pubt. yeqr,2aoe
11
otivation
PETER M. GOLLWITZER, JUAI{ D. DELIUS,
AND GABRIELE OETTINGEN
I 1.1
ll.2
Tue BropsycHot-ocrcAl PBRspecrrve
Tse SocropsycHot-ocrcel PenspECTrvE
Motivation is the study of the processesthat
causeanimalsandhumansto exhibit varying sets
of behaviorat different times.Someexamplesof
such behavior sets are eating, fighting, socializing, achieving, and studying. Traditionally,
one distinguishesbetweenbiopsychologicaland
sociopsychological
approaches
to the processes
that causethese behaviors (Reeve, 1997). The
processesaddressedby the first tradition are
principally physiological and those by the second tradition mainly cognitive. The biopsychological perspective has been particularly successful in the analysisof so-caliedbiological
motives common to animals and humans.such
as hunger,aggression,
or sex.The sociopsychological perspective has been effective in the
analysis of so-called cognitive motives largely
restrictedto humans,such as power or achievement needs. To the extent that modern psychologyhascometo acceptthat all psychological
processesare due ultimately to physiological
activity, the division is now somewhatarbitrary.
Nevertheless,explanationsof biological motives,
even when concerning humans, are mainly
offered in terms of largely factual physiological
mechanisms(neuronal activation, hormone secretions, etc.), whereas cognitive motives are
mainly explainedin terms of psychologicalconstructs (intending, planning, executing, etc.).
These conshucts, modern neuroimaging techniques notwithstanding,can not yet be easily
T9I
198
relatedwith physiological events.This validates
the dual approachoffered in this chapter.Still,
in some caseswe have offered an integration
of biopsychological and sociopsychological
approaches,and other examplesof suchintegration are given in Chapter4. We look forward to
further integration of these two approachesin
the years to come.
11.1 Tse Bropsycnor-ocrcAt-PpRsppcrrvp
All organisms,including humans,are the product of biological evolution, a pecuiiar gamethat
certain organic molecules with not perfectly
self-replicatingpropertiesstartedup about four
billion years ago. This observationis basic to
the biopsychologicalperspectiveon motivation.
Organisms are biological machines which are
dedicatedto the survival and reproduction of
their genes,the presentday descendants
of these
molecules(Dawkins,1989).All behavioris the
final product of a phylogenetic (evolutionary),
ontogenetic(developmental),and physiogenetic
(physiological)cascadeof causesand effects.
The biopsychological study of motivation is
principally concernedwith the last stagesof this
chain of eventsbut at times it must also attendto
their evolution and development.Geneticsand
International Handbook of Psycholo gy
t92
learning for exampleplay a role in deterrnining
why somepeople over-eatand othersundet-eat,
why some are aggressiveand otherstimid, and
so on. The modem biopsychologicalperspective, which originated with ClaudeBernard and
Charles Darwin during the nineteenthcentury,
assumesthat most behaviors of humans and
of
other advancedanimalsare the consequences
a varied and interactingnumberof causalfactors
and processes,which can not be easily subsumedunder one global theory or even a limited
number of different theories.This is best conveyed by describing some of the mechanisms
underlying the most salient biological motivation systems.
Thirst
The life functions of all organismsare basedon
physico-chemicalreactionsthat take place in an
aqueousmedium and work best when there is a
certain salt/water mixture. The circulation of
some animals furthermoredependson a certain
volume of blood. More than 90Voof the human
body consistsof water, about a third of it in a
chemically bound form. Water lossesare continuously incurred throughrespiration,perspiration, urination, and defecation.Drinking water
or very watery solutions is by far the main
mechanismby which water deficitsare compensated.Water saving through excretion of more
concentratedurine, avoidanceof dry foods, suppressionof sweating (o the possibledetriment
of thermoregulation!), and other mechanisms
can help temporarily but will not prevent death
if water is not drunk within a coupleof days(De
Caro, 1986).Water swallowedwets the mouth.
This stimulates chemo- and mechanoreceptors
in the mouth by diluting the concentrated(salty
tasting) and lesser (parched sensation) saliva
secretedduring water deprivation and relieves
the drinking drive for some time. The sensory
receptorssend neural signalsthat reach an area
of the hypothalamusresponsiblefor integrating
the neural messagesabout the lack or presence
of water in the mouth and elsewhere.Its activity
correlates well with the subjective feeling of
thi-rst. However, filling the mouth with water
and spitting it out again does not inhibit thirst
for long. Only when water filling the stomachis
sensedby mechanoreceptorsand chemoreceptors is the neural centermore lastingiy inhibited.
However, if the passageof the water to the
intestine is blocked (in animals) thirst recurs
after a while. A longer lasting quenching of
thirst occurs only when the water is allowed to
oassinto the intestinaltract and from there into
the blood. Here it replenishesthe loss in blood
volume which goes along with water deficits
and increasesthe venousblood pressuresensed
by baroreceptorsnear the heart. Loss of blood
pressureis known to be an important elicitor of
thirst becauseof the verbal report and drinking
behaviorby humansafter massivebleeding.An
increasein venouspressruedecreasesthe hypothalamic thirst drive, but still not definitively'
A more lasting inhibition of thirst occurs
when water-diluted blood reachesthe anterior
hypothalamusand water finds its way by diffusion into osmoreceptiveneurons, swells them
and causesthem to fire neural signalsthat massively inhibit the neighboringhypothalamicthirst
center. They are called osmoreceptorsbecause
they respondto the salt/waterconcentrationdifferencesbetweentheir outsideand inside giving
rise to osmotic pressure.In fact the sameoptimal salt/waterconcentrationis vital for all body
cells. The osmoreceptorsact as samplersof that
variable.We know that thesecells are crucially
important for the regulation of thirst because
water-satiatedanimals will begin to drink copiously again if a minute quantity of concentrated
saline solution is experimentally injected into
the anteriorhypothalamus.They overdrink drastically and as soon as the injection effect wanes
they begin to urinate profusely. Generally, an
excessof water intake can be compensatedby
an increased diuretic activity of the kidneys.
This activity is regulatedby many of the same
factorsthat control drinking, but of coursein an
opposingmanner.When their supply with blood
decreases,the kidneys secretea substanceinto
the blood that activates the hormone angiotensin. Among other things this active form of
angiotensin is capable of inducing drinking
through special brainstem chemoreceptorsthat
activatethe hypothalamicthirst center.The hypothalamicosmoreceptorson the other hand do not
only inducethirst but alsolead to the secretionof
the hormone vasopressinby the pituitary gland
(hypophysis).Vasopressinreachesthe kidneys
via the blood circulation and actsto reducetheir
water excretion. The hypothalamic thirst drive
activatesthe essentialand largely innate swallowing of water, but of course only if water is
directly available. Most often the quenchingof
thirst requireslearnedresponsessuchas walking
to a well and drawing water from it. Some
drinking may also be motivated less by the
osmoticneedsof the body than by the fact that a
solution containssubstancessuch as caffeine or
alcohol for which there is no real bodily need
but which are capable of directly stimulating
neural mechanismsresponsiblefor a sensation
of well-beingor pleasure(seebelow).
Motivation
Hunger
The life functions of all animals require the
fats, proteins,vitamins,
intakeof carbohydrates,
salts, and trace elementsto replenishthe loss
of solid matter which occurs through excretion
and respiration after metabolic turnover (Leeg,
1994).Deprivationof food inducesthe motivating stateof hunger,which is strongerthe longer
the deprivation lasts. When we eat a meal,
chemoreceptorsand mechanoreceptorsin the
mouth, pharynx, and stomachsignal to an area
of the hypothalamus which functions as a
satiation center. This area in turn temporarily
inhibits a neighboringhypothalamic area functioning as a hungercenter.It appearsthat inhibition is basedon the synaptictransmitterserotonin
and that hungeractivationinvolves the synaptic
transmitter noradrenaline. Fenfluoramine, a
pharmacological blocker of noradrenaline, is
used to control excessiveeatingby very obese
individuals. When the food mass enters the
inducethe secretionof
intestine,chemoreceptors
the hormone cholecystokinin,which enters the
blood streamand amongother things, stimulates
the satiefyareaof the hypothalamus.When food
reachesthe upper intestine, digestion has progressivelybroken down carbohydratesinto glucose, fats into fatty acids and glycerin, proteins
into amino acids,and trace elementshave been
freed from organicmolecules.Vitamins are not
modified and salts are dissolved. All of these
substancesenter the bloodstreamand are transportedto all the cells of the body wherethey are
further metabolizedin the service of the lifesupportingfunctions.
