2008. 05.05
TERMS OF REFERENCE
for the INPRO Collaborative Project:
PROLIFERATION RESISTANCE: ACQUISITION/DIVERSION
PATHWAY ANALYSIS
1. BRIEF SUMMARY
Within the International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles
(INPRO), a methodology for evaluating proliferation resistance (INPRO PR
methodology) has been developed. However, it remains to develop the methodology to
evaluate User Requirements (UR) 4 regarding multiplicity and robustness of barriers
against proliferation. This first requires an acquisition/diversion pathway analysis. This
Project will address these issues in reference to some innovative nuclear energy system
(INS), such as the DUPIC fuel cycle. Outputs such as a recommendation for the
assessment procedure for the above mentioned User Requirement are to be expected.
2. BACKGROUND
Further development of the INPRO methodology is one of the overall goals of
Phase 2 of INPRO, and the Collaborative Project (CP) on “Acquisition/diversion
pathway analysis for the assessment of proliferation resistance” is intended to contribute
to the development of the INPRO PR methodology.
The INPRO PR methodology was first documented in IAEA-TECDOC-1362
published in June 2003 as a result of Phase 1A [1]. The INPRO PR methodology was
revised through a Korean national case study and by various consultancy meetings, and
was documented in IAEA-TECDOC-1434 published in December 2004 as a result of
Phase 1B (first part) [2]. A further modification was performed based on the Korean
national extended case study on DUPIC (direct use of spent PWR fuel in CANDU
reactors) fuel cycle and by various consultancy meetings. The modified INPRO PR
methodology was documented in Volume 5 of the INPRO Manual as a result of Phase
1B (second part) in order to provide guidance in using the INPRO methodology [3].
Based on a decision at the 9th INPRO Steering Committee Meeting in July 2006,
INPRO has entered into Phase 2. At the 10th INPRO Steering Committee Meeting held
in December 2006, the Republic of Korea proposed a CPP regarding the
“Acquisition/diversion pathway analysis for the assessment of proliferation resistance” in
order to make the INPRO methodology being completed in the evaluation of the
robustness and multiplicity of barriers against proliferation.
The INPRO methodology in the proliferation resistance area has one Basic Principle
(BP) and five User Requirements (UR), along with relevant Criteria, Indicators, and
Evaluation Parameters, etc. The assessment metrics and procedures for three User
Requirements regarding the extrinsic measures of State’s commitments, the attractiveness
of nuclear material and technology, and the difficulty and detectability of diversion have
been established through the Korean case studies and by various consultancy meetings.
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However, the assessment procedure and metrics for User Requirement 4 (innovative
nuclear energy systems should incorporate multiple proliferation resistance features and measures) needs
to be developed. Moreover, the assessment of the multiplicity and robustness of barrier
requires performing first the acquisition/diversion pathway analysis.
3. OVERALL OBJECTIVE
This Project is aimed to contribute to the completion of the INPRO PR
methodology, which is to assess proliferation resistance and to provide guidance to
improve the proliferation resistance of the innovative nuclear energy system.
4. PURPOSE OF THE PROJECT
The specific objectives of the Project are to:
•
Develop the appropriate methods for the identification and analysis of pathways
for the acquisition of weapons-usable nuclear material;
•
Evaluate the multiplicity and robustness of barriers against proliferation for the
pathway by logic trees (success/failure trees, event trees, etc.) and/or qualitative
methods, etc.; and
•
Based on the above results, recommend the assessment approach for User
Requirement 4 of the INPRO PR methodology, regarding the multiplicity and
robustness of barriers against proliferation.
5. PARTICIPANTS AND OBSERVERS
The Project is initiated by the IAEA Member States (Republic of Korea, Canada,
China, and USA) and EC, which represent current leaders in developing the assessment
methodology for proliferation resistance of innovative nuclear energy systems. They
invite other INPRO members developing nuclear energy systems to join the Project.
