 (I f. 64F).
24
B. Duns Scoti: Ordinatio, prolog., pars prima:
. . . effectus magis ducunt in sempiternitatem
et
necessitatem
earum
quam
in
contingentiam et novitatem, secundum eos1.
Similiter videntur etiam philosophi ex
motibus concludere quod numerus illarum
substantiarum separatarum sit secundum
numerum motuum caelestium2. Similiter
quod istae substantiae sunt naturaliter beatae
et impeccabiles. Quae omnia sunt absurdaa.
. . . the effects lead more unto their
sempiternity and necessity than unto their
contingency and novelty, according to them
[cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book XII, t. 4250].1 Similarly the philosophers also seem
to conclude from the motions (of the
heavens) that the number of those separated
substances is according to the number of
celestial movements [cf. Averroes, in h. 1;
Epitome on the Books of Metaphysics, tr.
4].2 Similarly that those substances are
naturally blessed and impeccable [cf.
Avicenna, Metaphysics, Book IX, chs. 2, 3,
4; Metaphysics compendium, Book I, part 4,
tr. 1 ch. 1, and tr. 2, ch. 1]. All of which are
absurd.a
42.
[Instantia contra tertiam rationem
principalem] — Contra istam rationem
arguo quod quaecumque necessaria de
substantiis separatis cognoscantur a nobis
nunc per fidem sive per communem
revelationem, possint cognosci cognitione
naturali. Et hoc sicb: quorum necessariorum
cognoscimus terminos naturaliter, et illa
possumus naturaliter comprehendere; sed
omnium
necessariorum
revelatorum
terminos naturaliter cognoscimus; ergo etc.3
42. [Instances against the third principle
reason] — Against this reckoning of theirs
I argue that whatsoever necessaries
concerning separated substances may be
cognized by us now through faith or through
the common revelation, may be cognized by
natural cognition. And this (I prove) in this
manner:b we naturally cognize the terms of
these necessaries, and we can naturally
comprehend them; but we naturally cognize
the terms of all necessary revealed
(doctrines); ergo etc..3
43. Probatio maioris: illa necessaria sunt
mediata, aut immediata; si immediata, ergo
cognoscuntur
cognitis
terminis,
I
Posteriorum; . . .
a
Sequitur textus interpolatus: Item ex motu
caeli contingit angelos movere perpetuo4,
nec caelum possit esse maius, propter
laborem angeli moventis — ut si apponatur
una stella, non posset movere, etc.5
b
De Necessitate Doctrinae Revelatae
43. Proof of the major: those necessaries
are mediated, or not mediated; if not
mediated, therefore they are cognized when
their terms are cognized [cognitis terminis],
(as is had in) Posterior Analytics, Book I, [c.
3]
Textus a Duns Scotus signatur littera: e6.
1
Cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a. 25 q. 3 in
corp. (I f. 154H). 2 Cf. ibid. (f. 154H-I). 3
Cf. ibid. a. 13. q. 3 arg 2 (f. 91A). 4 Cf.
supra p. 24, 11-25,6. 5 Cf. Aristot., De caelo
II t. 3 (II c. 1, 284a 14-18). — Cf. Duns
Scotus, Lectura prol. N. 15. 6 Cf. supra p. 2,
16-3, 19.
a
There follows the interpolated text:
Likewise from the motion of the sky it
happens that Angels move it perpetually,4
nor could the sky be greater, on account of
the labor of the moving Angel — so that if it
approached a single start, it could not move,
etc..5
b
The text is marked by Duns Scotus with the
letter: e.6
25
B. Duns Scoti: Ordinatio, prolog., pars prima:
. . . si mediata, ergo cum possumus
cognoscere extrema, possumus concipere
medium inter illa. Et coniungendo illud
medium cum utroque extremo, aut habentur
praemissae mediatae, aut immediatae; si
immediatae, idem quod prius; si mediatae,
procedetur cognoscendo medium inter
extrema et coniungendo cum extremis,
quousque veniamus ad immediata. Ergo
tandem
deveniemus
ad
necessaria
immediata, quae intelligimus ex terminis ex
quibus sequuntur omnia necessaria mediata;
ergo illa mediata per immediata scire
poterimus naturaliter1.
De Necessitate Doctrinae Revelatae
. . . if mediated, therefore when we can
cognize the extremes, we can conceive the
means among them. And in conjoining that
mean with each extreme, either there are had
mediated premises, or not mediated ones; if
not mediated, the same as before; if
mediated, one proceeds by cognizing the
means among the extremes and by
conjoining it with the extremes, until we
come to the non mediated ones. Therefore
at last we shall come down to the necessary
non mediated ones, which we understand
from the terms from which all necessary
mediated ones follow;
therefore those
mediated through the non mediated we will
be able to know [scire] naturally.1
44.
Probatio minoris principalis, quia
habens fidem et non habens contradicentes
sibi invicem, non contradicunt de nominibus
tantum sed de conceptibus, sicut patet cum
philosophus et theologus contradicunt sibi
invicem de ista ‘Deus est trinus’, ubi non
tantum idem nomen sed eundem conceptum
unus negat et alius affirmat; igitur omnem
conceptum simplicem quem habet ille habet
iste2.
44. The proof of the minor of the principle,
that having faith and not having it contradict
one another, do not contradict (one another)
concerning only nouns, but concerning
concepts, just as is clear when the
philosopher and the theologian contradict
one another concerning this (doctrine) ‘God
is triune’, where not only the same noun but
the same concept the one denies and the
other affirms; therefore every simple
concept which the one has, the other has
(likewise).2
45. [Responsio ad instantiam] — Ad istud
respondeo. De substantiis separatis sunt
aliquae veritates immediatae. Accipio tunc
aliquam veritatem talem primam et
immediatam, et sit a. In illa includuntur . . .
45. [Response to the instance] — To this
(argument) I respond.
From separate
substances there are some immediate truths.
I accept next that some such truth (is) first
and immediate, and let it be (called) a. In
that there are included . . .
1
Cf. Henricus Gand., Quodl. VIII q. 14 in
corp. (f. 325K). 2 Cf. Henricus Gand.,
Summa a. 13 q. 3 ad 3 (I f. 92L).
26
B. Duns Scoti: Ordinatio, prolog., pars prima:
. . . multae veritates mediatae, puta omnes
quae enuntiant particulariter communia ad
praedicatum de communibus ad subiectum;
dicantur b, c. Ista vera mediata non habent
evidentiam nisi ex aliquo mediato. Igitur
non sunt natae sciri nisi ex isto immediato
intellecto. Si igitur aliquis intellectus possit
intelligere terminos b et componere eos ad
invicem, non autem possit intelligere
terminos a nec per consequens ipsum a, b
erit intellectui suo propositio neutra, quia
nec nota ex se nec ex immediata, quia illa,
per positum, non est nota. Ita est de nobis,
quia conceptus quosdam communes
habemus de substantiis materialibus et
immaterialibus, et illos possumus ad invicem
componere; sed istae complexiones non
habent evidentiam nisi ex veris immediatis
quae sunt de illis quiditatibus sub ratione
earum propria et speciali, sub qua ratione
non concipimus illas quiditates, et ideo nec
scimus illas veritates generales de
conceptibus generalibus.
De Necessitate Doctrinae Revelatae
. . . many mediate truths, such as all those
which enunciate in particular those common
to the predicate from those common to the
subject; let them be called b, c. Those
mediated true (propositions) are not evident
[non habent evidentiam] except from some
mediated one. Therefore they are not bound
to be known [scire] except from that one
mediated having been understood.
If
therefore any intellect can understand the
terms of b and compose them one with
another, it cannot however understand the
terms of a nor consequently a itself, b will
be to its understanding a neutral proposition,
because it is neither made known [nota] of
itself nor from what is immediate, because
that, through what is posited, is not known.
Thus it is concerning us, because we have
certain common concepts concerning
material and immaterial substances, and
those we can compose one with another; but
those combinations of these are not evident
except from the non mediated true
(propositions), which concerning those
quiddities under a proper and special
reckoning of them, under which reckoning
we do not conceive those quiddities, and for
that reason neither do we know [scimus]
those general truths concerning general
concepts.
46. Exemplum: si impossibile esset alicui
concipere triangulum sub propria ratione,
posset tamen abstahere a quadrangulo
rationem figurae et eam concipere,
impossibile esset etiam sibi concipere . . .
46. An example: if it were impossible for
anyone to conceive a triangle under its
proper reckoning, he could nevertheless
abstract from a quadrangle the reckoning of
the figure (of a triangle) and conceive it,
(and) it would be also impossible for him to
conceive . . .
27
B. Duns Scoti: Ordinatio, prolog., pars prima:
. . . primitatem ut est propria passio trianguli,
qiua sic non concipitur nisi ut abstahitur a
triangulo;
posset
tamen
primitatem
abstrahere ab aliis primitatibus, put in
numeris. Isteintellectus licit posset formare
compositionem hanc ‘aliqua figura est
prima’, quia terminos eius potest
apprehendere, tamen illa compositio formata
erit sibi neutra, quia ista est mediata, inclusa
in ista immediata ‘triangulus est sic primus’;
et quia hanc immediatam non potest
intelligere, quia nec terminos eius, ideo non
potest mediatam scire, quae ex hac
immediata trantum habet evidentiam.
De Necessitate Doctrinae Revelatae
. . . its primacy as the proper passion of the
triangle, because it is not conceived in this
manner except as abstracted from the
triangle; nevertheless he could abstract the
primacy from the other primacies, such as in
numbers. This intellect of his though it
could form this composition ‘some figure is
first’, because it could apprehend the terms
of this, nevertheless that formed composition
will be for it neutral, because it is mediated,
enclosed in that immediate (composition)
‘the triangle is in this manner first’; and
because he cannot understand this
immediate (composition), because (he can)
neither (understand) the terms of it, for that
reason he cannot know a mediated one,
which is only evident from this immediate
one.
47. Per hoc ad argumentum1:
nego
maiorem; ad probationem2 dico quod illa
necessaria sunt mediata. — Et cum dicis
‘igitur possumus concipere medium inter
extrema’, nego consequntiam, quia medium
inter extrema quandoque est essentialiter
ordinatum, puta quod quid est alterius
extremi3 vel passio prior respectu passionis
posterioris; et tale est medium ad
universaliter concludendum extremum de
extremo. Concedo igitur quod quicumque
potest intelligere extrema, potest intelligere
tale medium inter extrema, quia intellectus
eius includitur in altero extremo vel est idem
alteri. Si autem medium sit particulare,
contentum sub altero extremo . . .
47. Through this to the argument:1 I deny
the major; for a proof2 I say that those things
necessary are mediated. — And when you
say ‘therefore we can conceive the means
between the extremes’, I deny the
consequence, because the mean between the
extremes, whenever it is essentially ordered,
such as that which belongs to the other
extreme3 and/or the prior passion in respect
to that of the posterior passion; and such is
the means to conclude universally an
extreme from an extreme.
I concede,
therefore, that whosoever can understand the
extremes, can understand such a mean
between the extremes, because the
understanding of it is included in the other
extreme and/or is the same as that of the
other.
But if the mean be particular,
contained under the other extreme . . .
Cf. supra n. 42. — Cf.Henricus Gand.,
Summa a. 13 q. 3 ad 2 (I f. 92H). 2 Cf. supra
n. 43. 3 Cf. Aristot., Anal. Post. II c. 9 [t.
10] (II, c. 10, 94a 11-14); c. 16 [t. 25] (c. 17,
99a 3-4); c. 17 [t. 25] (c. 17 99a 21-22).
1
28
B. Duns Scoti: Ordinatio, prolog., pars prima:
. . . et non essentialiter inter extrema, tunc
non oportet quod potens concipere extrema
generalia,
possit
concipere
medium
particulare ad illa extrema. Ita est hic. Nam
quiditas sub ratione propria et particulari
habens passionem aliquam immediate sibi
inhaerentem, est medium inferius ad
conceptum communem de quo dicitur illa
passio in communi concepta; et ideo non est
medium univeraliter inferens passionem de
communi, sed tantum particulariter. Hoc
patet in exemplo illo1, quia non oportet quod
potens concipere figuram in communi et
primitatem in communi, possit concipere
triangulum in particulari, quia triangulus est
medium, contentum sub figura; medium,
inquam, ad concludendum primitatem de
figura particulariter.
De Necessitate Doctrinae Revelatae
. . . and not essentially between the
extremes, then it is not opportune that the
one with the power [potens] to conceive the
general extremes, be able to concept the
particular mean as regards those extremes.
Thus is it here. For quiddity under a proper
and particular reckoning, having itself some
inherent passion immediately, is an inferior
means to the common concept of which that
passion is said to have been conceived in
common; and for that reason it is not a
means universally inferring ‘passion’ from
the common (concept), but only particularly.
This is clear in that example,1 because it is
not opportune that one with the power to
conceive a figure in common and its
primacy in common, be able to conceive a
triangle in particular, because a triangle is a
means, contained under figure; a means, I
say, to conclude the primacy from the figure
in particular.
