Instruction No. 2/2006
Preventive Measures against Crimes of Money Laundering
and Terrorist Financing
In exercising the power conferred by Article 4(3) of Administrative Regulation No.
34/2003, and based on the terms of Article 2(2) of Administrative Regulation No. 7/2006,
the Director of Gaming Inspection Coordination Bureau issued this Instruction.
Definitions:
Money laundering—the process adopted by criminals through which money or assets
obtained from criminal activities is concealed or disguised, so as to transform as being
originated from legitimate source.
Check—the order of payment, which includes personal checks, company checks, bank
checks, traveler’s checks, cashier orders and money orders.
Gaming credit—acquisition of chips or other instruments for gaming purposes for the
delay of payment as conforming to Law No. 5/2004.
Crime of money laundering—acquisition of money or assets classified as criminal acts
specified and punishable under Law No. 2/2006.
Crime of funding terrorism—supplying or gathering of funds totally or partially for the
practice of terrorist acts characterized and punishable as crime under Law No. 3/2006.
Gaming Inspection and Coordination Bureau (abbreviated as DICJ hereinafter) —
the authority for regulating and supervising the entities subjected to the Article 2(1)
paragraph 1 of Administrative Regulation No. 7/2006.
Follow-up and coordination personnel (“compliance officer”)—a staff with the
authority to follow up and coordinate, on a daily basis, concerning the fulfillment of
obligations pronounced by the legal provisions and regulations for preventing the crimes
of money laundering and terrorist financing.
Financial Intelligence Office (Gabinete de Informação Financeira—abbreviated as
GIF hereinafter) — the office established under Executive Ruling No. 227/2006 of
Chief Executive dated 7th of August, whose responsibilities include gathering and
analyzing information relating to the crimes of money laundering and terrorist financing,
and providing such information to the regulatory authority for preventing and suppressing
such crimes.
Gaming operations—legal operations of games of fortune, lotteries or mutual bets
authorized by the government of the Macao Special Administrative Region, including
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placement of wager, payment of prize, acquisition of chips, tickets or tokens and
exchanging them for cash, and concession or reimbursement of gaming credit.
Suspicious transaction—the operation relating to the practice of gaming or wagering
which, by its nature, non-habitual manner or complexity, indicates any activity of money
laundering or terrorist financing.
Large amount transaction—transaction relating to the practice of gaming or wagering
with the value equal to or higher than MOP 500,000.00 (five hundred thousand patacas)
or its equivalence in foreign currencies.
Person with political involvement (abbreviated as PEP hereinafter)—a person, a
family member or an associate of such person who performs or has performed the
functions of prominent political positions in foreign country or territory, including prime
minister, government leader, chief executive, judicial or military officials, managers of
state enterprises or representatives of political parties.
Report of large amount transaction (abbreviated as ROVE hereinafter)—the report
generated by the entities subjecting to this Instruction when detecting any large amount
transaction within the scope of gaming or wagering. A sample of this report is included in
the appendix of this Instruction.
Suspicious transaction report (abbreviated as STR hereinafter)—the report generated
by the entities subjecting to this Instruction when detecting any suspicious transaction
within the scope of gaming or wagering, a sample report is provided by GIF.
Smurfing—technique of channeling large amount of money into the cycle of legal
economic activities, by dividing the money into smaller amounts for concealing the
identities of the parties involved and avoiding the registration of such operation.
Introduction
Being the legal entity of the convention for preventing and suppressing the crimes of
money laundering, and a member of the Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG),
the Macao Special Administrative Region intends to introduce as regulations and
implement the forty recommendations adopted in 1990 by Financial Action Task Force
on Money Laundering (FATF).
These recommendations of the FATF brought forth the nine special recommendations for
combating the financing of terrorism, following the surge of large scale terrorist activities,
as well as the subsequent Security Council Resolutions No. 1373 (Year 2001) and No.
1456 (Year 2003), and the resolution of the International Convention for the Suppression
of Financing of Terrorism (adopted by the United Nation General Assembly Resolution
No. 54/109 effective on 10th April 2002).
Therefore, the Legislative Assembly of the Macao Special Administrative Region
approved the Decree Laws No. 2/2006 and No. 3/2006 concerning prevention and
suppression of the crimes of money laundering, terrorism and terrorist financing activities.
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Following these laws, the government of the Macao SAR approved Administrative
Regulation No. 7/2006, effective on 12th November 2006. Such regulation defines the
presupposition and contents of the obligation for preventing the aforesaid crimes, and
established the penalty system for the failure to fulfill such obligation.
