THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND THE LABOR MOVEMENT
A Thesis Presented to the Faculty
of
California State University, Hayward
In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts in History
By
Peter R. Perry
June, 1991
THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND THE LABOR
MOVru~ENT
By
Peter R. Perry
Approved:
Date:
ii
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:2 \
~~
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PREFACE
Theodore Roosevelt was an important Progressive
symbol.
Many saw him as the quintesser!tial reformer of
his age.
An inherent conflict between the desire for
humanitarian social
reforms and the need
for
orderly
change sometimes left Progressives at odds with labor.
Roosevelt's stand on labor issues perhaps best exemplifies
this paradox.
At times he championed workers' struggles
for decent working conditions.
At others,
he quickly
dispatched federal troops to quell labor disturbances.
I will examine
thre~
separate incidents that help
reveal Roosevel t's attitude toward the workers' movement.
The anthracite coal .strike of 1902 shows Roosevelt at his
best.
In that crisis,
he seized the initiative by
bringing )abor and capital to the negotiating table.
He
proved to be a successful mediator in what contemporaries
saw as the most significant strike in American history.
Scarcely
one
year
later,
Roosevelt
appeals and effectively ended the
Government Printing Office.
rejected
labor's
closed shop in the
At the same time, he still
defended the union's right to exist in the government
service.
Finally, the Goldfield miners strike of 1907-
1908 offers a
less
flattering
111
view of the
President.
Here,
Roosevelt quickly dispatched
maintain order at the request of
federal
troops
to
the Nevada governor
before determining whether they were actually needed.
troops strengthened the operators' hand.
The
The strike was
broken and the miners union was destroyed in the process.
It is easy to see that Roosevelt had an ambiguous
relationship with labor.
Despite his disparate stands,
I
will attempt to demonstrate that there was an ideological
consistency
to
Roosevelt's
actions.
He
supported
a
worker's right to join a union and hoped that employers
would recognize that unions could play a responsible role
in society.
To him, this was merely a matter of justice
and fair play.
However, Roosevelt could never tolerate
unions that challenged his authority.
Like many other
Progressives, the President feared militant sectors of the
labor movement.
He was convinced that they were violence-
prone and could never act in a responsible manner.
conviction
guided
maintenance of
Roosevelt's
order was
actions,
since
This
the
paramount to the President.
Perhaps Roosevelt's comment to Labor Commissioner Carroll
wright expresses this thought best:
liThe first principle
of civilization is the preservation of order.
without
order there can be no liberty and the foe of order is the
foe
of
liberty."1
Roosevelt's
iv
activities
during
the
anthracite strike, the Government Printing Office dispute,
and the Goldfield conflict need to be seen in this
context.
Only
then
can
we
truly
understand
paradoxica 1 relationship between Rooseve 1t
movement.
v
and the
the
labor
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PREFACE:
iii
CHAPTER ONE:
THE ANTHRACITE COAL STRIKE OF 1902
CHAPTER TWO:
THE GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
1
AND THE OPEN SHOP
26
CHAPTER THREE: THE GOLDFIELD STRIKE, 1907-1908
49
CONCLUSION:
72
NOTES:
77
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY:
91
vi
CHAPTER 1
THE ANTHRACITE COAL STRIKE OF 1902
The origins of the 1902 coal strike can be traced
to the settlement of a dispute in the anthracite mines two
year sear 1i er.
In the fall of 1900,
one hundred thousand
miners walked off their jobs in the anthracite regions of
Pennsylvania and Wyoming.
Senator Mark Hanna.
This was unsettling news to
He feared the strike would jeopardize
McKinley's re-election campaign.
Hanna worked feverishly
to settle tne dispute before November,
using the good
offices of the National Civic Federation (NCF).
Dangling
the spectre of a William Jennings Bryan presidency,
presumably would be hostile to business,
which
in front of a
reluctant group of coal operators, Hanna convinced them to
grant some concessions in exchange for a temporary labor
peace.
The miners receiveu a ten percent wage increase, a
promise of arbitration on local issues, and other nominal
improvements.
However, the operators refused to recognize
the miners' union, the United Mine Workers (UMW).l
The
crlsis was averted, but the underlying problem remained
unsolved.
Seventy to eighty percent of all anthracite fields
were owned by six railroad corporations. 2
To a man, the
presidents of these companies were in no mood for further
1
2
compromise when the agreement expired in April, 1901.
The
UMW looked forward to the expiration as an opportunity to
gain further improvements in working conditions and win
formal recognition from the operators.
be confident.
from
8,000
During the strike,
to
100,000
They had reason to
their ranks had swelled
members. 3
UMW
president
John
Mitchell also hoped that his ties with Hanna and the
would payoff again.
and the
failed.
NCF
NCF
But the repeated efforts of Mitchell
to arrange negotiations with the operators
The operators consented only to extending the
wage scale for another year but adamantly refused to deal
directly with the union.
The stage was set for a showdown
in 1902.
In March, 1902 the union attempted again to meet
with the operators to negotiate over wages and conditions.
It demanded a twenty percent pay increase,
day, and universal recognition
an eight-hour
of 2,240 pounds of coal as
a basis for pay.4 (Miners were paid based on tons of coal
mined, but the operators had different definitions of what
constituted a ton of coal).
Hanna stepped in to finally
secure a meeting between Mitchell and the operators,
but
the result was merely a thirty-day cooling-off period.
The UMW called a meeting in Hazelton,
Pennsylvania on May
14, 1902 to determine whether to strike.
want the miners to go out.
Mitchell did not
He feared a strike would be
3
long,
hard and difficult to Wln.
He also hoped that:
... the operators would see the folly of their course
and make concessions, which woul d have preserved the
mineworkers and their famil ies, as well as the general
public, f~om the hardships and horrors of a protracted
conflict.
But Mitchell failed to convince the rank and file,
who no
longer shared his optimism that the operators would come
to their senses.
They voted to strike on May 15 if an
agreement was not reached.
Mitchell and
desperately to make a breakthrough.
Hanna
tried
The UMW reduced its
wage demand to ten percent, its work day to nine hours,
and
offered
arbi tration. 6
to
submit
all
Such flexibility
on the operators.
remaining
had
issues
absolutely
no
to
effect
They were supremely confident that a
strike would be easily crushed, and they looked forward to
the opportunity to break the union.
Theodore Roosevelt,
ascending to the presidency
upon McKinley's assassination in September, 1901, observed
the
situation.
There
is
no
evidence
in
Rooseve 1 t's
personal papers to indicate any alarm at the onset of the
strike.
Further, newspaper reports carried no comments
from the President about the dispute.
Nevertheless, his
speeches and writings from the period demonstrate that
Roosevelt hac many opinions on the proper relationship
between labor and capital.
His perspective was common to
many middle class reformers of the time.
He mistrusted
4
Great
the very wealthy and feared the great masses.
corporations,
rational
he thought,
manner,
greater society.
needed to behave in a
reflecting
a
responsibility
to
more
the
Roosevelt felt this was essential to
stop the spread of socialism.
Workers had legitimate
rights, and one of them was to join unions.
However, if
unions were to occupy their rightful place in society,
they must
all costs.
moderate their demands and avoid violence at
Roosevelt often tended to place unions and
business on the same plane, treating both as though they
had similar power and responsibilities.
For example, in a
speech before Congress in 1902, he specified the roles of
labor and capital in the following manner:
Each must refrain from arbitrary or tyrannous interference with the rights of others.
Organized capital
and organized labor alike should remember that in the
long run the interest of each must be brought into
harmony with the interest of the general public; and
the conduct of each must conform to the fundamental
rules of obedience to the law, of individu~l freedom,
and of justice and fair dealing toward all.
Roosevelt was serious about these guidelines.
During the
course of the 1902 anthracite strike, he would come to
judge the combatants by applying this framework.
John Mitchell was a labor leader who fit beautifully into the Rooseveltian mold.
While he wanted workers
to have a more equitable share of the pie,
challenged existing social relations.
Mitchell never
He saw labor and
capital as mutually dependent partners in production.
fhe
5
UMW leader wanted little more than formal recognition for
his union and yearly collective bargaining arrangements
with the operators. 8
He prefered the quiet methods of the
NCF to the raucous tactics of labor militants.
He stood
in stark contrast to the radical Big Bill Haywood of the
Western Federation of Miners, who called for revolutionary
change In the system of production. 9
On the other hand,
the operators came to represent
all the things Roosevelt detested in big business.
They
were greedy, narrow-minded, and cared little how their
actions
might
affect
rebuffed
all
of
negotiate
reasonable
the
country.
Mitchell's
and
so I utions.
They
the
consistently
NCF's
Their
efforts
condescension
to
and
arrogance eventually isolated them from nearly the entire
nation and earned Roosevelt's wrath as
well.
Perhaps
their attitude can best be summed up by George F. Baer,
president of the Reading Railway System and chief spokesperson for
the operators.
In a
letter to Mitchell
rejecting one of his requests to negotiate, Baer wrote
bl untl y:
"There cannot be two masters in the management
of business."IO
production.
The operators wanted no partnership in
Instead, they fought tooth and nail against
any reform, no matter now moderate.
The operators' obstinance drew fire from the press
as the strike grew near.
The New York
!i~~~,
hardly a
6
pro-labor paper, had this to say:
Tne attitude of the anthracite mine operators is much
to be regretted.
From the inception of the
trouble ... they have behaved in a way to encourage the
belief that they were desirous of having a strike and
were ~1epared to do all in their power to bring it
about.
In the same editorial, the
Ti~es
referred to Mitchell as a
sound, conservative leader who would have acce?ted minimal
concessions to avoid a strike.
as
The Nation
directly.
was
Even a
reluctant
journal as senteel
to criticize
Mitchell
Although it freely condemned the UMW rank and
file as militant and irresponsible, the journal found it
difficult
to
However, the
support
the
operators'
stand. 12
seemed confused about the significance
Ti~es
of the strike.
openly
On
May
16,
it wrote that " ... the most
serious labor struggle in the history of the country is
about to begin. II13
Three days
later,
it predicted an
early collapse on the part of the miners, asserting the
strike could last no more than thirty days.14
to
say
that
few
predicted
a
walkout
that
It is safe
would
last
through summer and into the fall and a strike that would
cause widespread fear about the coal supply.
Rooseve 1t' s
attention to other matters in May of 1902 indicate that he
gave little thought to such a possibility.
Three weeks into the strike, Roosevelt's attitude
changed.
The strike had not collapsed, and the chairman
7
of the New York Board of Trade, Oscar Straus, was callins
for the President to appoint a commission to investi9ate
and.
the dispute. IS
arbitrate
member
of
the
NCF,
and
Straus
his
was
request
a
prominent
reflected
the
continuins efforts of the organization to arrange an early
settlement
of
the
strike.
Roosevelt
responded
by
directing Labor Commissioner Carroll Wright to report on
the struggle and propose solutions.
even-handed
document,
citing
profit
concerns
of
the
suffered by the miners. 16
operators and injustices
Roosevelt then sent the
Wright produced an
report to Attorney General
PhilC\nder Knox, asking whether it should be made public.
Knox
advised C\sainst
strike
fell
publication and
outside
of
the
stated
President's
that
the
jurisdiction.
According to Knox, the President lacked the constitutional
authority to intervene in a private dispute between labor
and capital.
publishing
The Attorney General apparently felt that
Wright's
report
President to intervene.
might
put
pressure
on the
Roosevelt was concerned about the
strike but was not ready to act.
He heeded Knox's advice,
and for the time being, the report remained unpublished. 17
The strike wore on,
attention
elsewhere.
In
and Roosevelt C\gain turned his
July,
Mitchell
reluctantly
convened a meetin9 to respond to a rank-and-file demand
for a sympathy strike of bituminous miners.
'i
A
]
0
r kin sin
8
concert with nanna, the UMW leader succeeded in convincing
the miners to develop a strike fund for anthracite workers
as an alternative to walking out.
Roosevel t
abhorred sympathy str ikes.
not single out the President
meeting,
It was well known that
Whi 1 e
in his
Mitchell did
address at the
he reminded his audience of the importance of
maintaining public support:
"The effect of such action
would be to destroy confidence, to array in open hostility
to our cause all forces of society,
and to crystallize
public sentiment in opposition to our movement.,,18
The press hailed Mitchell's role at the convention
as a
sign of maturity and responsibility in the labor
movement.
t:1e
fray
Interestinsly, Roosevelt remained aloof from
even
during
the
miners
special
convention.
Nothing can be found in his papers and he is not quoted in
the pre ss.
Neverthe 1 es s,
he cou Id not have been bl ind to
Mitchell's growing stature.
August,
As the strike continuea into
McCl ure 's Magaz ine publ i shea a glow inC} account of
the union leader,
praising him for
" ... carrying the
respect of both Wall Street and the mines.,,19
Meanwhile,
the UNW's offer of binding arbitration remained on the
tabl e, s ti 11 refused by the oper ators.
By the end of July, the press began to show concern
about the coal supply.
After criticizing the miners for
violence and the operators for being unwilling to settle,
9
the --New York
Times oot to the heart of the matter:
- - -----
"Not a
-'
pound of
coal
is
being raised,
and the little surplus
stock in the market is dwindling to the famine point.,,20
Roosevelt shared this fear,
and during August,
took a more active interest in the strike.
he cabled Attorney General Knox,
he finally
On August 21,
asking:
"What is the
reason we cannot proceed against the coal operators as
being
engaged
in
a
trust?
I
ask
question continuall y asked of me. ,,21
counseled
restraint,
the
cable
it
because
several
weeks
later,
is
a
Although Knox again
indicates
popular and Presidential sympathies lay.
Q14ay
it
where
both
In a letter to
Roosevelt revealed that he was
trying to assess independently the miners' strength.
Quay
had led him to believe that the union would soon end the
strike, but Mitchell told him that the miners remained
firm
and
agreement.
had no plans to return to work without an
Roosevelt was frustrated
information.
sources of
It appeared to him that the strike was not
about to end. 22
refused
with his
The union held firm while the operators
to budge.
A short2ge
crisis
loomed,
and
the
President lunged uncertainly into the fray.
Al though
Roosevel t
finally
sanctioned
the
release
of Wrisht's report at the end of .Z\ugust, he directed that
Knox's
recommendation of
attached.
Presidential
restraint be
This indicated that the President had grown
10
frustrated with the length of the strike but was still
unclear about precisely what he could do to end it.
The
public, however, had its own ideas, and Roosevelt began to
feel pressure.
People were fed up with the operators'
intransigence.
As the strike continued through September,
the horrors of an impending coal famine were discussed in
both the streets and the press.
coal rose dramatically.
The price of anthracite
Normally $5-$6 per ton, i t had
climbed to $15-$20 per ton in eastern cities.
of the month,
By the end
coal was difficult to find at any price.
