THE DECISION TO DROP THE ATOMIC BOMB DBQ Document A
Source: President Truman’s second public statement on dropping the Atomic bomb
(August 9, 1945)
The world will note that the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, a military
base. That was because we wished in this first attack to avoid, insofar as possible, the
killing of civilians. But that attack is only a warning of things to come. If Japan does not
surrender, bombs will have to be dropped on her war industries and, unfortunately,
thousands of civilian lives will be lost.
Having found the bomb we have used it. We have used it against those who attacked us
without warning at Pearl Harbor, against those who have starved and beaten and executed
American prisoners of war, against those who have abandoned all pretense of obeying
international laws of warfare. We have used it in order to shorten the agony of war, in
order to save the lives of thousands and thousands of young Americans.
Document B
Source: Letter from President Truman to Senator Richard Russell, August 9, 1945.
[In response to Sen. Russell's wish that Japan be hit with more atomic and conventional
bombing:]
I know that Japan is a terribly cruel and uncivilized nation in warfare but I can't bring
myself to believe that, because they are beasts, we should ourselves act in the same
manner. For myself, I certainly regret the necessity of wiping out whole populations
because of the 'pigheadedness' of the leaders of a nation and, for your information, I am
not going to do it until it is absolutely necessary... My object is to save as many American
lives as possible but I also have a humane feeling for the women and children in Japan."
Document C
Source: The Franck Report, June 11, 1945
The Frank Report was issued by scientists working on the Manhattan Project who were
concerned about the use of atomic weapons.
The prospect of nuclear warfare and the type of measures which have to be taken to
protect a country from total destruction by nuclear bombing, must be as abhorrent (awful)
to other nations as to the United States...
From this point of view a demonstration of the new weapon may best be made before the
eyes of representatives of all United Nations, on the desert or a barren island. The best
possible atmosphere for the achievement of an international agreement could be achieved
if America would be able to say to the world, "You see what weapon we had but did not
use. We are ready to renounce its use in the future and to join other nations in working
out adequate supervision of the use of this nuclear weapon."
Document D
Source: Memoirs of Secretary of War Henry Stimson, 1947
In the middle of July, 1945, the intelligence section of the War Department General Staff
estimated Japanese military strength as follows: in home islands, slightly under
2,000,000; in Korea, Manchuria, China proper, and Formosa, slightly over 2,000,000; in
French Indo-China, Thailand, and Burma, over 200,000; in the East India area, including
the Philippines, over 500,000; in the bypassed Pacific islands, over 100,000. The total
strength of the Japanese Army was estimated at about 5,000,000 men. These estimates
later proved to be in very close agreement with official Japanese figures….
We estimated that if we should be forced to carry [out an invasion of the Japanese
mainland], the major fighting would not end until the latter part of 1946, at the earliest. I
was informed such an operations might be expected to cost over a million casualties, to
American forces alone.
Document E
Source: The comments of Admiral Leahy (FDR’s Chief of Staff) contained in the
Diary of Eben Ayers, Assistant White House Press Secretary, June 1945.
Leahy wrote that the White House conference was held primarily to discuss the necessity
and practicability of invading the Japanese home islands. He said that (Secretary of
State) Marshall… strongly advocated the invasion of Kyushu at the earliest possible date.
Leahy had been opposed to the invasion of the Jap mainland. Marshall held that such an
attempt on Kyushu would cost in casualties not more than 63,000 of the 190,000
combatant troops estimated as necessary for the invasion.