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Dan Berbecel
Government 97
Brandon Van Dyck
February 11, 2011
James Madison and his Republican Vision for the United States
The Federalist Papers were an essential stepping stone that led to the ratification of the
United States Constitution, and throughout these documents former President James Madison
made several arguments concerning the American political system. In this paper I will argue that
throughout the Federalist Papers Madison claimed that a republican regime is significantly
preferable to a democratic system. Throughout Part I of this essay, his rationale will be outlined;
and in Part II I will explain why Madison, in a manner that some might incorrectly view as
inconsistent, decided to promote the House of Representatives which contains more democratic
elements than the Presidency and Senate. This paper will draw upon four of the Federalist Papers
written by James Madison, namely Federalist Papers 10, 14, 39 and 63.
Defining terms
Throughout Federalist Paper 10, Madison clearly defines the terms republicanism and
democracy. He describes that a pure democracy is a society “consisting of a small number of
citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person” (10). In other words, a
democracy involves direct majority rule in which decision-making power is vested in each
individual citizen throughout society. Yet, Madison goes on to explain that republicanism is “a
government in which the scheme of representation takes place” (10). In other words, individual
citizens elect representatives to make decisions for them, and in a certain sense give up their
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rights to a third party. This view is similar to one which Thomas Hobbes articulates in his
seminal work, Leviathan, where he writes that:
[citizens] conferre all their power and strength upon one Man, or upon one Assembly of men, that may
reduce all their Wills, by plurality of voices, unto one Will…as if every man should say to every man, I
Authorise and give up my right of governing my selfe, to this Man, or to this Assembly of men, on this
condition that thou give up thy Right to him, and Authorise all his Actions in like manner. (103)
Throughout Federalist Paper 14, Madison reiterates the distinction between the terms,
democracy and republic, when he writes that “in a democracy, the people meet and exercise the
government in person; in a republic, they assemble and administer it by their representatives and
agents.”
Clearing misconceptions
The major misconception which Madison attempts to clear between democracies and
republics is the mistaken belief that democracies are better suited in countries with large
territories whereas republics only work best where the population and size of the nation is small.
Madison blames the “error which limits republican government to a narrow district” (14) on a
group of authors who, because they were the subjects of monarchies, attempted to praise
monarchies by emphasizing their positive aspects, and providing distorted, negative views of
republican regimes (e.g. by emphasizing the dysfunctional government of Italy). In fact, Madison
argues that the exact opposite claim is true, and throughout the next part it will be shown how in
fact it is democracies which are limited to a “narrow district” and how the only feasible form of
government in nations as large as the United States is republicanism.
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Part I: why republics are preferable to democracies
An introduction to factions and their dangerous effects
The main argument which Madison uses to promote the use of a republic as opposed to a
democracy is that republics mitigate the detrimental effects of factions. I will begin by
explaining what Madison meant by the term “factions,” and afterward, their negative effects will
be described. I shall then reconstruct the two principal arguments that Madison makes of why a
republic is better at neutralizing factions.
Madison describes a faction as “a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or
a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of
interest, adversed to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the
community” (10). Factions can be conceptualized through the term “interest groups,” and as
Madison explains, while some interest groups can be small and include only several thousands of
people, others can be very large and constitute millions of citizens.
Madison then makes the point that controlling the formation of factions is essential for 1)
the protection of individual and property rights, and 2) the stability and long-term survival of the
nation. In Federalist Paper 10, he claims that factions can easily lead to a scenario akin to the
“tyranny of the majority” described by Tocqueville. Madison writes that “a common passion or
interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a majority of the whole…and there is nothing to
check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party or an obnoxious individual” (10). This
Rawlsian, anti-utilitarian argument stresses that in a government run by factions, the individual
would essentially be a slave to majority, and such a system would be “incompatible with
personal security” (10). In addition, although he lived well before the time of Karl Marx,
Madison mentions how factions can most importantly threaten property rights. According to
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Madison, “the most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal
distribution of property” (10), and he describes the risk that citizens would get together in
factions demanding “an equal division of property” (10). Madison foresees the “turbulence and
contention” (10) that would certainly result when individual rights and property rights are
threatened, and describes that nations where powerful factions formed have been “as short in
their lives as they have been violent in their deaths” (10). The argument he makes is illustrated
below:
Figure 1: the dangers of factions
Factions created by “a common
passion or interest” result in…
Threats to individual and
property rights, resulting in…
“Turbulence and contention.”
These nations have “short”
lives with “violent” deaths.
The logical question that arises from the above explanation is, how do republics control
factions in a better way than democracies? Before delving into the two explanations offered in
the Federalist Papers, it is worth noting that both justifications involve tackling the effects of
factions as opposed to the causes. Madison articulates that the two fundamental causes of faction
are 1) liberty, and 2) the fact that individuals will have different opinions; and he makes clear
that these “causes of faction cannot be removed” (10). Madison certainly views the first
fundamental cause of faction, liberty, as an inalienable right and claims that liberty is to faction
what air is to fire. He writes that “it could not be less folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to
political life, because it nourishes faction, than it would be to wish the annihilation of air, which
is essential to animal life, because it imparts to fire its destructive agency” (10). He then
describes that it is equally impossible to prevent people from having different opinions, since this
is a natural consequence of liberty of thought and expression.