We have alreadymentionedthe needfor salts
in connectionwith the maintenanceof a precise
water/saltbalancein the body cells. The regulation of salt appetite is mediated by the same
osmoreceptorswhich are also important for
thirst regulation; but more immediately it is
simply the pleasanttastethat salt confersto food
which normally ensuresthat we take up enough
salt. A fall in salt concentrationsignaledby the
hypothalamicosmoreceptors
might even causea
relative upgrading of the hedonic value of the
tasteof salt. Any excessin salt intake that might
occur through this rough and ready mechanism
causesthe kidney to excrete more salt than it
normally does, at the cost of extra water loss.
This increasedsalt excretionis elicited by aldosterone, a hormone secreted by the adrenal
glands. Exaggeratedingestion of salt provokes
increasedthirst. The drinking that normally follows restoresthe osmotic state of the body's
ce11sbut also indirectly enablesthe disposal of
salt through increasedurine production.
r93
Glucose(blood-sugar)is the main metabolic
fuel for the cells and is thus requiredin appreciable quantities,not least so by the nervous
system. Nevertheless,its concentrationin the
blood should not exceed a certain measure
because too much glucose has a poisonous
effect, as in diabetes.To prevent this, glucoreceptorsin the hypothalamusactivatethe satiety
centerinhibiting any further eating.Also, under
the influenceof the hormoneinsulin, the lack of
which causesdiabetes,the liver regulatesblood
glucose levels by converting it into the starch
glycogen,which it stores.This glycogenis converted back into glucose,under the influence of
the hormone glucagon,when the glucose level
falls again. Both insulin and glucagon are
secreted by the pancreas gland under hypothalamic neural control.
Fatty acids can also supply metaboiic energy
except in neurons that are fully glucosedependent.The latter, however,can benefit from
the fact that the liver can convert glycerin into
glucose.Glycerin and fatty acids,recombinedto
fat, can however also be stored in special adipose cells located under the skin and elsewhere
in the body. While storingfat, thesecells secrete
leptin, a hormone which has a satiating effect
when it reachesthe brain (Kalat, 1997). Some
peoplemay in fact be obesebecausetheir brain is
genetically under-sensitiveto leptin or because
their leptin is chemically aberrant(Rosenzweig,
Leiman, & Breedlove, 1999). However, there
certainly are other causesof obesity, such as
individual differences in the basal metabolic
turnover controlled by the hormone thyroxin.
The mechanismthat causesfat celis to release
fatty acids and glycerin, which serve as energy
sources during extended physical exercise or
long-term fasting, is not yet clear. Although we
have left out many of details, it should be
obvious that the intake of carbohydratesand fats
is normally regulatedhomeostatically,ensuring
the maintenance of a fairly constant body
weight. Increasedlevels of metabolitesof these
substancesare sensedand these signals cause
a satiation of hunger. However, these postresorptive satiation signals arise too late to be
relevant for the loss of appetite that normally
limits the size of a meal. The latter arisesfrom
the much faster feedbackoriginating from the
food passagethrough mouth and stomach.
There do not seem to be any sensorscomparableto the glucoseor leptin receptorswhich
could ensurethe separateregulationof ingestion
of proteins, vitamins, and trace minerals. Less
definite regulatory mechanismsseem to ensure
that we eat enoughof them. One such mechanism is our preference for varied rather than
monotonousfood. The pleasurabieconnotation
of eating is much reducedif we persistentiyeat
194
Intentattonal Handbook of Psychology
the sametastingfood. This habituationcausesus
to seek some variety in foods. There are some
hypothesesabouthow this may be implemented
neurally. Chancesale that the varied diet that
comesabout in this mannerensuresa balanced
intake. There ale also learning processesthat
help to ensurea balanceddiet. Vitamin deficits
are known to induce a feelins of sickness.
Ingestion of food which contaiis the missing
vitamin quite rapidly brings relief. Animals, and
probably also humans,can associatethis relief
with the taste and odor of the food which they
ate shortly before, and will then seekit out later.
Conversely, animals and humans also learn to
associatesickness with the taste and odor of
food which they ate earlier.This aversionto the
taste or odor of the particular food is virfually
beyondconsciouscontrol.This device,of course,
ensuresthe avoidanceofpoisonousfoods.
It is possible that as in the case of salt
appetite,deficits and excessesof particular substances or elements may affect states of the
brain in ways that subjectivelyfeel like cravings
for or aversionsto foods containing these substances.These statesmay be equivalentto the
special hungers that we at times are able to
identify in ourselves: a definite appetite for
sweets,for meat, for vegetables,or some other
kind of food. Childhood experiencealso influence taste preferencesand might result in diet
customssuch as the eating of hot Indian curries
or of American Junk-food'. Cultural fashions
can also lead to a consciousregulation of food
intake with the aim of maintaining sportive
fitness or social attractiveness.Anorexia, a lifethreateningunder-eatingwhich arises often in
adolescentgirls, is exacerbatedby a learned
beauty-of-slimnessfad. Culture often connects
the simple act of eating and drinking with complex ceremonies(formal dinners, tribal feasts)
that serve social needsmore than the need for
nutrition. Or again, the hunger motive may
underlie complex cognitive operationssuch as
organized hunting or cofilmercial agriculture.
But even at this sociocognitive level genetics
can affect eating habits. Certain humanpopulations are genetically unable to digest lactose
(milk-sugar) as adults and therefore some of
thesegroupsbleed rather than milk their cattle.
Sleep and Wakefulness
The necessity of keeping oneself fed and
hydratedobviously requiresphysical and mental
activity. The satisfactionof most other motives
usually also involves activity. Even when all
needs seem satisfied there is stitl an intrinsic
motive for intermittent activity. It servesto keep
the neuro-musculo-skeletal
movementapparatus
in a fit condition. There is also an intrinsic
exploration or curiosity drive that makes us
suryey the envilonment,inspect novel items,
and generally acquire knowledge that may be
useful later (Schneider& Schmalt, 1994). All
this requires a state of wakefulnessassociated
with a heightenedresponsiveness
to extemal
stimuli and a general readinessfor behavioral
action. But activity is also connected with
increasedchemical turnover and physical stress
due to the drain on metabolic resourcesand
wear on body structures.Thesemust be replenished and repairedin periods of rest. In humans
as well as in animals,the cycles of activity and
rest are organizedon the basisof a daily rhythm
(Pinel, 1997).Diurnally active animals,humans
included, tend to sleep at night and be awake
during the day. In nocturnally active animals
this pattern is reversed.Even when humansor
animals are experimentallykept in a constantly
lit, even-temperatured,sound-insulated,clockless, artificial environmentthey persist with an
activity/rest cycle that is close to 24 hours in
duration, the so-called circadian rhythm. It is
driven by a neuro-humoraloscillator (biological
clock) with the nucleus suprachiasmaticusand
the pineal gland (epiphysis) as interacting elements.The basicrhythm, however,is modulated
by homeostaticprocesses.Temporary deprivation of sleepor activity is partly compensated
by
a relative iengthening of subsequentsleep or
activity phases.
Wakefulness is largely determined by the
activity of a densenetwork of neuronsalongthe
axis of the brainstem.It receivescollateral signals from all sensorystimuli and is capableof
activatingmost cortical circuits. This is reflected
by high frequency,small amplitude oscillations
(EEG). As a perseenin electroencephalograms
son becomes drowsy and falls asleep, EEG
recordings are dominated by low frequency,
large amplitude oscillations. This slow wave
sleep is periodicaily intemrpted by episodesof
EEG activity very similar to that seen during
waking, although the person remains asleep.
Rapid eye movements (REM sleep) can be
observed through the sleeping person's closed
eyelids. If a personwakes up during this phase
she/fie mostly reports having been dreaming.