Afterwards, GIF was established under Executive Ruling No. 227/2006 of Chief
Executive, with responsibilities to gather and analyze the information with regard to
combating money laundering and terrorist financing as well as to provide such
information to the police and judicial authorities.
The following provisions apply to the gaming industry:
a) Under article 34 of Law No. 16/2001, external auditors of the concessionaires,
sub-concessionaires and management level are obliged to communicate, in
writing, with DICJ and Finance Services Bureau (DSF) about any fact leading to
the suspicion of the aforesaid entities, management and their employees, on their
involvement in criminal activities, especially those of money laundering;
b) Under article 30(6) of Administrative Regulation No. 6/2002, concessionaires and
sub-concessionaires are obliged to communicate with the respective authorities
about any fact indicating the comission of money laundering by the gaming
promoters collaborating with such concessionaires or sub-concessionaires.
1. Objective of this Instruction
This Instruction defines the minimum obligatory duties, rules and procedures, to
be performed in the gaming industry in Macau, with the intent to prevent the
practice of crimes of money laundering and terrorist financing.
2. Addressees
The addressees in this Instruction are:
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
The concessionaries and sub-concessionaries operating games of fortune
or chance.
The management level of the concessionaries or sub-concessionaries
operating games of fortune or chance.
The concessionaries for lotteries or mutual bets;
The promoters of games of fortune or chance.
3. Internal rules and procedures
3.1
The addressees of this Instruction should approve the internal rules and
procedures for combating money laundering and financing of terrorism,
taking into consideration the Laws No. 2/2006 and No. 3/2006 and the
Administrative Regulation No. 7/2006.
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3.2
The internal rules and procedures should have, but not the least, the
following purposes:
3.2.1
3.2.2
3.2.3
3.2.4
3.2.5
3.2.6
3.2.7
3.2.8
The identification and follow-up of the participants involved in
suspicious transactions or large amount transactions;
The identification of suspicious transactions or large amount
transactions;
Report suspicious transactions to GIF;
Nomination and empowerment of the compliance officer(s);
Establish the control measures for the fulfillment of obligations of
recording and reporting the suspicious transactions and large amount
transactions, to be implemented by accounts department and internal
audit department;
Provide training to the employeees about the rules and procedures on
prevention of crimes and money laundering and terrorist financing;
The issue, acceptance and discount of cheques from players or wagers,
or from their agents or persons for whom they act;
The confidentiality of the information received or reported.
3.3
The internal rules and procedures must be approved, within three (3)
months after this Instruction becomes effective, by the addressees of this
Instruction and confirmed by DICJ.
3.4
The period referred to in the previous clause can be extended, by order of
the Director of DICJ, in exceptional and justified circumstances.
3.5
The internal rules and procedures confirmed by DICJ must be disclosed
and explained to the employees concerned.
3.6
DICJ, in exercising of its duties, can determine modifications or
amendments to the internal rules and procedures.
4. Follow Up and Coordination
4.1 Entities governed by this Instruction should a least designate one employee and other
designees as compliance officer, to monitor the compliance of the policies and
procedures applicable under the preventive measures against crimes of money laundering
and terrorist financing, and to conduct necessary coordination to ensure proper
compliance.
4.2 The above mentioned compliance officer(s) should be responsible for reviewing and
evaluating the ROVEs and STRs, to follow up and submit the STRs to GIF.
4.3 The compliance officer should have the independent authority and possess adequate
experience necessary to carry out functions stated in the previous clause.
4.4 Names of the compliance officer(s) should be notified to DICJ timely.
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4.5 DICJ may decide to change the compliance officer(s) if DICJ considers the
qualification or the technical knowledge of the compliance officer(s) is inadequate.
5. Identifying Persons Conducting Suspicious Transaction or Large Amount
Transaction
5.1. The addressees of this Instruction should identify;
5.1.1
Person gambling or wagering, or beneficiary of gaming credit, who
participates in suspicious transactions or large amount transactions;
5.1.2
Representative or agent of the participant involved in transactions stated in
the previous paragraph;
5.1.3
If the person gambling or wagering or the beneficiary of gaming credit is
acting on behalf of others, then the person on whose behalf the gambling,
wagering, or gaming credit transaction is conducting should be identified.
5.2. The identification of persons referred to in Article 5.1 must be verified by showing
the original documents issued by official entities, such as Identity Card, passport or
the original identification document of its equivalent.
