WEEK 4
Epistemology II ² Hierarchy
Romans 1:19
We left the subject of epistemology with a fundamental problem and a fundamental principle.
The fundamental problem in epistemology is that, from its beginning, the search for criteria
began to be confused with the first-­person perspective and the object was lost. The
fundamental principle in epistemology is that the logical (or possible) precedes the actual,
which, if we remember, rested upon the simple observation that while a statement may be valid
without being sound, a statement cannot be sound without being valid. In other words we
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only and always a matter of necessary conditions in all possible worlds. Is an entire worldview
based upon a necessary condition that is invalid? If so, such objects or states of affairs will also,
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And that being the case, its binary contrary state of affairs (by the law of the excluded middle) is
proven to the case³a necessity in all possible worlds. Notice immediately that such conditions³
the idea of them³are clear and distinct not in the self-­centered way of Descartes that begins
with the first-­person perspective, but over and above all finite minds, as (we will see) entailments
of an infinite Mind.
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THE RIGHT WAY ON
WHAT HAPPENED WITH THE WEST
In the chart on the board, the mind looking to the right represents the first-­person perspective of
epistemology whereas the house on the right represents the objective (criteria forming
hierarchy) sense of epistemology.
I. THE RIGHT WAY ON
A) First Principles of Deduction
1. NC 1 ² Being itself
2. NC 2 ² Possibility (i.e. Ontological logic)
a. OBJECTION: Logic refers to our sentences, and if a world existed without
sentences, no logic from outside it could prove otherwise.
b. REPLY: Symbolic (loose) logic refers to our sentences, but ontological logic refers
to being. We are considering this and the proposition that, ´,7LVQRWSRVVLEOHWKDW
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a world existed without possibility, then there would bHQRVXFKWKLQJDV´SRVVLEOH
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thing as a possible world that is not a possible world (LNC, LI).
3. NC 3 ² Either an uncaused Being, or, Cause and Effect (or both)
a. If such a Being caused no effects, then there is an uncaused Being;; but if there
is an effect, then there is a cause;; and if there is any cause, then there is a First (cf.
Cosmological Proof)
B) Epistemic Chains in Noetic Structures
2QH·V noetic structure is just the entire set of propositions one holds to (or the
entire set of states of affairs that one holds to ² i.e. the believed actual world of
an individual)
2. Epistemic chains are the systemic order (not necessarily the chronological
order!) that maNHXSRQH·VQRHWLFVWUXFWXUH$!%!&RU,EHOLHYH&RQWKHEDVLV
of B, and I believe B on the basis of A.
3. Now, how is any epistemic chain finally grounded?
a. Must it not be so ontologically³by the impossibility of an infinite regress?
b. Foundationalism attempted to ground the first principle ultimately in what is
indubitable (in other words³NOT on the basis of some other belief);; while
Coherentists have simply opted for the perfect circle within their circle: thus
coherentists must be internalists.
c. Properly basic belief is one which is not justified on the basis of some other
belief, such that it is 1) basis, and 2) meets some condition as basic (criteria
problem).
´It is only when you are asked to believe in Reason coming from non-­reason that you must cry Halt, for, if
you don·t, all thought is discredited. It is therefore obvious that sooner or later you must admit a Reason
which exists absolutely on its own.µ
C. S. LEWIS, Miracles
4. A Metaphysical proof for a hierarchy of knowledge:
a. If we know a thing, then that knowledge is a thing we know RU ´WKDW UHDO
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b. A thing we know must be either uncaused or caused;;
c. If that knowledge is uncaused, then it has always been known without prior
grounds (though, in an omniscient mind, it may be known in reference to all
possible grounds).
d. If that knowledge is caused, then that causing knowledge 1 was either caused
or uncaused;;
e. If there is no first cause to that epistemic chain, then there is no second, and no
third, and thus no effects (units of knowledge), then there is no such thing as a
unity of knowledge;;
f. If there is no such thing as a unit of knowledge, then no-­thing is known;;
e. If nothing is known, then the statement that nothing is known is unknown.
g. Therefore, there is an uncaused First Cause to HYHU\WKLQJZHNQRZ«
If we were to go further, we would see that this also proves that this First Cause³or Primal Ground (or Primal
Knowledge)³must also either suffer the same infinite regress of grounds, or, else refer to each possible
ground simultaneously (Omni-­scientia): since the first is impossible, by the LEM, the second is invincible.
