Evolutionary Game Theory
May 2009
Course Description:
This course is research oriented.
The standard non-cooperative game theory assumes that
1. All players are fully rational: know all details of the game,
2. The game is played just once.
In this course, we will talk about Evolutionary Game Theory.
Evolutionary game theory assumes that
1. There is a large population of non-fully rational agents,
2. The game is played over and over again,
3. Some agents are drawn at random each period to play the game.
There are several important tasks for evolutionary game theory. Evolutionary game theory
•
provides a link between Economics and other Social Science, for example Biology;
•
helps to explain boundedly rational individual behavior;
•
helps to select a Nash equilibrium, if there are many Nash equilibria in the game.
Main books:
Jorgen W. Weibull (1995), Evolutionary Game Theory. MIT Press.
Young, P. (1998): Individual Strategy and Social Structure. Princeton University Press.
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Preliminary Schedule
1.
Jorgen Weibull (2002): “WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED FROM EVOLUTIONARY GAME
THEORY SO FAR?” Working paper, http://www2.hhs.se/personal/Weibull/pdf/what4.pdf
2.
Preliminaries: Game Theory
Jorgen W. Weibull (1995), Evolutionary Game Theory. MIT Press.
3.
Evolutionary Stable Strategies
Jorgen W. Weibull (1995), Evolutionary Game Theory. MIT Press.
4.
Mark E. Schaffer (1989): “Are Profit-Maximisers the Best Survivors?” Journal of Economic
Behavior and Organization, 12, 29-45.
Mark E. Schaffer (1988): “Evolutionarily Stable Strategies for a Finite Population and a
Variable Contest Size,” Journal of Theoretical Biology, Vol. 132, No. 4, 469-478.
John Duffy, Alexander Matros, and Ted Temzelides “Competitive Behavior in Market Games:
Evidence and Theory,” Mimeo, University of Pittsburgh.
5.
Hehenkamp, B., W. Leininger, and A. Possajennikov (2004): “Evolutionary equilibrium in
Tullock contests: spite and overdissipation,” European Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 20,
1045–1057.
Tullock, G (1980): “Efficient rent-seeking,” in J.M. Buchanan, R.D. Tollison and G. Tullock,
Towards a theory of the rent-seeking society (Texas A&M University Press), 97-112.
6.
Kandori, M., G. Mailath, and R. Rob (1993): “Learning, Mutation and Long Run Equilibria in
Games,” Econometrica, 61, 29-56.
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7.
Young, P. (1993): “The evolution of conventions,” Econometrica, 61, 57-84.
Young, P. (1998): Individual Strategy and Social Structure. Princeton University Press.
8.
Ellison, G. (1993): “Learning, local interaction and coordination,” Econometrica, 61, 10471072.
Glenn Ellison (2000): “Basins of Attraction, Long Run Equilibria, and the Speed of Step-byStep Evolution,” Review of Economic Studies, 67 (1), 17-45.
9.
Bergstrom, T. and Stark, O. “How Altruism Can Prevail in an Evolutionary Environment.”
American Economic Review, May 1993 (Papers and Proceedings), 83(2), 149-55.
Eshel I., L. Samuelson and A. Shaked (1998): “Altruists, Egoists, and Hooligans in a Local
Interaction Model,” The American Economic Review 88(1), 157-179.
Bergstrom, Theodore C. “Evolution of Social Behavior: Individual and Group Selection.”
Journal of Economic Perspective, Spring 2002, 16(2), 67-88.
Matros, A. “Altruistic Versus Rational Behavior in a Public Good Game,” Mimeo,
University of Pittsburgh.
10.
Robson, A., and F. Vega-Redondo (1996): “Efficient Equilibrium Selection in Evolutionary
Games with Random Matching,” Journal of Economic Theory, 70, 65-92.
Josephson, J., and A. Matros (2004): “Stochastic Imitation in Finite Games,” Games and
Economic Behavior, Volume 49, Issue 2, 244-259.
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Additional Reading:
Alchian, A. (1950): “Uncertainty, evolution and economic theory,” Journal of Political
Economy, 58, 211-221.
Binmore, K. (1987a): “Modeling Rational Players I,” Economics and Philosophy, 3, 9-55.
Binmore, K. (1987b): “Modeling Rational Players II,” Economics and Philosophy, 4, 179214.
Friedman, M. (1953): Essays in Positive Economics. The University of Chicago Press.
Fudenberg, D., and D. Levine (1998): The Theory of Learning in Games. MIT Press.
Hofbauer, S., and K. Sigmund (1998): Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics.
Cambridge University Press.
Hurkens, S. (1995): “Learning by Forgetful Players,” Games and Economic Behavior, 11,
304-329.
Maynard Smith, J. (1982): Evolution and the Theory of Games. Cambridge University
Press.
Maynard Smith, J., and G. Price (1972): “The Logic of Animal Conflict,” Nature, 246, 15-18.
Samuelson, L. (1997): Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection. MIT Press.
Vega-Redondo, F. (1996): Evolution, Games, and Economic Behavior. Oxford University
Press.
Young, P. (1998): Individual Strategy and Social Structure. Princeton University Press.
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