School openings were delayed.
Smaller industrial
either reduced operations or shut down entirely.
York City,
plants
In New
pneumonia and other diseases were reported to
be on the rise. 23
Roosevelt's papers reflect the growing intensity
of the problem.
He was besieged with calls,
telegrams
associates,
large.
from
friends
A letter from a confidante,
letters, and
and the public at
Republican Senator
Henry Cabot Lodge, perhaps best exemplifies the general
mood:
The demand that the government take the coal fields is
risinq louder all the time.
It is a perilous cry.
When cold weather comes it will be far worse.
You
have no power or authority of course -- that is the
worst of it.
Is there anything we can appear to do?
Is there any form of pressure we can put on the operators who are driving on ruin? .. Why, sane, sensible
conservative men are urging us to decla~e in our
platform that the coal fields must be taken. 4
11
Roosevelt's frustration was evident his response to his
old friend:
"There is nothing, so far as I have been able
to figure out, which the national government has any power
to do in the matter.,,25
During the last three days of September,
consulted with a number of advisors,
one of whom was
Massachusetts Governor Winthrop Crane.
year,
Roosevelt
:c:arlier in the
Crane had mediated in a strike of Teamsters in
Boston.
By pulling both
persona 1
intervention
negotiated
sides to the
provided
settlement.
Crane's
the
table,
Crane's
impetus
for
a
experience provided
Roosevelt with a format for dealing with the anthracite
dispute. 26
Though the President remained uneasy about his
jurisdiction in the matter, the time had come for concrete
efforts to avert a crisis.
When Roosevelt brought together the opposing forces
in the famous meeting of October 3, it was the first time
in American history that a President had attempted to
mediate a dispute between labor and capital.
Wright's
report had convinced him that valid issues existed that
deserved arbitration.
Risht and wrong were not key issues
for Roosevelt at this stage.
order and get
~ining
His task was to restore
restarted in the coal
fields.
Roosevelt made his position clear at the outset of the
conference.
He could not impose a settlement.
He would
12
not sit to hear each side present its claims.
Instead, he
appealed to both parties to put the needs of the country
ahead of their own desires. 27
Roosevelt's obsession with order was already
eviaent.
This theme cropped up in many of his speeches
and writings from the period.
His letters to friends in
late September and October indicate that he feared not
only a coal famine,
general strike.
but worried that it would cause a
To Roosevelt, that represented a catas-
trophe just short of civil war. 28
But if Roosevelt was concerned only with order, he
would have merely acted as past presidents had done in
previous labor disputes.
After all, Cleveland had sent
troops to crush the Pullman strike in 1894.
done likewise in a miners' strike in Idaho
later.
McKinley had
five years
Yet Roosevelt chose a different path.
astute enough to realize
miners continued to grow.
Be was
that public support for the
But he also genuinely struggled
to find a solution that would promote long-term stability
In the mines.
As he wrote to Lodge:
Most of my correspondents wish me to try something
violent and impossible.
A minor but a very
influential part desire that I send troops at once
without a shadoVl of warrant into the coal districts,
or that I bring suit against the labor organization;
the others demand that I bring suit against the
operators, or that I under the law of eminent domain,
or for the purpose of protecting the public health,
seize their property, or appoint a receiver, or do
something else that is wholly impossible. My great
13
concern is, of course, to break the famine; but I must
not be drawn into any violent
wnich would bring
reaction and disaster afterward.
SZgP
Roosevelt was not the type ever to completely abandon the
option of force.
However, he clearly wished to avoid it
in this situation.
The October 3 conference was an eye-opener for the
President.
The coal barons heaped scorn upon Mitchell and
demanded that Roosevelt send federal troops to end the
strike once and for all.
Mitchell calmly reiterated his
request for arbitration and stated his full confidence in
the President to choose an objective panel.
Roosevelt was
stunned by the operators' arrogance and impressed with
Mitchell's civil manner and flexible approach.
He
wondered for the first time whether the employers were
primarily responsible for the strike. 3D
Although the conference failed to produce a settlement,
it set into motion
a
series of
meetings
and
negotiations over the next two weeks that eventually led
to a resolution of the crisis.
Meanwhile, Roosevelt had
captured the public imagination by bringing the union and
the
operators
to
Washington.
The
New
York
Times
of
October 4 reported the public's fascination:
The President's house had not been the scene of such
excitement since the days and nishts of the Spanish
War.
All day from early this morning there was a
crowd in Lafayette Place waiting for the result of the
conference between the President and the coal
presidents and John Mitchell of the United Miners.
14
The sidewalk in front of the temporary White House and
for a hundred feet north and south of it was crowded
during most of the day. Across the street along the
park there was a big crowd peering up into the windows
of the second story for hou
in the effort to see the
President and his visitors.
31
Yet with that fascination came the responsibility to reach
a settlement.
Ironically, many who never conceived of a
mediating role for the President in June or July now
looked
famine.
to
him
as
the
last hope
in preventing
a
coal
The failure of the conference only escalated
calls for Presidential action.
There was no turning back.
In the days immediately following
Roosevelt remained unsure of his next step.
he was chafins at the bit.
In a
the conference,
By October 8,
letter to Wright,
Roosevelt expressed his desire for a " ... constitutional
amendment, conferring upon the United States the power of
supervising and regulating all great corporations doing an
interstate business."32
Without such authority, he
supported Pennsyl vania Governor Stone's move to callout
state troops to offer protection to any miner who wished
to return to work.
He also added an interesting caveat:
the State Legislature should examine the steps necessary
to seize control of the mines from the operators. 33
He
now felt urgent action was needed to end the impasse.
If
it meant offering protection to strike-breaking miners or
removing control of the mines from the operators, so be
it.
Roosevelt's views had sharpened in a hurry.
15
From the operators' point of view, Stone's move
failed miserably.
They had guaranteed that armed protec-
tion would bring miners
miners,
however,
remained off the
continue their strike.
isolated.
willingly back to work.
job and vowed to
The operators were now thoroughly
The New York State Democratic Party convention
called for nationalization of the mines.
Representatives
of 50 cities and 11 states met in Detroit
and demonstrated support for the miners.
the
The
President
receivership.
to
place
the
mines
on October 9
They called for
under
federal
Some Democrats even asked that Mitchell run
for governor of Illinois. 34
Roosevelt finally decided to play his trump card.
He met with Knox and Secretary of War Elihu Root to lay
out his plan.
federal
He would get Governor Stone to request
assistance.
Roosevelt then would send troops
under the command of a trusted military leader answerable
only to tne President.
and production
The coal fields would be seized
would begin again.
Simultaneously,
Roosevelt would appoint Labor Commissioner Wright to lead
another panel to investigate the causes of the strike and
lssue
awards.
Jurisdictional
secondary to Roosevelt.
issues
had
now
become
Reviewing his plan later with an
advisor, the President wrote:
"I do not know whether I
would have had any precedents ... but
in my
judgment it
16
would have been imperative to act,
precedent or no
precedent, and I was ready."35
Historians debate whether Roosevelt's plan was the
key to settling the strike.
Exactly how federal troops
were going to mine coal remained unclear.
Some scholars
assert
knew
that
the
operators
never
even
President's ideas to seize the mines.
of
the
Others say that
Roosevelt sent Root as an emissary to J.P. Morgan to alert
him to the plan, with the expectation that the financial
magnate would help bring the operators to their senses.
Roo t, howe v e r, den i edt hat he dis c us sed Roo s eve It's P I an
with Morgan. 36
The evidence indicates, however, that the operators
must have known about the plan.
newspaper,
the
UMW
~Q~~~~l,
On October 9, the union
reported
Roosevelt's scheme to use federal
mines. 37
in detail
troops to seize the
If the union knew and saw fit to publicize the
plan, the operators must have had similar knowledge.
prospect,
on
This
coupled with the failure of Governor Stone's
action, forced the operators to settle.
Morgan met with the operators and urged them to
come to an agreement.
On October 13, they submitted a
plan for arbitration to Roosevelt.
Not surprisingly,
it
had no place for any labor representation on the arbitration panel.
Mitchell refused to accept a board without
17
any
figures
Mitchell's
sympathetic
concerns
were
to
labor.
Roosevelt
justified.
thought
Demons tra ting
a
creative flair, he succeeded in getting the operators to
agree to an enlarged committee with a union man designated
as an
"eminent sociologist."
f ina 1
negotiati ons
with
Roosevelt described
the opera tors
in a
the
hi lar ious
letter to Lodge:
It took me about two hours before I at last grasped
the fact that the mighty brains of these captains of
industry had formulated the theory that they would
rather have anarchy than tweedledum, but that if I
used the word tweedledee they would hail it as meaning
peace.
In other words, that they had not the
slightest objection to my appointing a labor man as
'an eminent sociologist " and adding Bishop Spalding
on my own account, but they preferred to see the Red
Commune come than to have me make Bishop Spalding or
anyone else the "eminent sociologist" and add the
labor man ...}\nd accordingly, at this utterly unimportant price, we bid fair to come out of as dangerous a
situation as I have ever dealt with. 38
Roosevelt's
pragmatic
approach
to
this
succeeded in getting a panel that Mitchell
with enthusiasm.
last
impasse
could support
The UMW accepted the proposal and the
strike ended on October 15.
The settlement was hailed by many as a triumph for
the President.
The UMW succeeded where other
before had failed.
unions
The pUblic's support for the miners
helped generate a new admiration for labor organizations.
The Anthracite Coal Commission set up by the
President issued its rulings after conducting several
18
months of hearings.
the
union.
The
The awards were a mixed blessing for
panel
averaged ten percent.
cases
from
operators
ten
an
importantly,
authorized a pay increase that
It reduced working hours in most
to nine
hours
increase
in
~~ fact~
tion in the
the price
It
of
granted the
coal.
Most
Mitchell argued that the union
recognition by virtue of its participa-
Washington conference and
negotiations and hearings.
disagreed.
day.
it denied the UMW formal recognition as the
miners' bargaining agent.
had won
a
On this point,
the
subsequent
Other UMW leaders bitterly
the Commission rulings sparked
widespread debate within the labor movement.
Mitchell gave Roosevelt full credit for settling
the
strike.
The
New
York
Times
also
negotiating skills and impartial stand.
recognized
that
Roosevelt
service to the country.39
had
praised
his
Even The Na tion
prov ided
a
nece s sary
The President proudly promoted
the settlement in speeches across the country.
He had
secured two important planks for his re-election campaign
in 1904:
the Northern Securities case had provided him
with the banner of trust control;
the coal settlement
would help promote him as a fighter for the legitimate
rights of labor.
The significance of Roosevelt's role should not be
understated.
He broke precedent and established new
19
ground.
For the first time,
the President had called
representatives of labor and capital to Washington in the
midst of a critical dispute.
For the first time,
the
federal government attempted to mediate the settlement of
a labor conflict.
both sides
An arbitration panel was set up with
pledged to accept the
results.
And the
President threatened to use federal troops to seize and
operate a major industry.
These were thoroughly novel
prospects, to say the least.
things,
They implied, among other
that justice might actually be on labor's side.
The government's traditional
struggles had been challenged.
isolation in economic
It had now become a third
force in relations between labor and capital.
is even more
played
in
significant
labor
predecessors.
The impact
when one remembers the role
disputes
by
Roosevelt's
immediate
Had Roosevelt followed suit, the miners may
well have faced hostile federal troops.
To his credit,
Roosevelt recognized the needs and sentiments of the time.
He also displayed a talent for leadership that enabled him
to weave his way through
jurisdictional questions and
chart a new course for the federal
government,
understood the impact of his actions.
draft
of
his
participants,
statement
to
the
and he
In the original
October
conference
Roosevelt wrote that " ... no precedent of
interference in strikes will be created.
II
He deleted that
20
comment from his final text. 40
times,
He recognized that, at
it would be necessary and proper for the government
to intervene.
Historians disagree about the reasons behind Roosevelt's
actions.
primarily
to
Some
preserve
feel
the
that
the
political
President
fortunes
acted
of
Republican Party and to stem the socialist threat.
emphasize the danger of a coal famine.
that
Roosevelt
sensed
a
personal
authority from the operators.
even wrote
the
Others
Still others feel
challenge
to
his
One prominent historian
that Roosevelt acted in
Hanna's presidential aspirations.
order
to undercut
Some popular writers
credit Roosevelt's strong sense of justice and decisive
leadership.41
Most
of
these
arguments
have
some
credibility.
Roosevelt's fear of socialism is well documented.
During the strike, correspondents expressed concern to the
President
that
the
Socialists
would
profit
from
the
crisis. 42 Yet the Socialist Party played a limited role in
the strike.
It left the leadership of the struggle to
Mitchell and local UMW officials.
efforts
on
distributing
The Party focused its
propaganda
materials
and
organizing socialist locals in mining districts to prepare
for
upcomlng
congressional
elections. 43
Roosevelt's
letters give no indication that the Socialist Party's
21
activities during the strike concerned him.
The President's correspondence also
shows that he
resented the operators for their arrogant display at the
October conference.
Roosevelt was not a man who took
challenges to his authority lightly.
The operators'
attitude certainly made it easier for him to act against
them.
He ultimately felt that their actions were stupid
However, historians who emphasize
and short-sighted.
this effectively belittle how Roosevelt struggled to find
his bearings during the crisis.
His letters,
even to
trusted friends, place more emphasis on the danger of a
coal famine than on any personal vendetta against the
operators. 44
Some feel
that the danger of a coal famine was
greatly exaggerated.
There is evidence, for example, that
bituminous coal remained in good supply.45
Yet, Roosevelt
truly believed that a famine was imminent.
The concern is
everywhere in his letters beginning in late September.
His
thoughts
are
best
expressed
in
a
note
to
Morgan
representative Robert Bacon:
If when the severe weather comes on there is a coal
famine I dread to think of the suffering, in parts of
our great cities especially, and I fear there will be
fuel riots of as bad a type as any bread riots we have
ever seen ... It is a dreadful thing to be brought face
to face with the necessity of taking measures, however
unavoidable, which will mean the death of men who have
been maddened by want and suffering.
I feel that
22
whatever I possibly can do to avert such a necessity I
must do; and I must not cease in my effor-;s while even
the slightest chance of success remains. 4
The state of the coal supply is certainly debatable.
But
there is no question that Roosevelt thought a famine was
imminent and worked to prevent it.
It is difficult to understand the contention that
Roosevelt sought political advantage over Hanna.
the
press
frequently
Presidential
candidate
referred to
ln
the
the
1904
Although
Senator
election,
as
he
and
Roosevelt had developed a close working relationship,
least on the coal issue.
a
at
Hanna participated in meetings
with the President and served as Roosevelt's emissary in
negotiations with Mitchell.