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How representation shields lawmakers from factions among the population
Having described the negative consequences of factions, the first way in which a
republican model would neutralize the effects of factions is through representation. As Madison
explains, the elected officials can use their “wisdom…patriotism and love of justice” (10) to sift
through the ideas expressed by the people and ultimately make decisions that are the best for the
public good. Madison expresses his view that “it may well happen that the public voice,
pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the public good than
if pronounced by the people themselves” (10). Representation thus counters the negative effects
of factions since through term mandates the elected officials who make laws are “shielded” from
factions among the general population, including factions which make up the majority of the
electorate. In modern-day politics, this concept is apparent when politicians make decisions that
are contrary to the mainstream public opinion (such as the recent health care bill which was
supported by less than 50% of Americans at the time of passage). Nevertheless, one of the risks
Madison was wary of in the representation model was the possibility of corruption and factions
forming among various elected officials; and so proposed having a moderate as opposed to a low
number of representatives. Madison claims that “the representatives must be raised to a certain
number, in order to guard against the cabals of a few” (10). Yet, he also cautions against a high
number of representatives since this could lead to “the confusion of a multitude” (10).
How republics weaken factions through their ability to cover large nations
In addition to the argument that representation shields lawmakers from factions, Madison
contends that republics neutralize factions through their ability to encompass large territories
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with many citizens. Although the relationship between factions and country size is not evident,
throughout this section I will attempt to explain this correlation.
In Federalist Paper 10, Madison articulates that a “greater number of citizens and extent
of territory…may be brought within the compass of republican than of democratic government.”
This claim is logical considering that in a country with a large population, it would be physically
impossible to bring all citizens into the lawmaking process of a democracy. As well, in countries
with vast territories, it would be unviable for many citizens to travel to the capital to take part in
government (and this was especially true in the late eighteenth century before modern
transportation).
Yet, Madison argues that a republican government was feasible in countries with
extensive territories and sizeable populations. With regard to population, a republic is certainly
practicable since citizens would elect only a small group of representatives to engage in
legislative activity. With regards to physical distances, he compares the size of the union of the
first 13 States to the size of European nations, and contends that in the same way that republican
governments had overcome distance barriers in Europe, they could overcome similar distance
barriers in America. Madison writes that “on a comparison of this extent [of the United States]
with that of several countries in Europe, the practicability of rendering our system commensurate
to it appears to be demonstrable” (14). Madison also points out that for the past 13 years,
representatives from states were able to meet despite vast distances, thus implying that there is
no reason why this should not be possible in the future. He states that:
…during the term of thirteen years, the representatives of the States have been almost continually
assembled, and the members from the most distant States are not chargeable with greater intermissions of
attendance than those from the States in the neighborhood of Congress. (14)
Because of the ability of republics to encompass vaster territories with greater
populations, in republics it is more difficult for factions to gain power. Madison justifies this
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claim by first describing that in small societies there will inherently be fewer “parties and
interests” (10) than in large societies. Because there are few parties and interests, it would be
relatively simple for a group of citizens to come together to 1) form a majority, and 2) coordinate
amongst themselves to promote their interest. Madison summarizes this point when he writes
that “the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a majority be found of
the same party; and the smaller the number of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller
the compass within which they are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute their
plans of oppression” (10). Nevertheless, in nations with more extensive territories and greater
populations whose governance is made possible through the republican model, it would be more
difficult for factions to rise to prominence since 1) the interests are more diverse, and so it is
harder to rally significant numbers of citizens around one central theme (this concept is similar to
the “divide and conquer” strategy), and 2) it is harder to logistically organize larger numbers of
citizens. Madison affirms this when he writes:
Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a
majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a
common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act
in unison with each other. (10)
This argument about how republics prevent factions from taking power is illustrated below:
Figure 2: how large republics neutralize
factions
Republics, unlike democracies, possess the
ability to encompass vaster territories with
greater populations. In large countries
whose governance is made possible by the
republican structure…
It is harder to rally the
majority of a population
behind one theme.
It is harder to logistically
organize a large multitude
of people.
Although factions still
form (as Madison says,
the causes cannot be
removed), the detrimental
effects of factions are
more limited.
In short, Madison claims that although it is impossible to remove the causes of factions,
their effects can be overcome through the use of a republican model. Firstly, through
representation, the influence of factions would be diminished because lawmaking would be in
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the hands of a group of shielded representatives. Secondly, a republic makes it possible to govern
a large country, and nations with extensive territories and a sizeable population provide a hostile
climate for factions to promote their objectives.
Part II: does Madison’s endorsement of the House represent an inconsistency in his views?