6. EXPECTED OUTPUTS
The expected output is a document containing, inter alia:
 the procedures for the acquisition/diversion pathway analysis and evaluation
of proliferation resistant characteristics of the pathway, and
 a recommendation for the assessment approach for User Requirement 4 of
the INPRO PR methodology, regarding the multiplicity and robustness of
barriers against proliferation.
7. ACTIVITIES AND SCHEDULE
The responsibilities of participating Member States and EC (Parties) are set forth in
the Annex 1.
An acquisition/diversion pathway analysis will be performed to assess compliance
with User Requirement 4 of the INPRO PR methodology. The DUPIC fuel cycle
(Annex 3) will be used as a Korean demonstration case study.
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The Project will be carried out in three stages.
Dates for the Project: November 2007–November 2010
STAGE 1: SELECTION OF THE PROSPECTIVE PATHWAYS
Dates for implementation of the Stage 1: November 2007–November 2008
The DUPIC fuel cycle will be the subject of the Korean case study.
The selection of the most promising pathways for the acquisition of nuclear material
will be performed at Stage 1.
At the first step, the objectives of the proliferation are identified. They include the
quality and quantity of the material, the time required to acquire the material for the
proliferation and the capability of the potential proliferant country, etc.
At the second step, the possible strategies, which the potential proliferant country
could adopt, are identified. They will include:
 Undeclared removal of nuclear material from the fuel cycle facilities; and
 Further treatment of the diverted nuclear materials needed to acquire
weapons-usable materials.
At the third step, a systematic study of the possible pathways for the
acquisition/diversion of nuclear material during the whole fuel cycle is performed. The
comprehensiveness of the possible pathways study is important to the value of the
analysis. A systematic method for the selection of pathways will be developed.
A kick-off meeting in November 2007 and two other meetings are to be organized in
the second quarter and the fourth quarter of 2008.
STAGE 2: ANALYSIS OF PATHWAYS
Dates for implementation of the Stage 2: December 2008–November 2009
As a demonstration sample case, the diversion of the nuclear material in the storage
place of the fresh DUPIC fuel will be selected for the Korean study for the evaluation of
pathway for the acquisition/diversion analysis.
At the first step, in order to perform the analysis of pathways in detail, it is required
to have the sufficient design and process information on the fuel cycle processes.
At the second step, the logic trees (success tree/event tree, etc.) will be developed for
the prospective acquisition/diversion pathways identified at Stage 1. For the evaluation
of pathways, the qualitative method, expert elicitation, probability analysis, etc. could be
studied, if recommended.
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At the third step, each segment of the pathway is evaluated in terms of the material
characteristics, technical availability, safeguardability, quality and quantity of the material,
etc. as specified in the User Requirement 1, 2 and 3 of the INPRO PR methodology.
Two meetings are to be organized in 2009, as determined by the Scientific and
Technical Committee established in Chapter 11.
STAGE 3: ASSESSMENT OF MULTIPLICITY AND ROBUSTNESS
Dates for implementation of the Stage 3: November 2009–November 2010
At the first step, the multiplicity and the robustness (User Requirement 4) of barriers
at each segment of selected pathways are evaluated.
At the second step, the recommended procedures and metrics for the evaluation of
the multiplicity and robustness of barriers are suggested based on the results of this
study. This will work as a reference for the evaluation of proliferation resistance in terms
of the User Requirement 4.
The technical document is to be drafted by Parties which implemented the pathway
analysis, in consultation with other Parties and the IAEA. The finalized document is to
be submitted to the INPRO.
Two meetings are to be organized in 2010, as determined by the Scientific and
Technical Committee established in Chapter 11.
8. RESPONSIBILITY AND RESOURCES OF EACH PARTNER
The responsibilities of each Party and human resources provided by it are set forth in
the Annex 1. These responsibilities and resources could be changed provided there is
approval of the Scientific and Technical Committee established in Chapter 11. Each
member state should bear the costs of participation in the related meetings and the
implementation of activities stated in its own responsibility box of Annex 1.