Roosevelt treated him more as
a trusted advisor than a potential adversary.47
However, the President was too much the politician
to be guided solely by reforming zeal.
He saw that a long
conflict spelled trouble for the Republican Party.
had
seen
the
strike as
a
golden
opportunity
to
If he
make
changes, he would have acted decisively at a much earlier
stage in the dispute.
The dye was cast
intransigent
union.
coal
After all,
the strike began in May.
immediately between reactionary and
operators
and
a
moderate,
flexible
Carroll Wright's report at the strike's outset
gave the President ample reason to press the operators to
improve working conditions.
An ardent reformer would have
23
seized the opportunity provided by the strike to push
immediately for
a
settlement that
would have granted
formal recognition to the UMW as well as improvements in
working
conditions.
Yet Rooseve I t
reacted cautiously at
first, weighing jurisdictional questions with political
considerations.
It was August before he took an active
role in the conflict.
Roosevelt's actions
were, in my judgment, based
on both ideological precepts and practical considerations.
The President
had made his views clear concerning the
relationship between labor and capital in a Progressive
society.
His role in the anthracite strike merely
reflected that vision.
bilities.
Each side had rights and responsi-
Those who refused to recognize them earned
Roosevelt's disgust.
Roosevelt's suspicion of the
wealthy elite was illustrated by his mistrust of the coal
operators.
Their stubborness and greed made the industry
a perfect target for intervention.
have to
make
sure
that
the
The government would
employers
behaved
in
a
responsible manner.
Roosevelt also believed that workers had the right
to organize, especially if their unions were moderate.
Under Mitchell's leadership,
the UMW was a model of a
conservative,
labor
responsible
organization.
It
constantly demonstrated a willingness to make concessions.
24
It preferred to rely on civic-minded organizations like
the NCF to promote its causes.
The UMW wanted labor peace
and asked to be recognized as a partner in production.
used the strike only as a last resort.
It
What more could
Roosevelt ask of a labor union?
The obstinance of the operators and the compliance
of the union made it easier for Roosevelt to remain true
to his convictions.
The danger of a coal famine made it
imperative that he act.
Fear of a winter without coal
made the public more receptive to an innovative solution
to the crisis.
Roosevelt reacted far differently to other labor
disputes during his administration.
involved
in
a
bitter
strike
in
He refused to get
Colorado
in
1904.
He
dispatched federal troops that were used to crush mining
strikes in Arizona in 1903 and in Nevada in 1908.
These
strikes involved miners' organizations that were far more
militant than Mitchell's UMW.
We will examine one of
these disputes in more detail later.
Such events demon-
strate that it is difficult to label Roosevelt as a friend
of labor.
Yet, in 1902, the forces involved combined with the
needs of the moment, and Roosevelt made history.
woras of one historian:
partly by design,
In the
"He preached, partly by instinct,
what the self-conscious middle class, a
25
~afe majority,
believed."48
strengthened
the
negotiations
as
hand
a
way
of
The settlement of the strike
Progressives
to secure
labor
who
sought
peace.
The
President successfully established himself and the federal
government as a buffer between the radical left and the
selfish rich.
In the process, he set a new standard for
others to follow.
CHAPTER TWO
THE GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
AND THE OPEN SHOP
When Rooseve 1t
intervened in the Anthracite Coal
Strike of 1902 and met with both the coal operators and
the mine workers' union, his action effectively recognized
the legitimate right of labor organizations to bargain
with capital.
His efforts to help mediate the strike won
accolades from the labor movement and enmity from intransigent capitalists and their allies in the press.
saw the anthracite settlement as a victory for labor.
Most
But
scarcely a year later, the case of William Miller and the
Government Printing Office (GPO) effectively evened the
score.
The President was vacationing in Oyster Bay, New
York in the summer of 1903 when controversy erupted in the
Government Printing Office.
A foreman had been fired
because he had been expelled from his union.
to
the Civil
His appeals
Service Commission and the Roosevelt
administration set the stage for the President to address
the
volatile
issues
of
the
between labor and management.
no strike in this case,
Roosevelt's
actions
here
union
shop
and
relations
perhaps because there was
historians have not examined
as
26
thoroughly
as
they
have
27
addressed
his
role
in
other
episode is significant.
William
Miller
opinions
on
the
issues. l
But
the
The President's action in the
case vividly
rights
labor
and
demonstrated
Roosevelt's
responsibilities
of
labor
unions.
The GPO had been a closed shop since its inception
in 1860 when the government purchased its printing plant
from
private hands.
organized and the
The printing trades were well
government did not
challenge
their
ability to represent all who worked in the facility.
The
closed shop first became an issue in 1897 when a group of
electrotypers refused to pay union dues.
1ater,
Three years
another recal ci trant employee refused to
join the
International Brotherhood of Bookbinders after his sixmonth probationary period in the GPO had passed.
cases,
In both
Public Printer Frank Palmer forced the men to
submit to the union to keep their
jobs.
Palmer,
the
facility manager, had no desire to challenge the closed
shop policy and risk a confrontation with the unions. 2
The GPO hac gradually developed into a large and
un ..; ie I dy burea ucr acy.
Al though Congres s was
supposed to
supervise the workings of the agency, most of its efforts
.."ent
towards
securing
appointments,
promotions
contracts for members' friends and political allies.
the words of one historian:
and
In
"AI though Congress maintained
28
a constant interest in such matters as personnel and paper
contracts, it manifested little concern for the efficiency
and economy of the GpO."3
In effect, the GPO under Palmer
enjoyed nearly complete administrative independence.
Roosevelt was not comfortable with this situation.
Never
one
to
tolerate
inefficiency,
the
President
expressed his concern about cronyism and patronage rampant
in government service.
In 1902,
he called for government
appointments to be based solely on merit.
criticized the operations of the GPO,
He also
particularly in his
annual address before Congress:
There is a growing tendency to provide for the publication of masses of documents for which there is no
public demand and for the printing of which there is
no real necessity.
Large numbers of volumes are
turned out by the government printing-presses for
which there is no justification.... The excessive cost
of government printing is a strong argument in support
of the position of those who are inclined, on abstract
grounds to advocate the government's not doing any
work which can with propriety be left in private
hands. 4
Even before the Miller controversy,
Roosevelt was clearly
unhappy with the state of affairs in the GPO.
William
Miller
assistant foreman,
joined the GPO in 1900.
As an
he established a uniform system of
recording work and developed cheaper bindings.
He a 1 so
earned the wrath of the unions by his outspoken criticism
of their practices on the shop floor.
own
union,
the
Bookbinders,
He claimed that his
resisted
the
innovation
29
necessary to improve productivity.
Many in the union felt
that Miller's changes would lead to a reduction in the
work force.
The differences led to a series of conflicts
between Miller and the Bookbinders between September, 1902
and April,
1903.
Finall y,
the Bookbinders had had enou9h
and expelled Miller from the union on May 12, 1903. 5
Public Printer Palmer immediately suspended Miller
from
his
later.
position at the GPO and fired him five days
Once again, he sought to avoid a clash with the
Bookbinders over the union shop issue.
The incident would
have probably died here in the GPO as others before it,
except Miller fou9ht back.
He filed a complaint with the
Civil Service Commission and appealed to Attorney General
philander Knox.
Knox sent a copy of the appeal to Roose-
velt and to Secretary of Commerce and Labor George
Cortelyou.
At the behest of the President,
both Cortelyou
and the Civil Service Commission began an investigation
into the complaint. 6
The Civil
Service Commission issued a ruling two
months later on July 6.
Civil Service Rule XII stated
that no person shall be removed "except for such cause as
will
promote
the
efficiency
of
the
public
service.,,7
Palmer had argued that Miller's disputes with the union
had created dissension
in
the ranks
hindered the efficiency of the agency.
of
the GPO and
The Commission
30
disagreed,
stating that Miller's expulsion from the union
had little impact on his ability to perform his duties.
It ordered Palmer to reinstate his assistant foreman. 8
But
Palmer
reinstatement
Roosevelt,
would
vacillated,
cause
a
fearing
strike.
that
In
a
Miller's
letter
to
he attempted to justify the termination of his
assistant foreman:
In view of the feeling of antagonism which had grown
up between Mr. Miller and employees in the bindery,
and because of the belief that he had lost the respect
and confidence of those with whom he had formerly been
associated, and because his continuance in the office
after his expulsion would have resulted in the
withdrawal of the entire force of bookbinders here for
an indefinite period, thus paralysing the work of the
office,
~
deemed i t my duty to authorize his
dismissal.
It
is at this point that Roosevelt got more
actively involved in the dispute.
submission to the union,
Appalled by Palmer's
the President ordered Cortelyou
to conduct interviews with both Palmer and
Miller.
Miller provided Cortelyou with a scathing critique of
Palmer's incompetence and union obstruction of his efforts
to increase efficiency.
refute
Instead,
Miller's
charges
Palmer made little attempt to
during
his
own
interview.
he focused on his desire to maintain labor peace
in the GPO. l 0
After completing his interviews, Cortelyou offered
influential advice to the President.
He suggested that
Roosevelt instruct Palmer to comply with the Commission
31
ruling,
tion.
pending the completion of Cortelyou's investisaThe Secretary thought this would be the best way to
avoid a strike.
A presidential directive backing the
Commission's ruling without passing judgment on Miller
would make the union think twice about walking out. ll
Roosevelt
reveal ing reply,
accepted
Cortelyou's
advice.
In
a
the President wrote of his apprehension
over the impending conflict with labor, but asserted that
he had no choice:
I think your suggestions excellent .... The Lord knows
that I do not want to get into a needless conflict
with a labor union, especially in the year before a
Presidential election.
But on the other hand I can
not possibly submit to any such position as that taken
by the labor union in question and acquiesced in by
Public Printer Palmer. His letter is extraordinary.
He admits in effect that he has turned over the discipline of his office to an outside labor organization
and that he dismisses from office on the complaint of
that organization any man whom the organization has
~oted t? censure or dis~ipline for his con1~ct within
l.t; ... Th1.s I regard as l.ntolerable tyranny.
Roosevelt then notified Palmer that he must reinstate
Mi ller at once.
Although
Roosevelt
also
told
Cortelyou's complete investigation
Palmer
that
would ultimately
determine Miller's fate,
it appears that Roosevelt had
already made up his mind.
He certainly had no confidence
in Palmer and was already looking for a way to get rid of
him.
GPO
He asked Cortelyou to examine Palmer's management of
affairs
and
assumed
that
the
Public Printer's
32
inability to handle his unions also meant that he probably
had no control over financial
and administrative affairs
either. 13
But
there
was
another
reason
why Roosevelt
exhibited little patience with Palmer and moved so quickly
on the Miller case.
The administration was gradually
becoming mired in a scandal
agency, the Post Office.
involving another government
In May and June, the press was
awash with stories of mismanagement, inefficiency, and
corruption in the nation's postal system.
Some newspapers
called for Grover Cleveland to return to the political
fray
to oppose Roosevelt
in the 1904 election. 14
President's political stock was falling
picked up the Miller case in July.
Ti~es
The
when the press
When the New York
ran a story on July 28 citing Miller's account of
inefficiency and mismanagement at the GPO,IS Roosevelt was
already convinced that a quick resolution was essential.
Although the President was clearly concerned about
his political fortunes,
a dilemma.
the Miller case presented him with
He could not ignore the closed shop issue as
McKinley had in 1897,
primarily because union control
appeared to many people to be the central cause of the
glaring inefficiencies within the GPO that were now coming
to
light.
To
stand
for
both a
union
shop and
for
proDuctivity reforms would be seen as a contradiction.
33
And given the growing outrage over mismanagement in the
public sector, the President really had no choice but to
promote actively the need for administrative changes.
Miller
case,
therefore,
The
brought the President onto a
collision course with organized labor over one of its most
cherished
principles,
the
union
shop.
With
the
presidential election just a year away, Roosevelt faced
the possibility of destroying the strong ties with labor
that had been built amidst the tension and drama of the
anthracite coal strike.
To
his
credit,
Roosevelt
reacted
in
a
manner
consistent with his views on labor-capital relations.
remained
He
adamant that labor unions had a right to exist
and that workers had every reason to want to join them.
He once wrote:
If I were a factory employee, a workman on the
railroads or a wage-earner of any sort, I would
undoubtedly join the union of my trade .... I believe in
the union and I believe that all men who are benefited
by the union are morally bound to help to the extent
of.thet~ power in the common interests advanced by the
unJ.on.
Yet Roosevelt also supported an open shop policy.
view:
"The
non-unionist,
like
the
unionist,
In his
must
be
protected in all his legal rights by the full weight and
po we r
was
0
f
the I a w. "I 7
revealed
settlement of
to
Roosevelt's belief in the open shop
United
Mine
Workers
the anthracite dispute.
members
in
Despite his
the
clear
34
sympathy for their cause and his intervention that
effectively granted legitimacy to their struggle,
the
President still agreed with the ruling of the Anthracite
Coal Strike Commission that left Pennsylvania mines open
to both union and non-union workers. 18
Roosevelt
responsibly.
also
felt
In his view,
that
unions
must
this meant that they
act
must
reject violence, abide by the law, and honor the letter
and spirit of any collective bargaining agreements they
signed.
It also meant that they must accept the presence
of non-union workers in their midst.
Roosevelt saw this
as merely a matter of fairness to both sides, part of his
Square Deal doctrine. 19
Unions must also never usurp the power of the
government or challenge the authority of the President.
Roosevelt believed that labor was
duty bound to honor
federal and civil regulations even when they ran contrary
to union policies. 20
He could never recognize that the
Bookbinders had the authority to override civil service
regulations in the GPO and force the termination of a man
who did not wish to be a member of the union in the first
place. Ultimately, he saw the issue in stark terms:
was
attempting
Roosevelt,
to
dictate
of course,
to a friend:
policy
to
the
labor
government.
would not stand for this.
He wrote
"Once and for all I intend to settle the
35
question
of
the
trades-unions
usurping
governmental
functions.,,21
In August,
Roosevelt issued a presidential decree
that extended the open shop to all executive departments.
Now
several
thousand
union
members
were
affected
in
addition to the 500 members of the Bookbinders union.
Roosevelt acted as soon as he began to be appraised of the
results of Cortelyou's ongoing investigation into the GPO.
As the President expected,
the examination was uncovering
evidence of poor administration and unnecessarily high
costs. 22
Roosevelt fired off an angry letter to Palmer
and stated that the Public Printer must shoulder the blame
for the
sorry state of affairs at the GPO.
The President
told Palmer of the need to rectify shoddy practices and
then added in a tone that scarcely hid his contempt for
the beleaguered administrator:
"It seems to reflect most
seriously upon any Government officer that i t should be
necessary to make recommendations of this kind ... I shall
be pleased to hear from you anything you have to say in
the way of explanation or defense in this matter.,,23
Roosevelt's directives to Palmer drew favorable
reviews from the nation's press.