Critics might argue that Madison is inconsistent in his views by pointing out that
although in theory Madison fully supports a republic and opposes democracy, in practice the
government structure which he advocates contains some democratic features. The main
legislative body that Madison endorses which critics might point to is the House of
Representatives, which is more democratic in nature than either the Presidency or the Senate.
Indeed, House representatives are elected in a direct manner, and as Madison puts it, the House
is “elected immediately by the great body of the people” (39). The House also possesses more
democratic ideals than the Senate and Presidency since representatives are chosen for only two
years, forcing members to be more responsive to the opinions of the majority of the population.
Nevertheless, it is important to consider that while the House is more democratic than the
Senate or Presidency, Madison is not inconsistent, since as per his definition, the House is still a
fundamentally republican institution that involves representation. The following diagram shows
the extent to which the three governing bodies proposed by Madison are democratic or
republican (note that the House is still republican-leaning despite being the most democratic):
Figure 3: the extent to which Madison’s three institutions are republican or democratic
Pure
Republic
The Senate: Indirect
elections, 6-year
terms
Pure
Democracy
The Presidency:
Indirect elections, 4year terms
The House: Direct
elections, 2-year
terms
Note: The Senate was placed to
the left of the Presidency since
Senate terms are 2 years longer,
thus making its representatives
less responsive to the people
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Although Madison does not contradict himself, a natural question that arises is, why did
Madison decide to include the more democratic institution of the House and not just promote a
unicameral legislature with the Senate? Although he does not explicitly state this, Madison
subtly conveys his concern about the dangers of republicanism in its extreme form; and one
particular danger he is mindful of is the possibility of the government becoming tyrannical. Just
like in an extreme democracy where there are the dangers of faction and the suppression of
individual rights, in an extreme republic there is the danger that the “representative” body will
use its power to take away the liberty of the people. In Federalist Paper 63, Madison writes that:
…liberty may be endangered by the abuses of liberty as well as by the abuses of power… [and] a senate
appointed not immediately by the people, and for the term of six years, must gradually acquire a dangerous
pre-eminence in the government, and finally transform it into a tyrannical aristocracy.
Therefore, Madison introduces the concept of checks and balances; and although as stated earlier
he is skeptical of direct majority rule by the people, he certainly views a more popular institution
like the House as an excellent check on the power of the Senate. Because it is directly controlled
by the people, in order to corrupt the House it would be necessary to more generally “corrupt the
people at large” (63), which is arguably an impossible task because of the size of the electorate.
Madison therefore implies that the House is an inherently cleaner institution, and in the
following quote describes how the House would serve as an “obstruction” (63) to an attempt by
the Senate for the “establishment of tyranny” (63):
Without exerting the means of corruption with equal success on the House of Representatives, the
opposition of that coequal branch of the government would inevitably defeat the attempt; and without
corrupting the people themselves, a succession of new representatives would speedily restore all things to
their pristine order. (63)
The promotion of a more democratic institution like the House could therefore actually
ameliorate the functioning of a republican system. As stated earlier, through the creation of the
House, Madison neutralizes the dangers of extreme republicanism by introducing a mechanism
to check the power of the Senate. Although Madison’s logic seems contradictory, the
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introduction of the more democratic House can be thought of as a necessary evil in the
promotion of an effective republican model that “blend[s] stability with liberty” (63).
Therefore, to summarize, Madison does not contradict his theoretical support of a
republic as the best form of government for the US with his support for some democratic
elements in the House of Representatives (i.e. direct elections with short 2-year terms).
Throughout this section I have attempted to show that 1) the House is still a fundamentally
republican institution since it involves representation, and 2) a more democratic institution such
as the House would work to ensure that the republican government is effective and does not
transform into a tyranny.
Conclusion
In conclusion, Madison undoubtedly provides his unfledged support for a republic as
opposed to a democracy, and I have outlined his main reasons for this view. I have discussed his
concern for factions; and articulated his belief that a republic would address the negative effects
of factions by shielding representatives from the larger population and by allowing a nation to
encompass vast territory with a large population. I have also attempted to explain Madison’s
support for a more popular institution such as the House, and have described that he decided to
include the bicameral legislature in the new regime in order to prevent the dangers associated
with an extreme republican form of government. Although the nature of the political regime in
the US has certainly changed from the time of Madison—moving away from a republic toward a
democracy since elections to the Senate and, in practice, the Presidency, became direct—
Madison’s writings clearly help to illustrate the thought process that provided the basis for the
creation of the republican-oriented American Constitution.
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WORKS CITED
NOTE*** Page numbers are derived from the course pack for Government 97.
Volume 1, ps. 55-62: Federalist Papers #10, 14, 39, 63,
<http://thomas.loc.gov/home/histdox/fedpapers.html>
Volume 1, ps. 63-77: Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Introduction; Vol. I, Part 1,
Ch. 8 pp. 149-54; Vol. I, Part 2, Ch. 6 pp. 231-5.
Volume 1, ps. 97-107: Thomas Hobbes. Leviathan (1651), chap. 16-18.
<http://oll.libertyfund.org/?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show.php%3Ftitle=869>