48. Haec tertia ratio2 potissime concludit de
prima substantia immateriali, quia eius
tamquam objecti beatifici potissime est
cognitio necessaria. Et tunc responsio ad
obiectionem3 contra ipsam:
supponit
videlicet quod naturaliter nunc non
concipimus Deum nisi in conceptu sibi
communi et sensibilibus, quod inferius in 1
quaestione distinctionis 3 exponetur4. Si
etiam negetur istud suppositum, adhuc
oportet dicere conceptum qui postest fieri de
Deo virtute creaturae esse imperfectum; qui
autem fieret virtute . . .
48. This third reason2 most ably concludes
from the first immaterial substance, because
to It as the Beatific Object belongs a
necessary cognition. And next the response
to the objection3 against it: suppose, let us
say, that we do not now naturally conceive
God except in His common concept and in
sensibles, which below in the first question
of Distinction 3 is explained.4 If this
supposition be also denied, still it is
opportune to say that the concept which can
be formed of God by virtue of the creature is
imperfect; but that which would be formed
by virtue . . .
1
Cf. supra n. 46. 2 Cf. supra n. 40. 3 Cf.
supra n. 42. 4 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I
d. 3 part 1 q. 1 n. [5-10].
29
B. Duns Scoti: Ordinatio, prolog., pars prima:
. . . ipsius essentiae in se, esset perfectus.
Sicut igitur dictum est de conceptu generali
et speciali1, ita dicatur secundum aliam
viam2 de perfecto conceptu et imperfecto.
De Necessitate Doctrinae Revelatae
. . . of the essence of it in itself, would be
perfect. Therefore, just as has been said
concerning the general and special concept,1
so may be said according to another way2
concerning the perfect and imperfect
concept.
49. [Quarta ratio principalis] — Quarto sic
arguitur: ordinatum ad aliquem finem ad
quem est indispositum, necesse est paulative
promoveri ad dispositionem illius finis;
homo ordinatur ad finem supernaturalem, ad
quem ex se est indispositus; igitur indiget
paulative disponsi ad habendum illum finem.
Hoc fit
per cognitionem
aliquam
supernaturalem imperfectam, qualis ponitur
necessaria; igitur etc.
49. [The fourth principle reason] — Fourth,
it is argued thus: it is necessary that (that
which has) been ordained to some end to
which it is indisposed, be moved forward
toward a disposition to its end little by little;
man is ordained to a supernatural end, to
which of himself he is indisposed; therefore
he needs to be disposed little by little to have
that end. This is done through some
imperfect, supernatural cognition, of the
kind that is reckoned [ponitur] as necessary;
therefore etc..
50. Si autem instetur quod agens perfectum
potest statim removere imperfectionem et
statim agere, respondeo: quod si posset de
potentia absoluta, tamen perfectius est
communicare creaturae activitatem respectu
suae perfectionis consequendae quam non
communicare; potest autem homo habere
aliquam
activitatem
respectu
suae
perfectionis finalis; igitur perfectius est quod
hoc sibi communicetur. Quod non potest
sine
aliqua
cognitione
imperfecta
praecedente illam cognitionem perfectam ad
quam finaliter ordinatur.
50. But if one insist that the perfect agent
can suddenly remove the imperfection and
act suddenly, I respond: that if it could (be
done) by an absolute power, nevertheless it
is more perfect to communicate to a creature
an activity in respect to its perfection to be
attained, which (it cannot under these
circumstances) communicate;
moreover
man can have some activity in respect to his
final perfection; therefore it is more perfect
that this be communicated to him.
Wherefore he cannot without some
imperfect cognition preceding that perfect
one to which he is finally ordained.
1
Cf. supra n 47. 2 sc. viam Henrici, cf.
Henricus Gand., Summa a. 13 q. 3 ad 2 (I f.
92H).
30
B. Duns Scoti: Ordinatio, prolog., pars prima:
51. [Quinta ratio principalis] — Quinto
arguitur sic: omne agens utens instrumento
in agendo, non potest per illud instrumentum
in actionem aliquam quae excedit naturam
illius instrumenti; lumen autem intellectus
agentis est instrumentum quo anima utitur
nunc in intelligendo naturaliter; igitur non
potest per illud lumen in aliquam actionem
quae excedat illud lumen. Sed illud de se est
limitatum ad cognitionem habitam per viam
sensitivam et viam sensuum; igitur anima
non potest in cognitionem aliquam quae non
potest haberi per viam sensus.
Sed
multorum aliorum cognitio est necesssaria
pro stato isto; ergo etc.
De Necessitate Doctrinae Revelatae
51. [The fifth principle reason] — Fifth, it
is argued thus [Henry of Gent, Summa, a. 3,
q. 4 in corp. (I f. 29P)]: every agent using an
instrument in acting, cannot (act) through
that instrument in any action which exceeds
the nature of that instrument; but the light of
the agent intellect is an instrument which the
soul uses now in understanding naturally;
therefore it cannot (act) through that light in
any action which exceeds that light. But that
(light) of itself is limited to the cognition had
through the sensitive way and through the
way of the senses; therefore the soul cannot
(use it) in any cognition which cannot be had
through the way of the senses. But the
cognition of many other things is necessary
for this (present) state (of man); ergo etc..
52. Haec ratio videtur concludere contra
eum qui fecit eam.
Secundum enim
deductionem istam lux increata non poterit
uti intellectu agente ut instrumento ad
cognitionem alicuius sincerae veritatis, quia
talis secundum eum non potest haberi via
sensuum, sine speciali illustratione. Et ita
sequitur quod in cognitione sincerae veritatis
lumen intellectus agentis nullo modo habeat
aliquam
actionem;
quod
videtur
inconveniens, quia ista actio est perfectior
omni intellectione: et per consequens illud
quod est perfectius in anima in quantum
intellectiva, debet concurrere aliquo modo
ad illam actionem.
52. This reason seems to conclude against
him who authored it. For according to that
deduction of his uncreated light will not be
able to use the agent intellect as an
instrument for the cognition of any sincere
truth, because such according to him [ibid.,
a. 1 q. 2, ad 1 in opp. et in corp. (f. 8S 4B8M); q. 3 in corp. (f. 9F-10G); a. 2 q. 1 in
corp. (f. 23B); a. 24, q. 8 ad 2 (f. 145R)]
cannot be had by way of the senses, without
a special illumination [illustratione]. And
thus it follows that in the cognition of
sincere truth the light of the agent intellect in
no manner has any action; which seems
inconvenient, because that action of it is
more perfect than every intellection: and
consequently that which is more perfect in
the soul inasmuch as (the soul is)
intellective, ought to concur in some manner
with that action.
31
B. Duns Scoti: Ordinatio, prolog., pars prima:
53. [Ad rationem quartam et quintam] —
Istae duae ultimae rationes1 non videntur
quam plurimum efficaces. Prima enim esset
efficax si esset probatum quod homo
ordinatur
finaliter
ad
cognitionem
supernaturalem (cuius probatio est pertinens
ad quaestiones de beatitudine2), et si cum
hoc ostenderetur cognitionem naturalem non
suficienter disponere pro statu isto ad
cognitionem supernaturalem consequendam.
Secunda ratio duo petit, scilicet aliquorum
cognitionem esse necesssariam quae non
possunt cognosci per viam sensuum, et quod
lumen intellectus agentis est ad talia
cognoscibilia limitatum.
53. [Reply to the fourth and fifth reasons]
— These last two reasons1 do not seem very
efficacious.
For the first would be
efficacious if it were proven that man is
ordained finally to a supernatural cognition
(the proof of which is pertinent to the
questions concerning beatitude),2 and if with
this there would be shown that a natural
cognition did not sufficiently dispose (man)
in this (present) state for the attainment of a
supernatural cognition. The second reason
begs two, namely, that there is a necessary
cognition of some things which cannot be
cognized through the way of the senses, and
that the light of the agent intellect is limited
to such cognizables.
54. Tres primae rationes3 probabiliores
apparent.
Quod autem nulla talis cognitio
necessaria ad salutem, proboa b:
De Necessitate Doctrinae Revelatae
54. The three first reasons3 appear more
probable.
sit
Moreover that no such cognition is
necessary for salvation, I prove (in this
manner):a b
Sequitur adnotatio Duns Scoti: ‘Pone,
aliquis non baptizatus’ etc., quaere supra ad
tale signum 0 ≠ 0 .4
b
Loco Quod (12) — probo (13) textus a
Duns Scoto cancellatus5: Sed contra hoc
posset sic argui rationec.
c
Loco Sed (16) — ratione (17) textus
interpolatus:
Sed contra conclusionem
principalem,
quod
scilicet
cognitio
supernaturalis non sit homini necessaria ad
salutem, posset sic argui.
a
a
There follows the note of Duns Scotus:
‘Posit someone not baptized’ etc., ask above
at such a sign 0 ≠ 0 .4
b
In place of Moreover that no such . . . I
prove (in this manner) there is this text
cancelled out by Duns Scotus:5 But against
this it could be argued by reason in this
manner.c
c
In place of But against this it could be
argued by reason in this manner there is this
interpolated text: But against the principle
conclusion, namely, that a supernatural
cognition be not necessary to man for
salvation, it could be argued in this manner.
1
Cf. supra n. 49. 51. 2 Cf. Duns Scotus,
Ordinatio VI Suppl., d. 49 q. 7 n. [2-7]. 3 Cf.
supra n. 13. 17. 40. 4 Idem signum repetit
supra ‘Pone’ (p. 33, 1). 5 Cancellatus virute
textus ‘Quod — probo’ (lin. 12-13).
32
B. Duns Scoti: Ordinatio, prolog., pars prima:
De Necessitate Doctrinae Revelatae
Pone, aliquis est non baptizatus: cum sit
adultus, non habeat aliquem docentem, habet
bonos motus quales potest habere,
conformes rationi rectae naturali, et caveat
illa quae ratio naturalis ostendit sibi esse
mala.
Posit ‘someone is not baptized’: since he is
an adult, he does not have any teacher, he
has good motives of the kind one can have,
conformable to right, natural reason, and he
is wary of those things which natural reason
shows him to be evil.
Licet Deus de lege communi talem visitaret,
docendo per hominem vel per angelum —
sicut cornelium visitavit — tamen pone quod
non docetur ab aliquo, ille salvabitur.
Similiter licet postea doceatur, tamen prius
est iustus, et ita dignus vita aeterna, quia per
bona velle praecedentia doctrinam meretur
gratiam qua est iustus1; et tamen non habet
theologiam, etiam quantum ad prima
credibilia,
sed
tantum
cognitionem
naturalem.
Ergo nihil theologiae est
simpliciter necessarium ad salutem.
Though God from the common law (of
nature) would visit such a one, by teaching
through a man and/or through an angel [Acts
10:1-48] — nevertheless posit that he is not
taught by anyone, (and that) he will be
saved. Similarly though afterwards he be
taught, nevertheless first he is just, and thus
worthy of eternal life, because through
willing the good (works) preceding doctrine
he merits the grace by which he is just;1 and
nevertheless he does not have theology, even
inasmuch as regards the first credibles, but
only a natural cognition. Therefore nothing
of theology is simply necessary for
salvation.
55. Posset dici quod ille per bona velle ex
genere meretur de congruo iustificari ab
originali, et Deus non subtrahit liberalitatis
suae munus2: ergo dat primam gratiam sine
sacramento, quia non est alligatus
sacramentis; gratia non datur sine habitu
fidei3; itaque habet habitum theologiae, licet
non possit in actum, sicut nec baptizatus nisi
intruatur.
Et licet non sit contradictio
gratiam dari . . .
55. It could be said that he through willing
good (works) merits out of a kind of de
congruo to be justified by the original (law
of nature), and God does not withdraw the
gift of His liberality:2 therefore He gives the
first grace without a Sacrament, because He
is not bound to the Sacraments; grace is not
give without the habit of faith;3 and thus he
has the habit of theology, though he cannot
(put it) into act, just as neither the baptized
unless he be instructed. And though it is not
a contradiction that grace be given . . .
1
Cf. Henricus Gand., Quodl. V q. 20 in
corp. (f. 195V-196V. 196Y. 196B-197B). 2
Cf. ibidem. 3 Cf. ibiden q. 21 arg. in opp. Et
in corp. (f. 197C. 198 H).
33
B. Duns Scoti: Ordinatio, prolog., pars prima:
. . . sine fide1, cum sint habitus distincti, et in
aliis potentiis2, tamen sicut in baptismo
ponitur simultas in infusione, ita propter
idem potest poni simultas in casu isto. Non
enim minus gratiosus est Deus illi quem
propter meritum de congruo iustificat sine
sacramento quam illi quem sine omni merito
proprio iustificat in susceptione sacramenti.
Itaque possibile est Deo de potentia absoluta
quemlibet salvare, et etiam facere quod
mereatur gloriam sine fide infusa si sine illa
det gratiam qua habens bene utatur quantum
ad velle quod potest habere secundum
naturalem rationem et fidem acquisitam, vel
sine omni acquisita si doctor desit, licet de
potentia ordinata non detur sine fidei habitu
praecedente, quia sine illa non ponitur gratia
infundi3; non propter indigentiam, quasi
gratia sine illa non sufficeret, sed propter
liberalitatem divinam quae totum reformat;
minus etiam perfecte esset homo dispositus
quantum ad assensum verorum quorumdam
sine fide infusa.