Newspapers first picked
up the story in July when Miller's appeal and Roosevelt's
preliminary ruling became public knowledge.
one
survey,
Republican,
According to
Democratic and Independent
36
newspapers generally supported the President's
the open shop.24
When Roosevelt would not budge in the
face of strike rumors,
even long-time critics of the
President offered praise for his stand.
press
saw this
finally
as
a
sign
that
perhaps
recognized the evils of
editor wrote:
stand for
The anti-labor
Roosevelt had
trade unionism.
One
"As long as he was dealing with strikes
against other people, he, by implication, seemed to be the
champion of unionism,
but when its intolerance was shown
to have permeated the government service he woke up to
this menace to free institutions. "25
Although Roosevelt never wavered in his support
for workers' right to join unions, the Miller case clearly
helped generate support for the President in the business
community.
Capital had been wary of his administration.
The Northern Securities case, the Anthracite settlement
and the establishment of a federal Bureau of Corporations
produced many enemies for Roosevelt on Wall Street.
There
were even rumors that he would be abandoned by business
interests in the 1904 campaign. 26
Roosevelt's stand for
the open shop in government service brought some back into
the fold and neutralized others.
example,
David Parry,
for
President of the influential conservative
business organization,
the National Association of
Manufacturers, gave Roosevelt his enthusiastic support. 27
37
Roosevelt also received effusive
support
from
Henry Cabot Lodge. His friend assured the President that
The senator was also
he had taken the correct course.
convinced that the position would reap dividends during
election time.
Lodge analyzed the political impact of
the Miller case in a letter to Roosevelt:
Your position and your action were both so fair and so
absolutely right that I do not think the labor
organizations will undertake to make a public issue
upon it, and the amount of secret opposition which
they can get up I do not think would cut any figure in
a Presidential election.
It would be confined to a
comparatively small number of agitators, and I do not
think would appeal to a great body of sensible labor
union men and other Republicans.
The country will
certainly not forget your attitude in regard to the
big corporations.
That is impressed on the pUb~~C
mind, and will give us great strength at the polls.
Lodge's prediction of labor's response
correct.
Many
unions
did make a
was only partially
public issue out of
Roosevelt's action, but their efforts proved to be utterly
unsuccessful.
Rumors of a strike at the GPO circulated throughout washington in July after Roosevelt instructed Palmer
to
reinstate
Miller.
Roosevelt
doused
the
fire
immediately with harsh talk that made its way back to the
Bookbinders.
He threatened:
"If those labor union men
strike not one jack of them will do another stroke of
government work whil e I am President. ,,29
took
a
different
tack.
They
claimed
The union then
that
Miller's
38
personal habits made him unfit for government service.
He was accused of being a bigamist and charged with sexual
harassment of women at the GPO.
presented by
the
union
These new charges were
to both Cortelyou and Palmer.
Cortelyou said that Palmer had the authority to evaluate
these accusations.
However,
Palmer vacillated,
hoping to
wait for Cortelyou to complete his investigation before
having to pass judgment.
Thoroughly frustrated with this
impasse, some workers began again to consider a strike.
But union leaders took Roosevelt at his word and did not
want their men to lose their jobs. 30
The union was growing desperate.
Miller's
character,
partial victory.
they
left
only
the
By focusing on
chance
for
a
Even if Miller was subsequently removed
due to the personal charges, it was entirely conceivable
that the Administration would still uphold the principle
of the open shop.
Firing a man because he was morally
unfit for government service would hardly send a message
that the union shop was safe in the GPO.
Roosevelt fully
recognized this when he agreed to let Cortelyou's investigation run its course before revealing his final opinions
on the state of the GPO.
The union next appealed to the Washington Central
Labor Union for assistance.
with the approval of the AFL,
the federation mailed a circular to 500 unions across the
39
country requesting passage of a resolution that criticized
Roosevelt for reinstating Miller.
The petition was mild
in tone, calling Roosevelt's action "unfriendly" towards
organized
labor
reconsider
his
petition,
and
requesting
action. 31
Many
but others did not.
that
the
unions
President
supported
the
They were reluctant to
criticize, even mildly, a President who was seen as an
ally of the labor movement. 32
The Bookbinders and the Central Labor Union then
turned to the AFL and asked Samuel Gompers to intervene in
their behalf.
The subsequent efforts of the AFL leader
were half-hearted at best.
Gompers believed that he had
cultivated a close relationship with Roosevelt, and he did
not want the Miller case to jeopardize it.
the union shop was at stake,
one gets
Even thouoh
the sense that
Gompers belittled the significance of the GPO matter. 33
Gompers
did
request
a
meeting
President and the AFL Executive Committee.
between
the
But the Miller
case was only one among several issues that Gompers cited
as a reason for the meeting.
His letter to Roosevelt
contained only a perfunctory reference to the dispute:
"Then, again, the controversy in the case of William A.
Miller,
who was dismissed from the public service and re-
instated by your order,
has been submitted to us. ,,34
tone was almost apologetic.
The
There were no comments about
40
the importance of the issue to labor or the ramifications
of the open shop question.
Gompers had no intention of
letting the Miller case lead to a showdown between the AFL
and the President.
Roosevelt agreed to meet the AFL delegation at the
White House on September 29.
The press fumed and fretted.
for examp Ie,
The New York
indicated that Roosevelt
might
thought the meeting
reverse
his
ruling on
Miller:
It is inconceivable that the President needs information from the leaders of organized labor in the
United States as to what he should do in this or any
other case .... We confidently hope, for the sake of the
President's self respect and the respect in which he
is held by good citizens generally, that the whole
story of his vacillation and his determination to
take counsel of the trades union leaders in a plain
matter
of public duty is a creation of the lively
imagination of one of them, in whom the wish is
father to the thought. 35
The
Ti~es
followed this editorial with a report two days
later that claimed the President might dismiss Miller on
moral grounds. 36
The Times had no cause for alarm.
Roosevelt had
not changed his mind at all and had no interest in passing
judgment on Mi ller's mora I character.
While he listened
to the AFL's comments on other issues, he made it clear
during the meeting that the Miller case was not open for
discussion.
reiterated
He merely read a statement to the group that
his
position.
Refering
to
Mi ller,
the
41
President said:
The question of his personal fitness is one to be
settled in the routine of administrative detail, and
cannot be allowed to conflict with or to complicate
the larger question of governmental discrimination for
or against him or any other man because he is or is
not a member of a union.
This is the only question
now
before me f~f decision, and as to this my
decision is
final.
Although Roosevelt had granted a hearing to the AFL,
it
was now clear to all concerned that the GPO would be an
open
shop.
After the meeting,
the AFL issued a statement.
Although it asserted its support for the union shop, the
federation
Instead,
refused
it argued
to
that
criticize Roosevelt directly.
the
President's
intended to be directed only to
addition,
decision
government service.
was
In
the federation claimed that Roosevelt actually
supported a closed shop in the private sector. 38
Gompers hoped to convince his constituents that
labor had suffered only a partial defeat. It was true that
Roosevelt's
emp loymen t.
judgment
applied
only
to
government
The President had no jurisdiction to rule on
the union shop in private industry.
But it was patently
false that Roosevelt favored the closed shop outside of
the public sector.
Roosevelt's oft-stated preference that
workers should join unions never meant to
actually had to do so.
him that they
It was merely a choice that every
laborer had a right to make.
No matter how Gompers tried
42
to explain it, Roosevelt's statement during his meeting
with the AFL represented a clear blow to labor's goal of
the closed shop.
Interestingly, Roosevelt let Gompers' statement go
unchallenged.
In a remarkably ambiguous statement to an
associate, he attempted to explain why:
As regards Mr. Gornpers' account of what I said, it of
course ought to be known by everyone that I am
responsible only for what I myself say, and not for
what others say I say .... I had an extremely frank talk
with him and the rest of the Supreme Council
afterwards, in which I explained what my unofficial
and private views were in a way that they could not
possibly misunderstand -- although of course there is
always a possibility of misrepresentation where there
is no misunderstanding .... hThat Mr. Gompers said of my
attitude amounts of course to a misrepresentation
chiefly in the way of suppression of essential truths.
But all this aside.
Exactly as verbal statements
cannot be allowed to alter a written contract, so Mr.
Gompers' memory ... cannot be held to alter, add to, or
detract from, what I said to him reading from a
written ~ocumen~ whicfgwas published at once as having
been sald to hlm; ...
In the midst of this murkiness lay the calculations of a
shrewd politician.
In essence, Roosevelt said that he
expected this to happen.
He would not worry, because the
confusing statement came from Gompers, not him.
It was
unnecessary for him to publicly defend or criticize the
AFL leader's comments.
All he had to do was to stand by
his own statement he made to the AFL and subsequently
released
to
the
press.
This
tactical
maneuver
gave
Gompers the opportunity to save face while Roosevelt lost
43
nothing.
He had made his point perfectly clear on the
Miller case.
He had already made his opinion known on the
closed shop in private industry during the course of the
anthracite settlement.
over
an
issue
that
There was no need to pick a fight
lay
outside
the
scope
of
his
presidential authority in the year before an election.
Roosevelt made additional efforts to soften the
blow of the Miller ruling with labor.
He expressed his
support for two key legislative goals of the AFL at the
meeting.
He told them that he would support efforts to
pass an eight hour work day bill and restrict the use of
injunctions against labor.
He also promised to investi-
gate the case of Ephraim Clark, a jailed merchant seaman
who had become a labor cause celebre.
the AFL.
This helped mollify
The organization again avoided direct criticism
of the President when its members met in November for
their
annual
convention.
The
convention
passed
a
resolution in support of the union shop in all areas but
requested only that Roosevelt examine affidavits from
Bookbinders to consider whether Miller's character was
appropriate for one in government service. 40
The convention bound Gompers to continued efforts
to get Miller removed from office.
However,
for all
practical purposes, the case ceased to be a major issue
from the moment Roosevelt read his statement to the AFL
44
council on September 29.
In February,
Gompers
Palmer with formal documents accusing Miller of
p~esented
wife-beating, bigamy and fraud.
not respond.
whether
made a last appeal
The President instructed Pa lmer to decide
the charges of
dismissal.
Once again, Palmer did
Gompers, for the record,
to Rooseve 1 t.
advice.
1904,
moral
misconduct
warranted
The Public Printer then went to Cortelyou for
Miller had proved to be an inval uable informant
for Cortelyou's ongoing investigation of the GPO,
and the
Secretary did not want to lose his source of information.
In June,
charges
Palmer
filed
finally
against
saw
Miller
fit
to declare
were
ability to perform the duties
that
irrelevant
to
required by his
the
his
job.
Gompers accepted this decision as final and the case was
closed.
Cortelyou's investigation concluded that the GPO
was poorly administered and plagued by unduly high costs.
He recommended that Palmer be fired.
for Palmer,
immediately.
favoritism
equipment,
Given his contempt
it is surprising that Roosevelt did not comply
But when the Public Printer was charged with
in
securing
contracts
Roosevelt finally
fired
for
new
him
in
printing
September,
1905. 41
The federal service has remained an open shop ever
since Roosevelt's action in the Miller incident.
also sparked Congressional
The case
investigations into the
45
practices of the GPO that ultimately led to a series of
reforms in its administrative methods.
Roosevelt was proud of his role in the GPO affair.
In his mind, i t demonstrated the fairness with which he
approached relations between labor and capital.
prepared for
his
re-e lection campaign in 1904,
As he
Rooseve 1t
listed i t alongside the Northern Securities case and the
anthracite settlement as among the most significant events
in his first term.
He advised his supporters that all
three indicated "... that corporation and labor union alike
have been protected when they have been within the law,
and yet have been held to a rigid accountability to the
law, and that equal justice has been dealt to all men-and this not as a figure of speech,
Roosevelt saw his
role as
successful one at that.
a
but in actual fact.,,42
taskmaster,
and a
rather
In a letter to his son just prior
to the election of 1904, the President took on the tone of
a school teacher:
" ... my action in the so-called Hiller
case ... gave to trades-unions a lesson that had been tausrht
corporations
that I
favored them while they did right
and was not in the least afraid of them when they did
wrong.,,43
This was precisely how Roosevelt saw his role:
an impartial activist who guaranteed a Square Deal for
all.
President
McKinley
had
ignored the
union
shop
46
issue when it surfaced in the GPO in 1897.
Roosevelt did
not have the luxury to do the same in 1903.
The Post
Office scandal created public awareness of trouble in the
government
service.
Miller's
indictment of
both the
Bookbinders and Palmer linked the union with disturbing
tales
of
mismanagement
and
inefficiency.
realized that any investigation
of the mess at the GPO
had to address the closed shop issue.
situation.
Roosevelt
It was a risky
Roosevelt had to do something to stop the
tidal wave of stories about corruption and mismangement in
government.
Yet he was sure to clash with labor if he
took action.
Their support in next year's election could
not then be guaranteed.
However, Roosevelt approached his task with relish.
Utterly convinced that he was right, he rode forth to do
battle against union "tyranny" in the same manner that he
had fought corporate "lawlessness".
principles,
even
if
they
yielded
Throughout the Miller case,
He stood fast to his
ambiguous
results.
he constantly reminded
colleagues that he supported a union's right to organize.
Yet he never gave any indication that he understood the
impact
that an
open shop had on a
represent its members.
union's ability to
He naively assumed that labor
would come to compete with capital on an equal footing in
an open shop environment, despite the monumental financial
47
and political advantages enjoyed by business.
Despite
Roosevelt's
assertion
ruling applied only to government work,
utilized it to aid their cause.
that
the
Miller
anti-labor forces
The momentum gained by
labor after the anthracite settlement now shifted to the
employers.
The Miller case, for example, gave a healthy
boost to the campaign of
the
National
Association of
Manufacturers to promote the open shop across the country.
While labor continued to organize effectively,
the closed
shop became even harder to attain. 44
Labor was caught in a difficult spot in the Miller
ca s e.
It could never agree to the open shop.
Yet
moderate leaders like Gompers and AFL Vice-President John
Mitchell were uncomfortable with the closed shop in the
GPO since it violated civil service regulations.
All
these leaders could do was attempt to save face without
defying the law or President Roosevelt.
Roosevelt was shrewd enough to allow them some
room to maneuver.
It paid off for him as well,
support for his re-election remained strong.
as labor
At the same
time, he reaped big dividends in the business community.
Many business leaders were satisfied that Roosevelt had
finally stood up to the unions.
The President staked out a position that enabled
him to successfully portray his actions as consistent with
48
the framework of the Square Deal doctrine.
Unions had a
legitimate right to exist in modern American society.