Deprivation of REM sleepfor a night increases
the number and length of REM sleep phases
during the next night. This indicates that the
organism needs REM sleep. The function of
this dream sleep is not totally clear but animal
studieshave suggestedthat its preventioninterfereswith the consolidationof memories.It may
serve to reorganizecognitive information that
accumulatesduring wakefulness.Both types of
sleep and their alternation are controlled by
nuclei of the midbrain and thalamus.where the
195
Motivation
synaptic transmitter serotoninmay be involved
togetherwith the epiphysialhormonemelatonin
in inducing the basic sleepingstate.The addition
of the transmitter acetylcholine induces REM
episodeswhereas wakefulnessstate may be
maintained by the synaptic transmitter noradrenaline. Noradrenaline and serotonin have
already been impiicated in the regulation of
hunger and satiety, and acetylcholineis among
other things the tralsmitter that acts at the
neuro-muscularendplates.Thus the sametransmitters are acting in the regulation of different
behaviorsin different parts of the nervous system. Certain affective disorders are associated
with sleep-irregularities and precisely timed
dosesof melatonincan bring relief. In any case,
disturbanceof the various mechanismsof sleep
results in symptoms such as insomnia, sleepwalking, or narcolepsy.
Aggression and Fear
Survival and reproduction are dependentupon
individual organisms securing environmental
resources.When resourcesare freely available,
as for examplewater in a humid country, there
is no need to fight for them. However, food
acquisitionby predatoryspeciesentailshunting,
and the prey may resist.Both predatorsand prey
may engagein aggressiveattack and defensive
fleeing during such encounters.This agonistic
behavior is often similar to that seen in inffaspecific interactions,as individuals of the same
speciesoften have to competefor resourcessuch
as food or shelter. Intra-specific antagonism
may also occur during competition for social
resources,such as mating partners or allies.
Such agonism often developsover prospective
resourcessuch as winter-barrenland in expectancy of its summerfertility, or over social status
in expectancyof prime accessto all kinds of
resources.Moreover, agonisticbehaviormay be
supportedby social groupingssuch as families,
tribes, or nations. These conflicts take on the
character of wars as the size of the groups
involved increasesand as weapons potentiate
the group's power to injure and kill. Xenophobia, sectarianism,obedience,and fanaticism
are some cognitive/cultural factors that can
exacerbateaggression.
Fighting is connectedwith risk of injury and
thus aggressionis often balancedby fear. This
frequently results in threat behavior. The individual developmentof agonistic motivation is
driven by geneticallydeterminedbehavioraldispositionswhich are modulatedby experience.It
is easy to breed genetically increasedaggressiveness;fighting flsh, cocks, and dogs being
examples. Children probabiy become more
aggressiveif they discover that aggressronis
more often followed by reward than by punishment. Agonistic behavior is mainly controlled
by non-homeostaticmechanisms,triggeredby
situationalfactorssuchaspain,offence,jealousy,
or frustration (Renfrew, 1997). Nevertheless,
deprivation from channeled,socially accepted
aggressiveoutlets such as competitive sportsor
verbal disputesmight lead to increasedaggressive drive in at least someindividuals.Frustrated
children are more likely to behaveaggressively
to a bystanderif they have previously experiencedan aggressivescenethan if they have not.
Sensoryinformation about situationsprovoking
anger or fear is apparently transmitted by a
special thalamo-amygdalarpathway. Stimulation through electrodesimplanted into a neural
circuit that extendsfrom the amygdalathrough
to the nucleusstriaeterminalis,the medialhypothaiamus,and the medial midbrain elicits agonistic behavior in animals.In humans,responses
such as slapping a medical attendant,accompanied by an angry facial expression, were
observedwhen stimulationof the amygdalawas
necessaryas a pre-surgical exploration. Male
animalsandhumansgenerallyare more prone to
show aggressionthan females.In animalsthis is
mediatedby the hormone testosterone(Rosenzweig, Leiman, & Breedlove, 1999). Castrated
male animals display less aggressionthan normal males and in both humans and animals
testosteroneinjections heighten readiness for
aggression.In female animals the pregnancy
hormoneprogesteroneappearsto increasereadinessfor defensiveaggressionwhen offspring are
threatened.
Sexand Parenthood
The central property of genes is replication.
Sexualreproduction,a common complicationof
genereplication,is advantageous
but also costly.
Advantageous,becauseit enablesthe mixing of
parental genes and thus guaranteesoffspring
diversity. This increasesthe chance that some
offspring will succeedin a perrnanentlychanging environment. Costly, because in many
speciesit requiresthe synchronizedcoupling of
ovurn and sperm within the body of the female
who then also bearsthe costs of pregnancyand
in marnmals, lactation. Sex is energetically
cheap for males but they must compete for
females.Femalesmust be choosy about males,
who are co-responsiblefor the geneticquality of
their offspring. Females assessthe quality of
malesand their willingnessto continueinvesting
in the cornmonprogenyafter mating. The dominanceof monogamyin human culturesis likely
derived from the poor prospectssingle mothers
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International Handbook of Psycltology
have of raising healthy progeny under rough
conditions.In many species,a maintainedpair
bondis essentialfor successful
parenting.Males'
reproductiveefforts could be wastedif they do
not contribute to the welfare of their offspring.
Love probably strengthensthis pair-bonding.
Among humans,culturalcustomsproducemuch
variation in courtship and partnership habits.
The role that off-reproductivemating plays in
pair maintenanceis probably why sex is connectedwith intensepleasure.The dissociationof
sexual activity from reproduction by contraceptivetechnologyhasreducedsex to a largely
hedonicmotive.
The existence of women and men is determined by the sex chromosomes.An XX fertilized ovum is predeterminedto develop into a
female,an XY fertilized ovum to developinto a
male. However, this only determineswhether
the embryos develop female or male reproductive organs. Occasionally occurring XO
(only one X chromosome)individuals develop
neither testes nor ovaries. The differences in
female and male behavior, or rather in the
details of brain structues that control these
differences,come about through a more complicated mechanism.A few weeks before birth
the testes of male (human) embryos secrete
testosteronewhich biasesbrain developmentin
a male direction. Femaleembryoshave no such
burst of testosterone,
nor indeedof estrogen,as
the ovaries exhibit no perinatal activity. This
allows the relevant brain structuresto go on
developing undisturbed (Kalat, 1997). Quite
early in life these brain differences have the
consequencethat girls tend to learn to speak
earlier than boys and boys are more prone to
show rough-and-tumble(fighting) play than are
girls. At puberty (testessecretingagain testosterone,ovaries secretingfor the first time estrogen), the brain differencesdeterminethat most
girl,s begin to develop an interest in boys and
most boys are attractedto girls. Why some do
not and becomehomosexualrather than heterosexualis not yet aitogetherclear. For a proportion of male homosexualsit seemslikely that
brain differentiation is partly blocked by a
mutant genelocatedon their X chromosome.
Readinessfor the sex act, or libido, is in part
influencedby the presenceof circulating testosteronein males and, to a lesserextent. circulating estrogenand progesteronein females.Erotic
stimuli and stimulationbring aboutmating readinessin both sexes.In males,more than females,
this arousalis helped by the novelty of erogenous stimuli. This so-calledCoolidge effect is an
easiiy demonstrablephenomenonin male animals. They appearto tire if the samefemale is
repeatedlypresentedbut show renewed sexual
efforts if a new receptivefemale is presented.
Sexual arousal results in penile and clitoral
erectionsand lubricatory gland secretions.This
entailsthe expansionof vein irrigated cavernous
tissueand glandularcontractionsunder the control of nervoussignalsfrom the brain. Mechanostimulation of penile and vaginal tissue results
in ejaculationof spermin the male and contractions of the vaginal walls in the female. Both
eventsare associatedwith a sensationof pleasure (orgasm),due to neural signalstransmitted
to the brainstemreward areas.The contractions
associatedwith female orgasmmay be coupled
with a particularly effective transportof sperm
to the uterus.The releaseof matureova by the
ovary occurs at four-weekly intervais and menstruation is connectedwith the post-ovulatory
sloughing off of tissue lining the uterus. This
tissue developswithin the cycle in preparation
for the possible implantation of a fertilized
ovum andis rejectedif suchimplantationdoesnot
take place. A complicated interaction between
hypophysial and ovarial hormone secretions
regulatesthe ovulatory/menstrualcycle. In contrast to many animals,the cycle has little influence on the day-to-day sexual receptivity of
the human female. Even the widespreadintercoursebar connectedwith menstrualbleedingis
probably culturally sanctionedand not physiologically determined (Abramson & Pinkerton,
1.99s).