De Necessitate Doctrinae Revelatae
. . . without faith,1 since they are distinct
habits, and in other powers,2 nevertheless
just as in Baptism there is posited a
simultaneity in infusion, so on account of the
same a simultaneity can be posited in this
case. For no less gracious is God to him
whom on account of merit de congruo He
justifies without a Sacrament than to him
whom without any merit of his own He
justifies in undertaking a Sacrament. And
thus it is possible for God by His absolute
power to save anyone at all, and even to
decree [facere] that he merit glory without
infused faith if without that He gives the
grace by which he who has it uses it well as
much as regards the willing that one can
have according to natural reason and
acquired faith, and/or without any acquired
(faith) if a teacher is lacking, though by
ordinary power [potentia ordinata] it is not
given without the preceding habit of faith,
because without that there is not posited the
grace to be infused;3 not on account of
indigence, as if grace without that would not
suffice, but on account of the divine
liberality which reforms the whole (man);
even less perfectly would man be disposed
as much as regards the assent to certain
truths without infused faith.
56. Et sicut hic, ita dico proportionaliter de
habitu theologiae, qui perfectus exsistens
includit fidem infusam et acquisitam
articulorum et aliorum revelatorum a Deo in
Scriptura, ita quod non est tantum haec
infusa fides nec tantum illa acquisita sed
simul ambae. Est ergo necessaria theologia,
verum est loquendo de potentia ordinata et
loquendo de principaliori habitu sive priori
pertinente ad theologiam, qui scilicet est
fides infusa, et hoc generaliter, quantum ad
omnes; non sic quantum ad secundum
habitum . . .
56. And just as in this (argument), thus I say
proportionally concerning the habit of
theology, which when existing perfectly
[perfectus exsistens] includes infused faith
and that acquired from the articles and the
other things revealed by God in Scripture,
such that there is not only this infused faith
nor only that acquired but both together.
Theology, therefore, is necessary, but yet it
belongs to speaking from the ordinary power
and to speaking from the more principle
habit or the more prior pertaining to
theology, which, namely, is infused faith,
and this generally, as much as regards all
(habits); not so as much as regards the
second habit . . .
1
Cf. Henricus Gand., Quodl. V q. 21 in
corp. (f. 198H). 2 Cf. ibid. arg. in opp. et in
corp. (f. 197C. 198G-H). 3 Cf. ibid. in corp.
(f. 198H).
34
B. Duns Scoti: Ordinatio, prolog., pars prima:
. . . quem includit, qui est fides acquisita, sed
forte de necessitate ordinata est necessaria in
adulto potente habere doctorem et eum
intelligere, et hoc quantum ad aliquorum
generalium fidem acquisitam.
De Necessitate Doctrinae Revelatae
. . . which it includes, which is acquired
faith, perhaps from ordinary necessity it is
necessary in the adult able to have a teacher
and to understand him, and this as much as
regards the faith acquired from the other
general (sources).
[II. — Solutio Quaestionis]
[II. — Solution of the Question]
57. Ad quaestionem igitur respondeo, primo
distinguendo quomodo aliquid dicatur
supernaturalea.
Potentia enim receptiva
comparatur ad actum quem recipit, vel ad
agentem a quo recepit. Primo modo ipsa est
potentia naturalis, vel violenta, vel neutra.
Naturalis dicitur si natualiter inclinetur,
violenta
si
sit
contra
naturalem
inclinationem passi, neutra si neque
inclinetur naturaliter ad illam formam quam
recepit neque ad oppositam1. In hac autem
comparatione nulla est supernaturalis. Sed
comparando receptivum ad agens a quod
recipit formam, tunc est naturalitas quando
receptivum comparatur ad tale agens quod
natum est naturaliter imprimere talem
formam in tali passo, supernaturalitas autem
quando comparatur ad agens quod non est
naturaliter impressivum illius formae in illud
passum.
57. To the question, therefore, I respond,
first by distinguishing in what manner
anything be said (to be) supernatural.a For a
receptive power is compared to the act
which it receives, and/or to the agent from
which it receives. In the first manner it is a
natural power, either violent, or neutral. It is
said (to be) natural if it be inclined naturally,
violent if it be contrary to the natural
inclination of the patient [passi], neutral if it
be neither inclined naturally to that form
which it receives, nor to its opposite.1 But in
this
comparison
there
is
nothing
supernatural.
But by comparing the
receptive to the agent from which it receives
form, there is naturality when the receptive
is compared to such an agent which is bound
naturally to impress such a form in such a
patient, but supernaturality when it is
compared to an agent which is not naturally
impressive of that form in that patient.
58. Antequam haec distinctio ad propositum
applicetur,
contra
istud
arguitur
multipliciter: tam quod distinctio ‘naturalis’
et . . .
a
58. Before this distinction be applied to the
proposed (argument), it can be argued
against in a manifold manner: both because
the distinction of the ‘natural’ and . . .
Sequitur textus interpolatus: vide append.
A.
a
There follows the interpolated text
contained in appendix A.
1
De naturali, violento et neutro cf. Aristot.,
Physic. VI t. 67 (IV c. 8, 215a 1-6); De caelo
I t. 9-10 (I c. 2, 269a 7-15); De gener. et
corupt. II t. 43 (II c. 6, 333b 26-30); Eth. Ad
Nic. III c. 1 (III c. 1 1110a 1-4).
35
B. Duns Scoti: Ordinatio, prolog., pars prima:
. . . ‘violenti’ sumitur ex comparatione passi
ad agens et non tantum ex comparatione eius
ad formam, quam quod distinctio ‘naturalis’
et ‘supernaturalis’ sumatur ex comparatione
passi ad formam et non tantum ex respectu
eius ad agens1.
Quae argumenta non
2
ponuntur hic .
De Necessitate Doctrinae Revelatae
. . . of the ‘violent’ is taken from a
comparison of the patient to the agent and
not only from the comparison of it to the
form, and that the distinction of the ‘natural’
and ‘supernatural’ be taken from a
comparison of the patient to the form and
not only from its respect [ex resepectu] to
the agent.1 Which arguments are not posited
here.2
59. Sed solutio rationabilis apparet, quia
illud est per se causa alicuius, quo posito,
circumscripto vel variato quocumque alio,
sequitur effectus3. Nunc autem licet forma
contra quam inclinatur receptivum non
inducatur nisi per agens violentans passum,
nec agens supernaturale agat supernaturaliter
nisi inducendo formam, tamen per se ratio
‘violenti’ est ex habitudine passi ad
formam4, et per se ratio ‘supernaturalis’ est
ex habitudine passi ad agens5. Probatur,
quia passo et forma manentibus in sua
ratione (puta quod forma sit receptibilis,
contra
tamen
inclinationem
passi),
quomodocumque varietur agens, passum
violenter recipit6; similiter, passo et agente
sic se habentibus quod solum agens non
naturaliter activum transmutet passum
(solum, inquam, ita quod agens naturale non
disponat), quamcumque formam inducet erit
supernaturalis respectu passi7.
59. But the solution appears reasonable,
because it is a per se cause of something,
whereby when posited, circumscribed and/or
varied in any other manner, the effect
follows.3 But now though the form against
which the receptive (being) is inclined is not
induced except through the agent violating
the patient, and (though) the supernatural
agent does not act supernaturally except in
inducing the form, nevertheless the
reckoning of ‘violent’ per se is from the
habit of the patient to the form,4 and the
reckoning of ‘supernatural’ per se is from
the habit of the patient to the agent.5 This is
proven, because with the patient and the
form being maintained in their reckoning
(such that the form be receivable,
nevertheless against the inclination of the
patient), in whatsoever manner the agent be
varied, the patient violently receives;6
similarly, with the patient and agent holding
themselves thus that only the non naturally
active agent transmutes the patient (only, I
say, such that the natural agent doest not
dispose it), whatever form it induce shall be
supernatural in respect to the patient.4
1
Cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a. 19 q. 3 ad 1
(I f. 76C-D). 2 Ponuntur in Duns Scotus,
Ordinatio IV d. 43 q. 4 n. [4-5]. 3 De causa
per se et per accidens cf. Aristot., Physic. II
t. 32-33 (II c. 3, 195a 27-195b 3); t. 59 (c. 5,
196b 24-29): « Sicut enim et quod est, aliud
quidem per seipsum est, aliud autem
secundum accidens, sic et causam contingit
esse: ut domus quidem per seipsam causa
esse aedificativa, secundum accidens autem
album aut musicum. Per se quidem igitur
causa finita est, secundum accidens autem
infinita: infinita autem uni accidunt ». 4 Cf.
Duns Scotus, Ordinatio IV d. 43 q. 4 n. [4].
5
Cf. ibid. n. [5]. 6 Cf. ibid. n. [4]. 7 Cf. ibid.
n. [5].
3
Concerning per se and per accidens causes
cf. Aristot., Physic. II t. 32-33 (II c. 3, 195a
27-195b 3); t. 59 (c. 5, 196b 24-29): « For
just as also that which it is, is one thing
indeed through its very self, another
however accidentally [secundum accidens],
so also does it happen that a cause is: as the
house indeed (happens) to be through its
very self an edifying cause, but accidentally
flat-white and decorative [musicum].»
36
B. Duns Scoti: Ordinatio, prolog., pars prima:
Hoc sic probatur secundo quia non tantum in
‘induci’ sed in ‘permanere’: aliqua forma
violenter permanet in passo sine actione
extrinseca licet non diu, aliqua naturaliter et
diu; aliqua manet naturalis, aliqua
supernaturalis, propter agens tantum, ita
quod circumscribendo agens a quo fit non
posset dici supernaturalis; posset autem dici
naturalis,
quia
perficit
naturaliter,
comparando formam ad receptivum tantum1.
De Necessitate Doctrinae Revelatae
Thus it is proved second that not only (is it
supernatural) in ‘being induced’ but in
‘perduring’ [permanere]: one form violently
perdures in a patient without extrinsic action
though not for long, another naturally and
for a long time; one remains [manet] natural,
another supernatural, on account of the agent
only, so that by circumscribing the agent by
which it comes to be it could not be called
supernatural; but it could be called natural,
because it perfects naturally, in comparing
the form to the recipient only.1
60. Ad propositum igitur applicando, dico
quod comparando intellectum possibilem ad
notitiam actualem in se nulla est sibi
cognitio supernaturalis, quia intellectus
possibilis quacumque cognitione naturaliter
perficitur et ad quamcumque cognitionem
naturaliter inclinatur. Sed secundo modo
loquendo2, sic est supernaturalis quae
generatur ab aliquo agente quod non est
natum movere intellectum possibilem ad
talem cognitionem naturaliter.
60. By applying, therefore, (this) to the
proposed (argument), I say that by
comparing the possible intellect to the actual
knowledge [notitiam] in itself it has no
supernatural cognition, because the possible
intellect is naturally perfected by any
cognition whatsoever and
is naturally
inclined to any cognition whatsoever. But
speaking in the second manner,2 thus it is a
supernatural which is generated by any agent
which is not bound to move the possible
intellect to such a cognition naturally.
61.
Pro statu autem isto, secundum
Philosophum, intellectus possibilis natus est
moveri ad cognitionem ab intellectu agente
et phantasmate, igitur sola illa cognitio est ei
naturalis quae ab istis agentibus imprimitur.
61. But for this (present) state, according to
the Philosopher [Aristotle, De anima, Book
III, t. 2-3. 18. 30. 39], the possible intellect
is bound to be moved to cognition by the
agent intellect and the fantasy, therefore that
cognition alone is natural to it which is
impressed by those agents.
Virtute autem istorum potest haberi omnis
cognitio incomplexi quae secundum legem
communem habetur a viatore, sicut patet in
instantia3
contra
rationem
tertiam
principalem. Et ideo licet Deus possit per
revelationem
specialem
cognitionem
alicuius incomplexi causare, . . .
Moreover in virtue of these every cognition
of the non-complex can be had which
according to the common law (of nature) is
had by the wayfarer, just as it clear in the
instance3 against the third principle reason.
And for that reason though God can through
a special revelation cause a non-complex
cognition of anything, . . .
1
Cf. Duns Scotus, Ordinatio IV d. 43 q. 4 n.
[4]. 2 Cf. supra n. 57. 3
37
B. Duns Scoti: Ordinatio, prolog., pars prima:
De Necessitate Doctrinae Revelatae
. . . sicut in raptu, non tamen talis cognitio
supernaturalis est necessaria de lege
communi.
. . . as in rapture, nevertheless such a
supernatural cognition is not necessary from
the common law (of nature).
62. De complexis autem veritatibus secus
est, quia, sicut ostensum est per tres primas
rationes
contra
primam
opinionem
1
adductas , posita tota actione intellectus
agentis
et
phantasmatum,
multae
complexiones remanebunt nobis ignotae et
nobis neutrae quarum cognitio est nobis
necessaria. Istarum igitur notitiam necesse
est nobis supernaturaliter tradi, quia nullus
earum notitiam potuit naturaliter invenire et
eam aliis docendo tradere, quia sicut uni ita
et cuilibet ex naturalibus erant neutrae2.