Workers were free to choose whether they wished to join
them.
Both labor and capital must act in a responsible
and orderly fashion. William Miller regained his job,
Theodore Roosevelt emerged as the big winner.
but
Chapter 3
THE GOLDFIELD STRIKE, 1907-1908
In the anthracite
proved
to
be
a
coal strike of 1902, Roosevelt
succes s fu 1
media tor
in
the
pro longed
dispute between the United Mine Workers and obstinate coal
operators.
For the first time, the federal government had
played an active role in promoting a
settlement that
essentially acknowledged the right of labor unions to
represent their workers in negotiations with capital.
In
the Miller case the following year, Roosevelt defined the
limits of union authority in the government service and
took a stand in favor of the open shop.
Several years
later, Roosevelt found himself embroiled in another labor
controversy.
This time he quickly dispatched federal
troops to Goldfield,
strike.
Nevada in the midst of a bitter
The employers used the troops to break the union
and crush the walk-out.
The events at Goldfield give us
another opportunity to examine Roosevelt's perspective on
the labor movement.
The
Goldfield
dispute
provides
Roosevelt
scholars with a far greater challenge than the coal strike
of 1902.
about
There is simply much more information available
Roosevelt's
anthracite industry.
actions
during
the
saga
of
the
The President's papers and letters
give a clear glimpse of what was going on in his mind
49
50
during
the
1902
. ramifications,
crisis .
The
strike
had
national
particularly in the Fall when the danger of
a coal famine seemed quite real to many people.
result,
the press coverage was extensive,
As a
and as the
strike lingered on into September the editorials were
plentiful.
The Goldf ield strike was entirely different.
The dispute was restricted to a mining town in Nevada.
It
became a matter of national interest only when Roosevelt
sent in the troops.
With the exception of telegrams to
Nevada's governor that were made public during the strike,
very little can be found in Roosevelt's letters and papers
about Goldfield.
Newspaper coverage was more sporadic.
It is more difficult to determine what was behind the
President's
actions.
We
must
take
what
we
can
from
Roosevelt's material and try to understand the events and
forces in the Nevada strike.
The
growth
of
the
Goldfield
mining
district
coincided with the defeat of the Western Federation of
Miners (WFM) at Cripple Creek,
Colorado in 1904.
Workers
deported by the Colorado state militia during the conflict
made their way to the next mining site.
Miners embittered
by their experiences in Cripple Creek formed the core of
the workforce in the mines of Goldfield. l
class conflict,
Schooled in
these miners also proved to be the
backbone of a new,
militant labor federation formed in
1905, the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW),
which
51
In his
would not prove to be a force for moderation.
opening address to the Founding Convention of the IWW,
William
Haywood summed
up
the
purpose
of
the
new
organization:
We are here to confederate the workers of this country
into a working class movement that shall have for its
purpose the emancipation of 2he working class from the
slave bondage of capitalism.
Haywood was also a well-known leader of the WFM.
His
union was incorporated into the IWW as the "Mining
Department" in August, 1905.
By that time, the Federation
had already been active in Goldfield for over a
appealing to gold miners
consciousness.
year,
with its own brand of class
Miners who were known to have been
strikebreakers in Cripple Creek had been quickly run out
of town by WFM members. 3
WFM Local
220
stood in stark contrast to the
American Federation of Labor (AFL) affiliate in Goldfield,
the Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners Local 1761.
A
smaller AFL affiliate, the Federal Union also organized in
the Fall of 1904.
The AFL unions were smaller and lacked
the militancy of the WFM.
concerned
with
maintaining
While the AFL unions were
recogni tion
and
securing
contracts from employers, the WFM openly challenged the
hegemony of capital and promoted socialism as the ultimate
solution
for
inevitable,
the
working
not only
class.
A conflict
was
between the WFM and the mine
operators, but between the radical and conservative unions
52
as we 11. 4
Radical forces grew with the arrival of the IWW in
Goldfield in 1906.
Federal Union,
By Sprinq, the IWW had absorbed the
and their organizational efforts increased.
The IWW organized workers across craft lines, mixing mine
workers with waiters and bartenders in the town saloons.
The leadership of WFM Local 220 cooperated with the IWW.
By the end of
summer,
traditional
craft unionism had
clearly been supplanted in Goldfield by organizations that
had a revolutionary perspective on labor relations. 5
The
disputes that began in September 1906 and lasted into the
Spring of 1908 reflected the character of these unions and
the challenge that they posed to the mine owners.
In September, 1906, miners walked off the
job,
demanding an eight-hour day and a raise from four to five
dollars per shift.
remained
idle
capitulated.
The strikers held firm and the mines
into December.
Finally,
the
operators
The settlement demonstrated both the
operators' desire
to
get
back
undeniable strength of the union.
to
business
and
the
The IWW and all of the
town workers it represented had merged under the banner of
Local 220 during the course of the strike.
The amalgamated union became more aggressive.
ordered all
as
It
local businesses to accept the eight-hour day
standard.
The demand was
promptly accepted.
For
workers who had commonly toiled twelve to fifteen hours
53
per day, this represented a tremendous victory.
Unions
held frequent meetings on company time and demanded and
received termination of workers it found objectionable. 6
IWW organizer Vincent St. John offered the most
colorful description of labor relations in Goldfield at
the time:
The highest point of efficiency for any labor
organization was reached by the IWW and the WF of M in
Goldfield, Nevada. No committees were ever sent to
any employers.
The union adopted wage scales and
regulated hours. The secretary posted the same on a
bulletin board outside of the union hall, and it was
the LA~. The ~mploy~rs were forced to come and see
the un10n comm1ttees.
Whether this 1S an entirely accurate picture is open to
deba teo
But one historian who conducted interviews with
participants in the Goldfield drama agreed that the union
dictated terms to employers on a regular basis:
"'There
was never any conference, or any evidence of an idea that
the employer had a right to be consulted."B
With the
exception of a handful of AFL building tradesmen, the IWW
soon came to represent nearly the entire workforce in
Goldfield.
By
the
beginning
of
1907,
Local
220
effectively controlled the town. 9
IWW organizational strength was again demonstrated
in a rally held in solidarity with European workers on
January 20, 1907.
shut
down
during
Virtually all mines and businesses were
the
addressed the crowd,
festivities.
and a
Vincent
series of
St.
resolutions
John
was
54
passed by acclamation.
The throng called for the release
of labor leaders Haywood, Pettibone and Moyer, who were
being held in jail on charges of murdering the Governor of
Idaho.
They denounced the Supreme Court as a tool
of
capitalist greed and called for its members to be elected
by popular vote.
The workers sent greetings to their
fellow toilers in Europe and called for an end to the
capitalist system. lO
This rally,
and the increasing boldness of the
IWW, made the owners uneasy.
Tensions rose a short time
later when the WFM posted a list of 386 Cripple Creek
strikebreakers and gunmen that were expected to come into
town.
The
unions
appeared
masters of their own fate.
conf ident
tha t
they
were
Although the IWW and WFM were
feuding on a national level, they were still cooperating
in Goldfield.
It would prove to be a fragile unity, and
the employers would soon seek to exploit the differences.
The
employers
counter-attack
began
on
March
formed the Goldfield Business
14.
The
Men and Mine
Operators Association and immediately passed a resolution
stating that IWW members were no longer welcome in the
mines.
\'V' F M
They shrewdly drew a distinction between IWW and
me mbe r s.
The
the following day.
0
wn e r s shu t dow n min e san d bus in e sse s
Three days later, the mines were re-
opened to WFM and AFL workers.
The IWW remained excluded.
Sensing an opportunity to gain new membership,
the AFL
55
Local supported the tactics of the Association. ll
The
George
leading strategists
Wingfield
and
Senator
for
the Association were
George
Nixon
of
Nevada.
Wingfield was the richest man in the state and President
of Consolidated Mines Company.
business
partner
president.
and
held the
Senator Nixon was his
title of
company vice-
Consolidated was the largest mining firm in
the area. 12
Although they had re-opened the gates on March 18,
the IWW exclusion clause had effectively left the mines
inoperative.
The operators hoped that gradually the AFL
would woo recalcitrant miners away from the clutches of
the
IWW,
and
additional
they did
organizers
gradually paid off.
not
into
protest when the AFL sent
Goldfield.
The
strategy
Although the AFL did not win many new
adherents, more moderate members of the WFM began to call
for the separation of the miners union from the IWW.
The
mines
WFM
remained
members,
closed
through
mid-April.
anxious to return to work,
Some
intensified their
efforts to purge their union of the IWw. 13
A settlement was reached on April 22.
The miners
union was given jurisdiction over all men employed in and
around
the
mines,
including
blacksmiths and machinists.
timbermen,
engineers,
In exchange, the WFM pledged
not to strike unless two-thirds of its members called for
a walk-out. 14
Although the agreement seemed favorable to
56
the WFM, the Association had begun to crack the militant
unity of the miners and the IWW.
Labor peace lasted until August.
Consolidated
Mines then announced that it would set up "change rooms"
to prevent what was commonly known as "high-grading."
It
was an open secret that miners often left the property
with valuable gold ore stuffed in their work clothes.
Consolidated was the
practice.
The
first
miners
company to challenge this
reacted
by
settlement was reached on September 18.
would remain,
walking
out.
A
The change rooms
but with some modifications.
Other mining
firms had closely followed the strike at Consolidated.
The operators all agreed that the settlement would not
eradicate high-grading.
More importantly,
the
latest
strike demonstrated that the miners remained as militant
as ever, despite the diminished presence of the IWW in the
mines. lS
The Panic of 1907 finally gave the operators an
opportunity to launch a full-scale assault on the miners.
The largest bank in town, the John S. Cook and Company,
experienced a
run
matters worse,
smel ters refused to pay cash to the mines
for ore shipped.
on
deposits
in
November.
To
make
The chief officers of the Cook Bank were
Nixon and Wingfield.
On November 14, the Bank and the
operators announced that miners would be paid in scrip
instead
of
cash.
Although
the
cash
reserves
of
the
57
operators
remained
solid,
the
move
was
necessary to protect their investments.
for
security
to
back
up
the
scrip
as
The miners asked
and
resumption of traditional payment methods.
refused.
justified
a
date
for
The operators
The miners walked out on November 26, and the
strike divided the town.
The newspapers, businessmen, and
the AFL supported the operators.
officials supported the miners.
Town workers and County
This time the owners were
pre?ared to make this the final showdown. 16
At the outbreak of the strike, President Roosevelt
was ?reoccupied with other matters.
He was preparing his
yearly address to Congress and focused on matters far
beyond the mining caves of Goldfield.
A review of his
papers
the
indicates
that
the
Panic
inquiry were his rna jor concerns.
and
Brownsville
These issues continued
to occupy Roosevelt even after he dispatched troops to
Nevada. 17
On December 3, Wingfield, Nixon and several others
met with Nevada Governor John Sparks on behalf of the
Association.
They
asked
that Sparks
assistance to handle the strike.
with local authorities,
request
federal
Without checking first
Sparks wired to Roosevelt the
following day and asked that a detachment of troops be put
on alert
quickly.
for
use
in Goldfield.
Roosevelt reacted
He fired off a telegram to Sparks the same day,
advising the Governor of the appropriate legal procedures
58
to follow when requesting federal
assured
him
that
he
was
assistance.
prepared
to
Roosevelt
send
troops
immediately.18
Sparks filed his formal request on December 5.
There is no evidence that Roosevelt consulted with
advisors or made any attempt to ascertain independently
the dangers in Goldfield.
Instead, he wrote to his Acting
Secretary of War the following day and directed him to
ready a detachment of soldiers.
following advice:
The letter contained the
"It is far better to avoid conflict by
sending too many troops than by sending too few to run the
risk of inviting bloodshed.,,19
Since little information is available from the
period,
for
it is helpful to examine Roosevelt's autobiography
clues
of
his intentions.
In his book,
Roosevelt
admits that he acted on the basis of Sparks' reports.
was
given the
impression of
hostile armed camps,
a
town divided
He
into two
"... with an unusually large number of
the violent and criminal element always attracted to a new
and booming mining camp.,,20
Roosevelt was clearly
concerned with maintaining order.
motivated
to
involved.
He detested the radical
movement.
blood
boil.
believe Sparks
But he was especially
because
of
the
wing of
unions
the
labor
The mere mention of the WFM and IWW made his
Earlier in 1907,
Roosevelt had made his
feelings well known about leaders of those organizations:
59
Messrs.
Moyer,
Haywood,
and Debs stand as
representatives of those men who have done as much to
discredit the labor movement as the worst speculative
financiers or most unscrupulous employers of labor and
debauchers of legislatures have done to discredit
honest capitalists and fair-dealing business men.
They stand as the representatives of those men who by
their public utterances of the papers they control or
inspire, and by the words and deeds of those
associated with or subordinated to them, habitually
appear as guilty of incitement to or apology for
bloodshed and violence.
If this does not constitute
undesirable citizenship, then there can never be any
desirable
citizenship ... those
preachers
of
violence ... are themselves the worst foes of the honest
laboring man. 2l
In
the
section
on
Goldfield
in
his
autobiography,
Roosevelt reminded his readers that the leaders of the WFM
had advocated "anarchy" and had been indicted for the
He stated: "With the Western
murder of Idaho's governor.
Federation
of
Miners
I
more
than
once
had
serious
trouble."22
One previous experience with the WFM left a
lasting impression on Roosevelt and influenced his actions
at Goldfield.
The bitter dispute in Cripple Creek in
In the
1903-04 produced a number of unpleasant memories.
early stages of the battle,
Colorado Governor Peabody
asked Roosevelt to send troops to strengthen Peabody's
Later, after the operators had
hand against the union.
taken the offensive, the union asked Roosevelt to send
troops to protect them from attacks and deportations.
both instances,
after
Rooseve I t
deliberate
Commissioner
refused. 2 3
consultations
Wright
was
most
with
In
But he did so only
advisors.
influential
Labor
in
this
60
situation,
Instead,
and
told
the
President
to
intervene.
he suggested that Roosevelt appoint a commission
to investigate the strike,
rest,
not
" ... and then let the matter
it will take care of itself much better than it can
be cared for.,,24
Roosevelt's
papers
indicate
that
he
thought a
great deal before making his aecisions in the 1903-04
c r i sis. 2 5
WFM,
He co u 1 d not be a r t 0 h 0 nor are qu est fro m the
but he was equally repulsed by the actions
Governor
Peabody.
And
although
followed Wright's advice,
Roosevelt
ultimately
he was never truly comfortable
with his decision not to intervene.
Roosevelt in August,
of
A letter written by
1904 is particularly revealing:
If the newspaper reports are true, Peabody's action is
unpardonable.
He has deliberately sanctioned the
criminal usurpation of state sovereignty by an
irresponsible mob.