1
See the principle of sufficient reason to see why only a unit of knowledge can render unto its effect a unit of knowledgeͶi.e. nothing can be known that is not a thing, and thus no unit of knowledge can be ground-­‐less (or without reason). The principle of sufficient reason is simply that a cause cannot render to an effect that power which it does not possess. Therefore an Omniscient Mind exists grounding every unit of knowledge. Each unit exists as a unity in this
Mind.
C) Reason within Revelation
1. Reason (Divine) versus Reasoning (Human)
a. We should distinguish between the power of reason (Aristotle ² i.e. what distinguishes
man from beast) and the product RIUHDVRQLH$ULVWRWOH·VVWDWHPHQWas a statement).
Assuming Aristotle to be correct, then all human beings have the faculty of reason
as well as access to it. It may remain unformed or underutilized either by defect or
by immorality.
b. Then, we should distinguish the source of reason (Word ² revealed) with the participation
of reason (Mind ² as a faculty in the soul)
2. Science (Finite) within Omniscience (Infinite)
a. Is our knowledge a sub-­set of the knowledge of God? OBJECTION: If one instance of
knowledge in our minds were a sub-­VHWRI*RG·VNQRZOHGJHWKHQWKHUe would be a one-­
to-­one correspondence between that unit of knowledge in our mind and that same unit in
*RG·VPLQG%XWWKHQZHZRXOGNQRZHYHU\-­thing about that thing.
E.QRZOHGJH·V´6RXUFHµ² Ontologically versus Chronologically (in a finite mind)
c. Can a unit of knowledge (an act of true knowing) be uncaused? If not, can this process
of ground-­consequent go on indefinitely? We have already proven it cannot. But if we
have partial knowledge of every part of knowledge, this can still be caused by prior
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any point.
II. WHAT HAPPENED WITH THE WEST
A) From Hume to Kant
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a. All our statements must be analytic, synthetic or nonsense
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contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental
reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames: For it can contain
nothing but sophistry and illusion.µ
DAVID HUME, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding
b. analytic = a priori / synthetic = a posteriori
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Are there not also synthetic a priori MXGJPHQWV"´*RGLVORYHµ
a. If we do not assume that knowledge only arises from sense experience, then
there is nothing self-­contradictory about a priori synthetic propositions.
b. Intuition IXQFWLRQHGDV.DQW·V´WKLUGZD\µVRWKDt we do ´SHUFHLYHREMHFWVLQ
VSDFHµVRWKDW´;LVLQVSDFHLQWKDWFKDLUµLVsynthetic because the predicate is
not contained in the subject AND is a priori because space is not derived by
sensory data as such.
c. So Kant defined synthetic a priori judgments as those which are preconditions
for other things we take for granted.
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OLIPHINT, 70
G.DQW·Vtranscendental deduction then was not an argument for objective
knowledge, but a conditional proof that assumed that: Since we do know, what
must be assumed for such knowledge to take place? These categories (12 in 4
more basic divisions) were not metaphysical essences (noumenal) but practical
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different name.
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unbelieving knowledge wiWKRXWNLOOLQJNQRZOHGJHDVVXFK+HDFFHSWHG+XPH·V
assumption that the noumenal cannot be experienced via the intellect.
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%)URP.DQW·V'LYLGHWRWKH&RQWHPSRrary Divide
1. The Noumenal and Phenomenal Realms
2. Continental Philosophy retained the subjective, and Anglo-­American
Philosophy retained the objective³neither with any basis in objective knowledge
to do so. That divide is essentially what is meant by the difference between
Modernism (Anglo-­American-­Object-­driven) and Postmodernism (Continental-­
Subject-­driven).
a. Late modernism (particularly in the positivist / analytical schools) gave
us the Verification and Falsifiability principles. But these were a
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SPROUL, Ch. 1-­3
1. Is the task of apologetics defensive, offensive, constructive, destructive, or all of the above?
How so?
2. Given what we have talked about in terms of acquaintance and description, knowledge and
opinion, subjective and objective: where do the three elements of saving faith (22-­24) fall on
those spectrums?
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with respect to the art of apologetics, not its science)
4. What basic epistemological question are the four non-­negotiable principles meant to answer?
That being the case, does Sproul think that these are suitable foundational proofs or universally
binding first principles?
The Four Basic Non-­Negotiable Principles are:
1) The basic laws of logic
2) The law of cause and effect
3) The basic reliability of sense perception
4) The analogical use of language
I hope it is becoming clear why we do not make the mistake of criticizing arguments
(worldviews) at their consequential level, but at their antecedent lHYHO 7DNH RXW WKH ´VTXDUH-­
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