When implantation occurs and gestation
begins, female libido is at first not inhibited
despitea much changedhormonalsituation.This
suggeststhat sexual receptivity in the human
female,additionally to fertilization also supports
pair-bonding. As birth approaches,the hypophysial hormone prolactin readies mafitmary
gland tissue for milk production. Emotional
attachmentto the baby seemsto be facilitatedby
mechanicalstimulationof the uteruswall during
child birth. When the baby nurses, an innate
responseactivatedby low blood glucose,this
stimulatesthrough a quite direct neuralpathway
the secretionof oxytocin, anotherhypophysial
hormonethat causesthe releaseof milk.
Parentalcare is the most basic form of genetically driven altruism (Rosenblatt, 1996).
Although genes are essentially selfish in their
operations,the evolutionary game allows that
carriers of identical genes (e.g., offspring, kin)
can benefit from genetically instructedaltruistic
behavior. The gene sets of children are of
coursecombinationsof half-setsof maternaland
paternalgenecopies.They can rely on being the
preferred recipients of altruistic parental attention. Parentsare preparedto bestow advantages
on their childrenat costto themselvesbut mothers
more so than fathers.Mothers cannearly always
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Motivation
be certain of their maternity whereas fathers
may have been cuckoldedand could be caring
for a child that is not their own.
Social Motivation
Many animal speciesare highly social.Much of
this is basedon familial clans,involving a kind
of extendedparenting. This genetically driven
kind of altruism provides gradedbenefitsfor all
blood-relations.Reiatives have a proportion of
genes in common, high if the relationship is
close, low if the relationship is distant. Aunts
and uncles are typically prepared to act parentally to nephewsand nieces.However, social
dispositionscan also developamongnon-related
persons.If I do somethinggood for someone,it
is not unreasonableto expect I might have a
favor retumedlater. This altruism is foundedon
a reciprocal strategy promoted by friendships
and/or cultural groups that make reciprocity
their rule or tradition (Zahn-Waxler,Cummings,
& Iannoty,1991).Division of labor,wheresome
people arehunters,othersare farmers,othersare
cooks, and so on, is more efficient than each
individual in a group trying to do everything.A
division of labor however,increasesdependence
on the mutual exchangeof servicesand goods.
Animals living in social groups are often
capable of extensive social learning. Transgenerational traditions or protocultures (song
protoculturesin birds, food-washingculturesin
monkeys,for example)and evenproper cultures
can develop as a result provided that the repertoire of traditions is sufficiently rich. The elements of culture are transmittedto individuals
and come to reside as long-term memory traces
in their brains and contribute to determining
their behavior. Long-tenn memory traces are
constellationsof synaptic connectionsbetween
neurons modified by learning, social in this
particularcase.Theseelementsof culture,sometimes calledmemes(Dawkins,1989),are packagesof information that multiply through social
iearning and have some superficial similarities
to genes.Genesare also packagesof information but they reproduceby biochemical means.
Memes are engagedin cultural evolution, which
has similarities to biological evolution (Delius,
1991). Through memetically (rather than genetically) drivendispositions,they canbring about
a meme-basedaltruism (for example, among
membersof trans-racialreligions such as Muslims and Catholics) and promote meme-based
aggression(for examplestrife betweenreligious
groups such as Catholics and Lutherans).This
altruism and agonism is of a predominantly
cognitive nature. Indeed, it is argued that the
selectionpressurefor the evolution of primate
intelligencearosemainly from the necessityto
efficiently cope with the complexities of the
socialenvironment.Shiftingalliances,coalitions,
squabbles,and struggleswith or againstgroup
members are usually necessaryto obtain the
best possiblelife quality for oneselfand one's
family.
Learned Motives
Biological motives are conventionally (and not
totally incorrectly) considered as essentially
innate and their development as genetically
driven.However,aswe havealreadyseen,among
many animals motivated behavior is rarely
based on only genetically determinedmechanisms. Learning processesusually refine or even
create part of the mechanisms that control
behavior. The capacity to learn is a genetically
instructedmechanismevolvedto take advantage
of the possibility of improving the behavioral
apparatusof an individual on the basisof experience. Genetically instructed because the synaptic connectivity modifications that underlie
learning and memory formation are biochemical
processesthat requiregeneactivity. Biologically
motivated behavior is often prone to modifications by learning because the satisfaction of
motives is usually associatedwith the activation of a positive hedonic state that is widely
broadcastfrom the midbrain to throughout the
forebrain by a ramified reward circuit using
dopamineas a transmitter.Endorphines,natural
morphine-like neuromodulators,also intervene.
We know about this circuit because animals
and humans with electrodesimplanted in the
relevant brain areas will learn to repetitively
perform some arbitrary responsesuch as lever
pressing to get brief weak electric pulses
deliveredto theseareas.Conversely,the thwarting of motivational goals is associatedwith the
broadcast of a hedonically negative signal
through a punishment system. Both these reinforcementsignalsare strongagentsin bringing
about synapticmodifications.
Apart from primary rewardsand punishments
such as the satisfactionof thirst, the achievement of sexualorgasm,or converselythe pain of
being bitten, initially neutral stimuli can acquire
secondaryreward or punishmentproperties.For
example,animals exposedto a particular sound
before receiving painful electric foot-shocks
learn to flee from that stimulus to avoid being
shocked,and persistin doing so for a long time.
althoughthe shock may have been disconnected
in the meanwhile. They show all the signs of
fear when they hear the soundeven though it is
innocuousby itself. They have acquireda conditioned or learnedemotionalfear responsethat
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International Handbook of Psycholo gy
is sufficient to motivate an escaperesponse.
Some human phobias(of knives or of heights,
for example)are thoughtto be acquiredthrough
such associativelearning (Mook, 1996). Conversely, monkeys who have been taught that
plastic chips thrown into vending machineswill
yield desirabletit-bits suchas peanutsor grapes,
once well trained, will work for hours on end,
pressinga lever for the occasionalreward of
chips. This learnedmotive also causesthem to
hoard chips in particular places and to steal
chips from each other, things that humanstend
to do with money. These learnedmotives may
representincipient cognitive motives, and help
to remind us that in the last analysiscognitive
motives are biological, in the sensethat they are
based on information processingin the brain.
Whether for example the monkeys are consciously aware of the stand-forquality of their
chips or not is debatable.On the other hand,
consciousreasoningis no longer considereda
necessaryattribute of cognitive operations in
humans.We are often only very dimly or not at
all arvareof many of the cognitiveprocessesthat
determineour behavior.
Summary
The biopsychological approach to motivation
assumesthat organismsincluding humans are
primarily biological machinessynthesizedunder
the control of inherited genesand operatingfor
the purposeof thesegenes' survival and reproduction. Behavior must be understoodas fulfllling aspectsof that overall function and as the
product of the physiologicalmachineryof individual organisms that, although grown under
geneticcontrol, is subjectto adaptivemodifications through learning. Through learning, the
machinery is open to the influence of memes,
cultural determinantsof behaviorthat may act to
support the organism's survival and reproduction or that may indeedpromote only their own
persistenceand multiplication. The mechanisms
of the motivation processesunderlying different
sets of behavior are varied and intricate, as
befits the varied and complicatedfunctions they
fulfil.
lI.2
TuB SocropsycHoI-ocrcAIPeRspscrrve
Three sets of phenomena have traditionally been
of concern in the field of human motivation for
personality and social psychologists: (a) the
selection of a certain course of action, (b) the
energizing of the implied behaviors, and (c)
the regulation of these behaviors. In other
words, motivation refers to what type of goals
people choose, and how they go about implementing them: when and how goal-directed
behaviorgetsstarted,is energized,sustained,
and
stopped.Taking this broad and comprehensive
perspective,any field in socialpsychology(e.g.,
helping others,aggression,inter-grouprelations)
may potentially be analyzedfrom a motivational
viewpoint, and this extends not only to how
people behave in social situations,but also to
their social thoughtsand feelings.