If I had power I should interfere
at once, putting down mob work with equal firmness and
severi ty, whether it was commi tted by the Federa tion
o f Min e r s 0 r by the Cit i zen's 2'~ 1 ian c e. I w ish the r e
was some action we could take.
This was Roosevelt the taskmaster again.
When he sensed
instability, he was not content to sit on the sidelines
and wait for events to run their course.
The President
much preferred to jump into a fray and impose order upon
the antagonists.
In
Goldfield,
Roosevelt
prompted by his fear of unrest.
reacted
instinctively
Preoccupied with other
issues, he immediately assumed that Sparks' description of
61
Given his prejudices
conditions in the town was correct.
against and past experiences with the WFM,
Roosevelt
believed that the miners were once again up to no good.
This time,
he would act to prevent another prolonged
episode like the one at Cripple Creek from developing.
Press
coverage initially
reinforced Sparks'
argument that troops were necessary to prevent anarchy.
The December 7th issue of the San Francisco Chronicle
reported that miners had accumulated a cache of arms and
that the sheriff sympathized with their cause.
editorial praised Sparks,
An
stating that rioting was
"probable" since the town was " ... wholly at the mercy of
an armed mob."
Ne~
The
~Qrk
claims in a similar story.27
Ti~~~
repeated the same
Interestingly, dispatches
printed in both papers from reporters on the scene often
differed from accounts produced from the press rooms.
For
example, dispatches filed for the same period in both the
f~~Qni~~
and the
~i~~~
reported that the miners were
working to keep the peace. 28
Immediately after the troops arrived on December
7, the operators fired the next salvo.
They reduced wages
by one dollar per day and demanded that workers renounce
their affiliations with the WFM.
to keep the peace,
With troops now on hand
the operators felt secure enough to
press for advantage.
The miners protested vigorously.
They accused Roosevelt of acting out of "personal hatred"
62
for the union and called for class solidarity to combat
this latest assault. 29
The union newspaper,
Miners' Magazine,
reprinted
articles of support coming mostly from the labor press.
One editorial
from
the
De.!2~er
EX~~~
was especially
critical of Roosevelt:
The action of the President in sending troops in
advance of violence is unprecedented. The action of
the mine owners in reducing wages immediately upon
their ~rr~~al makes the President a party to that
reductl.on.
Although the AFL supported Roosevelt's action, it became
increasingly clear that many in the labor movement did
not.
Throughout
Miners'
December,
pr int ed
excerpts from the labor press that were highly critical of
the President. 31
Although one can find no clear indication in his
papers,
it appears that Roosevelt was affected by labor's
criticism.
By December 11, Roosevelt began to have second
thoughts about the troops.
of
In a telegram to the Commander
the Goldfield garrison,
Roosevelt reminded him to
observe strict impartiality in keeping the peace.
He
urged him to use caution and ended with an interesting
"Better twenty-four hours of riot, damage, and
caveat:
disorder
than
illegal
use
of
troops."32
I twas
uncharacteristic of Roosevelt to put anything above the
need f or order.
Several days later an uncertain Roosevelt decided
63
that the situation warranted further investigation.
put
together
a
administration
committee
for
the
of
job.
three
The
men
from
investigative
He
his
panel
consisted of Lawrence G. Murray (Assistant Secretary of
Commerce and Labor),
Corporations),
Herbert Knox Smith
and
Charles
P.
Neill
(Commissioner of
(Commissioner
of
Labor). The investigators arrived in Goldfield on December
15.
Some
historians
think
that Roosevelt
reluctantly
appointed the committee to placate his critics. 33
doubt there is some truth to this.
bit
more
Goldfield
before
But the situation is a
Roosevelt
complicated.
major
No
newspapers
review of the San Francisco Chronicle,
sent
his
team
to
criticized him.
A
for example,
finds
that the paper barely mentioned Goldfield for the ten-day
period
between
December.
Th e
the
seventh
!':!~~ r.2!:.~
and
the
seventeenth
T i~es publ i shed an ed i tor ia 1 on
December 11 that supported the need for troops.
the most part,
paper's
editorial
matters
Coll ier' s
Diaest,
board.
during
this
magaz ine ran a
criticism,
but
deluged by protest.
it
is
a
-~---
weekly
was also interested in
In
period.
late
December,
photographic essay that clear 1 y
supported Roosevelt's actions. 34
to
But for
other issues occupied the minds of the
sampling of the nation's press,
other
of
safe
Roosevel t
to
was
say that
unfortunately,
he
subjected
was
not
his papers do not
64
offer any clear insights into his thinking at the time.
But in the absence of any real violence in Goldfield,
Roosevelt no doubt gradually realized that the troops
served the operators' purposes more than anything else.
Once the troops arrived, the operators' motives were too
blatant for him to feel entirely comfortable.
Roosevelt grew increasingly restive as the days
passed.
On December 17, he dashed off a telegram that
displayed his impatience:
I sent the troops at your request because from the
tenor of your telegrams ... it appeared that an
insurrection was imminent against which the State
authorities would be powerless.
The troops have now
been in Goldfield ten days and no insurrection has
occurred .... As the legislature of Nevada has not been
convened I am bound to assume that the powers vested
in the peace officers of the State are adequate and
that if they choose to do so they can maintain order
them sel ves.
Under these circumstances, unles s there
be forth\vith further cause shown to justify keeping
the troops at Goldfield, I sh~~l direct that they
return to their former stations.
Roosevelt
preliminary
twentieth.
became
report
from
angry
his
after
he
received
investigators
the
The team disputed Sparks' claim that civil
authority had collapsed in the town.
In their view, local
officials were capable of maintaining order.
In essence,
there was absolutely no need for federal troops.
matters
on
a
worse,
operators' wage reductions
increasing bitterness. 36
had
To make
led to
Roosevelt immediately informed
Sparks via telegram that he had just received word from
his representatives in Goldfield:
65
Their report ... satisfies me that there is no
disturbance threatened which the Government of Nevada
ought not to be able to control if it start to work
with a serious purpose to do so, but that no effort is
being made by the Government of Nevada to take the
steps necessary in the matter .... Federal aid should
not be sought for by the State as a method of
relieving itself from the performance of this
duty .... I have accordingly directed the troops to
return to thei~ former stations on Monday, December
th irtieth next. 7
Roosevelt's anger was apparent here.
He had been duped by
Sparks into believing that Goldfield was in chaos.
he
realized the true situation,
When
he became anxious
to
extricate himself as soon as possible.
But Roosevelt could still not bring himself to
come to the aid of a besieged miners' union.
20,
it was
By December
clear that the WFM was losing the strike.
Union attorney O.N. Hilton complained to the President
that the operators refused to meet with the miners.
He
pledged that the union would continue to keep the peace.
Finally,
Hilton conceded defeat and asked that the
President intervene with the operators to help arrange
terms
for
a
return
to
work. 38
Roosevelt ignored the
request.
Sparks, however, was not convinced that the miners
were defeated.
He wired Roosevelt and asked that the
troops remain for an indefinite period.
He explained that
a state of war still existed in Goldfield and appealed to
Roosevelt's well-known hatred of radical organizations.
Sparks then told the President that calling a
special
66
legislative session would be counter-productive,
since he
doubted Nevada lawmakers would support his request for the
continued presence of troops.39
None of this sat well with Roosevelt.
back
a
sharply
dragging
his
worded
feet.
response,
He
rebuking
He fired
Sparks
for
then issued an ultimatum:
the
Governor had five days to convene the Legislature.
failed
to
do
immediately.
so,
the
will
take
situation require
perrnit.,,40
would
be
withdrawn
But amid the bluster, the telegram contained
a fascinating caveat:
they do I
troops
If he
His
better of him.
"CircuITIstances may change and if
whatever action the needs of
so
fear
far
of
as my constitutional
radical
unions
still
the
powers
got
the
Despite mounting evidence to the contrary,
Roosevelt still feared that with organizations like the
WFM and IWW,
with
Sparks
President
violence was possible at any time.
and
anxious
remained
to
too
remove
uneasy
the
to
Furious
garrison,
commit
the
to
an
unconditional withdrawal.
Sparks relented at the end of the year and agreed
to call the Legislature into session.
Roosevelt received
the final
report from his investigators on January 4,
1908.
echoed
It
stronger terms.
their
preliminary
findings
in
even
The report criticized Sparks for calling
in troops when local authorities were capable of keeping
order.
It also attacked the motivations of the operators
67
as well:
The act ion 0 f the mine 0 per a tors war ran ts the be 1 i ef
that they had determined upon a reduction in wages and
the refusal of employment to members of the Western
Federation of Miners, but that they feared to take
this course of action unless they had the protection
of Federal troops, and that they accordingly laid a
plan to secuIe such troops and then put their program
into ef fect. 1
The
report effectively demolished any remaining hope
Sparks had to retain the troops indefinitely.
however,
suggest
that
the
troops
remaln
It did,
until
the
Legislature could take steps to set up a state militia to
handle
any
future
Roosevelt agreed,
problems.
again
Apprehensive about
reflecting his cautious approach.
continued unrest, the President refused once more to order
a unilateral withdrawal of the soldiers.
Sparks took the brunt of the criticism after the
report was released to the press.
For example, the San
and
Francisco
survey published in the
a
representative
Literary Digest all targeted the
Nevada governor as the chief culprit.
with the exception
of
it
sections
of
the
labor
press,
appears
that
Roosevelt's role was conveniently ignored by many at this
stage. 42
This all meant little to the miners at Goldfield.
By now,
they had been defeated decisively.
difference
that
the
operators'
actions.
Nevada
The
Legislature
union's
bargain with the owners fell
It made no
condemned the
repeated
efforts
upon deaf ears.
to
A State
68
Police Bill was adopted at the end of January,
and Nevada
troops began to replace the federal garrison the following
month.
The
The last of Roosevelt's troops left on March 7.
miners
returned
to work
a
month
later,
on terms
dictated by the employers.
The debate among historians about Goldfield has
centered upon two main issues:
The "armed camp" dispute
and Roosevelt's intervention.
Scholars disagree whether
the town resembled a hostile, armed camp in the months
preceding the November strike.
Some cite arms stockpiled
by both sides as evidence that a clash seemed imminent.
Others readily acknowledge the existence of weaponry but
insist that Goldfield was relatively peaceful. 43
There is
more of a consensus on Roosevelt's role.
Historians agree
that the President deserves criticism.
The differences
are
mainly a
matter of
degree.
Some have blasted
Roosevelt and claimed that Goldfield demonstrated his true
anti-labor sentiments.
Others have agreed that sending
the troops was a mistake,
but credit Roosevelt for
removing them quickly when he realized they were only
serving the operators' interests. 44
It is fascinating to read how Roosevelt himself
justified his actions almost seven years after the events.
In his autobiography, he acknowledged that both the unions
and operators
committed acts
that
were
indefensible.
Sparks is criticized only for wanting to keep the troops
69
too long, not for requesting them in the first place.
But
Roosevelt's analysis of the situation in Goldfield before
he intervened provides us with the most telling insights:
The State of Nevada in the year 1907 was gradually
drifting into utter governmental impotence and
downright anarchy.
The people were at heart all
right; but the forces of evil had been permitted to
get the upper hand, and for the time being the decent
citizens had become helpless to assert themselves
either by controlling the greedy corporations on the
one hand or repressing the murderous violence of
c e r t aJ-~ 1 awl e s s 1 abo r 0 r g ani z at ion son the 0 the r
hand.
Roosevelt clearly wished to be remembered as the one man
who brought order
to
the
inhabitants
caught
Ironically,
Roosevelt
town
between
and
two
praised
investigative team as even-handed,
conclusions.
protection
immoral
the
to
its
extremes.
report
of
the
without mentioning its
Evidently, in his mind, the salient point
was his decision to appoint the investigators, rather than
the judgments they rendered.
Their report so thoroughly
contradicted his own assessments,
that it is no wonder he
chose to avoid its conclusions.
Strong-willed leaders rarely admit their mistakes.
But Roosevelt knew he had acted hastily shortly after
dispatching the troops.
To his credit, he attempted to
extricate himself from a messy situation.
does
not
relieve
him
of
well
However,
deserved
this
criticism.
Preoccupied with other issues, he acted before he knew all
the facts.
He readily accepted Sparks' analysis because
70
he assumed the worst when radical unions were involved.
His antipathy towards the WFM and IWW prevented him from
ever being able to look objectively at
the events
in
Goldfield. The troops were allowed to remain well after he
first badgered Sparks about the responsibilities of state
government.
The garrison stayed for nearly three months
after Roosevelt realized that it was merely serving the
needs of the operators.
Roosevelt tried to portray his Goldfield actions
as similar to his role in the anthracite strike several
years earlier, claiming that in both he was only trying to
maintain order and render
impartial
Goldfield was more complicated.
against
powerful,
employers.
grew
A moderate union,
conservative leader,
greedy
But
The anthracite situation
became cut-and-dried for the President.
led by a responsible,
justice.
and
incredibly
was pitted
obstinate
At risk was the nation's coal supply as winter
near.
The
President
met
the
challenge,
helped
mediate a settlement and averted a dangerous crisis.
Goldfield, the dividing line was blurred.
had previously made some concessions.
divisions among the workers.
The operators
There were known
More importantly, the unions
had a militant history and a radical leadership.
was
little
at
risk
except
In
the
living
and
There
working
conditions of the people in an isolated mining district in
the Far West.
Given the forces involved,
Roosevelt chose
71
to believe anarchy was inevitable and assumed that order
meant justice.
there,
In Goldfield, he was wrong.
it meant the death of their union.
For workers
CONCLUSION
From these three events, one can see that Theodore
Roosevelt's labor record is decidedly mixed.
His role as
a mediator during the anthracite strike won him widespread
support in
the workers' movement.
Labor's enthusiasm for
the President was tested during the Miller case,
but many
mainstream leaders were reluctant to directly criticize
him.
Despite his stand against the closed shop, Roosevelt
continued to openly declare his support for a worker's
right to join a union.
His role in the Goldfield strike
spelled disaster for mineworkers there.
Even the most
conservative leaders of the AFL were hard pressed
to
publicly support an action that effectively destroyed a
union, albeit a rival one.
Each incident brought forth a different Roosevelt.
The anthracite crisis saw a measured,
diplomatic effort.
Ultimately, the President helped set in motion a series of
events that
strike.
led to a
settlement of a
long and bitter
In the Miller case, Roosevelt intervened much
sooner.and more decisively.
political finesse,
By combining threats with
he kept the unions in check.
brought a knee-jerk reaction from Roosevelt.
Goldfield
Troops were
sent at the first sign of disorder.
Once again he acted
decisively,
knowing
but this
time without
72
the
facts.