9. PARTICIPANTS’ ROLE, LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES
The role of each Party is stated in the Annex 1. Representatives of each Party are
listed in Annex 2 and can be changed according to the respective Parties’ report to the
Scientific and Technical Committee established in Chapter 11.
10. ASSUMPTIONS
It is expected that the work so far developed by PR&PP of GIF in the context of
Generation IV Nuclear Energy Systems, will be beneficial for the work on pathways
identification and analysis to be done in the course of this CP project. [4]
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Comparing and contrasting PR approaches, it can be said that: the INPRO PR
assessment is aimed to check-verify qualitatively the compliance of an entire INS with
INPRO BP and UR; it is a bottom up approach, while PR&PP of GIF is top down
process fully based on pathways and more analytic estimations of the identified PR
measures.
INPRO PR is oriented to provide tools for assessment of INS for the needs of
technology users, while GIF PR&PP is more oriented to technology holders and to
provide the designers with an evaluation framework.
11. MANAGEMENT OF THE PROJECT
The Project is to be implemented as the Joint Initiative defined in Framework, options,
topics and guidelines for the implementation of collaborative projects in INPRO Phase 2 in line with
procedures in the said document and the responsibilities of the Parties.
For the purposes of scientific and administrative management of this Project, the
Parties will establish a Scientific and Technical Committee (STC) after notification of the
enforcement of these Terms of Reference. The STC will make the main decisions
regarding the implementation of the Project in accordance with these Terms of
Reference, as well as the content and the progress of the work, and will make
recommendations to national authorities and the INPRO Steering Committee regarding
utilization of the results of the Project.
The STC will consist of representatives from each Party and these will make
decisions on the basis of a consensus among the members of the STC. The STC will
select a Chairperson. The members of the STC will be empowered to implement the
decisions of the STC at national level and it will recommend people who are responsible
for carrying out work under the Project at national level.
Representatives of other IAEA Member States may also participate in the meetings
of the STC as observers with no right to participate in the making of decisions.
Observers are not obliged to perform a part of the Project.
The Project is to be terminated in the case where the STC agrees that the Project has
been completed or cannot complete anymore.
12. PROCEDURE FOR IMPLEMENTING THE PROJECT
Work under each stage of the Project will be implemented principally at the national
level with subsequent coordination of results at joint meetings. Meetings will be held in
the IAEA Headquarters or in a country participating in the Project and participants will
be funded by each Party. If meetings are held in the IAEA Headquarters, the
administrative and financial rules of the IAEA shall apply.
13. GENERAL ISSUES
The Project is open to any INPRO members to join or participate in, provided they
agree to these Terms of Reference.
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The working language will be English.
Each Party is responsible for the performance of the work agreed upon the Project,
and for compliance with the rules regarding confidentiality and exchange of information
agreed upon by the STC.
The STC will determine the procedure for the exchange, compilation and use of
information submitted under the Project. The Parties will determine the level of depth in
the information submitted. In principle, the Parties should submit the materials to the
IAEA one week prior to the meeting under the Project. If there is any sensitive
information found in the materials, IAEA would strongly request that related Parties
withdraw the materials.
All rights worldwide to Intellectual Property which may arise from the activities
performed under the Project shall be held by one or more Parties which have the
responsibility for providing adequate measures for protection of such Intellectual Property.
Copyright of the final document published as IAEA publication shall be held by the IAEA.
Any activity under the Project must comply with the Statute and operating principles
of the IAEA.
Any disagreements arising in the course of the collaboration under this Project will
be resolved at working level in a constructive and friendly manner causing no damage to
any Party or its representative. Should this prove impossible owing to any circumstances,
the subject of the disagreement shall be submitted for consideration to the members of
the STC of the relevant Parties.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the IAEA shall not be liable to any Party for claims
arising from the publication or transmission of any report which results from the Project,
the application of the contents of any such report from the Project by a Party or by third
parties, or the handling or use of products which result from the Project.