The lay conceptof motivation points solely to
energizing. People are referred to as unmotivated when they fail to exert effort and do not
live up to their potential. This narrow definition
of motivation, however, reflects an important
insight. Issuesof what people can do, that is,
their cognitive capabilities and limitations, are
just the starting point of a motivational analysis
which commonly attemptsto discoverthe determinants and processesthat underiie a person's
willingaess to use his or her potential.
The history of motivational theory can be
summarizedin terms of how the basic nafure of
human functioning and development is conceived.Early theoriesportrayedthe human as a
machine-like, reactive organism compelled to
act by internal and/orexternalforcesbeyondour
control (e.g.,instincts,needs,drives,incentives,
andso forth). According to Weiner (1992),prototypical theoriesarethe psychoanalytictheoriesof
Freud, Hull's learning theory, or Lewin's fieldtheoretical approach.These theoriesimply that
if one could just push the right buttons,motivation would result. There is no room for consciousreflection and attemptsat self-regulation.
Instead,motivationalforcestransmittheir energy
outsideof awareness,establishinga stateof balanceor equilibrium (referredto as a.rousalreduction, self-preservation,or needsatisfaction).
More modern theoriesconstruethe human as
God-like (Weiner, 1992). Accordingly, people
are seenas all-just and all-knowing final judges
of their actions.Expectancy-valuetheories(e.g.,
Atkinson, 1957) and attribution theories (e.g.,
Weiner, 1992) are based on this metaphor.
Expectancy-valuetheories assumethat people
choosegoals rationally basedon comprehensive
knowledge about the expected value and the
probability of goal attainment. Attribution
theoriespropose that the motivational determinantsof a person'sbehaviorare the causalexplanationsof prior action outcomes.The human is
seenas an amateurscientist who systematically
exploresthe causesof his or her past behaviors.
The types of causesdiscoveredare expectedto
affect the person's readinessto engagein these
or related behaviorsby influencing affects and
expectations.However, even thoughpeoplemay
be quite knowledgeable, they are imperfect
Motivation
and evaluators(i.e., they only
decision-makers
possessa boundedrationality).
Present-daytheories of motivation go one
step further. Human beings are construed as
flexible strategists.The focus is on the different
tasksa personhasto perform when transforming
wishes into actions (Gollwitzer, 1990; Heckhausen,1991). Accordingly, humans are conceivedof as highly flexible organismswho readily adjust to task demands. When choosing
goals, people apparently try to live up to the
ideal of being all-knowing and ali-just by processing all of the available information and
weighing it impartialiy. However, when the
implementationof an already chosen goal is
at issue, people are determinedto achieve the
desired ends. As a consequence,we become
partial, favoring the implementation of the
chosengoal. The desirability and feasibility of
the chosen goal are seen in the most positive
light, and the focus of attentionis on the chosen
goal. Although this determinationto achievethe
chosengoal invokesa machinemetaphor,recent
research confradicts this image of the goaldriven human. GoaI achievement is rather a
highly strategicundertaking that demandsthe
flexible use of self-regulationskills.
In the following sections,selectedissuesare
presentedwhich characterizepresent-daysocialpsychologicalresearchon motivation. We will
addressresearchon (a) motives and needs,(b)
expectations,attributions, and control beliefs,
and (c) goal settingand goal striving.
Motives and Needs
Research on motives highlights the relation
between motivation and affect (McClelland,
1985). Any motivated behavior is pulled by
the anticipatedaffect associatedwith so-called
natural incentives.Such incentivesare attached
to situations and actions that are important for
the survival of the human species(e.g., affiliation, influence, intellectual mastery). Accordingly, it is proposed that there are a limited
number of natural incentives, each of which
showsan inborn relation to a specific cluster of
emotions.The individual's preferencesfor certain types of incentivesare defined as the individual'smotivedispositions.
Socializationis said to teachwhich situations
are associatedwith what kind of natural incentives and their respectiveaffective experiences.
In addition, people are assumedto acquire the
skills which allow them to successfullyapproach
desired incentives. McClelland distinguishes
three basic groupsof motives: the achievement
motive, the power motive, and the affiliative
motives(i.e., sex, affiliation, and intimacy).As
r99
food is the rewardor incentivefor hunger,so is
improving one's perfonnanceon a given task
the incentive for the achievementmotive. The
incentiveof the power motive is having impact.
control, or influence over another person, a
group, or the world at large. How this impact or
influenceis establisheddependson the individual's socialization.There are the crudeways of
attacking others physically, but also the more
sophisticatedroutes of persuadingor teaching
others. Finally, the incentivesfor the affiliative
motives extend to sexual pleasures (sexual
motive), being together with people (need for
affiliation), and experiencing harmony, concern, and commitment(intimacy motive). All of
these motives may entail a fear or avoidance
component.Trying to meet a standardof excellence may not be motivated solely by hope for
success,
but alsoby fear offailure, and spending
one's sparetime affiliating with others may not
be determinedsolely by the anticipatedpositive
but also by a high fear
feelings of togetherness,
of rejection.
In principle, all humansare seenas possessing the various motives described. There are
vast differences,however, in motive strength.
by exploring both the array
This can be assessed
of situations a person interprets in terms of a
given motive (e.g., a person high in need for
power interpretsall kinds of situationsaspowerrelated) and the intensity of the anticipated
affect associatedwith having acquired respective incentives.Commonly this is done with the
Thematic ApperceptionTest (TAT) which contains pictures of scenesloosely related to the
motive measured.In the AchievementTAT, for
instance,one picture showsan employeeknocking at his boss's door. Participantswho take the
test are instructedto give free reign to fantasy,
talking about what happensin the picture, how
the depicted scenario came about, what the
depicted personsthink, and what will happen
next.
This procedure(often referred to as the operprocedure)is based on the idea
ant assessment
that the presentedpictures will trigger motiverelatedthoughtswhich will then be expressedin
procedures
free fantasy.Respondentassessment
(i.e., the standardself-reportquestionnaires)are
less appropriate,becausethey also reflect the
values people hold with respect to a certain
motive. Most peopleknow that achievement,for
instance, is highly valued in our society, and
many havelearnedto value it highly themselves.
But when it comes to actually behaving in an
achievement-orientedmanner in a given situation, a person who highly values achievement
may neverthelessspontaneouslypick up the
affiliative cues present in this sifuation, and
opt towards enjoying togethernessrather than
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International Handbook of P sttchologv
achieving - becauseher achievementneed is
lower than her need for affiliation. A person's
spontaneousfantasyproductionas stimulatedby
TAT pictures should reflect such preferences,
and therefore should provide a more valid
assessmentof a person's motive dispositions
than do self-reportquestionnaires.
More recentresearchhas attemptedto link the
activation of different motives to different hormonal responses.An activatedpower motive
leadsto an increasein noradrenalineand adrenaline, whereasan activated achievementmotive
is associatedwith an increaseof the hormone
(McClelland, 1995). The
arginine-vasopressin
affiliation motive has been linked to the neurotransmitter dopamine.It is assumedthat each
motive is linked to specifichormonalresponses
that in turn facilitate motive-specificbehaviors.
People's motives have also been observedto
affect the functioning of the immune system.
For example, power-motivatedpeople become
ill more frequently and more severely when
their attempts to acquire social influence are
repeatedlyfrustratedor when they becometargets of influence attemptsby others.