73
However,
these three incidents also demonstrate an
ideological consistency behind Roosevelt's actions.
The
President operated from a certain sense of justice and
fair play.
exist,
He truly believed that unions had a right to
and to negotiate
with capital.
He promoted a
worker's right to join a union more forcefully than any
previous President.
While he may have feared and despised
the leaders of radical
unions like the Western Federation
of Miners, he never wavered in his stand that workers must
be free to
join an organization of their choice.
His
support of the open shop can be seen in this context.
Roosevelt, it was merely a matter of fairness.
was free to
join -
or not to
join -
To
A person
a union.
This
principle was more important to him than the impact of the
open shop on the labor movement.
In Roosevelt's world, unions had responsibilities
as
well.
An
accommodating.
order
nor
ideal
union
was
moderate,
sensible
and
It did not challenge the existing social
usurp
governmental
authority.
Roosevelt's
actions in labor matters were clearly influenced by the
unions
involved.
He
reacted
with
sympathy
and
understanding with John Mitchell's United Mine Workers
primarily because the union went out of its way to
demonstrate its faith in the President and the system of
collective bargaining.
In the Government Printing Office,
the Bookbinders Union earned Roosevelt's wrath mainly
74
because it attempted to dictate personnel policy to the
federal government.
The Western Federation of Miners was
deemed undesirable by virtue of its social and political
creed.
In fact,
Roosevelt was not well disposed toward
anyone who did not
share his
view of
responsible labor management relations.
the need
for
He had just as
much disdain for greedy and shortsighted coal operators as
he did for labor militants.
While Roosevelt certainly
feared the radicals more, he recognized that inflexible
anthracite operators inflicted as much damage by driving
workers into the militants' camp.
the Progressive social order.
Neither was
part of
Both lacked the vision
necessary to participate successfully in a just and stable
society.
It took a shrewd and capable politician to mold
this society and Roosevelt relished the challenge.
keenly aware of the public pulse.
He was
He intervened in the
anthracite strike after he recognized that the time had
come for action.
Public sympathy lay with the miners.
The operators remained obstinate.
A coal famine
loomed.
Conditions were right for the public to support a new
initiative even if it meant granting de facto recognition
to a labor union.
Roosevelt was also intelligent enough
to allow labor room to maneuver even when he opposed them.
The
Miller
case
represented
a
brilliant victory
for
75
Roosevelt precisely because he successfully opposed one of
labor's key platforms without rupturing his ties to the
movement.
He allowed Gompers' misleading statements about
the President's ruling to go unchallenged.
At the same
time he promised to support another key provision
labor's agenda,
the eight hour work day.
Roosevelt
judgment.
in
was even quick
to
sense an
Soon after he dispatched federal
error
in
troops to
Goldfield, he recognized they were not needed.
He began
to cajole and threaten Governor Sparks to get his own
house in order.
Yet Roosevelt still allowed the troops to
remain a full three months.
to keep
the
troops
long
His fear of violence led him
after
he
realized
they
were
serving the employers' interests.
It is this quest for order and stability that drove
Roosevelt more than anything else.
Roosevelt saw the
preservation of order as his primary responsibility as
President.
He
anthraci te strike.
gave
the
UMW
a
Square
But more importantl y,
Deal
in
the
the sett lement
he helped broker prevented riots he believed would surely
have followed the impending coal famine.
He stood firm on
the open shop issue in the Government Printing Office.
Yet to Roosevelt, that was not the heart of the matter.
It was ultimately a question of authority.
A civilized
society could never allow the authority of government to
be usurped.
In Goldfield, Roosevelt thought the issue was
76
clear enough.
involved.
Radical forces - or "foes of order" - were
Justice would have to be enforced from the
barre 1 of a trooper's gun.
Ultimately,
one needs to look at Roosevelt's labor
record in this context.
Moderate elements in the labor
movement could claim with confidence that Roosevelt had
done more for
workers
than any previous
President.
Militant leaders could quite easily assert that he was no
different from his predecessors.
enough for both to be justified.
find
a
unifying
contradictory
wrong,
theme
stands
that
together.
His record is ambiguous
However, one can still
ties
the
In the
President's
end,
Roosevelt followed his own principles,
right or
which were
guided always by the need for stability and order.
NOTES TO PREFACE
l.
Rooseve 1 t.
"4"12":-----
Theodore Roosevelt, Th~ £~~£~ ~f !~eod~re
Roosevelt to Wright, October 8, 1902, Reel
77
NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE
1.
For a more detailed explanation of the 1900
see Robert Cornell, The Anthracite Coal Strike of
l.2..Q~.
(New York: Catholic University of America Pres~
1957), 45-56.
See also Selig Perlman and Philip Taft,
!i~~to £.Y Qi Lab 0 r ~~ !.b.~ Q.~~!. e d ~!.~!.~~ l.~2..'§":'l2..l~ V0 ~ i,
New York, 1935, 36-39.
strike,
2. George E. Mowry, The Era of Theodore Roosevelt,
1900-1912.
(New York: Harper-and-Row,-19SST,--134:------3.
Perlman and Taft,
37-38.
4. Carroll D. Wright, "Report to the President on
the Anthracite Coal Strike."
U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics.
Washington: Government Printing Office,
(1902),1150.
5. John Mitchell, 2~g~~i~Q ~~~or, Its f~Q~~~~
f~~EQ~~~L ~~Q IQ~~l~ ~~Q !.b.~ f~~~~~!. ~~Q £~!.~~~ Qf
American ~age Earners,
(Philadelphia: American Book and
Bible House, 1903), 373.
6.
Wright,
1150.
7.
Theodore Roosevelt, "The President's Message
at the Opening of the Fifty-Seventh Congress, December 2,
1902." From The Roosevelt Policy:
Speeches, Letters and
~!.~te f~er~ 8.~l~ti~g to C0!:.£Q~at~ ~~~th anQ CIQselY
Relat~~ TOEics, edited by William Griffith,
(New York:
Scribners and Sons, 1919), 189.
8.
Magazine,
John Mitchell, "The Coal Strike",
20:1, November 1902,221.
MCClure's
9.
Haywood's union eschewed collective bargaining
and relied on "direct action" of its workers in the mines
to force concessions from the operators.
For a more
detailed description of Haywood's Western Federation of
Miners, see Laura A. White, The Rise of the Industrial
Workers of the World in Goldfle1d~-Nevada~--UnpubfIshed
M:-A~ThesTs.--Unlversi ty Of-Nebraska ,--f912~ 28- 37.
1902.
10. George F. Baer to John Mitchell, February 18,
Quoted in Wright, 1177.
11.
New York
Ti~es,
May 6, 1902.
78
79
12.
See The Nation, 73:1924, May 15, 1902, 379,
and 7 4 : 1 9 2 5, Ma y22 ,-1902; 4 0 1. The e d ito ria 1 s des c rib e
divisions within the UMW, and note that Mitchell did not
want to strike. He is only criticized for promising too
much and relying on the NCF.
No comments are made
specifically about the operators' stand.
13.
New York Times, May 16, 1902.
14.
Ibid., May 19,1902.
15.
Ibid., June 5, 1902.
16. Wright, "Report to the President". Wright's
report provided a detailed analysis of conditions in the
industry and helped Roosevelt understand some of the main
issues in the strike.
17. Cornell, The Anthracite Coal Strike of 1902,
110.
Roosevelt worried that pUb11cation-~ wright~s
report would be interpreted as an endorsement of its
analysis.
18. United Mine Workers, Minutes of th~ Special
Convention to Consider the AnthracIteStrike~ July 17-19,
1902.
Indianapolis, 19~ 39.
19.
Lincoln Steffens, "A Labor Leader of To-Day
and What He Stands For", McClure's Magazine, 19:4, August,
1902, 355.
20.
New York Times, August 1, 1902.
21.
Theodore Roosevelt, Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, Vol. 3, edited by Elting E. Morison, John M. Blum,
an~John J. Buckley, Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1951),323.
22.
Roosevelt.
412"-.----
Theodore Roosevelt, !he !:.~~!:~ Q! 1:heodo£~
Roosevelt to Quay, September 19, 1902, Reel
23.
Cornell, 1 74 .
24.
Selections
the Correspondence of Theodore
ROQ~~~~! ~~~ !:!.~~E.Y Ca£ot 1.Q33.~ .!.884::.l.~~, edited by
Henry Cabot Lodge, (New York: Scribners and Sons, 1925),
Lodge to Roosevelt, September 27, 1902, 531-532.
fro~
80
25.
Ibid., Roosevelt to Lodge, September 27,
1902,
533.
26.
Letters, Vol. 3, Morison, et al.
Crane, October 22, 1902, 359.
Roosevelt to
27.
Roosevelt, ~~Eer~. Notes of the October 3
conference and subsequent events. Roosevelt to Carroll
Wright, October 8, 1902, Reel 412.
28.
Letters to three of the President's closest
advisors during the strike reflect this concern about an
impending coal famine and subsequent unrest.
See
Selections, Lodge, ed.,
Roosevelt to Lodge, October 7,
1902-,-sT7=-5 3 8 • See a 1 soL e t t e r s, M0 r i son, eta 1 ., e d s . ,
Roosevelt to Hanna, October-3-,-1902, 338 and Roosevelt to
Winthrop Crane, October 22, 1902, 362.
29. Selections, Lodge, ed.,
October 7, 190'2;"537-=53 8.
Roosevelt to Lodge,
30.
Roosevelt, Papers.
Roosevelt to Joseph B.
Bishop, October 5, 1902, Reel 412.
31.
New York
Ti~es,
October 4, 1902.
32.
Roosevelt, ~~~E~. Notes of the October 3
conference and subsequent events. Roosevelt to Wright,
October 8,1902, Reel 412.
33. Letters, Vol. 3, Morison, et al.
Robert Bacon, October 7, 1902, 344.
Roosevelt to
34.
New York Times, October 7, 1902.
The
Secretary of-the -fIT1noIs-State Democratic Committee
issued the call.
35. Letters Vol. 3, Morison, et al.
Crane, October 22"-,-1902, 363.
Roosevelt to
36. Cornell implies that it is unclear whether the
operator s knew.
See The Anthraci te Str ike, 216 -12 7.
For
the view that the operators were aware of the plan, see
Mowry, Era, 138.
See also Henry Pringle, Theodore Roose~~lt, ~ ~i2g£~~Y, (New York, Harcourt, Brace and Co.,
1931), 192-193, and I.E.Cadenhead,
Jr.,
Theodore
Roosevelt, The Paradox of Progressivism,
(Woodburi,-N-=-~:
Barron's Educational Series, 1974), 83.
37.
UMW Journal, 13:27, October 9, 1902.
81
38.
October 17,
Selections,
Lodge,
1902~~40~541.
ed.
Roosevelt to Lodge
39. New York Times, October 17, 1902. The Nation,
7 5: 1 9 4 6, Oct-o ber-1-6-,-1-9 0 2 .
The Nat ion's ed ito rial
continued in its critical stand toward-t-heli."'i1ion. Whi Ie
it did not praise Roosevelt directly, its tone clearly
implied that his intervention was an unfortunate
necessity.
40. Jonathan Grossman, "The Coal Strike of 1902 Turning Point in u.S. Po 1 icy," Monthl y Labor Review, 98: 1 0
(1975), 27.
41.
For the view that Roosevelt acted to preserve
capitalism, see Philip S. Foner, Histo£Y Qi the Labor
Movement in the United States, vol. 3, (New York: International"Publishers, 1964), 98.
Edwin Berman in Labor
Qi~putes and !~~ President of the Qnit~~ States.,-rNew
York: Columbia University Press, 1968), 56-58, states that
Roosevelt acted to prevent a famine.
For the view that
Roosevelt sought to undercut Hanna and show the operators
who was boss, see Robert Wiebe, "The Anthracite Strike of
1902: A Record of Confusion," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 48:2 (1961), 244-245. For descriptions that
credlt-Roosevelt as a reform leader, see Joseph B. Bishop,
Theodore Roosevelt and His Time, Vol. 1,
(New York:
Scribners-an~SOns,--1920T~ and--Jacob Riis,
Theodore
Roosevelt:
The Citizen, (New York:
The Outlook Co.,
190"4");-376-377: --Bcith-Bishop and Riis were personal
friends of the President.
4 2 . For e x amp 1 e , see Roo s eve 1 t, !:~e r s . Will i a m
Whitman to Roosevelt, October 2, 1902, Reel 412;
Selections, Lodge, ed.
Lodge to Roosevelt, October 11,
1902-,-S3g:43.
Ira Kipnis, The American Socialist Movement,
COllim-b"1-a-ufiTve-rs i ty-P r e s-s-,-T'952T:'"
139-141.
A review of the Party's national newspaper,
~2~~1 !Q Rea~Q~ from May to October, 1902 reveals that
the Socialists provided strike support but hardly played a
leadership role.
1'§'.2.2=.1.2.l.~, (N e w Yo r k:
44.
See, for example, Selections, Lodge, ed.
Roosevelt to Lodge, October 7, 1902-,-537-538.
Letters,
Vol. 3, Morison et al., Roosevelt to Crane, October~2,
1902, 357.
82
45.
Robert Wiebe, "The Anthracite Strike of 1902",
244.
46.
Letters, Vol. 3, Morison, et al.
Robert Bacon, October 5, 1902, 340.
Roosevelt to
4 7 . Roo s eve 1 t, .!:~~E..~. Ge 0 r 9 e Cor tel you toM ark
Hanna, October 6, 1902, Reel 412.
48.
(Cambridge:
John Morton Blum, !he ~~public~~ ~oo~evelt.
Harvard University Press, 1954), 60-61.
NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO
1. Unfortunately, Roosevelt's major biographers
paid scant attention to the Miller case.
See, for
example:
Henry F. Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt, a
Bi~9..!:.~Eb.Y...
(New York:
Harcourt~-Brace-and-W-o-rlcf;-Inc.~
1956), I.E. Cadenhead, Jr., Theodore Roosevelt, The
Paradox of Progressivism (Woodbury;-N:Y":: -"Barron-'s-F:duca=
tional Series, 1974),
George E. Mowry, The Era of
Theodore Roosevelt, 1900-1912.
(New York: -Harper-and
R0 w-,-195 8)~--J-Ohn-M-.-BTuITl';"T h ~ E.~ u b 1 i can Roo ~ e v ~l!.
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954).
Blum and
Cadenhead did not address the case.
Mowry and Pringle
mention it only in passing to cite Roosevelt's support for
the open shop.
I was unable to uncover any scholarly
articles on the case.
2.
williard B. Gatewood, Jr., Theodore Roosevelt
of Co~!rov~£~y".
(Baton Rouge:
Louisiana
State University Press, 1970), 143.
Gatewood's work
provides us with the most thorough explanation available
of the details surrounding the Miller case.