5.3 The address can be verified through documents stated in the previous clause or,
alternatively, through documents issued by third parties, such as working permits,
professional certificates, water bills, electricity bills or telephone bills.
5.4. The semblance of the persons referred to above should be verified by comparing with
photos on the official documents, but in exceptional circumstances, verification can
be made through other types of documents, provided that an approval is granted b y
the compliance officer.
5.5. The documentation relating to the above exception stated in the latter part of the
previous clause should be signed and retained according to Article 11.
5.6. The identification of the person(s) involved in the suspicious transactions should
contain all information required in the STR Sample provided by GIF.
5.7. The identification of the PEPs must be conducted according to the additional due
diligence measures.
6. Registration for Large Amount Transaction
6.1. The addressees of this Instruction must use the “large amount transaction report” as
shown in appendix to identify the participants involved and to record the following
transactions:
6.1.1 Gambling or wagering in the amount equal to or exceeding MOP
500,000 or equivalent;
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6.1.2 Gaming credit or repayment of loan equal to or exceeding MOP 500,000
or equivalent;
6.1.3 Gambling, wagering, gaming credit or repayment of loan, although
individually less than the above reporting amount, but in the aggregated total
equal to or exceeding MOP 500,000 or equivalent within 24 hours;
6.1.4 Any games promotion business transaction equal to or exceeding MOP
500,000 or equivalent, including the payment to player or expenditure
incurred by bettor.
6.2 The above stated reports should at least include the following information:
6.2.1 Name of the participant;
6.2.2 Date of birth and Place of birth;
6.2.3 Address; (could be one or more)
6.2.4 Profession or Occupation;
6.2.5 Identification documents;
6.2.6 Date of transaction;
6.2.7 The amount of transaction and the source of fund;
6.2.8 The sample signature;
6.3 The above stated reports should be completed within two working days after the
transaction date.
6.4 Should submit a copy of the ROVE to DICJ.
7. Registration of Suspicious Transaction
7.1 The addressees of this Instruction should record the following transactions and to
identify the participants involved:
7.1.1 Gambling or wagering, based on its nature, complexity, the amount involved
or in a non-habitual manner indicates any activities of money laundering or terrorist
financing;
7.1.2 Gaming credit, based on its nature, complexity, the amount involved or in a
non-habitual manner indicates any activities of money laundering or terrorist
financing;
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7.1.3 Games promotion business, based on its complexity, the amount involved or
in a non-habitual manner indicates any activities of money laundering or terrorist
financing;
7.2 Must continuously monitor transactions involving PEPs and to verify the source of
fund of these transactions.
7.3 The above transactions must be recorded in STR and report to GIF within 2 working
days after the transaction date.
8. Procedures for completing and signing the ROVEs and STRs.
8.1 The “Large Sum Transaction Report” referred to in the above Article 6.1 shall be
completed and signed off by the person(s) specifically designated by the addressees of
this Instruction.
8.2 The “Suspicious Transaction Report” referred to in the above Article 7.1 shall be
completed by employee(s) of the addressees of this Instruction, who has detected
suspicious transaction while exercising their duty.
8.3 The above mentioned two types of reports shall be carefully reviewed and signed off
by the designee responsible for the function of follow-up and coordination.
9. Obligation to Refuse Transaction
9.1 The addressees of this Instruction have the obligation to refuse transaction(s)
requested by players, bettors, or customers when the information about identification or
details of the transaction(s) required under Article 5 to Article 7 referred above cannot be
obtained.
9.2 When the transaction stated in the previous clause is regarded as suspicious, the
transaction should be recorded on the STR and report to GIF indicating that the
transaction has been refused and the reason for such refusal.
10. Confidentiality
10.1 Information recorded on the ROVEs and STRs is classified as confidential, such
Reports or any details recorded shall only be accessed by authorized staff who
directly involve in the related transaction.
10.2 Employee(s) of the addressees of this Instruction including directors, supervisors,
administrators for casinos, junkets or junket area are all forbidden to communicate
to any person, party or entitiy involved in the suspicious transaction about the
matters recorded on the STR that has been reported to GIF.
11. Retention of Records
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11.1 The addressees of this Instruction should keep the following records for 5 years and
should make the records available to the competent authorities for review:
11.1.1
Documents or proof of identification (or copy of which) of the players, bettors,
credit beneficiaries, or their agents or designees who are involved in the
suspicious transactions or in large amount transactions.
11.1.2
Copies of the ROVE and STR as well as supporting documents, including the
written documentation of any gaming credit.
11.1.3
Supporting documents of the suspicious transactions, as determined by the
compliance officer, which were not sent to GIF.