Being high on a certain motive implies a
recurrent concern for acquiring the respective
incentives.Peoplehigh on the affiliation motive
perform affiliative acts frequently and energetically, readily perceiveaffiliative cues in the
environment,and quickly detect affiliative networks.Also, predictionsof the professionalsuccessof managersare strikingly accurate,particularly if one considersthe motive dispositionsin
achievement (high), power (high), and affiliation (low) in concert. However, attempts to
predict behaviors from motives commonly fail
when engagementin thesebehaviorsis basedon
consciousreflection.When it comesto choosing, betweencoursesof action,tasksof differing
difficulty, or persistingon a given task or leaving the field, people deliberateon the feasibility
and desirability of the alternative courses of
action. As it turns out, people do not determine
the feasibility and desirabilityof an action solely
on the basis of their motive dispositions,but
also by ttrinking abouttheir skills, the intricacies
of the situation, and the expectedvalue of the
respectivecou-rseof action.
Expectations, Attributions,
Control Beliefs
and
One of the first attempts to integrate these
aspectsof motivation was made by Atkinson
(1957) in his risk-taking model. He proposed
that the subjectiveprobability of successand the
task's incentive value conjointly affect task
choice, both variables being influenced by the
perceived difficulty of the task. Whereaseasy
tasks lead to a high subjective probability of
success(direct function),they also possesslow
incentive value (inversefunction) becausethe
anticipatedaffectassociated
with success(pride)
is lowestfor easytasks.The reverseis assumed
for difficult tasks.Atkinson suggestedthat multiplying probability of successand incentivevalue
will give a good estimate of whether a person
will chooseto work on a task, especiaiiywhen
the obtainedscore is weighted by the approach
and avoidancecomponentsof his or her achievement motive (hope for success and fear of
failure, respectively).The prediction is that primarily success-motivated
individualswill choose
tasks of medium difficulty, whereas failuremotivated people prefer easy or very difficult
tasks. Researchsupportsthe model for predictions on task choice, but the model fails to
account for the quantity and quality of task
performanceonce people have startedto work
on the chosentasks.
Elaborationsof the model(Heckhausen,
1991)
added further expectation-relatedconceptsand
differentiate various aspects of the incentive
value of task performance..Theincentive value
of task performanceis not simply determined
by anticipatedpride and shame.Positive selfevaluations,praise from significantothers (e.g.,
teachers,parents), the instrumentality of task
performanceto super-ordinatelong-term goals,
and extrinsic side-effects(e.g.,when an achievement task has affiliative benefits)must also be
considered.In addition, Heckhausenpoints out
that even if there are many potential positive
incentives,one will only be motivated to strive
for them if one expects that (1) the behaviors
one is capable of performing will lead to successfultask performance,and (2) successfultask
performance will lead to the incentives (i.e.,
possesses
high instrumentality).
There is a further type of incentivethat needs
to be taken into consideration.Certainbehaviors
may possessan incentive value in and of themselves. This is most apparent when people
fiercely engagein activities(e.g.,hang-gliding)
that serveno ostensiblepurpose.The associated
flow-experienceand completeabsorptionmakes
people seek such activities for no other reason
but performing the activity. This is difficult to
interpretin terms of expectancy-value
theorizing
which claims that people engagein action to
achievecertain ends that are a consequenceof
having actedsuccessfully.
Atkinson's model has also been elaborated
by attribution theorists (Weiner, 1992) who
attemptedto understandchangesin expectations
and incentive value in terms of the attributions
madefor past performances.Successand failure
may be interpretedas causedby internal (e.g.,
20r
Motivation
ability, effort) or external factors (e.g., task
difflculty, luck). Ability and task difficulty are
more stable causalfactors than effort and luck.
Weiner shows that the stability of successor
failure attributionsaffects people's expectations
of successful task performance (stabie attdbutionslead to high or iow expectations,respectively), whereasthe internality of performance
outcome attributions relates to affect (internal
attributions produce more pride or shäme,
respectively).
Weiner also discovered that the approach
componentof the achievementmotive (hopefor
success)is associatedwith attributing failure to
luck or lack of effort and successto ability,
whereasthe avoidancecomponentis linked to
attributing failure to lack of ability and success
to luck. Researchon aggressionalso points to
the importanceof attributionsfor people'sreadiness to retaliate.'Our anger and readinessto
retaliate in responseto the aggressionof others
are less related to the damagethat was done to
us, but ratherto our interpretationof the aggressive act as intentional.Similarly, attributionsalso
affect whether we help people in need. Interpreting the plight of victims as causedby their
own irresponsiblebehaviorsleads to less helping as comparedwith causal interpretationsof
their plight in terms of uncontrollable,external
factors.
People develop personalstyles of explaining
positive and negativeevents(Seligman,1990).
An optimistic attributionalstyle is the tendency
to make more stable and global attributionsfor
positive than for negative events, leading to
expectationsthat positive events will be more
persistentand pervasivethan negativeevents.If,
in addition, positive events are attributed to
internal causesmore than are negative events,
strengthenedself-esteemresults. An optimistic
attributional style predicts success at school,
work, and sports,as well as physical and mental
health(e.g.,lack of depression).
Recognition of the motivationai importance
of expectationsand attributionswas the starting
point of the cognitive revolution in the psychology of motivation. The revolution has progressed and has inffoduced further cognitive
conceptssuch as control beliefs and goals. The
most prominent theoretical explication of control beliefs is Bandura's (1997) self-efficacy
theory. Self-efficacious individuals hold the
firm belief that they possessthe potentiai to
executethe kinds of behaviorsthat a given task
demands.Peopleacquirethis belief by reflecting
on their own relevantpast behaviors,observing
the behaviorsof similar others,being evaluated
by significantothers(e.g.,teachers),and observing their own physiologicalreactionswhen challengedby a given task.High self-efficacybeliefs
are associatedwith choosing aspiring goals,
exerting strong efforts to attain thesegoals, and
persistingin the faceof obstacles
andhindrances.
Goal Setting
Determinantsof Goal Setting
Researchon the determinantsof goal setting
distinguishesbetween assignedgoals and selfset goals.Whetherpeopleadoptgoals assigned
by others depends on variables that facilitate
persuasion(e.g., the legitimacy and trustworthiness of the person who assigns the goal and
whether the recipient managesto integrate the
assignedgoal with the goals he or she already
holds). The adoptionof self-setgoals depends
on the perceived desirability and feasibility of
anticipatedgoal attainment,judged in comparison to potential alternative goals. Moreover,
peoplediffer in their preferencefor settinggoals
with certain structuralfeaturesor contents.For
example,peoplewho generallythink about their
actions in concrete versus abstract terms also
prefer to set themselvesconcreteversusabstract
goals, respectively.People who construe their
self as an ideal (which they intrinsically desire
to attain) set goalswith a positive outcomefocus
(i.e., goals focusing on establishingand keeping
positive outcomes),whereaspeople who construe their self as an ought which they feel
compelled to reach set goals with a negative
outcomefocus (i.e., goalsthat focus on avoiding
and getting rid of negativeoutcomes).
For goal settingin the achievementdomain it
matters what kind of implicit theories people
hold on the nature of ability. If people believe
that ability is fixed andcannoteasily be changed,
they chooseperformancegoals(i.e., goalsgeared
at trying to find out through past performance
how capableone is). If, however,peoplebelieve
that ability can be improved by learning, they
chooselearninggoals(i.e., goals gearedat trying to learn more abouton how one can successfully carry out the task at hand).
People's needs, wishes, and higher order
goals also influence the type of goals that are
set. Once specifichigher order goals are formed
(e.g., to becomea physician),the latter determine the contents of lower order goals (i.e.,
goals describingwhat has to be done to achieve
thehigherordergoal).Moreover,a person'sconcept of what he or she could possibly become
(i.e., the possibleself provides the individual
with thematicconceptionsof what future selves
he may strive for. Finally, the contentsof goals
tend to reflect people's needs. For example,
strong autonomy,competence,and social integration needslead to fewer materialistic goals
and promote self-realizationgoals.