This procedure may be changed by the STC depending on the implementation details
of each stage of the work, or at the request of one of the Parties, following joint review
by and agreement among the Parties.
References
[1] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Guidance for the Evaluation
of Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles, Report of Phase 1A of the International
Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO), IAEA-TECDOC1362, IAEA, Vienna (2003).
[2] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Methodology for the
Assessment of Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles, Report of Phase 1B (first
part) of the International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles
(INPRO), IAEA-TECDOC-1434, IAEA, Vienna (2004).
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[3] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Guidance for the Application
of an Assessment Methodology for Innovative Nuclear Energy Systems, INPRO Manual
— Proliferation Resistance, Volume 5 of the Final Report of Phase 1 of the INPRO,
IAEA-TECDOC-1575, (2007).
[4] THE PROLIFERATION RESISTANCE AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION
EVALUATION METHODOLOGY EXPERT GROUP OF THE GENERATION IV
INTERNATIONAL FORUM, Evaluation Methodology for Proliferation Resistance and
Physical Protection of Generation IV Nuclear Energy, OECD Nuclear Energy Agency
(2006).
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Annex 1
Responsibility and Resources of each partner
Country/
organizati
on
Republic
of Korea
Canada
China
Responsibility
Human resources
To perform the pathway analysis for the
acquisition/diversion of nuclear material
primarily referring the direct dry processing
fuel cycle like DUPIC fuel cycle as a
demonstration case study which will be
used for the evaluation of the robustness
and multiplicity of barriers specified in the
User Requirement 4 of the INPRO PR
methodology.
To contribute to the scope of work
described above by the Republic of Korea;
specifically,
to
provide
technical
information on DUPIC as needed,
contribute to diversion/acquisition pathway
analysis
and
assessment
of
multiplicity/robustness, and review findings
of proposal prior to publication. Canada
would consider hosting at least one meeting
if so desired by the project participants, but
recognizes that the IAEA is the logical
location for such meetings given the
geographic distribution of participants –
Canada encourages this approach.
To participate in the discussions in the
meetings, to provide comments on
participating MS activities, and to review
draft of final document.
Mr. W. Ko, Nuclear Fuel
Cycle System Analysis
Team, Korea Atomic
Energy Research Institute
(KAERI), and assigned
experts in his Institute
USA
To participate in the discussions in the
meetings, to provide comments on
participating MS activities, and to review
draft of final document.
EC
To participate in the discussions in the
meetings, to provide comments on
participating MS activities, and to review
draft of final document.
IAEA
To participate in discussion at the meetings
Secretariat and comment from the expertise of the
IAEA in safeguards;
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Mr. J. Whitlock, NonProliferation and
Safeguards, Chalk River
Laboratories, Atomic
Energy of Canada Limited
(AECL), and assigned
experts in his Laboratories.
Mr. Z. Gang, Theoretical
Division of Fast Reactor,
China Institute of Atomic
Energy (CIAE), and
assigned experts in his
Institute.
Mr. M. Zentner, National
Security Division, Pacific
Northwest National
Laboratory (PNNL), and
assigned experts in his
Laboratory.
Mr. G. Cojazzi, Institute
for the Protection Security
of the Citizen, Joint
Research Centre (JRC),
and assigned experts in his
Centre.
Mr. E. Haas, Department
of Safeguards
Mr. H. Chayama,
To serve as a coordinator and to facilitate Department of Nuclear
communication;
Energy, and assigned
To host meetings at the IAEA experts in the IAEA.
Headquarters; and
To make necessary arrangements to publish
final document as an IAEA publication.
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Country
Republic of
Korea
Expert
Mr. W. Ko
Canada
Mr. J.
Whitlock
China
Mr. Z. Gang
USA
Mr. M.
Zentner
EC
Mr. G.
Cojazzi
INPRO
Mr. E. Haas
International
Coordination
Group
INPRO
Mr. H.