Utrum autem post primam doctrinae de
talibus traditionem possit alius ex
naturalibus assentire doctrinae traditae, de
hoc in III libro distinctione 23 3. Haec
autem prima traditio talis doctrinae dicitur
revelatio, quae ideo est supernaturalis, quia
est ab agente quod non est naturaliter
motivum intellectus pro statu isto.
62. But concerning complex truths it is
otherwise, because, just as has been shown
through the three first reasons brought
forward against the first opinion, with the
whole action of the agent intellect and
fantasies posited, many complex (truths) will
remain unknown [ignotae] to us and neutral
to us, whose cognition is necessary for us.
Therefore of these it is necessary that the
knowledge be handed on [notitiam . . . tradi]
to us supernaturally, because no one could
naturally find knowledge of them and by
teaching hand it on to others, because just as
they were neutral to one from natural causes
[ex naturalibus], so also to anyone.2 But
whether after the first tradition of the
doctrine of such (truths) another could from
natural (causes) assent to the doctrine
handed on, (more is said) of this in Book III,
Distinction 23.3 Moreover this first tradition
of such a doctrine is called revelation, which
for that reason is supernatural, because it is
from an agent which is not naturally motive
of the intellect in this (present) state.
63. Aliter etiam posset dici actio vel notitia
supernaturalis quia est ab agente supplente
vicem obiecti supernaturalis. Nam obiectum
natum causare notitiam huius ‘Deus est
trinus’, et similium, est essentia divina sub
propria ratione cognita; ipsa sub tali ratione
cognoscibilis est obiectum supernaturale4.
Quodcumque ergo agens . . .
63. In another manner it also could be called
a supernatural action and/or knowledge
because it is from an agent taking the place
[supplente vicem] of a supernatural object.
For the object bound to cause the knowledge
of this, (that) ‘God is triune,’ and of similar
(truths), is the Divine Essence cognized
under Its proper reckoning; That cognizable
under such a reckoning is the Supernatural
Object.4 Whatever agent, therefore, . . .
1
Cf. supra n. 13-18. 40-41. 2 Cf. Henricus
Gand., Summa a. 13 q. 3 in corp. (I f. 91B92F). 3 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ordinatio III
Suppl. D. 23 q. Unicus n. [4-5]. 4 Cf.ibid. I
d. 3 part 1 q. 2 n. [16].
38
B. Duns Scoti: Ordinatio, prolog., pars prima:
. . . causat notitiam aliquam veritatum quae
per tale obiectum sic cognitum natae essent
esse evidentes, illud agens in hoc supplet
vicem illius obiecti. Quod si ipsum agens
causaret
perfectam
notitiam
illarum
veritatum qualem obiectum in se cognitum
causaret, tunc perfecte suppleret vicem
obiecti; pro quanto imperfecta notitia quam
facit, virtualiter continetur in illa perfecta
cuius obiectum in se cognitum esset causa.
De Necessitate Doctrinae Revelatae
. . . causes some knowledge of truths which
through such an object cognized in this
manner would be bound to be evident, that
agent in this takes the place of that object.
Wherefore if that agent would cause the
perfect knowledge of those truths, it would
cause such an object in itself (to be)
cognized, then it would perfectly take the
place of the object; as much as it is
imperfect [pro quanto imperfecta] the
knowledge, that it does cause [facit], is
virtually contained in that perfect
(knowledge) of which the object cognized in
itself would be the cause.
64. Ita est in proposito. Nam revelans hanc
‘Deus est trinus’ causat in mente aliquam
notitiam huius veritatis, licet obscuram, quia
de obiecto sub ratione propria non cognito,
quod obiectum si esset sic cognitum, natum
esset causare perfectam et claram notitiam
illius veritatis. Pro quanto ergo est haec
notitia obscura et in illa clara includitur
eminenter, sicut imperfectum in perfecto,
pro tanto revelans hanc obscuram, vel
causans, supplet vicem obiecti, illius clarae
notitiae causativi, praecipue cum non possit
notitiam alicuius veritatis causare nisi ut
supplens vicem alicuius obiecti; nec
veritatem talium de isto obiecto notitiam
causare possit ut supplet vicem obiecti
alicuius
inferioris
naturaliter
motivi
intellectus nostri, . . .
64. Thus it is in the proposed (argument).
For the one revealing this (truth), ‘God is
triune,’ causes in the mind some knowledge
of this truth, obscure though (it be), that
concerns the object not cognized under its
proper reckoning, which object if it would
be cognized in this manner, would be bound
to cause a perfect and clear knowledge of
that truth. Therefore, just as much as this
knowledge is obscure and included
eminently in that clear (knowledge), as the
imperfect in the perfect, so much does the
one revealing this obscure (knowledge),
and/or causing it, take the place of the
object, causative of that clear knowledge,
especially since it could not cause
knowledge of any truth except as one taking
the place of another object; nor could it
cause the truth of such (aspects) of this
object to be known, as it takes the place of
any inferior object naturally motive of our
intellect, . . .
39
B. Duns Scoti: Ordinatio, prolog., pars prima:
De Necessitate Doctrinae Revelatae
. . . quia nullum tale virtualiter includit
aliquam notitiam veritatum illarum, nec
claram etiam nec obscuram; igitur oportet
quod in causando etiam illam obscuram
suppleat
aliqualiter
vicem
obiecti
supernaturalis.
. . . because no such (object) virtually
includes any knowledge of those truths,
neither clear nor even obscure; therefore it
is opportune that in causing even that
obscure (knowledge) it in some manner take
the place of the supernatural object.
65. Differentia istorum duorum modorum
ponendi supernaturalitatem notitiae revelatae
patet, separando unum ab alio. Puta, si
agens supernaturale causaret notitiam obiecti
naturalis, ut si infuderet geometriam alicui,
ista esset supernaturalis primo modo1, non
secundo2 (hoc esta utroque modo, quia
secundus infert primum licet non e
converso). Ubi autem est primus tantum, ibi
non est necesse quod sit supernaturalis quin
naturaliter possit haberi; ubi est secundus
modus, necessitas est ut supernaturaliter
habeatur, quia naturaliterhaberi non potest3.
65. The difference of those two manners of
positing the supernaturality of revealed
knowledge is clear, by separating the one
from the other.
For example, if a
supernatural agent would cause the
knowledge of a natural object, as if it would
infuse geometry into someone, that
(knowledge) would be supernatural in the
first manner,1 not in the second2 (that isa in
either manner, because the second infers the
first though not conversely). But where
there is only the first, there it is not
necessary that it be supernatural, if that
could be had naturally; where there is the
second manner, there is the necessity that the
supernatural be had, because it cannot be
had naturally.3
a
Loco hoc est textus interpolatus: sed si
aliqua est supernaturalis secondo modo,
supernaturalis estb.
b
Loco sed (14) — est (15) textus
interpolatus: si autem infunderet notitiam
huius ‘Deus est triunus’, vel similium, haec
supernaturalis esset.
a
1
b
In place of that there is the interpolated
text:
but if some (knowledge) is
supernatural in the second manner, it is
supernatural.b
Cf. supra n. 60. 2 Cf. supra n. 63. 3 Cf.
Henricus Gand., Summa a. 13 q. 3 ad 2 (I. F.
92H).
In place of this interpolated text, is this
other interpolated text: but if it would
infuse knowledge of this, ‘God is triune’,
and/or of similar things, this would be
supernatural.
40
B. Duns Scoti: Ordinatio, prolog., pars prima:
De Necessitate Doctrinae Revelatae
[III. — Circa Tres Rationes Principales
Contra Philosophos]
III. — About the Three Principle Reasons
against the Philosophers
66. Tres rationes quibus innititur ista solutio
confirmantur per auctoritates. Prima1 per
auctoritatem Augustini XVIII De civitate
cap. 11:* « Philosophi, nescientes ad quem
finem essent ista referenda, inter falsa quae
locuti sunt verum videre potuerunt »2 etc.
66. The three reasons by which this solution
of mine is hinted at are confirmed through
authorities. The first1 through the authority
of (St.) Augustine, De civitate Dei, Book
XVIII, ch. 11:*
« Philosophers, not
knowing to which end these would be
referred, could see a truth among the false
things which they spoke »2 etc..
67. Secunda3 confirmatur per Augustinum
XI De civitate cap. 2:+ « Quid prodest nosse
quo eundum sit, si ignoratur via qua eundum
sit? » In hoc errabant philosophi, qui etsi
aliqua vera de virtutibus tradiderunt, tamen
falsa miscuerunt, secundum auctoritatem
praecedentem Augustini4, et patet ex eorum
libris. Improbat enim Aristoteles politias a
multis aliis dispositas, II Politicae. Sed nec
ipsa politia Aristotelis est irreprehensibilis:
67. The second3 is confirmed through (St.)
Augustine, De civitate Dei, Book XI, ch. 2:+
« What profit is there to know where one is
to go, if one ignores the way by which one is
to go? » In this the philosophers used to err,
who, even if they handed on some truths
concerning the virtues, nevertheless mixed
in falsehoods, according to the preceding
authority from (St.) Augustine,4 even as is
clear from their books.
For Aristotle
disproves of the political theories [politias]
set forth by many others, in his Politics,
Book II. But neither is that political theory
of Aristotle irreprehensible:
* August., De civ. Dei XVIII, c. 41 n. 3 (PL
41, 602; CSEL XL pars II 334, 22-335, 3): «
Quidquid philosophi quidam inter falsa, quae
opinati sunt, verum videre potuerunt, et
laboriosis disputationibus persuadere moliti sunt
quod mundum istum fecerit Deus, eumque ipse
providentissimus administret, de honestate
virtutum, de amore patriae, de fide amicitae, de
bonis operibus atque omnibus ad mores probos
pertinentibus rebus, quamvis nescientes ad quem
finem et quonam modo essent ista omnia
referenda, propheticis, hoc est divinis vocibus,
quamvis per homines, in illa civitate populo
commendata sunt, non argumentationum
concertationibus inculcata; ut non hominis
ingenium, sed Dei eloquium contemnere
formidaret,
qui
illa
cognosceret
».
* August., De civ. Dei XVIII, c. 41 n. 3 (PL
41, 602; CSEL XL pars II 334, 22-335, 3): «
Whatever truth certain philosophers could see
among the falsehoods, which they opined, they
also struggled to persuade (others of) by
laborious disputations: that God made this
world of ours, and that He administered it most
providently, of the honesty of the virtues, of the
love of one’s country, of the faith of friendship,
of good works and all things pertaining to
approved morals, although not knowing to which
end and whither now all those things would be
referred, (these truths) were committed to the
care of the people in that city as prophecies, that
is as from divine voices, although (they came)
through men, not inculcated by the conferences
of argumentation; so that one would not dare to
contemn, not the genius of men, but the speech
of God, who knew these things ».
+
August., De civ. Dei XI, c. 2 (PL 41, 318;
CSEL XL pars I 513, 12-15): « Quoniam si
inter eum qui tendit et illud quo tendit via media
est, spes est perveniendi; si autem desit aut
ignoretur qua eundum sit, quid prodest nosse
quo eundum sit? »
1
Cf. supra n. 13-16. 2 Cf. etiam Henricus
Gand., Summa a. 7 q. 6 in corp (I f. 55 O). 3
Cf. supra n. 11-18. 4 Cf. supra n. 66;
August., De civ. Dei XVIII c. 41 n. 2 (PL
51, 601; CSEL XL pars II 334, 1-2): « Ubi
etsi aliqua vera dicebantur, eadem licentia
dicebantur et falsa ».
+
August., De civ. Dei XI, c. 2 (PL 41, 318;
CSEL XL pars I 513, 12-15): « Since if
between him who tended and that by which he
tended there is a middle way, there is hope of
arriving; but if there is lacking or is ignored that
by which one must go, what profit is there to
know where one must go?»
41
B. Duns Scoti: Ordinatio, prolog., pars prima:
. . . VII enim Politicae cap. 7* docet deos
esse honorandos (« Decet enim », inquit, «
honorem exhibere diis »), et ibidem cap. 5 «
lex nullum orbatum » tradit « nutrire »!
De Necessitate Doctrinae Revelatae
. . . for in Politics, Book VII, ch. 7* he
teaches that the gods are to be honored («
For it is fitting », he says, « to show honor to
the gods »), and in the same place, ch. 5, he
hands down « the law to nurture no one
orphaned »!.
68.
Tertia ratio1 confirmatur per
Augustinum XI De civitate cap.3: « Ea
quae remota sunt a sensibus nostris,
quoniam testimonio nostro scire non
possumus, aliorum testimonio requirimus »2.
Et hoc confirmat totam solutionem
principalem3. Quia enim complexiones illae
de quibus argutum est4 nobis ex se neutrae
sunt, nullus potest testimonio suo credere de
ipsis, sed oportet testimonium supernaturale
requirere alicuius superioris tota specie
humana.