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Intetnational Handbook of P sychology
For applied psychologists who attempt to
strongly commit people to beneficialbehavioral
Goal settingis basedon reflectiveand reflexive
goals (e.g.,health goals, academicgoals,interprocesses.With respectto reflectiveprocesses, personalgoals), these
findings imply that alon-e
various ways of goal setting can be differwith promotingpeople'sconfidencein their own
entiated(Oettingen,L99l). First, rhe heightened capabilities,making them mentaliy
contrasttheir
senseof efficacy that is basedon having sucpositive fantasiesabout the future with negative
cessfuily attained a prior goal stimulates the
aspects of the impeding reality is critical.
setting of ever more challenginggoals. Second,
Merely encouragingpeople to 'think positive'
people show a greater readinessto set themabout their future does not lead to strong goal
selvesgoals when they have exhaustivelydelibcommitments, even if expectationsof success
erated the desirability and feasibility of their
are high. Moreover, the contrastingprocedure
wishes(i.e.,potentialgoals).Third, whenpeople
helps people to refrain from setting themselves
are lured into planning the implementationof a
goals in domainswhere expectationsof success
potential goal, they tend to commit themselves are low, as contrastingleads to recognizingthe
to it.
probability of success.Peoplewho are caughtup
Finally, recent research demonstratesthat
in perseveringfantasies about a desired future
feasibility of goal attainment is not always
or in perseveringruminations about a negative
reflectedin people's goal setting,in the sense reality ignore the feasibility of potential goals
that only goals with high probability of success and thus are at risk to commit themselvesto
are chosen (Oettingen,2000). When people
goals that cannotbe attained.
positively fantasizeabout a desiredfuture outGoals may also become reflexively activated
come, they set themselvesgoals independentof
outsideof awareness(Bargh & Chartrand,1999).
perceived feasibility. In other words, people
Strong mental links develop betweenthe cogniwho indulge in positive fantasiesabout desired
tive representationsof situations and the goals
future outcomes commit themselvesto goals
that peoplechronically pursuewithin them.As a
irrationally; they are too committedwhen probconsequenceof this repeated and consistent
abilities of successare low, and not committed
pairing in the past, such goalsbecomeautomatienough when probabilities of successare high.
cally activatedwhen the personentersthe releSuch irrational goal commitmentsare also obvant situation. The automatically activatedgoal
servedwith people who are caught up in rumithen guides behavior, without the individual
nations about aspectsof the presentreality that
choosing or intending the respective goalstand in the way of reachingone's fantasies. directedline of action.Therehasbeena reflective
When people are mentally contrasting their
choice of the goal in the past,but this conscious
positive fantasies with the impeding negative
choice is now bypassed. If, for example, a
reality, however, their goal setting strictly
person has repeatedly and consistently chosen
reflects perceivedfeasibility. Strong goal comsocial gatherings(e.g.,parties)to discusswork
mitments emergewhen the perceivedfeasibility
problems, the contextual cues associatedwith
is high, and no goal commitmentat all is found
parties will sooner or later trigger behaviors
when the perceivedfeasibility is low.
servingthis goal outside of awareness.
Accordinglj, when the perceived feasibility
of goal attainmentis high, the mental conffastGoal Striving
ing of positive fantasiesabout the future with
negative aspectsof the impeding reality is an
Goal Content Effects
effective route to creating sffong goal commitments.For instance,when an overweightperson
Successfulgoal striving is determinedby how
who is confident of her ability to lose weight
goalsare framed and what contentsthey specify.
contrasts his or her positive fantasies about
The following structural features of goals are
successfulweight loss with his or her thoughts
important.Challenginggoalsthat are spelledout
about the present negative reality (e.g., bad
in specificterms lead to a higher attainmentrate
eating habits, the hardships of exercising), a
than modest specific goals or challenging but
stronggoal commitmentcanbe expected.Strong
vague ('do your best!') goals. Proximal goais
goal commitments will not occur, however,
that relateto what the individual doesin the near
when people (evenhighly confidentpeople) fail
presentor will do in the future are superior to
to conüast their positive fantasies about the
distai goals that point far into the future. App*desired future with the negative reality and
ently, proximal goais allow for more performinstead mentally indulge in their desired future
ance feedback and make it easier to monitor
or are caught up in ruminations on negative
progresstowards the goai. Goals with a positive
aspectsof the presentreality (thus losing sight
outcomefocus produce a promotion orientation
of their desiredfuture).
geared at achievement,which facilitates goal
Processesof Goal Setting
Motivation
pursuit,whereasgoalswith a negativeoutcome
focus producea preventionorientationgearedat
acquiringsecurity,which hampersgoal pursuit.
Learning goals lead to better performancesthan
performancegoals, as the former allow for a
more effective coping with failure than the latter
by making people view set-backsas cues to
Accordingly,
focuson new behavioralstrategies.
becomes
oriented
towards
mastering
behavior
the causes of the set-backs,which ultimately
furthers goal attainment.Performancegoals are
lessdetrimental,however,when they are framed
as approachgoals (e.9., I want to get good
grades)as comparedwith avoidancegoals (e.g.,
I do not want to get bad grades).
Moreover, the thematic content of goals
matters. Goals covering issues of autonomy,
competence,and social integration are said to
further intrinsic goal pursuit and thus lead to
better performancein the senseof greater creativity, higher cognitive flexibility. greaterdepth
of information processing,and more effective
coping with failure. The side effects of such
goal pursuit are positive well-being and higher
life satisfaction. People who set themselves
goals such as making money,becomingfamous,
and acquiring high stafus,experiencea reduced
level of well-being as comparedwith goal contents such as cultivating one's relationshipsto
friends or becoming active in community services. This is particularly true for individuals
who feel a strong self-efficacy, implying that
peoplewho successfullyimplementmaterialistic
goais are particuiarly at risk for low well-being.
Holding a high proportion of achievementand
power goals is also linked to reduced wellbeing, whereas a high proportion of intimacy
goals enhancesit. The effects of goals on subjective well-being are also influenced by how
well people's goal contentsmatch the motives
of achievement,affiliation, power, and intimacy.
People with strong achievement and power
motives and goals of the same theme as well
as people with strong affiliation and intimacy
motives and goals of the same theme report
higher emotional well-being than people whose
motives and goals are mismatched.
Planning
Experiencetells us that it is often a long way
from goal settingto goal attainment.Having set
a goal is just a first step,commonly followed by
a host of implemental problems that need
to be successfullysolved. These problems are
manifold and pertain to initiating goal-directed
actions and bringing them to a successfulending. To solve theseproblems effectively a personmay plan how shewantsto attain the chosen
goal.
203
Researchon implemental mind-sets (Gollwitzer, 1990) has shown that planning the
implementationof a set goal createsa cognitive
orientation that facilitates getting started with
goal-directedactions. People with an impiemental mind-setbecomeclosed minded in the
sense that they are no longer distracted by
irrelevant information. They are, however, very
effective in processing information related to
the implementation of set goals. Moreover,
desirability-relatedinformation is processedpartially, favoring pros over cons, and anaiysis of
feasibility-related information favors illusory
optimism. This optimism extendsto the illusion
of control over behavioraloutcomes,a person's
self-conceptof possessingimportant skiils and
aptitudes,and to their perceivedvulnerability to
both conffollableand uncontrollablerisks. These
featuresof the implementalmind-setfavor goal
attainmentas they allow the individual to effectively cope with problems of goal striving such
as being distracted by irrelevancies, doubting
the attractivenessof the pursuedgoal, or being
pessimisticabout its feasibility.
Set goalscommit peopleto attainingthe specified future (outcomeor behavior),but they do not
commit people to when, where, and how they
want to attain it. Such additional commitments
can be added,however,by planningone's goal
pursuit via forming so-called implementation
intentions that take the form of if I encounter
situationx, I intend to perform the goal-directed
behaviory' (Gollwitzer,1999). Difficult to reach
goals (e.g., healthy eating) benefit greatly from
being furnishedwith implementationintentions.
As implementation intentions spell out links
between situational cues and goal-directed
behavior, by forming such intentions people
passon the control of goal-directedbehavior to
environmentalcues.This facilitatesthe initiation
of goal-directedactions. First, the mental representationsof the specified situational cues
become highly activated, making these cues
more accessible.Situational cues specified in
implementationintentions are thus more easily
detected,remembered,andmore readily attended
to than comparablenon-intendedsituations.Second, action initiation becomesautomated.Goaldirected behaviors specified in implementation
intentions are initiated immediately and effortlessly in the presenceof the critical situations.