International Chayama
Coordination
Group
Annex 2
Organization
Title
Contact
KAERI
Team Leader, nwiko@kaeri.re.kr
Nuclear
Fuel +82-42-868-2040
Cycle System
Analysis Team
AECL
Manager
whitlockj@aecl.ca
Non+1-613-584-8811
Proliferation
ext.4265
and Safeguards
AECL Chalk
River
Laboratories
CIAE
Director
gz27@ciae.ac.cn
Physical Group +86-10-69358507
Theoretical
Division of
Fast Reactor
PNNL
Staff Engineer
md.zentner@pnl.gov
Safety,
+1-509-372-4988
Licensing &
Regulation
Analysis
National
Security
Division
JRC
Institute for the giacomo.cojazzi@jrc.it
Protection
+39-0332-785085
Security of the
Citizen
IAEA
Acting Unit
E.Haas@iaea.org
Head
+43-1-2600-22192
Development
Unit
Section for
Concepts and
Approaches
Division of
Concepts and
Planning
Department of
Safeguards
IAEA
Nuclear
H.Chayama@iaea.org
Engineer
+43-1-2600-22762
Nuclear Fuel
Cycle and
Material Section
Division of
Nuclear Fuel
Cycle and
Waste
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Technology
Nuclear Energy
Department
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Annex 3
DUPIC Fuel Cycle
The basic concept of the DUPIC fuel cycle is to fabricate CANDU nuclear fuel from
PWR spent fuel using dry thermal/mechanical processes without separating the stable
fission products. As a CANDU reactor utilizes natural uranium fuel, the contents of the
remaining fissile materials in PWR spent fuel are large enough to be reused in a CANDU
reactor despite the fact that the fuel nevertheless contains fission products. The basic
concept of the DUPIC fuel cycle is schematically shown in Fig. 1.
The DUPIC fuel cycle is a symbiotic fuel cycle including PWR and PHWR oncethrough fuel cycles. The front end of DUPIC fuel cycle is similar to those of PWR fuel
cycle, such as mining, conversion, enrichment, PWR fuel fabrication, irradiation in PWR
reactors. However, the starting material of DUPIC fuel cycle is spent PWR fuel, which is
stored at PWR reactor sites and it will then be transported to the DUPIC manufacturing
plant.
In the DUPIC fuel manufacturing step, as there is no process step for the separation
of the fission products and transuranic materials while the volatile and semi-volatile
elements are removed during the thermal/mechanical treatments, the process materials
are highly radioactive throughout the manufacturing processes. Therefore, the
manufacturing processes should be performed inside a heavily shielded hot cell. These
characteristics lead to difficulties for material handling during fuel manufacturing, but
this is a strong incentive in terms of the proliferation resistance of the DUPIC fuel.
Since the fresh DUPIC fuel is still strongly radioactive, the transportation and
handling of DUPIC fuel at PHWR reactor should also be performed in remote manner.
After burning of DUPIC fuel at PHWR reactor, the spent DUPIC fuel is stored at
reactor sites before being disposed at the permanent repository.
By utilizing the DUPIC fuel cycle, there are three advantages, such as: (1) no need to
dispose the spent PWR fuel; (2) savings of the supply of the natural uranium resources to
be needed for manufacture of PHWR fuel; and (3) the reduction of spent PHWR fuel
accumulation due to the high burnup characteristics of DUPIC fuel.
While it depends on the discharge burnup of spent PWR fuel, it is generally
recognized that the spent PWR fuel from about three PWR reactors can be used to
supply the DUPIC fuel for one PHWR reactor with the same capacities.
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PWR
Uranium
Saving
Spent PWR Fuel
Natural Uranium
On-site Storage
CANDU
DUPIC Fuel Fab
AFR Storage
DUPIC
Spent CANDU/DUPIC Fuel
On-site Storage
PWR once-through
Permanent Disposal
CANDU once-through
Permanent Disposal
No
Disposal
Less
Disposal
Fig.1. Concept of the DUPIC Fuel Cycle
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