68. The third reason1 is confirmed through
(St.) Augustine, De civitate Dei, Book XI,
ch. 3: « Those things which are removed
from our senses, since we cannot know them
by our own testimony, we require the
testimony of others ».2 And this confirms
the whole principle solution.3 For because
those complex (truths) concerning which it
was argued by us are of themselves neutral,
no one can on his own testimony believe
(anything) concerning them, but it is
opportune that one require supernatural
testimony of anyone superior to the whole
human species.
69. Qualiter autem prima traditio sive
revelatio talis doctrinae potuerit fieri et facta
fuerit, dubium est, — an scilicet locutione
interiore, an exteriore, cum aliquibus signis
adhibitis, sufficientibus ad causandum
assensum; ad propositum sufficit, quod
utroque modo . . .
69. But in what manner the first tradition or
revelation of such doctrine could come about
and was made, there is a doubt, — whether,
namely, by an interior locution, or an
exterior one, with any employed signs,
sufficient to cause assent; for the proposed
argument it suffices that in each manner . . .
* Aristot., Polit. VII [c. 16] (eta c. 16,
1335b 19-25): « De reservatione autem et
alimento genitorum sit lex: nullum orbatum
nutrire.
Propter multitudinem autem
puerorum ordo gentium prohibet nihil
reservari genitorum.
Oportet enim
determinatam essse multitudinem puerorum
procreationis; si autem aliquibus fiant
propter hoc combinatis [plures pueri],
antequam sensus insit et vita, fieri oportet
aborsum ».
* Aristotle, Politics, Book VII [ch. 15] (eta
ch. 16, 1335b 19-25):
« But of the
reservation and nutrition of offspring let
there be this law: to nourish no one
orphaned.
Moreover on account of a
multitude of children the order of the nations
prohibits that none of the offspring are to be
saved. For it is opportune that the multitude
of children to be born [procreationis] be
determined; but if any come to be by any
(parents), before they partake of [insit] sense
and life, it is opportune that they be
terminated [aborsum].
1
Cf. supra n. 40-41. 2 Cf. etiam Henricus
Gand., Summa a. 13 q. 3 in corp. (I f. 91C).
3
Cf. supra n. 57-65. 4 Cf. supra n. 40-41;
cf. etiam n. 62.
42
B. Duns Scoti: Ordinatio, prolog., pars prima:
De Necessitate Doctrinae Revelatae
. . . potuit supernaturaliter talis doctrina
revelari1, sed neutro modo sine errore potuit
ab homine tradi primo2.
. . . such a doctrine could be supernaturally
revealed,1 but in neither manner without
error could it be handed on by the first man.2
70. Contra istas tres rationes simul instatur
quod seipsas destruant, quia quod ostenditur
esse necesssario cognoscendum, hoc
ostenditur esse verum, quia nihil scitur nisi
verum3; ergo quiquid istae rationes
ostendunt necessarium esse cognosci (puta
quod fruitio Dei in se est finis hominis,
quoad primam4, — via deveniendi ad ipsam,
est merita quae Deus acceptat ut digna tali
praemio, quoad secundam5, — quod Deus
est trinus et contingenter causat, et
huiusmodi, quoad tertiam6), totum illud
ostenditur esse verum. Vel igitur istae
rationes non sunt nisi ex fide, vel ex ipsis
concluditur oppositum illius quod probant.
70.
Against these three reasons it is
simultaneously insisted that they destroy
themselves, because that which is shown to
be to be cognized necessarily, this is shown
to be true, because nothing is known unless
(it be) true;3 therefore whatever these
reasons show to be necessary to cognize (for
example that the fruit of God is in itself the
end of man, as regards the first,4 — the way
of coming to that, is the merits which God
accepts as worthy of such a reward, as
regards the second,5 — that God is triune
and contingently causes, and (is) of this
kind, as regards the third),6 the whole of this
is shown to be true. Therefore, these reasons
are not but from the faith [ex fide], and/or
from them the opposite of that which they
prove is concluded.
71. Respondeo: naturali ratione ostenditur
necessarium esse scire alteram partem
determinate huius contradictionis ‘fruitio est
finis, fruitio non est finis’, hoc est, quod
intellectus non est mere dubius vel neuter in
hoc problemate ‘an fruitio sit finis’, quia
talis dubitatio vel ignoratia impediret
inquisitionem finis; non autem ostenditur . . .
71. I respond: by natural reason it is shown
that it is necessary to know the other part of
this contradiction, ‘the fruition (of God) is
the end, the fruition (of God) is not the end’,
in a determinate manner, that is, that the
intellect is not merely doubtful and/or
neutral in this problem ‘whether or not
fruition be the end’, because such a doubting
and/or ignorance would impede the seeking
out the end [inquisitionis finis]; moreover it
is not shown . . .
1
Cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a. 14 q. 1 ad 1
(I. F. 100H). 2 Cf. ibid. a. 8 q. 4 in corp. (f.
66C-67F). 3 Cf. Aristotle, Anal. Poster. I c.
2 [t. 5] (I c. 2, 71b 25-26): « Verum quidem
igitur oportet esse, quoniam non est scire
quod non est »; August., De diversis quaest.
83 q. 9 (PL 40, 13): « nihil percipi potest nisi
quod a falso discernitur ». — Cf. Henricus
Gand., Summa a. 1 q. 1 arg. 2 (f. 1A); q. 2 in
corp. (f. 4C); q. 12 in corp. (f. 22L). 4 Cf.
supra n. 13-16. 5 Cf. supra n. 40-41.
3
Cf. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, I, c. 2 [t.
5] (I c. 2, 71b 25-26): « Truly indeed, it is
therefore opportune that it be, since there is
no knowing that which is not »; (St.)
Augustine, De diversis quaest. 83, q. 9 (PL
40, 13): « nothing can be perceived except
that which is discerned from the false ».
43
B. Duns Scoti: Ordinatio, prolog., pars prima:
. . . naturali ratione quod haec pars sit
necessario cognoscenda.
Et hoc modo
rationes praedictae ut sunt naturales
concludunt de altera parte contradictionis,
hac vel illa; non determinate de hac nisi ex
creditis tantum1.
. . . by natural reason that this part is to be
cognized necessarily. And in this manner
the aforesaid reasons, as they are natural,
conclude concerning the other part of the
contradiction, the former or the latter [hac
vel illa]; not in a determinate manner
concerning the former except (in) as much
as from things believed.1
[IV. — Ad Argumenta Philosophorum]
72.
Ad argumenta2 pro opinione
Aristotelis3. Ad primum4 dico quod cognitio
dependet ab anima cognoscente et obiecto
cognito5, quia secundum Augustinum, IX De
Trinitate cap. Ultimo, « a cognoscente et
cognito paritur notitia »6. Licet igitur anima
habeat sufficiens activum et passivum intra
pro quanto actio respectu cognitionis
convenit animae, tamen non habet sufficiens
activum intra se pro quanto actio convenit
obiecto, quia sic est ut tabula nuda, ut dicitur
III De anima*7. Est igitur intellectus agens
quo est omnia facere, verum est in quantum
‘factio’ respectu cognitionis convenit
animae, non in quantum obiectum est
activum.
73. Ad confirmationem8 rationis.
maiorem dico quod natura . . .
De Necessitate Doctrinae Revelatae
IV. Regarding the Arguments of the
Philosophers
72. Regarding the arguments2 on behalf of
the opinion of Aristotle.3 Regarding the
first4 I say that cognition depends upon the
cognizing soul and the cognized object,5
because according to (St.) Augustine, De
Trinitate, Book IX, last chapter, [ch. 12, n.
18] « from the cognizing and the cognized is
born knowledge [notitia] ».6 Therefore,
though the soul may have a sufficient active
and passive (intellect) within (itself) as much
as the action in respect to cognition is fitting
[convenit] to the soul, nevertheless it does
not have a sufficient active (intellect) within
itself as much as the action is fitting to the
object, because in this manner it is as a blank
tablet [tabula nuda], as is said in De anima,
Book III.*7 Therefore it is the agent intellect
by which it is that it does all, however (this)
is inasmuch as the ‘doing’ in respect to
cognition is fitting to the soul, not inasmuch
as the object is active.
Ad
* Aristot., De anima III t. 14 (III, c. 4, 429b
30-430a):
« potentia quodammodo est
intelligibilia intellectus, sed actu nihil
antequam intelligat. Oportet autem sic, sicut
in tabula nihil est actu scriptum: quod
quidem accidit in intellectu ».
1
Cf. supra n. 12. 2 Cf. supra n. 6-11. 3 Cf.
supra p. 5, 2-6. 4 Cf. supra n. 6. 5 Cf. Duns
Scotus, Ordinatio I d. 3 pars 3 q. 2 n. [29];
Quodl. Q. 15 n. [7]. 6 Cf. Henricus Gand.,
Summa a. 40 q. 7 in corp. (I f. 259H); Quodl
V q. 14 in corp. (f. 175C). 7 Cf. Henricus
Gand., Summa a. 1 q. 10 arg. 1 in opp. (f.
19E). 8 Cf. supra n. 7.
73. For the confirmation8 of the reckoning.
Regarding the major, I say that nature . . .
* Aristotle, De anima, Bk. III, t. 14 (III, c.
4, 429b 30-430a): « the power in a certain
manner is an understanding of intelligibles,
but in act (is) nothing before it understands.
Moreover, it is opportune (that it act) in this
manner, just as on a tablet there is nothing
actually written: which indeed happens in
the intellect ».
44
B. Duns Scoti: Ordinatio, prolog., pars prima:
. . . quandoque accipitur pro principio
intrinseco motus vel quietis — prout
describitur II Physicorum* — quandoque
pro principio activo naturaliter, prout natura
distinguitur contra artem sive contra
propositum propter oppositum modum
principiandi, sive sit intrinsecum sive non,
dummodo sit naturale1. Primo modo maior
non est vera, quia non correspondet omni
passivo naturaliter principium activum
intrinsecum quod sit natura, quia multa sunt
naturaliter receptiva alicuius actus, cuius non
habent principium activum intrinsecum.
Secundo etiam modo propositio maior est
falsa in quibusdam, quando videlicet natura
propter sui excellentiam ordinatur natualiter
ad recipiendum perfectionem ita eminentem,
quae non possit subesse causalitati agentis
naturalis secundo modo. Ita est in proposito.
De Necessitate Doctrinae Revelatae
. . . whenever it is accepted as and intrinsic
principle of motion and/or resting — insofar
as it is described in Physics, Book II* —
whenever as a naturally active principle,
insofar as nature is distinguished against art
or against a proposition for the sake of the
opposite manner of beginning (the
argument), or (insofar as nature) be intrinsic
or not, so long as it be natural.1 In the first
manner the major is not true, because there
does not correspond to every passive
(power) a naturally active, intrinsic principle
which is of the nature, because there are
many, naturally receptive of some act, of
which they do not have an intrinsic, active
principle. In the second manner, also, the
major of the proposition is false on certain
points [in quibusdam], when, namely, the
nature on account of its own excellence is
ordained naturally to receive a perfection so
eminent, that it cannot be subject [subesse]
to the causality of a natural agent in the
second manner. Thus it is in the proposed.
74. Cum probatur maior2, dico quod
potentia passiva non est frustra in natura,
quia etsi per agens naturale non possit
principaliter reduci ad actum, tamen potest
per tale agens dispositio ad ipsum induci, et
potest per aliquod agens in natura — id est
tota coordinatione essendi vel entium —
puta per agens primum vel supernaturale
complete reduci ad actum.
74. When the major is proven,2 I say that a
passive power is not in nature as a trick
[frustra], because even if through a natural
agent it cannot be reduced principally to act,
nevertheless a disposition to it can through
such an agent be induced, and it can through
any agent in nature — that is by an entire
coordination of being and/or of beings
[essendi vel entium] — for example as (it
can) through a prime and/or supernatural
agent completely be reduced to act.
75. Et si obicitur quod istud vilificat
naturam quod ipsa non possit . . .
* Aristot., Physic. II t. 3 (II c. 1, 192b 2023): « Est igitur natura principium alicuius et
causa movendi et quiescendi in eo in quo est
primum et per se, et non secundum accidens »; t.
11 (193b 31-33): « Sicut enim ars dicitur quod
est secundum artem et artificiosum, sic et natura
quod secundum naturam dicitur et quod naturale
»; t. 49 (c. 5, 196b 17-22): « Eorum autem quae
fiunt, alia quidem propter hoc fiunt, alia quidem
non. Horum autem alia quidem secundum
propositum, alia vero non secundum propositum,
ambo autem sunt in his quae sunt propter hoc . . .
Sunt autem propter hoc quaecumque ab
intellectu utique aguntur et quaecumque a natura
».
75. And if it be objected that this vilifies
nature because it cannot . . .
* Aristotle, Physics Bk. II, t. 3 (II c. 1, 192b
20-23): « Nature, therefore, is a principle of some
and a cause of moving and of resting in that in which
it is first and per se, and not according to accident »;
t. 11 (193b 31-33): « For just as art it said (to be) that
which is according to art and artifice, so also nature is
said (to be) that which (is) according to nature and
that which is natural »; t. 49 (c. 5, 196b 17-22): «
Moreover of these which come to be, some indeed
come to be on account of this, other indeed not so.
But of these some indeed according to the proposed,
but others not according to the proposed, however
both are among these which are on account of this . . .