11.2 The documents stated in the previous paragraph could be replaced by microfilm or
transfer to other storage media in digital form.
11.3 In case when the addressees of this Instruction suspends or terminates their business
activities, all reports and supporting documents should be transferred to DICJ in
order to complete the necessary 5 years retention period.
12. Collaboration with the Authorities
The addressees of this Instruction should provide all the requested information and
documents to the Police, Judicial Authority or other competent authorities in order to
prevent and suppress money laundering and financing of terrorism.
13. Sanctions
Non-compliance due to failure or negligence to identify, record, refuse transactions,
retain supporting documents, report suspicious transactions or cooperate with authorities
in preventing and suppressing money laundering and terrorist financing activities is
considered as administrative offence, which is subject to penalty stated in Article 9 of
Administrative Regulation No. 7/2006.
14. Final Provisions
14.1
14.2
This Instruction is effective on 13th November 2006.
Any queries about the interpretation or implementation of this Instruction
should be referred to DICJ – Audit Department.
Gaming Inspection and Coordination Bureau, 13 November, 2006.
Manuel Joaquim das Neves
Director
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APPENDIX 1
Large Amount Transaction Report
Date:
Casino:
Location:
1. Participant
Name:
Report Writer:
Signature:
Telephone:
2.
Identification
Name: (could be more than one)
ID / Passport No.:
Date of Birth / Place of Birth:
Address: (could be more than one)
Occupation:
Identification documents for verifications:
3.
Sex (M/F):
Nationality:
Transaction
Date of Transaction:
Amount Involved:
Source of Fund:
4. Description (Please provide detailed information; attach additional pages if
necessary)
Signature of the follow-up and coordination personnel
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APPENDIX II
Examples of suspicious transactions
1. Various gaming players take coordinated action in purchasing large amount of
gaming chips, while the amount of individual purchases are not exceeding MOP
500,000.00 (threshold in ROVE).
Participants place small bets in order to cash out the gaming chips, and each of
them requests for the issuance of one or more casino checks with amount less than
the ROVE threshold.
2. One or more gaming players systematically request for cashing gaming chips
during the period of shift changes.
3. Habitually solicit the casino employees for controlling the amounts of wager to
avoid reaching the ROVE threshold, or switch to another gaming table or junket
when the wagering amounts are approaching the ROVE threshold.
4. Requesting the division of winnings or prize money, which exceeds the ROVE
threshold, into cash and chips below the ROVE threshold in order to exchange in
the casino cages.
5. One or more gaming players, with assistance from third parties, cash out the
gaming chips with total value exceeds the ROVE threshold, by dividing them into
smaller amounts each of which is worth less than the ROVE threshold.
6. Purchase gaming chips through the cage with checks issued by different credit
institutions, while the amount of each check is below the ROVE threshold.
7. Purchase large amount of gaming chips at the gaming tables, which are partially
used for gaming while the rest are exchanged for cash, and solicit to issue checks
or documents proving the respective transaction with amount below the ROVE
threshold.
8. Through the gaming or wagering credits, acquire large amount of gaming chips,
which are partially used in gaming while the rest are exchanged for cash, and
solicit to issue checks or documents proving the respective transaction with
amount below the ROVE threshold.
9. Establish a gaming account in casino by using cash with lower denomination or
through wire transfers, and withdraw the balance of the account by means of
casino checks or cash of higher denomination.
10. Acquire gaming chips with value below the ROVE threshold, which is to be
transferred out of the casino consecutively.
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11. After continually wagering at the cashless slot machines, attempt to convert the
accumulated tickets/vouchers into casino checks or cash in higher denomination.
12. Present false or forged documents when completing ROVEs or issuing large
amount casino checks.
13. Contradictions occurred between the identification information supplied by the
gaming player when completing more than one ROVE.
14. Representatives of the gaming players refuse to provide the identification
information of their representing parties when the transaction amount exceeds the
ROVE threshold.
15. By means of enticement or intimidation, the gaming players attempt to avoid
registration in one or more ROVEs, divide the prize money into smaller amounts
with values below the ROVE threshold, or through the assistance of third parties,
register the respective gaming transactions or acquire gaming chips / exchange the
gaming chips for cash.
16. Two or more gaming players engage in habitual and coordinated methods in
concealing their reciprocal and simultaneous wagering (e.g. wager red and black
in roulette; wager for and against the banker in baccarat), and demand payment in
casino checks of values below the ROVE threshold or cash with high
denomination.
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