Given the
dearth of secondary materials on the subject, his work
provided much needed background information.
an~
th~ ~rt
3.
Ibid., 140-141.
4. Theodore Roosevelt, "The President's !"1es sage at
the Opening of the Fifty-Seventh Congress, December 2,
1902."
From The Works of Theodore Roosevelt, Vol. 15,
edited by Herman Hagedor~ (NewYork:-C:h"arles Scribners
and Sons, 1926), 167.
5.
Theodore Roosevelt, Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, Vol. 3, edited by Elting E. Morison, (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1951), 514n.
See also Gatewood,
145-146.
6.
Gatewood, 147.
7.
Theodore Rooseve 1t, Addresses and Pres ident ia 1
- (New York:
G.P. Putnam and Sons,
!i~~~~9.~~ 1902:..l~!.
1904),273.
8.
9.
Roosevel t.
Ibid., 273.
Theodore Roosevelt, The E~~E~ ~i !~~odore
Palmer to Roosevelt, Jury 7, 1903, Reel 34.
83
84
10.
Gatewood.
See 148-149 for a detailed discussion of Miller's charges towards Palmer.
11.
Roosevelt,
July 11, 1903, Reel 34.
E~~~~.
Cortelyou to Roosevelt,
12. Ibi£., Roosevelt to Cortelyou, July 13, 1903,
Reel 331.
13. Ibid. Roosevelt wrote:
"It looks to me as if
Palmer has -ne>real control over his establishment, and in
that case it is of course possible that there is the
wildest extravagence of expendi tures under him."
14. Literary Digest, 26:19-26 (May-June, 1903).
In
the May 16 edition the Br~oklYQ Eagl~, Bo~to~ E~~! and
Hartford Times were cited as supporters of Cleveland's
candIdacY~--In New York, The World and The Sun were
regarded as sympathetic to the former President-.- Other
newspapers in New York, Alabama, and Virginia were also
mentioned as joining a Cleveland bandwagon.
15. New York Times, July 28, 1903, 6.
York:
16. Theodore Roos eve 1 t, ~~ ~ utobi..2:l~b.Y. (New
The MacMillan Company, 1913), 520.
17. Ibid., 521.
18. G. Wallace Chessman, Theodore Roosevelt and the
Pol~ti£~ ~! Po~~~.
(Boston:
Little, Brown, and Co.,
1969), 93.
See also Roosevelt, Letters, Vol. 3. Roosevelt to Cortelyou, July 14, 1903;-sr~ In his letter,
Roosevelt stated that the Anthracite Commission ruling for
open shops in the mining industry should be applied to the
public sector as well.
19. See Roosevelt, Letters, Vol. 3. Roosevelt to
James Clarkson, July 16, 190~518~519. Roosevelt writes:
" ... 1 will not tolerate discrimination against a man
because he does not belong to the union any more than
against him because he does belong to it ... The labor
unions will have a square deal and the corporations will
have a square deal, and in addition all private citizens
sha 11 have a square deal."
20.
See, for example, Roosevelt, Letters, Vol. 3.
Roosevelt to Cortelyou, July 13, 1903, 516.
85
21. Ibid. Roosevelt to Osvald Garrison Villard,
Ju 1y 25, 190T~--5 31.
August
22.
Gatewood, 151, 168-169.
23.
22,
Roosevelt,
1903, Reel 331.
24.
f~ers.
Lit~~~~y Qi~st,
Roosevelt
27:10,
to
(September 5,
Palmer,
1903),
278.
25. Louisville Courier Journal, cited in Literary
Digest, 27 :lO(Septe-ffiber-S-,-1903T;-279.
26. Gatewood, 139.
velt,
27.
Roosevelt, Pa~rs. James Clarkson to RooseJuly 29,1903, Reel 35.
28. Selections fro~ the Correspondence of Theodore
Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, 1884-1918, Vol. 2, edited
by Henry Cabot Lodge, (New York:
Charles Scribners and
Sons, 1925). Lodge to Roosevelt, September 13, 1903, 55.
For another example of Lodge's enthusiasm for the President's action, see Lodge to Roosevelt, September 24, 1903,
57.
29.
Roosevelt, Letters,
Clarkson, July 16, 1903, -519.-30.
Vol.
3.
Roosevelt
to
Gatewood,160-162.
31.
Joseph Bucklin Bishop, Theodore Roosevelt and
his Time, Vol. 1.
{New York:
Charles Scribners and Sons,
1920-)-,-250. See also Literary Di~st, 27:14 (October 3,
1903),413.
3 2. ~ i t ~~~~y Qi~ s t, 2 7 : 1 4 (O c to be r 3, 1 9 0 3 ), 4 1 1413.
For example, the Federated Trades Council of
Milwaukee claimed that the petition would only benefit the
Democratic Party. The Knights of Labor refused, saying:
"The President is one of the best friends that organized
labor ever had in the White House." The ~~~g~~~!ed
Journal of the Iron, Steel and Tin Workers praised Roosevelt as the "heart and soul of the labor movement."
33. Samue 1 Gompers, Se~~nty I~~E~ .2.!. ~if e and
La ~.2!...L An ~~ t 0 ~iQg!:.~y , Vol. 1.
( New Yo r k :
E. P. Du t ton
and Co., 1925), 527-536.
In his memoirs, Gompers ignores
the Miller case entirely.
He spends nearly ten pages
86
describing his relationship with Roosevelt, discussing his
contributions as an "advisor" to the President.
He
mentions occasional disagreements with Roosevelt on labor
'issues, but makes no mention of the GPO.
34.
Roosevelt, !:~~£~.
Gompers to Roosevelt,
September 24, 1903, Reel 37. Two days earlier, Gompers
had told the press that the AFL Executive Committee had
not even bothered to discuss the Miller case while in
session.
See the Ne~ York Times, September 22, 1903, 1.
35. New York Times, September 22, 1903, 8.
36. Ibid., September 24, 1903.
37.
Roosevelt, Letters, Vol. 3.
velt to Lodge, September-30-,-f903, 607.
Cited in Roose-
38.
American Federation of Labor, Report of !he
Proceedings of the Twenty-Third Annua 1 Convention of the
American Federation of Labor, November 9-23, 1903.
(was"Filngton-;---Tne-N"ationa 1 -TrTb-une-co.-;-1903 ) ~89=9 0.---39. Roosevelt, Letters, Vol. 3. Roosevelt to Lemuel
Clarke Davis, October 5, 1903, 617-618.
4 O.
87, 142.
41.
Gat e wood,
1 62- 1 64.
See also AFL,
Proceedings,
Gatewood, 165-172.
42. Roosevelt, Pa~rs. Roosevelt to Elihu Root,
2, 1 9 0 4 , Reel 3 34 .
Roo s eve 1 t pIa c e d th e Mill e rca s e
in a similar perspective in another letter the prior year.
See Roosevelt, Letters, Vol. 3.
Roosevelt to Lyman
Abbott, September 5, 1903, 591-592.
J un e
43.
Theodore Roosevelt, Letters to Kermit from
Theodore Roosevelt, 1902-1908, edited~Y-wITl-rrwin, (New
York:
Charles Scribners and Sons, 1946), October 26,
1904, 79.
44. Gatewood, 136, 174.
While AFL membership
continued to grow through 1904, employers often refused to
yield on the closed shop issue.
NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE
1. Laura A. White, The Rise of the Industrial Workers
of the World in Goldfield, Nevada. Unpublished M.A. thesis.
University of Nebraska, 1912, 8. See also Russell R. Elliott,
"Labor Troubles in the Mining Camp at Goldfield, Nevada, 19061908," Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 29, November 1950, 370.
2.
Proceedings of The Founding Convention of the
Industrial Workers of the World, (New York: Merit Publishers,
1969), 1.
3.
White, 4-12.
4.
IQig., 5-6.
5.
Elliott, 370.
See also Elliott, 369.
6. For a more thorough description of the 1906 strike
and the events immediately following, see White, Rise, 28-37
and Melvin Oubofsky, We Shall Be All: A History of the
Industrial Workers of the World, (New York: Quadrangle, New
York Times Book Co., 1969), 121-122.
7.
Paul F.
American Syndicalism,
1957), 201.
Brissenden, The I. W. W.: A Study of
(New York: Russell and Russell, Inc.,
8.
White, 37.
9.
Oubofsky, 120.
10. Philip S. Foner, History of the Labor Movement in
the United States, Vol. 4 (New York: International Publishers,
1965),94.
11.
Oubofsky, 122; and Elliott, 373.
Earl Bruce White, "Might is Right: Unionism in
12.
Goldfield, Nevada, 1904-1908", Journal of the West, 16:3
(1977), 76.
13.
Foner, Vol. 4, 94-96.
14.
Elliott, 374-375.
15.
Ibid., 375-377.
16.
Ibid., 375-378.
87
88
17.
Theodore Roosevelt, The Papers of Theodore
Roosevelt.
See, for example, Roosevelt to Senator Warren,
December 15, 1907, Reel 414; Roosevelt to Charles Bonaparte,
December 23, 1907, Reel 414; Roosevelt to Bonaparte, January
2, 1908, Reel 414; Roosevelt to George C. Lee, January 12,
1908, Reel 414.
18.
Roosevelt, Paoers.
December 4, 1907, Reel 347.
Roosevelt to John Sparks,
19.
Ibid., Roosevelt to Acting Secretary of War
Oliver, December 6, 1907, Reel 347.
20. Theodore Roosevelt, An Autobiography, (New York:
Charles Scribners and Sons, 1920), 376.
21. Joseph Bucklin Bishop, Theodore Roosevelt and His
Time, Vol. 2, (New York: Charles Scribners and Sons, 1920),
62-63.
22.
Roosevelt, Autobiography, 377.
23.
For a more detailed description of the Cripple
Creek Strike, see Philip S. Foner, History of the Labor
Movement, Vol. 3 (New York: International Publishers, 1964),
395-400.
24. Roosevelt, Papers. Carroll Wright to Roosevelt,
June 21, 1904, Reel 45. In essence, Wright told the President
that if he publicized the appointment of a commission, the
issue might then gradually fade from public view.
25.
Ibid.
See, for example:
Roosevelt to Wright,
June 16, 1904, Reel 413; Roosevelt to Henry Cabot Lodge, June
28, 1904, Reel 413; Roosevelt to Wright, August 4, 1904, Reel
413; Roosevelt to Wright, August 5, 1904, Reel 413; Roosevelt
to Wright, August 13, 1904, Reel 413; Roosevelt to Wright,
August 22, 1904, Reel 413.
26. Ibid., Roosevelt to William H. Moody, August 24,
1904, Reel 413.
6.
27. San Francisco Chronicle, December 7, 1907, 1-2,
New York Times, December 7, 1907, 2.
28.
San Francisco Chronicle, December 5, 1907, 2.
New York Times, December 7, 1907, 2.
In the same edition of
the Times, a dispatch reported that the local Sheriff disputed
claims that he was unable to control the situation.
29.
Miner's Magazine, 9:233, December 12, 1907, 6.
89
30.
Ibid., 9:234, December 19, 1907, 5.
31.
.I.l2.iJ;l.
See, for example, 9:235, December 26,
1907, 8-11. This issue was particularly full of press clips
critical of Roosevelt.
32. Edward Berman, Labor Disputes and the President
of the United States (New York: Columbia University Press,
1968), 66.
33. For example, see Foner, History, Vol. 4, 97. He
argues that Roosevelt reluctantly agreed to the commission in
response to an "outpouring of protests sent to the White
House."
34. New York Times, December 11, 1907, 10. Literary
Digest devoted its December 14 issue to a sampling of press
reactions to Roosvelt's message to Congress. The December 21
issue focused upon the financial situation and the President's
decision not to seek a third term.
The first reactions to
Goldfield appear in the December 28 issue, and merely contain
two cartoons depicting Sparks bringing order to the town.
35. Roosevelt, Papers.
17, 1907, Reel 428.
36.
Elliott, 382.
37. Roosevel t, Papers.
20, 1907, Reel 428.
38.
Roosevelt to Sparks, December
Roosevel t to Sparks, December
Miners' Magazine, 9:235, December 26, 1907, 8.
39 . Roosevel t, Papers.
26, 1907, Reel 428.
Sparks to Roosevelt, December
40.
Reel 428.
Ibid., Roosevelt to Sparks, December 28, 1907,
41.
One, 1486.
Congressional Record, sixtieth Congress, Session
42. The San Francisco Chronicle, in its December 31
issue, had actually criticized Sparks before the final report
was released. Colliers 40:17, January 18, 1908, 6. Literary
Digest 36:2, January 11, 1908.
For a critical account of
Roosevel t' s actions, see Max S. Hayes, "World of Labor",
International Socialist Review, 8:7, January 1908, 439-440.
(Reprint edition published by Greenwood Reprint Corp., 1968).
Hayes wrote that Roosevelt withdrew the troops only to avoid
labor criticism in an election year. For a popular analysis
90
of events written one month after the report was released, see
Winfield Hogaboom, "The Last Stand at Goldfield", The Overland
Monthly, 51:2, February 1908, 111-119.
Hogaboom was an AP
reporter sent to cover the strike. He supported the need for
troops through the bitter end.
43.
For examples of the "armed camp" view, see
Brissenden, 197 and Foner, Vol. 4, 96-97.
Dubofsky takes a
different view. He agrees that both sides were well armed but
insists that Goldfield was not in a state of war, and that
local officials were quite capable of handling the situation
(We Shall Be All, 122-124).
E.B. White wrote that the town
was relatively calm, at least until the operators initiated
their "change-room" policy in August ("Might is Right", 80).
44.
See Foner, Vol. 4, 96-97 for a highly critical
analysis of Roosevelt. George E. Mowry credits the President
for rectifying his mistake by removing the troops.
(The Era
of Theodore Roosevelt. 1900-1912), (New York: Harper & Row,
1958), 140. Edward Berman also praises Roosevelt for removing
the garrison once he realized it was not needed. In his view,
Roosevelt erred because he did not seek objective advice prior
to sending the troops (Labor pisputes and the President, 6465). Interestingly, some noted biographers of Roosevelt did
not feel Goldfield was significant enough to warrant mention
in their works.
For example, Henry F. Pringle devoted nine
pages to the anthracite strike of 1902, but none to Goldfield.
(Theodore Roosevelt. a Biography, New York: Harcourt, Brace,
& Co., 1931). I.E. Cadenhead, Jr. also omitted any reference
to the Nevada incidents. (Theodore Roosevelt. The Paradox of
Progressivism, Woodbury NY: Barron's Educational Series,
1974). Given the title of Cadenhead's work, one would assume
that Goldfield offered an ideal topic for discussion.
45.
Roosevelt, Autobiography, 375-376.
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