But there on account of this whatever are indeed done
by the intellect and whatever by nature ».
1
Cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a. 1 q. 4 ad 1
et q. 6 in corp. (f. 13G. 16C). 2 Cf. supra n.
7.
45
B. Duns Scoti: Ordinatio, prolog., pars prima:
. . . consequi perfectionem suam ex
naturalibus1, cum natura minus deficiat in
nobilioribus, ex II De caelo et mundo,
respondeo: si felicitas nostra consisteret in
speculatione suprema ad qualem possumus
nunc naturaliter attingere, non diceret
Philosophus
naturam
deficere
in
necessariis2. Nunc autem illam concedo
posse haberi naturaliter, et ultra, dico aliam
eminentiorem posse recipi naturaliter. Igitur
in hoc magis dignificatur natura, quam si
suprema sibi possibilis poneretur illa
naturalis; nec est mirum quod ad maiorem
perfectionem sit capacitas passiva in aliqua
natura quam eius causalitas activa se
extendat.
De Necessitate Doctrinae Revelatae
. . . arrive at its own perfection out of (its)
natural (powers),1 since nature is less
deficient in those things more noble, from
(Aristotle’s) De caelo et mundo, Bk. II [t.
50], I respond: if our felicity would consist
in a supreme speculation to which we can
now naturally attain, the Philosopher would
not say that nature was deficient in things
necessary [Aristotle, De anima, Bk. III, t. 45
(III, ch. 9, 432b 21-22)].2 But now I
concede that it can be had naturally, and
beyond this, I say that another more eminent
one can be naturally received. Therefore in
this nature is more dignified, than if the
supreme possible to it would be posited as
that natural one; nor is it to be wondered at
that there be a passive capacity in any nature
for a greater perfection than (that to which)
its active causality extends itself.
76. Illud quod adducitur de II Caeli et
mundi non est ad propositum, quia
Philosophus loquitur ibi de organis
correspondentibus potentiae motivae si ipsa
inesset stellis. Et concedo quod universaliter
cui datur potentia quae nata est esse
organica, ei datur a natura organum, in nonorbatis dico. Sed in proposito data est
potentia, sed non organica; non tamen data
sunt naturaliter omnia alia praeter potentiam
concurrentia ad actum. A Philosopho . . .
76. That which is adduced concerning De
caelo et mundo, Bk. II, does not regard the
proposed
(argument),
because
the
Philosopher speaks there of organs
corresponding to motive power, if that be in
the stars. And I concede that universally
that to which is given a power which is
bound to be organic, is given by nature an
organ, (that is) I say in those not deprived
(of organs). But in the proposed a power has
been given, but not an organic one;
nevertheless not all the other things, besides
the power, concurrent to the act have been
given naturally. From the Philosopher . . .
1
Cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a. 1 q. 2 in
corp. (I f. 4B). 2 Cf. ibid. q. 4 ad 2 (f. 13H).
46
B. Duns Scoti: Ordinatio, prolog., pars prima:
. . . igitur ibi haberi potest quod natura
ordinabilis ad aliquem actum vel obiectum
naturaliter habet potentiam ad illud, et
organum si potentia est organica; sed non sic
de posterioribus requisitis ad actum1.
De Necessitate Doctrinae Revelatae
. . . therefore, in that passage [ibi] there can
be understood that nature ordainable to some
act and/or object naturally has a power for
that, and an organ, if the power is organic;
but not so concerning the posterior things
required to act [ad actum].1
77. Aliter posset dici ad maiorem2 quod ipsa
est vera loquendo de potentia passiva
naturali ut passiva comparatur ad activam,
non autem ut passiva comparatur ad actum
receptum. Differentia membrorum patet in
principio solutionis istius quaestionis3.
77.
In another way it could be said
regarding the major2 that it itself is true
speaking of the passive, natural power as
passive compared to the active, not however
as passive compared to the act received.
The difference of the members is clear in the
beginning of the solution of that question.3
78. Minor4 autem est vera secundo modo,
non primo modo5. Posset etiam tertio modo
faciliter dici ad minorem, negando, quia licet
absolute intellectus possibilis sit naturaliter
receptivus talis intellectionis, non tamen pro
statu isto. De causa autem huius dicetur
inferius distinctione 36.
78. The minor,4 however, is true in the
second manner, not so in the first manner.5
It could also in a third manner be easily said
regarding the minor, by denying, that though
absolutely the possible intellect is naturally
receptive of such intellection, (it is) not,
however, so in this (present) state. But one
will speak of the cause of this below in
distinction 3.6
79.
Ad rationem tertiam7 quaere
responsionem Thomae in Summa, I parte
Summae quaestione 1 [a. 1 ad 2 (IV 7ab)],
ubi respondet sic, quod . . .
79. Regarding the third7 reason seek the
response of (St.) Thomas in the Summa, the
First part of the Summa, question 1 [a. 1 ad
2 (IV 7ab)], where he responds in this
manner, that . . .
1
Cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a. 24 q. 1 in
corp. (I f. 137E). 2 Cf. supra n. 7. 3 Cf.
supra n. 57. 4 Cf. supra n. 7. 5 Cf. supra n.
57. 6 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I d. 3 pars
1 q. 2 n. [16]; q. 3 n. [2. 25-26]; cf. etiam
Quodl. q. 14 n. [10-12]. 7 Cf. supra n. 8.
47
B. Duns Scoti: Ordinatio, prolog., pars prima:
. . . « diversa ratio cognoscibilis diversitatem
scientiarum inducit.
Eandem enim
conclusionem demonstrat astrologus per
medium mathematicum, id est a materia
abstractum, (puta quod terra est rotunda), et
naturalis per medium circa materiam
consideratum.
Unde nihil prohibet de
eisdem rebus de quibus philosophicae
disciplinae tractant secundum quod sunt
cognoscibilia lumine rationis naturalis etiam
aliam scientiam tractare secundum quod
cognoscuntur lumine divinae revelationis ».*
De Necessitate Doctrinae Revelatae
. . .« a diverse reckoning of the cognizable
induces a diversity of sciences. For the
same conclusion does the astrologer
demonstrate through the medium of
mathematics, which is abstracted from
matter, (for example that the Earth is round),
and the physicist [naturalis] through the
medium concerned with matter. Whence of
these same subjects [rebus] of which the
philosophical disciplines treat according to
which they are cognizable by the light of
natural reason, nothing prohibits that another
science also treat according to which they
are cognized by the light of divine revelation
».*
Contra: si de cognoscibilibus in theologia
est cognitio tradita vel possibilis tradi in aliis
scientiis, licet in alio lumine, ergo non est
necessaria cognitio theologica de eisdem.
Consequentia patet in exemplo eius, quia
cognoscens terram esse rotundam per
medium physicum, non indiget cognitione
per medium mathematicum, tamquam
simpliciter necessaria.
On the Contrary: if of cognizables in
theology there is a cognition handed down
and/or able to be handed down in other
sciences, though under another light,
therefore a theological cognition of them is
not necessary. The consequence is clear in
his example, because the one cognizing that
the Earth is round through the medium of
physics, does not need the cognition through
the medium of mathematics, as (something)
necessary simply speaking.
80.
Dicta tamen responsio ad tertium
exponitur sic, quod scilicet . . .
* (St.) Thomas, Summa theologiae I-II q. 54
a. 2 in corp. (VI 342ab): « Respondeo
dicendum quod habitus et est forma
quaedam, et est habitus.
Potest ergo
distinctio habituum secundum speciem
attendi aut secundum communem modum
quo formae specie distinguuntur, aut
secundum proprium modum distinctionis
habituum. Distinguuntur siquidem formae
ad invicem secundum diversa principia
activa »; ibid. ad 2 (VI 343ab): « Ad
secundum dicendum quod terram esse
rotundam per aliud medium demonstrat
naturalis, et per aliud astrologus: astrologus
enim hoc demonstrat per media mathematica
. . . naturalis vero hoc demonstrat per
medium naturale . . . Tota autem virtus
demonstrationis . . . dependet ex medio. Et
ideo diversa media sunt sicut diversa
principia activa, secundum quae habitus
scientiarum diversificantur ».
80. Nevertheless the response given to the
third (reason) is expounded in this manner,
that, namely . . .
* (St.) Thomas, Summa theologiae I-II q. 54
a. 2 in corp. (VI 342ab): « I respond, that it
must be said, that a habit is both a certain form, and is
a habit. There can be, therefore, a distinction of
habits according to the species to be attained or
according to the common manner by which forms are
distinguished by species, or according to the proper
manner of the distinction of habits. If indeed the are
distinguished as forms according to diverse active
principles »; ibid. ad 2 (VI 343ab): « To the second it
must be said ‘that the Earth is round’ the physicist
demonstrates through one medium, and the astrologer
through another: for the astrologer demonstrates this
through the media of mathematics . . . but the
physicist demonstrates this through the medium of
nature [medium naturale] . . .Moreover, the whole
virtue of demonstration . . . depends on the medium.
And for that reason the diverse media are as diverse,
active principles, according to which the habits of the
sciences are diversified ».
48
B. Duns Scoti: Ordinatio, prolog., pars prima:
. . . habitus et est habitus et est forma; in
quantum habitus, habet distinctionem ab
obiecto, sed in quantum forma, potest
distingui a principio activo. Respectu autem
habitus scientifici principia sunt causae
effectivae. Licet igitur ubi est idem scibile
(puta quod terra est rotunda) non sit
distinctio per obiecta, tamen est distinctio
per principia quibus mathematicus et
physicus hoc ostendunt: et ita erit distinctio
habituum in quantum sunt formae et non in
quantum sunt habitus.
De Necessitate Doctrinae Revelatae
. . . a habit is both a habit and is a form;
inasmuch as a habit, it has its distinction
from its object, but inasmuch as a form, it
can be distinguished by its active principle.
Moreover, in respect to scientific habits the
principle are the effective causes. Therefore,
though where there is the same knowable
(for example that the Earth is round) there
may not be a distinction (of sciences)
through objects, nevertheless there is a
distinction through the principles by which
the mathematician and the physicist
[physicus] show this: and thus there will be
a distinction of habits inasmuch as they are
forms and not inasmuch as they are habits.
81. Contra: forma est communis ad
habitum; sed impossibile est aliqua esse
distincta in ratione superioris et indistincta in
ratione inferioris; ergo impossibile est aliqua
esse distincta per rationem formae unde
forma et tamen esse indistincta in ratione
habituum (hoc enim esset ac si aliqua essent
distincta in ratione animalis et indistincta in
ratione hominis). Praeterea, supponit etiam
quod principia sunt distinctiva habitus in alio
genere causae quam ut principia effectiva,
quod falsum est, quia si aliquam rationem
causae distinctivae habeant ad habitus, non
habent rationem nisi causae efficientis.
Praeterea,
semper
stat
ratio
quia
quantumcumque possent poni habitus
distincti cognitivi, tamen non salvatur
necessitas unius, quasi alias cognitio sit
impossibilis, ponendo possibilitatem alterius
habitus undecumque distincti.
82. On the contrary: form is common to
habit; but it is impossible that there be some
distinct according to the reckoning of
(something)
superior
and
indistinct
according to the reckoning of (something)
inferior; therefore it is impossible that there
be some distinct through a reckoning of the
form from which the form (came to be) and
nevertheless that there be (some) indistinct
according to the reckoning of habits (for this
would be as if some were distinct according
to the reckoning of animal and indistinct
according to the reckoning of man).
Besides, it also supposes that principles are
distinctive of a habit in some genus of cause
rather than as effective principles, which is
false, because if distinctive causes have any
reckoning according to habit, they do not
have a reckoning except as an efficient
cause.
Besides, the reckoning always
remains the same [stat], because however so
much there can be posited distinct, cognitive
habits, nevertheless the necessity of one is
not saved, by positing the possibility of
another habit whence-so-ever [undecumque]
distinguished.
49
B. Duns Scoti: Ordinatio, prolog., pars prima:
82. Ideo ad argumentum respondeo quod in
illis scientiis speculativis etsi tractetur de
omnibus speculabilibus, non tamen quantum
ad omnia cognoscibilia de eis, quia non
quantum ad propria eorum, sicut patuit prius
in tertia ratione1 contra primam opinionem
(quaere supra g2).
82. For that reason I respond to the
argument that in those speculative sciences
even if one treats of all things able to be
speculated [speculabilibus], nevertheless not
as much as regards all things cognizable
from them, because not as much as regards
what are proper to them, just as was clear
before in the third reason1 against the first
opinion (see above g).2
83. Ad quartum3 respondetur sic, quid
principia prima non possunt applicari ad
conclusiones aliquas nisi sensibiles: tum
quia termini eorum sunt abstracti a
sensibilibus, et ita sapiunt naturam eorum,
tum quia intellectus agens, per quem debet
fieri applicatio, limitatur ad sensibilia.
83. To the fourth3 one responds in this
manner [Henry of Ghent, Summa, a. 3, q. 4,
ad 1], that the first principles cannot be
applied to any conclusions except sensible
ones:
both because their terms are
abstracted from sensibles, and thus known
their nature, and because the agent intellect,
through which the application ought to come
to be, is limited to sensibles.
