The Regulation of
International Trade in
Enriched Uranium in a
New Build Era
Maxine Symington
Introduction
 Regulation of the international trade in enriched
uranium has come a long way in a comparatively short
time
 In a new build era what are the challenges, do we
need to take stock?
 Proliferation- measures for control
 Time for a new approach?
Uranium and the Nuclear Fuel Cycle
Where is uranium mined?
The largest producing Uranium
mines in 2011
Mine
Country
Main owner
Type
Production (tU)
% of world
McArthur River
Canada
Cameco
underground
7686
14
Olympic Dam
Australia
BHP Billiton
by-product/
underground
3353
6
Arlit
Niger
Somair/ Areva
open pit
2726
5
Tortkuduk
Kazakhstan
Katco JV/ Areva
ISL
2608
5
Ranger
Australia
ERA (Rio Tinto 68%)
open pit
2240
4
Kraznokamensk
Russia
ARMZ
underground
2191
4
Budenovskoye 2
Kazakhstan
Karatau JV/Kazatomprom-Uranium One
ISL
2175
4
Rossing
Namibia
Rio Tinto (69%)
open pit
1822
3
Inkai
Kazakhstan
Inkai JV/Cameco
ISL
1602
3
South Inkai
Kazakhstan
Betpak Dala JV/ Uranium One
ISL
1548
3
27,951
52%
Top 10 total
The balance between exploitation of
atomic power for civil use and
proliferation risk

Post 1945

How to open up trade? How to control it safely?

A bargain is struck in the hope of minimising
proliferation

A regulatory agency is set up
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons 1970
The First
Pillar
The
Second
Pillar
The Third
Pillar
Nonproliferation
Art I&II NWS
agree not to
help NNWS
develop or
acquire
nuclear
weapons +
Art III tasks
IAEA with
inspection of
NNWS
facilities
Nuclear
disarmament
Art VI all
parties to
pursue
disarmament
Right of
NNWS to use
nuclear
technology
for peaceful
purposes Art
VI
Article IV NPT
"Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so
shall also co-operate in contributing alone
or together with other States or
international organizations to the further
development of the applications of nuclear
energy for peaceful purposes, especially in
the territories of non-nuclear-weapon
States Party to the Treaty, with due
consideration for the needs of the
developing areas of the world."
Definition, guidelines and co-operation
Zangger
Committee
Indian
Atomic Test
Other
cooperation
agreements
are signeddiversion is
a concern
Nuclear
Suppliers
Group
S 123
Agreements
Export
Control/Dual
Use
Technology
Timeline
1971
1974
1975
1977
1991
Tension between commerce and proliferation
control
NPT
extension
9/11 2001
Fissile
Material CutOff Treaty
India is
made an
exception to
the NPT
Resolution
1887tightening
of export
control
Timeline
1995
2001
2004
2005
2009
With
Technology
advances,
definition of
“export“
becomes
wider
New build era

At the IAEA’s 56th General Conference 2012 Director General
Amano noted that developing countries show keen interest in
nuclear power.

Some countries see states already benefitting from nuclear power,
concerned about diversion of fissile material and nuclear
technology for nuclear weapons development- particularly in
relation to enrichment and reprocessing (E&R)- having a tendency
to push the bar to entry ever higher.

Is the safeguarding regime still fit for purpose in its current form?
New ideas?
A view from the European Commission

Concern that potentially differentiated control standards of third countries
may distort competition.

Suggest an integrated, risk driven strategic trade control model.

Vision involves, “human security”, “smart security” and development of an
“EU technological reaction capacity”.

Move to an effective response to use of cyberspace for proliferation.

Emphasis on end use monitoring and traceability of intangible transfers of
technology, self auditing and post transfer monitoring.

Wider variety of export licences e.g. “low value shipments”, “encryption”,
“Intra-company technology transfers”, and “large projects”.
New ideas?
The IAEA, a Multilateral Nuclear Approach (MNA) INFCIRC/640 2005 Expert Group
Report. Five possible approaches:

Range of transparent suppliers’ arrangements with government backing, such as
fuel leasing and fuel take-back offers, commercial offers to store and dispose of
spent fuel, and commercial fuel banks (in 2010 IAEA authorised set up of a low
enriched uranium fuel bank as a supply of last resort).

International supply guarantees with IAEA participation,

Voluntary conversion of existing facilities to a multilateral nuclear approach (MNA).

Creating multinational, regional MNAs for new facilities based on joint ownership for
uranium enrichment, fuel reprocessing, disposal and storage of spent fuel.

Consider up-scaling concept to nuclear fuel cycle with stronger multilateral
arrangements by region or by continent involving the IAEA and international
community.
New ideas?
..from the Project on Managing The Atom (Harvard)

Back to basics (Art IV) but offer incentives and opportunities as an alternative to national E&R.

NSG should try to reach agreement on “clean text”.

Revise trigger list and dual use controls.

Promote fuel assurances and multinational control of E&R facilities.

Recognise limitation of US-UAE model.

Cradle to grave options for countries with small nuclear programs.

Universal adoption of the Additional Protocol.

R&D of more proliferation resistant fuel cycle technology.

Diplomatic pressure.
Conclusion
Have we come full circle?
www.wragge-law.com