Even patientswith frontai lobe injuries (who are
known to be plaguedby deficient consciousand
effortful conffol of behavior)benefitfrom implementation intentions. But it is not only the
problem of action initiation that is amelioratedby implementationintentions.Resistanceto
temptation,fighting bad habits, and escapingthe
204
Internationctl Handbook of P sychology
unwantedinfluencesof competing goals activatedoutsideof the person'sawareness
can also
be facilitated.
Next to forming implementation intentions
there are other effective forms of planning. The
task of planning can be approachedin a more
reflective way as is entailed in mental simulations that explore possible routes to achieving
one'sgoal(so-calledprocesssimulations;Taylor,
Pham,Rivkin, & Armor, 1998).If suchprocess
simulations are applied repeatedly,they further
goal attainment,such as achieving good grades
in academicexams.Apparently,repeatedmental
simulations of how to achieve the soal also
result in firm plans.
Action Control Strategies
Goal attainmentis often hamperedby competing
goals.The issueof competinggoal pursuitshas
been paid particular attention in theorizing on
action control (Kuhl & Beckmann,1994).Successful goal attainment implies that a cuffent
guiding goal has to be shieldedfrom competing
goals(e.g.,the goal of makinga phonecall from
the competing goal of tidying up one's messy
desk). A number of different, but compatible
control strategiesaredifferentiated,suchasattentionai control, emotional control, motivational
control, and environmental control. Through
environmentalcontrol, for example,the individual prevents the derailing of an ongoing goal
pursuit by removing competing temptationsor
enticementsfrom the situation in which goal
pursuit is to occur.
Whether and how effectively these strategies
are useddependson the cunent control mode of
the individual. An action-orientedperson concentrateson the planning and initiation of goaldirected action, respondsflexibly to contextual
demands,and usescontrol strategieseffectively.
Things are quite different with a state-oriented
person as he or she cannot disengage from
incompletegoalsand is thus caughtup in uncontrollable perseverationof thoughts related to
aversiveexperiencesor in dysfunctionalthoughts
about future successes.Action- and stateorientation may be induced by situational variables(e.g.,a surprisingevent,persistentfailure),
but are also foundedin a personaldisposition.
Recent research on state orientation as a
personality attribute has discovered a further
volitional handicapcalled self-infiltration. Stateorientedindividualsreadily misperceiveassigned
goals as self-generated,and the degreeof such
false self-ascriptions
is closely associatedwith
reduced enactmentof self-chosenas compared
with assignedgoais.Thesefindingshave stimulated a new theoreticai perspective on action
orientationversusstateorientation,basedon the
assumptionthat the volitional control of action
is a result of the cooperationof various subsystems(i.e.,intentionmemory,extensionmemory, intuitivebehaviorcontrol,and objectrecognition). Action orientationversusstateorientation
are parametersthat modulate the cooperation
betweenthesesystemsthus leading to different
kinds of action control with different outcomes.
Successfullyresolving goal conflicts is not
only an issue of shielding an ongoing goal
pursuit from competinggoal pursuits (Cantor &
Fleeson, 1994). There is also the possibility of
creativeintegtations,wherenew goalsareformed
which serveboth of the conflictinggoals (e.g.,
affiliation and achievementgoals can be reconciled by taking on very important or responsible
communal roles). Moreover, in an attempt to
meet higher order goals (e.g., graduatingfrom
high school)peoplecan strategicallylink behavioral goals that on the surfaceappearin conflict
(e.g., when being with people and studying
are reconciled by studying in groups). Finally,
people may always resort to disengagingfrom
one of the conflictinggoals (e.g., by using the
mental contrastingproceduredescribedabove).
Mobilization of Effort
A different line of researchis concernedwith
how people avoid failures through increased
effort (Wright, 1996). A person's readinessto
exert effort turns out to be directly determined
by the perceiveddifficulty of the task at hand.
As the perceiveddifficulty increasesso doesthe
person's effort expenditure,unless the task is
recognizedas unsolvable.But there is a second
limit to the linear increaseof effort expenditure
in responseto heightenedtask difficulty: a person's potentialmotivation.
Potential motivation is determinedby needrelated variables (i.e., strength of the related
needor higher order goal, the incentive value of
the task, and the instrumentalityof task completion for need satisfactionor attainment of the
higher order goal). If the level of potential
motivation is low, people do not find it worthwhile to extend more effort when an easy task
becomes more difficult. This is because the
upper limit of effort expenditure(suggestedby
the potentialmotivation) is low and thusreached
quickly. If potential motivation is high, however, an increase in difficulty is matched by
investing more effort, and this responsiveness
holds up to high levels of difficulty. This is
becausethe upper limit of effort expenditure
(suggestedby the potential motivation) is high
and thus reachedonly after much effort.
Motivation
205
comesto 'Be-goals'that specifya desiredidentity (such as being a good parent, an excellent
When failure occurs people do not give up on
scientist,or a very reiigious person)there are
their goal pursuitsbut experiencea discrepancy many different, alternative ways to indicate to
that needsto be ciosed.In Bandura's(1997)
oneselfandothersthat one possesses
the aspired
theory,goalshaveno motivationalconsequences identity. If one has failed to attain an indicator
per se. They oniy specify the conditionsthat
or has discovered that an indicator is out of
allow for a positive or negativeself-evaluation. reach(e.g.,importantdiscoveriesfor a scientist),
If the set goal is attainedthroughone's actions, one can compensateby striving for alternative
a positive self-evaluationprevails;whereasstayindicators (e.g., supervisingstudents).People
ing below one's goals leadsto a negativeselfwho havesetthemselvesself-defininggoalsand
evaluation.The individual thus is seenas pushed
still feel committed to attain them readily
by the negativeself-evaluationassociatedwith
respondto experiencesof falling short with such
the discrepancy,and pulled by the anticipated
compensatoryefforts.
positive self-evaluationthat is intrinsically linked
to closing the gap betweenthe statusquo and
Summary
the goal (i.e., the performancestandard).This
implies that goais stimulate effortful action
perspectives
Social-psychological
on motivation
toward goal attainmentonly when peoplerecogfirst
focused
on
identifying
the
determinants
of
nrze a discrepancybetweenthe statusquo and
motivation.
This
search
has
moved
from
motives,
the set goal. Bandurathereforeproposesgiving
needs,and incentivesto more cognitive determifrequentfeedbackas a powerful meansof stimunants,such as expectations,attributions,control
lating goal pursuit.However,peopleareexpected
beliefs, and goals. With the recent focus on
to engagein efforts to reduce the experienced
goals, the issue of self-regulation of behavior
discrepancyonly when they feel self-efficacious,
has becomeprevalent.The human is conceived
Carverand Scheier(1998)proposea different
as a flexible strategist.This concept leads to a
discrepancy reduction theory of goal pursuit.
focus on the analysisof reflective and reflexive
Based on cyberneticcontrol theory, the central
psychologicalprocessesthat guide the successconceptualunit of their analysisis the negative
ful attainmentof desiredoutcomes.
feedbackloop. Carver and Scheierhighlight the
hierarchical organization of goal pursuit and
thus assumea cascadingloop structure. GoalAcrNowr-BDGEMENTS
directed behavior is usually regulated at the
middle level ('Do-goals') with action at higher
J. D. D. thanks Dr. M. Siemann (Konstanz)
levels ('Be-goals') suspended
until the individfor much help during the preparation of the
ual becomesself-aware.When discrepancieson
the 'Be-level' or the 'Do-level' are discovered, manuscript.
lower level goalsor behaviorsgealedat discrepancy reduction are triggered.
People are assumedto consult their outcome
Resounce RBpeBBNcps
expectations when discrepancy reduction is
hampered;in case of high expectationspeople
Bandura, A. (1997). Self-fficacy: The exercise of
keep trying, whereaslow expectationslead to
control. New York: Freeman,
giving up. A positive affective responseas a
Carver, C. S., & Scheier, M. F. (1998). On the selfconsequenceof goal attainmentis not assumed,
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nor is the detectionof a discrepancyassumedto
University Press.
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Gollwitzer, P. M., & Bargh, J. A. (Eds.). (1996). The
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Heckhausen, H. (1989). Motivation und Handeln.
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ii
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