84.
Contra: certum est intellectui ista
prima principia esse vera non tantum in
sensibilibus, sed etiam in insensibilibus; non
enim dubitat magis intelletus quod
contradictoria non sunt simul vera de
immateriali quam de materiali. Et quod
dicitur quod terminus primi principii est ens
quod divitur in decem genera, et illud non
extendit se ad obiectum theologicum, hoc
nihil valet; non enim magis dubitamus quod
contradictoria non sunt simul vera de Deo
(ut quod Deus est beatus et non-beatus, et
huiusmodi) quam de albo.
1
Cf. supra n. 40-47.
Cf. supra n. 9.
2
Cf. supra p. 22, 22.
De Necessitate Doctrinae Revelatae
84. On the contrary: it is certain that for
the intellect those first principles are true not
only among sensibles, but also among
insensibles; for the intellect does not doubt
more
that
contradictories
are
not
simultaneously true of the immaterial than of
the material. And because it is said [ibid., a.
24, q. 6 in corp.] that the terminus of the first
principle is the ‘being’ which is divided in
the ten genera, and that it does not extend
itself to the theological object, this has no
value; for we do not doubt more that
contradictories are not simultaneously true
of God (such as that God is blessed and nonblessed, and (statements) of this kind), than
of (the color) white.
3
50
B. Duns Scoti: Ordinatio, prolog., pars prima:
85. Alia datur responsio, quod ex solis
maioribus non sequutur conclusiones, sed
cum minoribus adiunctis; nunc autem
minores non sunt naturaliter manifestae quae
deberent illis adiungi1.
De Necessitate Doctrinae Revelatae
85. Another response is given, that from
only the majors (of arguments) do
conclusions follow, but with the minors
adjoined; but now the minors are not
naturally manifested which ought to be
adjoined to them.1
Contra: minores summendae sub primis
principiis praedicant de sumptis ‘sub’
terminos subiectos primorum principiorum;
sed notum est terminos primorum
principiorum dici de quocumque, quia sunt
communissimi; igitur etc.
On the contrary: the minors to be taken up
under the first principles predicate the
subject terms of the first principles
concerning those (terms) assumed ‘under’
(them); but it is known that the terms of the
first principles are said of (anything)
whatever, because they are most common;
therefore etc..
86. Ideo respondeo quod secunda pars
minoris est falsa, haec videlicet quod in
primis principiis ‘includuntur virtualiter
omnes conclusiones scibiles’2.
Ad
probationem dico quod sicut termini subiecti
sunt communes, ita et termini praedicati.
Quando igitur termini subiecti, quia
distribuit, accipiuntur pro omnibus, non
accipiuntur pro omnibus nisi respectu
terminorum
praedicatorum
qui
sunt
communissimi, et per consequens virtute
talium principiorum non sciuntur de
inferioribus nisi praedicata communissima3.
86. For that reason I respond that the second
part of the minor is false, this, namely, that
in the first principles ‘are included virtually
all knowable conclusions’.2 For the proof
(of which) I say that just as the terms of a
subject are common, so also the terms of the
predicate. Therefore when the terms of the
subject, that distributes, are accepted for all,
they are not accepted for all except in
respect to the terms of predicates which are
most common, and consequently in virtue of
such principles there are not known (any
conclusions) of inferiors except the most
common predicates.
87. Hoc patet ratione, quia medium non
potest esse ‘propter quid’ respectu alicuius
passionis nisi quae passio includitur
virtualiter in ratione illius medii; in ratione
autem subiecti principii communissimi non
includitur ‘propter quid’ aliqua passio
particularis,
sed
tantum
passio
communissima; ergo illud subiectum non
potest esse medium vel ratio cognoscendi
aliqua nisi sub illa ratione communissima. . .
.
87. This is clear by the reckoning, that a
medium cannot be ‘propter quid’ in respect
to any passion except the passion which is
included virtually in the reckoning of that
medium; but in the reckoning of the subject
of the most common principle there is not
included ‘propter quid’ any particular
passion, but only the most common passion;
therefore that subject cannot be a medium
and/or reason for cognizing anything except
under that most common reckoning. . . .
1
Cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a. 9 q. 3 arg 1
(I f. 72O); Hervaeus Natalis, Sent. Prol. Q. 1
in corp. (2va). 2 Cf. supra n. 10. 3 Cf. supra
n. 11.
51
B. Duns Scoti: Ordinatio, prolog., pars prima:
Sed praeter passiones communissimas sunt
multae aliae passiones scibiles, ad quas
passiones non possunt passiones primorum
principiorum esse media, quia non includunt
illas. Igitur multae sunt veritates scibiles
quae non includuntur in primis principiis.
De Necessitate Doctrinae Revelatae
But besides the most common passions there
are many other knowable passions,
regarding which passions there cannot be
passions that are media of the first
principles, because they do not include them.
Therefore there are many knowable truths
which are not included in the first principles.
Hoc patet in exemplo, quia ista ‘omne totum
est maius sua parte’ etsi includat istam
‘quaternarius est maior binario’, et alias
similes de eodem praedicato, non includit
tamen istas: ‘quaternarium est duplus ad
binarium’, ‘ternarius se habet in proportione
sexquialtera ad dualitatem’, nam ad ista
praedicata oporteret quod habet specialia
media includentia ipsa.
This is clear in the example, because this
‘every whole is greater than its part’ even if
it includes this other ‘a four-fold (number) is
greater than a two-fold’, and others similar
concerning the same predicate, it does not
include, however, theses: ‘a four-fold is
double the binary,’ ‘a three-fold holds itself
in a one-and-a-half proportion to a duality,’
for regarding these predicates it would be
opportune that one have a special means
including them.
88. Tertia probatio1, logica, est quia licet
contingat
descendere
sub
subiecto
universalis affirmativae, non tamen sub
praedicato; multa autem praedicata contenta
sub praedicatis primorum principiorum sunt
scibilia de inferioribus ad subiecta illorum;
igitur illa praedicata per prima principia non
sciuntur de illis subiectis.
88. The third proof,1 the logical one, is that
though it happens to descend under the
subject of a universal affirmative, not
however under a predicate; moreover many
predicates contained under the predicates of
the first principles are knowable from
inferiors as their subjects; therefore those
predicates are not known through the first
principles concerning these subjects.
89. Contra istud obicitur: ‘de quolibet
affirmatio vel negatio et de nullo eodem
ambo’2; sequitur ‘igitur de hoc album vel . . .
89. Against this it is objected: ‘concerning
anything (there is) an affirmation or [vel]
negation and concerning nothing (there is) in
the same manner both’;2 there follows
‘therefore of this (one says that it is) white
or [vel]. . .
1
Prima n. 86, secunda n. 87. 2 Aristot.,
Topic. VI c. 7 (Z c. 6, 143b 15-16): « de
omni aut affirmatio aut negatio vera est»;
Anal. Post. I c. 11 [t. 27] (I c. 11, 77a 30):
«Omne autem affirmare aut negare »; De
interpr. I [c. 6] (c. 9, 18a 28-29): « In his
ergo et quae sunt et quae facta sunt, necesse
est affirmationem vel negationemm veram
vel falsam esse ». — Cf. Henricus Gand.,
Summa a. 1 q. 12 in corp. (I f. 22L).
2
Aristotle, Topics VI ch. 7 (Z ch. 6, 143b
15-16): « concerning everything, either the
affirmation or [aut] the negation is true »;
Posterior Analytics I ch. 11 [t. 27] (I ch. 11,
77a 30): «Moreover one is to affirm or [aut]
deny everything »; On interpretation I [ch.
6] (c. 9, 18a 28-29): « Among these,
therefore, both what is and what has been
made, it is necessary that the affirmation or
[vel] the negation be true or [vel] false ».
52
B. Duns Scoti: Ordinatio, prolog., pars prima:
De Necessitate Doctrinae Revelatae
. . . not white,’1 such that there it is allowed
to descend under the predicate and under the
subject.2
. . . non-album’1, ita quod licet ibi
descendere sub praedicato et sub subiecto2.
Respondeo: istud principium ‘de quolibet
affirmatio vel negatio’ etc., valet istam ‘de
quolibet cuiuslibet contradictionis altera pars
est vera et altera falsa’3, ubi est duplex
distributio, et sub utroque distributo licet
descendere
‘ergo
de
hoc
huius
contradictionis’ etc.; sed sub praedicato
stante confuse tantum non licet descendere,
quia non sequitur ‘de quolibet cuiuslibet
contradictionis altera pars, ergo haec pars’.
Ita est in aliis principiis; semper praedicatum
universalis affirmativae stat confuse tantum,
sive sint ibi duae distributiones in subiecto
sive una.
I respond: that principle ‘of anything (there
is) an affirmation or [vel] negation’ etc., is
equal to this [valet istam] ‘of anything one
part of whatever contradiction is true and the
other false,’3 where there is a two-fold
distribution, and under each distribute it is
allowed to descend ‘therefore of this (one
part) of this contradiction’ etc.; but under a
predicate remaining only in a confused
manner it is not allowed to descend, because
there does not follow ‘of anything the one
part of whatever contradiction, therefore this
part.’ Thus it is in the other principles; the
predicate of an universal affirmative always
remains only in a confused manner, either
there are there two distributions in the
subject, or one.
Et in proposito exemplo adhuc patet
propositum. Quia de homine scibile est
quod est risibilis, numquam per hoc
principium ‘de quolibet’ etc. potest plus
inferri nisi ‘igitur de homine risibile vel nonrisibile’.
Altera igitur pars praedicati
disiuncti numquam . . .
And in the proposed example the proposed
is still clear. Because concerning man it is a
knowable that he is risible, never through
this principle ‘of anything’ etc. can
(anything) be further inferred except
‘therefore concerning man (he is) risible or
[vel] not risible.’ Therefore one part of the
disjoined predicate is never . . .
1
Cf. Aristot., De interpr. I [c. 6] (c. 9, 18a
34-18b 5): « si omnis affirmatio vel negatio
vera vel falsa est, et omne necesse est vel
esse vel non esse . . . Nam si verum est
dicere quoniam est album vel non album,
necesse est album esse vel non esse . . Quare
necesse est aut affirmationem aut
negationem veram essse vel falsam »;
Metaphy. IV t. 15-16 (III c. 4, 1007b 291008a 25). 2 Cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a.
26 q. 2 arg. 1 (I f. 158L). 3 Cf. Aristot.,
Metaphy. IV t. 29 (III c. 8, 1012b 10-13): «
Est enim necesse contradictionis partem
alteram esse veram . . . Altera namque pars
contradictionis est falsa »; De interpr. I [c. 5]
(c. 7, 17b 26-28): «Quaecumque igitur
contradictionis
universalium
sunt
universaliter, necesse est alteram esse
veram, alteram falsam, et quaecumque in
singularibus sunt ».
1
Cf. Aristotle, On interpretation I [ch. 6]
(ch. 9, 18a 34-18b 5): « if every affirmation
or [vel] negation is true or [vel] false, it is
also necessary that everything be or [vel] not
be . . . For if it is true to say that it is white
or [vel] not white, it is necessary that it be
white or [vel] not be . . . Wherefore it is
necessary that either the affirmation or the
negation be true or [vel] false ». 3 Cf.
Aristotle, Metaphysics IV t. 29 (III c. 8,
1012b 10-13): « For it is necessary that one
part of a contradiction be true . . . For the
other part of the contradiction is false »; On
interpretation I [ch. 5] (c. 7, 17b 26-28): «
Whatsoever, therefore, belong to a
contradiction of universals universally, it is
necessary that one be true, the other false,
and whatsoever be among singulars ».
53
B. Duns Scoti: Ordinatio, prolog., pars prima:
. . . scietur de subiecto per hoc principium,
sed requiritur aliud principium speciale, ut
definitio subiecti vel passionis, quod quidem
est medium et ratio ad sciendum ‘risibile’
determinate de homine.
. . . known from the subject through this
principle, but another special principle is
required, such as the definition of the subject
and/or of the passion, which indeed is the
medium and the reason for knowing ‘risible’
in a determinate manner concerning man.
[V. — Ad Argumenta Principalia]
V. — Regarding the Principle Arguments
90.
Ad argumenta principalia. — Ad
primum1 distinguo de obiecto naturali.
Potest enim accipi obiectum natural vel pro
illo ad quod naturaliter sive ex actione
causarum naturaliter activarum potest
potentia attingere, vel pro illo ad quod
naturaliter inclinatur potentia, sive possit
attingere naturaliter illud obiectum sive non.
— Posset igitur maior negari intelligendo
‘naturale’ primo modo, quia obiectum
primum est adaequatum potentiae, et ideo
abstractum ab omnibus illis circa quae
potest potentia operari; non autem oportet
quod si intellectus possit naturaliter
intelligere tale commune, quod possit
naturaliter
intelligere
quodcumque
contentum sub illo, quia intellectio alicuius
contenti multo excellentior est intellectione
confusa talis communis; sic, concessa
minore2 in utroque sensu, conclusio intenta
non habetur, scilicet de naturaliter attingibili,
quia sic maior fuit falsa.
1
Cf. supra n. 1.
2
De Necessitate Doctrinae Revelatae
90. (Reply) to the principle arguments. —
Regarding the first1 I make a distinction
[distinguo] concerning the natural object.
For a natural object can be accepted [cf.
Henry of Ghent, Summa, a. 3 q. 4 ad 2] for
that to which naturally or from an action of
active causes naturally the power can attain,
and/or for that to which the power is
naturally inclined, or may be able to attain
naturally that object or not. — Therefore
the major could be denied by understanding
‘natural’ in the first manner, because the first
object is adequate to the power, and for that
reason abstracted from all those (things)
about which the power can operate; but it is
not opportune that if the intellect can
naturally understand such a common
(being), that it can naturally understand
whatever (is) contained under It, because the
intellection of anything contained (under It)
is much more excellent that a confused
intellection of such a common (object); in
this manner, having conceded the minor in
each sense, the intended conclusion is not
had, that is concerning the naturally
attainable, because in this manner the major
was false.
Cf. ibidem.
54
B. Duns Scoti: Ordinatio, prolog., pars prima:
91. Contra hanc responsionem arguo quod
destruit seipsam. Primum enim obiectum est
adaequatum potentiae, per ipsum, et verum
est, hoc est, quod nihil respicit potentia pro
obiecto nisi in quo est ratio illius primi, et in
quocumque est ratio illius primi illud respicit
potentia pro obiecto; igitur impossibile est
aliquid esse primum naturaliter quin sit
quodlibet contentum sic per se obiectum
naturaliter. Da enim oppositum, et tunc non
est adaequatum naturaliter sed excedens, et
aliquod eo inferius est adaequatum, et ita
primum.
De Necessitate Doctrinae Revelatae
91. Against this response I argue that it
destroys itself.
For the first object is
adequated to the power, through itself, and it
is true, that is, that the power regards
nothing as an object except that in which
there is a reckoning of that first (object), and
in whatsoever there is a reckoning of that
first one that the power regards as an object;
therefore it is impossible that anything be
first naturally that be not something
naturally contained in this manner as a per
se object. For grant the opposite, and then
there is no naturally adequated (object) but
(only) one exceeding (the power), and
anything inferior to it is adequated, and thus
(is) the first (object).
Ratio autem quae adducitur pro responsione1
fallit secundum figuram dictionis2. Licet
enim ens ut est quid intellligibile uno actu
(sicut
homo
est
intelligibilis
una
intellectione) sit naturaliter intelligibile (illa
enim unica intellectio entis ut unius obiecti
est naturalis), non tamen potest ens poni
primum obiectum naturaliter attingibile, quia
est primum obiectum ut includitur in
omnibus per se obiectis, et ut sic non est
naturaliter attingibile nisi quodlibet illorum
sit naturaliter attingibile. Commutat igitur
hic ‘hoc aliquid’ . . .
Moreover the reason which is adduced for
the response1 fails according to its form of
diction.2 For though ‘being’ as something
intelligible by one act (such as man is
intelligible by one intellection) is naturally
intelligible (for that unique intellection of
‘being’ as of one object is natural),
nevertheless ‘being’ cannot be posited as the
first, naturally attainable object, because the
first object is as included in all objects per
se, and such as this [ut sic] it is not naturally
attainable unless any of them is naturally
attainable. Therefore it commutes this ‘this
anything’ . . .
1
Cf. supra p. 54, 11-19. 2 Cf. Aristot.,
Soph. Elenchi. I c. 2 (c. 4, 166b 10-14):«
Quae autem secundum figuram sunt
dictionis, accidunt quando non idem
interpretatur similiter, ut masculinum
feminam, vel feminium masculinum, vel
quod inter haec est alterum horum; vel
responsum quale quantum, vel quantum
quale; vel facies patiens; vel dispositum
facere, et alia ».
2
Cf. Aristotle, Soph. Elenchi. I c. 2 (c. 4,
166b 10-14):« Moreover those (errors)
which are according to the form of diction,
happen when the same (term) is not
interpreted similarly, as (for example) the
masculine as the feminine, and/or the
feminine as the masculine, and/or that
among these there is another of them; and/or
the response ‘which as much’, and/or ‘as
much as which’; and/or ‘he will do it
suffering’; and/or ‘a disposed doing’, and
other (such) statements ».
55
B. Duns Scoti: Ordinatio, prolog., pars prima:
De Necessitate Doctrinae Revelatae
. . . in ‘quale quid’ cum arguit ‘ens est
naturaliter intelligibile, igitur ens ut est
primum obiectum intellectus, hoc est
adaequatum, est attingibile naturaliter’, quia
antecedens est verum ut ens est unum
singulare intelligibile, sicut album, sed
consequens concludit de ente ut includitur in
omni intelligibili, non ut seorsum ab illis
intelligitur.
. . . into ‘that something’ when it argues that
“‘being’ is naturally intelligible, therefore
‘being’ as it is the first object of the intellect,
that is adequate, is attainable naturally,”
because the antecedent is true as ‘being’ is
one singular intelligible, just as white (is),
but the consequent concludes concerning
‘being’ as included in every intelligible, not
as understood apart from them.
92.
Ad argumentum1 igitur est alia
responsio, realis, quod videlicet minor est
falsa de obiecto naturali, id est naturaliter
attingibili, — vera alio modo, ad quod
scilicet naturaliter inclinatur vel ordinatur
potentia2. Et ita debet intelligi auctoritas
Avicennae.
Quid autem sit ponendum
obiectum primum naturaliter attingibile, de
hoc infra distinctione 33.
Confirmatur
responsio per Anselmum De libero arbitrio
cap. 4:* « Nullam», inquit, « ut puto,
habemus potestatem, quae sola sufficiat ad
actum ». ‘Potestatem’ vocato quod nos
communiter vocamus ‘potentiam’4; patet per
exemplum eius de visu.+ Non est igitur
inconveniens potentiam esse naturaliter
ordinatam ad obiectum ad quod non potest
naturaliter ex . . .
92. Regarding the argument,1 therefore
there is another response, the real one, that
namely the minor is false concerning the
natural object, that is naturally attainable, —
true in the other manner, to which, that is,
the power is naturally inclined and/or
ordained.2 And thus ought the authority of
Avicenna be understood. Moreover that
one must posit a first, naturally attainable,
object, concerning this (more is said) below
in distinction 3.3 The response is confirmed
through (St.) Anselm, De libero arbitrio, ch.
4:* « No power, » he said, « as I think of it,
do we have, which alone suffices for an act
». ‘Power’ [potestatem] is called that which
we commonly call a ‘power or potency’
[potentiam];4 this is clear through his
example concerning sight.+
It is not,
therefore, inconvenient that a power is
naturally ordained to the object to which it
cannot naturally . . .
* Ansel., De libero arb. c. 3 (PL 158, 494;
ed. Schmitt I, 212): « Nullam namque
potestatem habemus, ut puto, quae sola sibi
sufficiat ad actum ».
* Anselm, De libero arbitrio, c. 3 (PL 158,
494; ed. Schmitt I, 212): « For no power do
we have, as I think of it, which alone
suffices for an act ».
+
Ibidem (ed. Schmitt I, 213): « Quod ut in
multis animadvertas, in uno tibi monstrabo:
Nullus visum habens dicitur nullatenus
posse videre montem ».
+
Ibid. (ed. Schmitt I, 213): « That which,
for example, you advert to in many things, I
will show you in one: No one having sight
is said to be able to no extent to see a
mountain ».
1
Cf. supra n. 1. 2 Cf. supra p. 54, 7-10. 3
Cf. Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I d. 3 pars 1 q. 3
n. [8-12]. 4 Cf. supra p. 19 nota 8.
56
B. Duns Scoti: Ordinatio, prolog., pars prima:
. . . causis naturalibus attingere, sicut
quaelibet ex se sola ordinatur et tamen non
potest sola attingere1.
De Necessitate Doctrinae Revelatae
. . . attain from natural causes, just as any
(power) is ordained alone of itself [ex se]
and nevertheless is not able alone to attain
(its object).1
93.
Ad secundum argumentum2 nego
consequentiam. — Ad probationem3 patet
ex dictis in responsione4 data ad secundum
argumentum pro opinione Philosophi, quia
superiora ordinantur ad perfectionem
maiorem passive recipiendam quam ipsa
active possunt producere, et per consequens
istorum perfectio non potest produci nisi ab
aliquo agente supernaturali. Non sic est de
perfectione inferiorum, quorum perfectio
ultima potest subesse actioni inferiorum
agentium.
93. Regarding the second argument2 I deny
the consequence. — For the proof (of
which)3 it is clear from what has been said in
the response4 given to the second argument
in favor of the opinion of the Philosopher,
that superiors are ordained to receive a
greater perfection passively than they can
actively produce, and consequently their
perfection cannot be produced except by
some supernatural agent. Not so is it
concerning the perfection of superiors, the
ultimate perfection of which can be under
the action of inferior agents.
94.
Ad tertium5 dico quod veritati
complexae
alicui
firmiter
tenendae
intellectus possibilis est improportionatus, id
est, non est proportionale mobile talium
agentium quae ex phantasmatibus et ex
lumine naturali intellectus agentis non
possunt cognosci.
94. Regarding the third5 I say that the
possible intellect is improportioned to any
complex truth that is to be firmly held, that
is, there is no mobile proportional of such
agents which cannot be cognized out of
fantasies and the natural light of the agent
intellect.
Quando arguis ‘ergo fit proportionalis per
aliud’6, concedo — et ‘per aliud’ in ratione
moventis, quia per movens supernatualerevelans assentit illi veritati, — et ‘per aliud’
in ratione formae, quia . . .
When you argue ‘therefore, let it be a
proportional through something else,’6 I
concede — both ‘through something else’ in
the reckoning of the one moving, because
through the one moving the supernaturalrevealer assents to that truth, — and
‘through something else’ in the reckoning of
form, because . . .
1
Cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a. 8 q. 2 in
corp. Et ad 4 (I f. 64H. 65Q). 2 Cf. supra n.
2. 3 Cf. ibidem. 4 Cf. supra n. 73-78. 5 Cf.
supra n. 3. 6 Cf. ibidem.
57
B. Duns Scoti: Ordinatio, prolog., pars prima:
. . . per illum assensum factum in ipso, qui
est quasi quaedam inclinatio in intellectu ad
istud obiectum, proportionans illum isti.
De Necessitate Doctrinae Revelatae
. . . through that assent wrought in this,
which is a certain quasi-inclination in the
intellect toward this object, proportioning it
to this.
Cum ultra de illo ‘alio’ quaeris ‘an sit
naturale vel supernaturale’, dico quod
supernatuale, sive intelligas de agente sive
de forma.
When beyond this ‘something else’ your ask
‘whether it be natural and/or supernatural,’ I
say that (it is) supernatural, understand it as
you may, of the agent or of the form.
Cum
infers
‘ergo
intellectus
est
improportionatus ad illud, et per aliud
proportionatur’, dico quod ex se est in
potentia oboedientiali ad agens1, et ita
sufficienter proportionatur illi ad hoc ut ab
ipso moveatur. Similiter, ex se est capax
illius assensus causati a tali agente, etiam
naturaliter capax2; non oportet igitur ipsum
per aliud proportionari ipsi assensui
recipiendo.
When one infers ‘therefore the intellect is
improportioned to it, and through something
else is proportioned (to it),’ I say that of
itself it is in an obediential potency to the
agent,1 and thus is sufficiently proportioned
to it for this that it be moved by it.
Similarly, of itself it is capable of that
assent caused by such an agent, even
naturally capable;2 it is not opportune,
therefore, that it be proportioned through
another by receiving that assent.
Statur igitur in secondo, non in primo3, quia
veritas ista revelata sufficienter non est
inclinativa intellectus ad assentiendum sibi,
et ita improportionale agens, et passum sibi
improportionale; sed agens supernaturale est
sufficienter inclinativum intellectus ad istam
veritatem, causando in ipso assensum quo
proportionatur huic veritati4, ita quod non
oportet intellectum per aliud proportionari
tali agenti, nec formae ab ipso impressae,
sicut oportet ipsum proportionari tali obiecto
per aliud duplici modo praedicto5.
(The truth of the proposition) stands in the
second (argument), not in the first, 3 because
that revealed truth is not sufficiently
inclinative of the intellect for it to assent by
itself, and thus (there is) an improportional
agent, and a patient improportional to itself;
but the supernatural agent is sufficiently
inclinative of the intellect to that truth, by
causing in it the assent whereby it is
proportioned to this truth,4, so that it is not
opportune that the intellect be proportioned
through something else to such an agent, nor
to a form impressed by it, just as it is
opportune that it be proportioned to such an
object through something else in the
twofold, aforesaid manner.5
1
Cf. Duns Scotus, Ordinatio III d. 1 q. 2 n
[7]; q. 4 n. [2]; Quodl. Q. 19 n. [15]. 2 Cf.
Henricus Gand., Summa a. 3 q. 5 ad 2 (I f.
30Y) 3 Cf. supra n. 3. 4 Cf. Henricus Gand.,
Summa a. 13 q. 3 in corp. (f. 91D-92D). 5
Cf. supra n. 94.
58